Senior Leader Perspective

Introduction to Indo-Pacific Security Challenges ❘ 3

ADM Phil Davidson, US Navy

Features

A Pathway toward Enhancing the US Air Force–Indian Air Force 

Partnership and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific Region ❘ 11

Stephen F. Burgess

Preparing for the Last War

Insurgency in the Era of Great Power Competition ❘ 47

Karl Umbrasas

The 2016 European Global Strategy, European Union Defense Integration, and 

Asian–European Security Cooperation in a Declining Multilateral 

International Order ❘ 67

David J. Garcia Cantalapiedra

Critical Review Essay

Anatomy of Failure 

Why America Loses Every War It Starts ❘ 80

Manabrata Guha

Book Review 

Asia-Pacific Security: An Introduction

by Joanne Wallis and Andrew Carr, eds. ❘ 103

Jieruo Li, PhD candidate, Reviewer

SPRING 2019

Volume 2, No. 1

The AIR FORCE

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs
Spring 2019 | 2

Gp Capt Nasim Abbas

Instructor, Air War College

Pakistan Air Force

Dr. Sascha-Dominik “Dov” Bachmann

Assoc. Prof. & Director, Centre of Conflict, Rule of Law and 

Society

Bournemouth University (United Kingdom)

Dr. Lewis Bernstein

Historian, retired

United States Army

Dr. Paul J. Bolt

Professor, Political Science

US Air Force Academy

CDR John F. Bradford, USN

President

Yokosuka Council on Asia–Pacific Studies

Dr. Sean Braniff

Assistant Professor, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Air University

Dr. Stephen F. Burgess

Professor, Air War College

Air University

Dr. Chester B. Cabalza

Vice President, Center of Research and Strategic Studies

Development Academy of the Philippines

Mr. Eric Chan

Policy Analyst 

United States Air Force

Dr. Adam Claasen

Senior Lecturer in History

Massey University (New Zealand)

CDR Mark R. Condeno

Philippine Coast Guard

Dr. Zack Cooper

Senior Fellow for Asian Security

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dr. Ian C. Forsyth

Lead Intelligence Analyst

Fulcrum, LLC

Dr. Jai Galliott

Defense Analyst, Cyber Security

Australian Defence Force Academy

Maj Jessica Gott

Strategy Officer

Headquarters, USAF

Dr. Manabrata Guha

Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies

Ministry of Defence (India)

Dr. Achala Gunasekara-Rockwell

Indian Languages and Cultural Advisor

University of Alabama at Birmingham

Dr. Akhlaque Haque

Professor of Political Science and Public Administration

University of Alabama at Birmingham

Dr. B. M. Jain

Professor, Political Science and International Relations

Editor-in-Chief, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs

Dr. Jessica Jordan

Assistant Professor, Air Force Culture and Language Center

Air University

Mr. Chris Kolakowski

Director

The General Douglas MacArthur Memorial

Dr. Carlo Kopp

Lecturer

Monash University (Australia)

Dr. Amit Kumar

President

AAA International Security Consultants

Lt Col Scott D. McDonald, USMC

Military Professor

Daniel K. Inouye Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney

Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute

Air University

Dr. Satoru Nagao

Visiting Fellow

Hudson Institute

Dr. James E. Platte

Assistant Professor, Center for Unconventional 

Weapons Studies

Air University

Dr. Jim Rolfe

Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies

Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand)

Mr. Richard M. Rossow

Senior Adviser and Wadhwani Chair in US–India 

Policy Studies

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Maj Gary J. Sampson, USMC

Foreign Area Officer, Northeast Asia

PhD Student, Fletcher School, Tufts University

Commodore Abhay Kumar Singh, retired

Research Fellow

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (India)

Dr. Bawa Singh

Assistant Professor, Global Relations

Central University of Punjab (India)

Mr. Daniel K. Taylor

Senior Defense Intelligence Analyst for China

Asia–Pacific Regional Center, Defense Intelligence Agency

Dr. Lavanya Vemsani

Professor, History and Religious Studies

Shawnee State University

Mr. Keith Webster

Senior Vice President for Defense and Aerospace

US–India Strategic Partnership Forum

Brig Gen Craig D. Wills, USAF

Director of Strategy, Plans, and Programs

Pacific Air Forces

Dr. Roland B. Wilson

Program Coordinator & Professor of Conflict Analysis 

& Resolution

George Mason University, Korea Campus

Editorial Advisors

Lt Col Darin Gregg, Director, Air University Press

Gen Herbert J. “Hawk” Carlisle, USAF, Retired; President and CEO, National Defense Industrial Association

Amb. Daniel Shields, Department of State, Retired

Dr. Matthew C. Stafford, Chief Academic Officer, Air Education and Training Command

Col Jeff Donnithorne, USAF, PhD, Chief Academic Officer, Air University

Reviewers
Spring 2019 | 3

Senior Leader Perspective

Introduction to Indo-Pacific 

Security Challenges

ADM Phil Davidson, US Navy

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA) are those of 

the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, 

Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This 

article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the JIPA requests a courtesy line.

Thank you, Peter, for the kind introduction—I appreciate that—and thank you for the invite to speak here at the Forum. On behalf of everyone here, 

Peter, thank you for the addition of the McCain Award added to the Forum’s 

program. It is a wonderful way to remember the Senator and his contribution to 

the Forum.1

I’m grateful for the opportunity to talk to you this morning about the Indo-Pacific 

region. While that might seem like half a world away—and it quite literally is from 

here in Halifax—I think the security and prosperity of all of our countries depend 

on the stability of the Indo-Pacific.

 Of course, there is plenty of activity ongoing in the Indo-Pacific just this past 

week. ASEAN has just completed, and APEC will shortly.2 And I think these are 

indicative of both the pace and the power of the region. Moreover, it makes clear 

that through the remainder of the twenty-first century, the Indo-Pacific will be the 

engine that drives global economic development, and it is in all of our interests 

that the international community play an active role in preserving the rules-based 

international order.

If you’re not already sold on the economic potential of the Indo-Pacific, consider 

the following:

•	 The Indo-Pacific is home to 10 of the 20 fastest-growing economies;

•	 The Indo-Pacific currently contains over a third of global GDP and 60 percent 

of the global GDP growth;

•	 By 2050, the Indo-Pacific is projected to account for over 55 percent of global 

GDP, largely due to a growing middle class;

•	 Speaking of which, 87 percent of the next one billion middle-class entrants 

* Keynote speech by ADM Phil Davidson, commander, US Indo-Pacific Command, delivered at Halifax International Security 

Forum, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 17 November 2018.
4 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

will come from the Indo-Pacific;

•	 And by 2030, 65 percent of the world’s middle class will reside in the IndoPacific, representing an unrivaled amount of purchasing power.

In short, the potential markets and the economic prospects present opportunities that all can benefit from as long as all nations, large and small, work together.

This is where the United States’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy comes into play.

You may recall, President Trump announced a vision—or end-state—for a “Free 

and Open Indo-Pacific” last year when he traveled to the region for APEC, the 

East Asia Summit, and a number of bilateral discussions.

But what does a Free and Open Indo-Pacific mean? It may seem self-evident, 

but let me offer a few thoughts on what we at USINDOPACOM believe when we 

say Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

We mean Free both in terms of security—being free from coercion by other 

nations—and in terms of values and political systems.

There is agreement that free societies respect individual rights and liberties, to 

include the freedom to openly practice their religion; free societies promote good 

governance; and free societies adhere to the shared values of the United Nations 

Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

I also think Free means nations do not have to choose who they trade with and 

who they partner with because of fear or coercion.

An Open Indo-Pacific means we believe all nations should enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which our nations and economies depend.

An Open Indo-Pacific includes open investment environments, transparent 

agreements between nations, protection of intellectual property rights, fair and 

reciprocal trade—all of which are essential for people, goods, and capital to move 

across borders for the shared benefit of all.

Now, while the clarity of this vision is new, the core elements of a Free and 

Open Indo-Pacific are not—in fact, this is how the US has approached the region 

throughout our 240-plus-year history.

We have advanced this vision for more than two centuries, because we, like 

nearly all of you here, are a Pacific nation.

American businesses have traded in Asia since the eighteenth century.

We have five Pacific states: Hawaii, California, Washington, Oregon, and 

Alaska.
Spring 2019 | 5

Senior Leader Perspective

We also have Pacific territories on both sides of the International Date Line, like 

Guam, Wake, and the Northern Marianas. . . . and we have Compacts of Free Association with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.

Americans fought and bled on these lands, not to conquer them, but to liberate them.

Then, together with partners and allies, we helped rebuild Japan, pushed back 

aggression in South Korea, and helped create the security architecture of the postwar era.

Five of the United States’s seven major security alliances are in the Indo-Pacific, 

including our oldest treaty ally, Thailand. Indeed, our oldest treaty in the region is 

a Treaty of Amity and Commerce the US signed in 1833 with Thailand. Today, we 

are observers in ASEAN and—as the Vice President affirmed this week—we are 

one of its most vocal supporters. Of course, USINDOPACOM is our military’s 

largest and oldest combatant command.

The United States is an enduring Pacific power. That will not change, and we 

could not leave the region even if we wanted to—our historical, structural, economic, and institutional ties to the Indo-Pacific are indelible.

But even though America’s vision for the region has not changed, some other 

things have. Most notably, there are a number of challenges that threaten the longterm viability of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

North Korea remains an immediate challenge, and it is important that we remain united in our pursuit of the final, fully verified denuclearization of North 

Korea as agreed to by Chairman Kim [Jung-un] in Singapore. At PACOM, we 

continue the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions in order to help 

achieve meaningful breakthroughs on denuclearization.

In my role as Commander of USINDOPACOM, I continue to emphasize military readiness while supporting the US Department of State-led pressure campaign 

as well.

It is also evident that terrorism and other transnational threats continue to challenge this shared vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, as we saw just last year in 

the Philippines.

Following six months of heavy fighting, the Armed Forces of the Philippines 

and the Philippine National Police defeated ISIS and liberated the city of Marawi 

. . . . and they did this by reaching out to partners.3

The United States, Australia, and other countries provided intelligence and support that was essential to the outcome, but the effort was requested and led by the 

Philippines.
6 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

We must continue to work with like-minded nations across the region to develop multinational counterterrorism capabilities and capacity, and to prevent the 

return of foreign fighters to the region. If we do not, I believe we will see another 

Marawi somewhere else in the region in the future.

I’m also concerned about Russia’s resurgence. While most of Russia’s malign 

activity occurs in other areas of the world, Russia is increasingly active across the 

region, and it often seeks to block or disrupt the diplomatic efforts of others as 

they work to sustain the rules-based international order.

There is, of course, an even greater challenge to the long-term stability of the 

region. Often times, when we think of coercion, we think in military terms and 

violent outcomes, but with the Chinese Communist Party’s desire to keep disagreements just below the threshold of armed conflict, coercion is particularly 

evident in the sphere of economics.

It is problematic when countries promise loans, improved infrastructure, and 

economic development, but have a much more opaque intention underneath. 

When nations accept loans for more than they can possibly afford—often secured 

through corruption—borrowers quickly find themselves deep in debt and on the 

path to default, with the lender gaining leverage against the borrower’s sovereignty.

This is not right, and it is not new. It is debt-trap diplomacy, or as some say, 

predatory economics. It is a pernicious and insidious challenge to many in the region today.

 The US opposed such practices in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 

and continues to do so today.

We see similar coercion with the PRC’s militarization of features and a sustained 

campaign to intimidate other nations in the East and South China Seas, while also 

making excessive territorial claims that the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 

Hague does not accept.4

As distasteful as these tactics are, we recognize the need to continue to find ways 

to address many of the problems that have been discussed.

Engagement is critical to designing the solutions that will help promote and advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

So the United States will continue to cooperate where we can, but—as the 

National Defense Strategy makes clear—compete where we must. The stakes in 

the region are just too high.

So what do we do, and how do we respond to those who reject our vision of a 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific?
Spring 2019 | 7

Senior Leader Perspective

Figure 1. Keynote speech. ADM Phil Davidson, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, delivered remarks about 

security challenges, collaboration, and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region during the Halifax International Security 

Forum in Nova Scotia, Canada, 17 November 2018. This year’s forum brought together individuals from more than 

90 countries who face consequential local threats, writers who challenge and influence the world’s thinking on security, 

and decision makers who make the tough choices. (Photo courtesy of Halifax International Security Forum)

Well, the most obvious point—and one made abundantly clear in the US National Security Strategy—is that whatever we do, we must do it together, which 

means we need to start by identifying areas of agreement.

From my travels around the region, I’ve found three specific areas where I believe we can ground our efforts to advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Our values, our interests, and our commitment to our mutual security, so that all may 

prosper.

I was pleased to see during the polling on Day 1 of a recent Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies (APCSS) course, when asked, “What is the best way to improve Asia-Pacific security?”, the number-one response international students from 

across the region gave was, “Through shared identity and values.”

First, the vast majority of nations across the region do share similar values—including the core belief that governments should be chosen freely by their citizens 

and are, therefore, accountable to their people.
8 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Foreign interference in our governments, intellectual property theft, suppression of religious beliefs, malign cyber activities, and attempts to override state 

sovereignty using fear and coercion all run counter to the idea of a Free and Open 

Indo-Pacific.

We must stand together in support of our shared values, and be unambiguous in 

condemning those who attempt to undermine those values.

I know it’s easy to become distracted by the differences between our nations and 

to think of them as larger fissures, but that’s just not the case.

While the Indo-Pacific is one of the largest and most-diverse regions on Earth, 

these differences are actually strengths, and the thousands of miles of ocean and 

sky between us do not divide us. In actuality, they are the connective elements that 

bind us together.

It is our collective responsibility—all of us—to ensure the continued freedom of 

the seas and skies. . . . more on this in a minute.

Second, the vast majority of nations in the region share a common vision of the 

economic strength of the Indo-Pacific. As I said at the beginning, economists 

know the future of global economic growth is in the Indo-Pacific, and that free 

and open trade are the keys to that future.

This is why the United States is the single largest source of cumulative foreign 

investment in Southeast Asia—larger than China or the European Union—and 

why the United States does more two-way trade with the region than anyone else.

Sixty percent of the same APCSS students I mentioned polling a few moments 

ago also said the most-powerful country is the one that has the largest economy—

but we know all nations can advance together in ways that benefit everyone involved, and we want to do it fairly.

Where America goes, we seek partnership and collaboration, not domination. 

We do not believe in using loans as coercion or development as a weapon.

We seek to work with anyone to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, so long 

as that cooperation adheres to the highest standards that our citizens demand.

For example, the United States’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

(OPIC) has a portfolio of $3.9 billion invested in the Indo-Pacific and has done so 

alongside American firms in energy, health care, and banking. For every dollar that 

OPIC has invested, the private sector has more than doubled it.

And just this past September, the United States passed and placed into law the 

Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act, or BUILD Act, 
Spring 2019 | 9

Senior Leader Perspective

that will make it even easier for America’s private sector to invest in developing 

countries to create economic partnerships and stimulate economic growth.

We know nations can advance together without sacrificing sovereignty or making corrupt backroom deals, because the power of private investment has lifted 

billions out of poverty since the end of World War II, and we are confident that it 

will continue to do so.

Third, the vast majority of nations in the Indo-Pacific also share similar security 

concerns and challenges—and in fact, cooperating on security is at the heart of a 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Of course, security cooperation is more than fighting together in wars; it also 

means preventing war by presenting a credible deterrent to would-be adversaries.

Security cooperation includes working together to respond to humanitarian crises and natural disasters—such as relief for the hurricane and tsunami that struck 

Indonesia just two months ago.

Security cooperation also means working together in areas like countering terrorism; illegal drugs; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and human 

trafficking.

In brief, cooperating in times of peace and war to make our people safer and the 

Indo-Pacific more secure.

Thinking about values, interests, and security concerns independently helps us 

identify common ground, but it’s important to remember that these concepts actually intersect, and that challenges to one area have ramifications across all three. 

Perhaps the best example of this is in the South China Sea.

Earlier this decade, the PRC ignored international law, disregarded legitimate 

claims from smaller countries, and built a number of illegal features in the South 

China Sea. Then, despite President Xi’s 2015 promise not to militarize these features, 

the PLA secretly deployed antiship missiles, electronic jammers, and surface-to-air 

missiles (also known as SAMs) earlier this year.5

So what was a “Great Wall of Sand” just three years ago is now a “Great Wall of 

SAMs” in the South China Sea, giving the PRC the potential to exert national 

control over international waters and airspace through which over 3 trillion dollars 

in goods travel every year, along with commercial air traffic, as well as information 

and financial data through undersea cables.

The PRC says they’re militarizing these features in order to defend Chinese 

sovereignty, but in doing so they’re now violating the sovereignty of every 

other nation’s ability to fly, sail, and operate in accordance with international 
10 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

law—the right of all nations to trade, to communicate, to send their financial 

information, to send their communications through cables under the sea. It’s not 

just the right of the US Navy and US Air Force combined.

While the recent unsafe, unprofessional behavior by the PLA Navy garnered 

significant media attention, we need to remain focused on the broader strategic 

implications.

Further, in the ongoing negotiations over a South China Sea Code of Conduct, 

the PRC is pressuring ASEAN states into granting China de facto veto authority 

over who ASEAN states can sail, fly, train, and operate with in the South China 

Sea—a clear violation of the international sea and air standards codified in the 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

We must stand together in support of ASEAN—indeed, all nations—in any 

such negotiations, while also standing together in support of the idea that all nations have the right to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

In closing, I would like to make one additional comment on the perception of 

choice: the United States is not asking anyone to choose. The very phrase Free and 

Open obviates that question.

The United States helped set the conditions for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

following World War II by setting other nations free. What’s clear is the region has 

mainly benefited from that international rules-based order.

Further, we are seeing a general convergence around the idea of a Free and Open 

Indo-Pacific across the region. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and India have all 

put forth similar concepts or visions.

Yes, there is still much work to do, but the invitation remains an invitation to 

all—including China—and as Vice President [Mike] Pence commented at APEC, 

Beijing has “an honored place in our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, if it 

chooses to respect its neighbors’ sovereignty, embrace free, fair, and reciprocal 

trade, and uphold human rights and freedom.”

Thank you for your attention this morning. JIPA

Notes

1. In November 2017, the Halifax International Security Forum, established a new prize, named for recently deceased US Senator John McCain, honoring outstanding courage and leadership in public service.

2. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

3. The six-month-long armed conflict in Marawi, started on 23 May 2017, between Philippine military forces and 

terrorists affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS), including the Maute and Abu Sayyaf Salafi jihadist groups. The battle 

was the longest urban battle in the modern history of the Philippines.

4. People’s Republic of China (PRC)

5. People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Spring 2019 | 11

A Pathway toward Enhancing the US Air 

Force–Indian Air Force Partnership and 

Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific Region

Stephen F. Burgess

The article proposes a path toward increased partnership between the US Air Force (USAF) and Indian Air Force (IAF), given China’s increasing challenge to Indian and US interests and the two countries’ formal commitment to 

global order, democracy, and technological innovation. Since 2002, the US–India 

strategic partnership has included a focus on cooperation in nuclear energy, space, 

high technology, and missile defense.1 For more than a decade, India’s military has 

held more joint exercises with the US armed forces than with any other country, 

including those involving the IAF and USAF with combat and transport aircraft 

and other platforms.2

In 2014, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s nationalist Bharatiya Janata 

Party (BJP) government came to power, and the US–India partnership is now experiencing a growth spurt. Currently India is striving to develop its armed forces, 

including its air force, and the capabilities to resist Pakistan’s asymmetric aggression and deter China’s expansionist tendencies. The People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) continues to encroach on India’s territory in the Himalayan mountain region, and China is implementing its Belt and Road Initiative, with infrastructure 

projects and other forms of assistance to win over regimes in the Indo-Pacific and, 

according to some experts, encircle India. Thus, the stage is set for the United 

States to try creative approaches to strengthen its relations with India and the IAF. 

Building stronger relations can enhance deterrence and help meet increasing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

The article begins by assessing what the United States and USAF and India and 

the IAF would like each other to accomplish, based on a range of Indian and US 

sources and dozens of interviews. It proceeds to analyze the barriers to progress on 

both sides. It assesses how the United States and USAF might overcome those barriers and advance both countries’ interests and provides recommendations for how 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA) are those of the 

authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article 

may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the JIPA requests a courtesy line.
12 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Burgess

the USAF might be creative in working with the IAF. The article weighs different 

scenarios regarding how US engagement with India may change and evolve to 

meet future security goals, including the provision of deterrence, and how the 

USAF and IAF might be involved.

The article’s two main recommendations are that the United States should emphasize building partnership first, while remaining judicious about the transfer of 

technology, and promoting the acquisition of US aircraft second. The USAF 

should follow the model of the 26-year US Navy (USN)–Indian Navy (IN) partnership—featuring multipronged strategic/operational-level dialogue, extensive 

war gaming, linking technology development to service requirements, and increasingly complex exercises.3

What Would the United States Like India and the IAF to Do?

According to the 2017 US National Security Strategy and other sources,4 the 

United States would like India to develop forces that can help provide dominance 

and deterrence in South Asia and the surrounding waters of the Indian Ocean, especially as PLA forces gain increasing access to the region. Ideally, the IAF would 

develop equivalent forces to those of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) units based in 

Tibet and be capable of deterring them from conflict escalation in the Himalayas 

and South Asia. The air force would also further develop its capabilities to transport Indian Army forces to the frontier with China in case of conflict escalation. 

In helping to eventually provide dominance, India would develop the forces, including space and cyber capabilities, to fight a possible two-front war against 

China and Pakistan. US expectations are that India would continue to develop 

self-sufficiency in the Himalayas and the IAF would eventually achieve interoperability with the USAF and USN over the Indian Ocean and, in the end, Southeast 

Asia, the South China Sea, and the Persian Gulf. The IAF would become increasingly expeditionary and work with the IN and US forces in the Indian Ocean and 

Southeast Asia in maintaining sea lines of communication (SLOC). This would 

require the IAF building up its aerial refueling and logistics capabilities.5 While India and the IAF would take the lead in the Himalayas, the United States would 

continue to lead in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, South China Sea, and 

Strait of Malacca. Eventually, the growing USAF–IAF partnership would create a 

force multiplier that would deter China from taking offensive action in the Indian 

Ocean and the Himalayas.
Spring 2019 | 13

A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

The United States and USAF would like India and the IAF to develop a greater 

shared strategic outlook with the United States and USAF and for India to continue to move away from its traditional nonaligned status and focus on Pakistan. 

Such a change of perspective would also entail the IAF shifting from concentrating 

on the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and toward developing a common position with 

the USAF regarding how to counter China’s assertiveness and creating ways to deter Beijing’s forces from offensive actions.6 The IAF would transition to become as 

focused on countering the PLA and PLAAF as it has been on preparing to fight 

the Pakistan Army and PAF. The IAF would follow the two navies’ partnership 

model and develop a strategic relationship with the USAF through sustained, multilevel interactions, strategic dialogue, war gaming, and a variety of joint exercises, 

such as Exercise Malabar,7 to develop a shared strategic outlook, a high level of 

trust, and a degree of interoperability in communications and data link/exchanges.8 In addition, the IAF would engage with the USAF to identify technologies 

that the US Air Force Research Laboratories (AFRL) and Indian Defence Research 

and Development Organisation (DRDO) could develop together and have clear 

operational benefits in the air domain—just as the two navies do.9 In following 

the two navies’ path to an expanded strategic partnership, the USAF has the experience and capabilities working with other air forces that make it possible for it to 

work more closely with the IAF.10 In line with this recommendation, the USAF’s 

involvement in the Joint Technical Group forum has led to the AFRL having five 

cooperative projects in applied science with DRDO valued at $22 million, with 

the costs split equally.11

In 2018, the Trump administration announced a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

Strategy,” replacing the Obama administration’s “Rebalance to Asia” and calling for 

a strong coalition of democracies committed to uphold the existing order.12 As 

part of the vision of this strategy, India and the IAF would increase participation 

in ensuring a “rules-based order” in the Indo-Pacific, which includes respect for 

territorial integrity, freedom of navigation, and overflight.13 To defend that order, 

the United States has been working with India and other allies and partners to 

strengthen deterrence and dissuade China from engaging in aggressive expansion. 

India and the IAF is envisioned as increasingly engaging with the United States 

and USAF as part of an emerging multilateral defense partnership (also involving 

the air forces, navies, and land forces of Japan and Australia). The signs of emerging multilateral cooperation include regular meetings of defense ministers and 

multilateral joint exercises, including those involving air forces.14 In September 
14 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Burgess

2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense James Mattis met 

with Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj and Minister of Defence Nirmala 

Sitharaman in the inaugural 2+2 Strategic Dialogue. The United States would like 

India to continue to engage in and organize multilateral exercises in the Indian 

Ocean and South China Sea, with the IAF becoming more involved and increasingly expeditionary. At the 2+2 Dialogue, the two countries agreed to engage in 

tri-service exercises, with the IAF and USAF mastering the complexities of multidomain threats. India and the IAF would have to overcome constraints, including 

the country’s traditional posture of strategic autonomy, the slow-paced increase of 

India’s defense budget, and the IAF’s traditional preoccupation with Pakistan and 

the PAF. A developing USAF–IAF partnership could be an important component 

of maintaining the status quo in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

 US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and its air component, Pacific 

Air Forces (PACAF), would like a stronger partnership with India and the IAF. Its 

commander from 2015 to 2018, Adm Harry Harris, was a force behind what was 

hoped to be an emerging quadrilateral defense cooperation—the “Quad”—and a 

closer partnership with India.15 In 2016, he envisaged broad and deep cooperation: “USPACOM [US Pacific Command] aims to build a powerful quadrilateral 

partnership framework of the most powerful democracies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

India, Japan, Australia and the US working together will be a force for the maintenance of the regional rules-based order, counterbalancing and deterring coercion 

or unrestrained national ambitions.”16

Harris’ successor, Adm Phillip Davidson, has reiterated support for the Quad 

and called for the United States to work with India to reduce its advanced weapons dependence on Russia. The United States would like India to exercise air dominance in the Indian Ocean and South Asia by the 2020s. This would allow the 

United States to focus on the PLA in the East and South China Seas and on North 

Korea. PACAF has engaged in joint exercises with the IAF, mostly centered on humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR). The United States would 

like the IAF to lead in HA/DR and stabilization (including Afghanistan) in its region and assist the IN in ensuring freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and 

in enforcing the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims at halting trafficking 

of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to 

and from states and nonstate actors.17
Spring 2019 | 15

A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

Figure 1. PACAF–IAF cooperation. US Air Force Gen CQ Brown, Jr., Pacific Air Forces commander, prepares 

for an orientation flight in an IAF Mirage 2000 at Cope India 19 at Kalaikunda Air Force Station, India, 14 

December 2018. Brown attended the closing ceremony of Cope India 19, a field training exercise focused 

on enhancing mutual cooperation and building on existing capabilities, aircrew tactics, and force employment. (USAF photo by SSgt Hailey Haux)

The United States and US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its air 

component, US Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), with their forward 

base in the Persian Gulf at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, would like India and the IAF 

to assist more in Afghanistan. The commander of US Forces Afghanistan has visited New Delhi on a number of occasions for consultations with Indian officials 

concerning how India can further assist in the stabilization effort. In the last few 

years, the US–India Military Cooperation Group has included USCENTCOM 

representation along with India’s Chief of Defence Staff, the IAF Air Chief, and a 

USINDOPACOM three-star general officer.18 The United States and India have 

recently decided to start exchanges between the US Naval Forces Central Command and the IN, which will be another avenue for deepening maritime cooperation and possibly establishing USAF–IAF links in the western Indian Ocean and 

Persian Gulf.19 India has vital interests in the Gulf, including oil and gas ship-
16 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

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ments and the safety of seven million Indian nationals who live and work there. 

While India does not see a strategic threat from Iran that would spur deterrence 

cooperation with the United States in the Gulf, there has already been cooperation 

in Yemen with the IAF’s use of C-130Js to evacuate Indian and US citizens. The 

IAF and USAF could mount joint exercises in the Gulf and elsewhere, preparing 

for possible noncombatant extraction operations of Indian nationals and others 

and HA/DR.

In the technological and defense procurement realm, the United States would 

like to continue helping India as the latter upgrades its military forces and capabilities and develops a range of technologies in the air domain.20 Under such cooperative efforts, India would develop advanced fourth-generation, airspace awareness and other capabilities that can match those of the PLAAF and PAF and 

eventually refine its aircraft engine technology. The United States would like to see 

Figure 2. Operation Raahat. During the 2015 onset of the Saudi intervention in the Yemeni Civil War, the Indian Armed Forces 

evacuated Indian citizens and foreign nationals from Yemen. The IN began seaborne evacuations on 1 April 2015 from Aden port. 

The IAF started air evacuations utilizing military and Air India planes on 3 April 2015 from Sana’a. More than 4,640 Indian citizens 

in Yemen were evacuated along with 960 foreign nationals of 41 countries. (IAF photo)
Spring 2019 | 17

A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

the development of a more capable and technologically advanced IAF, creation of 

more advanced joint exercises, and progress toward interoperability. However, the 

United States will never provide India with the same level of technological capability as that possessed by the USAF and the USN.

India continues to collaborate with Russia in defense technology development, 

making cooperation in some areas with the United States difficult if not impossible. Nevertheless, the United States would like to expand cooperation in developing defense technologies in other areas that would benefit India’s powerful but 

ponderous DRDO and the country’s indigenous defense industry.21 Under the US 

Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and its air systems Joint Working 

Group (JWG), the USAF and IAF have worked to resolve process issues impeding 

cooperation and alignment of systems, increase the flow of technology and investment, develop capabilities and partnership in codevelopment and coproduction, 

and intensify cooperation in research and development.22 An intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) JWG is helping to advance IAF capabilities in that 

area and in developing distributed common ground control systems for intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED). A major benefit of 

DTTI is that it brings the IAF, DRDO, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) together to develop capabilities with the US services. However, the United States 

does not support using DTTI as a way to codevelop a fourth- or fifth-generation 

combat aircraft. Instead, the United States would like India to acquire the F-16 

Block 70 and/or F/A-18-E/F for greater IAF performance and USAF–IAF interoperability.23

In the future, the United States and USAF would like to expand ties with India 

and the IAF to assist in missile defense, deterrence in space, and cyberspace. Although missile defense cooperation is still a far way off, India would eventually develop a shared strategic vision and interoperability with the United States and Japan.24 In the space realm, India would continue with its dynamic space program 

and make progress in preparations against antisatellite (ASAT) warfare.25 In the 

cyber realm, India would be better prepared to deter China from waging cyber war 

and prevail if deterrence fails.26 The United States and India would build trust and 

common standards for cyber defense.27

India and the IAF would increasingly engage in logistics and information sharing with the United States and USAF.28 The 2016 Indo–US Logistics Exchange 

Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) has opened the door for USAF and IAF 

access to logistics at each other’s bases and will enhance HA/DR exercises and op-
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erations in the Indian Ocean region and beyond.29 Eventually, the LEMOA could 

provide a logistics hub and forward operating location (FOL) on the Andaman 

and Nicobar Islands in the eastern Indian Ocean where the IAF and USAF could 

work together to demonstrate resolve toward China and deter PLA efforts to dominate the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca.30

Concerning information sharing, India signed the General Security of Military 

Information Agreement in 2002 and the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (COMCASA) in September 2018.31 These 

agreements allow the United States to supply India with US proprietary encrypted 

communications equipment and systems, enabling secure peacetime and wartime 

communication between high-level military leaders on both sides. In addition, the 

COMCASA could establish this capability between Indian and US military assets, 

including aircraft and ships and advancing USAF–IAF interoperability.

The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) has been pending for 

more than a decade. The BECA would set a framework through which the United 

States could share sensitive data to aid targeting and navigation with India and further advance interoperability.32 COMCASA and BECA combined with PLA expansionism could eventually lead to India becoming a more capable member of 

the “Pacific Seniors” division of the “five eyes” signals intelligence arrangement. 

However, there is no indication that India will become a US ally and “sixth eye.”33

What Would India Like the United States and the USAF to Do?

India would like the United States to develop a partnership of equals, respecting 

India’s strategic autonomy and substantial economic relations with China, which 

calls for a diplomatic approach toward Beijing rather than a military one.34 Indian 

leaders and officials want to develop the country’s economic power first, with an 

increasing role in regional and global leadership. India is pleased with the recent 

US designation of Pakistani militants as terrorists and the withholding of counterterrorism funding from the Pakistani government. India’s preference would be for 

the US would continue to lead in building a multinational defense framework that 

would provide more security in the Indo-Pacific and counter the potential for PLA 

encirclement. The United States in cooperation with Japan and Australia would 

draw China’s attention toward East Asia and away from encroaching on Indian 

territory in the Himalayas and encirclement in the Indian Ocean; would work to 

* This analysis of what India and the IAF would like the United States and USAF to do is derived from Indian government 

pronouncements and documents as well as interviews of Indian think-tank experts and IAF officials in New Delhi, November–

December 2017.
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

maintain the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific; and would take the lead in 

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, benefiting India’s “Act East” policy. In 

working with India to counter China’s encirclement strategy, the United States and 

India would ensure sustained oil and gas shipments from the Persian Gulf and 

protection of Indian nationals,35 as well as develop defense and technological relations with Israel.36 The United States would continue to lead in aiding Afghanistan and its military with substantial but low-key Indian assistance and hold open 

the door for India and its navy and eventually the IAF to cooperate in helping to 

provide security in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility in the western Indian 

Ocean and Persian Gulf.37 India is developing the port of Chabahar in Iran as a 

means of improving access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which will enable it to 

provide more assistance to the regime in Kabul.38

India’s interests in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia mean that its ambitions 

would gradually expand beyond South Asia and the Chinese frontier and that the 

IAF would eventually become more expeditionary with US and USAF assistance. 

The United States and USAF would continue to draw away from Pakistan and the 

PAF, so that India and the IAF would continue to maintain military and air superiority. The United States would partner with India in preparing for a possible 

two-front war against China and Pakistan, which would involve strategic dialogue, 

joint exercises, and upgraded and expanded forces.39 The United States would 

continue to engage India in strategic-level discussions regarding the strengthening 

of theater missile defense against Pakistan and developing ballistic missile defense 

against China.40 However, before the United States can transfer missile defense 

technology to India, Washington would need to change export control restrictions. 

The United States would start to partner with India in developing space defense, as 

well as cyber defense.41

New Delhi wants the United States to transfer as much technology as possible 

to enable the development of its aerospace industry and other high-end industries 

as part of India becoming a major strategic and economic power and to enable the 

IAF to eventually build a world-class air force.42 India and the IAF would like the 

United States and USAF to assist in developing fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft and space and cyber capabilities, while benefiting Indian industries.43

India would become increasingly competitive with China, which is developing 

fifth-generation fighters, ASAT weapons, and cyberwarfare capabilities. If New 

Delhi buys US fighter aircraft, the country would like to produce as much of the 

aircraft and their components at home, secure as much transfer of technology as 
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possible at a reasonable cost, and provide the basis for skilled job creation.44 It is 

important to note here that US officials assess India’s expectations in the aerospace 

sector as somewhat unrealistic.

Some Indian leaders would like the United States and USAF to assist in the development of the country’s indigenous aerospace industry, which would propel the 

development of the strategic partnership.45 There are those who would like the 

United States—which has an aerospace industry that remains head and shoulders 

above those of Russia, China, and others—to enable India to eventually produce 

world-class combat aircraft with state-of-the-art jet engines. They would like 

Washington and US defense industries to assist the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL),46 which has been striving for decades to produce the Tejas 

light combat aircraft (LCA) and other fighter planes and working with DRDO for 

many years to develop jet engines for more advanced, capable aircraft.47

In a shift in policy, the BJP government also would like Washington and US 

aerospace companies to engage with the private sector that is competing with HAL 

in the production of combat aircraft. For example, Tata Industries is teaming up 

with Lockheed Martin in a possible F-16 Block 70 deal that would provide the 

IAF with a “four-and-a-half generation multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA),”48 and 

Mahindra Defence System (MDS) and HAL have linked up with Boeing for an 

F/A-18-E/F Super Hornet bid that would give both the IN and IAF an MRCA 

with greater than fourth-generation capabilities.49 These companies are competing 

with the Ambani family’s Reliance Group, which will be working with the French 

aircraft manufacturer Dassault Aviation to assemble in country the 36 Rafale multirole fighters that India recently purchased—with the prospect of more to come if 

the price could be lowered.50 Additionally, MDS must compete with the Adani 

Group, which is working with Saab on a possible Gripen fighter deal in which the 

Swedish company would assist in developing the Tejas LCA and other HAL products. On a smaller scale, innovative start-up companies, especially in Bangalore, 

could open up opportunities to collaborate under the DTTI air systems JWG.

The IAF would like an equal partnership with the USAF with reciprocity, 

greater capabilities, and independence.51 With the signing of COMCASA, the 

IAF might eventually want to develop a degree of interoperability with the USAF. 

The IAF would like the USAF to assist in developing strategy, upgrading joint exercises, and training to build more fighter squadrons. The USAF would assist in 

further developing IAF capabilities to counter the PLA and PLAAF. The United 

States and USAF would work with India and the IAF to acquire US aircraft that 
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

meet the latter’s operational requirements, as well as space and cyber capabilities.52

Most of the IAF leadership is more concerned with capabilities and less so with the 

transfer of technology and development of indigenous industries. The IAF leadership has pushed for the emergency acquisition of 36 Rafale fighters due to a dire 

need for aircraft to maintain a bare minimum number of squadrons. The IAF 

would like more resources to increase the number of squadrons from approximately 32 to 42 and eventually move toward 60 squadrons.53 The IAF is also interested in next-generation capabilities, including fifth-generation fighters with 

stealth and advanced munitions, radar, and e-warfare capabilities.54 Finally, India 

and the IAF would like to acquire US armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS), particularly armed Predators or Sea Guardians.55

Challenges Confronting the Partnership and the IAF

On the US side, the principal barriers to a stronger partnership are unrealistic 

expectations that India will become an ally, frustration over the lack of quick wins, 

and a complex Indian bureaucracy. In the past, some US officials have exhibited 

paternalism and impatience in their efforts to encourage India to become a dependent ally as some European countries are in NATO. In addition, while the US officials believe that India procuring the F-16 Block 70 is in the country’s best interests, advocacy can create the impression that there is greater interest in arms sales 

than a partnership. India and the IAF want capable fighter aircraft, and there has 

been recent interest in eventually acquiring the F-35. However, Indian leaders remain cautious about making a major commitment to acquire US planes and being 

drawn into too close a relationship. On-again, off-again US relations with Pakistan 

has demonstrated inconsistency. In recent years, Washington has been moving 

away from Pakistan and taking a harder line toward China. However, the threat of 

US sanctions over New Delhi’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, 

which reportedly is capable of shooting down an F-35, has puzzled Indian officials.56 With the finalization of the purchase in October 2018, the United States 

must decide if it should impose sanctions or grant a waiver (as expected).57 In addition, US–Indian relations may worsen because of the threat of sanctions for the 

importation of Iranian oil and gas.58

The United States and USAF remains uncertain as to how they should engage in 

South Asia—and with India. Since 2001, Washington’s focus in South Asia has 

been on Afghanistan. The problem that US policy makers have not historically 

seen South Asia as strategically important as East Asia, the Persian Gulf, or choke-
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points such as the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab al-Mandab Strait. 

The lack of vital national interests is one of the reasons that the US Department of 

Defense has placed India in USINDOPACOM (which focuses on East Asia) and 

Pakistan in USCENTCOM (which is concerned with Afghanistan and the Persian 

Gulf), creating a strategic seam that runs through South Asia. Thus, the United 

States has problems demonstrating consistent commitment in working with India 

and the IAF. Washington has been moving away from its “major non-NATO alliance” with Pakistan but needs to maintain a residual relationship to continue to 

operate in Afghanistan with the major lines of communication running from Karachi into Afghanistan.59

Indian officials and security experts increasingly view China as the greatest strategic challenge, while they see Pakistan as the most intense threat.60 Washington 

wants India to engage to the east in the South China Sea and to the northwest in 

Afghanistan to help fight violent extremist organizations, both of which are in India’s vital interests. The United States has courted India as a potential partner in 

Afghanistan, but New Delhi has demurred, in part due to lack of financial resources and in part out of concern that Pakistan would escalate support for the 

Taliban and anti-Indian jihadists.

India’s commitment to strategic autonomy, electoral politics, and a bureaucratic 

culture remain the principal obstacles to the development of the IAF and relations 

with the United States and USAF. While Prime Minister Modi has cultivated the 

US partnership at the expense of his country’s commitment to nonalignment because of the challenge from China, some officials in the foreign policy and military 

establishments remain suspicious of Washington and its relations with Pakistan 

and China. While New Delhi is concerned about China’s strategic behavior, many 

in government and the business community do not want a confrontation between 

the two powers to escalate and harm the economy.61

India’s five-year election cycles mean that successive governments and parliament (the Lok Sabha) give intermittent attention to defense spending and IAF requirements and requests.62 The political imperative is reflected in India’s purchase 

of multiple aircraft brands due to shifting criteria, difficulty articulating military 

requirements, and influence by foreign aerospace firms and governments.63 Political factors also explain delays in acquiring sufficient aircraft to enable the IAF to 

maintain the 32 squadrons that it currently has, as well as preventing it from losing squadrons. The slowly expanding budget and shifting government priorities 

constrain the Indian Armed Forces, especially the IAF, regarding the size, scale, 
Spring 2019 | 23

A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

and frequency of joint exercises.64 In contrast, China’s defense budget has increased by an average of 10 percent annually for the past two decades, propelling 

the PLA and PLAAF well ahead of the Indian Armed Forces and IAF.

The structure of India’s government remains an obstacle to the development of 

the IAF and partnership with the USAF. India’s relatively small, conservative bureaucracy possesses comparatively little capacity to plan and monitor the development of the IAF and its relations with other air forces. In addition, the prime minister’s office, where most political power is concentrated, controls 

force-development deliberations and decisions and has been found to pay insufficient attention to strategic planning and force requirements.65 US officials are concerned with India’s lack of a rigorous requirements definition process; they assess 

that New Delhi’s “requirements” are more specifications or lists, which means that 

Indian officials have not always thought out why they need a particular item or 

how they plan to use it. This makes it difficult for US officials to respond when 

there is a lack of clarity regarding what is desired.66 The result of an underdeveloped requirements process has often been inappropriate choices of aircraft and 

other weapons systems. In addition, there are weak links between the country’s 

strategic planning and requirement generation and actual force development. 

Force development could be more effective if the government moved greater responsibility to India’s MoD through the still-to-be developed “Defence Staff,” 

which would work with the services to develop strategic planning and requirement 

generation.67 A related problem is that the MoD has no real equivalent to the US 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to enhance political-military communication and coordination among the Indian Army, IAF, and IN in developing strategy and planning, 

requirement generation, acquisition, and budgeting.68 The result is friction among 

the MoD and the services.69

Until these challenges are surmounted, India and the IAF will remain burdened 

by inconsistent, ad hoc force-development decisions that do not always lead to the 

most effective force and hinder the development of an equal partnership with the 

USAF.70 The most glaring examples have been the process of acquiring 126 medium MRCA since 2004, the controversial 2011 United Progressive Alliance 

(UPA) government’s decision to buy French Dassault Rafale planes, and the Modi 

government’s controversial emergency purchase of 36 Rafale MRCA in 2015 after 

the original Dassault decision stalled. The MRCA procurement process was criticized on a number of grounds, especially that it violated defense procurement pol-
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icy and specifically the government’s “Make in India” and transfer of technology 

commitments.71

The Indian Army remains the dominant service, and there is weak “jointness” 

among the three services, leaving the IAF in a secondary position in operational 

planning and decision-making processes as well as resources and capabilities. It will 

take years of Indian government and IAF efforts to help the air force become a 

roughly co-equal service. The IN also is secondary to the Army in priority and resources, but it operates autonomously and has had the advantage of working with 

the USN for more than two decades in the Indian Ocean, which has led to the development of a shared strategic vision and steps toward interoperability. If the Indian government enables the IAF to become more autonomous and expeditionary 

and emulate the IN model, this would benefit engagement with the USAF.

The IAF leadership has a conservative organizational culture and vision that 

presents a challenge, which the USAF and IAF must overcome. This culture has 

hindered dynamic O-5s (wing commanders) and O-6s (group captains) who are 

striving to bring about change; also, when one-star general officers (air commodores) become two-star generals (air vice marshals), they tend to stop pushing for 

change and instead conform to the prevailing culture.72 The result is that the IAF 

leadership has tended to persist in its traditional role of supporting the army in defense of the country against Pakistan with mostly aging Russian fighter aircraft.73

The IAF leadership has tended to question the need for a wider regional vision and 

mission, which has resulted in slow movement toward organizational change and 

partnership with the USAF. It has also been slow in developing an expeditionary 

air force, even though the IAF has been developing ideas about an expeditionary 

capability since the Kargil War of 1999 and articulated the intention to do so in 

doctrine and policy statements in recent years. Also, the IAF has resisted developing long-range strategic bombing capability, even though the PLAAF could strike 

India with similar aircraft. Some in the IAF leadership question the growing threat 

from PLAAF and PAF capability advances, and the possibility of a two-front war, 

believing that only skirmishes will occur for the foreseeable future. While the IAF 

leadership has welcomed a deepening partnership with the United States and 

USAF, it questions the purpose of the US relationship with Pakistan.74 A problem 

related to organizational culture is a lack of continuity and planning in the IAF, 

which is partly attributable to the generally uneven transition from one air chief 

marshal to another, weakness of the IAF staff, and lack of an IAF Secretariat. The 

weakness of planning is evidenced in the 15- and 5-year IAF plans, which the 
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

MoD and the Prime Minister’s Office do not integrate into decision-making processes.75 The disjointed planning, requirements, and force-development process 

contribute to why the IAF has been slow to modernize. However, with a concerted 

approach proposed herein, these challenges can be overcome.

Shortfalls in IAF capabilities are another obstacle to greater cooperation.76 They 

include communications, air-space-cyber linkages, aerial refueling, and ISR, which 

limits the amount and sophistication of joint exercises and the development of interoperability.77 The IAF has only recently been developing its Airborne Early 

Warning and Control System (AEWCS),78 which cannot match the long-standing 

and well-developed USAF Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).79

Most significantly, the IAF suffers from a shortage of squadrons and sophisticated 

combat aircraft that are needed to compete with the PLAAF and PAF and build 

cooperation with the USAF.80 The IAF is currently at an estimated 32 squadrons, 

and the retirement of MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircraft by 2025 means that the IAF 

could have 28 or fewer squadrons.81 Given the rising challenge from the PLAAF 

and PAF, Indian military planners estimate that the IAF will need 42 squadrons by 

2027.82 Given the PLAAF buildup in Tibet and superior combat aircraft, Ashley 

Tellis estimates that the IAF needs to double the number of squadrons to 60 by 

2027.83 In contrast, Laxman Behera observes that instead of building fighter 

squadrons, India could rely on missiles for defense and deterrence.84 Even the goal 

of 42 squadrons will be difficult to achieve, given the Indian government’s defense 

budget shortfalls, slow procurement of combat aircraft, and questionable acquisition decisions that have resulted in multiple platforms that are difficult to maintain and operate. For example, the Modi government’s emergency purchase of 36 

Rafale MRCA in 2015 to plug a gap in IAF capabilities cost an estimated $200 

million per plane, which will be virtually impossible to expand to fulfill the requirement of 126 planes and will add another aircraft type to the several that the 

IAF already has to maintain and operate.85 Security experts have pointed out that 

India must use all means necessary to acquire more combat aircraft, and one has 

even suggested that the IAF should give up its attack helicopters to the army to 

have the resources to buy aircraft and build squadrons.86

A related obstacle for the IAF developing dominance and deterrence in South 

Asia and the Indian Ocean, in partnership with the USAF, is pressure from those 

in politics, government, and the think-tank world to develop India’s aerospace industry, especially HAL. To achieve this goal, these policy makers are willing to sacrifice significant short- to medium-term capability and future interoperability with 
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the USAF. These advocates assert that the HAL Tejas LCA is good enough to serve 

as the LCA in the immediate future and that it can be upgraded in the long run; 

the same applies to the HAL Sukhoi 30MKI heavy fighter and even the advanced 

medium combat aircraft that is still under development. Also, advocates for HAL 

argue that low-cost platforms such as the Tejas and Sukhoi MKI will enable the 

IAF to expeditiously develop more squadrons.87 If India follows such a path, the 

IAF will struggle to generate enough highly capable combat aircraft to deter and 

possibly fight Pakistan and China. The proponents of indigenization over capability argue that the risk of war is low in the short term and that it is essential for India to develop jobs through a world-class combat aircraft industry over the long 

run. However, the intensity of the threat from Pakistan remains at an elevated 

level, and the challenge from China is growing. Thus, IAF leaders want quality 

over quantity—highly capable fighter aircraft rather than mediocre planes.

Some Indian and IAF leaders want more capability in the LCA and other combat aircraft and agree with aircraft experts who think that HAL will take too long 

to develop world-class jet engines and planes.88 Many US officials and experts 

agree with IAF leaders that India needs capable fighter aircraft as soon as possible, 

given the growth of the PLAAF.89 US officials have been hesitant about encouraging their Indian counterparts in regard to the Tejas, while remaining aware that 

HAL officials and some defense experts are proud of it. US officials think that the 

Tejas and indigenous jet engines are not as far along as HAL officials and others 

think they are and that their pride makes it difficult to cooperate when the US side 

has to be critical.90 Furthermore, US companies are limited in how they can support these indigenous programs.

The BJP government has opened the door to private companies to compete with 

HAL in the manufacture of fourth-generation combat aircraft. These companies 

include the Reliance Group, which is working with Dassault Aviation to assemble 

the Rafale MRCA in India; the Tata Group, which is working with Lockheed Martin to possibly manufacture F-16 Block 70 MRCA in India; and the Adani Group, 

which is working with Saab to manufacture the Gripen Block 50 MRCA in India.91 While the insertion of private-sector competition has positive aspects, it also 

adds to political pressures on government decisions about combat aircraft and 

could slow down the acquisition process. Any MRCA acquisition must wait until 

after the 2019 election, and it could be 2022 before a contract can be signed—if 

there is not an economic downturn. It could be 2026 before aircraft are delivered 

to the IAF given new acquisition procedures. Lockheed Martin wants the produc-
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

tion line up and running in 2028 at the latest and wants Indian assurance that at 

least 100 F-16s will be produced.92

In contrast to the IAF, the PLAAF is moving ahead with the development of 

fifth-generation fighter aircraft and advanced sensors, weapons systems, and cyber 

capabilities. However, like India, China is encountering difficulties in manufacturing jet engines, trying to develop a fifth-generation stealth fighter by reverse engineering the Russian Sukhoi 35 (a four-and-a-half-generation stealth fighter) to upgrade the locally produced J-20.93 Beijing is also prepared to fight in multiple 

domains, with the PLA likely to launch cyber attacks and ASAT warfare well before initiating a large-scale conventional offensive.94 In addition, the PLAAF is 

building bases in Tibet that will help it to gain an increasing advantage over the 

IAF in the Himalayas95 and protect Chinese mining enterprises on the Indian border.96 China is increasing its defense budget and developing the PLAAF at a much 

faster rate than India and the IAF. The PLAAF is helping the PAF to develop evermore capable fighter aircraft. This means that deterrence will be increasingly difficult to maintain. In the 2017 PLA standoff with the Indian military over the 

Doklam Plateau in the Himalayas, the PLAAF demonstrated a degree of air and 

space superiority.97 As part of a possible Indian conflict with China, the IAF currently is planning for 10–15 days of combat with the PLAAF, with the expectation 

that there will be third-party intervention to stop hostilities.98

In conclusion, the challenges to a growing USAF–IAF partnership are considerable given the US and USAF’s focus on East Asia and the Persian Gulf and India 

and the IAF’s focus on Pakistan. India’s foreign policy uncertainty and bureaucratic 

deliberateness are a major impediment. The IAF’s focus on supporting the Indian 

Army make the partnership difficult to develop in a similar fashion as the USN 

and IN have in the Indian Ocean and adjacent waters. There are those who ask if 

the IAF’s baggage is too great as the first steps are taken to make it more strategic 

and expeditionary. However, the United States and India can use creative methods 

to surmount the challenges and build a stronger USAF–IAF partnership.

How Can the United States and India Be Creative in Strengthening the 

USAF–IAF Partnership?

If the United States and USAF approach India and the IAF with the concept of 

“partnership first and platforms second,” it would serve as the basis for creatively 

developing relations. Such an approach enabled IN–USN relations to progress for 

more than two decades.99 In contrast, while India acquiring combat aircraft from 
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the United States would benefit interoperability, putting aircraft first creates a paternalistic and transactional impression. Partnership first requires intensified, sustained engagement by the USAF leadership on the basis of equality and a process 

of developing a shared strategic outlook about the Indo-Pacific region through 

multipronged dialogue and a range of simulations,100 especially tabletop war gaming with the IAF.101 This would lead to larger and more complex joint exercises. 

While more, higher quality exercises are preferable, they should also be structured 

to demonstrate the value of interoperability and information sharing (command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, C4ISR)—both cross-service and IAF/USAF. Such structuring will highlight 

the need for greater information and logistics sharing.102

If the United States and USAF were to implement a more concerted South Asia 

strategy and prioritize engagement with India and the IAF, this could eventually 

facilitate the development of aerospace dominance and deterrence by the IAF, 

USAF, and other allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. As China’s assertive 

expansion continues, the USAF can use the US partnership with India, Japan, and 

Australia as a vehicle for developing a shared strategic vision with the IAF. Although India is reluctant to openly balance against China, multilateral defense cooperation provides a mechanism for sharing perspectives about how to deal with 

the rising power, its partners, and their air forces. The USAF and IAF can take part 

in multilateral defense meetings and use communiques as the basis for developing 

a shared strategic outlook and multilateral exercises. The Quad’s naval chiefs have 

met and deliberated together, which sets the stage for the four air force chiefs to 

follow suit.103

In developing a partnership with the IAF, the USAF can follow the example of 

the IN–USN partnership that the two services have developed and sustained 

through various phases of the US–India relationship and in which the two navies 

have cultivated a shared strategic vision. The USN—as the most expeditionary 

American service in the Indo-Pacific and the source for most USINDOPACOM 

combatant commanders—reached out in the 1990s to the IN and worked to develop their relationship through a range of navy-related think tanks and conferences.104 Also, the IN and USN have engaged in a wide range of frequent tabletop 

war games, including HA/DR scenarios, to better grasp each other’s strategic 

thinking and standard operating procedures, thereby developing shared strategic 

and operational visions and mounting more realistic, complex joint exercises.105

Following the IN–USN example, the USAF and IAF engaging in larger, more 
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

complex joint exercises, including HA/DR, and based upon extensive simulations 

will help develop the partnership.106 PACAF is making progress on this front, 

though it remains focused on the South China Sea. For example, the USAF could 

assist the IAF in developing contingency gaming models to figure out structures of 

cooperation and doctrine to prepare for the possibility of a two-front conventional 

conflict. There could be an exercise in northern India involving US AWACS and 

ISR assets.107 India and the United States have committed the IAF and USAF to 

be integrated eventually into Exercise Malabar with the IN and USN. Washington 

could also elevate the Indian Armed Forces, including the IAF, to full-participant 

status in Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand.108 However, to make integration effective, the air forces would first have to deal with the cognitive level and extensive 

war gaming before engaging in such a complex exercise.109 The IAF and USAF 

could eventually work out a mechanism to join with the IN and USN to use in 

countering aggressive moves by China. This could be a joint defense of the SLOCs 

or a distant blockade beyond PLAAF and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 

air range, while seeking to avoid escalation in a complex and adaptive environment.110 Washington and New Delhi need to work out how much there should be 

a division-of-labor approach as against striving for interoperability. For example, 

the IN with IAF support could increasingly share the burden of patrolling the 

Gulf of Aden with the United States and its allies. The IAF’s primary focus should 

remain on deterring China from encroaching on its territory, with possible US 

support in a contingency. For instance, if the confrontation on Doklam Plateau 

spirals into a shooting war, the United States could provide logistical support.111

The USN has demonstrated cooperation with the USAF in the development of 

strategy and joint operational concepts that can be useful in the development of an 

IAF-IN-USAF-USN relationship. For example, the USAF and USN have worked 

together in strategic planning and in developing the “Air Sea Battle” and Joint Access Measures-Global Commons (JAM-GC) operational concepts and building 

joint exercises around them, especially in the Indo-Pacific, to counter “Anti-Access 

and Area Denial” (A2/AD) strategies and operational concepts and capabilities. 

The USAF and the USN can work with the IAF and IN in developing India’s joint 

strategy and operational concepts, including anti-A2/AD.112 Also, the USN has 

worked with the USAF to become more expeditionary in the Indo-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia. The USAF and USN can work with the IAF and IN to 

develop joint expeditionary operations.113
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If the USAF were to elevate the level of its relationship with the IAF to the 

Headquarters Air Force (HAF) level with more engagement by the USAF Chief of 

Staff (CSAF) and Secretary of the USAF (SECAF), it would lead to greater mutual 

respect and provide a boost of confidence as the IAF seeks to become regionally 

dominant. Already, CSAF Gen David L. Goldfein visited India in February 2018, 

but the relationship would advance further if it were institutionalized at a higher 

level through the SECAF and Under Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs (SAF/IA) and their Indian counterparts.114 Engaging with the IAF at all levels—top, mid, and bottom—would better enable the partnership to advance. In 

regard to bilateral ties, there are multiple points of contact that the USAF could 

pursue, including the IAF Air Warfare Strategy Cell, the Centre for Air Power 

Studies, and other think tanks.115 If the USAF leadership would promote the discussion of strategic perspectives in various fora and through multiple nodes, including think tanks and a Track II dialogue involving USAF and IAF civilians and 

retired senior officers, the two air forces could more easily come to agreement on 

mutual concerns in the region, including Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, and the 

Persian Gulf. Among topics for discussion could be how the IAF could cooperate 

with the USAF and USN in defense of the security of the Gulf, common concerns 

about multidomain warfare and A2/AD, and the development of strategic nuclear 

forces and deterrence.116

Offering more professional military education (PME) and exchanges to the IAF 

would help build capacity and advance the partnership. This includes working 

with the IAF to send more officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) to 

USAF PME institutions, including the use of more International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. Arranging to send a large number of IAF officers 

at the O-3 (captain) level to the USAF Squadron Officer School, as well as senior 

NCOs to the USAF Barnes Center, would increase much-needed critical thinking 

skills and familiarization with USAF tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).117

However, such an expansion should be made in concert with engagement with senior IAF leaders to help avoid confusion when junior officers return to India.

More USAF officers and NCOs attending IAF PME schools would familiarize 

them with IAF TTPs. Such exchanges would bring greater familiarity and development of a shared vision, especially as both air forces are building and revitalizing 

squadrons. Visa-free official travel for IAF and USAF personnel to each other’s 

country would make exchanges easier and a goodwill gesture. Exchanges by senior 

USAF and IAF leaders will also build goodwill and trust in the development of the 
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

partnership. For example, in February 2018, CSAF Goldfein responded positively 

to Indian overtures to either fly the HAL Tejas MK-1 LCA or the HAL Sukhoi 

MKI; ultimately, he flew the Tejas and was reportedly impressed.118 If USAF leaders continue such initiatives, they would foster stronger relations. Also, the USAF 

could reciprocate by having IAF leaders fly the F-35,119 especially as some Indian 

leaders have expressed interest in exploring the acquisition of the aircraft as a fifthgeneration fighter in the next decade.120

At the combatant command level, the renaming of USPACOM as USINDOPACOM places a greater emphasis on India and the Indian Ocean and signals 

the intention of the command and its air component to engage more with the Indian Armed Forces and the IAF. An invitation to the IAF to station liaison officers 

at USINDOPACOM would help to operationalize this opportunity. If the United 

States were to invite India to participate more in USCENTCOM and the IAF to 

develop relations with AFCENT, the US–India partnership would move forward 

in the Persian Gulf, where both countries have vital interests.121 If AFCENT was 

to advocate for the IAF to have a liaison officer at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, it 

could open the door to greater engagement by India, not only in the Gulf but also 

Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Working with India and the IAF to increase logistics and information sharing 

would advance the strategic and operational aspects of the partnership.122 The LEMOA will enhance joint exercises involving the IAF and USAF and focusing on 

HA/DR scenarios. Eventually, the LEMOA could provide access for the USAF 

and IAF to additional FOLs in the Indo-Pacific and the development of the quadrilateral partnership, building the potential to deter China. Working with India in 

operationalizing the COMCASA would enable the United States to supply India 

with proprietary encrypted communications equipment and systems. This would 

enable the USAF and IAF to secure peacetime and wartime communication between their leaders. COMCASA would extend this capability to Indian and US 

military assets, including IAF and USAF aircraft. The BECA would set a framework through which the United States could share sensitive data to aid in targeting 

by the IAF.123 Greater information sharing could eventually lead to Indian entry 

into a deeper intelligence partnership with the United States, which would help 

the IAF.

The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides the USAF with another way of 

engaging with the IAF.124 The SPP enables the Air National Guards (ANG) of US 

states to interact with other air forces, largely independently of the active duty 
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USAF. The SPP and the ANG’s flexible, state-based funding stream has facilitated 

rapid engagement in many cases. Another advantage is that ANG personnel are 

relatively permanent and are able to engage with their partner countries for a sustained period, building relationships. ANGs also specialize in civil defense and 

HA/DR, which are also concerns for the IAF and would be the basis for joint exercises. With a large country like India and a large air force like the IAF, it would be 

preferable for a large ANG from a large US state to engage. The Texas ANG would 

be one possibility; with the 136th Airlift Wing and its eight C-130 H2s, it would 

be ideal to engage in HA/DR exercises with the IAF. In addition, the Texas ANG 

has F-16 Block 32s that it could use to familiarize the IAF with the aircraft. This 

arrangement could lead the IAF to lease 50 F-16 Block 32s for five years while 

waiting for the possible acquisition of the more advanced F-16 Block 70s in the 

next decade.

Figure 3. State Partnership Program. Czech Alcas and US F-16s sit side by side on the ramp at Caslav Air Base, Czech Republic. 

Members of the Texas Air National Guard’s 149th Fighter Wing were in the Czech Republic conducting mutual training as part of 

the National Guard’s State Partnership Program. Similar ventures with the IAF would foster a deeper USAF–IAF relationship. (US Air 

Force photo by SMSgt Miguel Arellano)
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

If the United States and USAF were to engage with India in multiple domains, 

such overtures could facilitate cooperation in space and cyber to meet various challenges from China and other strategic competitors. In space, the United States and 

USAF can work with the India’s Integrated Space Cell, which includes the IAF, in 

developing countermeasures to deter China from launching ASAT attacks and 

other forms of space warfare.125 US and Indian satellites could be used to track 

PLAN ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean. The USAF can use its 

considerable experience to work with other US agencies in assisting DRDO to develop missile defense.126 The USAF can work with other US agencies in assisting 

India’s Cyber Command, which includes the IAF, to counter China’s cyber attacks.

While emphasizing the development of an IAF–USAF strategic partnership 

above platforms and transfer of technology, the latter are also part of developing 

stronger relations. A relevant example is the development of the USN–IN partnership, during which India purchased naval hardware from the United States to enable the IN to become more capable and thereby achieved a modest degree of interoperability with the USN.127 In regard to technology and arms sales, DTTI and 

JWGs will continue to familiarize the Indian bureaucracy with US policies and 

procedures and should smooth the way to greater transfer of technology, while the 

United States remains able to secure its vital secrets. If the DTTI and JWGs would 

enable their Indian counterparts’ practices in the MoD and IAF to improve strategic planning, force development and acquisition, it would provide the basis for the 

timelier and logical procurement of aircraft and other items. In turn, this would 

lead to the long-term development of an IAF–USAF partnership. If as much transfer of technology as possible is made, it would advance the partnership and India’s 

defense capacity. The United States and USAF continuing to develop multiple 

ways to assist the IAF in developing capabilities, such as AWACS and UAS, should 

eventually lead to the development of the IAF as a world-class air force. In regard 

to UAS, the United States currently is only willing to sell India an ISR-capable 

Predator B (Sea Guardian) and not an armed Predator. With the development of 

the IAF–USAF partnership, trust can be developed that could eventually allow the 

United States to sell armed Predators to India.128

In regard to platforms, India agreeing to the purchase of US MRCA—either the 

F-16 Block 70 or F/A-18-E/F Super Hornet—would provide the IAF with a capability of “generation four plus” and transfer of US technology that India could use 

to eventually achieve interoperability with the USAF.129 Boeing linking with MDS 

and HAL to coproduce Super Hornets holds out the prospect of IAF–IN–USN 
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interoperability and would open the door for Boeing to work with HAL in attempting to upgrade the Tejas as a LCA.130 Lockheed Martin’s 2016 agreement 

with Tata to coproduce F-16 Block 70 MRCA made the aircraft attractive to India, which could produce parts for F-16s worldwide,131 and would enhance prospects for interoperability with the USAF.132 Indian defense experts observe that 

the F-16 would fit well into expanded IAF squadrons. An F-16 Block 70 deal 

would increase the chances for India working with Lockheed Martin to acquire 

and coproduce the F-35, which the IAF is exploring as a possible MRCA of the 

2030s. One consideration is that Lockheed Martin is shutting down F-16 production in the United States in less than five years; so, India needs to make a commitment after the 2019 elections.133

In trying to sell MRCA to India, the United States and its companies are competing with Sweden and Saab, which are selling the Gripen and offering to help 

HAL develop the Tejas LCA into a more capable fighter and India acquire the Meteor air-to-air missile,134 which is attractive to the IAF.135 Given the competition, 

it would be wise for US agencies to judiciously increase the amount of technology 

that can be transferred to India, select companies, and devise an arrangement so 

Lockheed Martin and/or Boeing would assist those companies and DRDO in developing technology for Indian combat aircraft.136

In conclusion, India deciding to acquire US MRCA would constitute an important step forward in the relationship. However, even if India moves in a different 

direction, the United States and USAF engaging with India and the IAF to build 

the strategic partnership would still pay dividends.

Conclusion: The Future of USAF–IAF Partnership and Deterrence in the 

Indo-Pacific

This article has provided analysis of what the two countries and air forces want 

from a partnership and the barriers to realizing stronger relations and a more capable IAF. Additionally, the article has put forward recommendations for how the 

United States and USAF can creatively engage with their Indian peers. It is evident 

that both sides want a stronger partnership but for somewhat different reasons and 

at different levels and rates of speed. The challenges are considerable, but with the 

right amount of will and creative effort, the United States and USAF are capable 

of working with India and the IAF to overcome those obstacles and move the relationship forward. Washington has signaled that it is prepared to exert greater will 
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

through the renaming of USPACOM and efforts to try to make India part of a 

strong quadrilateral partnership.

Given the rising level of US interest and will, the prospects for the development 

of USAF–IAF cooperation are positive. Going forward, there are three likely scenarios: (1) incremental development in which both sides continue to build the 

USAF–IAF partnership, with occasional lulls; (2) aggression by China against India that moves New Delhi and Washington toward a stronger partnership or an 

alliance and USAF–IAF interoperability; and (3) aggression by China against India 

leading the United States to move slowly toward an alliance commitment and the 

USAF not becoming interoperable with the IAF. Based upon recent trends, there is 

a greater than 50-percent chance that “scenario one” will continue to prevail, despite US efforts to push toward a strong partnership and NATO-like interoperability between the IAF and USAF. Incremental development would continue as it has 

between 2002 and 2008 and 2014 to the present and occasionally plateau again as 

from 2008–2014, depending on the political situation. Although China continues 

to encroach in the Himalayas and build relationships in the Indian Ocean region 

and with Russia, there is little indication that such activities will escalate toward 

open conflict.137 However, if conflict does ensue, Washington will have to choose 

either to move toward a stronger partnership or alliance commitments to India or 

refrain from them. While the United States and USINDOPACOM have indicated 

that they want a strong partnership and interoperability with the Indian Armed 

Forces, making commitments to India may be a bridge too far given existing US 

alliances.

US and USAF engagement with India and the IAF can eventually lead to 

greater burden sharing, deterrence, and regional dominance in the Indo-Pacific. 

Burden sharing is necessary for the United States, with greater security interests in 

East Asia and the Persian Gulf than in the Indian Ocean and South Asia. Countering the continued rise of China and Beijing’s incipient strategy of eventually dominating Eurasia, including the energy producing Gulf, and the Indo-Pacific will require burden sharing and stronger partnership, including the USAF and IAF. The 

development of deterrence of China in the region will require a quadrilateral partnership in which the four armed forces and air forces commit themselves to acting 

in concert in case the PLA and PLAAF acts aggressively in one area of the IndoPacific. Regional dominance will require a strong quadrilateral partnership, including the expeditious buildup of the IAF with US and USAF assistance. US and Indian leaders need to constantly stress that India is a lynchpin of the Quad.138
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The IAF and USAF can play a role in preventing China from achieving dominance by developing a shared strategy, interoperability, and the capability to deter 

China from further encroaching in the Himalayas and encircling India in the Indian Ocean. Multilateral defense cooperation is the optimal way in which the IAF 

can assist in fielding a regionally or globally dominant air force in a changing 

world with increased challenges and enhance deterrence in Indo-Pacific region. A 

USAF–IAF partnership could enhance deterrence prospects in South Asia and the 

Indian Ocean in relation to China. Ultimately, deterrence works better in the 

quadrilateral framework with Japan and Australia—and even better when Vietnam 

and Indonesia are added to the equation.

In overcoming obstacles, the United States and USAF can undertake initiatives 

to help arrest the decline of the IAF and help it to become a regionally dominant 

force. As the number of fighter squadrons is declining and remedial measures have 

proven insufficient to plug the gap, the United States and USAF can assist with 

training and equipment, including working toward selling US MRCA to India, 

which would enable training and squadron development to proceed faster. US engagement could also provide the IAF with a substantial capability boost, with 

DTTI and other bilateral mechanisms to develop ISR, PED, and AWACS. The role 

of Office of the Secretary of Defense and HAF in helping IAF and MoD to develop 

is worthwhile but will be a long and continuing process. The departments of State 

and Commerce and SAF/IA should work with Lockheed Martin and/or Boeing to 

facilitate greater transfer of technology, while safeguarding US national security.

In closing, the US should continue to build the partnership with India and the 

IAF primarily through various forms of dialogue, simulations, and exercises as well 

as security assistance and exchanges. The USAF and the air components in the 

Indo-Pacific and Persian Gulf can lead in partner development, while avoiding a 

paternalistic and transactional relationship. Secondarily, Washington should promote US combat aircraft with the aim of the USAF developing interoperability 

with the IAF. The United States should work with India and the IAF to reverse the 

decline in the number of fighter squadrons and begin building the IAF into what 

eventually could be a regionally dominant force. JIPA

Notes

1. While US and Indian officials have discussed missile defense since 2002, thus far there has been no 

cooperation between the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency and its Indian counterpart. Additionally, while US–India space cooperation has developed since 2004, there is not yet cooperation on military 

space issues.
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

2. Dr. Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, and Angad Singh, Zone5Aviation, 

interview by the author, 28 November 2017. However, communications in most joint exercises remain 

underdeveloped—often conducted over mobile phone.

3. Ibid. The USN and IN have mutually acculturated, cross-pollinated ideas, and engaged in joint 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. However, there is little interoperability, 

especially for joint freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and the prospect of joint antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations is even further in the future.

4. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 

The White House, December 2017), 45–47, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/

NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. This analysis of what the United States wants India and the IAF to do 

is derived from the 2017 NSS, 2018 National Defense Strategy, posture statements of USINDOPACOM, news from the PACAF–IAF steering group meeting, and interviews with officials in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs, and US Embassy, New Delhi.

5. Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, director, National Maritime Foundation, interview by the author, 

11 December 2017. The admiral noted that the IAF has the vision to become more strategic and expeditionary but that the logistic burden is great.

6. US officials, interviews by the author, New Delhi, 5 December 2017. Some observed that the PLA’s 

offensive actions on the Doklam Plateau in Summer 2017 could be a “game-changer” in US–Indian relations had led Indian officials, including the IAF Chief, into a closer relationship with their US counterparts and to discussions about a future “alliance”.

7. Subimal Bhattercharjee, “2+2 Will Revitalize US–India Defence Ties,” The Hindu, 14 September 

2018, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/22-will-revitalise-indo-us-defence-ties/

article24948626.ece. “The announcement at the 2+2 dialogue of the creation of a new, tri-services exercise and to further increase personnel exchanges between the two militaries and defence organisations is a 

major development and is expected to happen next year. . . . Clearly these exercises will also have the benefit of COMCASA [the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement] in 

terms of enabling better interoperability.”

8. Ajai Shukla, journalist and a retired colonel of Indian Army, interview by the author, New Delhi, 

12 December 2017.

9. US official, to the author, e-mail, 17 September 2018. Two more collaborative opportunities are in 

the field discussions stage: high-altitude human performance testing and psychological assessment and 

training.

10. Chauhan interview.

11. US official, to the author, e-mail, 17 September 2018.

12. Michael D. Swaine, “Creating an Unstable Asia: The U.S. ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy,” 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Security, 2 March 2018, http://carnegieendowment.

org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720.

13. Office of the Spokesperson, US Pacific Command, “Joint Statement from the US Department of 

State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka on the Second US–Sri Lanka Partnership Dialogue” (joint statement, Washington, DC, 6 November 2017), http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/

News-Article-View/Article/1364170/joint-statement-from-the-us-department-of-state-and-the-ministryof-foreign-aff/.

14. Stephen F. Burgess and Janet Beilstein, “Multilateral Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

Region: Tentative Steps toward a Regional NATO?,” Contemporary Security Policy 39, no. 2 (2018), 

258–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1386953.
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Burgess

15. Wyatt Olson, “US Fleet Forces Commander to Replace PACOM Head Harris,” Stars and Stripes, 

10 April 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-fleet-forces-commander-tapped-to-replace-pacom-head-harris-1.521394.

16.House, Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 114th Cong., 

2nd sess., 24 February 2016, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20160224/104587/HHRG114-AS00-Wstate-HarrisH-20160224.pdf.

17.MSgt George Maddon, “U.S., Indian Air Forces Solidify Cooperation through Steering Group,” 

Pacific Air Forces, 16 December 2016, https://www.pacaf.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1032996/

US-Indian-air-forces-solidify-cooperation-through-steering-group/.

18.US officials, interview by the author, New Delhi, 5 December 2017. USINDOPACOM is making 

efforts to raise the level of discussion from the tactical to strategic level.

19.Bhattercharjee, “2+2 Will Revitalize US–India Defence Ties.”

20.According to US officials, the USAF has not yet developed space and cyberspace partnerships with 

the Indian military, but there are efforts under way to do so. 

21.Rajat Pandit, “To Up Efficiency, Centre Gives DRDO More Financial Powers,” Times of India, 28 

June 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/to-up-efficiency-centre-gives-drdo-more-financialpowers/articleshow/64770965.cms. This was done to “‘enhance its efficiency and effectiveness’ but the 

body requires a drastic overhaul rather than just mere tinkering to ensure India develops a robust defence-industrial base in the years ahead.” Also, US officials interview, 5 December 2017, who—among 

others—commented that DRDO was being criticized for focusing more on emerging technologies and 

less on applied research for the services, including the IAF, which can only do basic maintenance on its 

C-130Js.

22.Richard Weitz, Promoting U.S.-Indian Defense Cooperation: Opportunities and Obstacles (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 7 June 2017), 13–18, 

https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1355.

23.Ashley J. Tellis, Troubles They Come in Battalions: The Manifold Travails of the Indian Air Force

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2106), http://carnegieendowment.org/

files/Tellis_IAF_final.pdf Ashley Tellis is a US strategist and architect of the US-India Strategic Partnership that developed under the administration of President George W. Bush.

24. Samir Nair and Guru Amrit Khalsa, “Toward U.S.–India Missile Defense Cooperation,” cogitASIA

(blog), 6 June 2013, https://www.cogitasia.com/toward-u-s-india-missile-defense-cooperation/.

25.Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Kick-Starts Military Satellite Programs,” Defense News, 19 June 2017, 

https://www.defensenews.com/space/2017/06/19/india-kick-starts-military-satellite-programs/.

26.Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “FACT SHEET: Framework for the U.S.-India Cyber Relationship,” 7 June 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07/factsheet-framework-us-india-cyber-relationship.

27.James Carafano, Walter Lohman, David Inserra, Dean Cheng, Riley Walters, Paul Rosenzweig, and 

Steven Bucci, “Trump–Modi Agenda for Next Steps in U.S.–India Cybersecurity Cooperation,” Heritage 

Foundation, 1 May 2017, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/trump-modi-agenda-next-steps-usindia-cybersecurity-cooperation.

28.Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, Michael Wills, and John H. Gill, Power, Ideas, and Military 

Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017). India needs to 

develop an automated logistics system.

29. “LEMOA Comes in Force, US Tanker Refuels Indian Navy Ship in the Sea of Japan; Know What 

the Memorandum Is All About,” Financial Express, 11 November 2017, https://www.financialexpress.
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

com/india-news/lemoa-comes-in-force-us-tanker-refuels-indian-navy-ship-in-the-sea-of-japan-knowwhat-the-memorandum-is-all-about/928773/.

30. Darshana M. Baruah, “The Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s Eastern Anchor in a Changing 

Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, 21 March 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/the-andamanand-nicobar-islands-indias-eastern-anchor-in-a-changing-indo-pacific/. India’s Andaman and Nicobar 

Command is in the process of development and could host joint IN-IAF-Indian Army exercises, but the 

islands’ infrastructure needs to be upgraded.

31. According to US officials, the Indian media have been overly optimistic about what COMCASA 

will be able to achieve. See for example, “Seven Reasons Why COMCASA Is so Important for India,” 

Economic Times, 7 September 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/seven-reasonswhy-comcasa-is-so-important-for-india/articleshow/65707682.cms.

32. Ankit Panda, “LSA, CISMOA, BECA and the Future of the US–India Defense Partnership,” The 

Diplomat, 7 April 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/lsa-cismoa-beca-and-the-future-of-the-usindia-defense-partnership/.

33. Ryan Gallagher, “The Powerful Global Spy Alliance You Never Knew Existed,” The Intercept, 1 

March 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/03/01/nsa-global-surveillance-sigint-seniors/. India became 

a member of SIGINT Seniors Pacific Division when it was founded in 2005 to fight terrorism. However, 

Indian signals intelligence officers leaked intelligence in 2008, which caused problems for upgrading to a 

higher SIGINT status.

34. Raji Rajagopalan and Abhijnan Rej, roundtable,Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 6 December 2017. India must contend with evidence that China is winning the economic competition in 

Asia, with Beijing’s high volume of regional trade and investment and with the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt and Road Initiative. Most Southeast and South Asian nations are finding it 

hard to resist China’s politico-economic influence.

35. Brigadier Arun Sahgal, Indian Army, retired, and Lt Gen Anil Ahuja, Indian Army, retired, interview by the author, Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi, 5 December 2017. Currently, India is concerned 

about the blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

36. Rupam Jain, “Israel’s Netanyahu Eyes Trade, Defense Ties on Trip to India,” Reuters, 12 January 

2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-israel/israels-netanyahu-eyes-trade-defense-ties-on-indiatrip-idUSKBN1F11SD. Indian interests in Southwest Asia also include its increasingly close defense ties 

with Israel. 

37. Dhruva Jaishankar, Brookings India, interview by the author, 11 December 2017. In regard to India’s interests in its diaspora and energy and complex cooperation with Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and 

Russia, the country has a clearer “look and act west” policy than its official “Act East” policy toward the 

“messy East” with the “Quad” and trying to counter China and the PLA. It is possible that the Indian 

Navy will be able to replenish from a base in Oman by 2022. 

38. Catherine Putz, “Iran Scores a Chabahar Port Exemption in an India and Afghanistan-Inspired 

Sanctions Exemption,” The Diplomat, 8 November 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/irans-chabahar-port-scores-an-india-and-afghanistan-inspired-sanctions-exemption/; and “U.S. Exempts Iran’s 

Chabahar Port from Sanctions in Nod to Afghanistan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 November 

2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-exempts-iran-chabahar-port-project-from-sanction-in-nod-to-afghanistan-india/29586874.html.

39. Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Security, telephone interview by 

the author, 15 November 2017.

40. Nair and Khalsa, “Toward U.S.–India Missile Defense Cooperation.”
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41. Raghuvanshi, “India Kick-Starts Military Satellite Programs”; and ET Bureau, “India, US Renew 

Agreement for Cyber Security Coordination,” Economic Times, 11 January 2017, https://economictimes.

indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-renew-agreement-for-cyber-security-coordination/articleshow/56484102.cms.

42. Discussions at the Centre for Airpower Studies (CAPS) and Indian Air Force Headquarters, New 

Delhi, December 2017. There was interest in hypersonic and unmanned aerial system (UAS) technologies, 

among other technologies.

43. US officials, Washington, DC, to the author, e-mail, 26 September and 2 October 2018; and US 

officials, conversations with the author, US Embassy, New Delhi, December 2017. These officials voiced 

skepticism about India developing its own fourth and fifth-generation combat aircraft, given the underperformance of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in the sector. Instead, the view is that it is in India’s interest to purchase the F-16 

Block 70 and/or F/A-18-E/F as the optimal way of enhancing India’s air combat capabilities in a timely 

manner.

44. US officials, conversations with the author, New Delhi, 5 December 2017. US officials commented 

that Indian government contracts often fall apart and that they are not willing to pay the price for new 

technology.

45. Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, IAF, retired, Matheswaran Strategic Consulting, interview by the 

author, New Delhi, 6 December 2017.

46. HAL is an Indian state-owned aerospace and defense company headquartered in Bangalore, India, 

and under the management of the MoD.

47. US officials, interview by the author, New Delhi, December 2017. The United States has no interest in transferring valuable jet engine technology to HAL and DRDO, which have struggled but failed 

for more than three decades to develop competitive jet engines.

48. US officials, interview by the author, New Delhi, India, December 2017; and Sahgal and Ahuja 

interview. There is prejudice against the F-16 Block 70. For example, one retired air vice marshal, who is 

now a defense consultant, pined that India would be acquiring “third-generation” combat aircraft, when 

it would actually be procuring four-and-a-half-generation ones. Others thought the Pakistan F-16 Block 

30 (a third-generation aircraft) would be equivalent to the F-16 Block 70.

49. Sanjeev Miglani, Jamie Freed, “India Eying Boeing’s Super Hornet in Latest Twist to Air Force Procurement,” Reuters, 14 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-boeing-analysis/india-eying-boeings-super-hornet-in-latest-twist-to-air-force-procurement-idUSKCN1GR081.

50. Rajat Pandit, “Government Says Rafale Cost Secret, but Had Disclosed It in 2016,” Times of India, 7 February 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/government-says-rafale-cost-secret-buthad-disclosed-it-in-2016/articleshow/62812165.cms.

51. A common theme from interviews in India in November–December 2017 was that India and the 

IAF valued partnership with the USAF over interoperability.

52. Discussions at the Centre for Airpower Studies (CAPS) and Indian Air Force Headquarters, December 2017.

53. US official, to the author, e-mail, 28 September 2018. The USAF is in the process of building more 

squadrons and revitalizing others, which provides an area for partnership going forward.

54. Royal Australian Air Force, “Five Generations of Jet Fighter Aircraft,” Pathfinder: Air Power Development Centre Bulletin 170 (January 2012), http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/

Pathfinder/PF170-Five-Generations-of-Jet-Fighter-Aircraft.pdf. This article classifies aircraft as follows: 

fourth-generation fighters: developed from 1970 to the late 1980s, feature head-up displays, fly-bywire, swing-role fighters and include the following aircraft: MiG-29, Su-27, F/A-18, F-15, F-16, and Mi-
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

rage 2000. Four-and-a-half-generation fighters: from the late 1980s into the 1990s (fell short of a fifthgeneration fighter due to budget cutbacks), feature stealth technology, radar-absorbent materials, thrust 

vectoring, active electronically scanned array radar, network warfare, and capable of multirole missions 

and include the F/A-18-E/F, F-15SE, Eurofighter Typhoon, Saab Gripen, and Dassault Rafale. Fifthgeneration fighters: from 2005, feature stealth technology, multispectral sensors, and networking and 

include the F-22, F-35, PAK FA (Su-57), and Chengdu J-20. See also, John A. Tirpak, “The Sixth Generation Fighter,” Air Force Magazine, October 2009, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/

Pages/2009/October%202009/1009fighter.aspx. Tirpak classifies the fighters as follows:

• 4th—features pulse Doppler radar, high maneuverability, and look-down/ shoot-down missiles and includes the F-15, F-16, Mirage 2000, MiG-29. 4th 

plus – features high agility, sensor fusion, and reduced radar signature and in- cludes the Eurofighter Typhoon, Su-30, F/A-18-E/F, and Rafale. 

• 4th plus—features active electronically scanned arrays; contin- ued reduced signatures or “active” (waveform canceling) stealth technol- ogy, and super-cruise and includes the Su-35 and proposed F-15SE. 

• 5th—features all-aspect stealth with internal weapons bays, extreme agility, full-sensor fusion, integrated avionics, and some or full super-cruise and includes the F-22 and F-35.

55. US official, to the author, e-mail, 5 December 2017; and Rajat Pandit, “Satellite Control Set to 

Give Armed Drones More Sting,” Times of India, 22 September 2018. The United States and India are 

in the advanced stages of purchasing the armed Predator-B or Sea Guardian UAS.

56. “With CAATSA, the U.S. Is Trying to Make Russia Hurt,” Stratfor, 28 May 2018.https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/china-russia-airborne-security-cooperation-continues.

57. “India, Russia Formally Ink the $5.2 Billion Deal for S-400 Air Defence System,” Economic Times, 

5 October 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-formally-ink-the5-2-billion-deal-for-the-s-400/articleshow/66082930.cms.

58. Press Trust of India, “India to Continue to Iranian Oil Imports Post-US Sanctions,” Economic 

Times, 5 October 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/india-to-continue-iranian-oil-imports-post-us-sanctions/articleshow/66088584.cms.

59. Lexington, “The President Was Never Going to Smile on Pakistan,” The Economist, 8 December 

2018, https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/12/08/the-president-was-never-going-to-smile-onpakistan. 

60. T. V. Paul, “Explaining Conflict and Cooperation in the China-India Rivalry,” in The China-India 

Rivalry in the Globalization Era, ed., T. V. Paul (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 

5.

61. Sahgal and Ahuja interview. They see the most likely scenario being China succeeding through Belt 

and Road in subordinating Asian states; the next most likely outcome being the Quad leading in balancing against China; and least likely, China hitting a growth wall.

62. Laxman Behera, Institute for Defence and Security Analyses, interview by the author, New Delhi, 

26 November 2018.

63. Sahgal and Ahuja interview. India’s relatively weak industrial base explains the failure to develop 

combat aircraft and jet engines. 

64. Ibid. IAF participation in the USAF Red Flag exercise cost 1 billion dollars.
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65. Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview. Prime Minister Modi plays the dominant decision-making role in 

the prime minister’s office and projects the government’s position, with the national security advisor, Ajit 

Doval, subordinate to him.

66. US official, to the author, e-mail, 5 December 2017. This official provides the following examples: 

Indian officials have requested “roll-on/roll-off kits for C-130s but are not sure which ones they want; 

electro-magnetic launchers for aircraft carriers they but do not know what sortie rate they are trying to 

achieve; and sonobuoy dispensers on unmanned aerial systems but are not sure how they want to use 

them.”

67. Bharat Karnad, Centre for Policy Research, interview by the author, 30 November 2017.

68. Shukla interview. The MoD has made no attempt to create a defense acquisition specialization as 

exists in the US Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The lack of such a specialization will hamper 

the efforts of the DTTI JWGs to upgrade Indian acquisition procedures. The key official for DTTI in 

MoD is Shri Shambhu Kumaran, Joint Secretary for Planning and International Cooperation (JSPIC).

69. Dhruva Jaishankar, Brookings India, interview by the author, 11 December 2017. The Ministry of 

External Affairs (MEA) is better integrated with the military than the MoD. There are serving military 

officers in the MEA.

70. Behera interview.

71. Amit Cowshish, “Defence Acquisition: Procurement Procedure Separate from Procurement Policy,” 

Economic Times (blog post), 24 November 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/defence-acquisition-procurement-procedure-separate-from-procurement-policy/.

The unseemly controversy surrounding the purchase of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft lays bare 

the drawback of mixing procurement policy with procurement procedure, and the absence 

of proactive disclosures regarding defence contracts. This leaves the field wide open to all 

kinds of inferences and accusations. Since 2002, the procurement of all major equipment, 

weapon systems and platforms has been governed by the Defence Procurement Procedure 

(DPP). The DPP has been tweaked several times since then. But it continues to be a queer 

mix of the policy on—and the procedure for—capital acquisitions for the armed forces. . . . 

Several components of what should ideally be a distinct overarching procurement policy (such 

as those related to defence offsets or the use of agents) are enmeshed with the procedure by 

way of guidelines, a part of some specific provision in the DPP, or as separate chapters. The 

problem arising from the policy-procedure mix is that any deviation from procedure tends 

to be viewed as a deviation from policy. Thus, even if such deviation is absolutely neces- sary to ensure that the procurement proposal does not get derailed, this fear prevents the 

procurement personnel from taking bold decisions to break the procedural logjams that 

crop up in practically every procurement programme. Nothing exemplifies this better 

than the view many hold that off-the-shelf purchase of defence equipment, without any 

transfer of technology (ToT), violates the putative ‘Make in India’ policy and impedes the 

stated objective of indigenisation of defence production. This view disregards the fact that 

it is not mandated by any policy or concomitant procedure to seek ToT in every case.

72. Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview; and Karnad interview.

73. Indian officials, interviews by the author, New Delhi, 11 December 2017. Indian officials recognize 

that Russian weapons, such as the Sukhoi MKI, are more expensive than American ones in the long run.

74. Centre for Airpower Studies, lecture and interaction, 6 December 2017. Some former IAF officers 

downplay the 1962 PLA victory over India as an anomaly because the IAF was not used, while extolling 

the IAF role in the 1999 Kargil War that helped to turn the tide, even though aircraft were not allowed to 

cross the Line of Control because of Pakistan’s threats of nuclear retaliation. US officials, interview by the 

author, New Delhi, 5 December 2017. US officials commented that the IAF was not properly positioned 

to take out Pakistan forces during Kargil and the PLA during Doklam and had lessons to learn.
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

75. Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview; Behera interview; and Shukla interview. The Indian Navy has methodically planned and developed its fleet with 36 ships procured in the last two decades. In contrast, 

defense experts observe that the Indian Army has been the worst service in regard to planning, with the 

IAF second worst.

76. Behera interview. The IAF still has considerable amounts of 1970s technology, though it has advanced subsystems.

77. Tellis interview. Tellis observes that intellectually the IAF is “platform-obsessed” like the USAF was 

in the 1980s. IAF leadership is not focusing on the development of networks or complementary capabilities or precision munitions or secure data links. Also, IAF bases need modernization. These issues lead to 

doubts about the IAF’s ability to sustain an air campaign.

78. Rajat Pandit, “India to Launch AWACS Project to Counter China, Pak,” Times of India, 19 June 

2012, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-to-launch-AWACS-project-to-counter-China-Pak/

articleshow/14253161.cms?referral=PM.

79. India is also developing a system to match the Northrop Grumman E-8 Joint Surveillance Target 

Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), which the USAF is phasing out and folding into its AWACS program.

80. The PLAAF Western Theater Command that faces India and the IAF has four fighter divisions that 

amount to an estimated 36 fighter squadrons. The PAF has an estimated 21 fighter squadrons. This places 

India’s likely foes with a total of 57 squadrons at India’s front door.

81. Shukla interview.

82. Franz-Stefan Gady, “India’s Air Force Will Field 42 Combat Squadrons by 2027,” The Diplomat, 6 

October 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indias-air-force-will-field-42-combat-squadronsby-2027/.

83. Tellis, “Troubles They Come in Battalions” 2016. 

84. Behera interview.

85. Manu Pubby, “Rafale Deal: Pricing Issues, India's Insistence on 50% Local Spending Lead to Missing of July Target,” Economic Times, 31 July 2015, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/

rafale-deal-pricing-issues-indias-insistence-on-50-local-spending-lead-to-missing-of-july-target/articleshow/48288656.cms.

86. Ajai Shukla, “Indian Air Force Initiates Rs 33,000 Crore Buy of 83 Tejas Fighters,” Broadsword 

(blog), 21 December 2017, http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2017/12/indian-air-force-initiates-rs-33000.

html.

87. Shukla interview; and Karnad interview.

88. Rajat Pandit, “Armed forces say no to advanced versions of indigenous ‘Tejas’, ‘Arjun’,” Times of 

India, 13 November 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/armed-forces-say-no-to-advancedversions-of-tejas-arjun/articleshow/61620740.cms.

IAF, for instance, says Tejas is yet to become combat-ready or achieve ‘final operational clearance’ after being in the making for over three decades. Moreover, with its limited range and 

weapon carrying capacity, the Tejas simply does not give IAF the punch and cost-effectiveness 

it needs. Tejas, which has just about 50% of the capabilities of an F-16 or Gripen in terms of 

endurance, payload etc., will have to fly under the protection of other fighters during conflicts,” 

said an officer. Grappling with just 33 fighter squadrons when 42 are need to take care of the 

“collusive threat” from China and Pakistan, the IAF feels the single-engine fighter project is 

necessary to maintain adequate force-levels till an entirely new Tejas Mark-2 becomes a reality.

89. Amit Gupta, “Global Arms Industry: From Hi-tech to Lo-tech,” Geopolitics 8, no. 11 (April 

2018): 12–16, https://www.scribd.com/document/392249685/Geopolitics-April2018. India has long 
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lacked the technological and industrial base to develop a world-class aircraft industry, and there are few 

signs of improvement. 

90. US official, to the author, e-mail, 5 December 2017. 

91. Iyer-Mitra interview. The Adani Group specializes in resource trade and has limited experience in 

high-end manufacturing, but the company is politically well-connected to the BJP. Tata has disconnected 

manufacturing programs. Both would need to build the factory, train the team, and start manufacturing 

the aircraft. Shukla interview. The closeness of the Adani Group to the BJP could also draw increased opposition and slow down any deal.

92. Behera interview. The Indian government is handicapped by the lack of a centralized defense acquisition authority. Prime Minister Modi also campaigned on allowing 100 percent foreign direct investment to spur industrialization, but the government has not followed through.

93. David Majumdar, “If the J-20 Stealth Fighter Is So Amazing, Why Is China Buying Russia’s SU35?” National Interest, 2 November 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/if-the-j-20-stealthfighter-so-amazing-why-china-buying-18273.

94. Karnad interview.

95. Press Trust of India, “China’s Airfields in Tibet Lack Military Infrastructure for Offensive Ops: Air 

Chief Marshal B S Dhanoa,” Indian Express, 9 September 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/

china-airfields-in-tibet-lack-military-infrastructure-for-offensive-ops-air-chief-b-s-dhanoa-4836195/. 

96. Stephen Chen, “How Chinese Mining in the Himalayas May Create a New Military Flashpoint 

with India,” South China Morning Post, 20 May 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2146296/how-chinese-mining-himalayas-may-create-new-military-flashpoint.

97. Manoj Joshi, “After Doklam, Military Postures Continue to Escalate in India, China,” Asia Times, 

23 March 2018, http://www.atimes.com/post-doklam-military-postures-continue-escalate-india-china/; 

and Tellis interview. The IAF has problems with operations in mountainous regions.

98. Indian officials, interviews by the author, New Delhi, 11 December 2017. India, the United States, 

and Japan see China’s actions in Doklam as part of its “salami-slicing” tactics that Beijing is also employing in the South China Sea and East China Sea. 

99. Commodore C. Uday Bashkar (Indian Navy, retired), director, South Asia Monitor, interview by 

the author, New Delhi, 8 December 2018.

100.Sahgal and Ahuja interview. These two retired officers recommend strategic-level discussions and 

red-blue-green gaming first; technology transfer second; and the development of India’s conventional deterrent third.

101.“Wargaming,” RAND Corporation, accessed 14 June 2018, https://www.rand.org/topics/wargaming.html

102.US official, to the author, e-mail, 5 December 2017.

103.Indian officials, interviews by the author, New Delhi, 11 December 2011.

104.Chauhan interview.

105.Chauhan interview. 

106.Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview.

107.Indian officials, interviews by the author, New Delhi, 11 December 2017.

108.US officials, interviews by the author, New Delhi, 5 December 2017.

109.Chauhan interview.

110.Stuti Banerjee, India World Affairs Council, interview by the author, New Delhi, 8 December 

2017. 

111.Matheswaran interview. In such a case, India needs to explicitly state that the United States and 

India are working together in a contingency and not as part of an alliance.
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A Pathway toward Enhancing the USAF–Indian Air Force Partnership

112.Tellis interview.

113.Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview. A number of hurdles need to be crossed before the IAF and IN can 

achieve interoperability.

114.Press Trust of India, “Indian, U.S. Air Forces to Deepen Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Region: U.S. 

Air Force Chief,” The Hindu, 4 February 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-us-airforces-to-deepen-cooperation-in-indo-pacific-us-air-force-chief/article22650919.ece.

115.Some think tanks that the USAF could interact with include the Centre for Peace and Conflict 

Studies; Institute for Defence and Security Analyses; Observer Research Foundation; and Brookings India.

116.Jaishankar interview.

117.Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview. If the US president were to impress upon the Indian prime minister the urgency of lowering bureaucratic barriers to International Military Education and Training 

(IMET), engagement, exchanges, and exercises, the USAF–IAF partnership would develop more rapidly.

118.Gen Goldfein was supposed to fly the HAL Sukhoi MKI but could not due to technical difficulties. Previously, there was concern that these aircraft needed to undergo air worthiness certification, the 

wait could be worth it, but this concern was overcome.

119.US official, to the author, e-mail, 5 December 2017. Lockheed Martin does not want to advocate 

for the F-35, which may distract India from the F-16 Block 70. Also, most Indian in leaders have not 

shown much enthusiasm for the idea of acquiring the F-35 given the expense.

120.Jaishankar interview. If Lockheed Martin could make the F-35 case privately to the Indian government, perhaps as a follow-on aircraft to the F-16 Block 70, the chances for a sale would increase.

121.Ibid. If USCENTCOM would give India special treatment, the IAF–USAF relationship would 

benefit.

122.Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview. If Prime Minister Modi would intervene, the process of signing the 

BECA would accelerate.

123.Panda, “LSA, CISMOA, BECA.”

124.Pushpindar Singh, Society for Aerospace Studies, interview by the author, New Delhi, December 

2017.

125.Air Marshal Anil Chopra, IAF, retired, “India’s Military Space Program,” South Asia Defence & 

Strategic Review 11, no. 5, (November–December 2017). http://www.defstrat.com/india%E2%80%99smilitary-space-program. The ISC is jointly operated by all the three services of the Indian Armed Forces, 

the civilian Department of Space, and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).

126.Nair and Khalsa, “Toward U.S.–India Missile Defense Cooperation.”

127.Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview. The IN purchased vessels from Russia in the past, and Russia does 

not want US equipment installed on its ships. Therefore, some IN ships have difficulty communicating 

with each other.

128.US official, to the author, e-mail, 5 December 2017.

129.Nayanima Basu, “Full Transfer of Tech in Defence Aviation is Non-negotiable,” The Hindu, 21 

November 2017, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/full-transfer-of-tech-in-defenceaviation-is-nonnegotiable/article9968794.ece. “Keith Webster, Senior Vice-President (Defence and Aerospace), US-India Strategic Partnership Forum (USISPF), said while the Trump administration is excited 

about the $10-billion single-engine fighter jet deal, Lockheed Martin will not be going for full transfer of 

technology. In an interview with BusinessLine, he said if India decides to buy the F-16s, the first few 

planes will be bought off the shelf.”

130.Press Trust of India, “Boeing Says F/A-18 Super Hornet Fighter Jet Can Help India Grow Its Aerospace Ecosystem” Economic Times, 18 May 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
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boeing-says-f/a-18-super-hornet-fighter-jet-can-help-india-grow-its-aerospace-ecosystem/articleshow/64175203.cms.

131.Jaishankar interview. There are approximately 4,000 F-16s worldwide.

132.Mike Stone, “Lockheed Signs Pact with Tata to Make F-16 Planes in India,” Reuters, 17 June 2017 

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-airshow-paris-india-idUSKBN19A1G0.

133.Behera interview. The Ministry of External Affairs disqualified the F-16 and FA/18 during the last 

MRCA competition in 2014. There is still a question concerning whether Lockheed Martin and Boeing 

can rebid.

134.Ajit Kumar Dubey, “Setback for IAF’s Plans to Arm Fighter Jets with Meteor Missiles,” India Today, 4 June 2018, https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/iaf-s-meteor-missile-plans-likely-to-take-ahit-1249650-2018-06-04.

135.Iyer-Mitra and Singh interview. There will be no money in the budget for a possible Gripen deal 

with Saab before the 2019 elections. Also, there needs to be a two-year lead time for the purchase, which 

means that 2024 is the earliest date that the Gripens could arrive.

136.US officials, interviews with the author, New Delhi, 5 December 2017. Evidently, IAF leaders preferred the Gripen and were giving lip service to the F-16.

137.US official, to the author, e-mail, 27 September 2018. China participated in Operation VOSTOK 

with Russia in September 2018. The United States and India could engage in similar large-scale exercises 

to bolster India as a strong partner.

138.Harinder Sekhon, Vivekenanda Institute, interview with the author, New Delhi, 29 November 

2017.

Dr. Stephen F. Burgess, has been professor of international security studies, US Air War College 

since June 1999. He has published books and numerous articles, book chapters and monographs on 

Asian and African security issues, peace and stability operations, and weapons of mass destruction. 

His books include The United Nations under 

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-97 and South Africa’s 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. His recent journal 

articles include “Multilateral Defense Cooperation 

in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region: Tentative Steps toward a Regional NATO?” Contemporary Security Policy, (December 2017): 1–22; and “Rising Bipolarity 

in the South China Sea: The Impact of the US Rebalance to Asia on China’s Expansion,” Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 1 (April 2016); and “The 

US Pivot to Asia and Renewal of the US-India Strategic Partnership,” Comparative Strategy 34, no. 44 

(July 2015). He holds a doctorate from Michigan 

State University (1992) and has been on the faculty 

at the University of Zambia, University of Zimbabwe, Vanderbilt University, and Hofstra University.
Spring 2019 | 47

Preparing for the Last War

Insurgency in the Era of Great Power Competition

Karl Umbrasas

China’s economic influence poses a threat to the international balance of power.1 China uses its economic influence to achieve geopolitical goals that 

directly threaten US interests. This is seen in China’s economic infusion in Latin 

America, which increases China’s influence in the Western Hemisphere relative to 

the United States.2 China organized the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, 

and South Africa into a structure that evades US economic leadership, and China 

created its own banking system to rival the World Bank—a US-led institution.3 In 

2013, China announced its intention to create land and sea corridors that would 

reorient the world economy toward China.4 This One Belt One Road (OBOR) 

initiative will also offer China a trade route through Eurasia should the South 

China Sea (SCS) be closed to commerce due to a conflict in the waters. The Eurasian trade route, however, is vulnerable to disruption by religious and ethnicbased insurgency from groups in Central Asia. Lessons from insurgencies and 

proxy wars during the Cold War may inform an approach to frustrating China’s 

advance through Eurasia. This article begins by examining some of the insurgencies sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 

This is followed by an examination of the sociopolitical context in regions along 

the OBOR. Lessons learned from this examination are then applied to policy recommendations for US competition with China.

Learning from the Past

A popular injunction among strategists is that preparation for the next war 

based on the last war is dangerous.5 This point is highlighted in Western Europe’s 

ineptitude against Germany at the beginning of World War II.6 France, for example, prepared its forces in the 1930s for a war that resembled the Great War, emDisclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA) are those of the 

authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article 

may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the JIPA requests a courtesy line.
48 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Umbrasas

phasizing static lines of defense.7 Preparation along these lines proved disastrous 

for France, which capitulated six weeks after the German invasion. German maneuver warfare evolved substantially from 1918 and allowed Germany to outclass 

Allied forces decisively at the war’s outset. Even with these evolved tactics, Germany eventually found itself in a protracted, multi-front war, which contributed 

to its downfall—just as it had in 1918. Though extrapolating the past merits caution, a look to the past can offer a glimpse of recurring historical patterns, such as 

those inherent in great power competition.

One historical pattern in great power competition is the presence of insurgency.8

Low-intensity conflict, such as insurgency, is a likelihood in great power competition because high-end military capabilities tend to deter direct conflict and push 

the fighting to the geopolitical periphery.9 The high-end military capability that is 

perhaps most effective at deterring direct conflict among great powers is nuclear 

weapons.10 Nuclear weapons likely prevented the United States and the Soviet 

Union (USSR) from turning the Cold War hot during their 45-year standoff. Instead of nuclear escalation, both nations engaged in proxy wars, many of which 

were insurgencies.

Support for insurgencies was deliberate and a matter of foreign policy.11 Geopolitics—not the religious, ethnic, or social grievances that animated these conflicts—was the driving force behind the support. Insurgencies provided the great 

powers a forum for war by other means.12 This forum allowed the United States 

and the USSR to vie for influence on the world stage by promulgating their respective ideologies and economic systems—many times through subversion and 

violence. Proxies would be selected and shaped for their capacity to effect social, 

political, or economic change through low-intensity conflict.13

For the United States, this policy could be traced back to the containment approach articulated by George Kennan.14 Kennan observed that the Soviet Union 

sought to flood the world with its influence, but if the Soviet Union encountered 

sufficient resistance in a particular region, it would redirect its attempt to exploit 

other opportunities.15 The Soviet persistence in spreading its influence necessitated 

a long-term strategy that contained Soviet expansion, rather than anticipated a single decisive victory. Efforts to contain Soviet expansion could be seen in the counterinsurgencies and insurgencies supported by the United States. Two notable examples, each with starkly different characters, were in Vietnam and Nicaragua.

In addition to containing Soviet expansion, support for low-intensity conflict 

facilitated a bloodletting of the Soviet Union, which—coupled with other instru-
Spring 2019 | 49

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ments of power—had a ruinous effect on Soviet viability.16 The Soviet’s Afghanistan experience is a prime example. The protracted conflict caused great fiscal 

strain on the Soviet economy at the same time the Soviets relied heavily upon an 

unstable oil market. Saudi Arabia quadrupled its oil output in 1985, which caused 

a collapse in oil prices and significant loss in revenue for the Soviets, exacerbating 

preexisting problems feeding the latter’s population and funding its government.17

Furthermore, the Soviet military experienced its own bloodletting as it struggled to 

adjust to the mujahedeen’s unconventional warfare in Afghanistan.18 By the end of 

the Afghan War, the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse.

Insurgency was also an important way to degrade great power influence, so it 

could not be concentrated on other priorities during the Cold War. The Soviet 

Union’s involvement in Latin America sought to distract the United States from 

other regions of the world by creating instability in the Western Hemisphere.19

The Soviets’ communist ally, Cuba, also sought to dissipate US global influence by 

sponsoring low-intensity conflict in Africa and Latin America.20 Ernesto “Che” 

Guevara inveighed in his 1967 message to the Tricontinental Conference of Marxist revolutionaries from around the globe that the world needed “many Vietnams” 

to overextend the United States to facilitate its demise.21 The Soviet Union specifically supported revolutionary movements in Latin America to make the United 

States less effective in its global competition with the USSR.22 The Soviets’ longterm objective for this type of influence was to eventually supplant US influence in 

Latin America.

The effects sought by the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere were multifaceted. The Soviets believed that supporting insurgencies in Latin America would 

threaten American security interests, such as access to the Panama Canal. Security 

threats and instability in the Western Hemisphere would result in a siphoning of 

resources and attention from other more contested Soviet interests elsewhere in the 

world. The Soviets believed that the United States had to become deeply involved 

in Latin America to stop a cascade of revolutions in the region. Yet, direct involvement in the region by the United States, according to the Soviets, would draw international condemnation and harm American credibility. The Soviets supported 

insurgencies in Latin America through intermediaries and surrogates to avoid a direct provocation of the United States.23

Currently, China’s ongoing ties to Latin America has gained American attention. 

Most conspicuous is China’s economic statecraft in the region. China has already 

invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the region and has pledged more. 
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Though China is not overtly hostile in Latin America, its influence is not necessarily benign. China supports the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra 

América (ALBA, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), an organization hostile to US interests and a counterbalance to US-led organizations in the 

region.24 China’s assistance has helped fund the Bolivarian socialist projects that 

emanate from these countries. Bolivarian threats are notable for their potential to 

cause great instability in the region.25 China’s influence in Latin America, such as 

its support for ALBA, could be perceived as a way of undermining of the US-led 

order in the hemisphere and a glimpse of its worldwide ambitions.26 Chinese support to these regimes could also grow into something directly hostile to US security, such as the Super Insurgency across Latin America promulgated by the nowdeceased Hugo Chavez and his acolytes.27 Even if not overtly hostile now, growing 

Chinese influence and capacity in Latin America can emerge as a capability directly hostile to the United States in the future.

Characteristics of Cold War Insurgencies

Several authors have distilled the elements of successful insurgencies. Robert 

Taber’s classic work on guerilla warfare, for example, showed the importance of the 

insurgents’ ability to inspire revolutionary fervor within local populations.28 Successful insurgents nurtured their connection with the community because it was 

essential to the insurgents’ survival. Organic connection with local populations is a 

strength insurgents have that poses an ongoing problem for counterinsurgents. 

Another important advantage enjoyed by insurgents is initiative. Insurgents begin 

the war and decide where and when to strike. They enjoy increased mobility and 

decreased territorial commitments. Victory for the insurgent is merely survival. 

This is the so-called “war of the flea,” where a protracted conflict against an amorphous foe results in eventual exhaustion of military, political, and economic resources to sustain the fight. The Cuban Revolution exemplifies these aspects of insurgency. Fidel Castro’s revolutionaries occupied a remote area of Cuba, where he 

and his fidelistas enjoyed sanctuary, while recruiting soldiers and running an economy. The government army was quite vulnerable to ambush by the fidelistas, who 

would only fight when the odds were in their favor. This resulted in constrained 

movement by government forces, which were rendered ineffective by the guerilla 

tactics. Although not a proxy war between the United States and Soviet Union, 

Castro’s victory soon resulted in Cuba’s affiliation with the Soviets and posed a 

source of ongoing concern in the Western Hemisphere.
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Unlike the Cuban Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent insurgency there could be seen as a fight by proxy between the United States 

and Soviets. One of the most important aspects of the mujahideen’s success was 

the ongoing and substantial support they received from outside sources, most notably the United States.29 The insurgents received increasing levels of monetary and 

materiel support that allowed them to equalize aspects of the fight with the Soviets. This was clearly seen in the delivery of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles 

that allowed the insurgents to degrade the Soviet air capability. Yet, the insurgents 

did not have to defeat the Soviets in a conventional sense. They simply had to survive and continue to drain Soviet will and capability. Furthermore, in addition to 

insurgent tactics, the conduct of the Soviets had an important role in the insurgents’ success. The Soviets did not have a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, so 

they brought conventional military hardware to the fight with the intent that they 

would “crush” the insurgents. The insurgents’ mobility, in addition to weapons 

that equalized certain aspects of the battlefield, allowed them to surprise, exhaust, 

and ultimately prevail against the Soviets. The Soviet Union lacked legitimacy 

throughout the conflict, both within the Afghan culture and within the international community, which continued to harm Soviet efforts for the duration of the 

war.

Nicaragua was another battleground for a proxy fight between the United States 

and Soviet Union. The Soviets supplied the Sandinista government with military 

hardware, including tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and helicopters. The United 

States, by contrast, provided funding and assistance to the counterrevolutionaries 

(i.e., “Contras”) that fought the Soviet-backed Sandinista government. The United 

States also provided substantial support to covert operations during the insurgency—targeting important infrastructure, such as bridges, oil pipelines, and harbors—and supported the targeted killing of Sandinista leaders.30 Both the insurgents and counterinsurgents adapted to their adversaries’ tactics during the 

conflict. The Contras, however, remained viable by not giving up. Their persistence led to political talks within the government and ended in success when a 

US-backed candidate was elected president of Nicaragua. An overarching factor 

that contributed to the insurgents’ success was ongoing US support.

China and the Road to Insurgency

China’s pursuit of regional dominance is inherently hostile to US interests. 

China wants to displace the United States as the dominant power in the Indo-Pa-
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cific region and aspires toward reshaping the international system to make it more 

favorable to Chinese interests.31 China is rapidly modernizing its military, while 

also asserting its military prowess in the absence of American presence. China employs other instruments of power, such as economic, diplomatic, and intelligence, 

to persuade or coerce weaker states to conform to its priorities.32

The United States, according to China, is employing a containment strategy to 

stifle China’s influence.33 In addition to pressure by the United States, China has 

ongoing tension with its neighboring states related to issues of sovereignty near its 

territorial waters. Because of these constraints, China has looked to its west and 

south for ways to ensure its economic and political viability without being exclusively reliant upon the SCS. The OBOR initiative is a way to achieve that aim. 

China’s OBOR extends economic and political influence throughout the Eurasian 

landmass, offering a way to reshape the international order by making China central to the world’s economy. The OBOR has a number of trade corridors across 

Eurasia (i.e., the belt) and the Indian Ocean (i.e., the road). Countries involved in 

the land belt include China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 

Iran, Turkey, and Russia. The sea road includes stops in Malaysia, Indonesia, India, 

Sri Lanka, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, and Egypt.

China’s project relies on safe travel through states with social, political, and economic difficulties. Most of the states involved in the OBOR have elevated warnings for instability.34 A substantial number of states have either a high warning or a 

very high warning for instability. Other states have alert status, and one, Somalia, 

has a very high alert status.35 This suggests that some of the locations China will 

rely upon for its project cannot ensure safety of the commerce, and for those that 

can, preexisting instability leaves those countries at risk for further decline. Many 

of these countries have high levels of grievance within their populations, which is a 

major factor in societal discord and, in conjunction with other factors, insurgency.

China itself may be vulnerable to insurgency within and across its borders. 

China has a sizable Muslim Ethnic-Uyghur population, which has a range of 

grievances and a history of uprisings. One of the land belt corridors will pass 

through the Uyghur autonomous region in Xinjiang province. A major grievance 

held by the Uyghurs in China is related to their minority status and China’s identification of them as a problem group. China has enforced interethnic mingling, 

suppressed Uyghur language instruction, and stifled Uyghur political expression.36

Chinese authorities have hastily imprisoned millions of Uyghurs and placed others 

in re-education camps that entail degrading treatment and insensitivity to cultural 
Spring 2019 | 53

 Preparing for the Last War

and religious observations. China’s response has left the Uyghur population with a 

sense that its culture is in jeopardy.37

Figure 1. Testimony of former Uyghur detainee. Mihrigul Tursun, a Uyghur woman who was detained in China, testifies at the National Press Club in Washington about the mass internment camps in China and the abuses she suffered 

therein. (Department of State photo by David A. Peterson)

The perception that Muslim cultures are in jeopardy has animated Islamic radicals for decades. The Soviet Union and then the United States became the target of 

Islamist hatred for what was perceived as outside powers attacking Muslim societies. With the OBOR, China may have a similar experience. A number of Islamic 

non-state actors are active in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), al-Qaeda, and the Eastern 

Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).38 Kyrgyzstan, for instance, has witnessed a 

number of fighters travel to and from Syria to participate to fight alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Kyrgyzstan government has been concerned that terrorists may leave Afghanistan and occupy the country’s mountainous region, which could become a sanctuary for fighters. In 2016, a person 
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identified as a Uyghur separatist detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive 

device outside the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, suggesting specific animus toward 

China.39

China’s belt initiative through Central Asia travels through a milieu of risk factors for insurgency. Successful insurgencies historically have been able to mobilize 

local grievances, often of a peasant nature, and take control of rural areas, while 

forcing a larger foe into a state of protracted conflict.40 Insurgencies benefit from 

irregular terrain, which provides challenges to counterinsurgents and cover for insurgents.41 Most importantly, insurgencies require support from a sympathetic 

population.42 Insurgencies in the twenty-first century are notable for their cultural 

and religious motivators, which offer potential for broader bases of support.43

Moreover, twenty-first-century insurgencies are transnational rather than confined 

to specific borders; so, they may involve larger swathes of territory and have uprisings in regions dislocated from the main theater.

These factors appear prevalent among China’s proposed Central Asian belt. China’s attempted exploitation of the region may appear colonial as it invests in projects that support Beijing’s economic interests rather than those of the local populations. Western liberalism is notably absent from Chinese policy, suggesting that 

human rights and individual freedoms may be absent from its international development projects. Instead, China’s authoritarianism may be projected along with its 

investments in the region, further inflaming tension with indigenous populations 

that do not conform to China’s plans. The propensity for Chinese initiatives to 

stimulate popular backlash is seen in Ecuador, where resistance to Chinese projects 

has included violent protests.44

China’s close ties to the regimes in Muslim countries may agitate Islamic fundamentalists. Muslim countries have remained relatively silent on China’s treatment 

of the Uyghur population. Such silence is seen as the result of close trade relations 

with China.45 China’s relationships with Muslim regimes may inflame grievances, 

however, as it ties into a common Islamist narrative that apostate Muslim leaders 

regularly sell out their coreligionists for secular opportunities. As such, regimes 

that cooperate with China on the OBOR may be at risk for hostility directed at 

them from Islamist elements within their own populations.

China’s Uyghurs and neighboring non-state actors pose a potential threat for a 

transnational insurgency against China’s interest in Central Asia based on ethnoreligious grievances. As China’s influence in Central Asia grows, local populations 

may perceive China more as an imperialist power whose basic tenets are antitheti-
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cal to the Muslim societies its project spans. Though this appears to be an organic 

confluence of factors for insurgency, insurgency could be accelerated by outside organization and support.46 Resistance to China’s OBOR project could even bring 

larger instability to the region as the weak states involved in the OBOR may themselves be vulnerable to collapse due to insurgent violence.47 China’s approach to 

COIN is hard-power centric, which may only perpetuate insurgent violence, and 

leave China in a protracted conflict in Central Asia.48

A Strategic Opportunity for the United States

China’s OBOR project portends a scenario where China encounters insurgents 

in Central Asia and elsewhere. The current geopolitical context may support and 

accelerate the collision of China and Islamists. This scenario leaves the United 

States with an opportunity for a bait-and-bleed strategy through which China and 

Islamist fighters degrade each other, while the United States remains physically out 

of the fray.49 The United States is decreasing its footprint in certain locations 

around the world, while China is actively increasing its own. This may gain China 

more recognition as a self-interested, colonial power. China’s mistreatment of its 

Uyghur minority and its heavy-handed means of repression may only serve to inflame Islamist fervor as China becomes more and more noticeable on the world 

stage. Moreover, the weakness of many states China seeks to partner with in its 

economic endeavor increases the chances that the states will fail if faced with ongoing violence, leaving China with loss of investment and conflict.

Consistent with the transnational nature of contemporary insurgencies, resentment of the OBOR may also occur in regions outside of Central Asia. Somalia, for 

example, is a projected stop on China’s sea road and is exceedingly unstable and 

teeming with extremists. China’s activity in Central Asia could become a rallying 

cry for extremists in Somalia, who by themselves would not likely need an issue 

such as China’s treatment of Uyghurs to foment chaos. China’s belt and road also 

come into contact with a number of other countries with politically active Muslim 

populations that might take issue with China’s treatment of the Uyghurs and China’s exportation of Beijing’s worldview. This could create a potential for protest 

and agitation against countries that deal with China. The center of gravity in this 

scenario, however, would be in Central Asia, where treatment of the Uyghurs and 

the exportation of China’s self-interest becomes a local and possibly an international issue.
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The United States would benefit from a bait-and-bleed strategy, but it is not 

without US investment. The United States would have to keep Afghanistan from 

being the main attraction for foreign fighters for this strategy’s maximum impact. 

The Afghan government is not strong enough to protect its territory without US 

assistance, which leaves the United States with an important role in securing the 

country. To do this, the United States would have to increase troop numbers in Afghanistan substantially to provide proper training for Afghan forces and to secure 

Afghanistan’s borders—particularly its eastern flank.50 A strong US presence in Afghanistan that pushes fighters out of the country would leave China’s OBOR an 

easy target for displaced fighters. The displacement of fighters from Afghanistan in 

conjunction with clarion calls to take up arms against China’s imperialism may 

make China’s commerce belt through Central Asia the target of insurgent activity, 

just as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria were attractions to fighters in the recent past. 

China may naturally seek to secure its route, which invites a protracted fight between a COIN-naïve Chinese military and Islamist radicals. Though the United 

States would remain out of the fight, US troops in Afghanistan would be an important deterrent to China seeking entry to Afghanistan to draw fighters away 

from its trade route.

Peace and security in Afghanistan have a direct relationship to concentration of 

fighters—or potential fighters—along the OBOR. Though a substantial US troop 

presence is important to secure Afghanistan’s borders, troops in Afghanistan nonetheless attract foreign fighters, which may deplete the concentration of fighters 

along the OBOR. A peace negotiation with the Taliban would help minimize the 

incentive for foreign fighters to enter Afghanistan and would provide plausibility 

for a large troop presence in the country. A peace agreement that links alteration of 

location and mission of US troops and likelihood of eventual withdrawal to the 

Taliban’s acceptance of peace and stability may be possible considering the latter 

has shown signs of willingness to negotiate, and though militarily confident, is realistic about its marginal prospects of retaking Kabul anytime soon.51 A negotiation such as this would be consistent with recent trends of continued talks about a 

peace agreement in Afghanistan. Perhaps more importantly, however, a peace 

agreement would allow maximal concentration on competition with China.

Inability for the OBOR initiative to get started, or its failure once begun, would 

highlight China’s lack of options for power projection. The inability of China to 

create its land-based trade route leaves China beholden to the SCS. Since the US 

Navy is the dominant sea power in the region, this forces China to accede to US 
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presence or engage in a sea-based confrontation that aims at expelling the US presence from the SCS. China’s military build-up and provocations in the waters suggests it may eventually choose a path of naval confrontation. Not only is entering 

battle with an experienced and technologically superior navy perilous, it is also 

self-injurious because China is highly dependent upon exports and needs the SCS 

open to commerce. More than 60 percent of China’s trade travels by sea; so China’s waters are extremely critical to Beijing’s overall viability.52 Yet, trillions of dollars from the global economy also transit the waters, including commerce from 

close US allies, such as Japan. As such, a conflagration in the SCS would have 

wide-ranging implications, which would have negative effects on the United States 

and its allies, not just China. Even so, the implications are existential for China, 

whose economy mostly relies on safe passage in its waters.

Preparing for the Last War

Insurgencies had an important role during the last great power competition. The 

United States and Soviet Union used insurgencies to great effect—most successfully by the former, however, which was the winner of the Cold War. The great 

power competition with China may also call for alternatives to open warfare, degrading China’s strength without entering into a high-end confrontation. As with 

past competitions, proxy fights are only one aspect of the larger contest. Other instruments of power will be necessary to maximize the effect of a bait-and-bleed 

strategy. The economy, for example, will play an important role in sealing China’s 

fate—as will diplomacy with allies and strategic partners.

A bait-and-bleed strategy against China would be advantageous to the United 

States, but it would not be conclusive. At the end of the fight, a foe would still exist. If China endures, it would probably be degraded after fighting a protracted insurgency, which would invite other opportunities to continue bloodletting or even 

a change in strategy, such as a golden bridge that allows China to return to the 

global economy as a productive member—but certainly not as regional hegemon. 

If Islamists sufficiently stall the Chinese from getting through Central Asia, the remaining Islamists would need to be addressed. This would require timely engagement by the US military to prevent a repeat of the aftermath of the Soviet–Afghan 

War, where US disinterest fed Islamists’ delusion of grandeur. This would also underscore the importance of diplomacy in the region as well as a secure Afghanistan. 

Even if China’s economic plans for Central Asia and beyond encounter significant 

obstacles, it is still possible that China would consider seizing control of the SCS 
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by force. Yet, because China is so dependent on the sea lanes, such a move could 

be perilous, as China would effectively be shut out from the world economy.

A sharp halt to China’s economy would place great strain on the communist regime. The hundreds of millions of Chinese who attained middle-class status and 

the hundreds of millions who live in poverty comparable to sub-Saharan-Africa 

would experience a dramatic downgrade in their way of life. This would pose a 

new source of unrest for China, a country with a history of factions. As China’s 

economy faded so would its regime’s power. The Chinese economy would dissipate 

quickly with a SCS fight because China needs access to ports where materials imported so it can make products that it then exports. Since violence increases when 

power is at risk, economic catastrophe that delegitimizes the regime may precipitate harsher crackdowns by the government, which would likely invite more rebelliousness and fictionalization.53 A SCS fight may produce revolutionary fervor 

within China’s own borders.

Policy Recommendations

Information operations should take place that amplify the plight of the Uyghurs 

on the world stage. News organizations should be encouraged to cover testimonials from dissidents, and stories related to Uyghur mistreatment should be made 

widely available online. Media should be introduced to the environmental enablers 

inherent to the situation, such as ethnic fissures, animosities, authoritarian repression, and others, which may stir passions related to the issue.54 The aim is to create 

awareness of the issue in sympathetic populations around the world and to incite a 

desire to help the Uyghurs out of their plight. This awareness would also reach 

malcontents in certain parts of the world, who are animated by cultural paranoia 

and interested in their next transnational fight. Diplomacy, such as work within 

the United Nations, should make the Uyghurs plight a main topic to legitimize 

the issue and to enhance its media coverage.

Early implementation of information operations is important because China 

may try to deny an unconventional warfare strategy from being employed by continuing to make large investments in the region. Loans, labor jobs, and stimulation 

of local economies, along with promises of returns on investment, could logically 

be targeted at regimes and their indigenous populations with the aim of placating 

them so they do not take up arms against Chinese interests. The limits to buying 

favor are yet to be seen, however. The resentment at China from segments of the 

Muslim world is already burgeoning due to China’s treatment of the Uyghurs. 
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China’s exploitation of the region also underscores its authoritarian character and 

may stimulate resentment by local populations for that reason itself.

China’s economic investment in the region is essentially mismatched to the challenge it faces. China faces a potential religious and ideological battle in Central 

Asia and elsewhere along the OBOR against which economic pledges may have 

little consequence. China’s economic largesse could have a bifurcating effect on 

Muslim societies, where leaders and certain elites may welcome the investment, 

but those same investments may naturally frustrate Islamist interests. A major 

grievance nurtured by Islamist thought is related to the perceived marginalization 

of Muslim orthodoxy by secular interests.55 This belief galvanized resistance to the 

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and has fueled ongoing resentment at the United 

States. A new generation of “near enemies,” therefore, have the potential to emerge 

based on close economic ties to China, in addition to a new “far away enemy” in 

China. Support of apostate Muslim regimes earned the United States great scorn 

and, along with policy toward the Palestinian people, served as the rationale for 

decades of terrorism against the United States, which culminated in the September 

11, 2001 attack.56 This hostility has occurred despite billions of dollars in American aid, opportunities for private investments, and military assistance to Muslimmajority countries. Even after heroic diplomatic efforts, segments of these societies 

maintain a highly distorted and hostile view of the United States. There is no reason to suppose that China’s economic investments would elicit a different reaction 

from radicals in these countries. China’s tendency to suppress basic human rights 

of those it identifies as enemies of the state and Beijing’s other human rights violations may make it simply easier for regional animosity to emerge against China.

Special forces should establish ties with indigenous populations in Central Asia 

to develop allies and to gain knowledge of the culture and language. It is best for 

special forces to develop allies who have secular interests in opposing China’s 

OBOR, such as those found in ethnic-based grievances instead of religious fundamentalism. These allies in the region could be designated key players at the end of 

a successful campaign against China and possibly supported in their efforts to assert control over territory, which itself would be in various levels of disrepair due 

to protracted low-intensity conflict. In addition to indigenous forces deemed favorable to the United States, US diplomats should work channels with Muslim allies in the Middle East and South Asia to motivate politically active Muslims to 

fight for the Uyghurs. China’s mistreatment of the Uyghurs and its imperialism in 

Muslim lands would serve as the siren song of handlers who motivate Islamists 
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Umbrasas

against China, much as Pakistan’s intelligence service motivated warring factions 

against the USSR during the Soviet-Afghan War.57

Intermediaries will be important in accelerating the collision between Islamists 

and China. Though animus would naturally be organic to the situation, materiel 

and personnel would be needed for an effective insurgency. The examination above 

suggests that outside assistance is crucial to successful insurgencies. Indeed, surrogates may be more important in this instance because the United States would 

have no physical role beyond amplifying messages and creating allies close to the 

fight. In a bait-and-bleed strategy, the United States has no real interest in seeing 

the insurgents through to victory as it did with, say, the Contras in Nicaragua. 

Surrogates will also be important in maintaining plausible deniability for the 

United States. Such deniability is important to prevent escalation. However, if the 

Cold War is any lesson, discovery of support for proxies may lead to more proxy 

fights, rather than conventional war.

The United States must underscore its nuclear capability throughout the competition. A critical assumption is that great powers will not engage in a high-end 

fight because they acknowledge that such a confrontation could lead to nuclear escalation. Evidence that the US military is upgrading its nuclear arsenal and that 

US leaders are willing to use nuclear weapons if sufficiently provoked will have an 

important deterrent effect, which is needed to keep the fighting on the geopolitical 

periphery. However, such posturing must occur in a fashion that does not provoke 

unnecessary anticipation of a first strike.

Benefit to the National Security Strategist

The National Security Strategy of the United States holds that America will use 

all instruments of power to prevent regional domination by any country.58 A baitand-bleed strategy against China in Central Asia meets this requirement, while 

also maintaining the United States’ strategic depth. China is but one actor in a 

multipolar world; so, the possibility exists that the United States will be faced with 

other near-peer adversaries concurrent with, or sequential to, open warfare with 

China. A bait-and-bleed strategy would maintain the United States’ high-end military capabilities, while China and Islamists degrade each other. The United States’ 

overmatch capability, as a result, is not degraded with this approach should other 

conflicts erupt.

Another benefit of this strategy is that it can achieve success in defeating China. 

Some of the ablest militaries have historically struggled with insurgencies. In itself, 
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engaging in a protracted COIN would reduce China’s capability to address issues 

it had prioritized, such as those related to regional dominance or undermining the 

international order. Yet, the nature of insurgency in Central Asia along China’s 

OBOR has greater implications because of China’s investment in the project and 

China’s need to diversify its ability to conduct commerce. Denying China its commerce belt through Central Asia would strike at one of China’s vital interests. This 

strategy, therefore, offers a way to weaken China, and, depending on the courses of 

action China chooses during its fight, could lead to the failure of its government.

On Opposing Views and Counterarguments

An opposing view to the strategic approach described above is that insurgencies 

are not always successful against an established power. The irredentist Hmong insurgency in Laos, for example, did not achieve its separatist aims against Laotian 

government forces. This view, however, overlooks the fact that the aim of the above 

strategy is not to install a new regime. Rather, this strategy seeks to impose additional constraints on China that will affect Beijing’s strategic decision making and 

its advance across Eurasia. To be sure, the strategy proposed above is a bait-andbleed strategy that does not have use for insurgents beyond a source of friction 

that frustrates China’s advance. To this end, the insurgents do not have to “win” in 

a conventional sense. This strategy will nonetheless have value if China finds itself 

in a COIN quagmire that drains military, political, and financial resources.

The strategy stands the risk of provoking a Chinese backlash if US support for 

insurgencies against China’s interests are discovered. Despite this, the competition 

between the United States and China is already developing into a game of hardball. American tariffs on Chinese goods and Chinese naval operations that put US 

warships at risk also have potential for backlash. Even if support for insurgency is 

attributed to the United States, such a strategy must be appropriately placed 

within the context of great power competition. In this context, where vital interests are at stake, discovery and its resultant escalation may be an acceptable risk. 

Unconventional warfare would be an unsurprising aspect of great power competition.

This strategy does not aim specifically for regime change in China, but secondand third-order effects of this strategy may occur that result in the implosion of 

the regime. Such an implosion would be due to China’s decision making as it navigates its constraints—not due to an overt US objective. A backlash by China to 

frustration along the OBOR that incites a SCS conflagration and its attendant ef-
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fects on the Chinese economy—and government—would be a chain of events set 

in motion by Beijing. Within the context of great power competition, China faces 

a number of threats to its internal stability that Beijing must carefully manage. 

China’s intentional or accidental provocation of a conventional naval confrontation, for example, carries risks for regime instability as does its economic maneuvering. Great power competition is naturally perilous.

The above strategy not only affects China but also impacts those countries that 

may host fighting between insurgents and China. Central Asian countries may 

find themselves the battleground for increased insurgent activity against China. 

Diplomatic and political backlash against the United States may occur if America 

is seen as the instigator of these insurgents. It is clear that Central Asia currently 

has an Islamist problem, with a number of Islamist terrorist groups active in the 

region. Some of these groups may share not only a religious affiliation with the 

Uyghurs but also an ethnic connection. This has nothing to do with the United 

States and everything to do with the counterterrorism policies of these countries 

that left their nations vulnerable to non-state actors. The willingness of the United 

States to step out of the way and allow insurgents and China to inflict damage on 

each other is simply not a legitimate grievance against the United States.

It is important to underscore that the strategy discussed above is a theoretical 

discussion of geopolitics. Since this strategy deals with future events, it cannot be 

known whether the strategy would unfold as discussed. Important facts can change 

or emerge that might alter the course of this approach. For instance, this strategy 

expects that the same animus that emerged against the USSR and United States 

from Islamic radicals would emerge against China. Yet, certain geopolitical events 

could mitigate such hostility and therefore alter the strategy. Despite this limitation, the above discussion can elucidate geopolitical vulnerabilities that exist in isolation or as a whole, which can inform strategic competition with China.

Conclusion

Insurgency played a major role during the last great power competition between 

the United States and Soviet Union. The history of insurgency in this context 

shows that proxy wars can distract, drain, and, in conjunction with other factors, 

contribute to the downfall of a major power. This does not suggest that the situation presently studied is a carbon copy of the past; most certainly it is not. Constraints exist, however, that make patterns more likely to occur, such as an effort to 
Spring 2019 | 63

 Preparing for the Last War

avoid nuclear conflict or a large-scale war. Certain geopolitical realities serve as 

powerful motivators for war by other means.

China’s actions against its Uyghur minority and its influence projection have a 

ready-made adversary in Islamist fighters who are themselves targets of American 

lethal operations. A strategy that fosters the collision of Islamist fighters and China 

is advantageous to the United States, which can remain out of the physical fight 

while each foe exhausts the other. This strategy defeats China’s attempt at regional 

domination and undermining of the world order by distracting and eroding China’s political, economic, and military capabilities. Failure with the OBOR initiative would leave China beholden to the SCS. Though this reality could cause 

China to attempt to dominate its waters, doing so would quickly suffocate its 

economy, placing its regime at risk. Very importantly, this strategy prevents the 

United States’ high-end capability from being depleted against China in open warfare. This conservation of resources is particularly needed in the multipolar world, 

where other competitors with high-end capabilities themselves can attack the 

United States’ interests around the world or in the homeland. JIPA

Notes

1. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap? (New 

York: Mariner, 2017), 24.

2. Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd Commander, United States Southern Command 

Before the 115th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 February 2018, http://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SOUTHCOM_2018_Posture_Statement_FINAL.PDF?ver=2018-02-15-090330-243.

3. Allison, Destined for War, 23. 

4. China Power Team, “How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s Interests?” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 May 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-beltand-road-initiative/.

5. Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, The Past as Prologue: The Importance of 

History to the Military Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2.

6. Williamson Murray, “Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly 

16, (Summer 1997), 69. 

7. Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, 2nd ed. (New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68.

8. Department of the Army, US Army Counterinsurgency Handbook (New York: Skyhorse, 

2007), xv. 

9. Ibid.

10. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 11. 
64 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Umbrasas

11. Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends 

in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), xiii, https://www.

rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2001/MR1405.pdf. 

12. Ibid, 32. 

13. See, Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1995); and van Creveld, Transformation of War, 22.

14. George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 65 (July 1947): 852–

68. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Abigail Linnington, “Unconventional Warfare in US Foreign Policy: US Support of Insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Iraq from 1979-2001” (dissertation, Fletcher School of 

Law and Diplomacy, 2012), https://dl.tufts.edu/bookreader/tufts:21948#page/1/mode/2up. 

17. Yegor Gaidar, “The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil,” American Enterprise Institute for Public 

Policy Research, April 2007, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20070419_Gaidar.

pdf.

18. Scott R. McMichael, “The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War,” Parameters

19 (December 1989), 22, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/1989/1989%20

mcmichael.pdf. 

19. Director of Central Intelligence, Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1982), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/19820625.pdf.

20. Gavriel D. Ra’anan, The Evolution of the Soviet Use of Surrogates in Military Relations with the 

Third World, with Particular Emphasis on Cuban Participation in Africa (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1979), 16, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P6420.pdf. 

21. William Ratliff, “Che Guevara, Apostle of War” Hoover Digest 2008, no. 1 (16 January 

2008), https://www.hoover.org/research/che-guevara-apostle-war.

22. Director of Central Intelligence, Soviet Policies and Activities.

23. Ibid., 3.

24. R. Evan Ellis, “The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America,” Perry 

Paper Series, no. 1 (Washington, DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 

2013), https://www.williamjperrycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication_associated_files/

The%20Strategic%20Dimension%20of%20Chinese%20Engagement%20with%20Latin%20

America.pdf.

25. Max G. Manwaring, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2005), http://strategicstudiesinstitute.

army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf. 

26. See, Ted Piccone, “The Geopolitics of China’s Rise in Latin America,” Geo-economics and 

Global Issues Paper, no. 2 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, November 2016), https://www.

brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america_tedpiccone.pdf; and Ellis, “Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement.”

27. Max G. Manwaring, Latin America’s New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and 

Hugo Chavez (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2007), http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub808.pdf. 

28. Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerilla Warfare (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002), 6, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/

RAND_MG964.1.pdf.
Spring 2019 | 65

 Preparing for the Last War

29. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Faces: Detailed 

Counterinsurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 13. 

30. Ibid., 71. 

31. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The 

White House, 2017), 25, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 

32. Ibid., 46. 

33. Rumi Aoyama, “One Belt, One Road: China’s New Global Strategy,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 5, no. 2 (2017), 5, https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2016.11869094.

34. “2018 Fragile States Index,” Fund for Peace (website), 2018, http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/. 

35. Ibid. 

36. Anna Lipscomb, “Culture Clash: Ethnic Unrest in Xinjiang,” US-China Today, 2016, 

https://china.usc.edu/culture-clash-ethnic-unrest-xinjiang.

37. Ibid. 

38. Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State, “Kyrgyzstan 2017 Crime and Safety 

Report,” 30 January 2017, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21137.

39. Ibid. 

40. See, Metz, Counterinsurgency. 

41. Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein, “Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion,” 

World Politics 42, no 4 (July 1990), 442, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010510.

42. See, John Lynn “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 85, no. 4 

(July–August 2005); and Dragoş Dumitru Iacob, “Historical Models of Insurgency,” Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre 18, no. 3 (September 2013): 240–45.

43. Lynn, “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 22. 

44. R. Evan Ellis, “Ecuador’s Leveraging of China to Pursue an Alternative Political and Developmental Path,” Air Force Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 1, no. 1 (Fall 2018), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-01_Issue-1/07-F-Ellis.pdf.

45. Nithin Coca, “Islamic Leaders Have Nothing to Say about China’s Internment Camps for 

Muslims,” Foreign Policy, 24 July 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/islamic-leadershave-nothing-to-say-about-chinas-internment-camps-for-muslims/.

46. Desai and Eckstein, “Insurgency.”

47. James D. Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97 (February 2003): 75–90. 

48. Liselotte Odgaard and Thomas Galasz Nielsen, “China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” Journal of Contemporary China, 23, no. 87 (2014), 535, https://doi.org/10.108

0/10670564.2013.843934. 

49. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 

153. 

50. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “America’s Afghanistan Problem: It’s Not Just About Sending More 

Troops,” Order from Chaos (blog), 25 May 2017 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2017/05/25/americas-afghanistan-problem-its-not-just-about-sending-more-troops/.

51. Johnny Walsh, “Are the US and the Taliban Finally Ready for Direct Talks?,” United States 

Institute of Peace, 19 July 2018, https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/07/are-us-and-talibanfinally-ready-direct-talks.
66 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Umbrasas

52. China Power Team, “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, 2 August 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-southchina-sea/.

53. Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 1970), 56. 

54. James J. F. Forest, Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), 7. 

55. Ahmad S. Moussalli, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, 

Legitimacy, and the Islamic State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 31. 

56. Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 

of Harvard University Press, 2005), 3.

57. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the 

Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004). 

58. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States, 4. 

Maj Karl Umbrasas, PsyD, US Army, has a master’s degree in intelligence management and a master’s de- gree in terrorism and counterterrorism studies from 

Henley-Putnam School of Strategic Security and cur- rently studies defense and strategic studies with the 

University of Texas, El Paso. He has written on topics 

related to social movements and national security. Um- brasas is an active duty clinical psychologist and foren- sic psychology fellow at the Center for Forensic Behav- ioral Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland.
Spring 2019 | 67

The 2016 European Global Strategy, 

European Union Defense Integration, and 

Asian–European Security Cooperation in a 

Declining Multilateral International Order

David J. Garcia Cantalapiedra

On 10 November 2017, the European Council launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO),1 completing a set of major steps in the 

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and a key movement for an augmented and different European Union (EU) role in global affairs. In June 2016, 

the EU heads of state and government started this process at the European Council Summit, which was mainly dedicated to CSDP. The European Council received, from the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative (VPC/

HR) Federica Mogherini, a new strategic vision, Shared Vision, Common Action: A 

Stronger Europe; A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (often referred to as EU Global Strategy or EUGS). The new vision included a 

CSDP with a more defined role, opening a process for enhancing the effectiveness 

and strengthening of military capabilities and the European defense industry 

through an “Implementation Package.” Undoubtedly, the process and creation of 

such a document and the subsequent initiatives represented a remarkable achievement in the European integration process. However, this is happening in a less 

than favorable context.

The internal and international environment that the EU faced was challenging 

due to several factors: first, the refugee/immigration crisis; second, one of the 

bloodiest years in terrorist attacks on European soil in 10 years; and third, the 

Ukraine crisis—all of which had marked European security with a dangerous conflicting dynamic since 2014. The United States under the Trump administration 

also suggested a difficult future track for transatlantic relations, and finally, the decision by the United Kingdom to abandon the EU, called into question the very 

viability of that organization.2 All these have created a new scenario for the EuroDisclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA) are those of the 

authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may 

be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the JIPA requests a courtesy line.
68 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Garcia Cantalapiedra

pean integration process, for European security, and for the EU goal of “strategic 

autonomy.” However, the seemingly most serious long-term strategic problem 

that the EU is facing is one of the main anchors regarding mission and vision for 

the organization: a declining ability to sustain an already embattled liberal multilateral international order. 

What Liberal Order?

According to international relations theorist John Ikenberry, this would be an 

“open and rule-based international order . . . enshrined in institutions such as the 

United Nations and norms such as multilateralism.”3 This order is composed of 

many elements, each mutually reinforcing. These elements include a set of legitimate global institutions—such as the UN and the World Trade Organization—as 

well as many issue-specific organizations; a set of international legal conventions 

as, for instance, the 1982 Convention on Sea Law; several arms control regimes, 

such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which constrain the actions of states; and an 

emerging set of inchoate, but often powerful, shared norms. However, Hedley 

Bull’s definition of international order could explain better the structure and parameters: ‘‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the 

society of states, or international society.”4 These goals include the preservation of 

the states system, state sovereignty as a principle, general peace among states, and 

the limitations on violence to protect rules of property. However, this order would 

also be a ‘‘World Order’’ that “signifies the regimes of values, morals, and rights 

that extend to all humanity and infuse the international order with a sense of justice and purpose.”5

 It connotes the complex of Western liberal international law 

and economics that is currently institutionalized through international organizations, like the United Nations. Thus, any security order established by the states 

system would be an order in which what states can and cannot do is not simply 

determined by power. Rather, international law constrains the action of states. In 

this vein, the EU holds a proactive trade agenda supporting the multilateral liberal 

international order. On one hand, the EU promotes this agenda through a set of 

administrative areas with several regional actors in Asia and the Americas (states 

and organizations). For instance, the EU has closed a long negotiation with Japan, 

establishing one of the most extensive free trade agreements (FTA) in the world. 

The EU is also Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) second-largest 

trading partner and is a strategic area because the 20 percent of EU trade passes 

through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea.6 The EU also is the biggest 
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The 2016 European Global Strategy and Asian–European Security 

provider of foreign direct investment (FDI) to ASEAN countries, accounting for 

almost a quarter of total FDI in ASEAN. The EU has concluded negotiations for 

bilateral FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam and is negotiating FTAs with several 

other ASEAN countries. These agreements are building blocks toward a future 

full-fledged EU–ASEAN region-to-region FTA. In a March 2017 joint statement, 

the EU and ASEAN agreed to take new steps toward resuming talks for this region-to-region agreement. On the other hand, the “2012 Guidelines on the EU’s 

Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia,”7 reinforced by Mogherini’s address at the 

2015 Shangri-La Dialogue8 and the 2015 Joint Communication to the European 

Parliament and the Council “The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic 

Purpose,”9 includes a roadmap for strengthening EU–ASEAN security cooperation. These documents address challenges such as counterpiracy, cybersecurity, 

maritime security, energy security, environmental security, natural disaster response, conflict mediation, and even potential military contribution in East Asia. 

Meanwhile, EU member states are suppliers of military-relevant technology, including complete weapons systems and components, to Indo-Pacific countries, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. These exports amounted to €44.1 

billion in 2015 (€30.2 billion in 2014).10 However, the impact of the 2008 recession and the whirlpools of the political crisis in the several EU member states and 

the EU as a whole seemed to offer a bleak future. The economic crisis and subsequent political debates included the enacting of reduced budgets in the EU members states (even previous to the crisis) and has affected severely security and defense capabilities, including reductions on deterrence, crisis management, and 

political influence.

Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stridently warned European governments in 2010 about not only defense budget limitations but also a dangerous 

state of affairs regarding going “to too far in the other direction.” From Gates’ perspective, large parts of the public and political class were so averse to military force 

and the risks that go with it that the climate had become an impediment to 

achieving real security:

These budget limitations relate to a larger cultural and political trend affecting 

the alliance. . . . I believes we have reached an inflection point, where much of 

the continent has gone too far in the other direction. . . . The demilitarization of 

Europe—where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to 

military force and the risks that go with it—has gone from a blessing in the 20th 

century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st. 
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Garcia Cantalapiedra

. . . Not only can real or perceived weakness be a temptation to miscalculation and 

aggression, but, on a more basic level, the resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared threats.11

Figure 1. VPC/HR Federica Mogherini in Indo-Pacific. Federica Mogherini meets with Dionísio da Costa Babo 

Soares, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Timor Leste, while attending the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and 

related meetings. (Photo courtesy of European External Action Service)

This situation has generated a dangerous impact on the EU’s political and strategic positions, not only in the short term but, and this is more important, in the 

long term. From an Asian point of view, in spite of the large EU–ASEAN economic and trade relation, this situation could show an image that would create a 

perception of declining ability concerning security cooperation in common security problems and a reduction in the perception of strategic assurance at a time of 

rapid global change. Nevertheless, an absence of a real global vision, instruments, 

and political will would reduce the EU’s credibility for present and future commitments and cooperation. It seems clear the EU is committed to and defends an international rules-based order and an international fair-and-free trade system, but 
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The 2016 European Global Strategy and Asian–European Security 

the changing dynamics in the global security environment could represent a different challenge for the EU, which probably would represent a major game changer 

in the EU strategic vision and mission. Despite the impact of the economic crisis 

and the declining resources to face security and defense matters, a clear message 

regarding the political will, a strong strategic vision, and a clear role for the CSDP 

and its instruments could show further reliability and commitment in these areas—even with reduced mechanisms and options.

Beyond Economics and Trade: Strategic Autonomy and PESCO

However, for the European Union, a narrative of relative decline does not necessarily establish the strategic options available. Indeed, these positions come from a 

particular situation in the domestic politics of the member states and the EU—not 

merely from a social and economic crisis but also from a deep crisis about values 

and objectives. Despite the fact that the new 2016 European Global Strategy makes 

constant reference to the uncertainty in the international system, paradoxically it 

did not explicitly refer to the specific policies to be implemented in this context:

We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. 

Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the 

European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague 

North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is 

yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of 

extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological progress—alongside our deepening partnerships—enable us to thrive, and allow ever 

more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate 

this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared 

interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand 

united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.12

Probably, the 2016 EUGS is not truly a grand strategy as it is far away from attaining that status devised by the major powers. It cannot reach such a level because the EU is not yet such a strategic, unitary, or autonomous player. Second, 

the EUGS is not a security strategy either, because it is undoubtedly weak in content, the hierarchy of threats and challenges, and the means to face such obstacles—although it sees the challenge of sophisticated threats as the effects of asymmetry, interdependence, and multipolarity, including the regional crises in the 

Union’s eastern and southern neighborhoods. The EU faces a security dilemma 
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Garcia Cantalapiedra

mainly created by the reduction of capabilities during the 2008 recession and the 

perception of a partial abandonment of the transatlantic alliance by the United 

States. Nevertheless, the EUGS is a foreign policy project, framing security and defense aspects within the context of the EU’s external action and setting out the 

main principles, values, and operational patterns of the Union’s international conduct. In this vein, and with the goal of strategic autonomy in mind, the EU institutions launched a set of initiatives during 2016, the so-called “Winter Package”—

the Implementation Plan on Security and Defense (to respond to external conflicts 

and crises). These initiatives cover the full range of CSDP tasks in civilian and military crisis management, capacity building of partners to strengthen the CSDP, 

and protecting the Union and its citizens along the nexus of internal and external 

security. The other main initiatives are a European Defense Action Plan and a joint 

NATO–EU declaration. The European Council also invited the VPC/HR and the 

European Defense Agency to create a Coordinated Annual Review on Defense 

(CARD) that will help foster capability development, addressing shortfalls, deepening defense cooperation, and ensuring more optimal use—including coherence 

of defense spending plans. Following this track, the next step was to launch the 

“Defense Package” in June 2017. This initiative includes two main elements: first, 

a “Reflection Paper on the Future of the European Defence.”13 This document establishes three possible scenarios for the period 2017–2025. First, security and defense cooperation under which member states continue to pursue individual agendas but work toward ad hoc measures aimed at EU solidarity. This scenario also 

calls for the establishment of a European defense fund, which would include two 

different programs: the European Defense Research Program created to stimulate 

research in the field of defense (€90 million for the next three years). Additionally, 

a European Defense Industrial Development Programme (€500 million for the period 2019-2020) and, as from 2020, the European Commission will be prepared 

to invest in approximately €1 billion annually).14

In the second scenario, development of a shared security and defense agenda under which member states undertake measures to ensure “operational and financial 

solidarity,” assisting one another on issues of border security, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, and EU–NATO coordination. This scenario is seen as enhancing 

the Union’s “ability to project military power and to engage fully in external crisis 

management and in building partners’ security and defence capacities.”15 Collaboration among member states would lead to development of joint acquisition pro-
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The 2016 European Global Strategy and Asian–European Security 

grams and maintenance capabilities, focusing on enhancing interoperability and 

dramatically reducing duplication of efforts.

In the third scenario, member states would more dramatically deepen their integration to establish a common defense and security arrangement. The aforementioned European defense fund would be used to support common procurement of 

systems and materiel, and “cutting-edge knowledge would be pooled, enabling 

critical research and start-ups to develop key technologies to address Europe’s security challenges. Efficient defense spending and more and better defense outputs 

would be achieved through the right mix of competition and consolidation, specialization, economies of scale, the sharing of expensive military assets and technological innovation aimed at getting the best value for money spent.”16

The PESCO could be the primary mechanism to gather the member states progressively toward this new reality. Thus, the European Union established a Military 

Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), a permanent command-and-control 

structure at the military strategic level within the EU Military Staff as part of the 

CSDP. Composed of up to 25 staffers, the MPCC is devoted to assisting with the 

planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e., training and assistance) missions.17

EU Defense and European Defense? “Eppur, si muove.”

The European Union has tried, in a tortuous and challenging way, to define itself and its role in an international system in a transformation that will hardly respond to the global framework integrated by Western countries since the end of 

the Cold War. Thus, the EU understands what it is currently facing: the world today is a more complicated space that is interconnected regarding dependency, connectivity, migration, citizenship, and development. This international system is increasingly anarchic, sustaining a set of uncertainties, regarding issues and reliable 

actors of the past. These geopolitical issues include the political future of the 

United States, the rise and possible leadership of specific powers such as China and 

India, the positioning of Russia, and the direct implications on the EU derived 

from the Brexit. From the geo-economic point of view, the main issues range from 

the incipient economic recovery to the global situation regarding energy, water, 

and other resources, which do not allow observers to predict the next stages regarding international politics. Likewise, the EU considers that the world today is a 

place in controversy or in question. In this sense, the global system today has many 

more actors, less and worse leadership, and a more complex agenda than in the 
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Garcia Cantalapiedra

past. Nevertheless, the EU sees itself as a promoter of peace and guarantor of the 

security of its citizens and territory.18 Thus, Europeans, working with partners, 

must have the necessary capabilities to defend them and live up to their commitments to mutual assistance and the solidarity enshrined in the treaties that bind 

their member states together. Still, certain European elites and major allies have 

harbored a worrying perception. Again, former US Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates stridently warned European governments in 2011:

If you told the American taxpayers, as I just did, that they’re bearing 75 

percent of the financial burden of the alliance, this is going to raise eyebrows. And so my hope is that the reality—that the fact that reality is changing in the United States will get the attention of European leaders to realize that the drift of the past 20 years can’t continue—not if they want 

to have a strong transatlantic partnership with the United States.19

This resounded as a warning for the European allies when most of them do not 

invest enough in military capabilities to deal with the threats the Union identifies 

in the 2016 EUGS. From this point of view, it was clear that the European Union 

still ought to operate with allies and partners. Thus, the EU itself signed a joint 

declaration with NATO at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. Paradoxically, most 

of the first efforts responded precisely to create a core around collective defense: 

first, Article 47.2. (Lisbon Treaty), which creates a mutual assistance clause (a 

NATO article V (and IV)); second, Article 222 (Lisbon Treaty, which establishes a 

solidarity clause); and, finally, Article 42.6 (Treaty on European Union), creating 

the PESCO. In fact, France, due to the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, invoked, for 

the first time, Article 47.2, which, unlike the other listed articles, directly addresses 

terrorist attacks. In direct response, 28 European governments pledged their unconditional support of French counterterrorist operations, initiating a continentwide security clampdown.20

This incident offered a slightly different vision about the EU defense integration 

goals for the member states, opening a debate about the central role of all these 

structures because power projection appears as the primary goal for France, but for 

other countries, collective defense is emphasized. Still, some member states continue to look to NATO for this mission in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis that 

began in 2014. 

At the same time, Germany and France have been taking steps outside the 

NATO and EU frameworks to advance European defense. Berlin, using the 

Framework Nations Concept, which consists of around 20 partner nations and 

covers a wide array of defense cooperation in different areas such as medical; 
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The 2016 European Global Strategy and Asian–European Security 

chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear; civil-military cooperation; logistics; 

and so forth, started to put military units from other European countries under 

German command. 

Meanwhile, France, understanding the difficulties in moving decisively and 

quickly in some vital regions (mainly Europe’s southern periphery), has also 

launched defense cooperation outside the EU framework. The European Intervention Initiative would allow willingly European states to act militarily independently from the existing institutional structures of the EU or NATO. French president Emmanuel Macron launched the idea in his September 2017 Sorbonne 

speech,21 and the 2017 French Defense and National Security Strategic Review established the European Intervention Initiative as a priority.22 In this regard, Paris’ delegation at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue mentioned France’s bases and forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific. The German and French postures seem a duplication of 

effort, although both could not match very well nor develop a proper European 

strategic culture.

The Next Debate: Collective Security, Deterrence, and Power Projection

The EU has emphasized the cooperative nature of security engagement in Asia, 

with a priority on mutual security, focusing on nontraditional security issues, inviting cooperation, and arguing for greater diplomatic engagement on hard security issues. Consequently, the EU sees itself as a diplomatic broker on hard security 

issues and not as a strategic actor. Thus, most of Indo-Pacific experts in Europe 

frame the discussion of Asian security around “the allegedly limited influence the 

EU exerts through diplomatic statements.”23 As a result, the EU has only had a 

negligible impact on the motivations and behaviors of Asian states, leading many 

in Europe to conclude that involvement in Asian security is hopeless. At the same 

time, there are critical postures concerning the costs for the EU’s interactions in 

the region, including fears that standing up for international sea law in the IndoPacific would have a negative impact on EU–China relations, concerns that EU 

resources should focus more on national security priorities, apprehension over the 

handling of Russian assertiveness, and worries of further jihadist terror attacks. 

Nevertheless, the 2016 EUGS has an enthusiastic approach toward Asia, focusing 

on supporting collective security all across the board: “We will also develop a more 

politically rounded approach to Asia, seeking to make greater practical contributions to Asian security.”24 This approach includes support to an ASEAN-led regional security architecture, with a particular focus on freedom of navigation; re-
76 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Garcia Cantalapiedra

spect for international law, including the Law of the Sea and its arbitration 

procedures; and encouraging the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. The 

range of this approach includes cooperation on counterterrorism, antitrafficking, 

and migration, and enhances transport, trade, and energy connectivity. However, 

the endeavor focuses on nonproliferation challenges in the Korean peninsula—although the EU has a minor role there. Thus, the EU capability for reinforcing collective security and defending the status quo of the multilateral international order 

and international law is reduced due to a (perceived) lack of will and credibility. 

Nevertheless, one must acknowledge the growing security relations of some EU 

member states such as France and the United Kingdom with Indo-Pacific powers 

like Japan and Australia. With military presences and territories in the Indo-Pacific, it is unsurprising that the two latter countries remain more engaged in the 

concerns of the region. For example, the UK is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements, a series of defense relationships established by a series of multilateral agreements between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Signed in 1971, these arrangements bind the signatories to consult one 

another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of these five countries for 

the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in response. Additionally, the UK maintains a military presence in the area in Brunei 

and a support facility in Singapore. According to Michael Fallon, former British 

defense secretary, Britain will increase its presence in the area, and by the 2020s, 

one of the two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers will be in the region. Likewise, France has military installations and territories, specifically in Polynesia and 

New Caledonia. The UK and France have plans to increase power projection capabilities as the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region grows, but the Brexit 

and the current developments of EU defense integration complicate any overarching EU approach other than security cooperation as outlined above. 

However, the European Union does not rely mainly on its capacity for the projection of power. Instead, the EU prides itself on being a model for prosperity and 

a facilitator for the peaceful resolution of problems and reconciliation. Europe 

leads this model as an example for the rest of the world, and there is a compelling 

logic behind this notion. Unfortunately, this position also maintains a series of 

postulates that are either outdated or have not responded to the evolving dynamics 

of the international system. The influence of European leadership decreases rapidly 

with an increase in geographical distance and the reduction of the EU’s economic 

capacity. Paradoxically, the states on its borders present a whole series of strategic 
Spring 2019 | 77

The 2016 European Global Strategy and Asian–European Security 

problems, which can no longer be addressed by normative power alone. The EU’s 

behavior, as demonstrated during the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, and the 

Crimea/Ukraine crisis showed a worrying disconnect between the EU’s vital interests and the necessary military, economic, and technological capabilities and instruments to protect those interests. Not only does the EU need a realistic understanding about the nature, rules, and consequences of a new and evolving 

international system-in-the-making, it also requires the will to develop the necessary changes and adequate policies to work in this new environment. Failing to do 

so, the EU could enter a security dilemma, not perhaps in the short or medium 

term but in a longer term—strongly affecting the future of the multilateral liberal 

international order. JIPA

Notes

1. According to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the Council is likewise the institution responsible for 

adopting decisions relating to civilian and military tasks, defining their objectives and scope and 

the general conditions for their implementation (Article 43.2) Treaty of the European Union 

(TEU) and may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of member states (Article 44.1 

TEU). Thus, The Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation 

(Article 46.2 TEU), a decision confirming the participation of a member state in structured cooperation (Article 46.3 TEU), a decision suspending the participation of a member state in structured cooperation (Article 46.4 TEU). This mechanism has been regulated in arts. 42 and 46 of 

the TEU and in an annexed Protocol. Then the Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, is 

defined as: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have 

made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding 

missions shall establish Permanent Structured Cooperation within the Union framework.” Unlike 

ordinary enhanced cooperation (open to the participation of all member states), structured cooperation requires a member state to possess military capabilities that fulfill high criteria and a wish 

to make more binding commitments in this military sphere. The participation of such states in 

the mechanism for structured cooperation entails belonging to the European Defense Agency. All 

the member states of the Union, except Denmark, are currently members of the agency. This 

PESCO is not limited exclusively to the states that originally established it; other member states 

are allowed to join provided, of course, that they notify their wish to the Council and the High 

Representative. The Council, comprised solely of the member states participating in the structured cooperation, shall be responsible for authorizing the decision acting by qualified majority, 

after ensuring that the member state in question fulfils the criteria and takes on the commitments 

established in articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation.

2. The UK probably means a 25 percent EU's military capability, but also a solid actor regarding intelligence capabilities and power projection.

3. G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 

(2011), 56.
78 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Garcia Cantalapiedra

4. Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1977), 16–18.

5. Ibid., 20–21.

6. European Commission, “Countries and Regions: Association of South East Asian Nations 

(ASEAN),” website, 1 August 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean/.

7. General Secretariat, Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and 

Security Policy in East Asia” (policy guideline, Brussels, Belgium, 15 June 2012), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf.

8. Federica Mogherini, “Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at 

the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015” (speech, Singapore, 1 June 2015), https://eeas.europa.eu/

headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6254/speech-high-representativevice-president-federicamogherini-iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-2015_en.

9. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Commission, “The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic Purpose” (joint communication, 

Brussels, Belgium, 18 May 2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=J

OIN:2015:22:FIN&from=EN.

10. Mathieu Duchâtel and Mark Bromley, “Influence by Default: Europe’s Impact on Military 

Security in East Asia” (policy brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2017), https://

www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Influence_by_default.pdf.

11. Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates” (lecture, 

NATO Strategic Concept Seminar, National Defense University, Washington, DC, Tuesday, 23 

February 2010), http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1423. 

12. European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe; A Global Strategy for the 

European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels: European Union, June 2016), https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf.

13. European Commission, “Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence” (Brussels: 

European Commission, 7 June 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/

reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf

14. Ibid., 12–13.

15. Ibid., 13.

16. Ibid., 14–15.

17. European Commission, “The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)” (fact 

sheet, EU Defence, November 2018), https://cdn4-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/

aGKF41zrLDLuNeg8csm24scxmjEwj4JBvrRbaLeaY4M/mtime:1542656575/sites/eeas/files/

mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf.

18. European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action, 7.

19. Robert M. Gates, “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium” (presentation, Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium, 10 June 2011), 

http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839.

20. Michel Cabirol, “Terrorisme: la France a-t-elle les moyens de faire la guerre contre Daech?,” 

La Tribune (France), 19 November 2015, https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/

aeronautique-defense/terrorisme-la-france-a-t-elle-les-moyens-de-faire-la-guerre-contredaech-523477.html#xtor=EPR-2-[industrie-services]-20151119.
Spring 2019 | 79

The 2016 European Global Strategy and Asian–European Security 

21. Emmanuel Macron, “Sorbonne Speech of Emmanuel Macron” (speech, Sorbonne, Paris, 

France, 26 September 2017), http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html.

22. Ministry for the Armed Forces, Defence ans national security strategic review 2017 (Paris: Bureau des éditions, October 2017), https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/520185/8732945/file/Defence%20and%20National%20Security%20strategic%20review%202017.pdf

23. Duchâtel and Bromley, “Influence by Default,” 1.

24. EUGS, 38.

Dr. David J. Garcia Cantalapiedra is currently professor, 

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political 

Sciences, and director, Research Group Security and 

Cooperation at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. He 

also teaches US foreign policy at the Spanish Foreign Service 

School and is professor at the Joint Staff Course, Spanish 

Armed Forces School (ESFAS). 

Dr. Garcia Cantalapiedra is a member of the Strategic 

Study Group on Migrations, Immigration Special Commit- tee, National Security Department, Spain. He is also a mem- ber of the Working Group on Organized Crime and Illicit 

Trafficking at the Royal Elcano Institute and conducts a 

Santander-UCM Research Project on the 2016 EUGS, focus- ing on terrorism–organized crime synergies in the Maghreb 

and Sahel and Spanish policy options.

He was awarded with the 2001 National Defense Award by 

the Spanish Ministry of Defense. Previously, Dr. Garcia Can- talapiedra was senior analyst for US foreign policy and trans- atlantic relations at the Royal Elcano Institute 2007–2009; 

His last books are The Greater Maghreb. Hybrid Threats, Security and Europe. Security and Intelligence collection. Lexington Books. (forthcoming 2019); Aliados. Las Relaciones 

transatlánticas en el siglo XXI. Ed Plaza y Valdés. Madrid and 

Mexico. 2015. (with Ruben Herrero de Castro); Contemporary Spanish Foreign Policy (author and co-editor with Ramón 

Pacheco) Routledge. London, 2014.
80 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Anatomy of Failure

Why America Loses Every War It Starts

Manabrata Guha

I

n a “critical notice” referencing Derek Parfait’s On What Matters, Michael 

Rosen fleetingly, but acutely, poses a question that is of some relevance to 

what follows. Rosen asks, “[are] book reviews—the ranking of others’ work, delivered in a tone of apparent omniscience—examples of . . . academic gatekeeping?”1

This critical review does not pretend to engage in any kind of gatekeeping exercise—academic or otherwise. However, that still leaves the question of how to engage with Harlan Ullman’s text, Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every War 

It Starts (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), Kindle version.

At the outset, it is best not to mince words. Ullman’s book is a challenging read. 

While the book is littered with some rather perceptive and profound observations, 

the reading experience is, at best, disjointed. One immediately obvious reason is 

the style of presentation, which reminds this reviewer of the explanatory notes that 

accompany the ubiquitous PowerPoint (or equivalent) presentation slide deck. 

More importantly, however, Ullman’s book is challenging because, in effect, it 

seeks to interrogate how we think about war and its conduct, which is far more 

disturbing, as it compels us to rethink the problem of war afresh. From a reviewer’s 

perspective, it is also challenging because—in a situation like what Rosen faced 

when reviewing Parfait’s work—Ullman’s book is almost impossible to review conventionally.2

 What should the reviewer do? Summarize its contents? That is very 

easily done. Over seven chapters—each addressing a specific event/strategic condition in US military history and interspersed with a number of “personal vignettes”—Ullman relentlessly pursues one key question: “Why, given what we believe is the greatest military in the world, [is] our [the American] record in war and 

military interventions . . . so failure prone?” (p. vii) However, such an exercise in 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA) are those of the 

authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article 

may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the JIPA requests a courtesy line.
Spring 2019 | 81

Critical Review Essay

summarization would only serve to reduce Ullman’s thesis and, more importantly, 

its import to mere slogans and “calls for action,” which, while providing catchy 

“sound bites,” will only perpetuate the very condition that Ullman writes against. 

That said, ironically, it appears that Ullman is himself not above a bit of sloganeering—case in point: “the brain-based approach!”

Then there is the question of “assessment.” How does Ullman’s work stack up 

against the plethora of books and articles that investigate and examine the US strategic military capability and its effectiveness in actual use? While it is possible to 

cast Ullman’s thesis within an even more fine-grained evidential background than 

what he provides, the core problem highlighted in this book cannot be denied—

though it should be noted that such an exercise is also not unique to him. Others, 

in different ways, have addressed these and related matters. Moreover, it would be 

wrong to assume that American strategy and security managers are not fully cognizant of this less-than-stellar history of US strategic military power. However, what 

is unique about Ullman’s work is his call to reevaluate the very foundations on 

which American (and, by extension, Western) strategy making/war waging rests. 

While we will have occasion to assess how far his call for a reevaluation goes, a 

question that is tempting to pose in the immediate context is whether Ullman’s 

book endures or not. That, in my opinion, would be an inappropriate question 

given the explicit and implicit stakes involved. What is in no doubt, however, is 

that Ullman highlights a matter that is not only of pressing concern for America’s 

strategy and security managers but also one that is, most certainly, a matter of high 

interest for their counterparts globally—friendly and adversarial.

Regardless, as Rosen points out, “the idea that one should just recommend a 

work and leave the rest to the reader seems inadequate.”3

 Works such as Ullman’s—though engaging with a very serious topic—also run the risk of being dismissed as being mere “pop(ular)” or “folk” commentaries on war, strategy, and politics, and as such, they are open to misinterpretation leading to the obscuring of 

what I refer to as the “metastrategic armature” that underwrites such efforts.4

Surely, when the stakes are so high, a more nuanced engagement with such books 

is necessary, and Ullman’s latest effort is no exception. Like Rosen, therefore, while 

I will not shirk the responsibility to engage with Ullman’s work with care, I will 

begin by clarifying a few preliminary points that may enframe my engagement 

with his work better.

First, my original intention was to write a combined critical review essay on Ullman’s book and Rufus Phillips’ memoir.5

 My reasoning was not as obtuse as it may 
82 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

appear to be at first glance. Phillips’ account suggests that a growing disjoint between its political and military strategies wracked the US strategic effort in Vietnam. And, while Phillips’ focus is primarily on the shortcomings and failures of 

the former, his account provides a close look at how this disjoint manifested itself—needless to say, to the detriment of the overall American effort in Vietnam—

at every level, i.e., from the strategic to the microtactical. In effect, In effect, Phillips’ memoir serves to not simply elucidate Ullman’s chapter on Vietnam in detail 

but also to forcefully reiterate Ullman’s contention that US strategy making was 

not (and is not)—in Ullman’s terms—“brains-based.” Further, as Ullman notes, 

his own experience in strategic-military affairs began with his service in Vietnam, 

which he describes by means of three “personal vignettes” in the introduction, 

which only serves to confirm an obvious congruence and overlap between the two 

texts. However, repeated close readings convinced me that a combined review 

would not—indeed, cannot—do justice to either book, which would be tragic 

given that both deserve our close attention. Thus, my decision was to focus only 

on Ullman’s text.

Second, Ullman’s principal concern in the book is about “the larger reasons for 

failure and the damning impact of the absence of sound strategic thinking.” (p. 

viii) Ullman is under no illusion—and he leaves the reader under no illusion—

that the American strategic-military posture is flawed, and he fleshes out his contention in the 236 pages of his book. It is important to mention here that Ullman’s 

argument is not that the American strategic-military establishment is staffed with 

and by dullards. Indeed, he clarifies, “There is no doubt that today’s American military is by orders of magnitude more professionally competent, committed to service, and able” than ever before in the country’s history. Instead, Ullman posits 

that the American strategy-making process has become rote. It has become subservient to technology, it has become bureaucratic and, consequently, sluggish, given 

the interagency struggles that ensue during the strategy-formulation and execution 

process—leading to strategic failures.6

 That being said, we should also not fail to 

recognize and appreciate that the “strategy-making process” is not simplistic, linear, or iterative. It is a multidimensional, multidomain, and multimodal exercise, 

particularly in the context of the modern nation-state and of the globalized (and 

increasingly informationalized) world that we currently inhabit and that we can 

look forward to inhabiting in the near- and mid-term future. Equally, we should 

also remember that strategy making is also not a “freewheeling” exercise. It is not 

so in the context of commercial or social enterprises, and it is certainly not so in 
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Critical Review Essay

the case of nation-states. In effect, the strategy-making process is, to use Rousseau’s 

phrase out of context, “bound in chains.” The chains that I am referring to here, 

which Ullman also invokes, albeit indirectly, are not simply those of technology, 

the weight of institutions and bureaucracies, among others, they are also the cognitive-conceptual frameworks within which the strategy-making (or any other) 

process unfolds. In this sense, these cognitive-conceptual frameworks serve as a 

metastrategic armature, which shapes how we understand concepts such as “victory,” “defeat,” “friend,” or “enemy”; how we engage with technology; how we develop strategies, doctrines, and tactics; and how we design and operationalize institutions. As such, this metastrategic armature plays a foundational role in how we 

make strategic sense of the world and how we respond to it strategically.

Third, and related to the above, while it may not be confidence inspiring in 

some quarters to invoke former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, nevertheless, it is necessary to pay heed to his call to change how we think about war.

7

 Ullman issues a similar call when he presents us with an awkward term—brains-based 

strategy—and a stern admonishment to “use the matter between our ears.” In this 

sense, it is worth observing that Ullman—like Rumsfeld—is not recommending a 

specific strategy; instead, he is recommending an approach to strategizing.

My aim in this critical engagement with Ullman’s work is to suggest that Ullman’s argument, despite whatever reservations we may have, seeks to draw our attention to a subtle and metastrategic question—namely, how to strategize. This is 

not simply a process-related question; rather, it is, at its most potent—but also at 

its most subtle—an opportunity to investigate the nature and constitution of the 

aforementioned metastrategic armature, which I contend underwrites the strategymaking process. Second, I examine a few of the elements that Ullman identifies as 

constituting his notion of brains-based strategy and assess their resilience when examined against the very criteria that Ullman proposes. Third, I reiterate Ullman’s 

assertion that we are in a state or condition of existence marked by fast-paced 

transformations in not only strategic-military affairs but also, to steal a phrase 

from Michel de Certeau, in the very “practice of [our] everyday life.”8

 These transformations, which are changing the nature of the emergent battlespace in ways 

that were the preserve of science fiction just a decade or two back, compel us to reinterrogate “how we think about war” in the twenty-first century. I will conclude 

by pointing out that while Ullman’s solution—the “brain-based approach to strategy-making”—may have its shortcomings (principally, falling victim to the “blind-
84 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

ness of insight” trap), that does not undermine, however, the critical importance 

of the call that he issues, which merits our most urgent attention.

The Foundational Concerns

In May 2015, at an event where Ullman was presenting his last book, he had an 

exchange with a conferee, which he reports as follows:

Conferee: Can you also explain why it is that the United States has lost every war it has 

started since 1945? Is it because government fails, or something else?

HKU: Your question is my next book. The simple answer is that no matter who or what 

party is in power and whether the president is seasoned or inexperienced, ideology, political 

expediency, and failure to pose and answer difficult questions or to challenge basic policy 

assumptions too often dominate and become surrogates for sound strategic thinking.

Nor do we always fully understand the issues and consequences of action and inaction. 

Vietnam was the most blatant example. The second Iraq war is another. And the interven- tion in Libya in 2011 is a third. “Every time we initiated using force without just cause or 

legitimate provocation, the results at best damaged our security and at worst were far more 

destructive. Unfortunately, every administration since Vietnam, less one—that of George 

H. W. Bush—ignored or did not understand this reality.

Without a major revolution in how the nation provides for the common defense and its 

security, do not expect the future will prove any more successful than the past five decades 

when we decide to commit force to protect or advance our interests. The most worrying pos- sibility is that this propensity to start wars and use force for the wrong reasons may now be 

deeply embedded in the nation’s DNA.

That does mean we should not use force when we must. But we must be certain when we 

do use force that it is for the right reasons and in our national interest. (p. 23, emphasis 

added)

This, effectively, is a summary of the core issues that appear to animate Ullman’s 

concern, and it is only fair that we engage with them head-on.

Ullman, quite reasonably, contends that the use of force must be chosen as a 

course of action if, and only if, the “reasons” are “right,” and when it is in the 

(American) “national interest.” Considering that, notionally, these are the basic 

principles on which any nation-state—ideally—wages war, Ullman is not making 

a point that is outside the norm. However, Ullman elides a critical concern; 

namely, nation-states often confront situations where the right reasons may conflict 

with national interest. This conflictual condition does not seem to merit much of 
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Critical Review Essay

Ullman’s attention. That said, the critical issues at stake here are (1) what constitutes national interest and (2) what is meant by right reasons. Let us assume—not 

without foundation and as a bare minimum—that national interest involves (a) the 

protection of the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the nation-state, 

(b) the provision of sociocultural and economic security for the citizens, and (c) 

ensuring that (a) and (b) are protected and, to the extent possible, furthered. However, the case of “right reasons” gives us reason to pause. If considered in the context of national interest as described above, then any act that furthers this national 

interest is always the right reason.9

 Ullman confirms this when he asserts that “every time we initiated using force without just cause or legitimate provocation, the 

results at best damaged our security and at worst were far more destructive.” (p. 

23) In the process, we also see how Ullman, albeit tacitly, is suggesting that the use 

of force for a “just cause,” which may, at times, even transcend the requirements of 

national interests, is also a right reason. This is consistent with the duties and responsibilities that a nation-state assumes as a responsible member of the international state system. Nevertheless, at the same time, it is important to recognize that 

it is also a pathway to interventionism. I am highlighting this specific point because it ties in what Ullman mentions at the beginning of his reply to the conferee. 

Ullman says sound strategic thinking should be free from influences of ideology 

and political expediency, which he then cojoins with his call to interrogate the underlying assumptions on which policy (strategy) is based. Ullman’s insistence on 

this point—and we come across this theme or a variation of it—repeatedly 

throughout the text, could lead us to conclude that, perhaps, he is invoking a 

monochromatic political and strategic landscape wherein there is total and absolute unanimity on the notion of right reasons. Nevertheless, the question stands: 

can “sound strategic thinking” be kept away from ideological, political, cultural 

considerations? Indeed, one is pressed to ask: is not the determination of which 

reasons are right (or otherwise) also a function of ideology, political systems, cultural dispositions, and institutional imperatives? In the real world, it is impossible 

to sanitize the strategy-making process from such considerations unless one presumes a condition wherein strategy is divorced from politics. However, this would 

result in an untenable situation; principally because if, as Clausewitz asserted, “war 

is an extension of politics by other means,” then it is unavoidable that the strategymaking process will remain untainted by the specter of politics in the applied and 

abstract senses of the term. Nevertheless, let us, for the moment, give Ullman the 

benefit of the doubt and assume that what he is referring to are the partisan politi-
86 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

cal struggles that strategy makers often must contend with that are internal to the 

political system of which they are a part. This, to some extent, is understandable, 

particularly in the context of Ullman’s firsthand experiences during the Vietnam 

War. Reality, however, dictates that any strategy-making process will inevitably be 

subject to the internal pulls and pressures of a variety of constituencies: political, 

bureaucratic, cultural, among others.10 Wishing them away is only possible under 

a system of government that is authoritarian and dictatorial, which would undermine the very basis of the American (or any democratic) political system.11 Again, 

giving Ullman the benefit of the doubt, let us assume that what he is calling for is 

a consensus between the various constituencies involved to reach a common 

ground—defined by national interest and the right reasons—which is bereft of 

such partisan political activities. But then again, it is also necessary to recognize 

and appreciate that such pulls and pressures often serve as checks and balances 

against the wanton use of executive power and privilege, with the caveat that such 

checks and balances should not stymie the strategy-making process, particularly 

under wartime conditions.12

Notwithstanding, Ullman makes a larger, more controversial, point, contending 

that “successive administrations of both parties, despite asserting that force was a 

last resort, too often turned to force as the first resort of policy, ignoring or marginalizing other tools of government.” (p 23) He goes on to assert that “the United 

States . . . [seems to be] incapable of applying sound strategic thinking and judgment, of treating the causes and not the symptoms of crisis, threats, and challenges 

to security and well-being—and always with predictable and unwanted results.” 

(p. 23) This leads him to ask what, to me, is a key question: “Has this propensity 

of failure become permanently grafted onto America’s political DNA? Is failure a 

product of a political system that is seemingly unable or unwilling to govern...? 

Or do today’s multifaceted, complex, and numerous challenges, some of which 

defy solution, simply exceed the capacity of any individual and administration, no 

matter how capable, to respond effectively?” (p. 23) It is at this point that Ullman 

veers into dangerous territory. He asserts,

Each of the post–World War II presidents, from Harry Truman to Richard Nixon, with the 

exception of JFK, was reasonably prepared to assume . . . high office. While Truman may 

not have possessed obvious, outward qualifications for the presidency and had been excluded 

by Roosevelt from may decisions...few presidents read more history or knew more knew 

more about every prior presidency. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nixon, and Gerald Ford like- wise were seasoned. . . . Jimmy Carter was the first president whose resume could be called 

into question regarding his fitness to assume the office on Day One. (p. 26)
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While pointing out Kennedy’s inexperience in presidential-level activities, Ullman grants him a pass by noting, “The young Kennedy’s charisma and selection of 

the so-called best and brightest for his team offset his lack of experience.” (p. 26) 

He similarly gives a pass to Ronald Reagan, asserting, “He had twice been governor of a state with a gross domestic product larger than those of most countries 

and had presided over the Screen Actors Guild for many years [!]” (p. 26, emphasis 

added)13 Ullman is critical—to the point of being disparaging—of the presidents 

that followed Kennedy, with the exception of George H. W. Bush, for whom he 

reserves his highest praise, stating that he “was as qualified as any president in recent history . . . how he and his administration dealt with the implosion of the Soviet Union, made Europe ‘whole, free, and at peace,’ and ejected Saddam Hussein 

from Kuwait in 1991 are textbook cases of the application of sound strategicthinking and judgment.” (p. 26) However, is this a valid assessment even by Ullman’s own standards? When considered superficially, Ullman may seem to have a 

point. Nevertheless, consider also the facts that the implosion of the Soviet Union 

has now led to the rise of an aggressively authoritarian Russia, which has—or so it 

is alleged—materially intervened in and disrupted the American democratic process; Europe is gradually becoming a “new” battleground, where a newly resurgent 

Russia is increasingly flexing its muscles; and, Iraq has degenerated into a quagmire that oscillates between violent sectarian violence and an uneasy peace between rival factions. Ullman, of course, can (and probably will) argue that the advantages accrued by the actions of Pres. George H. W. Bush have been squandered 

by later administrations. Yet, one cannot escape the facts that (1) strategy is a longterm activity and should be—in Ullman’s own terms—planned and engaged in accordingly and (2) the reality is that it is impossible to predict the effects that the 

design and implementation of a strategy will or may have in the long term.

So, to what does Ullman ascribe this apparently shoddy history of American 

strategy making? He lists five points:

1. Lack of a sense of history;

2. Unachievable aspirations and objectives;

3. Insufficient knowledge and understanding of situations;

4. Group think, which eliminates the “challenging of assumptions and arguments”; 

and
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5. Politicization of issues that are at stake. (p. 214)

In addition to these, Ullman attributes the progressive decline of American 

strategy-making ability to a “broken government,” which he attributes (correctly, 

in some measure) to the increasingly polarized conditions afflicting the domestic 

American political scene and to structural deficiencies such as the constitution of 

the National Security Council and the office of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, among 

others. While some of Ullman’s concerns ring true, the manner in which he presents them takes away from the force of his argument. Thus, for example, using the 

Iraq War of 2003 as an example, Ullman notes that Pres. George W. Bush’s aim to 

“transform the geostrategic landscape of the Middle East” (p. 214) is reflective of 

an unquestioned belief in American exceptionalism, a flawed ideology, a sense of 

moral superiority, and confidence in the ability of the US military to resolve complex political, socioeconomic, religious, and cultural divides and conflicts. (p. 214) 

While the strategic rationale underwriting the younger Bush’s administration’s strategic-military efforts in Iraq was and remains eminently questionable, it is also 

worth bearing in mind that post–World War II, as the world segued into the Cold 

War, the United States remained the sole and paramount global power. With the 

Soviet Union battered after its brutal victory over the Axis forces, it fell to the 

United States to take the place of the British Empire, which could not sustain itself 

in the aftermath of the war, and to take the lead in the reconstruction of a shattered Europe. Matters were made more acute by the growing perception—not unfounded—that, while devastated, the USSR did not hesitate to extend its influence 

over nation-states that were, at the time, emerging from under the yoke of colonialism. To combat such a turn of events, the United States had no choice but to 

step into a role that has been often described in terms of the world’s policeman. 

Now, Ullman makes an important point. He suggests that to assume that the 

United States will continue to carry the burden of being the world’s policeman 

into the twenty-first century is untenable and unfair. Understandably, Ullman calls 

for America’s allies to shoulder a part of the responsibility, particularly in the context of dealing with violent pan-global insurgencies fostered by entities like the Islamic State (IS)/Da’esh, among others. The same logic applies to the Korean peninsula; though, in that specific context, the matter on hand requires a more 

nuanced stance given the role played by nuclear weapons and the presence of their 

long-range delivery systems.

Further, Ullman does not hesitate to point out—again, correctly—that with the 

collapse of the USSR and the advent of the twenty-first century, the strategic com-
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mons has lost the comfortable bipolarity that the world had segued into after the 

World War II. While this is not, per se, a new observation, given that this has been 

debated across academic journals ad nauseam, Ullman’s call to recognize the ramifications of this—he refers to it as the “No World Order”—is important and worthy 

of our consideration. Ullman’s litany of complaints, with the exception of the 

American involvement in the First Gulf War, continues across multiple administrations. The theme is always the same; namely, the presidents were/are underqualified, 

America has developed a propensity to engage in unproductive wars, and the American national security establishment is not brains-based and is held hostage to partisan party politics and to the inertia of the bureaucracy—among other problems. 

The Brains-based Approach

Arguably, the last two chapters of Ullman’s book represent a summary of his 

core thesis. In them, he tells us “how to win,” and it is not surprising that his solution is the “brains-based approach to sound strategic thinking.” According to Ullman, this approach consists of “three parts: complete knowledge and full understanding of all aspects of the problem set and solutions; a mind-set that is based on 

the realities of this, the twenty-first, century and not the last one; and a focus on 

affecting, influencing, and controlling the wills and perceptions of real and potential enemies.” (p. 211) It is worth pointing out that Ullman’s insistence on cultivating and employing a twenty-first-century mind-set is not at the expense of a sense 

of history. Indeed, Ullman argues “history counts.” However, unfortunately, he 

does not pursue this line of thinking in any systematic manner by which the reader 

can profit. Instead, after a few perfunctory statements, he launches into a rehashed 

version of his complaints, with which the reader, by now, is very familiar.

Nevertheless, it is also in this section that Ullman introduces some of the more 

interesting points/issues that warrant our attention. Thus, for example, Ullman 

brings up the topic of deterrence and asks how and in what ways the concept of 

deterrence is valuable or even applicable in the twenty-first century. Observing 

that the world is now more interconnected than ever before and the loss of the bipolar system that collapsed with the dismantling of the USSR, Ullman makes a 

forceful and thought-provoking point when he asserts, “A new definition of deterrence must also be fashioned for so-called peer competitors.” (p. 221) Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in 2016, proposed a “four plus one” threat matrix 

involving “the four main contingencies for which the Pentagon was to be prepared 
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. . . (a resurgent) Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. . . . The ‘one’ refer[ing] to 

IS.” Ullman observes—not without reason—that “given this planning guidance, it 

followed that the services would attempt to identify what it would take to deter 

and if necessary to defeat such an adversary if war were to come.” (p. 221) He 

finds this as being an instance of “inadequate and flawed strategic thinking.” According to Ullman, “Planners were asked . . . to employ mindsets and concepts of 

the twentieth century to deal with twenty-first century issues.” (p. 221) His contention is not without merit. Is the concept of deterrence relevant, particularly in 

the context of terrorist insurgents like the IS? And, if yes, how and, more importantly, by what means can such organizations (and movements) be deterred? These 

remain major unresolved questions in strategic-military affairs given that what is at 

stake is not simply the matching of weapons systems and capabilities but, more 

importantly, of influencing hearts and minds. Ullman then goes on to make a curious, but dubious, recommendation in this regard. He suggests—here reiterating 

his assertion that history counts—that perhaps one way would be to revisit how 

given that in “terms of historical comparisons, the decades between the 1880s and 

1920s were far more rife with terrorist attacks, including the assassination of kings, 

tsars, prime ministers, and presidents.” (p. 223) While it is certainly the case that 

such events marked the last decades of the nineteenth century and the early years 

of the twentieth, to equate them to the rash of planetary-scale violent insurgencies 

that are underway in the twenty-first century would be inappropriate and inaccurate. Even a cursory glance at the historical records of the time shows that the revolutionary movements marking the late immediately preceding centuries were 

driven more by independence movements, which are markedly different in nature 

and character from the rationale that appears to underwrite modern-day insurgencies and terrorist movements. In sum, therefore, while Ullman’s assertion to pay 

attention to history is laudable, it is important that in the process we should not 

misread and misunderstand history and the lessons that it holds up for us.

More than anything else, the tripartite constituents of Ullman’s brains-based approach are interesting and revealing, and it is worth paying attention to them, particularly in the context of our increasingly informationalized world. In the first instance, Ullman suggests that a “complete knowledge and full understanding of all 

aspects of the problem set and solutions” is a necessary prerequisite for sound strategic thinking. This is not as unique a proposition as Ullman may make it out to 

be. Consider, for example, the dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK) and fullspectrum dominance (FSD) models.14 While both invoke a knowledge-centric 
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model in the context of strategic-military affairs, they have also invited sharp criticism for the lack of modesty with which they—particularly the FSD model—invoke the notion of knowledge. Even so, it is interesting to note, particularly in the 

case of the DBK model, that the use of the word dominant—as opposed to complete knowledge—suggests that the designers and proponents of this and similar 

models were sensitive to the fact that the fog of war ensures that complete knowledge of the battlespace (or, alternatively, of the global strategic commons) is impossible to achieve. Granted that with the advent of the network-centric model of 

warfare coupled with recent advances in sensor-technology, data sciences, machine 

learning, and artificial intelligence systems, our knowledge of the world and our 

ability to catalogue it has grown exponentially. Nevertheless, the notion of complete 

knowledge remains a misnomer simply for the fact that the world and its constituents are not closed systems; rather, they are open systems, which are constantly in 

a state or condition of transformation. As such, the “known unknowns” and the 

“unknown unknowns” remain real and potent barriers to the acquisition of complete knowledge. However, what leads Ullman to argue for complete knowledge? 

Aside from it being a desired ideal, it is also reflective of the mind-set that Ullman 

brings to the argument, which is a matter that we will explore in the following section of this essay.

The second constituent of the brains-based approach is the development and cultivation of a mind-set that is more in sync with the twenty-first century. Ullman’s 

call to revisit the concept of deterrence in the twenty-first century is, in part, motivated by this concern. In principle, one cannot help but agree with Ullman. However, what constitutes a twenty-first century mind-set? While it is undeniable that 

rapid advances in information technology and the computational sciences have triggered, in part, what Gernot Böhme refers to as “invasive technification,” it is still 

unclear as to how these trends have impacted the way by which we cognize the 

world, particularly in the strategic-military context.15 Further, it has been argued 

that as the process of globalization intensifies leading to the emergence of what 

Kenichi Ohmae referred to as “the borderless world,” there is a renewed assault on 

the concept of the nation-state.16 Nevertheless, the mainstay of the international 

system remains the nation-state. Even the rash of planetary-scale insurgencies and 

other nonmilitary emergences such as global pandemics, natural disasters, and flows 

of population fleeing areas of violence, famine, and such, have not fundamentally 

broken the concept and architecture of the nation-state, though it may have weakened it. How then are we to pay heed to Ullman’s call for the cultivation of a 
92 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

twenty-first century mind-set? Given that for Ullman “national interest” in the 

American context is a key concern, we can see how he contradicts himself if we assume that at least one element of the twenty-first century mind-set—particularly 

in the strategic-military context—is the emergence of a “borderless world.”

The third constituent of Ullman’s solution is a “focus on affecting, influencing, 

and controlling the wills and perceptions of real and potential enemies.” This has a 

lineage that can be drawn back to a 1996 text that he coauthored with James P. 

Wade and others from the Defense Group Inc.17 That text, titled Shock and Awe: 

Achieving Rapid Dominance, was primarily an analysis of military operations that 

are specifically designed to radically undermine an adversary’s war-waging ability 

by the imposition of overwhelming force.18 Some of the examples that the authors 

of that text include in their analysis are the so-called Blitzkrieg operations undertaken by the Wehrmacht during the Battle for France in 1940, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Battle of Grozny (1994–95), and the Iraq 

War of 2003. For our purposes, however, it is necessary to recognize that “shock 

and awe” was a doctrine that was identified as being applicable at the military-operational level. The key idea of this doctrine was to impose a cognitive overload on an 

adversary, which would cripple its war-fighting capability. As Ullman himself explained in an interview with CBS News, “You’re sitting in Baghdad and all of a 

sudden you’re the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped 

out. You also take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. 

In 2, 3, 4, 5 days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted.”19

It is also important to recognize that such a design can work within a battlespace 

that is limited in scope and extent, though its trickle-effects should be felt across 

the myriad of adversarial capabilities. This is evident from the examples that Ullman and Wade provide in their collaborative work.

Against this backdrop, we are compelled to ask: what does Ullman mean when 

he says, “focus on affecting, influencing, and controlling the wills and perceptions 

of real and potential enemies?” Notice, in this context, his invocation of potential 

enemies. This suggests that he is attempting to apply the doctrine of shock and awe 

beyond the confines of the battlespace to a wider strategic landscape. Again, there 

is some merit to this. However, such a posture will involve factors that include, but 

which are not limited to, the military and its use of force. It will involve a kind of 

diplomacy that can create and sustain a strategic narrative that will convey to 

friends and foes alike of America’s consistency, its resilience, and its principled 

stance in the use of force. When considered in this light, and when cast against 
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Ullman’s contention that America’s use of force has often been misapplied, one can 

appreciate the import of what Ullman is trying to convey. Yet, as I have observed 

over the course of this essay, Ullman hobbles his own efforts given the manner in 

which he presents his case.

The “Blindness of Insight”

The tragedy of Ullman’s latest effort lies in the fact that while he provides us 

with some truly thought-provoking concepts and ideas, he does not develop them 

to their fullest potential. I have remarked on his questioning of the concept of deterrence in the twenty-first century, his insistence on disrupting the cognitive capabilities of adversaries by the use of shock and awe, and his emphasis on developing 

a mind-set attuned to the twenty-first century. These are all valuable insights. Nevertheless, they are not, per se, new. In addition to this, in the process of offering us 

these insights, it appears that Ullman falls victim to the very point with which he 

began his exposition—namely, an inability to interrogate the foundations on 

which his propositions stand.

Recall Ullman’s insistence on interrogating the fundamental assumptions that 

underwrite strategy and policy. It then behooves us to query the assumptions on 

which his own prescriptions stand. Let us take, by way of an example, his insistence on the need for “complete knowledge and full understanding of all aspects of 

the problem set and solutions.” As discussed above, the notion of complete knowledge in the context of an understanding of the world as an open system is a misnomer. Yet, Ullman is insistent on this. It, therefore, falls on us to ask what allows 

Ullman to make this assertion. 

James Gibson, in his insightful book titled, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam, informs us that, according to Henry Kissinger,

American foreign policy [and, by extension, strategic policy] has been based “on the assump- tion that technology plus managerial skills [gives] us the ability to reshape the international 

system and to bring domestic transformations in ‘emerging countries.’” He indicates that 

there are virtually no limits to this technical intervention in the world: “A scientific revolu- tion has, for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in 

foreign policy.” Power thus becomes measured solely in technical terms: political power be- comes physically embedded in the United States’ large, efficient economy, its war production 

system capable of creating advanced war machines, and its economic-managerial science for 

administering these production systems.20
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Despite Ullman’s cautionary note on being subservient to technology, it is obvious that he is grounded within a scientific-technical construct, which is, in turn, a 

consequence of “a scientific revolution, which has, for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power.”21 Thus, as Gibson reports, 

power “is measured solely in technical terms.” Ullman makes this assumption 

without being explicit about it. At the cost of a minor diversion, it is worth pointing out that Martin Libicki, among others, have has also made a similar point:

. . . even with stealth, everything ultimately can be found. All objects have mass and thus 

gravity. Every object moving in a medium creates vortices and must expend energy to do 

so. If nothing else, objects of a certain size have to occupy some space for some time. A set of 

sensors placed sufficiently close together can, in theory, eventually trap everything by getting 

close enough. A line of sensitive receivers placed close together will find its line-of-sight to a 

beaming object cut if a bomber – no matter how stealthy—rolls past . . . sensors of certain 

minimum discrimination placed close enough together can, at some epsilon, catch any- thing.22

As is evident, when cast within a “grid of intelligibility,” the ideal of attaining 

complete knowledge is an easy trap into which to fall. However, is the casting of 

such a grid of intelligibility possible? Confining ourselves to the strategic-military 

context, such a possibility would mean the solution of the fog-of-war problem that 

Carl von Clausewitz had identified, which remains the holy grail for military theorists and strategists. Currently, even with the considerable advances that we have 

made in the computational and data sciences and in the field of artificial intelligence and sensor-technology, this remains beyond our reach. Former Secretary of 

Defense Rumsfeld recognized this when he noted that the intractable problem afflicting strategic-military affairs is the problem of the “unknown unknowns.”23 Indeed, the case of the unknown unknowns is the extreme. As Slovenian philosopher 

Slavoj Žižek has astutely pointed out, we even have problems with “the unknown 

knowns;” that is, often we are ignorant of what we know!24 Thus, while there is no 

denying the fact that strategy and military operations are knowledge- and information-based activities, striving for, in Ullman’s terms, “complete knowledge and full 

understanding of all aspects of the problem set and solutions” is untenable. Indeed, such a pursuit would be dangerous for, in the first instance, it will require us 

to become overly dependent on technology, which is a state of affairs that he himself critiques. Moreover, we would run the danger of taking for granted that the 

grid of intelligibility constitutes the world-as-such; thereby, exposing ourselves to 

the trials and tribulations when we are confronted by the unknown unknowns.
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As we have seen, Ullman’s brains-based approach also includes that curious call 

to adopt a twenty-first century mind-set, meaning not to be held hostage to the 

past. This does not mean jettisoning a sense of history and being insensitive to the 

lessons that history teaches us. What it does mean, however, is the ability to create 

new concepts and constructs that are more attuned to the time. Take, for example, 

the German operations during the Battle for France in 1940 and in the early stages 

of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. During those operations, German 

military theorists and planners were able to mate three distinct technologies—the 

tank, the radio, and short-ranged aircraft deployed as flying artillery—coupled 

with an expanded understanding of their Stoßtrupp tactics, to create conditions 

that threw their adversaries off balance.25 Particularly in the case of the Battle for 

France, in addition to the unexpected thrust through the Ardennes, this combination undermined the Allied war-waging ability to the extent that France had to sue 

for peace. It is important to note that in addition to these German initiatives, another crucial element that marked the Battle for France was the rigidity that the 

Allied High Command displayed both in terms of preparing for war and when 

confronting the German military juggernaut. The evidence for this lies in the 

French reliance on the Maginot Line and their expectation that any German offensive would take the shape and form of the great offensives of World War I, marked 

by massive artillery barrages and frontal infantry assaults. This expectation was 

rudely disrupted as the Germans bypassed the fixed defenses of the Maginot Line 

and struck deep into the Allied interior, which resulted in, first, a command paralysis and, shortly thereafter, into a collapse of the Allied war effort on the European continent. What this example serves to highlight is how the Allied insistence 

on following the doctrinal lessons of the past (of World War I) led them to face a 

military disaster.

We can point to the recent Chinese efforts to construct an antiship ballistic missile defense system to protect their eastern seaboard from the powerful US carrier 

battlegroups as another case in point. Again, in this instance, Chinese military theorists and scientists have been able to mate three “old” technologies—namely, an 

over-the-horizon radar, a ballistic missile, and a maneuverable warhead—to create 

a “system” that, even if not tested under battle conditions, has given enough concern to the US Navy reason to pause.26 Here again we find Chinese military strategists—operating within the confines of an age-old concept, namely, the antiaccess/

area-denial concept—creating a concept of operations that is “new.” A last example 

will serve to reiterate the point. Recently, the Armed Forces of the United States, 
96 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

specifically the US Army, has been at the forefront of the development of what has 

been referred to as the concept of Multi-Domain Battle/Operations (MDB/O). It 

is interesting to note the reasoning offered for this initiative. Advocates have argued, “Potential adversaries are closing the technology gap with the United States 

and developing strategies to keep U.S. forces at bay.”27 Further, it has been assessed 

that “separatist forces [are] able to gain air superiority via the land, without even 

an air force . . . they are] able to take down large land forces with a combination of 

electronic warfare, cyber, autonomous systems, drones, et cetera—not with a closein battle.”28 In short, the conclusion is that the US strategic-military establishment 

requires “urgently”—depending on who is asked—“a very difficult-to-fracture 

concept.”29 The MDB/O concept is, perhaps, the most powerful example that 

serves to reiterate Ullman’s point. Noting that the use of emergent weapons systems and capabilities transcend the traditional domains in which they have been 

hitherto used, the US military is increasingly cognizant of the fact that when employed creatively in a cross-domain manner, such capabilities can effectively erode 

the combat worthiness of First-World militaries. Thus, to respond to such challenges, which are notionally twenty-first-century in character, the Armed Forces of 

the United States have determined that they are in need of a battle concept that 

can not only address such challenges but which can also present potential adversaries with a concept of battle that is difficult to contend. In this way, it could be argued that the Armed Forces of the United States are slowly but surely breaking 

away from the past and becoming responsive to the problems and prospects of 

twenty-first century (or, more modestly, newer) models of warfare.30

Thus, when Ullman calls for adopting a twenty-first-century mind-set, what he 

is cautioning us about is not to always fall back onto the comfort of resorting to 

the tried-and-tested means of operating that, while effective in the past, are also 

predictable and thus “fracture-able” by potential adversaries. The key word here is 

always. It is true that some of the future wars of the twenty-first century will continue to be fought using the ways and means of the last century. However, that is 

not—or, should not be—the rationale for abandoning efforts to design newer strategic, operational, and tactical models. This is good advice and one that all militaries, including the Armed Forces of the United States, will be required to internalize 

if they are to succeed in addressing the strategic-military concerns of the future. 

We should also note that as the process of such research and development gets underway, there should also be a concomitant transformation in the institutions 

tasked with managing the American strategic-military capability. An early start to 
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this was proposed with the theory of network-centric warfare and the force transformation project, wherein it was suggested that if the critical need for a military 

force is to be agile and responsive, then, among other things, the stovepiped command-and-control institutions should be flattened to reduce the long chain of 

command.31 Of course, this is easier said than done. All military institutions are 

built on a foundation of trust, reliability, and the tried-and-tested means by which 

military force is employed. Thus, to transform radically the design of such organization would be fraught with danger. Ideally, transformation in the strategic-military context, while being revolutionary in nature, should be evolutionary in character. In other words, the way to transform is in incremental stages.32 Equally, it 

should be noted that transformation is a process and not a goal. Thus, to expect a 

finite outcome of the transformation process is futile, and insisting on such outcomes can only prove to be counterproductive. Ullman, it appears, is not convinced by this. Indeed, he appears to be sharply critical of the force transformation 

initiative. (p. 147) His observations on this matter suggest that, like many others, 

he considers the transformation project as being teleologically driven, which only 

serves to, in the first instance, highlight his underestimation of the nuances of 

transformation as a process.

With the exception of his (misguided) ideas about force transformation, Ullman’s call for the cultivation and adoption of a twenty-first-century mind-set cannot be faulted. If there is a shortcoming, then it lies in the fact that he does not 

engage with these ideas in a sustained and consistent manner. However, there is an 

aspect of the twenty-first-century mind-set theme that Ullman completely elides. 

While he flags the increasing informationalization of the world that is currently 

under way, he remains silent about the sociotechnical ramifications of this process. 

Thus, for example, he does not account for the ways by which the human condition is segueing from pyramidal to more distributed forms of organizing and from 

the platform-centric model to the more network-centric model of cognizing things 

and objects. These transformations in our practice of everyday life are having a 

subtle, but undeniable, impact on strategic-military affairs. Thus, what we see 

emerging are ensembles of information and communication networks with lethal 

capabilities.

33 Interestingly, such ensembles include the Soldier, who is increasingly 

transforming into what can best be referred to as a weaponized cyborg. Note that 

here I am not simply referring to computationally underwritten and protocologically organized entities. Rather, the reference is to what the philosopher Luciano 

Floridi refers to as informationally embodied organism or “inforgs,” which, he 
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contends, is an emergent consequence as the “threshold between here (analogue, 

carbon-based, offline) and there (digital, silicon-based, online) is fast becoming 

blurred.”34 These are considerations that not only distort the existing cognitive 

frameworks by means of which we understand and render the concept of war and 

of combat but are also emergent indicators that the very design of our current strategic-military systems are fast becoming outdated and outmoded. “This is not because such systems do not and are not employing cutting edge technology. Rather, 

it is because the organizing principle of the military per se is now [increasingly becoming] defunct.”35 Thus, if we are to truly take Ullman’s call for adopting a 

twenty-first-century mind-set seriously, then it is not enough to merely call for superficial transformations in our strategic-military practices and institutions. Instead, what is required is an intensive effort from the ground up that will take into 

account some of the subtler and deeply transformative sociotechnical processes 

that are currently underway. However, to do this would challenge the geocentric 

model of strategic-military affairs to which Ullman appears to remain beholden. In 

this sense, he again falls short of standing true to his own call to question the fundamental assumptions that underlie his recommendations. In short, the matter—

conceptually speaking—is not as simple as he may make it out to be.

The third constituent of Ullman’s brains-based approach involves, as we have 

seen, focusing “on affecting, influencing, and controlling the wills and perceptions 

of real and potential enemies.” It should come as no surprise that influencing the 

will and perception of an adversary is critically important, especially under battle 

conditions. Indeed, as Ullman and Wade point out in their collaborative work, the 

imposition of shock and awe is an age-old military practice as is evidenced by ancient works on war such as Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War, wherein a general’s 

strategic and operational acumen was determined by his ability to compel an adversary to capitulate before battle is joined. Numerous such examples abound in 

history, where, when faced with the weight of firepower, coupled with the art of 

maneuver, armies have been out thought and compelled to capitulate. This has resulted in the identification of what is often referred to as the cognitive battlespace, 

wherein the aim is to do precisely what Ullman mentions.36 However, he, again, 

does not engage with this topic with the seriousness that it warrants. His recommendations are desultory and superficial, and his skimming over the issue undermines his assertions regarding the development and cultivation of a twenty-firstcentury mind-set. However, the matter is not one to be taken lightly. Thus, as 

Alexander Kott, chief scientist of the US Army Research Laboratory observes, 
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“What if the true weak link of the information age force is not the hardware of 

machines, but the software of the human mind? And if so, could it be that the entire conceptual structure of the information revolution, at least as it applies to military affairs, is built on sand, on the notorious fickleness of human cognition?”37

Such matters cannot be passed over by glib suggestions that include the setting up 

of a “twenty-first-century equivalent of Bletchley Park” or to reiterate the importance of “data mining” to derive information and knowledge on potential enemies.” (p. 233) Leaving aside the complexities of the cognitive sciences and associated technologies involved, influencing the will and perception of an adversary 

requires, among other things, an empathy with the adversary—of his culture, of 

his cognitive frameworks. While this is true in the close confines of the battlespace, 

it is even more relevant when applied in the context of the wider strategic landscape. Ullman is correct when he points out that purely military means are not 

enough to influence an adversary, though it is instrumental in instilling a sense of 

“awe” in him. Nonmilitary means that necessarily involve diplomacy (including 

cultural diplomacy), geo-economics, and such, are equally critical constituents 

when developing a strategic posture that aims to engage in a battle of cognition. 

One must also contend with the fact that as this process gets underway, the concept of the battlespace will also expand. In this context, Ullman refers to the Russian “active measures” involving “interference in the domestic politics of many democracies,” (p. 238) most recently, as alleged, in the United States. However, it 

worth pointing out that as far back as in 1999, two Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army colonels had (unofficially) invoked the concept of unrestricted warfare, 

which referred precisely to the expansion of the battlespace. Indeed, the two Chinese military officers had even gone to the extent of observing,

If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to com- pel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means, including armed 

force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to 

compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” This represents a change. A change in war and 

a change in the mode of war occasioned by this. So, just what has led to the change? What 

kind of changes are they? Where are the changes headed? How does one face these changes?38

This highlights not only the depth and intricacies involved when considering 

the prospect of influencing and affecting the will and perception of an adversary; it 

also suggests the ways by which a near-peer competitor is thinking about such 

matters. Measured against this, Ullman’s rumination on the subject fall short.
100 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Conclusion

As we have seen, Ullman correctly identifies a number of themes and issues that 

afflict the current and prevailing US strategic-military establishment and posture. 

In fact, it cannot be denied that the call that he issues is a valid, indeed, an urgent 

one. While his presentation of his ideas detracts from the force of the material he 

presents, that is not a good enough reason to dismiss his latest effort for, in addition to some of the points that we have occasion to engage with above, Ullman 

also pays attention to some other critical issues that we have not examined—

namely, the budgetary issues that he foresees will impact the American strategicmilitary posture, the problems associated with what he refers to as the “hollow 

force” issue, and so forth. These are important considerations, and ignoring them 

will serve the US strategic-military establishment poorly.

Ullman deserves credit for highlighting these and other issues boldly and without reserve, though some of his more offhanded and scathing remarks, which are 

littered throughout the book, are somewhat in poor taste. Nevertheless, as I have 

mentioned from the outset, while the book is a challenging read, it deserves our 

close attention—if not for any other reason but for the fact that it invites us to reinterrogate the metastrategic armature that underwrites the US strategic-military 

posture. In this sense, it represents a sincere call to reshape the US strategic-military establishment in a manner that will best serve the interests of the country in 

the twenty-first century. JIPA

Notes

1. Michael Rosen, “Non-Religious Ethics? A Critical Notice of Derek Parfait, On What Matters,” International 

Journal of Philosophical Studies 21, no. 5 (2013): 755–72, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/12967839/

On%20What%20Matters%207%20November%202013.pdf?sequence=1. Contrast this with the position taken by 

Thomas S. Nichols with reference to “peer review” in the context of “expertise.” Clearly, Nichols understands the “gatekeeping” function that Rosen draws our attention to in a positive sense, since he argues that one of the mechanisms by 

means of which “being an expert” is validated and confirmed is by peer review. See Thomas S. Nichols, The Death of 

Expertise: The Campaign against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters (London: Oxford University Press, 2017), 35.

2. Ibid. This reviewer was struck by how his own experience resulting from multiple readings of Ullman’s book 

paralleled what Rosen documented in his “critical notice” of Parfait’s work, though, it must be added, the two works are 

from different domains and they operate within and across different registers. Parfait’s work is, by some accounts (including Rosen’s), one of the greatest modern works of moral philosophy, while Ullman’s book is focused on strategic, 

military, and political affairs.

3. Ibid.

4. I use the word armature here to mean “a framework.” An alternate but perhaps more archaic word would be 

“architectonic,” which was famously used by Immanuel Kant.

5. Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned, Reprint Edition, (Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017).

6. This is reminiscent of the famous phrase “lions led by donkeys,” which was “used to describe the British infantry 

of the First World War and to blame the generals who led them. The contention is that the brave soldiers (lions) were 
Spring 2019 | 101

Critical Review Essay

sent to their deaths by incompetent and indifferent leaders (donkeys).” See Nigel Rees, Brewer’s Famous Quotations, 

(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 23.

7. Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002), 29.

8. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkley: University of California Press, 

1988).

9. Of course, there are a variety of values and morals involved in such instances, but for the purposes of this essay, I 

will set those aside without minimizing their importance.

10. In this context, it is instructive to read Graham Allison’s and Phillip Zelikow’s analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, which dissects how various constituencies within the American strategic-political-military establishment perceived 

and responded to the strategic problem posed by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. See Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd, ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

11. This could also include, particularly in democratic political systems, what is often referred to as condition of 

“constitutional dictatorship,” which is declared when a state of emergency is invoked. It is also worth noting that such 

conditions rarely last for very long and often have negative consequences for those who invoke such conditions. A case 

in point was the state of emergency that was invoked by the then Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi., which lasted 

21 months (from 1975–1977). The political consequences for Mrs. Gandhi, when free elections were called, were disastrous. See, for example, Kuldip Nayar, The Judgement: Inside Story of the Emergency in India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977). On constitutional dictatorships, see Clinton Rossitor, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government 

in Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948).

12. Ullman has what is evidently a strong opinion on the matter of checks and balances, which we will have occasion to revisit in due course.

13. Interestingly, Ullman leaves unsaid how and why Reagan’s presidency of the Screen Actors’ Guild prepared him 

for assuming the role of the President of the United States of America.

14. On dominant battlespace knowledge, see Martin C. Libicki and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Dominant Battlespace 

Knowledge (Washington, DC: NDU Press, October 1995). Full-spectrum dominance, officially known as full- spectrum 

superiority, was defined, “The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference.” See Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010. This has come under 

sustained criticism from various quarters. See, for example, Jason Vest, “Missed Perceptions,” Government Executive, 1 

December 2005, https://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2005/12/missed-perceptions/20710/. See also William F. 

Engdahl, Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order (Boxborough, MA: Third Millennium Press, 2009).

15. Gernot Böhme, Invasive Technification: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Technology, trans. Cameron Shingleton, 

(London: Continuum Press, 2012).

16. On “the borderless world,” see Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999). On the challenges faced by the concept of the nation-state, see, for example, 

Gurutz Jáuregui Bereciartu, Decline of the Nation-State, trans. William A. Douglass (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 

1994); and Michael Mann, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

17. Harlan K. Ullman, James P. Wade, et al, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, 1996).

18. Note: The doctrine of shock and awe is related to the concept of “decisive force,” though Ullman and Wade do 

draw some distinctions between the two in terms of intent, design, manner in which force is applied, and so forth.

19. Harlan Ullman, interview by Sue Chan, CBS Evening News, 24 January 2003, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/

iraq-faces-massive-us-missile-barrage/..

20. James William Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000), 34.

21. Interestingly, Ullman betrays this sentiment when he asserts, “What is missing today in our search for an effective national-security strategy is the geostrategic equivalent of E = mc2.” (p. 229)

22. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, 1995), 30–31.

23. SecDef Donald H. Rumsfeld and CJCS Gen Richard Myers, “DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and 

Gen. Myers” (transcript, 12 February 2002), http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.

24. Slavoj Žižek, “Rumsfeld and the Bees,” Guardian, 28 Jun 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/jun/28/wildlife.conservation. 

25. An excellent account of how this came about is available in Mary Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of 

Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014).
102 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

26. See, for example, Zachary Keck, “China’s DF-26 ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missile Could Stop the Navy in Its Track (without Firing a Shot),” National Interest, 20 April 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-df-26-carrierkiller-missile-could-stop-the-navy-its-25493; Terrence Kelly, Anthony Atler, et al, Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship 

Missiles in the Western Pacific (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_

reports/TR1300/TR1321/RAND_TR1321.pdf; and Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) 

Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

27. Jon Harper, “Pentagon Pushing ‘Multi-Domain Battle’ Concept,” National Defense (website), 4 October 2016, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20161117220422/http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.

aspx?ID=2319. 

28. Megan Eckstein, “‘Multi-Domain Battle’ Concept to Increase Integration across Services, Domains,” USNI 

News, 4 October 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/04/multi-domain-battle-concept-increase-integration-acrossservices-domains. The comment is attributed to Gen David Perkins, commanding general of the US Army Training 

and Doctrine Command. 

29. Sean D. Carberry, “Officials: DOD Must Adapt to Multi-domain Warfare Model,” Federal Computer Week, 4 

October 2016, https://fcw.com/articles/2016/10/04/multi-domain-warfare.aspx. 

30. For an extended discussion of the MDB/O concept, see Manabrata Guha and David Galbreath, The Multi-Domain Battle Concept: A Preliminary Assessment, (New Delhi: Center for Joint Warfare Studies (MoD), 2018), forthcoming.

31. See, for example, David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, Network-Centric Warfare: Developing 

and Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington: CCRP, DOD, 2003), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/

a406255.pdf.

32. See, for example, Manabrata Guha, Indian Strategic-Military Transformation: Revolutionary in Nature, Evolutionary in Character, MacArthur Foundation-RSIS Policy Brief (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 

Nanyang Technical University, December 2013), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PB131201_Indian_Strategic_Military_Transformation.pdf.

33. Manabrata Guha, “Networked Nightmares,” in The Digital Dionysus: Nietzsche and the Networked Condition, ed. 

Dan Mellamphy and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy (New York: Punctum Books, 2016), 54.

34. Luciano Floridi, “A Look into the Future Impact of ICT on Our Lives,” Information Society 23, no. 1 (2007) : 

59–64.

35. Guha, “Networked Nightmares,” 65.

36. See, for example, Alexander Kott, ed., Battle of Cognition: The Future Information-Rich Warfare and the Mind of 

the Commander: The Future of Information-rich Warfare and the Mind of the Commander (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).

37. Ibid., 2.

38. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of Globalization, 

[Chaoxianzhan - dui quanqiuhua shidai zhanzheng yu zhanfa de xiangding], (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Arts 

Publishing House, February 1999), 7, https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf.

Dr. Manabrata Guha is a research associate at the University of 

New South Wales at The Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia. He is a member of the Values in Defence and Security Technology Research Group and is a distinguished fellow at 

the Center for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi, India.

He is the author of Reminagining War in the 21st Century: From 

Clausewitz to Network-centric Warfare (Routledge, 2010). His 

current work focuses on defence and military strategy in an age of 

autonomous weapon systems, and the design and application of 

technology in military affairs.
Spring 2019 | 103

Book Review

Asia-Pacific Security: An Introduction by Joanne Wallis and Andrew Carr, eds., Georgetown University Press, 2016, 298 pages.

Joanne Wallis and Andrew Carr, along with their contributors, wrote this book primarily to serve as a 

textbook for university students who major in international relations and for those interested in the AsiaPacific region. Published in 2016, the cases and data cited are comparatively up to date. The book is divided into 12 chapters that cover three themes concerning Asia-Pacific security studies.

The book starts with the editors elucidating on how the Asia-Pacific has been getting attention because 

of US policy and rising powers in the region. Then they present what are the major security concerns and 

how to use security studies theories to understand those issues.

In chapter 1, Brad Glosserman writes about an important topic: how the United States is facing China’s 

rising. The United States will remain significant in the Indo-Pacific for several reasons: mobilization of military power, massive economic capability, participation in the regional institutions, and its liberalism and 

democracy. Despite interaction on economic issues, China and the United States share limited trust and 

ideologies. The author concludes that until China presents a threat, the United States could share the 

power. In chapter 2, Lowell Dittmer acknowledges Glosserman’s idea and adds that China now is engaging 

in multiple territorial disputes that involve US interests as well. Indeed, the bilateral relations are so far positive; however, whether China is a threat or not depends on the interpretation of the United States. 

The following three chapters in part 1 discuss other relatively small states in the Asia-Pacific. In chapter 

3, H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall discuss whether India and Japan will be the next China—potential great 

powers. They conclude that despite both countries acquiring a certain level of economic and military capability, neither is likely to emerge as a great power anytime soon, because India is now focusing on alleviating 

domestic poverty and Japan has always considered its triangle relations with the United States and China as 

vital. 

In chapter 4, Andrew Carr analyses the middle powers of the Asia-Pacific and whether they can be 

builders or breakers of the regional power dynamics. As builders, they can establish regional institutions to 

coordinate and resolve the collective challenges; as breakers, these middle powers might drag their allies 

into difficult situations in which the greater powers are unwilling to get involved, or the middle powers are 

capable of starting conflicts among themselves due to focusing of self-interests. Examining the region’s small 

states, Joanne Wallis, in chapter 5, applies several security theories—neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism, and critical theories—to explain the behaviors and actions of these actors.

Part 2 consists five security issues. Tim Huxley and Taylor Brendan, in chapter 6, argue that it is very 

hard to have a consistency on whether there is or is not an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region due to the 

different levels of military development, the reasons for acquisition, and other factors. From this reader’s 

perspective, the situation looks far more pessimistic in Northeast Asia than in the Southdue to the Northeast having more potential triggers of conflicts and lacking a communication mechanism. In chapter 7, 

James Manicom scrutinizes maritime issues, concluding that these matters are not limited only to the economic benefits and constructivist theme but also to security, which includes food, energy, climate catastrophes, and humanitarian disasters. Among all the listed disputes, the author points out that the South China 

Sea issue is the most dangerous due to its complexity and the lack of constructive dialogue in resolving the 

issues. Indeed, the several flashpoints that engage China will be hard to solve due to Beijing’s rapid emergence and its assertive and aggressive position toward dispute resolution. Christopher Paul and Nick Nelson, in chapter 8, describe the threats posed by terrorism and insurgency in the Asia-Pacific, including their 

history and current situation. The authors demonstrate different ways for the government to solve the isDisclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA) are those of the 

authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article 

may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the JIPA requests a courtesy line.
104 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

sues; however, it is extremely risky for other societal factors to form other unrest. Most Asia-Pacific states 

are facing severe domestic problems; so, internal security issues should be on their priority list. Besides the 

internal cause of security concerns, external threats come from connection and globalization, which causes 

nontraditional security issues, such as those analysed by Alistair D. B. Cook in chapter 9. Rex B. Hughes, 

in chapter 10, turns our attention to a modern security concern: cybersecurity. Since the 1970s, cyberspace 

has developed rapidly; however, it was arguably not until 2007 that regional governments began to give 

adequate concern to the matter of cybersecurity—lagging behind many others who had already began to 

understand the matter. Meanwhile, cyberspace has been a growing environment for competition between 

the United States and China.

Part 3 of the book provides potential solutions for Asia-Pacific security issues. In chapter 11, Mathew 

Davies discusses the roles and functions of multilateralism and security institutions in the Asia-Pacific. 

Sarah Teitt, in chapter 12, prioritizes human beings’ lives as the primary security concern. With the growth 

of economic development, gradually more people are moving out of poverty. However, such economic advancement does not necessarily lead to an equitable degree of human security. However, the author does 

not clearly answer whether shifting the focus in such a manner can provide a solution for traditional security issues in the region. 

The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly of interest to researchers and those interested in global and regional security. This edited book covers several poignant topics from theoretical discussions of regional order that draws a sketch of security in the Asia-Pacific to concrete security issues that governments should be 

concerned about to possible solutions to address those issues and concerns. This is a well-organized book 

with both empirical case studies and relevant security theories. Additionally, at the end of each chapter, the 

authors provide key points and questions—as well as further readings—for readers to review, discuss, and 

develop. The editors and authors can improve future versions of this book by updating the data and considering ongoing instability of US-China relations as the background, as these two are the most important 

players in the region.

Jieruo Li 

PhD candidate

Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand