_ RADIATION EXPOSURE FROM 

PACIFlC NUCLEAR TFSTS 

OVERSIGHT-HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

_. . SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

. OVERSIGHT Al\TD INVESTIGATIONS 

OF 'l'HE 

COMMITTEE-·ON 

NATURAL RESOURCES 

HOU~E OF-REPRESENT~TIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

. SECOND SESSION . 

ON 

RADIATION EXPOSURE FROM NUCLE_AR TESTS IN THE PACIFIC 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 

· Serial No. 1~3--68 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

.~ · 
RADIATION EXPOSURE FROM 

PACIFIC NUCLEAR TFSTS 

OVERSIGHT HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

NATURAL RESOURCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

RADIATION EXPOSURE FROM NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE PACIFIC 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 

Serial No. 103-68 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

7~784 WASHINGTON : 1994 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 

ISBN 0-16-044459-4 
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman 

PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana 

EDWARD J . MARKEY, Massachusetts 

AUSTIN J . MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

NICK JOE RAHALL II, West Virginia 

BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota 

PAT WILLIAMS, Montana 

RON DELUGO, Virgin Islands 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut 

RICHARD H. LEHMAN, California 

BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico 

PETER A DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

LARRY LAROCCO, Idaho 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, Califor;nia 

CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO, Puerto Rico 

KARAN ENGLISH, Arizona 

KAREN SHEPHERD, Utah 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

ROBERT A UNDERWOOD, Guam 

SAM FARR, California 

LANE EV ANS, Illinois 

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii 

THOMAS J. BARLOW III, Kentucky 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconain 

DON YOUNG, Alaska, 

Ranking Republican Member 

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah 

BARBARA F. VUCANOVICH, Nevada 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ROBERT F. (BOB) SMITH, Oregon 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

SCOTT MCINNIS, Colorado 

RICHARD W. POMBO, California 

JAY DICKEY, Arkansas 

JOHN LAWRENCE, Staff Director 

RICHARD MELTZER, General Counsel 

DANIEL VAL KlsH, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITl'EE ON 0vERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut ROBERT F. (BOB) SMITH, Oregon, 

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California Ranking Republican Member 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah 

PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana BARBARA F. VUCANOVICH, Nevada 

BRUCE F . VENTO, Minnesota JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

RICHARD H. LEHMAN, California JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

KARAN ENGLISH, Arizona KEN CALVERT, California 

KAREN SHEPHERD, Utah RICHARD W. POMBO, California 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York JAY DICKEY, Arkansas 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

LANE EV ANS, Illinois 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconain 

JOHN LAWRENCE, Staff Director 

LINDA J. CHASE, Chief Counsel 

ELJZABETII McMILLAN, Clerk 

TED CASE, Republican COIUlultant on Oversight and Investigations 

(II) 
CONTENTS 

Hearing held: February 24, 1994 .......................................................................... . Member statements: 

:~:: ~~ ~=~~·::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 

Hon. Lane Evans ............................................................................................. . 

:~:: ~fs;T~Mi~··:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 

Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega ......................................................................... . Witness statements: 

Jonathan M. Weisgall, Esq., legal counsel to the People of Bikini ............. . Professor Merril Eisenbud, distinguished scholar in residence, Duke University Medical Center, Division of Occupational Health and Safety ..... . Panel consisting of: 

David M. Weiman on behalf of the People ofRongelap ........................ . Howard L. Hills, Esq ................................................................................ . Thomas E. Hamilton, M.D., chief of endocrinology, Department of 

Medicine, Pacific Medical Center, Seattle, Washington .................... . Steven L. Simon, Ph.D., director, Nationwide Radiological Study, Re--

Ed:~ ~tj}~~.M~t :!~:ia:~t··i;;··th~··p~bli~··~d~;;;;~:··N~~i~~; 

Claims Tribunal, Republic of the Marshall Islands ........................... . Panel consisting of: His Excellency Wilfred I. Kendall, Republic of the Marshall Islands, 

Ambassador to the United States, accompanied by Peter N. Oliver, 

Under Secretary for Compact Implementation .................................. . William C. Graham, Public Advocate, Nuclear Claims Tribunal ......... . Hon. Johnsay Riklon, Senator from Rongelap to the Nitijela of the 

Marshall Islands ................................................................................... . Hon. Henchi Balos, Senator from Bikini to the Nitijela of the Marshall Islands .......................................................................................... . Hon. Hiroshi V. Yamamura, Senator from Utirik to the Nitijela of 

the Marshall Islands ............................................................................ . Hon. Ishmael John, Senator from Enewetak, accompanied by Hon. 

and Mrs. Neptali Peter, Mayor of the Enewetak, Ujelang Local 

Government Council, Johnson Hemest, council member, and Davor 

Harry ~~VPei!:ul~:UfnA~i~~~i··~~~ey·f~~··H~;yth:··n~p~~·~i of Energy, accompanied Gy John E. Rudolph, Director, Office of Transportation, Safeguards and Energy Management, Department of Energy 

Material submitted for the hearing record by: 

Hon. George Miller: Prepared statement of Hon. Norman D. Dicks, a U.S. Representative in Congress from the State of Washington ............. . Professor Merril Eisenbud: "Atomic Energy Committee, Stucli.es of Radioactive Fallout," pp. 63-103, An Environmental Odyssey, University of m:E~:~~ \vnfred·°i:·K~~d~ii":"··································································· 1. Letter to Chairman Miller dated July 8, 1993, from Tom D. Kijiner, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Marshall Islands ......... . 2. Letter to Dr. Harry J. Pettengill, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Health, Department of Energy, dated February 14, 1994, from 

Tom D. Kijmer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Marshall Islands .......................................................................................... . 

(III) 

Page 

1 

1 

2 

36 

44 

52 

54 

4 

69 

137 

165 

174 

208 

233 

264 

347 

357 

371 

372 

389 

399 

66 

73 

266 

272 
IV 

Material submitted for the hearing record by-Continued 

His Excellency Wilfred I. Kendall-Continued 

3. "1993 Annual Report, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Report on Implementation of the Agreement Between the Government 

of the United States and the Government of the Mars~ Islands 

for the . Imrlementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free 

Association ........................................................................................... . 4. Prepared statement of Hon. Billiet Edmond, Mayor of ~ngelap .... . 

Ho1ggft1:ai=~%~~~ .. ~ .. ~~~ ~ .. ~~~ .. ~~~ .. ~~ .~~ .. ~~'. 

APPENDIX 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 

Additional material submitted for the hearing record from: Hon. Ron deLugo: 

Page 

275 

381 

368 

1. Letter from Chairman deLugo to Dr. Steven L. Simon, Director, 

Nationwide Radiological Study, dated March 9, 1994 ........................ 429 

2.Response from Dr. Simon dated April 27, 1994, to Chairman de 

Lugo's March 9 letter ............................................................................ 431 

Professor Merril Eisenbud: 1. Letter to Chairman Miller dated February 28, 1994, and attachment........................................................................................................ 437 

2. Letter to Chairman Miller dated March 7, 1994, and attachments .. 442 
RADIATION EXPOSURE FROM NUCLEAR 

TESTS IN THE PACIFIC 

THURSDAY,FEBRUARY24, 1994 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, . pursuant to call, at 9:23 a.m. in room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. George Miller (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

will come to order. 

The purpose of this morning's hearing is to conduct oversight 

hearings on the radiation exposure from nuclear tests in the Pacific. 

Forty years ago next week, March 1, 1954, a joint U.S. military/ 

civilian task force detonated a 15-megaton thermonuclear device at 

Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands, 2,000 miles southwest of Hawaii. Code-named BRAVO, the test unleashed the most powerful 

explosion then known to mankind. 

BRA VO's mushroom cloud rose more than 20 miles into the 

stratosphere. Radioactive fallout from the test blanketed inhabited 

atolls downwind from ground zero, unalterably changing the lives 

of the thousands of people who lived in its path. The joint task 

force called the pattern of radioactive fallout an accident that occurred due to a last-minute shift in the winds and the failure to 

anticipate the bomb would yield so much power. 

The task force evacuated the inhabitants of the islands of 

Rongelap, Rongerik, and Utirik over the days following the BRA VO 

accident and issued reports which identified the scope of the fallout 

from BRA VO as confined to a narrow band of 13 mostly 

uninhabited atolls east of ground zero. In all, we were told, only 

267 people were exposed to the fallout from BRA VO; 28 of those 

exposed people were U.S. servicemen on Rongerik Atoll. The remainder were islanders from Rongelap and Utirik who became part 

of the DOE health monitoring program which continues to this day. 

This is the picture presented to this committee and to the representatives of the Marshall Islands during the Compact of Free 

Association negotiations a decade ago. But was it a complete story 

of the BRA VO test and its aftermath? Information presented to the 

committee suggests that the true facts of BRA VO have been hidden 

from this committee, from the American people, and, most seri-

(1) 
2 

ously, from the affected peoples of the Marshall Islands. That information strongly suggested that the disposition of the BRA VO fallout on the uninhabited atolls was not accidental, that the fallout 

from BRA VO and other nuclear tests was deposited far more widely than has been disclosed; and many more people may be suffering 

from their exposure to the BRA VO radiation than are included in 

the DOE health program. 

Just a few months ago, the committee was informed by the Republic of the Marshall Islands about the preliminary results of an 

alarming thyroid survey. That independent study indicated that 

the rate of thyroid cancer on Ebeye Island far to the south of the 

designated fallout zone may be 100 times greater than any other 

place on Earth. That information appears to corroborate a previous 

study which found that significant fallout from the U.S. nuclear 

test most likely extended far beyond the previously identified narrow band of mostly uninhabited atolls. 

The Administration, and particularly the Department of Energy, 

have wisely decided to confront the past of half truths and lies 

about our nuclear testing and experimentation programs here in 

the United States. We must also end the secrecy and the deception that have shrouded the aftermath of the BRA VO test in the Pacific. 

Long classified and otherwise unavailable information about 

these tests and their legacy in the Marshall Islands must be 

opened to the Congress and to public scrutiny. So long as this story 

is only half told, so long as file drawers full of information remain 

needlessly restricted, the suspicion and mistrust will continue, particularly in light of the recent disclosures about secret human radiation experiments. 

The Administration has indicated its willingness to work toward 

full disclosure in this matter and its willingness to tum over previously classified documents to this committee. We hope that this 

hearing will be the first step in a long road to full disclosure to the 

American public and to the people of the Marshall Islands. 

Representative Underwood. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I commend you 

very much for holding these hearings. 

We have heard a lot lately about the atrocities by the U.S. Government against unknowing citizens. Human radiation testing 

sounds incongruous for democracy at best and criminal at worst. 

Today's hearing focuses on a slightly different topic, although the 

theme is the same, and that is that human beings were needlessly 

injured by the U.S. Government. 

To the people of the central Pacific, this is not a new issue. However, in today's climate of professed openness and disclosures, new 

opportunities lie on the horizon to get some very old questions answered. 

I am concerned, for example, that the Department of Energy's 

medical checkups on the people of Rongelap and Utirik may be failing to take into account the people who were on islands downwind 

of the 1954 BRA VO test. The 1978 DOE study lists several islands 

as irexposed to, quote, intermediate-range fallout. These islands are 

Ailinginae, Ailuk, Bikar, Jemo, Likiep, Mejit, Rongerik, Taka, 
3 

Utirik, and Wotho. They may sound like foreign names in Wash~ 

ington, DC, but they are real places with real people, and they certainly are neighbors of mine in Micronesia. 

Another concern of mine is that, even after the U.S. Government 

began offering assistance to the Marshallese, too much emphasis 

was placed on research and not enough on treatment and prevention. For example, in 1975 about six years after telling the 

Bikinians that it was safe to return home, U.S. scientists found 

higher levels of radiation than expected. Even though warning 

signs were evident, people were not evacuated until 1978. 

An error of judgment? We can only speculate, but I am alarmed 

when I find a DOE report that states, "Bikini may be the only global source of data on humans where intake via ingestion is thought 

to contribute the major fraction of plutonium body burden." 

Mr. Chairman, we owe it to the people of the Marshall Islands 

to determine if populations were kept in high-risk circumstances 

unnecessarily. 

We are now told that the southern islands of Rongelap may be 

within "permissible limits" of radioactivity while the northern islands are still unsafe. This begs the question, can we divide the 

same atoll into categories of safe and unsafe? Do we run the risk 

of repeating history and resettling people too soon? 

Of course, the key question remains, Do we really have enough 

information? Which leads me to my last point. We must once and 

for all declassify every last document related to the Marshall Islands testing. We are beginning to see such documents which show 

higher yield levels than previously acknowledged. 

Mr. Chairman, no amount of reparations or trust funds will reverse the crime committed by this country against the people of the 

Marshall Islands, but the very least we can do is let the truth be 

known, and I commend you for contributing to that effort. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Let me say at the outset of the hearing that we have a rather 

lengthy witness list today. I would hope that the witnesses, to the 

extent possible, could summarize their testimony because, much of 

the testimony which I have been reading over the last week raises 

a number of questions, and we want to make sure that there is 

time for those questions to be asked of all panelists. 

We obviously will not be able to ask all of the pertinent questions 

in this morning's hearing, but as I stated at the outset, this hearing is only a beginning. We certainly hope to be able to recontact 

any of the witnesses that appear this morning for the purposes of 

helping us with that investigation and with answering additional 

questions that we simply will not have time to put to individuals 

today. 

So to the extent to which you can summarize the pertinent 

points, I think it would be helpful for this initial hearing, but I also 

want you to testify in the manner in which you are most comfortable. So somewhere in between there is an accommodation to 

both of our needs. The problem that has occurred is obviously that 

in a short while the House will be going into session, and we may 

shortly end up in a series of votes which are going to take Members 

back and forth to the Floor. 
4 

Having said that, let me welcome Jonathan Weisgall, who is the 

legal counsel for the people of Bikini, to the committee. 

Welcome. Your entire statement and whatever supporting documents you think are necessary will be included in the record in 

their entirety, Mr. Weisgall. Proceed as you are most comfortable. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN M. WEISGALL, ESQ., LEGAL 

COUNSEL TO THE PEOPLE OF BIKINI 

Mr. WEISGALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to give the committee a quick historical overview of 

the U.S. nuclear testing program in the Marshalls, focusing specifically on BRAVO. 

Some of my testimony comes from a book I have been working 

on called Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Test at Bikini Atoll, 

which will be out in about two or three weeks. The rest comes from 

documents that I have obtained in the last months and, in fact, in 

some cases in the last five days. 

Not only is next Tuesday the fortieth anniversary of BRAVO, but 

I think today really marks the first time 40 years after BRA VO 

and 48 years after the first nuclear test at Bikini that any congressional committee has ever asked the questions of: What happened? 

What went wrong in these tests? So I commend the committee for 

holding this hearing. 

As you know, there were 66 atomic tests held in the Marshall Islands, and what I want to focus on today specifically are two of 

them. 

I would like to set the stage in 1946 with the BAKER shot at 

Operation Crossroads which was the fifth atomic bomb ever detonated in the world. 

These two shots, BAKER and BRA VO, which came eight years 

later, are linked, in my opinion, by four themes. The first two are 

the arrogance and the ignorance that permeated the U.S. nuclear 

testing program. Added to this was a third theme of secrecy that 

served only to feed that arrogance and excuse the ignorance. Mixed 

into this recipe was a fourth theme, a weapon of terror called radioactive fallout that was really designed more for genocide than any 

kind of military purpose. 

I think that while Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that the instant blast from an atomic bomb could kill tens of thousands of 

people in seconds, the lesson from BAKER and the real lesson from 

BRA VO was that the killing power of the lingering effects of radioactive fallout far surpasses the sledgehammer effect of the bomb's 

blast. 

BAKER was the world's first underwater shot. It was a near disaster for many of the 40,000 sailors who were exposed to radioactivity from the blast. This was a shot that looked a little bit like 

Niagara Falls in reverse with a one-mile-wide column of water 

shooting up into the atmosphere and then about ten seconds later 

collapsing back into Bikini's lagoon. 

Much like BRAVO, there were warnings on the BAKER shot. Los 

Alamos in December of 1945 warned-and I am quoting-that an 

underwater test against naval vessels would contain so many hazards that it should be ruled out at this time. 
5 

A Los Alamos study, another one, said-and I am quoting-the 

water near a recent surface explosion will be a witch's brew. There 

will probably be enough plutonium near the surface to poison the 

combined armed forces of the United States at their highest wartime strength. 

The warnings were there. They were clear, and they all came 

true, as more than half of the fission products came collapsing back 

into the lagoon's water and on to the 95 target ships that were at 

Bikini. 

Radiation dangers following that test were serious, and I do not 

think enough steps were taken there to prevent widespread exposures. This is mostly of American veterans now. This test, much 

like BAKER or BRA VO eight years later, was also marked by a 

level of ignorance and indifference displayed by people in charge. 

Nevertheless, despite the disaster that was occurring, despite the 

fact that all of this fallout came back and absolutely inundated the 

target ships with what a Navy report called a kiss of death. For 

weeks men routinely boarded these ships, ate on these ships, slept 

on these ships, and did what they could to get rid of this radioactivity, which of course was something brand new which no one knew 

about. 

While there was no conspiracy, I don't think, to get men exposed 

to radiation, there was a very clear and deliberate decision by scientific and medical experts to refuse even to consider the possibility that a serviceman's presence at Bikini might later result in any 

kind of a radiation-related disease. 

Let me just read you two quick items, one from the chairman of 

what was called a medical legal board that was set up at Bikini 

at the time. The chairman said the purpose of the board was, 

quote, "to give what assurance was possible that no successful suits 

could be brought on account of the radiological hazards of Operation Crossroads." Then several months after the tests as experts 

were studying the radiation levels on these target ships, there is 

one very interesting meeting in November in which a participant, 

Leslie Groves, one of his assistants-he, of course, was the head of 

the Manhattan Project-said that General Groves, quote, "is very 

much afraid of claims being instituted by men who participated in 

the Bikini tests." 

This is not the 1980s; this is not the 1970s; this was 1946, two 

months after Operation Crossroads. 

The Navy's attitude at the time, much like the U.S. Government's attitude at the time, was kind of casual indifference. Here's 

a book called Bombs at Bikini. It is the official Navy publication 

on Operation Crossroads. I will just read you one sentence here. 

We want ships which are tough even when threatened by atomic bombs. We want 

to keep the ships afloat, propellers turning, guns firing. We want to protect the crews so that if fighting is necessary, they can fight well today and return home 

unharmed tomorrow. 

Well, the ships at Bikini, virtually every single one was hit with 

enough fallout that they all had to be scuttled. There might have 

been a fleet left after the test, but it would have been a little like 

the Flying Dutchman-there would have been no men on these 

ships. 
6 

The ships did survive to a large extent the blast and the heat of 

an atomic bomb. The Navy, though, had never fought an alpha particle, and the Navy lost that battle. 

Now Bikini would not· be used again for nuclear testing until 

1954. Enewetak, as you know, became the site of several tests in 

1948 and 1951, and then after the outbreak of the Korean War, the 

Government, fearful that the Koreans or the Chinese might actually invade the Marshall Islands, settled on a test site in Nevada. 

The return to the Pacific for BRA VO was occasioned by the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. The AEC could not risk testing 

this new weapon in the continental United States, so Enewetak in 

1952 was prepared for the first test of a hydrogen bomb. That was 

November 1, 1952. That was not a usable, deliverable weapon. It 

was two stories tall; it weighed 65 tons. It was not a deliverable 

hydrogen bomb, meaning one that could be delivered by an airplane. 

The Russians, who were behind us in the development of the 

atomic bomb-of course they didn't test their first one until 1949-

in August of 1953, before BRAVO, tested a deliverable hydrogen 

bomb. So the Soviets had not only caught up with American nuclear technology, they actually had moved ahead. I think that is 

important, because to me that answers to a certain extent part of 

this writing about BRA VO and moving forward. There was a need 

to move forward as quickly as possible. 

You summarized the basic results of the BRA VO shot. One of the 

more interesting documents I came across just a couple of weeks 

ago was a letter from Lewis Strauss, the chairman of the AEC, inviting President Eisenhower to attend the detonation of the 

BRA VO shot. Scribbled at the bottom of the letter from Ike, he 

says, "Thanks. Don't believe I can do it." It would have been interesting to speculate what might have happened if President Eisenhower had been out there. 

But for the BRAVO shot, incidentally, Bikinians might well have 

been put back at Bikini atoll because in 1952 the AEC said-and 

I am quoting from an AEC mem<r-"The health hazard here essentially is negligible. There is no reason why these people should not 

be returned as far as the hazards from radioactivity may be concerned." 

The AEC, though, before even testing MIKE at Enewetak, was 

very concerned about the explosive force of this hydrogen bomb. 

Again, I think this is relevant as we look into the facts of March 

1. Listen to what the AEC says in 1952 before a hydrogen bomb 

is tested. "It is possible that the tests planned for Enewetak may 

result in the destruction of a part of or all of the atoll. A severe 

shock may cause the crumbling of the entire structure. In such 

case, there would be no other test site feasible in the entire area 

other than Bikini." 

What happened at BAKER in 1946 was repeated in BRA VO in 

1954. The same four themes came back on a grander scale. The ignorance, the arrogance, the secrecy, and, sadly, the radioactive 

cloud. 

To me, Mr. Chairman, the greatest irony of BRA VO concerned 

the decision whether to evacuate any Marshallese at all. For Operation Crossroads back in 1946, the Navy evacuated all Marshallese 
7 

living on the three inhabited atolls closest to Bikini: Rongelap, 

Wotho, and Enewetak. So here we have Bikini. All the way to the 

west, Enewetak, south to Wotho and east to Rongelap, the three inhabited atolls were evacuated for a couple of months for the two 

shots. 

In 1953, the Navy suggested extending the danger zone for the 

BRA VO shot to include Rongelap and Ailinginae. 

Mr. MILLER. The information highway is having trouble following 

you, so slow it down here a bit. 

Mr. WEISGALL. Sorry I can't show it for the crowd [indicating 

map], but basically you have got the Navy suggesting in 1953, with 

Bikini here, that Rongelap and Ailinginae be evacuated. Ailinginae, 

while not inhabited, was used quite frequently by the people of 

Rongelap for fishing. It is not more than 10 or 15 miles from one 

to the other. In 1946, you had an area this wide evacuated for an 

atomic bomb. But in 1953 the decision was made not to evacuate 

Rongelap. 

Who made that decision? Interestingly enough, it was the U.S. 

Interior Department, those great experts on nuclear testing. The 

trust territory high commissioner, who was the highest ranking 

U.S. official at the time, wrote to Washington-and I am nine 

months before BRA VO-he says that the reaction of displacing 

more Marshallese will be apprehension and fear that future extensions may place any of them in the same homeless position as the 

Bikinians now occupy. The Bikinians, of course, had been evacuated in 1946. He said, "I urge you"-this is to his superior in Washington, the director of territorial a affairs-"! urge you to do everything in your power to limit the boundaries of the proposed danger 

area to exclude Ailinginae Atoll in its entirety as well as any other 

atolls or islands in the Marshall Islands other than Bikini or 

Enewetak." · 

As a compromise, he said, okay, extend the danger area to 

Ailinginae but draw that line three miles west of Ailinginae Atoll. 

111 quote: ''This would at least avoid the necessity of informing the 

Marshallese of the expanded danger area and so protect them and 

the Administration from the results of what would be, at the very 

best, unsettling knowledge for them to have." 

So the irony you have got is, in 1946 with an atomic bomb the 

size of Nagasaki, three atolls are evacuated. In 1954, knowing that 

the hydrogen bomb was at least 400 times more powerful-and in 

fact BRA VO turned out to be 1,000 times more powerful than the 

atomic bomb shots in 1946-no action was taken, no one was evacuated from these atolls. 

There were other warnings given. In 1953, the head of the Los 

Alamos Test Division wrote a memorandum criticizing a technical 

report on the weather tracking for the tests, and he said, "The 

whole approach of this report is felt to be based on too few observations by observers with too little experience. The result has been 

the creation of a theoretical picture and conclusions based on this 

picture which are not supported by the facts." 

Let's move up to March 1, 1954. Let me introduce Senator 

Henchi Balos, the elected representative of the people of Bikini to 

the Marshall Islands Legislature. 

Mr. MILLER. Welcome, Senator. 
8 

Mr. WEISGALL. You know the story. The party line has been that 

there was an unexpected shift of the winds. I don't want to spend 

much time on this, but I think it is important to note that the documents at the time, documents written not after the fact, the actual weather briefings on February 28 and March 1, paint an absolutely clear picture of the weather pattern. 

Seven a.m., the day before the shot: "No significant fallout for 

the populated Marshall Islands." Later in the day: "The trend was 

toward an unfavorable or marginal condition." 

Six p.m.-now we are 12 hours before the shot-"Conditions were 

getting less favorable." Midnight, less than seven hours before the 

shot: "Less favorable winds at 10,000- to 25,000-foot levels, winds 

headed for Rongelap to the east," and it was recognized that Bikini 

and Enmon Islands would be contaminated. 

Let me take a quick moment just to show you where the shot 

was detonated at Bikini. If I hold this here, perhaps some of the 

audience can see as well, Mr. Chairman. 

Here is Bikini Atoll, a circular chain of what was 26 islands. This 

circle in the northwest comer is a BRA VO crater detonated in the 

northwest comer of Bikini, and it was recognized at midnight that 

Bikini and Enmon Islands would be contaminated. Winds were not 

going north; they were headed due east and southeast. 

Now, who took action at the time? Was the shot postponed? No. 

Were precautions taken for the Marshallese downwind? No. But 

following the midnight briefing, Task Force 77 ordered several of 

its ships to move 20 miles farther out to sea and to the south to 

get out of the way. This, to me, puts the BRA VO shot in a different 

category from an unexpected wind shift. 

Have I seen evidence of U.S. Government officials deliberately planning to expose Marshallese to fallout? No. Have I seen evidence of U.S. officials failing to take immediate action to get 

Marshallese out of harm's way? Yes. Measures were taken to try 

to help some of the Americans to take precautionary moves. Nothing Has done for the Marshallese. So either way, the result is the 

same, irradiated Marshallese and U.S. scientists measuring the 

long-term effects on them. 

If this weather forecast created enough risk to move the ships, 

the Marshallese in danger should have been warned, they should 

have been moved, or the shot should have been postponed. 

One other thing I remembered this morning in my own research 

on Operation Crossroads. The Bikinians were on Rongerik for Operation Crossroads in 1946. They were 125 miles away from Bikini. 

The U.S. Navy had a landing craft at Rongerik, and it actually put 

the Bikinians on that ship the day of the first shot at Bikini, and 

then when the winds turned out okay, they were put back and 

there was no fallout in the area. Nothing like this was done eight 

years later. 

The cover-up began immediately. Lewis Strauss, chairman of the 

AEC, sent out a cable to Kwajelein saying, "No public release will 

be made in regard to fallout or evacuation in the trust territory unless forced by leak or other circumstances. Washington presently 

plans no report, no announcements, and urgently requests that you 

make nothing public on these matters." 
9 

The Los Alamos Test Division leader cabled back that he was 

"very concerned" about Strauss's order saying, quote, "I should regret very much the impression that we are being furtive in our actions with regard to these people." The cover-up started on March 

3. 

Bikini, Mr. Chairman, would be the site of 20 other nuclear tests 

over the next four years, and I applaud what this committee is 

doing today. You are going to hear from other witnesses about the 

effects today. 

This hearing is a start, you are correct, and this hearing, these 

issues, don't just concern the BRA VO shot. BRA VO alone was one 

of six shots in March 1954, March and April at Bikini, that had 

a total megatonnage of about 48 megatons, with BRA VO being 

about 15. 

Other hydrogen bomb shots destroyed other parts of Bikini. The 

ZUNI shot in 1956 vaporized the western end of one of Bikini's islands. There is more to this story. A lot of it has been made public. 

For you English literature majors, I rather enjoyed one document 

I found which was AEC's efforts to try to return the Rongelap people back to their atoll. It was called "Project Hardy, the Return of 

the Native." So the AEC did get a chuckle out of all this. 

I think the real issue today, though, is, What should this committee do? Let's begin with the Compact of Free Association. Article 

9 is entitled "Changed Circumstances," and it says that if injuries 

or damages in the Marshalls are discovered after the date of this 

agreement and could not have reasonably been identified at the effective date of the agreement, which was 1985, that the Marshalls 

Government can ask the Congress to provide for such injuries. 

Ironically, having provided this remedy to the Marshallese, most 

documents have remained classified. So despite requests from myself and others to declassify documents, a lot of documents on the 

nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands remain classified. 

The compact negotiations were largely one-sided. The U.S. had all 

the information. 

I sat at this table ten years ago, and I said to Mr. SeiberlingI'll quote my testimony-"The U.S. Government has sought in the 

section 177 agreement to put a price tag on its nuclear legacy in 

the Pacific and close the books on this sorry bit of history. If Congress is to pass judgment on the agreement, it seems only fair that 

it should have before it all the pertinent facts on the testing program." 

That was May 1984. I could say the same thing today. There is 

a catch-22. "Here's a remedy," said the U.S., "Changed circumstances, but we will set up every obstacle we can to make sure 

you can't exercise it by keeping documents classified." 

I have been filing Freedom of Information requests since the 

compact became effective. I filed one as recently as about a week 

ago. There is a lot that remains classified. 

I am aware from your opening statement that apparently there 

has been some movement already in the Administration, but by 

calling on the Government to declassify these documents this committee can also help determine whether these changed circumstances have occurred. 
10 

What you have heard from me today is information I have 

learned since the compact came into effect. As far as I know, the 

position of the White House remains that the radiation tests on humans and the U.S. nuclear testing program are separate issues. I 

don't think that is the case. 

I think there is a fine line, at best, between a patient injected 

with radioactive isotopes that we have been reading about and, on 

the other hand, a Marshallese and resident of Rongelap sprinkled 

with fallout or a Navy diver who went back into Bikini's lafoon two 

hours after the BAKER shot. They all get sick; they are al studied 

by doctors. In fact, I would argue that there is almost a more compelling case in the case of the BAKER-BRA VO victims where there 

was not even a hint of informed consent. 

Mr. MILLER. I am going to ask you to summarize. 

Mr. WEISGALL. I am wrapping up right now. 

Step one, I think that there has got to be complete declassification of documents. It is 40 years after BRAVO, 40 years after Operation Crossroads. 

Step two, I think the people of Bikini need to be included in the 

Brookhaven medical program. The Bikinians, as Mr. Underwood 

said earlier, were back on Bikini in the mid-1970s. Sir, you quoted 

one sentence from a Lawrence Livermore study. Let me quote the 

second sentence after that. "Bikini is possibly the best available 

source of data for evaluating the transfer of plutonium across the 

gut wall after being incorporated into biological systems." 

Now a lot of that is medical-speak, but the fact of the matter is, 

the Bikinians in the 1970s were the same experimental subjects 

that the Rongelapese, the Utirikese, and undoubtedly, as you will 

hear today, other Marshallese were as well. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions that 

you may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Weisgall follows:] 
11 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN M. WEISGALL 

LEGAL COUNSEL TO THE PEOPLE OF BIKINI 

BEFORE THE HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITIEE 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

My name in Jonathan Weisgall. I have served as legal counsel 

for the people of Bikini since 1975. 

I. Overview 

Let me begin with a thumbnail sketch of the history . numbers 

and stat1st1cs: First, consider this statistic. From July I 6. I 945 until 

September 23, 1992, the United States conducted I .OS I nuclear tests. 

Put another way, from July 16, 1945 until September 23, 1992, the 

United States conducted one nuclear test every 16.4 days. Sixty-six 

of these tests were conducted in the Marshall Islands, 23 at Bikini 

Atoll and 43 at Enewetak. I want to talk to you today about two of 

these tests: the 1946 Baker shot at Bikini, which was part of 

Operation Crossroads, and the 1954 Bravo shot, which was part of 

Operation Castle. 

In a little over three weeks in 1945 -- at Alamogordo in the 

New Mexico desert and at Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- the world 

entered the atomic age. Seven months later, the U.S. Navy moved the 

I 67 residents of Bikini off their atoll, and in July 1946 it exploded 

the world's fourth and fifth atomic bombs jn Bikini lagoon. Operation 

Crossroads, as these tests were called, consisted of two shots -- an 

air-drop code-named Able and an underwater shot -- the world's 

first -- code-named Baker. 

Bikini would not be used for nuclear testing for eight years, 

until I 954, when it was the site of five of the six hydrogen bomb 

shots in Operation Castle. Next Tuesday, March I, will mark the 40th 

anniversary of the first shot in Operation Castle, the Bravo shot, the 

largest and most destructive nuclear test in U.S. history. 

The stories of Baker and Bravo are linked by four major 

themes. The first two are the ignorance and arrogance that marked 

the U.S. nuclear testing program. Added to this was a third theme 

secrecy -- that served only to feed the arrogance and excuse the 
12 

2 

ignorance. Mixed into this recipe was the fourth theme -- an 

insidious new weapon of terror called radioactive fallout -- a weapon 

of biological extinction, designed more for genocide than the 

destruction of buildings or military targets. Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

showed that the instant blast and heat of an atomic bomb can kill 

tens of thousands of people in a matter of seconds. The story of 

Baker and Bravo was that the killing power of lingering radioactive 

fallout far surpasses the instant sledgehammer effect of the bomb's 

blast. 

In light of the Clinton Administration's new policy of openness 

concerning archival documents related to radiation testing, as 

exemplified by Energy Secretary O'Leary's bold and courageous 

stand, the time has come to reexamine the U.S. nuclear testing 

program in the Marshall Islands, its health impacts on U.S. military 

personnel and Marshallese citizens, and the relationship between 

these new facts and the 1985 Compact of Free Association between 

the United States and the Marshall Islands. I might add that 

Congressional committees have previously examined the impact of 

U.S. nuclear testing on both U.S. veterans and the Marshallese, but I 

believe that today marks the first time ever, 40 years after Bravo 

and nearly 48 after Baker, that Congress is asking what went wrong 

in these tests and why. 

II. Compact Section 177 Agreement 

and Declassification of Documents 

As I review this history, please keep in mind the Compact of 

Free Association Act of 1985, P.L. No. 99°239 (Jan. 14, 1986), which 

contains the Compact Section 177 Agreement. Article IX of that 

Agreement, entitled "Changed Circumstances,~ provides that if 

personal injuries or property damage in the Marshall Islands are 

later discovered and could not "reasonably have been identified as of 

the effective date of [the] Agreement," and if those "injuries render 

the provisions of [the] Agreement manifestly inadequate," the 

Marshall Islands government can ask the U.S. government to 

"provide for such injuries by submitting such a request" to Congress. 

Having provided a remedy for the Marshallese to come back to 

Congress in case of changed circumstances, the U.S. government has 

continued to keep documents from the testing program classified. 

thus making it impossible to determine the extent of injuries and 

damages during the 1940s and l 9S0s . .. The Compact negotiations 
13 

3 

were largely one-sided. Only the U.S. government knew the full 

details of the 66 nuclear tests it conducted in the Marshall Islands 

and the damage and destruction they caused. Despite requests from 

myself and others, in litigation and negotiations. thousands of 

documents remained classified and were never produced. 

I recently looked back at my testimony in this very hearing 

room ten years ago on the upcoming Compact of Free Association: 

The U.S. government has sought in the Section 177 

agreement to put a price tag on its nuclear legacy in the Pacific 

and close the books on this sorry bit of history. If Congress is 

to pass judgment on the agreement, it seems only fair that it 

should have before it all the pertinent facts on the testing 

program. 1 

I could submit that very statement today. The situation is 

exactly the same today as it was IO years ago and 40 years ago; the 

United States still has most of the information. Some documents 

have been declassified over the last decade, but many remain 

inaccessible. This is a classic Catch-22. The United States agreed to a 

remedy called "Changed Circumstances," but it continues to block 

access to archival documents, thus making it harder to prove that 

"Changed Circttmstances" may have occurred. Here's a remedy, said 

that United States, but we will set up every obstacle we can to make 

sure you can't exercise it. 

My historical overview today is not intended as an indictment 

of anyone in this room. These events did not occur during the watch 

of anyone here; indeed, some of us weren't even born. But that fact 

is all the more reason why the U.S. government must declassify all 

documents related to these tests. We must all be dealing with the 

same set of facts. There is no longer any reason to hide information 

on the nuclear testing program. Some of this information is nearly 

50 years old, and the national security imperatives that necessitated 

classification in the 1940s and 1950s no longer exist. 

1Compact of Free Association • Part II, Hearings Before the House Interior and 

Insular Affairs Suhcommittee on Puhlic Lands and National Parks 180 (98th 

Cong., 2d Sess., May 8, 1984). 
14 

4 

Following the settlement of the Bikinians' last lawsuit against 

the United States, I continued to file Freedom of Information Act 

requests for documents on the testing program and track down new 

documents as they were declassified and placed in public files. This 

was for a book I was writing entitled Operation Crossroads: The 

Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll, which will be published next week by 

the Naval Institute Press. 

The information I am about to tell you comes from that 

research -- from documents I have obtained since the 177 

Agreement was signed. Nothing of what I am about to tell you comes 

from material released by the Department of Energy last December 

or since then. Indeed, the Department -- and the White House's 

Human Radiation Inter-agency Working Group Task Force formed 

late last year -- take the position that issues raised by the U.S. 

nuclear testing program are different from the issues raised ' by 

radiation experiments on human subjects. 

I submit that this is not the case. There is a fine line, at best, 

between, on the one hand, a patient injected with radioactive 

isotopes, and, on the other hand, a Marshallese resident of Rongelap 

sprinkled with fallout from Bravo or a Navy diver who entered 

Bikini's water two hours after the Baker shot. All three people end 

up with radiation-related diseases. All three are studied by doctors, 

and all three become guinea pigs in one form or another. Indeed, the 

Baker and Bravo examples may well be more the compelling cases 

for Secretary O'Leary's offer of compensation. In those cases there 

was no information given to the military personnel or the 

Marshallese and there was certainly no informed consent. These 

people -- the veterans and the Marshallese -- deserve our 

government's fullest attention. 

III. Operation Crossroads 

I will begin with Operation Crossroads, first looking at the fate 

of the tens of thousands of sailors and then the U.S. government's 

treatment of the Bikinians. 

A. Baker 

The Baker test, on July 25, 1946, was both a great technical 

success for the Navy and a near-disaster for many of the 40,000 

sailors who were overexposed to radioactivity from the blast. In one 
15 

5 

second, an · underwater bomb pushed a one-mile-wide dome of water 

into the sky. It looked like Niagara Falls in reverse. Then, a full 10 

seconds later, the water column collapsed back into the lagoon, 

creating enormous rolling waves of spray, mist and air that crept 

over the target fleet and swallowed the ships from view. This 

unexpected radioactive cloud bank, later called a base surge, was not 

predicted by any of the scientists. and it was about to become 

America's Chernobyl.2 

Billowing outward, the base surge spread more than three 

miles across and I ,800 feet high. engulfing all the target ships within 

minutes and leaving what Crossroads's technical director called a 

"kiss of death" on the ships.3 The base surge "heavily contaminated" 

all but 9 of the 95 target ships, wrote the Navy, and "its radioactive 

mist settled on the decks, moistened every bit of exposed metal, 

wood and canvas. "4 The blast, which sank the 26,000-ton battleship 

Arkansas in a matter of seconds, unleashed the greatest waves ever 

known to humanity, one of which lifted the huge aircraft carrier 

Saratoga 43 feet. 5 It also unleashed the greatest amount of 

radioactivity ever known up to that time. 

I. Warnings from Los Alamos and Stafford Warren 

At first, an underwater atomic explosion had seemed too 

reckless. Scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory warned the 

Navy in December 1945 that an "underwater test against naval 

2William A. Shurcliff, Technical Report of Operation Crossroads ( 1946). p. 28.3 

(XRD-208, NTIS Document No. AD 367496.); Commander, JTF-1 , Operational 

Report on Atomic Bomb Tests Ahle and Baker <Operation Crossroads) ( 1946), p. 

VI-D-45 (XRD-206. NTIS Document No. AD 473986). 

3Ralph Sawyer, Report of Technical Director Operation Crossroads ( 1946), p. 7. 

(extracted version prepared by Defrnse Nuclear Agency as XRD-210). 

4J. J. Fee, Operation Crossroads: Radiological Decontamination Report of Target 

and Non-Taq~et Vessels (1946), Vol. I, p. 14 (Technical Report XRD-185-87, NTIS 

Document No. AD 473 906); William A. Shurcliff, Bombs At Bjkini· The Official 

Report of Operation Crossroads (1947), p. 159. 

5Director of Ship Material, JTF-1, Bureau of Ships Group, Technical Inspection 

Report USS Saratoga, p. 14, Defense Atomic Support Agency Records; Shurcliff, 

Technical Report, pp. 6.12, 9.14, 21.5, 28.5; Berkhouse, L. et....Al., Operation 

Crossroads - 1946 (1984), pp. 101, 107 (DNA Report No. 6032F). 
16 

6 

vessels would contain so many hazards that it should be ruled out at 

this time. "6 If the muffling effect of the water were to prevent the 

radioactive material from rising high enough into the atmosphere, 

there would be trouble. "A rise of only 10,000 feet ... would present 

the greatest hazard,• one study concluded, "because most of the 

contamination would fall on the target ships or back into the lagoon,• 

and another report predicted that the water column would rise only 

5,000 to 8,000 feet. 7 "The water near a recent surface explosion will 

be a witch's brew," warned Los Alamos. "There will probably be 

enough plutonium near the surface to poison the combined armed 

forces of the United States at their highest wartime strength. •s The 

warnings could not have been clearer, and they all came true, as 

nearly half the bomb's fission products fell back into the lagoon's 

water or onto the target ships.9 

Stafford Warren, Operation Crossroads's radiological safety (or 

radsafe) director, warned that Baker would cause severe 

contamination in the lagoon and that the target ships "may remain 

dangerous for an indeterminable time thereafter,• but these 

warnings were ignored. Despite drone boat readings of 730 roentgen 

per day near the center of the target array (more than twice the 

lethal dose), the first patrol boats entered the lagoon 41 minutes 

after the shot, followed by a salvage group, radsafe monitors and 

technicians, who boarded 12 target ships to retrieve data and 

instruments. By the end of the day 49 support ships returned to 

Bikini's lagoon with nearly 15,000 men on board. 10 

6William S. Parsons to Admiral William H. P. Blandy, memorandum, Decemher 3, 

1945, Box 4, Entry I, Folder 8, Record Group 77 , Manhattan Engineer District 

Records, National Archives. 

7Commander, JTF-1, Operation Plan Annex E <Safety P)an) (1946), App., pp. 

1286-89; Berkhouse et al. , Operation Crossroads. p. 60. 

8Henry W. Newson to Norris E. Bradhury, 1f1emorandum entitled "Possihle 

Difficulties in Naval Testst Decemher 17, 1945, p. 4, DOE/CIC (Department of 

Energy Coordination and Information ,Center, Las Vegas) 120851. 

9Fee, Radiological Decontamination, Vol. I, p. I 4. 

IOR. J. Buettm:r, "Safety Prediction - Test Baker," pp. 14-16, n.d., DOE/CIC 

140564; Commander, JTF-1. Operational Report. pp. VIJ-(C)-53, VI-D-79; 

Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads, pp. 97, 104; Shurcliff, Technical Report, 

p. 20. 12. 
17 

7 

Radiation levels on some of the target ships remained 

dangerously high even a week after the shot. and boarding them was 

unsafe except for brief visits. To make matters worse, radioactivity 

in the lagoon's contaminated waters quickly spread to the support 

ships. Warren's radsafe plan cau_tioned that no apparatus on the 

support ships that used saltwater cooling should be operated until 

the seawater in the lagoon was declared safe. Nevertheless, the day 

after Baker, the support ships were authorized to operate their 

evaporators, which distilled seawater for drinking. As a result, every 

nontarget support vessel became contaminated, just as the planners 

had feared, and fission products became concentrated on underwater 

hulls and in condensers, evaporators, and saltwater pipes.I I 

Despite all the warnings that the highly radioactive column of 

water would come crashing down on the ships. no one had planned 

for the disaster that had been predicted with such amazing accuracy. 

"Since the nature and extent of contamination of the targets was 

completely unexpected," the Navy later admitted, "no plans had been 

prepared for organized decontamination measures." 12 

2. Overexposures of Sailors 

Few of the 42,000 men at Bikini were even aware of the 

hazards and the need to take radsafe precautions, and others did not 

care. One of Stafford Warren's radsafe colleagues wrote about one 

captain "who insists on a 'hairy-chested' approach to the matter with 

a disdain for the unseen hazard, an attitude which is contagious to 

the younger officers and detrimental to the radiological safety 

program." 13 Two other monitors wrote of "an attitude of indifference 

on the part of the ship's officer" of one target vessel, the Prinz Eugen. 

Despite readings of 50 times the maximum daily tolerance dose. 

some crew members were ordered to spend the night there, because 

the ship's officer believed that there was "such a large safety factor 

11Herbert Scoville, Jr., to Warren, memorandum, April 27, 1946, Box I, Folder 

13, Warren papers; Bureau of Ships minutes of confenmce of 3 May 1946 (May 

7, 1946), Box I, Folder 13, Warren papers; Berkhouse et al.. Operation 

Crossroads. p. 105. 

12Fee, Radiolo~ical Dl)contamination. Vol. I, p. 4. 

13George Lyon to Parson, memorandum, May 5, 1947, DOE/CIC 140713. 
18 

8 

that it can, be ignored." 14 "Radioactive material "was scattered over 

the decks of the ships," said a Navy speaker at a 1947 conference on 

defensive atomic warfare. "Men walked through it, tracked it 

around. and got it on their clothing and hands and faces. There was 

some tendency on the part of the men to disregard a danger which 

they could not see, nor touch. nor smell." IS 

It is impossible to recreate with any accuracy radiation levels 

on every part of. the target ships over specific periods of time. It is 

equally impossible to determine who may have ingested or inhaled 

radioactive materials or received high doses from open cuts or 

wounds. One sailor sleeping close to saltwater lines may have 

received much higher doses than another sleeping three feet away. 

One man may have worn protective boots and gloves during a 

decontamination shift, while another just a t-shirt. "The erratic 

location of high and low intensities on the target ships does not 

permit an accurate estimate of any one individual's exposure," noted 

Stafford Warren shortly after the tests. 16 

Virtually all the available evidence, though, points to the 

conclusion that radiation dangers following the Baker test were 

serious and that not enough steps were taken in time to prevent 

widespread overexposures. A host of factors - the overwhelming 

amount of contamination from the base surge, lingering radiation on 

the target and nontarget ships, malfunctioning radsafe equipment, a 

shortage --0f monitors, failure to observe radsafe regulations, and the 

ignorance and indifference '1ftsplayed toward the radiation hazard by 

officers and enlisted men alike - caused many men regularly to 

receive radiation doses in excess of the daily tolerance dose of . I 

roentgen. Moreover, this tolerance dose, deemed appropriate in 

1946, has now been lowered for the general population by a factor of 

365. so that today the current recommended maximum dose for QM 

14R. J. Rieckhoff and D. W. Jones to William A. Wulfman, memorandum, August 

10, 1946, DOE/CIC 140634. 

!Sf. T. Winant, Jr., "Command Prohlems of Atomic Defense Warfare," 

Septemher 1947, DOE/CIC 48678. 

16Warren to Blandy, memorandum, August 7, 1946, DOE/CIC 140692; GAO, 

Operation Crossroads· Personnel Radiation Exposure Estimates Should Be 

Improved (1985) (GAO/RCED-86-15). 
19 

9 

year is approximately the same dose that was recommended as the 

maximum exposure for one da.y at Operation Crossroads. 

The anecdotal documentary evidence of overexposure. even at 

the 0.1 roentgen level. is simply overwhelming. Warren's radsafe 

section detected 67 overdoses in one three-day period, with some 

men exposed to 20 times the daily limit, and one batch of 125 film 

badges showed 26 overexposures. Work on two target ships was 

stopped due to the crew's overexposure from working and living on 

the ships. Ten days after the tests, 35 target ships had average 

topside readings more than IO times the daily tolerance dose, and 

some had readings 70 times greater.'7 

3. Actions by Stafford Warren to End Operation Crossroads 

In early August, Warren warned Admiral William Blandy, the 

head of Operation Crossroads, that "some of the most important ships 

have had many lethal doses [of plutonium] deposited on them and 

retained in crevices and other places." He warned Blandy that 

plutonium "is the most poisonous chemical known" that "it is 

insidiously toxic in very minute quantities," and that his monitors 

lacked the equipment to measure it. 1S Scientists. knew that only a 

few millionths of a gram of radium lodged within human bones could 

prove fatal. Plutonium, the main component of the Baker bomb, has 

the same effects and is even more toxic. The Baker test, though, did 

not involve millionths of grams of radium, or even hundredths of 

grams. It created the equivalent of thousands of tons of radium.19 

Nevertheless, for weeks after the test men routinely boarded target 

ships, swept them, scraped them, ate their meals on board, and even 

slept aboard them; they were constantly exposed to the danger of 

inhaling plutonium and fission products from Baker. 

17Scoville, "No.clear Radiation Effects," pp. J. 11, J.46, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory; Warren to Blandy, message, August 15, 1946, p. 2, Box 4, Folder 5, 

Warren papers; list of overdoses evaluated on 9 August 1946, 8 August 1946 and 

6/7 August 1946, Box 4, Folder 1, Warren papers; Wulfman to Warren, 

memorandum, August 9, 1946, DOE/CIC 64034. 

!Swamm to Blandy, memorandum, August 7, 1946, p. 2, DOE/CIC 140692. 

19Sawyer, Report of the Technical Director. p. 25; Scoville, "Nuclear Radiation 

Effects in Tests A and B - Preliminary Report of" (September 25, 1946), 

Enclosure J to Sawyer, Revort of the Technical Director, p. J.7. 
20 

l 0 

On August 3, nine days after Baker, Warren was convinced he 

had a disaster on his hands. He told Blandy that decontamination 

efforts were largely useless and that the target ships "should be 

declared hopelessly contaminated." He warned that there was 

"increasing evidence" of overexposures, and he called for an 

immediate end to Operation Crossroads.2° 

Blandy rejected this recommendation at a staff meeting on 

August 6, but Warren did not let matters rest there. "Control of the 

safety of the target ships' crew is rapidly getting out of hand,• he 

asserted bluntly the next day. "The target vessels are in the main 

extensively contaminated with dangerous amounts of radioactivity. 

Quick decontamination without exposing personnel seriously to 

radiation is not possible under the present circumstances and with 

present knowledge." Worried about the breakdown of much of his 

monitoring equipment, he also sent an urgent cable to Los Alamos 

requesting 300 new Geiger counters and 50,000 film badges. 

"Strongly urge that ... this [be] treated as an actual emergency 

involving safety to life," he teletyped. 21 

Blandy changed his mind on August 10, when faced with 

Warren's clear evidence, now buttressed by analyses flown in from 

Los Alamos. All decontamination work was halted, and most of the 

target vessels were towed to Kwajalein Atoll, 250 miles away. 

Operation Crossroads "was conducted as an emergency and a lot of 

compromises were made to meet this emergency," Warren wrote to a 

radsafe monitor later that year. "I never want to go through the 

experience of the last three weeks of August again. "22 

While the documentary records of Operation Crossroads do not 

suggest a conspiracy to cover up the test results, they do show a 

deliberate decision by the scientific and medical experts to refuse 

20warren to Blandy, memorandum, August 3, 1946, DOE/CIC 140630. 

21Warren to Blandy, memorandum, August 7, 1946, DOE/CIC 140692; 

handwritten teletype message from the USS Haven, Box 4, Folder 5, Warren 

papers, UCLA; D. R. Bergh, Flag Secretary, memorandum prepared on August 6, 

1946, Conference on CJTF-1, Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

22Warren to Viola Warren, letter, August 11 , 1946, DOE/CIC 140498; Warren to 

Admiral Fahrion. memorandum, August 13, 1946, DOE/CIC 140666; Warren to 

William Myers, letter, December 31, 1946, DOE/CIC 140703. 
21 

11 

even to consider the possibility that a serviceman's presence at 

Bikini might later result in a radiation-related disease. In fact, one of 

the main purposes of a Medico-Legal Board established at Bikini by 

Stafford Warren was to provide a paper trail designed to lay the 

groundwork for future denial of legal claims that might be brought 

against the U.S. government arising from Operation Crossroads. 

Robert R. Newell, chairman of the Board, readily admitted just weeks 

after the tests that the board "initially ... served to reassure Col. 

Warren that the safety measures adopted by RadSafe were such as to 

attract no justifiable criticism, and to give what assurance was 

possible that no successful suits could be brought on account of the 

radiological hazards of Operation Crossroads. "23 

Nevertheless, lawsuits were on the minds of top Crossroads 

officials at an October 1946 meeting to discuss decontamination 

issues. "Having in mind both medical and legal protection," the 

participants, led by Admiral Blandy, agreed that documents relating 

to decontamination efforts should be classified "and that the public 

relations angle should be considered carefully to remove confusion 

and the impression that the Navy is 'covering up.'" And at a meeting 

in late November to discuss possible litigation from the sale of target 

ships as scrap, one participant noted that Leslie Groves, the head of 

the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb. "is very 

much afraid of claims being instituted by men who participated in 

the Bikini tests. "24 

Although the instantaneous bursts from Able and Baker sank 

only 14 ships, radiological contamination eventually sank almost the 

entire target fleet. Most of the ships still showed high levels of 

radioactivity one year after the tests. In the end, all but six vessels 

were sunk by the bombs or deliberately scuttled or sunk because of 

lingering radioactivity. 

"We want ships which are tough, even when threatened by 

atomic bombs," wrote the official Navy historian of Operation 

Crossroads in 1947. "We want to keep the ships afloat, propellers 

turning, guns firing; we want to protect the crews so that, if fighting 

is necessary, they can fight well today and return home unharmed 

23Report of Medico-Legal Board, August 19, 1946, DOE/CIC 140683. 

24Fee, Radiological D,;contamination, Vol. Ill, pp. 78, 112. 
22 

12 

tomorrow _"25 His comment captured the Navy's attitude toward the 

bomb after the war. No one yet recognized that the greatest danger 

of atomic warfare -- or of weapons testing -- lay not in the 

immediate blast and heat from the atomic bomb but from the deadly 

lingering radioactivity. The ghost fleet would not sail back under the 

Golden Gate Bridge, triumphant and invincible. The ships survived 

the familiar enemies of heat and blast, but the Navy had never 

fought an alpha particle. 

B. Removal of the Bikinians. 

And what of the Bikinians, who were moved off their atoll by 

the Navy? The working assumption for the past 48 years has been 

that the Bikinians agreed to leave their atoll forever, or at least 

indefinitely. Navy Commodore Ben Wyatt wrote that when he 

visited Bikini on February 6, 1946, to ask the Bikinians if they would 

leave, their leader, "King" Juda (as he was later dubbed by the 

media), immediately stood up and said, "If the United States 

government and the scientists of the world want to use our island 

and atoll for furthering development, which with God's blessing will 

result in kindness and benefit to all mankind, my people will be 

pleased to go elsewhere. "26 

In a matter of minutes, or hours at most, the Bikinians had 

readily acquiesced in Wyatt's request, without even knowing where 

they would go. Why? Several factors may have contributed to their 

decision: America's power, the destructive force of the bomb, the 

islanders' fear. Another possibility remains, though, and that is that 

Wyatt only asked the Bikinians to leave temporarily . 

The evidence is there. There were no plans to use Bikini after 

Operation Crossroads, which originally was planned for three shots. 

When asked by a reporter if the Bikinians would be moved 

permanently, Admiral Blandy responded, "I don't think that it should 

necessarily be permanently." At a later press conference he said that 

2Sshurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 2. 

26Dorothy Richard, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory 

of the Pacific Islands (1957), Vol. Ill, pp. 509-10; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 

February 23, 1946, p. 11. 
23 

I 3 

Bikini would be a restricted security area "for some time after the 

tests," and in numerous statements he said the Bikinians • return to 

their homeland was being measured in terms of months.27 

Blandy's statement was not an isolated incident. Wyatt said in 

November 1946, "They can't go home now," and lnfantey Journal's 

April 1946 issue reported that "unless the resulting radioactivity is 

permanent, and experts are confident that it will not be, the 

inhabitants will be permitted to return to their homes when the 

operation is completed. "28 

The Bikinians clearly believed that they would be able to 

return home shortly. On the day they were moved. they told a Life 

magazine reporter that they would return to Bikini one day, and an 

anthropologist who visited them in 1948 wrote in the early l 950s 

that "these people understood that their enforced absence from the 

atoll was to be only short-lived."29 

As a precaution against future lawsuits, Navy surveyors 

photographed each dwelling on Bikini and counted each family's 

coconut and pandanus trees. Their homes and all buildings on Bikini, 

though, except for the church and meeting hall, were destroyed, and 

the Navy transplanted 2,500 palm trees from Bikini and Rongerik 

"for the purpose of improving the appearance" of Kwajalein, as Wyatt 

wrote in a confidential memorandum.30 

27Blandy press conference, January 24, 1946, p. 5, File No. 39-1-37, Record 

Group 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy; Honolulu StarBulletin, September 5, 1946, p. 13; Blandy, lecture at Constitution Hall, 

Washington, D.C., November 22, 1946, p. 2, DOE/CIC 10o<J55. 

28 Time, November 11, 1946, p. 31; "The Atomic Bomb Test," Infantry Journal 

(April 1946). 

29Life, March 25, 1946, p. 105; Mason, Leonard, "Relocation of the Bikini 

Marshallese: A Study in Group Migration," p. 109 (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 

University, 1954). 

30Commodore Ben Wyatt to ComMarianas, memorandum entitled "War Diary -

Suhmission of," April 13, 1946, Record Group 313, Records of the Naval 

Operating Forces, National Archives; CINCPAC to Navy Department, cable, 

Fehruary 14, 1946, Box 225, Record Group 374, Defense Atomic Support Agency. 
24 

14 

IV. Bravo 

Bikini would not be used again for nuclear testing until 1954. 

Enewetak Atoll was the site of atomic bomb tests in 1948 and 1951, 

but after the outbreak of the Korean War the National Security 

Council, concerned that the Russians or Chinese might invade the 

Marshall Islands, recommended a site in Nevada for further atomic 

tests. 

The return to the Pacific was occasioned by America's decision 

to develop the hydrogen bomb, a weapon triggered by an atomic 

bomb. With a force much greater that the atomic bomb. the AEC 

could not risk testing the new weapon in the continental United 

States, so Enewetak was prepared for a new round of tests. The 

world's first hydrogen bomb, code-named Mike, was tested at 

Enewetak on November I, 1952, but it was not a usable weapon . It 

was larger than a two-story building and weighed 65 tons. A better 

bomb was needed. 

The Russians had tested their first atomic bomb in 1949. Then, 

in August 1953, they tested a deliverable hydrogen bomb. the 

Soviets had not only caught up with American nuclear technology; 

they had actually moved ahead, and America had to develop and test 

a hydrogen bomb capable of delivery by aircraft. 

The result was the Bravo shot, detonated at Bikini on March I. 

1954. Bravo, with an explosive force equal to nearly 1,000 

Hiroshima-type atomic bombs, vaporized the test island and parts of 

two others, sucked them more than 20 miles into the atmosphere, 

and left a gaping mile-wide crater in the lagoon floor. The force of 

the explosion shook buildings at Kwajalein, 250 miles away. 

Incidentally. President Eisenhower at one point considered attending 

the test, but five weeks before the shot he turned down the AEC's 

invitation: "Thanks," he wrote by hand to AEC chairman Lewis L. 

Strauss. "Don' t believe I can do it."3 1 

31January 26 letter from Lewis L. Strauss to President Eisenhower, DOE/CIC 

33075. 
25 

I 5 

The 1946 Baker shot at Bikini was a harbinger of the Bravo 

shot. The four themes I mentioned earlier - arrogance, ignorance, 

secrecy and devastating effects of fallout were all repeated -- on a 

grander scale. Bravo's history is better known than Baker's, but 

what I want to discuss today are some of the facts about Bravo that 

were not known eleven years ago, when the Compact and the Section 

177 Agreement were signed: 

A. Possible resettlement of Bikini 

But for the 1954 Bravo shot, it is likely that the Bikinians 

would have returned to their homeland. Scientific teams returning 

to the atoll in the late 1940s and early 1950s detected such low 

levels of radioactivity that the AEC saw no reason not to return the 

islanders. These are the words of Dr. John C. Bugher, the head of the 

AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine at a 1952 meeting: .. The 

health hazard here is essentially negligible. There is no reason why 

these people should not be returned as far as the hazards from 

persistent radioactivity may be concerned. "32 

B. Withholding information on Bikini's condition 

An April 1952 memorandum for Gordon Dean, the AEC 

chairman, confirmed Bugher's conclusions, but suggested that the 

AEC provide n6 information on the fish in the lagoon. The following 

are excerpts from that memorandum: 

From a health standpoint, Bugher advised that radioactivity on 

Bikini Island itself is very, very low .... Some of the fish 

around the island have appreciable amounts of radioactivity in 

their bones, but would be of no possible harm to the natives if 

they returned. It would be undesirable to volunteer any 

information on this latter point if it can be conveniently 

avoided, as there is some doubt as to the basis on which we 

would prevent the natives from returning. 33 

32Bugh.:r, m.:morandum to files e·ntitled "Return of Natives to . Bikini," April 

10, 1952, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, Box 326-78-3, Box I, MRA Bikini 

and Eniw.:tok, Doc. No. 9458, U.S. Department of Energy. 

33April 9, 1952 m.:morandum for Gordon Dean, prepared by M. W. Boy.:r, AEC 

G.:neral Manager, DOE/CIC 138945. 
26 

16 

C. Possible destruction of Enewetak 

As the AEC prepared for hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific. it 

wanted to keep Bikini in reserve as a test site because it was 

concerned 1hat the Mike shot would completely wipe out Enewetak. 

Here is an excerpt from an April 1952 memorandum to AEC 

chairman Gordon Dean: 

Bikini may be necessary in connection with future weapons 

tests, either because the 1952 test at Eniwetok may result in its 

elimination, or the fall-out may be so bad that we could not 

go back for so long that we would have to find another test 

site.34 

Another internal AEC memorandum made the same point: 

It is possible that the tests planned for Eniwetok may result in 

the destruction of a part or all of the atoll. A severe shock may 

... cause the crumbling of the entire slructure. In such case 

there would be no other test site feasible in the entire area 

other than Bikini. 35 

A third memorandum made the point in less bureaucratic style: 

~AEC may need Bikini if Eniwetok goes up with M[ike.]"36 Eventually, 

five of the six shots in Operation Castle, including the Bravo test, 

were held at Bikini, not Enewetak, resulting in the destruction of 

parts of Bikini, not Enewetak. 

D. Danger zone 

The greatest irony of Bravo concerned the decision whether to 

evacuate any Marshallese for the shot. For Operation Crossroads, 

back in 1946, the Navy, at the recommendation of Stafford Warren, 

had evacuated the Marshallese living on the three inhabited atolls 

closest 10 Bikini -- Rongelap, Wotho, and Enewetak -- but no damage 

35Bugher, memorandum, ~ . note 32. 

36April 7, 1952 memorandum entitled "Possible Return of Bikini Natives,-

DOflCIC l03587. 
27 

l 7 

was caused to these atolls-37 Thus, in I 953, when the Navy 

suggested extending the danger zone to include Ailinginae and 

Rongelap and evacuate its residents. the Interior Department .balked. 

Trust Territory High Commissioner Elbert Thomas, the highest 

ranking U.S. official in Micronesia, was reluctant to displace more 

Marshallese again. "Their reaction to an enlargement of the area of 

activity will be apprehension, and fear that future extensions may 

place any of them in the same homeless position as the Bikini people 

now occupy," he wrote in a memorandum to his superiors in 

Washington more than one year before Bravo. "While it is impossible 

to predict the exact nature of the reactions, experience has shown 

that the most probable result would be first, a lowering of morale 

with a consequent. reluctance to fend for themselves, followed by the 

expectation that the Government would provide their food in return 

for the land that had been taken." He therefore suggested that the 

boundaries of the danger zone be drawn precisely to exclude these 

atolls: 

I find it difficult to accept the proposals of the Atomic 

Energy Commission even with full realization of the significance 

of · the work they are doing. I do urge you to do everything in 

your power to limit the boundaries of the proposed Danger 

Area to exclude Ailinginae Atoll in its entirety, as well as any 

other atolls or islands in the Marshalls other than Bikini and 

Eniwetok. 

As a compromise, he proposed expanding the danger zone to a 

point three miles off the western shore of Ailinginae Atoll: "This 

would at least avoid the necessity of informing the Marshallese of 

the expanded Danger Area and so protect them and the 

administration from the results of what would be, at the very best, 

unsettling knowledge for them to have. "38 

37warren to JTF-1, memorandum entitled "Evacuation of Atolls Neighboring to 

Bikini," March 13, 1946, DOE/CIC 140512. If it became necessary to j,:nison the 

atomic bomb on Able Day, Warren recommended that it be dropped on Taongi 

Atoll, an uninhabited atoll located some 225 miles northeast of Bikini and more 

than 200 miles from the nearest inhabited Marshallese atoll. 

38february 5, 1953 letter from Thomas to James P. Davis, Director, Office of 

Territories, U.S. Depanment of the Interior, Record Group 326, DMA Collection, 

Box 3782, U.S. Department of Energy Archives, DOE/CIC 30094. 
28 

I 8 

The AEC agreed, and the results were tragic.39 Here 1s how the 

AEC explained the decision: 

If the danger area had included such inhabited atolls as 

Rongelap and Utirik it would have required that the natives of 

those atolls be evacuated and that a permanent home be found 

for them elsewhere. [T]he Department of the Interior was 

not sympathetic to removing the natives, having experienced 

considerable difficulty with the Bikini natives who were 

relocated .... 40 

The irony was painful. For an atomic bomb the size of the ones 

dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Navy in 1946 had 

evacuated Marshallese for hundreds of miles to the east, west and 

south of Bikini. For a hydrogen bomb in 1954 that the government 

knew would be at least 400 to 500 times more powerful than those 

bombs, no one was evacuated from these atolls. 

E. Inadequate plannin" 

The radsafe planners were not really sure what to expect at 

Bravo, largely because the United States had only conducted one 

previous hydrogen bomb test -- the 1952 Mike shot at Enewetak. 

There was very little local fallout at Mike, and the radsafe teams had 

been unsuccessful in tracking the bomb's radioactive cloud. 

"Although conscientious effous were made _to document the fallout 

from MIKE," wrote the Bravo Task Force commander, "only about 5% 

of the total debris could ever be accounted for. "41 Nevertheless. the 

radioactive cloud from Mike had risen to a height of 26 miles, and 

government scientists knew that dangerously high levels of fallout 

39Marion W. Boyer to Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum dated March 31, 

1953, DOE/CIC 137067; Cushing to CINCPAC, "Radiological Hazards in the 

Marshall Islands Area during Operation Castle" (July 30, 1953). attachment to 

DOE/CIC 26198; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War 

1953-1961 (1989), pp. 170-71. 

40Vincent G. Huston to Kenneth D. Nichols, "Chronology of Estahlishment of 

Danger Area around Pacific Proving Grounds" (March 30, 1954), DOE/CIC 29635. 

41 April 12, 1954 memorandum for the record by Alvin C. Graves and P. W. 

Clarkson entitled "Bravo Shot, Operation Castle," DOE/CIC 17859. 
29 

I 9 

could occur on atolls even hundreds of miles away from the site of a 

hydrogen bomb shot.42 

As a result. several scientists expressed doubts about the 

weather forecasting plans for the Bravo shot. Listen to the words of 

Harold F. Plank of the Los Alamos Test Division criticizing a technical 

report on the expected configuration of the test, the rise of the plume 

and weather tracking: 

The approach of the whole report is felt to be based on 

too few observations by observers with too little experience. 

The result has been the creation of a theoretical picture and 

conclusions based on this picture which are not supported by 

the facts. 43 

F. Winds 

Ever since March I, 1954, the U.S. government has explained 

that there was an unexpected "shift of the winds occurring after the 

detonation," which carried the radioactive fallout from Bravo 

eastward over Bikini and most of the islands in the atoll, as well as 

over Rongelap, Utrik and other atolls in the Marshall Islands.44 

We now know that this is not true. The shot was deliberately 

set off despite the fact that AEC officials knew exactly which way the 

winds were headed. According to now-declassified documents, the 

weather briefing at 7:00 a.m. the day before the shot predicted "no 

significant fall-out ... for populated Marshall Islands," but later in 

the day "the trend was toward an unfavorable or marginal 

condition," and by 6:00 p.m. "conditions were getting less 

favorable. "45 

42Meril Eisenbud, An Environmental Odyssey: People. Pollution, and Politics in 

the Life of a Practical Scientist (1990). pp. 74-75, 82. 

43July 17, 1953 memorandum from Plank to Alvin C. Graves entitled "Comment 

on the Pate-Palmer Report to CJTF-7 Dated 30 June 1953," DOC/CIC 120579. 

44 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy 

Program Januacy - July 1954 (1954), p. 51, DOE/CIC 40054. 

45March I, 1954 memorandum for record by Richard A. House, RadSafe Officer, 

entitled "Command Briefing, 1800, 28 February 1954," House memorandum 

entitled "Radsafe Narrative Sequence of Events," memorandum by C. D. Bonnot, 

USAF Staff Weather Officer, entitled "Summary of Weather Situation for Bravo 

79-784 0-94-2 
30 

20 

The midnight briefing, less than seven hours before the shot. 

showed "less favorable winds at I 0,000- to 25.000-foot levels.· 

Winds at 20.000 "were headed for Rongelap to the east." and "it was 

recognized that both Bikini and Eneman Islands would probably be 

contaminated. "46 The final weather and radiological safety check. at 

4:30 a.m., shows that the AEC knew there was a problem: "The 

general recommendation for this briefing was one of minimizing the 

effects of the low level northerly and westerly winds. "47 

Was the shot postponed? No. Were precautions taken for the 

Marshallese downwind? No. Were precautions taken for the U.S. 

personnel downwind? Yes. Following the midnight briefing. Bikini's 

weather outlook was downgraded to unfavorable, and Joint Task 

Force Seven ordered several of its ships to move 20 miles farther out 

to sea and to the south, to get out of the path of the fallout. 48 

This evidence puts the Bravo shot in a different category from 

an "unexpected" wind shift. This attitude -- getting the Americans 

out of harm's way but taking no action to protect the Marshallese --

is perfectly consistent with the attitude displayed in some of the 

radiation experiments that were conducted in the 1940s and 1950s. 

Those experiments weren't conducted on Harvard Law School 

Shot," Tabs A and B to April 12, 1954 memorandum for the record by Graves and 

Clarkson, note 41, above. 

46 Bonnot memorandum entitled "2400M Weather Briefing Prior to Bravo 

Shot," House memorandum entitled "Command Briefing, 0000, I March 1954," 

Tah A to April 12, 1954 memorandum hy Graves and Clarkson, note 41 , above; 

Edwin J. Martin and Richard H. Rowland, Castle Series 1954 (1982), pp. 201-02 

(DNA 6035F). 

47March I, 1954 memorandum for record by Richard A. House, RadSafe Officer, 

entitled "Final Weather and RadSafe Check, 0430, I March 1954," Tah A to April 

12, 1954 memorandum by Graves and Clarkson, note 41 , above. 

48House, "Radsafe Narrative Sequence of Events," I, Tab B to April 12, 1954 

memorandum by Graves and Clarkson, note 41, above; Bonnot, "Summary of 

Weather Situation for Bravo Shot," note 45, above; March 22, 1954 

memorandum from H. C. Burton to Chief of Naval Operation entitled 

"Radioactive Contamination of Ships and Radiological Exposure of Personnd of 

Task Group 7.3 due to BRAVO, the First Nuclear Explosion of CASTLE." p. I 

(DOE/CIC 76555); House, "Final Weather and RadSafe Check." note 47, above; 

Martin and Rowland. Castle Series, note 46, above, p. 202. 
31 

2 I 

students. They were conducted on the handicapped. the uninformed. 

people with no political power. 

This attitude existed at the Bravo shot. Some of the Americans 

were moved out of harm's way. The "natives." as they were called, 

were left in place. This obviously gives rise to the charge of using 

the Marshallese as guinea pigs. Have I seen evidence of U.S. 

government officials deliberately planning to expose Marshallese to 

fallout? No. Have I seen evidence of U.S. government officials failing 

to take immediate action to get Marshallese out of harm's way? Yes. 

And either way, the result -- irradiated Marshallese enabling U.S. 

scientists to measure the long-term effects of low-level radiation --

is the same. If the weather forecast created enough risk to move the 

ships, either the Marshallese in danger should have been moved or 

the shot should have been postponed. 

Let me review parenthetically the attitude of American 

officials toward the Lucky Dragon incident, the Japanese fishing 

vessel whose 23 crewmen were sprinkled with fallout from the 

Bravo shot. AEC chairman Lewis Strauss declared that the boat, 

despite its 800 pounds of tuna, was really a "Red spy outfit" snooping 

on the American tests. This attitude was echoed by John M. Allison, 

the American ambassador in Tokyo. who cabled Secretary of State 

John Foster Dulles that the Lucky Dragon accident was followed by a 

"period of uncontrolled masochism," as the nation, aided by an 

unscrupulous press, seemed to revel in fancied martyrdom." Allison 

claimed that this breakdown was triggered by a small group of 

Japanese doctors. whom he described as "fuzzy-minded leftists" who 

had "vistas of nation-wide publicity at home and world-wide 

scientific prominence as exclusive proprietors of the world's first 

hydrogen bomb patients." Allison also recommended a quick lumpsum settlement with the crew in order to weaken .. the position of 

neutralists, pacifists, feminists, and professional anti-Americans. "49 

G. Publicity. 

As you know, the 236 inhabitants of Rongelap and Utrik atolls, 

28 American servicemen on Rongerik and 23 crewmen of a Japanese 

fishing vessel were sprinkled with fallout from the Bravo shot. AEC 

49 Allison to Secretary of State, memorandum entitled "Fukuryu Maru," May 20, 

1954, DOE/CIC 71978. 
32 

22 

chairman Lewis Strauss immediately opting for total secrecy. 

advising all personnel that "no public release will be made in regard 

to fallout or evac[uation] in Trust Territory unless forced by leak or 

other circumstances .... Wash[ington] presently plans no [report,] no 

announcement and urgently requests you not make anything public 

on these matters. "50 

Los Alamos test division leader Alvin Graves strongly objected 

to this policy. In an "Eyes Only" cable to Kenneth E. Fields, the Task 

Force Director of Military Application, he said he was "very 

concerned" about Strauss' order. "I should regret very much the 

impression that we . .; being furtive in our actions with regard to 

these people," he said.SI 

No one really paid much attention to the Marshallese after the 

Bravo shot. They petitioned the United Nations to ask the U.S. 

Government to take all "possible precautionary measures" in future 

tests, but the Trust Territory High Commissioner dismissed this 

action. In a May 18, 1954 letter to the Interior Department. he 

described the petition as "one of the things the Micronesians are so 

fond of doing -- passing resolutions and getting up petitions. They 

spend a great deal of time doing just that."52 

Bikini would still be the site of 20 more nuclear tests over the 

next four years, all of which caused even more destruction at the 

atoll. For example, the shots following Bravo in the. Castle series 

were designed in part to measure the size of new craters caused by 

atomic and hydrogen bombs, and the May 28, 1956 Zuni shot 

vaporized most of the western end of Bikini's Eneman Island. 

The rest of the story has already been made public, except for 

the AEC's plan to return the people of Rongelap to their atoll. For you 

English literature majors, it was called "Project Hardy (The Return of 

SONaval message 0419052 from Combined Joint Task Force 7 to CINCPAC Fh:et, 

March 4, 1954 (AEC files, Record Group 326, box 3772, folder MRA 7 Caste, 

DOE/CIC 28581). 

51 Naval message 0422022 from Graves to Fields, March 5, 1954 (Los Alamos 

National Laboratory files, Bravo fallout folder), DOE/CIC 125331. 

52Records of the Office of Territorial and International Affairs, U.S. 

Department of the Interior. 
23 

the Native)." It's nice to know that the AEC could find a chuckle in 

this tragedy .53 

V. Committee Action 

Where does all of this leave the Bikini people today and what 

steps should this Committee take? 

A. By calling on the U.S. Government to declassify and release 

all remaining documents related to the nuclear testing program in 

the Marshall Islands, this Committee can help determine whether 

the "changed circumstances" provision of the Compact Section 177 

Agreement should be invoked. Releasing all the documents will level 

the playing field and help all sides make a more informed decision. 

B. The people of Bikini are the recipients of a Resettlement 

Trust Fund, designed in part for a cleanup of their islands. But in 

appropriating this trust, Congress only took into account the cost of 

cleaning up two of Bikini's 23 islands. No funding was provided for a 

cleanup of any of the other 21, and the Bikinians do not want to go 

back to a half (or really one-tenth) clean atoll. This Committee 

should call on the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee to 

provide more funding for the cleanup of all of the atoll. 

The Bikinians, I might say, take very good care of their trust 

funds and spend their money wisely. In fact, in the 12 years since 

Congress first appropriated the Resettlement Trust Fund, every 

penny has been audited and accounted for to the Interior 

Department and the Auditor-General of the Marshall Islands, who, 

incidentally, has determined that there is only one local government 

in the entire Marshall Islands whose books are in good enough shape 

to audit -- the Bikinians. 

C. Immediately following the Bravo shot, the AEC contracted 

with Brookhaven National Laboratory to monitor the health of the 

people of Rongelap and Utrik. Section I 03(h)(l) of the Compact of 

Free Association Act (Public Law No. 99-239) indefinitely continues 

that program for the populations of Rongelap and Utrik. 

53April 14, 1954 memorandum entitled "Project Hardy (The Return of the 

Native)," DOE/CIC 125302. 
34 

24 

Brookhaven doctors briefly monitored the people of Bikini 

following their abortive nine-year return to Bikini in the 1970s, 

when the Bikinians had experienced what was described as an 

~incredible" one-year 75% increase in their body burdens of cesium137.54 One report prepared for DOE by Lawrence Livermore 

Laboratory in 1976 made the Bikinians feel that they, too. were 

human guinea pigs. The report said: 

Bikini Atoll may be the only global source of data on humans 

where intake via ingestion is thought to contribute the major 

fraction of plutonium body burden. . . . It is possibly the best 

available source of data for evaluating the transfer of 

plutonium across the gut wall after being incorporated into 

biological systems.55 

Responsibility for monitoring the Bikinians was later turned 

over to the Marshall Islands Government under the Section 177 

health care program established by the Compact. As I have 

explained in detail to your staff and to the Interior Department, that 

program has not been successful, and the Bikinians have slipped 

between the cracks -- excluded by Congressional legislation from the 

Brookhaven program and victimized by an inefficient Marshallese 

health care program. The Bikinians are entitled to better health care, 

and I urge this Committee to take the lead in amending Brookhaven's 

mandate to include the people of Bikini. 

D. Section 103(h)(2)(B) of the Compact of Free Association Act 

continued for five years. through 1991. the U.S.D.A. supplemental 

food _ program for the people of Bikini. Following that five-year 

period, Congress, in §304 of P.L. No. 102-247, extended the program 

for another five years and included the peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, 

Rongelap and Utrik. However, this extension set an annual cap on 

funding of $500,000, which is no longer enough to provide for the 

food needs of the people of Bikini. 

The primary reason the Bikinians rely so heavily on this 

program is because they are still not back on their atoll. Most of 

54Washin~ton Post, May 22, 1978, p. I. 

55Quoted in Washin&tQo Post. April 3, 1978, p. 9; Jonathan M. Weisgall, "The 

Nuclear Nomads of Bikini Atoll," Forei~n Policy 39 (Summer 1980), p. 90. 
35 

25 

them live on Kili Island, 425 miles south of Bikini, which has neither 

lagoon nor atoll and therefore cannot begin to meet the food needs of 

the people. The Bikinians therefore call on this Committee to amend 

P.L. 102-247 by providing that U.S.D.A. food will be provided strictly 

on an eligibility basis, without regard to an appropriations ceiling. 

This is more in keeping with how the Department of Agriculture runs 

its supplemental food program for Native Americans. 

* * * 

The people of Bikini gave the United States everything they 

had -- their land and their home. They demanded nothing in return; 

they asked only that the United States care for them until their land 

had served its purpose and could be returned to them. The United 

States promised that it would do so, but 48 years later, the Bikinians 

are still not home. They lived up to their side of the deal, and the 

United States did well by them. The tests in the Marshall Islands 

cost hundreds of billions of dollars (in 1994 dollars), but the United 

States never questioned their value, because they assured U.S. 

nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and led to immediate 

savings of billions of dollars in the defense budget in the late 1940s 

and 1950s. As the AEC told Congress: 

Each of the tests involved a major expenditure of money, 

manpower, scientific effort and time. Nevertheless, in 

accelerating the rate of weapons development, they saved far 

more than their cost.56 

Bikini was a real bargain for the United States. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

56u.s. Atomic Energy Commission, Thirteenth Semiannual Report of the 

Atomic Energy Commission (1953), p. 18. 
36 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Weisgall, for your testimony. 

Before I ask you questions, I would like to recognize Mr. Lane 

Evans, a member of this committee and also ranking member of 

the Veterans' Committee. 

Mr. Evans do you have a statement? 

STATEMENT OF HON. LANE EVANS 

Mr. EVANS. Yes,.Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity, and 

I want to salute you for holding this very important hearing. 

Since the acknowledgement by the Clinton Administration that 

the Federal Government performed radiation experiments on uninformed Americans, there has been a flurry of activity and, of 

course, widespread media coverage. 

I am certainly pleased with the Administration and particularly 

Ms. O'Leary's policy of revealing information pertaining to radiation experimentation, but I am dismayed that the U.S. nuclear 

testing program conducted in the Marshall Islands and its health 

impact on U.S. military personnel and the citizens of the Marshall 

Islands had not been included in the comprehensive investigation 

conducted by the White House's Human Radiation Interagency 

Working Group. 

At the time the group was formed, I and 27 colleagues in the 

House wrote to the President to request that this investigation include the thousands of service personnel that have been exposed to 

ionizing radiation over the last 50 years, including those serving in 

the Marshall Islands. 

The Administration has argued that there is no significant evidence that radiation experiments were conducted on the people in 

the Marshall Islands at the time of the BRA VO shot. However, 

today we are hearing testimony and will be examining documents 

and data that suggest that the Federal Government may have 

knowingly used the citizens of and the military personnel stationed 

in the Marshall Islands as human guinea pigs. 

As we know, the BRAVO shot is arguably the largest and most 

destructive nuclear test in nuclear history. The 15-megaton thermonuclear shot was 1,000 times more powerful than the bombs 

dropped on the Japanese during World War II. Furthermore, BRAVO's radioactive fallout is proven to be far more devastating in its 

effects on the Marshall Islands, its citizens, and our veterans on 

the islands at the time than previous data have suggested. 

It is my understanding that since learning of this hearing Secretary O'Leary has promised to turn all formerly classified documents regarding the BRA VO shot and Operation Castle to this subcommittee for review. I would request the chairman look into obtaining the same kind of cooperation from the Departments of Defense, Veterans' Affairs, Interior, and State so that we can bring 

this matter to resolution. 

I am the son of an atomic veteran who was stationed at Bikini 

Atoll. I feel a personal bond with the people of Bikini and the Marshall Islands. We have to put this behind us. 

I have worked on legislation for years to help the atomic veterans of our Armed Forces and very much appreciate this commit-
37 

tee's interest in this issue and of the light that it will bring on this 

subject, and thank you again for holding the hearing. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, and we appreciate your support, and we look forward to joining with you, Lane, on these requests. 

Let me state for the record where we are on that before we get 

into questions. 

We have made a request for information both from the Department of Energy and from the Department of Defense. The day before yesterday, Secretary O'Leary called me and said that she 

would be turning over to us very shortly all of the classified documents in their possession and they would be gathering all of the 

documents not in their possession that were classified and be turning those over to us, again, as soon as possible, and we really welcome that openness. At the moment it appears that if we can think of exactly the 

right question, the . Department of Defense will give us exactly the 

right answer. This is a game that has gone on for 50 years in this 

Government. We would hope that the President and the Secretary 

of Defense would recognize their duty and their obligation to simply come forth with those classified documents and hopefully the 

other Departments that may have information. 

I think the country clearly applauds Secretary O'Leary for what 

she has done and the candor with which she has done it and the 

speed with which she has tried to put this information out on to 

the public record. We want to thank her for that participation. I 

think it will be very helpful to the issues surrounding this event. 

We will simply continue in that manner, but I think clearly the 

Department of Veterans' Affairs, the Department of the Interior, 

and the Department of Defense have got to cooperate. 

We have also requested, as you and as Chairman Dingell and 

others have, that this be made part of the White House Interagency Task Force on Experimentation. I think at the moment we 

are playing with semantics here about experimentation because 

they may not have designed a protocol for this experiment, but 

clearly after they started acquiring knowledge of what they had 

and their failure to act upon that knowledge, we were into an experiment with the future of the people of the Marshalls and the 

veterans who were there. 

We are taking requests for top 40 hits here from other Members 

of Congress who want to testify. 

Let me again thank you, Mr. Weisgall, for your testimony and for 

your help and assistance to the committee. 

On the issue of the unpredictability of the fallout and the information that you have pertaining to the expected weather and the 

variances of information that were available about the atmosphere 

and the stratosphere and the winds at different levels, is there any 

reasonable explanation for why they would not have carried out an 

evacuation of the downwind atolls before BRA VO? 

Mr. WEISGALL. I came across one document from 1953 saying 

that the task force will be ready to evacuate if necessary. I came 

across one other document-that would take me too long to find 

right now but that I will submit for the record-talking about 

budget constraints, if you could ·believe it. 
38 

But you had seven ships east of Bikini available, and I do not 

at this time ha e any explanation. The kindest one I can give with 

the situation th the servicemen on Rongerik was that some of 

the radio ages seem to have gotten garbled because the servicemen the e informed Kwajelein immediately that there was a 

problem. 

There was also one weather-tracking plane that was in the 

wrong location. So there was a lot of sloppiness, a tremendous 

amount of the sloppiness. 

But to me, we still have more questions about this test today 

than we have answers. 

Mr. MILLER. But in terms of the information that was gathered 

in the periodic weather reports leading up to the BRA VO shot, your 

testimony is and the documents seem to suggest, that that information was in fact acted upon. It may have been discounted to some 

extent, but it was acted upon at least to the extent of getting the 

movement of the ships prior to the shot. Is that correct? 

Mr. WEISGALL. You have pinpointed the very point I am trying 

to emphasize. It is one thing to know the winds are shifting. It is 

another thing to take precautionary measures. 

So yes, the U.S. Government did try to take precautionary measures after that midnight briefing for some of those U.S. personnel, 

meaning that that wind shift was real, meaning that they were 

concerned about it, but, again, there is a line drawn here on the 

one hand between the Americans, or some of the Americans, and 

on the other hand the Marshallese. 

Mr. MILLER. And so the early public information that this was 

in fact unpredictable simply isn't credible. It was predicted to such 

an extent that overt actions were taken. 

Mr. WEISGALL. I am not even talking predictions, I am talking 

facts, I am talking the weather briefing. 

You know, it is one thing to say a week before, "We might have 

a problem." It is another thing to say 12 hours before, "It is looking 

bad"; seven hours before, "The winds are headed to the east." 

These are no longer predictions, this is what is happening at the 

time. It is worse than a prediction. 

Mr. MILLER. On the issue of changed circumstances, the issue is 

not so much whether the circumstances have changed since the 

compact was signed or negotiated and signed. Is not the issue 

whether information at the time of the negotiations was in fact 

withheld from one of the parties to the negotiations? 

Mr. WEISGALL. I think that is right. As I said, those negotiations 

were largely one-sided. Yes, you have got article 9 with its changed 

circumstances, but I would direct the committee's attention to article 8 of the compact 177 agreement that says that the northern 

Marshalls radiological survey and related environmental studies 

conducted by the Government of the United States represent t',.e 

best efforts of that Government accurately to evaluate and desc~ i.oe 

radiological conditions in the Marshall Islands. 

Now here was the U.S. Government saying in a treaty-like ac,-eement in 1985, "We have made our best efforts," when we K.t )W 

today, and I hope with this initiative by Secretary O'Leary in the 

future, these were not best efforts in 1985. 
39 

So you are absolutely correct. We are not looking just at changed 

circumstances from 1985 until today, although that is a factor and 

you are going to hear about some of these thyroid studies. 

Mr. MILLER. But in terms of the threshold that would have to be 

considered in order to consider invoking that clause, it is not that 

we have learned something since 1985 that would cause us to consider reopening or not reopening that? The fact is, those circumstances were present then and were known by the U.S. Gov- ernment. The wider exposure, the physical damage, the human exposure was all known at the time; it was simply withheld and misrepresented by the Government. 

Mr. WEISGALL. And was not known by the other parties to the 

negotiations, the Marshallese people. 

Mr. MILLER. If you do that in criminal work, if you withhold 

State's evidence from the defendant, you usually get a new trial: 

Mr. WEISGALL. Well, if you do it in a civil setting in a contract, 

in fact, it is called fraud. If you and I have a contract and I am 

going to buy a house from you and you forget to tell me that the 

foundation was constructed in a faulty way, that is fraud. It is not 

full disclosure. 

Mr. MILLER. You mentioned that, in your opinion, the public 

statements and documents support the effort, to be polite, to limit 

access to information and public knowledge of what took place and/ 

or even a cover-up took place the next day, or immediately following the BRA VO shot. 

I am looking at a document from March 31, 1954, signed by 

James Reeves, who was the commander of Task Force Group 7.5, 

where there appears to already be an attempt to start gathering 

their legal defenses and/or information and to start characterizing 

various groups of people that could present or not present a case 

based on whether they were wearing badges or in groups of people 

where not everybody had radioactive film badges on them. 

So clearly the legal consequences were well within the purview of the negotiators in 1954 given that in March legal defenses were 

starting to be formed. Mr. WEISGALL. Exactly as happened in Operation Crossroads. Mr. Chairman, listen to the AEC press release ten days after 

BRAVO. 

Here is what the AEC did say publicly on March 11, 1954: "During the course of a routine atomic test, some Marshallese were unexpectedly exposed to some radioactivity. They were moved to 

Kwajelein, according to plan as a precautionary measure, but there 

were no burns and all are reported well." 

Well, that is about as disingenuous as you can get in a press release with these forecasts and this bomb 2-3 times bigger than expected. That is not a routine atomic test, as the press release said. 

Plan-they were moved according to plan. That was no plan; that 

was an emergency evacuation. 

"Some radioactivity." Well, some of the Rongelapese, yes, they 

got some radioactivity. It was the equivalent of being located less 

than two miles from Ground Zero at Hiroshima. That was the 

"some radioactivity" that they got. 

And the statement, "They were reported well." You will hear 

more about that, but I mean they were already displaying the clas-
40 

sic symptoms of radiation diseases when they got to Kwajelein: The 

hair loss, the skin lesions, the lowered white blood cell counts. 

So, yes, the cover-up began the day after the pre~ay after. 

The press release was disingenuous. You are correct, the information has been there, but it simply has not been public. I think that 

is what this hearing is beginning to get at. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Evans. 

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your testimony. 

Let me get at a few things here. 

First, the attitude of the Administration, I think, seems to be focusing on experimentation conducted on involuntary or uninformed 

subjects. I take it that perhaps the Human Radiation Interagency 

Working Group feels that the citizens of the Marshall Islands were 

either not subjected to experimentation or voluntarily agreed 

through these uneven negotiations to subject themselves to atomic 

tests and that perhaps they have a feeling that, since our servicemen were in the military, that just by the fact that they were in 

the military, that they were, in effect, just following orders and not 

being involuntarily subjected. 

Did you detect that attitude on the part of the Administration? 

Mr. WEISGALL. Mr. Evans, I guess the response I can give you 

is, I got a call from a captain in the U.S. Navy about a month ago 

from the interagency task force saying, "We just want to make sure 

there were no Navy experiments on human subjects, and we hear 

you have got some book that you are writing, and I just want to 

confirm that there were no experiments," and I said, "No, with the 

exception of 42,000, there were not any." 

You had military personnel in Bikini in 1946 who were put in 

harm's way and they weren't told a di;mm thing. That is where I 

say this is even more compelling than one of these patients, as 

awful as those human radiation experiments are, where there may 

or may not have been informed consent. 

Of those 42,000 people at Bikini, you had 38,200 sailors. They 

were not told anything about the radioactive dangers. Many of 

them-you see it in the documentary footage-they are washing 

down ships, they are wearing shorts, sneakers, and sailor hats, and 

the RadSafe monitors are coming aboard in the little white footees, 

completely clothed, knowing that there is a problem. 

Mr. EVANS. So your opinion is, if there wasn't a direct individual 

kind of experiment conducted on an individual, that the interagency working group doesn't feel that that is an experiment? 

Mr. WEISGALL. That seems to be the attitude, and I think the 

Chairman put it very well, that after the fact the U.S. Government 

has had to track the people of Rongelap. To a certain extent, it has 

tried, it has made some effort to track the medical conditions of 

veterans. 

I guess the difference is that when you set up an experiment, you 

have a protocol, you have control groups, you set it up that way. 

I might say that putting the people back at Rongelap in 1957 

with a so-called control group certainly smacks of an experiment to 

me. That is another issue, but, as you know, the exposed people 

were put back. 
41 

Mr. EVANS. That was the 28 people that were---

Mr. WEISGALL. That is correct, and then the so-called control 

group was also put back. 

I mean if it is okay to go back, what do you need a control group 

for? 

Mr. EVANS. Okay. 

To your knowledge, were any of the 42,000 servicemen stationed 

at Bikini Island during the BAKER shot or the BRA VO shot ever 

informed of the possible dangers of participating in nuclear tests? 

Mr. WEISGALL. Absolutely not. 

Mr. EVANS. And were they, in fact, told that this was their patriotic duty to be there and that they would be okay if they were not 

incinerated by the bombs themselves? 

Mr. WEISGALL. It permeates the entire test; yes, sir. 

Mr. EVANS. What documentation do you believe exists that suggests that the medical legal board established at Bikini by Stanford 

Warren was designed to bury any paper trail that would aid our 

U.S. military personnel in their future legal claims against the 

Government arising from the Operation Crossroads testings, and 

are you aware of any other type of medical legal board established 

after BRA VO? 

Mr. WEISGALL. If you give me a second, I will give you an answer. 

Okay. Again, I don't have to make this up, I am just reading 

from documents. 

Here is something that the medical legal board wrote on June 30, 

1946, the day before the first test at Bikini. 

There are some 40,000 persons engaged in these operations. Among them are sure to appear sooner or later a number of diseases, some of which will be attributed to 

radiations from the atomic bomb, but these claims will be without merit because 

these diseases appear spontaneously in the human race without previous exposure 

to man-made radiations, so their OCC\ln'ence will be statistically insignificant. 

We expect that no attribution will be well founded, and we expect that the records 

under the radiological safety section will be adequate to show that the quantity of 

radiation received by that particular person was well below the threshold or perceptible biologic injury. 

Well, this is before the test, and they are saying, "Here's what 

we are going to do, we have reviewed everything, there is no prob- lem." 

By the way, the tolerance standards-this is really, I think, an 

important point-the tolerance standards acceptable at Operation 

Crossroads in 1946 were .1 roentgen a day. That tolerance dose has 

now been lowered for the general population by a factor of approximately 365, meaning that the current recommended dose for one 

year for the general population of the United States is the dose 

that was recommended as the maximum exposure for one day at 

Operation Crossroads. 

By the way, at Crossroads it was known from the studies of the 

radium dial painters in the 1920s and 1930s, the women who 

would lick the tips of brushes as they painted watches, that even 

a millionth of a gram of radium could prove fatal if ingested. 

Plutonium, which was the paint component of the bomb at Bikini, has the same effects. It is actually more toxic than radium. 

The BAKER test did not involve millionths of grams of radium or 

even hundredths of grams. I have here the Navy reports. The 
42 

BAKER shot involved thousands of tons of radium, and the medical 

legal board was set up and said there is not going to be a problem. 

There is not a problem, and we were set up, as I said in my statement, that it was specifically set up to assure the RadSafe section 

that there would-to give what assurance was possible that no successful suits could be brought on account of the radiological hazards of Operation Crossroads. That is a document written by the 

chairman of that board about a month after the tests were held. 

Mr. EVANS. Any other evidence of other boards of this type established after BRA VO, that you know of! 

Mr. WEISGALL. Not offhand. I will submit it for the record, Mr. 

Evans, rather than take everyone's time now. I do have more information in the book. I was just quickly looking in the index under 

"Medical Legal Board." That was certainly an important part of my 

own research. There are some other statements and other documents, and I will get them to the committee. 

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions I could 

ask on a second round. I think my time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Underwood. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one 

question. 

In your testimony, Mr. Weisgall, you discuss the role of the Department of the Interior, and especially Trust Territory High Commissioner Elbert Thomas in perhaps redrawing the boundaries in 

terms of the recommendation for evacuation by the Atomic Energy 

Commission. 

I am just curious about the role that the Department of the Interior and, in particular, the trust territory high commissioner played 

at the time. Was the role that they were playing in the whole proc- ess-and what eventually haopened with the BRA VO shot-a very large role in your estimation1 Do you have any evidence connecting 

perhaps some Interior involvement in the decision, or was it the 

thinking of the people who were running the test that how to deal 

with the people from the Marshalls was essentially an Interior decision in terms of any decision to evacuate as opposed to their own 

decision, as opposed to a scientific decision, as opposed to a military decision? 

And in analyzing or perhaps researching the role that Interior 

played in that, are you satisfied that all the documents relative to 

Interior's role have been disclosed, or do you think that there might 

be additional documents somewhere? 

Mr. WEISGALL. Well, let me answer your last question first. Yes, 

there are more documents. In fact, the document I quoted from I 

have got here from Elbert Thomas, the high commissioner, written 

to the director of the Office of Territories. His name was James 

Davis, and this was February 5, 1953. We are talking a year before 

BRA VO. This decisionmaking-should we move these people off? 

There are references to other letters, and there are references to 

AEC proposals for continued use of Bikini. There are other documents that are classified. It is a catch-22 when you have got classified documents: What do you want? I don't know. 

I do have a chapter-verse citation of what I have been able to 

get, but that doesn't mean that that is the universe of what remains classified. Yes, there are still classified documents on this 
43 

subject. For example, this letter talks about Rongelap but then 

talks about drawing a danger zone near Ailinginae. The AEC went 

along with this recommendation. 

One question I have asked myself, and I have had this document 

for five days, but I don't know if this high commissioner had the 

slightest idea that this was a hydrogen bomb shot. 

You know, MIKE, the IVY-MIKE shot at Enewetak, had only 

been detonated about two months earlier. This is part of the secrecy. I mean how is the high commissioner of the trust territory 

to know when a hydrogen bomb has been tested-nothing has been 

made public, nothing has been made known about the danger zone. 

There was very little local fallout at the MIKE at Enewetak, which 

of course led to the lessened need to evacuate or take precautionary 

measures at BRAVO. I don't even know if this fellow had the 

slightest idea that this was a bomb that was going to be at least 

400-500 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. 

So here you have got an Interior Department official trying to 

make a scientific or medical judgment, and I am not sure that he 

was in a position to do so. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. So would it be fair to say that the people in 

Interior, I guess, were in charge of the political fallout from these 

decisions and that that perhaps overwhelmed any kind of scientifically based decision regarding--

Mr. WEISGALL. Here it is. It is 1953. The Bikinians have already 

been moved now for seven years. They are unhappy on Kili, they 

are making that known. The Enewetak people have been moved to 

Ujelang. 

I think the Interior Department is looking at this and saying, 

"My God, we are going to have to evacuate the whole Marshall Islands if you want to conduct this kind of a testing program, don't 

do it." 

I am sure the fellow had the best of intentions. I mean here is 

what he says about what happens if you do have to move the people of Rongelap, slightly or not so slightly paternalistic: 

While it is impossible to predict the exact nature of the reactions, experience has 

shown that the most probable result would be, first, a lowering of morale with a consequent reluctance to fend for themselves, followed by the expectation that the 

Government would provide their food in return for the land that had been taken. 

It goes on saying, "I don't want this to be another Bikini, so let's 

not move the people." And, by the way, he is very sympathetic to 

the people of Bikini. He says, "The Bikinians feel they have been 

badly used by the Government of the United States and they resent it." I am afraid I must agree with them. 

So here is someone with the best of intentions saying, "Let's just 

leave them on their islands. This will avoid the necessity of informing them of the expanded danger area and protect them." Really 

very sad-protect them and the Administration from information 

that would be unsettling, meaning that they have to leave. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Okay, thank you, and thank you for your well 

documented testimony. 

Mr. MILLER. Chairman de Lugo. 
44 

STATEMENT OF HON. RON de LUGO 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I have an opening statement, which I ask to be inserted in the 

hearing record. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. de Lugo follows:] 
45 

Statement of the Hon. Ron de Lugo 

opening a hearing on 

Radiation Exposure 

from Nuclear Tests in the Pacific 

February 24, 1994 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

As chairman of the subcommittee of jurisdiction, I want to 

begin by publicly thanking you for this hearing ... not as 

Members sometimes do for reasons of mere protocol; but 

because it responds to my request that our Committee use 

its oversight subcommittee resources to further investigate 

very troubling information that our legislative 

subcommittee obtained earlier. 

And, because I plan to retire this year, I want to note how 

comforted I am to know that you will continue a cause first 

championed here by our mentor, the late Phillip Burton. 

I also want to note that its continuation is the one request 

made by my predecessor, John Seiberling, when he retired. 

We should, additionally, remember that much of our work 

on it was made possible by a former member of the staff 

who passed away just the night before last, Pat Krause. 

The cause is to adequately address the contamination and 

health problems that our government's testing of nuclear 

weapons created for people in the Marshall Islands. And 

we can't be sure that what needs to be done has been until 

the whole truth about the problems is revealed. 
46 

2 

Phil, John, I, and others have felt es.pecially strongly about 

it because the islands and people bad been irradiated while 

our nation was obligated to protect them as trustee for the 

international community and they were· powerless in our 

system. 

Yet, some in our government have apparently regarded 

these responsibilities as less important than other 

objectives, like developing weapons, avoiding 

embarrassment, minimizing the costs of cleaning-up and 

compensation, and, possibly, ending overall U.S. 

responsibility for the Marsballs and other Pacific islands. 

The concerns of the peoples of the atolls that were clearly 

affected by the testing were a major sticking point in the 

negotiations for the agreement that was to establish the 

Marshalls as a sovereign state. The Reagan 

Administration's initial settlement said that it was based 

on a premise that the adverse impacts had been identified. 

We, by contrast, agreed with the people clearly affected 

that the compensation provision of the Marshalls 

association compact didn't do enough. Before our country 

was let off the hook, we wanted to ensure that 

contamination would be found and cleaned-up so islanders 

could return to their homelands. We also wanted to ensure 

that medical care and food that could no longer be grown 

on contaminated islands would continue to be provided as 

long as needed. 
47 

3 

Several of us, therefore, spent a couple of years forcing 

others in the Federal Government to agree to amendments 

to the legislation that authorizes the association. 

I assumed my chairmanship a few months after the 

compact went into effect. Later, Mr. Chairman, you asked 

me to conduct oversight that led to the broader 

investigation we are now conducting. 

The issue was the implementation of our Committee's 

amendment concerning Rongelap, the populated atoll 

which received the greatest amount of fallout from the 

massive Bravo test. It required a full study of Rongelap's 

habitability if an independent review didn't support the 

Energy Department's conclusion that the island was safe 

and it committed our government to do whatever was 

necessary to make Rongelap safe. 

Due to the courage and persistence of Rongelap's late 

Senator, Jeton Anjain, and the effectiveness and energy of 

one of his representatives, David Weiman, what we found 

were among the most disturbing facts that I have come 

across in 20 years in Congress. It wasn't just the findings 

of the review, which were bad enough - for example, 

Rongelap was habitable so long as parents didn't have 

their children there. 

It included information that made it clear that the alleged 

Bravo "accident" was no accident and suggested that more 

atolls -- and people -- than had been admitted had been 
48 

4 

dangerously irradiated. 

It also raised questions of whether the Rongelap victims 

were being monitored for medical research without their 

knowledge and whether the Bravo cover-up was continuing. 

Specifically, those who detonated the bomb knew well 

before they did that the winds were blowing in the 

direction that could carry fallout to populated islands. 

Alarming rates of thyroid abnormalities were showing up 

in people from atolls which had supposedly not received 

dangerous fallout. There were significant radiation levels 

on atolls not even evacuated after the fact or on which any 

subsequent measures have been taken. Medical data was 

being collected from individuals without being shared with 

them. The safety and dose standards being used were 

unclear. 

There was also reason to suspect resistance intended to 

avoid revelation of the facts~ Federal officials had 

continued to insist that Rongelap was safe. Senator Anjain 

and his representatives here were undermined back in the 

Marshalls when they pressed the issue. There were efforts 

to force the Rongelapese back to their island in spite of 

their understandable concern about its safety. When that 

didn't work, there were efforts to entice them back with 

resettlement promises. 

I have spoken about our Rongelap findings because they 

led to our hearing today, included information regarding 
49 

5 

the entire Marshalls contamination issue, an ..... ,.,,.vide a 

case study regarding this matter. 

An Arizona lawyer wrote me with advice about R.onr 1p 

that I would apply to the overall situation. Bruce Habhitt 

urged quote decisive action to produce the facts necess!lry 

for [the people of Rongelap] to make decisions about their 

lives and those of their families end quote. 

I hope that what is exposed today will result in the 

Administration undertaking that kind of investigation 

regarding the entire Marshalls testing story. I was 

somewhat concerned when officials reacted to our request 

to make this a part of the human radiation 

experimentation investigation launched by Secretary 

O'Leary by saying that they would handle it separately. 

But I am now more encouraged that she has promised to 

expeditiously provide the documents that we have been 

seeking. Let us hope that it will finally lead to the entire 

Marshalls story being told and the prompt taking of 

whatever remedial measures are necessary. 

The Marshalls testing played a role in winning the Cold 

War. Now that it has been, there surely is no good reason 

not to explore the whole truth and ensure we are fulfilling 

our obligations regarding the people who sacrified. 
50 

Mr. DE LUGO. Let me ask Mr. Weisgall some questions here. 

To what do you attribute the basis for the high commissioner of 

the trust territory recommending that only a limited area of the 

Marshall Islands be evacuated? What do you think was the basis 

of that recommendation? 

Mr. WEISGALL. This is complete speculation on my part. My 

guess is that for the 1946 smaller test, the atomic bomb test, when 

people were evacuated off of Enewetak to the west, Rongelap to the 

east, and Wotho to the south, there was pretty much localized fallout at Bikini. There was no problem; fallout did not go drifting 

anywhere other than on the target vessels at Bikini Lagoon. 

So here it was, 1953, and the Navy is saying, "Well, we should 

define some danger zone, and we think we had better move it to 

the east," and I think this fellow is saying, "Gee, we didn't have 

a problem in 1946. We loaded these people up and moved them." 

This is a little-known fact in Marshallese history, but those people were moved, they were moved to Lae-L-A-E-Atoll for a couple of months. It was disruptive. Word was out in the trust territory at the time that the Bik.inians were unhappy, and I think the 

fellow just didn't want to have a headache on his hands and he 

said, "Let's not do it," and then, as I said, there is no indication 

in the documents that this man was aware that this was a different order of magnitude of testing. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Let me ask you this. Do you think human error 

or confusion can be responsible for ignoring the Pate-Palmer report 

with the concerns of the director of health of the Atomic Energy 

Commission regarding the weather report? What possible explanation can there be for that, for what at best could be called neg- ligence? 

. Mr. WEISGALL. Mr. de Lugo, aside from the ongoing thread of arrogance and ignorance-a thread, by the way, that explains Hanford, Savannah River, and Rocky Flats today-where the AEC said 

to hell with the environmental guidelines, we will do it our way, 

that whole secrecy that started with the Manhattan Project continued. So you have got those themes of ignorance and arrogance. 

I would add only two other factors that I can think of: Number 

one, tremendous pressure on the AEC to develop a deliverable hydrogen bomb. 

Remember, BRA VO was the first of six shots in Operation Castle 

that were planned in 1954, and that went off. Those were from 

March 1 until May 13, 1954. They had a schedule they had to keep. 

The other factor-again, this is speculation on my part-but believe it or not, you had people in the United States like Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin accusing the Administration of delaying the development of the atomic bomb, and he was asking questions at this 

very time. 

This, of course, gets into the whole Oppenheimer hearing and the 

whole question of the development of the atomic bomb. There was 

a genuine debate about going ahead with that document, and Senator McCarthy in 1954, March of 1954, was accusing the Government of delaying the development of this weapon. 

Mr. DE LUGO. What explanation do you have for the Interior Department excluding Rongelap from the area that needed to be evacuated when scientists suggested that it should be? 
51 

Mr. WEISGALL. Nothing more than I can say earlier-you know, 

inconvenient, it would be a major headache, and going on. I will 

add one other factor. At the MIKE shot at Enewetak-that was the 

first hydrogen bomb sho~nly about 5 percent of the fallout could 

be accounted for. The radiological safety team simply couldn't track 

much of the radioactive cloud. 

So there may have been a view that there might not be as much 

of a problem, but I can't buy that. I see an Interior Department 

that is looking pretty much for the easy way out. 

I mean when a fellow says, "I urge you to do everything in your 

power to limit the boundaries of the proposed danger zone to exclude Ailinginae as well as any other island or atolls in the Marshalls other than Bikini or Enewetak," what I hear is, "I don't want 

to have to deal with this." But, again, that is speculation. The document speaks for itself. It is callous, it is patronizing, but that was 

the attitude. 

You know, it is an interesting point, everyone is called a native 

here, you know; nobody is called an islander. Even in 1946, you 

didn't want to call the Bikinians, Bikinians. That would imply that 

they actually lived somewhere; they were natives. You know, what 

is the image of a native? I don't know, some sort of peripatetic 

wanderer or something like that. Everyone was a native. You 

couldn't even be called an islander. I mean that was just the attitude, and you know, to call it politically incorrect I guess is an understatement. No one really cared. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Do you think the fact that some of the information 

that you have discussed here was not available during the compact 

negotiations deliberation? 

Mr. WEISGALL. It sure was convenient. I mean almost everything 

I have told you today has been the result of my own research since 

1984, and a lot of it, I swear to God, is in the last seven days. I 

mean I found enough about Operation Crossroads to write a book, 

and God knows, people don't publish books about things that are 

already known. 

There is a tremendous amount unknown. I think that the declassification process is an incredibly slow and painful one. I have worked with a fellow at Temple University working on a 

biography of Arleigh Burke who has been working for ten years to 

get documents declassified, and I will say one thing-and I think 

this Administration is making some changes. You know, the Carter 

and Ford administrations put much lower levels of years on the 

number of years that documents from their own Administrations 

would be classified. I think 25 and 30 in the case of Ford and 

Carter. This is an issue for archivists and historians, but it is important. The preliminary Clinton Administration position is a 40-

year embargo on documents, in other words, being created today. 

But even if you use that limit, we are coming up on 40 for 

BRAVO, and we are at 48 for Operation Crossroads. I can't put myself in the mind of the U.S. Government. I can say that it was convenient, and I will say at least the negotiators for the Marshall Islands, myself included, fought like hell to get in a changed-circumstances provision that would say, "Look we don't think there 

is everything here, we want to have a second bite at the apple if 

more comes out." 
52 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MILLER. Mrs. Mink. 

STATEMENT ON HON. PATSY T. MINK 

Mrs. MINK. Thank you very much. 

This is an issue that many of us in Hawaii have been struggling 

over for many decades, so I commend the Chair for calling these 

hearings and bringing attention to this travesty of human concern 

in the Pacific. You are absolutely right that there was not only a 

callous, arrogant attitude about the experiment and its importance 

to the security of the United States but an utter disregard for the 

people who inhabited these islands. 

So I join you in everything that you have said in describing the 

attitude of people that went ahead with these tests without providing the safety necessary for them. 

My concern right now is, some of the comments that you make 

in your testimony about still-undisclosed information that remains 

classified. To what extent would the release of this information 

that remains classified make it possible for this whole chapter to 

be reopened and the opportunities for the families involved-not 

just the service personnel, the 42,000-but the people out there in 

the Pacific, to have complete, adequate compensation, adequate understanding of what happened to them and the price that this Nation must pay, I believe, for the callousness and secrecy under 

which they conducted these tests? 

What value would it have if we could get this information declassified today? 

Mr. WEISGALL. I think it would be a tremendous value for a 

number of reasons. 

Let's divide up your question. For the Marshallese, it would put them finally on a level playing field with the United States. I mean 

there is no reason not to have the information out now. The imperatives of the Cold War are gone. I mean it is over. 

Mrs. MINK. Is there any national security justification left for 

keeping this information secret? 

Mr. WEISGALL. Mrs. Mink, there may be some aspects of the details of the weapons, the construction of the weapons themselves, 

and that is nothing that I, as a part-time researcher, care about 

quite as much. It is useful, by the way, in terms of the exposures 

of people. 

But no, I think with some very minor exceptions, most of the material can come out. 

I have got documents here with complete sections blacked out 

still. I mean there is a lot that remains classified. I don't think 

there is an ongoing need. I think that there has got to be leadership though, and this really is where I do applaud Mrs. O'Leary. 

I think she has taken an incredibly bold move, and I will bet you 

there are people at the Defense Department and the Justice Department who were shocked when she came out and called for declassification and called for compensation. It is about time. I mean 

if there is bad news, let's just get it out on the table and let's deal 

with it. 

Now, for the veterans, you know, I have spoken to many of them; 

I have spoken to children of many of them. You know what they 
53 

want more than anything? I am not even sure that compensation 

is the issue. They want to know what happened. They want something like an apology, and they want some recognition. 

You know, it is almost like the Vietnam Memorial. The cathartic 

effect that has had is probably equal to more than all the compensation you can pay to a paralyzed veteran. There are children 

of veterans whose dads were out there at Bikini, at Enewetak, at 

the Nevada test site. They were told not to tell their family members what they were doing. Many of these men have developed illnesses-not all, but many have, many have died. The children are 

confused. They are very angry. There is a lot of anger. They want 

facts. They want a certain amount of recognition. They would like 

an apology. 

That stuff doesn't cost a lot of money, you know. These aren't 

necessarily budget issues. Compensation is one, but these are the 

other matters. It would go a long way towards closing the door to 

this legacy. It is still open, and it still hurts a lot of people. 

Mrs. MINK. Take an individual case of a veteran who was exposed, one of the 42,000 you mentioned. Supposing they filed a 

claim connecting their current injuries or their children's conditions 

to what happened to them out there. What does the military do in 

that instance when they haven't quite admitted to what happened? 

Do they simply deny the connection, deny the service connection, 

deny the disability has any relevance to the exposure out there at 

the test? 

Is there any kind of record that we can find in our search or in 

getting this information declassified which would open the door to 

a real hard look at the consequences of this exposure? 

Mr. WEISGALL. Mrs. Mink, in 1979 the Defense Nuclear Agency 

said that 12 additional cancers would have occurred among the 

250,000 U.S. veterans who participated in the U.S. nuclear testing 

program-12. 

By the way, the Veterans' Administration ruled in favor of veterans in 8 of 291 claims brought until 1979. 

Now what did Congress do? In its wisdom, I think Congress 

eventually realized that you couldn't look at this cancer and that 

radiation. It passed the Radiation Exposed Veterans Compensation 

Act of 1988, Public Law 103-21 and simply said, if a veteran can 

show that he suffers from a certain form of cancer specified in the 

legislation and that he participated in a nuclear test or other activity likely to result in exposure to radiation, he receives compensation according to a set schedule much like the Nuclear Claims Tribunal set up in the Marshall Islands for the Marshallese. The scientific questions are unanswered, so the solution was a political 

one. It wasn't a medical; it wasn't a scientific; it wasn't any other 

way to answer it. 

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. The gentlewoman's time has expired. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I apologize. We had a two-hour delay on the 

traffic this morning, and I am sorry that I was not here earlier. 

Mr. MILLER. So I understand. 
54 

STATEMENT OF HON. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I do have an opening statement to make at the hearing this morning, and I would be remiss 

if I did not first express my sense of appreciation to some of the 

members that had carried on this long-standing issue not only with 

the committee but certainly here in the Congress, and I would like 

to express my appreciation to the late Congressman Phil Burton 

who previously chaired this subcommittee that dealt with the territories, also the name of the former Congressman Bob Lagomarsino, 

also Chairman Sid Yates who has been most helpful in dealing 

with this case for the Marshallese, former Congressman Seiberling, 

and certainly the former staff member Pat Krause who has been 

one of the most outstanding staff members who worked on this 

issue for all these years. I want to express my condolences for Pat 

Krause who passed away, just a couple of days ago, and certainly 

to her family. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to 

present a short statement on this very important issue. With the 

chairman's permission I would like to submit a fuller statement for 

the record. 

Mr. MILLER. Without objection. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. AB you know, hundreds of reports have been 

written on this issue. This is not a new issue. This has been ongoing now since the mid-1970s since I was here formerly as a staff 

member, and very few arrive at the same conclusion about the extent of our responsibility to the people of the Marshall Islands. 

But one conclusion that remains constant, Mr. Chairman, is that 

between 1946 and 1958 the United States detonated about 66 

atomic devices on the group of islands known as the Marshall Islands and forever altered not only the landscape of these central 

Pacific islands but, more importantly, the lives of its inhabitants. 

Despite its protestations, I remain convinced that the scientists 

employed by the U.S. Government deliberately misled the inhabitants of Rongelap because they wanted to conduct radiation tests 

on them after they dropped, especially, the BRAVO test in 1954. 

This was the first thermonuclear device that the U.S. had exploded 

in 1954 supposedly 1,300 times the destructive force of the atomic 

bomb that was dropped at Hiroshima. 

Our friends in the U.S. Government did not tell about the 

Rongelap test in advance. Approximately five hours after the detonation, it began to rain radioactive fallout at Rongelap. Within 

hours the atoll was covered with a fine white, powder-like substance. No one knew it was radioactive fallout. The children played 

in what was quoted as snow. They ate it, not knowing what it was. 

The people of Rongelap and radiation became linked perhaps for all 

time. 

I believe, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Government officials were not 

truthful to the people of Rongelap and have lied to the American 

people since then about the extent of the damage resulting from 

these nuclear tests. 

I am very appreciative of the fact that the Department of Energy 

and Mrs. O'Leary are now bringing this out into tlie open for us 

to see what exactly transpired, with not only the people of the Mar-
55 

shalls but also many of the Americans who served in the armed 

services and what happened to them as well. 

Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is about truth. It is time for the 

Department of Energy also finally to tell the people of the Marshall 

Islands and the American people the truth about what happened 

out there in the Pacific. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your tireless efforts and 

leadership in this committee to see what has happened. I also want 

to thank other Members of the Congress, Mr. Dingell, and the 

President, and this Administration and to see that we will get to 

the truth and to the bottom of this. 

I finally would like to thank the late Senator from the Marshall 

Islands, the Honorable Jeton Anjain, who spent a great deal of his 

life bringing world attention to this shameful part of our history. 

Ironically, Senator Anjain died last year of cancer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:] 
56 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OVERSIGHT HEARLNG 

ON 

RADIATION EXPOSURE FROM NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE PACIFIC 

Thursday, February 24, 1994 

-=EH=I:-::F::-,--:H::-,--:F:,AL""""'E=-o""MA=::v=AEGA 

Member of congress 

Mr, Chairman: Thank you for giving me the opportunity 

to submit a statement on this very important issue. 

As you know, hundreds of reports have been written on 

this issue very few arriving at the same conclusion about 

the extent of our responsibility to the people of the 

Marshall Islands. But the one conclusion that remains 

constant is that between 1946 and 1958, the United States 

detonated several atomic devices on a group of islands known 

as the Marshall Islands -- and forever altered not only the 

landscape of these central Pacific islands, but more 

importantly, the lives of its inhabitants. 

It is my hope that some of the witnesses today will 

address the events and consequences surrounding the "BRAVO" 

Shot -- a U.S. hydrogen bomb test which took place near the 

Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954. 

According to official records, this 15-megaton 

thermonuclear device was 1,000 times more powerful the bombs 

dropped on Japan during World war II. Rongelap, an 

inhabited island, was only a hundred miles away and directly 

downwind of the explosion. None of the 239 islanders were 

warned. 

In a statement to congress in 1989, the late Senator 
57 

2 

from the Marshall Islands, Jetson Anjain, said, 

"Approximately five hours after detonation, it began to rain 

radioactive fallout at Rongelap. Within hours, the atoll 

was covered with a fine, white, powdered-like substance. No 

one knew it was radioactive fallout.• 

The Department of Energy (then known as the Atomic 

Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development 

agency) did not tell the Rongelap people about the BRAVO 

test. "The children played in the snow-like substance. 

They ate it,• said Senator Anjain. 

The third day after BRAVO, suffering from a near 

lethal radiation dose, the Rongelap people were finally 

evacuated to another atoll known as Kwajelein, where they 

stayed until 1957 ••• when the DOE concluded it was "safe• 

for the residents to return to one of the primary residence 

islands, Rongelap Island. 

In 1988, documents from the archives of the old Atomic 

Energy Commission's Advisory Committee on Biology and 

Medicine were found in which the word "safe• applied only to 

the Rongelap people. 

By early 1960, the DOE doctors began discovering 

significant "unanticipated" medical problems and began 

performing operations to remove thyroid nodules. Between 

1960 and 1982, 24 operations were performed on Rongelap 

people to surgically remove thyroids. During the s~me 

period, another 15 similar cases were fou~d at Utirik, a 
3 

neighboring atoll al• o irradiated by BRAVO. Thyroid 

neopla• ia (benign and JUalignant) can be a direct re• ult of 

over-expo• ure to radiation. 

Since 1957, the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) 

ha• been under contract by the DOE, to perform medical 

examinations on Marshall Islanders exposed to nuclear 

fallout. According to BNL, the most prevalent long-tena 

health effect in the Marshallese population has been the 

development of benign and malignant thyroid neoplasms. 

Approximately JOI of adults and 601 of children (exposed 

when younger than 10 years of age) developed thyroid 

nodules, some of which were thyroid carcinoma (malignant). 

Other long-term health effects have included growth 

retardation. several deaths have resulted from acute 

myelogenous, leukemia and gastric carcinoma. 

Mr. Chairman, the question that keeps haunting me is 

"why didn't we evacuate the residents of Rongelap before or 

immediately after the BRAVO test?" According to an article 

written by Dr. Thomas Hamilton in the March 1991 issue of 

PSR (a journal of medicine and global survival), "no formal 

investigation of the decision to conduct the test with the 

wind blowing toward Rongelap, and of the failure to evacuate 

these inhabitants immediately, has ever been made public." 

Although many details may be unrecorded or classified 

as secret, a Defense Nuclear Agency report published in 1982 

provides data that indicate it was logistically possible to 
59 

4 

evacuate the people from Rongelap Island and the nearby 

island of Ailingnae. The report • how• that the u,s,s, Gypsy 

lay within a few miles and just outside the lagoon of 

Rongelap. In addition, at least six other naval vessel• 

(the u,s,s, curtiss. Bi2llX... Tawakoni. b.tu, Belle Grove. 

and Bairoko) were in position between Rongelap and Bikini at 

the time of detonation. 

Dr. Hamilton goes on to say that if the people of 

Rongelap had been evacuated immediately or within hours 

after BRAVO, "they could have been spared most of the 

wholebody doses from external radiation, and the organ doses 

from internal radiation exposure, that they eventually 

received." 

Although many reasons might be offered for the failure 

of the United States government to evacuate the residents of 

Rongelap, one conclusion is inescapable: the personal 

safety of the Rongelapese and other Marshallese people was 

not a high priority of U.S. officials on hand. 

Worse yet is an assertion made recently in the 

Washington Times by Chairman John Dingell of the House 

Committee on Energy and Commerce, that "the inhabitants of 

Utirik Atoll may have used as human guinea pigs." 

Residents of Rongelap have also voiced a similar belief with 

Chairman George Miller. If this assertion is true, then the 

DOE, is guilty of nothing less than genocide. 

The Times article refers to documents found in the 
60 

5 

archives of federal agencies which "reveal a callous 

attitude by u.s. scientists toward using Pacific islanders 

as test subjects after atomic blasts in the 1950 1 s. 

Mr, Chairman, I have attached a record of a disturbing 

conversation between two u.s. scientists: Dr. Merle 

Eisenbud, and a Dr, Failla, from the files of the U.S. 

Atomic Energy Commission. Following is a brief part of that 

conversation: 

Nr. lisenl>u4: Thank you John. Gentlemen, the 

adjournment time is 5:15, it is now 5:00, I had hoped 

to be able to make a few sWD111ary remarks and project a 

little bit of this into the future, but I don't need 

to do this now, I can do this tomorrow. 

Dr. Failla: It might be better to do it now. 

Nr, lisenl>u4: I want to re-emphasize that the program 

you have heard today is a program that is in progress 

now. 

If you heard it six months ago, it wouldn't be very 

different with one exception. None of the items have 

been reported in internal reports. 

We have a few things that we are thinking about for 

the immediate future and I would like to mention a few 

of these. 

We think that one very intriguing study can be made 

and plans are on the way to implement this -- "Uterik" 

Atoll is the atoll furtherest from the March 1st shot 
61 

6 

where people were exposed got initially about 15 

roentgen• and then they were evacuated and they 

returned. 

They had been living on that Island; now that Island 

is safe to live on but is by far the most contaminated 

place in the world and it will be very interesting to 

go back and get good environmental data, how many per 

square mile; what .. isotopes are involved and a sample 

of food changes in many humans through their urines, 

so as to get a measure of the human uptake when people 

live in a contaminated environment. Now, data of this 

type has never been available. While it is true that 

these people do not live, I would say, the way 

Westerners do, civilized people, it is nevertheless 

also true that these people are more like us than the 

mice. So that is something which will done this 

winter." 

Mr. Chairman, the record supports my personal belief 

that the residents of these islands were left there 

deliberately in order to provide scientists working for the 

U.S. government with "human" specimens to test the aftereffects of radiation exposure. 

I know that shortly after this statement was made, 

the U.S . Government, through the Brookhaven National Lab and 

Lawrence Livermore Lab, began extensive environmental and 

health studies of the Rongelap and Utirik peoples -- of the 

79-784 0-94-3 
62 

7 

very kind that were aade in the attached tran•cript of the 

1956 •••ting of the AEC Advisory Committee on biology and 

Medicine. 

This issue certainly deserves our attention and a 

thorough investigation. At the same ti-, and even as we go 

forward in today's hearing, let us not lose sight of the 

fact that, ultimately, the real concern is and must be the 

impact the nuclear weapons testing progrU1 has had upon the 

health of the people exposed. Do we really know what the 

true health consequences have been to the people of the 

Marshall Islands result' from the fallout blown upon their 

lands and waters? 

Whether conducting human radiation experiments or 

serving more legitimate medical purposes, we do know that 

Brookhaven National Lab has conducted over 40 years of 

research and studies on the Rongelap and Utirik peoples. we 

also know that the health data collected on the people has 

never been subjected to outside, independent medical review 

and evaluation, notwithstanding the efforts of Marshallese 

leaders such as my dear departed friend Senator Jeton 

Anjain. As an editorial that appeared in the Marshall 

Islands Journal almost a year ago notes, Senator Anjain 

"doggedly pursued access to and Rongelap control over 

medical records and raw scientific data that up to now has 

either not been made public or had never been provided to 

the Rongelap community." The editorial, a copy of which I 
63 

a 

provide to the committee for inclusion in the record, notes 

that failure of Senator Anjain'a •quest for acceaa to an 

independent scientific review of the 40 years of Rongelap 

medical records locked in the vaults at Brookhaven National 

Laboratory.• 

Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association signed 

by the United States and the Marshall Islands Government set 

aside money for further medical studies, and some of this 

money was used to hire doctors. Under the direction of the 

Nuclear Claims Tribunal, a review was made of at least some 

of the Brookhaven medical records. However, I am concerned 

that this review was anything but independent. It certainly 

was not comprehensive. 

Mr. Chairman, I will be satisfied if nothing results 

from these hearings other than that this Committee ensures 

that Senator Anjain's last remaining and unfinished quest be 

finally achieved: that the Department of Energy immediately 

allocate funds for an outside, independent medical 

evaluation of all of the health data that Brookhaven has 

gathered on the Rongelap and Utrik people. Moreover, it is 

essential that the Rongelap and Utrik people as well as the 

Marshall Islands Government, be fully involved in 

establishing the protocols for this study and in the 

selection of the doctors that conduct this study. It is 

also important that they be involved in the selection of the 

doctors that conduct this undertaking. An excellent model 
9 

to follow in pursuing this objective would, in • y opinion, 

be the MemorandUll of Understanding that was negotiated with 

the Department of Energy by Senator Anjain on behalf of the 

Rongelap people that has enaured an independent 

environmental assessment of the radiation conditions on 

Rongelap atoll. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to co-end you 

for your tireless efforts to seek the truth about the people 

of Rongelap. I also commend Chairman John Dingell and other 

members of Congress for their tireless efforts to seek 

justice in dealing with this sensitive issue. But mostly, I 

would like to take this opportunity to remember and honor my 

dear departed friend Jeton Anjain. If he were here today, 

he would surely be before this Committee to testify, and he 

surely would have concluded his remarks with this closing 

salutation, "Mr. Chairman , On behalf of the Rongelap people, 

and especially the children, I thank you." 
65 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. At this point in the record I would like to insert a statement by 

Congressman Norm Dicks of Washington on this topic. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Dicks follows:] 
66 

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN NQRM DICKS 

HEARING ON RADIATION EXPOSURE FROM NUCLEAR TESTS 

NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 

Mr. Chairman, I want to express my 

appreciation to you for calling these hearings on 

a very important issue that has life and death 

implications for hundreds of people who were 

exposed to dangerous levels of radiation from 

atmospheric nuclear testing beginning in 1946. 

I am especially concerned about the potential 

exposure to U.S. military personnel who were 

stationed in and around the Marshall Islands 

during this period. In addition, there have been 

questions raised with respect to radiation levels 

· on Navy ships which subsequently returned to 
67 

2 

the United States and may have exposed not 

only their crews, but federal civilian workers who 

overhauled these vessels to dangerous radiation 

levels. 

I hope that as you review these events, you 

closely question representatives of the 

Department of Defense as well as the 

Department of Energy. Among the steps that 

should be given serious consideration is 

comprehensive testing of anyone who may have 

been exposed to these dangerous radiation 

levels. 

Clearly, the federal government has a 

responsibility to fully inform, and to the extent 

feasible, provide treatment or compensation, for 

any individuals who have paid for these tests 

through years of suffering or early death. I 

stand ready to work closely with the Committee 
68 

toward this end and again appreciate your 

providing me this opportunity to appear. 

3 
69 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Evans is recognized. 

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You alluded to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal established by the 

agreement with our Government and the Marshall Islanders. · I understand that they have awarded compensation for 27 presumptive 

conditions. I might note for my colleagues, 13 of those are presumptive for our U.S. veterans, atomic veterans, but they have 14 additional conditions that they are awarded presumptive compensation. 

But I understand-is this correct?-that no awards have been 

made to the people of the Marshall Islands whose conditions may 

be radiogenic in nature but not on the presumptive list. Is that correct? 

Mr. WEISGALL. Mr. Evans, I don't think I am as good a witness 

to answer that as a gentleman who is from the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, so not meaning to duck it, but I think you can get a better 

answer from the tribunal. 

Mr. EVANS. I have a whole line of questions in that regard, so 

I will reserve them and appreciate your testimony. It has been very 

helpful to us. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much for your testimony and for 

your assistance, and we look forward to continuing to work with 

you. 

Mr. WEISGALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. The next witness before the committee will be Professor Merril Eisenbud. 

Professor Eisenbud, welcome to the committee. We look forward 

to your testimony, and, as you can see, the questions being raised 

are rather numerous, and again I want to thank you for your assistance to this committee in helping to put together this hearing 

and to start unraveling this problem. 

STATEMENT OF MERRIL EISENBUD, DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR IN RESIDENCE, DUKE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 

Professor EISENBUD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was asked to include some information about my professional 

background. I am professor emeritus of environmental medicine at 

New York University Medical Center where I served for 26 years 

as professor of environmental medicine and director of the Environmental Studies Laboratory. 

I went to New York University after a 12-year career with the 

Atomic Energy Commission where, for the most part of that period, 

I was director of the Commission's Health and Safety Laboratory 

located in New York City. For many years, that laboratory was 

known by the acronym HASL-H-A-S-L-but the name was 

changed in the mid-1970s to the Department of Energy's Environmental Measurements Laboratory. 

I hold the degree of bachelor of science in engineering and two 

doctor of science degrees, both honorary. I am a member of the National Academy of Engineering, an honorary member of the National Council on Radiation Protection, a fellow of the New York 

Academy of Medicine, an honorary life fellow of the New York 

Academy of Sciences, and a foreign member of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences. 
70 

Since my retirement from New York University in 1985, I have 

resided in Chapel Hill, and I currently hold the position of distinguished scholar in residence, Duke University Medical Center. 

I began my career in environmental health science in the mid1930s, nearly 60 years ago. At various times during these many 

decades, I have been involved with research and teaching and administration in programs concerned with air and water pollution, 

occupational health, the urban environment, and both the ionizing 

and nonionizing radiations. 

Environmental radioactivity has been a major interest of mine 

for many years. I published the first edition of a textbook called 

Environmental Radioactivity in 1963, the fourth edition of which 

will be published by Academic Press in 1966. I have published 

more than 200 peer review articles in the scientific journals, and 

in 1990 my professional memoir entitled An Environmental Odyssey, was published by the University of Washington Press. A little 

later I will request that certain pages from that book which relate 

to the BRA VO tragedy be entered into the record of this hearing. 

For your purposes today, the period of my career that will be of 

most interest was from 1951 when I first became involved in studies of fallout from nuclear weapons tests to the end of 1954, the 

year of the BRA VO explosion. 

It is important that I begin by telling you why HASL was organized and how it became involved in the fallout measurements and 

the central role it played in the BRA VO episode. 

When AEC was created by the Congress in 1947, it was realized 

that many of its contractors both in academia and in industry would require assistance in dealing with problems in industrial 

and radiological hygiene. It was decided that an AEC laboratory 

should be created in New York to provide the required technical assistance to the many plants and laboratories under contract with 

the New York operations office. 

The uranium and beryllium industries, both of which were confronted with serious health problems, made the bulk of the work 

that was done in the first few years. A laboratory of high quality 

was put together with a staff of industrial hygienists, physicians, 

physicists, engineers, and chemists who were willing to work under 

field conditions; that is a key point. 

When the weapons testing program began in Nevada in 1951, 

our staff was not initially involved in any way. We learned about 

Operation Ranger in the news broadcasts, just like most other people. 

A few days after the test began, I received a call from Rochester 

that the Eastman Kodak Company had detected radioactive particles in the air intake filters of their film manufacturing plant. 

From telephone calls I made to Washington and the Nevada test 

site, I was amazed to learn that no fallout monitoring network had 

been established by AEC. This was obviously a major deficiency in 

planning since it had been known that fallout from the New Mexico 

test explosion in the summer of 1945 had spoiled photographic film 

packaged with interleaving paper made from fallout-contaminated 

com stalks in Iowa, hundreds of miles from the test. 
71 

As a result of that experience, the Eastman Kodak Company 

wisely adopted the practice of routinely monitoring its plants and 

laboratories for radioactive dust. 

As a result of that experience, HASL was requested by the AEC 

Division of Military Applications to prepare a national network of 

fallout monitoring stations. This network was extended worldwide 

in the following year. 

A collection system was operated on an unclassified basis, and 

the first summary of our findings was published in the Journal of 

Science in February 1953. This was the first of many publications 

on the subject in the open literature, and they are noteworthy because they show that the AEC at that time was not attempting to 

conceal the fact that fallout of radioactive dust from test explosions 

was occurring. 

Our early studies led me to become very much concerned about 

the possibility that lethal levels of radiation might occur at great 

distances from explosions in the megaton range of TNT equivalent. In addition to the global network of monitoring stations, HASL 

requested and was granted the assignment to monitor fallout intensively in the 200- to 500-mile annulus around the test site. We first 

undertook these studies in Nevada during Operation Jangle in the 

fall of 1951. This series consisted of two small explosions, one on 

the surface and one just below the surface. I believe the yields were 

of the order of one kiloton. 

My associates and I became particularly concerned about the levels of fallout measured in about 400 miles from the test site. The 

measured fallout intensities we measured were not so high as to 

be alarming of themselves, but they were the result of explosions 

equivalent to explosive yield of no more than one kiloton of TNT. 

Since explosions more than 10,000 times larger were being planned 

for the test in the Marshall Islands, it took but a simple calculation 

to show that very dangerous levels of fallout might occur at great 

distances. 

Using aerial survey methods of our own design, we undertook intensive monitoring of all northern Pacific atolls after the MIKE 

Detonation in the fall of 1952. We found no significant fallout and 

concluded that whatever fallout had taken place was in the open 

ocean within which the atolls were very thinly distributed. 

We then began to prepare for Operation Castle scheduled to 

begin on March 1, 1954. In the interim, we had been consulting 

with the late Colonel N.H. Lulegian, an Air Force meteorologist 

who took quite seriously our concerns about the potential dangers 

from massive fallout following explosions in the megaton range of 

yields. 

He sent me a highly classified report he had prepared in which 

he confirmed by rigorous analysis what we had concluded almost 

intuitively based on our limited field experience; i.e., lethal levels 

of fallout could occur at great distances from near-surface explosions of megaton weapons. For some unexplained reason, that report was recalled within a few days after I had received it, and I 

have not seen it since. 

What happened on March 1, 1954, as a consequence of BRA VO 

is now a part of history, but the full story is largely untold. The 

fact that heavy fallout was occurring was first recorded about 
72 

seven hours post firing by a continuous gamma radiation detector 

placed by HASL in the care of Air Weather Service personnel on 

the atoll of Rongerik. These are the 26 servicemen that have been 

referred to previously. 

The HASL representative aboard the task force flagship was immediately notified by radio. There was no confusion about that 

message. I had a copy of it; it was quite clear. But what happened 

thereafter is still a matter of mystery. There were delays in confirming that the fallout had occurred and in measuring its extent. 

I was then in the New York laboratory and was notified of the 

Rongerik report immediately, but thereafter there was a blackout 

of information for about a day. 

The reason why aerial confirmation was not permitted and why 

prompt evacuation procedures were not implemented has never 

been explained. 

My knowledge of the events prior to the explosion and immediately afterwards are summarized from my notes as well as official documents in An Environmental Odyssey. Of particular interest 

to you will be the material on pages 72 through 103 which also covered the effects of the BRA VO fallout on the Japanese fishing boat, 

the Lucky Dragon. These pages have been made available to the 

committee, and I request that they be included in the record of 

these proceedings. 

[The document follows:] 
73 

AN ENVIRONMENTAL 

ODYSSEY 

People, Pollution, and 

Politics in. the Life of a 

Practical Scientist 

MERRIL EISENBUD 

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS 

Seattle and Washington 

" 
FIVE 

Atomic Energy 

Commission 

74 

Studies of Radioactive Fallout 

THE FIRST EXPLOSION of a nuclear weapon took place on a 

steel tower in the New Mexkan desert in July 1945, about one month before two bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki. The test explosion in New Mexico, known by the code name 

TRINITY, caused skin burns on grazing cattle several miles downwind 

where radioactive particles deposited on them. The radioactive cloud 

drifted over Iowa, where a thunderstorm washed particles of radioactive 

dust into a corn field, the shocks of which were subsequently shipped to a 

factory of the Eastman Kodak Company, which manufactured the black 

interleaving paper used to separate sheets of X-ray film. The radioactive 

particles became incorporated into the interleaving paper and caused 

black spots to appear on developed film that had been packaged with the 

contaminated black paper. Eastman Kodak described its experience in a 

scientific article, but it attracted little attention. 

Dangerous fallout of radioactive particles occurs when a nuclear bomb 

is exploded so close to the ground that panicles of soil and other materials are sucked into the cooling fireball as it rises. When bombs arc exploded at greater altitudes, the debris takes the form of fine particles that 

settle to the ground, usually with rain or snow, at great distances from 

the explosion, after most of the short-lived radionuclides have decayed. 

The two bombs dropped on the Japanese cities were exploded high in the 

air, which tended to minimize fallout, but rain showers shortly after the 

explosions did result in slight, but measurable levels of fallout at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

The first nuclear bombs exploded after the war were at Operation. 
75 

h,t A . f.C : STlll)IES 01' RAl)IOACTIVE l'Al.l.lHIT 

( HO\\kOAt>S, a well-publicized demonstration that took place in 1946 

1111 rlw P.11:ific atoll of Bikini. CROS~ROAl>S was a festive occasion at1nukd hy im·ited guests from many nations and a vast corps of reporters. 

h "a, aprart·ntly hoped that a demonstration of the power of nudear 

w1·,11""'' would have a beneficial effect on the outcome of a conference 

1111 l lllltrol 111 atomil· l'nugy that was in progress at thl· n·n·nrly fonrn:d 

t l1111nl Nations. 

111 preparation for the tests, 162. Bikini natives were moved to another 

;u11II . A lll·et of warships, some surrendered hy the .J,tpanese and Ger111,1m ,md some antiquated vessels from the U.S. tlcet, were anchored in 

1111· lagoon lo dcmon,;1r.11c the effects of thl· Jll'W wc:apons on naval ves-

" ·I,. I hl· first bomb was detonated high ahoVl' the lagoon and the r.tdio-

.1-tl\·t• doud Jrihed away without incident. The second bomb was explnd1·d helow the lagoon surface and aeated a massive and spectacular 

gl'\'l'r that dousetl the ships with so much radioactivity that some had to 

h1· ,unk. Others were towed to naval stations where they served as labor.11ories for development of decontamination methods. The underwater 

t·xplosion caused so much contamination of the ships and lagoon that a 

third planned explosion was cancelled. 

In .luly 194 7, the AEC announced that it was establishing a "proving 

grounds" for the testing of nuclear weapons on the atoll of Eniwetok, 

.11,o m the M.trshall Islands. The 110 natives who lived on that atoll, like 

1hc l\1kini native'"' in 1946, were remon·d to another island, thus hcginnmg ,1 sad saga 1hat continues to this Jay. The tirst tests of Eniwetok 

1110k place in 1948, the year in which the Soviet Union exploded its first 

nudl.'ar weapon at a test site in Siberia. This latter event took the U.S. by 

surprise and resulted in the acceleration of nuclear weapons developmcnr. Additional testing facilities were needed, and because of the logislll' problems associated with the Pacific Test Site, a decision was made to 

1kvdop a site in the llni1eJ Siatcs. The site selected was near Las Vegas, 

Nl.'vada, and the first exercise, Operation RANGER, began on January 2.7, 

19~1. 

Prcp;uations for the weapons tests at both the Pacific and Nevada test 

"res wae undertaken in great secre1..)' by the AEC. Since NYOO was not 

1moln·J, I learned about the tests as did the general public, by hearing of 

rlwm on the radio. A few Jays after the first series of tests began in Ne-

' .1tl.,. I H'lTived a call from Harry Blair of the llnivrrsity of Rochester, 

"ho 111forml·d llll' that Eastman Kodak Company had rcponcd that ra-

.110.1111\'t' dust w:is acn1m11la1ing on the air intake tillers at their Roches-
76 

A , F.,<:. : STlll>IF.S OF RAl>IOACTIVF. FAI. I.OllT 65 

ter film manufacturing plant. It seems that the experience of the company 

aher the TRINITY explosion in 1945 had alerted them to the need to take 

precautions against the presence of radioactive dust in the air of their 

many manufacturing facilities. The presence of radioactivity at the Rochester pl.ult was reported hy radiation detectors installed for that purpose. 

Blair also reported that the radiation h,Kkgruund in the university lahorntorit·s was .,lso higher than normal. The levds were nut high c111111gh 

for concern ahout their effects on human health, hut they were high 

enough to justify the concerns of the Eastman Kodak ofticials ahout the 

integrity of their film-making process. The increased hackground was 

31sn afk,.:ting the sensitive measurements being made at the University of 

Rodicster lahorntorics. 

A test explosion had taken place high above the Nevada desert about 

thirty-six hours previously, and the radioactive cloud had drifted over the 

Rochestfr area during a snowstorm that was blanketing the Northeast. I 

first called the medical director at the Nevada test site and advised him of 

the reports we had received. He thought it was nonsensical that fallout 

was reported so far away. He had been to ground zero a few hours previously, and there was only insignificant residual radiation. What he 

failed to realize was that the bomb was detonated so high in the air that 

there was no local fallout, but the: cloud of radioactive debris had been 

carried in a northeasterly direction and brought to the ground by the predpiration in the Rochester area. I immediately advised the Division of 

Biology and Medicine in the AEC hcad4u.utcrs, and was told, much to 

my surprise, that the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island 

had been alerted that the tests were about to take place, and that its staff 

had heen asked to install radiation monitoring stations "somewhere: in 

the Northeast." 

When I called Brookhaven I was told they had installed two monitorin~ stations, one ,It rhe laboratory and another somcwhcn: in Maine. The 

instrument at the laboratory was recording nothing but the normal radiation hackground, which meant that that part of Long Island was not in 

the path of the cloud. What about the station in Maine? It was unattended in a remote area, and they would be unable to recover the information for several days! In view of the fact that there was apt to be considerahle interest in. the subject, I thought it was worthwhile for them to 

send someone to the station immediately, hut I was not persuasive 

enou~h. 

It had heen snowing throu~hout the Northeast, the temperatures were 
77 

hh A.f .L: SHIHll' S Of RAUIOA<:TtVf fAI.I.OllT 

l,,·luw lnT1111g, anJ the snow was still on the ground. It would thus he 

l'"'""k III nu•,1'-urc- the amount and extent of rlw fallout hy examining 

"·•mpln of snow. The HASL branch chiefs, Harris, LcVinc, Harley, anJ 

Bl.111, rnnterred with me and we decided to take advantage of NYOO's 

111.111~· cnntra'--.s with industrial companies and universities throughout 

1hc Northust states and request that those organizations assist in collectmg ,now samples for analysis. We asked them to purchase quart ice 

(n·,1111 omtaincrs, collect snow samples along designated routes, sc,11 the 

(t111t.1iners, and deliver them by messenger to HASL over the weekend. 

We wanmt the samples collected as soon as possible, but not until it had 

Moppl·d ,nowing, so that we could be certain that all the precipitation 

woulJ he rnllected. By early Saturday morning, samples were being collt:dt'll III the northeastern U.S. by personnel dispatched from St. Louis, 

( lnd.1ml, Rochester, Albany, New York City, and Boston. The HASL 

"'·'II worked throughout Friday night assembling the equipment to evapor.ue the water samples for measurement in beta radiation counters, the 

,·.1"icst way to assay radioactivity io those days. The staff performed mag111lirc11tly over that weekend and by Tuesday afternoon prepared a map 

"li11w111g the pattern of radioactive fallout. It was the first time this had 

nw ht·t'n Jone, and Shidds Warren was anxious to see the map because 

111.- wa-. i.cheduleJ to testify at a congressional hearing anJ thought the 

rnmmittee would be interested in what we haJ found. r took the map to 

\V.1.,hingwn that night, and Warren presented our findings to the con-

~"·"11111al .:omminee on the following day. 

HA\I h;1il ;1lreaJy aura,:ceJ aucn1io11 within ilw AFC for the dfrctiVt'. 

w.1,· in whii:h the hl'ryllium s111Jies had hecn i:ond1K1ed. Tht." Rodicstt·r 

111, ult-111 drove home the message that the nature of AEC ai:1ivitics rcljlllrcJ an in-house troubleshooting group that was responsive to the spei:1.11 1wed,; of the commission whenever and wherever they might arise. 

At 1he time of the Rochester fallout there was little appreciation of the 

I.let that some of the nudides present in the bomb debris were capable of 

heing ahsorbed by plants and animals and could eventually find their 

way into food and the human body. Such information was available from 

!otudies that had been conducted at Hanford and other nuclear centers, 

hut rhe information was still secret in 1951, and at HASL we didn't know 

i1 ni.,tcd. What is disappointing in retrospect is that the Division of Biolo~r ;111d Medii:inc at AEC headquarters had p,1id so liulc am·mion to rhc 

111.Hll'r th.it there were no advance prepara1ions for fol10111 mcasuremcnh. Immediately following the Roches1cr incident there was intcrt."st in 
78 

A . f.C. : STlll)H.S Of KAl>IOACTIVI'. l' Al . l.llllT 67 

the suhil'l:I, hut only hecause it was ,l sdentific curiosity, nor hec.u1sc..· till' 

fallout should Ill' inVl'stig.ued for its puhlk health implic..·.uions. I IASI. 

might not h,IVl' hl·en involved in further fallout studies were it not for the 

fact that Eastman Kodak needed information to protect its processes and 

requested the AEC to provide it with advance notice when a cloud from a 

weapons test was approaching one of their manufacturing facilities. This 

request was relayed by the AEC Division of Military Applications to Wilhur Kdll'Y, manal(cr of NYOO, with instructions for I IASI. to ,1ssis1 Kodak in any way possible. 

By the spring of 1951, preparations were already well underway for 

tests to he cond1Ktcd in Nevada that fall in two parts-Busn:R, a series 

of explosions above ground, and JANGLE, which consisted of a surf.11.:e 

and an underground test. Although the latter two explosions would be 

relatively small, they could be expected to result in much higher levels of 

fallout than had the previous Nevada tests. l was invited to Los Alamos 

for a hrichng on the proposed tests and learned that the test organization 

was planning to monitor the environment only to two hundred miles 

from the hursrs. I was of the opinion that intensive monitoring should he 

l'Xtetllkd to at least five hundred miles. I w.1s told the test organization 

would he unable to go heyond two hundred miles, but that they would 

supporr a rc~ommendation to monitor out to five: hundred miles if HASL 

or orhers could develop a feasible .plan. I stated HASL would be willing 

to assume monitoring responsibility for the 200- 500 mile annulus 

around the test site if the military provided us with logistic support. It 

was a~rt't'd that this would he done. 

We now had two n·sponsihiliries during th,· forrh~o111i11~ tc..·sts. In addi · 

tion to monitorin~ the 2.00- ~oo mile annulus around 1he tcsl site, wc 

would cstahlish a network of fixed stations throughout the world. 

The design of the remote monitoring system received a good deal of 

thought. Ideally, we would have liked to make measurements of external 

gamma radiation, airhorne dust, and individual nudidcs deposited on the 

ground. This was not feasible because we had a very modest budget, and 

the logistic prohlems could not have been solved if we had had the funds. 

Hanson Blatz came up with a practical suggestion. He had investigated 

commercially availahle adhesive films and had found gummed plastic 

sheets that would retain their adhesive properties when exposed out of 

doors in indt·nwnt weathl·r. We ordered a quantity of one-square-foot 

shl'l'ls and had rh,·m placed ahout tliree fret ahov,· the ~round on a 

simplt· stand that we had m,mufact1m·d. With the t.:ooper.ttion of the U.S. 
79 

t,ll A. t.<:. : s ·1111>ns 01' KAl>IOACTIVI: l' AI. I.OIJ'I 

\\'.,.11hn l\urcau, we cstablislu·d an initial network of forty-five stations 

.11 \d11d1 rlw ~ummed films were exposed for tWl'nly-four hours hdore 

l>.-111~ d,.111~,·,I. ·1 h,· films Wl'rt' rl1l'II (old,·d, plan·d i11 a11 1·11v,·lopl', and 

111.11lnl 111 11,\SI. where 1lw ill·ta .,ctivity was llll',tsurl'd, usin~ an in~l'-

'""'" auwmatic counting system dcsignl'd l,y Harry LeVine and his 

~rnup. That simple sampling collection sysrem was eventually extended 

worldwide and for man)· years provided rhe only available information 

.thout th..- levds of radioactive fallout. h was originally considered at best 

;1 ,,mpl,· method that cm1ld provide semiquantitative information about 

ilw p,..,,agl' of the douds of weapons debris and about the places where 

l.1ll11111 was m:rnrring. It later developed that the data could lle used to inIn 1lw r;uc.-s of fallout of individual nudidcs of spc.-cial interc.-st, s1Kh .,s io-

.l111t· 1, 1, u·sium I\ 7, and strontium 90. It is now 111orc than thirty-five 

~ ,·ar\ ,mce rhe gummed tilms were used, hut the data we l·olll'l.·ted con11nm· 10 attract the attention of investigators who use tht· infor111atio11 in 

v.uious ways to reconstruct the radiation doses received lly inhahitanrs in 

\";1rio11s parts of the U.S. and elsewhere. 

h,r studies in the 100-500 mile annulus, the army detailed fifteen enli,teJ men to HASL in addition to rwo DC- 3 aircraft and their crews. 

1 lww llll'n, with HASL. supervisors, were based at convenient airfields 

.111d dt·ployed ro monitoring locations selected on the hasis of meteorolo~irnl information al the rime of Jeronation. Our objective was to esrab1 ... h su1ions across the trajectory of the doud, to begin sampling prior to 

.1rrival of the cloud, and to sample continuously for ~6 hours. We usually 

l'Stahlished three stations following each burst. There were so many military installations near the test site that it was usually possible to establish 

1he tl'mporary sta;ions ar airfields attached fO those bases. Each station 

~l't ur gummed film stands, air samples equipped with inertial particle 

si1e sorters, and gamma radiation recording instruments. The plan 

workc.-d extremely well and was repeated for each of the test series during 

the: next five years. 

h,r most of the period of its operation the mobile sampling program 

""·" M1pcrvised in the field by Paul Klevin, Al Breslin, .J(.)hn Harley, and 

Willi;1111 Harris. It was dangerous work because oi the need to fly into 

~111.1II airtields in all kinds of weather, and I recall one tense episode in 

whidi rhe aircraft to which Klevin was attached was missing for half a 

day. which was a long time considering that rhe aircraft was never more 

1h.111 tivl" hundred mill's from its ha!.e. We sent radio messages to all air 

tid,I, 11111uirin~ i1ho111 the plant· llut received 110 rl'ply hl'cause the radio 
80 

A.I·,( .• : SIIIIJII'.\ 01- l(AUIOACTIV~. l·Al.1 ou·1 b'j 

operator at Hill Air force Base in northern Utah, where Klevin lud 

landed for purposes of monitoring, thought the plane was on a sccrl't 

mission! Tlw HASI. mobile tl•ams functioned efficiently during SL'VL·ral 

seriL·s ol Nevada ll'Sls during thl· early 11.JSOS, aml then· Wl'l'l' lort1111a1dy 

no mishaps. 

Our studies were classified "secret" for a while but before long we 

were allowed to disseminate the information without restriction. John 

Harley and I prepared the first summary of our findings. which we published in Science in 19 5 .l • 

1 This was the first of several articles on the subject. i The policy of publishing our data in the open literature was a wise 

one. It would have been wrong not to have done so, and from a practical 

point of view there was no way in which the presence of radioac.:tivity in 

tht· l'nvironment could be kept seaet. By the mid-195os most research 

laboratories used sensitive radiation detectors, and many scientists were 

reporting increases in the background levels, which they realized was due 

to fallout from the weapons tests. Some of the scientists began to complain to their elected officials who made inquiries to the AEC, and these 

were referred by Washington to HASL because we had the needed information. Richard Nixon, Senator from California, was among those who 

asked for information in May 1953, when tests were in progress in Nevada. Reports of fallout began to be made even in Europe, and the distinguished British physicist Sir John Cockroft visited me to report his estimate (ten curies) of the amount of bomb debris that lrnd deposited on the 

Thames valley from the tests that were conducted in the fall of 19 51. The 

existence of radioactive fallout from the weapons tests could not, need 

not, and should not have been kept secret. 

Although the first concerns about fallout were because of the effects on 

film manufacturing and radiation detection equipment, it wasn't long before many scientists raised questions about effects on human health. The 

studies of the fallout patterns following the surface and underground 

tests in the fall of 19 51 led us to conclude that the effects of radioactive 

deposits from the explosion of nuclear weapons in time of war could be 

comparable to, if not greater than, the effects due to blast and heat. Although the radioactivity from the two relativdy small JANGLE explosions 

was deposited dose to the site, we concluded that the fallout from the 

thermonuclear weapons being contemplated could contaminate thousands oi square miles of territory with lethal or near-lethal levels of 

radioactivity. 

ThL· sill's of nuclear explosions arc described hy their equivakncL' to 
81 

""1 A . F. . (:.: ~ ·ru Ill F S t)f RAU l()A(:TI VE f A 1.l.O u ... 

I >dt•mt·, using Joint Task Force J 3 2., commandeJ hy Major General 

l'a1:y Clarkson. The task force was not planning extensive monitoring 

opl·r;nions heyonJ the atolls in the immediate vicinity of Eniwetok. lnuca,ed sur,·eillance was essential to better understand fallout phenomc11;1 and, above all, to protect the inhabitants of the Pacific islands. The 

hr'it tc<,t of the Ivy series was named MIKE. This test was of particular 

l "lllll"l'rll to me. 

Tlw !>urvcy methods would be far more Jiffkuh than in Nevada bcc111,e the land to be monitored consisted of tiny islands scattered over 

thou<,anJs of square miles of ocean. However, we believed that the 

.,mount of fallout could be measured by flying low over the islands with 

,1:intill.uion counters. Instruments of the kind required didn't exist but 

1ht·)· rnulJ be designed and built in our laboratory. When Bughcr w.,s 

wi1h 1he Rockefeller Institute he had studied tropical diseases in the jun-

.:lcs ot South America, so he had a "field man's" appreciation of the challcn~c that existed. Time was short, the logistics were "difficult, and there 

were organizational · hurdles to be gotten over. His eyes gleamed as he 

said he would try to arrange for us to monitor the Pacific islands. 

With encouragement from Bugher, but without approval to proceed, 

we hegan to design and construct the instruments we needed. It would be 

neccs!oary that the detector be self-contained so that it could he used in 

.my aircraft assigned to us. h had to have a fast response time, so that 

d,anges in the radiation level could be detected from low-flying planes 

I 2.00- 500 feet) at normal flying speeds, and it had to have a logarithmic 

rt•t;ponse so that it would be useful from 0.01 mr/hr to 100 mr/hr. In adJuion to the aerial measurements, we would also install land-based monitoring instruments on a few islands, but these could he of a type with 

whkh we had considerable experience, so little additi<mal development 

would be required. 

We received approval for our plan by the end of July and began the 

hc:~·ric rrerarafions for the program. The officers of JTF-, J 2. in Washington 1:,x,~rated splendidly, and in early September I flew to the headquarters of General Clarkson at Pearl Harbor to review our final plans and 

confirm that the required logistic suppon would be made available. By 

that time I was high up in the civil service system, with the grade of GS17, only one step from the top, and I found that when I travelled with the 

military I was given the privileges of a general officer. I found it remarkahk that information ahout my assigned equivalent rank always pre-
82 

A.I\.<:.: STlll>IF.S 01' llAl>IOACTIVE l'AI. I.OUT 7\ 

ct·dcd me and the red carpet was always rolled out. Military protowl was 

at a high levd of efficiency. 

One of the important decisions that was made while I was in Pearl 

Harhor was that we would be supported by CINCPAC, the headquarters 

of the Commander in Chief of Pacific Operations. This had the advantage of not burdening JTF- 13 2. with providing the planes and personnel 

we required. In addition, the support we received from CINCPAC added 

prcsti~t· to our mission, and we were given space on the ll.S.S. f.st,•s, the 

flagship of JTJ-'- 1 12.. 

The instruments were completed on schedule and in mid-Octohcr we 

shipped several thousand pounds of equipment and supplies to 

Kwajalein, the atoll on which we would be based. John Harley, Melvin E. 

Cassidy, Al Hrcslin, and I followed a few days apart. I arrived in Honolulu on (ktohcr 14 and conferred again with the CINCPAC stafi, who 

seemed to have developed even more interest in our program since I had 

last seen them. Of special importance was their decision that all the islands of the Pacific Trust Territory should be surveyed, regardless of the 

fallout predictions based on meteorological forecasts. CINCPAC had 

reason to he concerned about the forthcoming tests. Most of the islands 

of the central Pacific had been Japanese possessions prior to World War 

II. After the war they became a trust territory, assigned by the United Nations to the U.S. for administration and protection. These functions were 

in turn assigned to CINCPAC with responsibility for safeguarding the indigenous population. 

From Pe.1rl Harhor I proceeded co Kwajalein which, like many of the 

Marshall Islands, had hcen the scene of violent battles only seven yc:ars 

before. This atoll would serve as headquarters for the HASL s1aff of 

thn·e, who had arrived ahead of me and had already departed for the 

other islands on which instrumentation would be installed. l was really 

enjoying the VIP treatment I was receiving. I ate and slept with the admirals and generals and was extended all the privileges expected by them. 

On Octoher 2.5, 19p., Harley, Breslin, Cassidy, and I tr.tvcllcd to 

Eniwetok for a final test of our newly built instruments. This time we 

flew over the radioactive craters and debris left from the previous tests. 

We flew over the radioactive areas, measured the radiation levels within 

the aircraft, and then monitored the same places on foot. We found, as 

we had calculated, that the levels of radiation we were recording at 509 

ft. were almost exactly one-tenth of the intensities measured at ground 
83 

74 A.E.C.: STUl>IES OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 

Ind. The.- re!oults were quite reproducible on repeated passes over the 

,1rt·,1, mt·,1,urcd. 

t )11 ( ktober .Jo I transferred from my shore billrt to the Estes, which 

w;1, rht· task force command ship. I shared a comfortable: room and pri• 

\ ,m· ,howc:r with three officers, with all of whom I was well acquainted. 

The.- nc.-xt day was occupied with readiness reviews and meteorological 

hridingo; preparatory to the detonation scheduled for the early morning 

of November 1. The test, code-named MIKE, would he the first large 

1l11·r111111111dcar uplC11,ion amt it was expected to yield in excess of ten 

mt·tt-"111" 111 cxpl11s1v,· power. ·111crc w.1s some um:cr1.1i111y ahntlt 1h,· 111,• .. 

1n11olo~u:al condiuons, and the final decision w prou·cJ was not m,Hlc 

11n1il 1:00 A.M. on November 1, only a few hours before firing time. 

I .1stcning to the final countdown on the loudspeaker, I stood on the 

tlt·t:k of the F.st~s as dawn approached. The Jeck was crowded with offil't'rS and civilians of a wide variety of backgrounds. There were congressmc.-n, senators, top officials of several governmental agericies, and a numhcr of prominent scientists. Sir William Penney, a British explosives 

expert who had been involved with the bomb project at Los Alamos durinK the war, stood next to me and commented about the comfortable 

quarters to which we had been assigned. "I must say," he said with typit·al Rritish humor, "if one mu1tt join the Navy, there arc advantages in belllK an admiral." The contrast in the various types of chitchat during that 

last nervous hour was remarkable. There were more than a few observers 

who expressed the hope that, for some reason, the thermonuclear reaction would fail. It would be a better world without thermonuclear weapc111s. Others were betting on the yield of the explosion. One prominent 

physici!it was particularly somber: he had told me the night before that he 

rnulJ not fully rule out the possibility that the thermonudear rea..:tion 

might "ignite the atmosphere." There was a good deal of the normal gallows humor in which men indulge at tense moments. 

Thr explosion was unexpectedly awesome. First we saw the fireball, 

perhaps one mile in diameter, through the dark glasses we were required 

10 wear, and at first it didn't look very different from much smaller nudear c.-xplosions I had seen because we were witnessing the event from a 

,ltMance of thirty miles, whereas the small bombs, sometimes only one 

onc-rlumsandth the size of MIKE, were seen from much smaller dis1.1nn·,. It wa~n•t until we were permitted to remove our dark glasses that 

we ;1pprcciateJ the full magnitude of the event. /\s the fireball cooled on 

11, w,1)· up to the siratosphcre (1 larcr ll·amcd that ir rc,ll'hc.-d an alrirude of 
84 

A.f. . C.: STUl>IF.S OF RAl>IOACTIVE FAI.LOUT 75 

twenty-six miles), it entrained enormous quantities of water vapor that 

condensed in progressive stages to produce a great invcrted ziggurat with 

sharply Jdirwd stl·ps as it punched its way through successive inversion 

layers of the .ttmospherc. As in the last minutes before the explosion, 

there were marked differences in the behavior of the observers. Most, like 

myself, were dumbstruck, but many cheered. I couldn't understand how 

they could cheer the fact that we had witnessed the beginning of an era 

when wars might be fought with bombs having as much as a thousand 

timi.-s the destructive power of those that destroyed the two Japanese dtil'S in World W.1r II, only ,I few yr.1rli lwfon•, 

TIil' plan l·alll·d for me to he in thl' first plane b,u.:k to Kwajalcin, Ml 

that we rnuld begin our surveillanc.:e of the islands. One hour afo:r the 

detonation, when the head of the mushroom cloud had expanded to a diameter of about sixty miles, and was drifting to the west at twenty miles 

per hour, I left the fates by helicopter for the aircraft carrier Remlover. 

There I boarded a plane with a forward cockpit for the pilot, and a rear 

sear for one passenger, but two of us, George Cowan, a chemist from Los 

Alamos, and myself were squeezed into it! We were catapulted from the 

carrier and spent the next two hours under such cramped conditions that 

thirty years later George insisted that his shoulder never fully recovered 

from the flight! For the first hour we had to fly around the enormous 

mushroom doud, but the dosimeter I was carrying recorded very little rndiation from it. 

When we arrived at Kwajalein, the naval officers assigned to that island were standing at attention on the tarmac awaiting us. This was in 

part a matter of protocol, but it was also because they were eager to hear 

about the results of the test. We could tell them very little except that it 

was :1pparently successful, hut this they already knew since they had Sl'Cn 

the flash of the fireball nearly two hundred miles away. 

Our plan called for the sweeps over the islands to begin on the first day 

after the test and to continue for four days. On the morning after my arrival, Cassidy and I left Kwajalein in two PBMs. sturdy long-range Navy 

flying boars. We were each to sweep about a thousand miles of ocean 

over which the cloud should have already passed. When we departed at 

5 :JO A.M., the radiation hackground at Kwajalein was about ten rimes its 

normal level, indicating that part of the cloud had passed our way. During that first day I made measurements over fifteen exquisite atolls with 

Polynesian names lih Tillmgi, Utirik, Wotho, and Bikini. The weather 

was Vl"ry hiHI, and there was no way to :tvoid frequent squalls that inter-
85 

7ft A. f .C: SfUl>IF!o Of RAl>IOA<:TIVF fAI.I.OllT 

frrt•J with our •;isihility anJ maJe the flight UIKOlllfnrtahlt•. from time to 

111111..· we woulJ fly through a piece of the doud anJ partides of rnJioacm·e Just would impact on the leading surfaces of the aircraft, which 

woulJ increase the radiation hackground within the aircraft. We found 

1h.11 rhe particles would wash away when we flew through a squall. I 

lounJ only minor levtls of radiation on the arolls despite the fact that l 

haJ ..:hosen rhe sccror which I rhought would receive the heaviesr fallout. 

I thought that perhaps I had been wrong to believe that heavy fallout 

wnulJ occur. I did detect elevated radiarion levels on a few atolls, but the 

lughest level at the surface was only o.6 mr/hr, which is much lower than 

we haJ seen in many parts of Utah and Nevada after tests near Las Ve-

~·'"· 

Wl· realiied rhat rhe islands were so far apart that significant fallout 

nu~lu miss them, and this was what haJ happened. As a matter of fact, 

tlwre were a number of times on that flight when my instrument reading 

ht·~.111 to Jrift upscale. I inrcrpreteJ these readings as the result of ini.r.,hilities in the instrumt>nt, which was only rfet·ntly off the drawing 

ho,uJ. The instrument was in fact behaving properly and was recording 

radiation from fallout in the water. It had not occurred to me that the raJioa'-"tive materials would remain near the surface long enough to he derc:ctahle, even with the effect of shielding by the water. 

< >n November 6, after four days of essentially negative results, I flew to 

<;11,1111 in the wes1ern P,u:ific to join john lfarky, who had hrcn monitorlllJt rht· i!>l.tnJs of tht· Mariana and Caroline groups. Tht· final sweep ol 

our program was a flight from (juam to Tokyo in which we tlcw low 

cl\'cr many volcanic islands, including lwo .lima, on which one of the 

hl'rcest baules of World War II haJ been fought. 

We ended our surveys of the Pacific islands without finding significant 

amounts of fallout. CINCPAC was delighted with the negative results. 

However, there would be other multimegaton tests in the future, and I 

was of the opinion that the good fortune and careful meteorological control that had resulted in minimal fallout following M1KF. might not always be the case. Improved monitoring methods were needed to obtain 

1ht.' knowll'dge we necJcJ to better understanJ the dangers of fallout. 

Ii-pent much of 195 \ at conferences on the subject of weapons fallout, 

.md how to Jo a bener joh of documenting the phenomenon. ln the 

spring of that year, during the tests called lll'SltOT-KNOTHOI.E in 

Nl•,•;1Ja, there was another occurrence similar to the Rochester fallout 

J11nn1t R.\NGFR. This time it was centered on Troy, New York, where it 
86 

A.I'.<:.: SHll>IF.S <H RAl>IOACTIVI-: l' AI.LOUT 77 

was dl·teal·d by l>r. Herbert Clark, John Harley's former nwntor a1 

llcnsselaer. The fallout was associated with heavy thunderstorm ,Ktivity 

in the area and resulted in ambient gamma radiation levels of about one 

mr/hr. Unlike the Rochester incident, the fallout at Troy received .mention from public officials, but in telephone conversations with the commissionl"r of health of New York St,Ut' I found no Sl'IISC of alarm, hut 

only an interest in obtaining information. Professor Clark estim,ued that 

the gamma exposure to the residents from the deposited radionudides 

was about 100 milliroentgen, which is about the dose received from nat• 

ural sources in one year. John Harley and I flew up to define the extent of 

the fallout with our scintillometers but were turned back by heavy thunderstorms in the area. It wasn't until May 4, six days after the i11itial 

report, that the weather cleared sufficiently to allow a flight. Harley 

found that the city of Albany had accumulated even more fallout than 

Troy, and the ground level radiation levels averaged about 0.4 mr/hr. despite the fact that hy this time much of the radioactive deposit must have 

hec:n washed aw,,y by the heavy rnins. 

Tiu· fallout i1H:idcnts were beginning to attract considerable media attention, especially in the southwestern states, where many scientists were 

becoming concerned about the levels of exposure being received by the 

general public, The photographic industry was also increasingly concerned and in late May the National Photographic Manufacturers Association st'.nt a formal protest to AEC about the problems created in their 

i11d11s1ry hy thl' a~:cdl'ratl·d testing sdll'Juk 

WEAr<lNS TESTING AND STRONTIUM 90 

In the spring of 1953 I learned about Project GABRIEL, which had been 

underway since 1949 in great secrecy, and had as its purpose the calculation of the numhcr of nuclear weapons that could be exploded in a nuclear war hefore the world would be so contaminated with fallout that 

long-lived effects of radiation would develop. It was then believed that 

there was a "threshold dose," below which no delayed effects of radiation woulJ occur. This is no longer believed to be true, at least so for as 

cancer and gl'nl'tic effects arc concerned, but until the late 1950s the concept of threshold dose prevailed. 

The last report of Project GABRIEL had been issued in 1951 and concluded that the critical radionuclide in fallout was Strontium 90 (Sr-90) 
87 

;K A . f . C. : STlll>IES Of RAl>IOACTIVf FAI. I.OUT 

wlud1 has prnperries similar to radium in that it deposits in the skeleton. 

lre1111 whKh it is diminatt'd \'l'ry slowly. The limit for "threshold lcthal11\··· was estimated at betwt'en forty thousand and forty million megatons 

ol 11~,mn equivalent. The great uncertainty implicit in the thousandfold 

rant:t' hl'tween the upper and lower limits was a reflection of the ignor.1nn· 1hat existed about the manner in which the dust from nuclear 

hnmh explosions was transponed in the atmosphere, the rates of surface 

dt·pn,ition, and the kinetics of Sr-90 uptake by plants, animals, and hu111.m,. Even the lower limit seemed huge in 1951, when there were very 

lc'w nudear weapons, but a desire to narrow the uncertainty in the 

< ,ARIUt-1 estimate began to develop in 19n because of the experiences 

with weapons testing, much of which had been doi:umented by the HASL 

rl'~t•an:h. 

Tht· n·sponsibility for reinvl'stigating the matter was given to the MAND 

( .orpnration, a "think tank" established by the Air Force after World 

\X';ir II. That organization assembled a group of ahoin fifty scientists at 

rheir headquaners in Santa Monica for a series of discussions of the mat1er in .luly 19SJ. 1 I attended and was pleased that most of the available 

d;1t;1 for the discussions came from the HASI. reports. The meeting was a 

rurning point in our understanding of the hazards of fallout because it 

was attended by many prominent scientists who recogni7.ed that far more 

information was required about the physical, chemical, and biological aspt·ds of weapons fallout. Out of the meeting came a new project codenamed SuNSHINF., after the excellent weather we c:njoyed while in Califorma. This was a most unfortunate selection that inadvertently g:we a 

mm:h more cheerful connotation than was appropriate for the somber 

maners with which the project was to deal. 

SllNSHINF. confirmed that Sr-90 was the critical radionuclide in fallout 

.anti recommended that specific measurements of this isotope should be 

emphasized in future studies. Willard F. Libby of the University of Chic.,~o (well known for his development of methods of archaeological dat• 

in~ by the use of carbon 14, for which he later received the Nobel Prize) 

anenJeJ the meeting and served as leader of many of the discussions. 

A satisfactory method for the measurement of Sr-90 in samples of soil, 

wa1er, or biological material did not yet exist, and Libby, who was a supc:rh raJiochemist, agreed to develop a procedure. Both he and J. Laurenn· Kulp, then at Columbia University, perfected procedures during the 

m"11I few weeks and opened the way to systematii: studies of the ecologi- ; 

i.:al hc:havior of Sr-90. It was agreed that since Sr-90 is similar to cakium 
88 

A.F..C.: STUDIES OF RAl>IOACTIVF. FAI. I.OUT 79 

in its chemical properties, and will tend to behave like it in soils and bio• 

logkal systems, that it would be convenient to report the results of analy· 

ses as micrornrics of Sr-90 per gram of calcium (f.l,Ci Sr-90/gm Ca). This 

ratio became known for a while as the Sunshine Unit, but was ch,111geJ 

after a while to the strontium unit (SU), which is still used co some t•xtent. 

Libby later was appointed an AEC commissioner and occupied an important, though often controversial, position as the senior government 

spokesman on the subject of the public-health implications of nuclear 

weapons testing in the atmosphere. 

During the 195.l conference the estimates of Project GABRIEi. were re· 

vised on the assumption that Sr-90 would contaminate the calcium pool 

of the biosphere, and that the dose to the world's population could be· 

calculated from knowledge of the behavior of that element. It was con· · 

duded that the limit of "safe" Sr-90 contamination would result from 

40,000 megatons of fission, which happened to be the lower limit of 

GABRIEi.. 

A big question that emerged from the RAND conference was the whereabouts of the debris from the MIKE explosion. Our worldwide network 

,11;coumctl for only a small fraction of that prodm:c:d, and our aerial sur· 

veys found very little fallout dose to the site. We know now that a substantial fraction was probably · deposited within a few hundred miles 

from Eniwetok, but was missed by us because it fell into the vast expanse 

of ocean between the Pacific islands. Could it be that a major fraction 

was injected into the stratosphere from which it would take many 

months or years to fall to the earth's surface? This was what we c.unc to 

believe, but how could the hypothesis be demonstrated? 

One way would be to send instruments into the stratosphere to sample 

its thin air for radioactive dust. I had long been interested in electrostatic 

methods of collecting dust samples, and had actually improvised such an 

air sampler in the kitchen of our first apartment in Philadelphia in 1939. 

On the return flight from Los Angeles I prepared a s,hematic diagram of 

a precipitator that could be lifted by balloon to an altitude of about 

100,000 feet, and upon my return I discussed his possibility with Le Vine. 

We knew that the next major series of tests would take place in the Pacific starting in March 1954, and that it would involve the explosion of 

many multimegaton devices. It would be useful to obtain dust samples 

from the s1rntosphcrc before the March tests (codc-namc:J CAsTa.t;) be· · 

gan, but that was only a little more than seven months off. The instrument was only a schematic diagram and it would have to be designed, 
89 

Ho A. I-.<:. : !dlllJll' S 01' ltAIJIOACTIVf l'Al. l.0111 

h111h, ;Uhl rci.teJ. It would be necessary to arrange for balloon flights, a 

1n hnology with which we had no experience. Could all of this he done in 

sl·n·n momhs? It didn't seem possible, but it Wils done, th.1nks ro hard 

work h>· the HASL staff and excellent cooperation from the U.S. Weather 

Uun·.111, which arranged for a series of twelve flights to about 100,000 

ln·r. Thl"st· were completed by late fall. Although too few samples were 

.-olle.-1,·J to permit an estimate of the amounr of Sr-90 in the strato-

~phen·, we JiJ demonstrate that the nuclide was present. I believe this 

w.,, till' fin,t time: duM samples were collcct,·d from that .iltitude but rhert· 

w.,, no 1111crelil hy otht•rs, ahhough we would havt· het·n l1.1p1,y to sha_n• 

our ,.unplc:s so that the characteristics of stratospheric Just could be 

stml,ctl. 

l

1

n·parations for monitoring the Pacific islands during the tests of 

1\1.ird, ''H4 took much of my time during this period, hut it was .,lso 

tll'l'l'".trY to decide the needs of the distant monitoring progr:un. The 

~umnu-J-film network by then extended around the world, and we were 

hqtmning to place occasional stainless steel pots at representative locarion~ !>O that we could collect total fallout for comparison with the data 

ohtainc-J from the films. As a result of the RAND conference, there began 

a worltlwide search for Sr-90 in all sorts of materials. Samples of rain 

w;Ut•r, soils, f(K>ds, ice cores from Greenland, vintage wines, and olJ 

d,n·ses were only some of the materials that were analy1.ed to obtain an 

unJerstanding of the rates of accumulation of Sr-90 in the ei:osystems of 

1hc world. We quickly came to the conclusion that, because of its similar- · 

tty ro c:aldum, Sr-90 was present in minute hut detectable quantities in all 

forrm of lite. 

In the: fall of 195 \ there was littlt' informa1ion to guiJc us in the Jcsi~n 

of our sampling programs. An important suggestion was maJe by D. Lyle 

Alexander of tht' U.S. Department of Agriculture who noted that the 

amount of Sr-90 in tht' milk produced in an area should he inversely proportional to the amount of soil calcium available to the grass consumed 

ht· the Jairy cows. On the basis of his suggestion, we established a milks,unpling nt'twork that includt'J plact's in which tht' soil cakium spanned 

the known levels in the U.S. 

Alexander and I were at an agricultural ficlJ station at Logan, Utah 

.uul ,te'-·iJt'd ro take advantage of the fact that some sheep were being 

wnfin,·J to a pasture where we could collect samples of soil, manure, 

11111k. ,1mf hone. Analysis of the samples for strontium 90 would add to 

our knowledgt' of the processes hy which the radionuclide passes from 
90 

i\ . l'. 1 . : \1111111' ~ 111: IUl1tt1,\I. IIVI'. l' All.11111 H1 

the soil to man. We were crawling around the pasture making our collections of grass and manure when he turned to me and asked, "Merril, is 

what we are doing in your job description?" We were both high up in the 

civil service system, and I am certain that he was right in his implication 

that the bureaucrats would have demoted us on the spot if they could 

have seen us collecting bags of grass and sheep droppings! 

The procedure for measuring Sr-90 in minute amounts is very tedious. 

Although originally developed by Libby at the University of Chicago and 

Kulp at < :olumbia, Harley and his associates at HASI. deserve much of 

alll· al',lil for 1wrf,·c1i11,c thl' ml.'thml, ,lcvdoping a sysll.'111 of ,,u.11i1y \ ·1111 -

trol, and adapting the method to the routine measurements of thousands 

of samples. 

rRf PA RATIONS FOR CASTLE 

In the foll of 1953 I returned to Pearl Harbor to discuss our participation 

in CASTI.F., which was scheduled to start on March 1 with a multimegaton explosion from a barge anchored on the reef of what I erroneously thought was to be Eniwetok atoll but actually turned out to be 

Bikini. I was rece.ived warmly by the CINCPAC staff, who I knew were 

very pleased with our surveys during IVY, in the fall of 1952.. We had 

obviously developed a symbiotic relationship with CINCPAC, even 

though our interests and objectives were very different. CINCPAC had 

the practical need of assuring that the inhabitants of the Pacific islands 

were not affected by the fallout. The HASL objective was to obtain information about fallout because we believed that its effects were being 

underestimated by both the Department of Defense and the AEC. 

The HASL plan was to use the same general methods developed for 

Ivy, except that our ground instrumentation had been improved and 

would be located on islands on which military weather stations would be 

maintained during the exercises. These units would be equipped with 

continuous gamma radiation recorders. The military personnel would 

monitor the units and report the readings to the HASL coordinator 

aboard the fates, the flagship for the task force Je11ignated JTF-7, again 

under the command of General Clarkson. The ground-level measurements would assist us in the deployment of the aerial sweeps. 

The HASL calculations, based on extrapolations from the fallout ·encountercJ following the two .IANGI.F. explosions in November 1951, had 
91 

H.t A . F,C..; STUDIES Of RAl>IOACTIVE FALLOUT 

111J,~·.11eJ that dangerously h.igh levds of fallout could occur on atolls as 

l;ir .iway as a hundred miles following the large explosions contemplated 

lor the CASTLE series. I discussed with the CINCPAC staff the need to 

11ro\·1,le an evacuation capability for the atolls closest to the explosions, 

hur I ha,I not seen the plans for CASTI.E and was under the erroneous im1m·.,sion that rhe tests were to take place at Eniwerok again, as was the 

c1se Ju ring lvv. This is another example of the problems created by scue,:y. I had been sent a list of the contemplated detonations, their exp,·cted )'ields, and the approximate times, but was not given their location-.. That was in another documem which I didn't know existed and 

tlut\ ,liJ not ask for. One result of this confusion was that at the time of 

lhl' conferences with CINCPAC, seven months before the start of 

LA'>'II t, I thought the nearest atoll to the blasts would be lljclang hecauw ir was the closest to Eniwetok, and I made a recommendation that 

JIT-7 provide the capability to evacuate the natives of that atoll in the 

nent conditions so warranted. This recommendation was supported hy 

UNCPAC.:, hut the staff of JTF-7 decided that such an evacuation capability would not be needed because the tests would not be conducted if 

there was any possibility of fallout on the atolls. 

At HASL we were faced with the dilemma that if CASTLE was conJuned properly, and the meteorological predictions were valid, the fallou1 would lanJ mainly in the ocean, as apparently happened during lvv. 

Tim; would be a very desirable result from the standpoint of the natives 

of ,he i'ilands, but would not give us the inform,uion we needed to Jcmom,tra1e the danger of fallout in wartime. We conceiveJ the iJea of laying 

ml slicks downwind of the explosions, so that particles that fell on them 

miRht be retained long enough to permit them to be measured from the 

air. This would make it possible to fly over the slicks with our scintillometers anJ measure the amount of fallout. Experiments designed to test the 

feasibility of this methoJ were conducted off the New Jersey coast in January 19S4, but the ocean was so rough that coherent oil slicks could not 

he maintained long enough to obtain useful information. We decided to 

con1inue the tests in rhe calmer waters of the Pacific. John Harley, who 

was already in Hawaii, made plans to obtain the required oil, which 

would he dropped from low-flying aircraft. We even experimented with 

methoJs of dropping the oil. Plastic bags that would rupture on contact? 

< )11 drums that would be dropped and be riddled with bullets? These and 

other: '>chemes were discussed and some of them tried. In the end we de-
92 

A.E.C.: STUDIES OF RADIOACTIVE FAI.I.OUT 83 

cided that the method simply was not feasible because we couldn't lay an 

oil slick that would hold fallout particles for more than one hour. 

Regrettably or fortunately, depending on the point of view, it proved 

unnecessary to lay the oil slicks because massive fallout occurred on severa I atolls about seven hours after BRAVO, the first detonation of the 

CAsTI.F. series, which was exploded near J,twn on March 1. 

The preparations for BRAVO were similar to those for MIKE, except 

that Breslin was assigned to the Estes, which permitted me to remain in 

the laboratory in New York to supervise the oil slick experiments which 

· we planned to continue as long as possible in the hope that it would be 

possible to use the technique sometime during CASTLE. In addition, automatic monitoring instruments were placed on certain atolls in the: care of 

military personnel. About seven hours post-shot, Breslin received a message from the Air Weather Station on the atoll of Rongrik, about a hundred miles east of the explosion, informing him that our gamma radiation detedion instrument had gone off scale, i.e. the radiation level 

exceeded 100 mr/hr. He immediately forwarded the information to me 

and attempted to confirm the Rongrik report with surveillance flights by 

our aircraft based on Kwajalein. However, for reasons that have never 

been explained, the Task Force prevented Breslin from using the radio 

transmission facilities aboard the Estes for about thirty hours; The operating procedures developed by HASL and approved by JTF-7 called for 

immediate aerial confirmation but Breslin's hands were: tied for many 

crucial hours after his telegram to me:. 

At about thirty hours post-shot, the twenty-eight weather station personnel were evacuated by air, but by that time they had accumulated a 

dose of 78 rem, which is barely below the dose at which the acute effects 

of radiation would be experienced. More serious was the fact that when 

the surveillance aircraft flew over other nearby atolls it found that the 

atoll of Rongelap, about forty miles west of Rongrik, had rc:ceivc:d even 

greater fallout. Nearby Utirik and Ailinginae had also received heavy fallout. A decision was made to evacuate the Marshallese natives from the 

three atolls, and a total of 258 persons were removed by ship, but not until more than fifty hours after the fallout occurred. 

When a medical team was sent to examine and treat the evacuated natives, they concluded that the Rongelaps had received whole body doses 

of about 175 rem, with much higher doses to their thyroids due to the radioactive iodine to which they had been exposed. Some of the Rongelaps 
93 

H,t A.t: . L : STllllll'S OF RAUIOAC:rlVf. l' Al.1.011'1' 

h:1n· d,•vdopeJ thyroiJ ahnormalities, including cancer, as a result of 

tlwir ,·xposure. If the HASL instrument haJ not been in place, then: 

woultl have heen no way of knowing that the fallout haJ occurreJ, and 

1he doses received hy the natives would have heen very much hiKher. On 

1h,· other hanJ, had the HASL procedures been followed, the natives 

~·ould have been evacuated sooner, and the doses received would have 

hr,·n \'ery mm·h le!is. 

The circumstances surrounding the BRAVO fallout have hccn shrouJeJ 

in mysrery for more than thirty-five years. PublisheJ references to the 

im·iJent frequently refer to it as an "accident" that resulted from an 

unexpected shift in wind direction. But was the shift greater than normally allowed by the margin of safety provided? Did the forecast properly interpret che available meteorological information? Why was a gag 

pl.1n·,I on Breslin? Why weren'c the confirmatory flights made as re-

,,uircd hy the written procedures and dictated by common sense? Why 

w,1,; rlu:re never a formal inquiry of the episode? 

lttF I.IICl'Y l>RAGON INCIOfN'f 

Unknown to anyone until the fishing vessel returned to its home port of 

Yaim in Japan on March 14, the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands and 

th<' 1wenty-eiKht servicemen on Rongrik were not the only ones affected 

hy the BRAVO fallout. At the time of the explosion, the F,~kury11 Mam (I,,. k)• l>ragon) No. f. a 100-ton tuna fishin~ ho.u with a new of 

twenty-three, was about eighty miles east of Bikini when the crew saw a 

hright tlash and realized that they had witnessed a nuclear explosion. 

Th,·y immediately sailed away from Bikini. but after four hours encounrrr<'J a fallout of white particles so large as to be individually visible. The 

fishermen later reported that hy the time the fallout stopped, the ship appeared to have been coated hy a thin layer of snow. 

The U.S. had declared the area around Bikini a restricted zone, which 

wa!i known to the fishermen. The evidence indicates that they were just 

outside the specified boundary at the time of the explosion and were ner• 

vous ahout ~in~ apprehended by the U.S. authorities because the sa.me 

urw had ~en found poaching in Indonesian waters one year earlier and 

had spent somt" time in jail as a result. It was apparently for this reason 

that the crew madt' no mention hy radio of the fact that they became sick, 

79-784 0-94-4 
94 

A.f. .(:.: Sl'Ul>IU OF RAUIOACTIVf. fAI.I.OUl' II~ 

stilrtin~ a few days after the fallout. By the time they reached their home 

port 14 days later, all the crew were seriously ill. 

I learned about the Fukuryu Maru the same way most people did, from 

Japanese news reports that a fishing boat had returned to its home port 

of Yaizu (south of Tokyo) with rwenty-three crew members suffering 

from radiation sickness. The story did not seem credible to me at first because I was familiar with the extensive rrecautionary swecrs made over 

the area in advance of a test. I had in fact tlown on one such ~arch ilnd 

was impressed with what I thought was the thoroughness of the prm:cdure. Nevertheless, Bugher contacted John Morton, newly appointed 

director of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Hiroshima, and 

asked him to obtain whatever information was available. I knew also 

that John Harley was in Japan, and attempted to alert him to the fact that 

he might be needed but he had already departed for home. 

It took very little time for Morton to confirm from his Japanese colleagues that the men were suffering from radiation sickness, and that the 

boat was highly radioactive as was its cargo of tuna fish, which had been 

disposed of by burial. On the morning of March 19, Bugher and I participated in a conference call from Morton who said a consultant was badly 

needed to advise the U.S. embassy as well as the Japanese on the radiological aspects of the matter. It .was decided that I should proceed to 

Tokyo immediately. 

That call came at a particularly awkward time. I was attending an important meeting of the NYOO staff at which it had just been announced 

that the office would be reorganized and that Burke fry, manager ot the 

NYOO, was to retire. Alphonso Tammaro, the Assistant General Manager for Research and Development on the Washington staff, was present 

at the meeting, and when it became apparent that I had to leave, he and 

Fry drew me aside to inform me that I had been selected as the new Manager of Operations. That came as a total surprise. I responded that while 

I was flattered to be asked to assume greater responsibility, I thought it 

important that I remain as head of HASL, at least for a while. They suggested that I could fill both positions if I wished to do so. I agreed, 

quickly took off, and didn't have a chance to think about the matter in 

the weeks ahead. That was one of the major decisions in my life, but they 

proposed and I accepted in no more than five minutes! 

In an organization like the U.S. government it is amazing how fast 

things can move when an emergency arises. For security reasons; the 
95 

H1, i\.f.L: '-Tlll>lfS 01' Ri\11101\(;TIVf l'i\1.1.IIIJT 

passports of all AEC employees in those days were kept in the Washingrun headquarters, and preparation for foreign travel normally required 

aho111 CUil" month ,lurinK whil·h tht rravd application form crept from 

111w desk to the next rnllcl·ting authori1.ing siKnatures. The call from 

Morton came at 11: 30 A.M., at the conclusion ot which it was decided 

1har I should proceed to Washington for a conference at AEC headquar1,·r, hdorc leaving for .lapan. It took me a few hours to collect the instruments and reference material I knew I would be needing, and I left on the 

four r.M. plane from La Guardia where Irma, my mother, and our three 

hoys were waiting for me with the bags she had packed. When I arrived 

in Bugher's office, he had my passport, my authorization for travel to Jap.111, my tickers, and an ample travel advance. We discussed the important implications of what had happened in the Pacific, and he told me 

1ha1 .,llour one million pounds of tuna were suspected of heing contaminatt·d. This added a new dimension to an already complicated situation. 

A llighr to Tokyo from the East Coast now takes about fourteen hours, 

and can be nonstop. In 1954, it took twelve hours to reach the West 

Coast, about ten more to Honolulu, another six or eight hours to Wake 

Island, and a final ten-hour leg to Tokyo. Forty hours total, with an additional three or four hours consumed at the stopovers. But travel was 

mm:h more rnmfortablc, and the planes even haJ sk·eping berths for 

those that wanted them. We reached Honolulu at 5:JO A.M. and only 

then did I find that the Lucky Dragon affair had blossomed into a full 

hlown international incident. I was mer at the airport by Commander 

Deller, who was on the CINCPAC staff and was my liaison with .ITF-7. 

He briefed me on the latest developments in the Marshalls. A medical 

team from the U.S. had arrived there and were keeping the evacuated natives under observation. Rumors about the evacuation had reached the 

imernational press, abetted of course, by the sensational stories from 

Japan. The problem was exacerbated, so far as I was concerned, hy the 

:mnounct"ment of a small pharmaceutical company that they were sendmg a drug to Japan that wou1d help the fishermen. The medicine was no 

more 1han a common over-the-counter skin hum lotion, hut Bugher, who 

of ,:nurse knew nothing about the shipment, had cabled prominent memhcrs of the Japanese medical profession that I was on my way to Japan to 

assist them, and when they learned of the announcement of the publicity· 

,t·eking pharmaceutical company, it was assumt>d that I had some mir-

.1dt· dru,t wi1h me. As I lrft Honolulu, I was surprised to read about this 

111 1lu- I 111110/11/11 f'imc•s, .uul it ,listnrhl·d 111,· mon· th.in a li111l-. 
96 

A.l: . l:.: !>TUl>ll'.S 01' HAUIOA(:TIVI'. tALltllJT K7 

I reached Tokyo at 10:30 P.M. totally unprepared for the reception I 

received. After the plane had rolled to a stop, one of the stewardes!les 

tappl·d me on the shoulder and intrmluced me to an ofticer of the ll.S. 

Military Police, who was my escort for the next. il-w minutes. I k askl·d 

for my passport and baggage checks, and told me that there were representatives from the press waiting for me, but that I should make no statements. Because I had been sitting on the opposite side of the plane, I was 

not aware of the large number of reponers and photographers waiting 

for the plane and, had I seen them, I would have assumed they were waiting for another passenger. There were about thirty of them, behind a barricade at the edge of the apron. They were dose enough to take pictures, 

whkh appeared in the newspapers the next morning, but except for the 

few seconds it took for me to descend from the plane, they saw no more 

of me that evening. An embassy sedan was at the bottom of the ramp and 

I stepped into the rear seat where I found William Leonhan, who introduced himself as First Secretary of the ll.S. embassy. Without waiting for 

my baggage, the car took off for the Sanno Hotel, at which I had stayed 

during previous visits. It had been taken over by the United States Army 

during the occupation of Japan to billet officers in transit. 

En route, Leonhart briefed me efficiently about the state of things. The 

Japanese people were angry abour the fallour on the I.uclty Drago11. They 

were the only people ever to have been hurt by atomic bombs, lirst during the war, and now again. The Japanese scientists were making sensational statements to the media. The formal peace treaty between the U.S. 

and Japan had only recently been signed, and this was the first postwar 

crisis in the relations between the two countries. The bottom had 

dropped out of the tuna market. No one in Japan fully understood the 

technical implications of the event, and I should expect to spend considerable time providing information to both the Japanese and the Americans. 

After a restless night I had a breakfast conference with John Morton, 

who was also staying at the Sanno. He was in a very difficult position. 

His entire career had been spent as a surgeon on the staff of the University of Rochester Medical School, from which he had recendy retired ali 

chairman of the Department of Surgery. He knew nothing about radiation medicine, but was invited to come to Japan because he had developed a good reputation as a scientific administrator. He was in Of> position to answer the kinds of questions that were being asked. How. should 

thl· doses to the fishcnm·n he cakul.ucd? What r,ulirnu:tivc: 1mhs1;11h.:cs 
-7 I 

88 A.l.C,: STUDIES Of RAl>IOACTIVF. FALLOUT 

were in the fallout? What was the allowable level of contamination in 

tuna fish? How is radiation illness treated? . 

After breakfast we began a round of conferences and visitations that 

continued for three weeks. I spent the first hour reading the cables that 

had bttn going back and fonh between Tokyo and Washington, from 

which I could sense the deterioration in the relationship between the two 

countries during the few days in which Japanese scientists, newspaper 

writers. and some officials had vented their fears and hatreds against the 

U.S. and its military forces in Japan. These troops had been an army of 

,Kcupation from 194s until the formal peace agreement was signed in 

19s~. but the U.S. still maintained a large military cstahlishmcnt in Ja• 

pan. This was the first serious interruption in the otherwise smooth relationship that had existed between the two countries since the end of 

World War II. It was suggested by some Americans that the fishermen 

were spying on the U.S. bomb tests. Could this have been so? In the end 

there was no evidence to support the allegation. Were the fishermen as 

su:k as daimcd by some of the Japanei.e physidans? They were indeed 

sick and getting sicker by the Jay. Could the U.S. provide medical assistance? Very little. After all, the Japanese had been through the atomic 

hombings of two cities only nine years before, and many of the physilians involved in treatment of the survivors were now treating the fisherman. 

However, the Japanese had no understanding of the biophysics of 

radioactive contamination, and they needed and wanted assistance in 

that area and welcomed any help I could give them. Immediately after my 

arrival, the Japanese scientists expressed a desire to meet with me. Unfortunately, there was a considerable amount of rivalry between different 

groups of scientists. The staff at Tokyo University was at odds with the . 

group at rhe National Institute of Health, and the local physicians in 

Yaizu were unhappy because some of the fishermen had been transferred 

to a hospital in Tokyo. The Japanese government had appointed an offi. 

cial committee to investigate the incident and recommend the steps that 

should be taken. The ambassador was advised that all communications 

of a scientific nature between the U.S. and Japanese should be through 

that committee, which was chaired by Dr. Rokuzo Kobayashi, Director 

of the Japanese National Institute of Health. I met with his committee on 

March 1.4, accompanied by Morton, and representatives of the Far East 

Command and the embassy. It was a difficult conference because very 

few Japanese scientists spoke English and the interpreters from the diplo-
98 

A,E.C.: STUDIES OF RAl>IOACTIVF. FALLOUT 89 

matic offices were not familiar with many of the scientific terms being 

used. 

It was at that meeting that I had my first e"'ample--of tfie misunderstandings that can arise from subtle errors in translation. Dr. Masco 

Tsuzuki. a physician wnohad been barred from his position as professor 

of surgery by General MacArthur because he had held the rank of rear 

admiral in the Imperial Navy (i.e., he had been "purged" in the vernacular of the times), was in Yaizu on the day of our meeting, but left word 

with one of the committee members that he would return to his home by 

eleven o'clock that evening and that it was urgent that I call on him. That 

seemed a stranKe time for a visit, but since the message was transmitted 

hy a mernher of the Japanese forci~n Office. arrangements were matfe 

for an embassy car to pick me up at the Sanno in time for our meeting in 

his home. When we arrived the house was dark, but our knock on the 

door wakened Tsuzuki. who received us in his kimono. It turned out that 

he did want to speak to me, and had left a message that I should call him 

,It the designated time, not call 011 him. Fortunatdy he lipokc: enough En· 

glish to understand the humor of the situation and we sat for more than 

one hour getting acquainted. That private conversation early in my visit 

was very fortunate because Tsuzuki became very relaxed as we sipped 

warm saki. l ~eveloped an understanding of him that was to prove useful 

in the difficult days ahead, and would lead to a dose friendship that 

lasted until his Jeath in 1961. 

Tsuzuki had heen one of the most controversial of the Japanese scientists and had not shown a willingness to accept the assistance of the 

ABCC staff, represented by the director, John Morton. Tsuzuki was surprisingly frank in telling me of his resentment because the U.S. occupation forces had confiscated a report he had written following his survey 

of the effects of the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He had led the 

team of Japanese physicians that entered the two cities to provide medical assistance, but he was never allowed to publish his report. I was familiar with that report, which actually had been translated into English 

and published, under his authorship, as an appendix to a report issued, 

but not widely circulated, by the U.S. National Research Council. It was 

true that 'lsuzuki's report, which was a classic, JiJ not receive the recognition that it deserved. 

During that hour-long conversation, lsuzuki also discussed his unhappiness about the fact that he had been placed on MacArthur's list of f<>rmer officers that were purged from their civilian positions. I reasoned 
99 

90 A.E.C.: STUl>IF.S OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 

ilut in the afterm.uh of a long and cruel war there were hound to he inequiri<·,, h111 I knew that he was respected as a medical scientist in the U.S. 

;111d promised that I would look into his status. (This I did, and with such 

,11.:n.·ss that he was invited to the U.S. by the State Department a few 

months later.) In addition I assured him that he would be free to publish 

his ,1udics of the injured fisherman, and that my position was that of a 

l l.S. s'-·iemist and government official who was there to advise my govt•rnment about the circumstances of the accident and assist the Japanese 

""·icntists in any way possible. 

following the long day of conferences, first with the committee and 

then with Tsuzuki, it was dear to me that there were a number of separ .ur but interrelated problems to be addressed: 

1. The clinical management of the twenty-three tishemwn: In my opinion there was little help to be offered. The ll.S. had no methods of 

treating acute radiation sickness that were not already known to the 

Japanese physicians. 

2.. The dose received by the fishermen: This included that delivered by 

external radiation because they lived for fourteen days on a ship covered with radioactive dust, and by internal radiation because the fallout particles were inhaled or ingested. 

l • The concerns of the Japanese that the Pacific tuna would be contaminated. 

8y 1he rime of my arrival, the Japanese physicists had already estimated the external radiation dose using crude instruments th.11 were nevertheless quite rdiable in their expert hands. However, they did not know 

how to estimate the dose delivered by radionuclides deposited in the bodies of the fishermen. In 1954, even the radioactive species present in 

bomb fallout were secret, but by the time I arrived, Japanese radiochemi!>ts had made progress in analyzing particles of fallout collected from the 

l.11dty Dragon. However, their results were purely qualitative, and they 

were unable to separate nudides that had similar chemical properties. 

They were fortunate to have the assistance of Professor Kenjiro Kimura, 

an internationally respected radiochemist who had attracted attention after the bombings by concluding, correctly, that the Nagasaki bomb utili1ed plutonium because he had found traces of that element in samples 

ot soil collected from an area in which rainout had occurred. lk had also 

Jisl·overed previously that he could produce U-2. 3 7 in the laboratory by 
100 

A.F..C.: STUl>IES OF RADIOACTIVE FAl.LOUT 91 

bombardment of U-2.38 with fast neutrons. In my first meeting with him 

he told me he had found U-2.37 in the "Bikini ashes" from which he conduded that the March I explosion involved the fission of U-2.38, which 

was still a secret known by only a few scientists back home. 

In response to my cable to him, Harley advised that the isotopic content of the bomb debris would be similar to the tables of fission prmlucts 

that had been published in the open literature, from which the Japanese 

scientists condudcd that Sr-90 was the isotope that would be of grc.ucst 

danger to the fishermen. 

I had requested samples of urine from the fishermen with the understanding that I would send them to Harley for analyses at HASL. The 

amounts of the various nuclides in the urine would give us a clue as to the· 

,,u,mtities that were deposited in their bodies. On the basis of the results · 

n·ccivcd from the laboratory I advised the committee that the amount of 

radioactivity deposited in the bodies of the fishermen was insignificant in 

relation to the dose received externally.4 This came as a big surprise to me 

because the men had lived for fourteen days in an environment contaminated with radioactivity to an unprecedented extent. In fact, the analytical results were so unexpected that I initially wondered about their validity but any doubts were dispelled a few months later when one of the 

fishermen died· of scrum hepatitis and his tissues were analyzed for the 

major radionuclides by Professor Kimura. He confirmed our findings: 

only insignificant amounts of radioactivity were found in the body of the 

deceased fisherman. 

Shortly after my arrival in Japan, General Hull, who had replaced 

Douglas McArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the 

Pacific, asked to meet me and some of his staff at their headquarters in 

the Dai khi building. By the time of our conference, the true importance 

of the BRAVO fallout seemed obvious to me: Thermonuclear weapons 

had the ability to contaminate tens of thousands of square miles with lethal amounts of radioactivity. This was what we at HASL had suspected 

but now we had the proof. 

In my briefing of Hull I made it clear that I was in· no position to discuss the full military and political implications of the Bikini fallout, but it 

was quite obvious that thermonuclear weapons were far more destructive 

than had been anticipated by the military planners with whom I had been 

discussing this possibility for the past two years. Hull didn't purs~e this 

point, which was understandable, considering my position. However, he 

did ask repeatedly about the security implications of the fallout residues 
101 

9.1 A.E.C.: STUDIES OF RADIOACTIVE FALi.OUT 

pre'if'nt on the ship. He was aware that a radiochemical analysis of the 

p;1r1ides of fallout could reveal classified information ahout the design of 

1ht· lhuvo device. If it was in thr U.S. inrcrc11r to Jo 5o, he: wns prt•p.trc:d 

111 st·11c the fishing boat. I was surpriseJ to hear him speak so strongly 

aho111 the securiry aspect because it was obvious that most of the fallout 

haJ already been removed from the boat. Much of the material had untlouhredly been passed to innumerable scientists throughout Japan and 

pos\ihly elsewhere. As a matter of fact, I had in my pocket a vial of fallout ,,.,rridrs chat haJ hcen Kivcn to me by on\' of the .lapam:st' !IA.'.it•ntists 

1hat Vl'ry morning. I told Hull that 1he people who were in the hcst posi- . 

rion tu advise on the security implications were at that very time with 

JU:-7 at Eniwe1ok, and that I would consult with them as to whether any 

a'-1ion was required to secure whatever fallout particles remained on the 

hoat. I sent a radiogram to General Clarkson asking for the opinion of 

the Task Force intelligence personnel, and when he replied promptly that 

che boat was of no interest, the matter was put to rest. 

During the first week of my visit, much of the time of the embassy 

staff, as well as Monon and myself, was spent negotiating with the committtt to gel permission for American physicians to examine the fishermen. The Japanese scientists were reporting daily on their medical status. 

The \:onJition of the men was said to be deteriorating: they had lost their 

hair, had developed skin ulcers from burns caused by the beta particles 

emitted from the fallout that deposited on their skin and, more ominously, their white blood counts were continuing to decline. The interest 

of th«- ABCC in having contact with the cases was understandable. ABCC 

wH rr!iponsiMe for one of the largest medical follow-up stuJic:s in history, which was concerned with the delayed effrcts of exposure to radiation. 1M twenty-three Japanese fishermen were the largest group of 

~rsons suffering from the immediate effects of radiation since the bombings of World War II. In the United States, physicians who were interested in developing methods of treating acute radiation · injury wanted to 

collaborate with the Japanese physicians. But the Japanese were adamant 

that they wanted no help in dealing with the patients, although they did 

welcome any assistance I could provide that would help them to understand the physical and radiochemical problems they were facing. 

I was anxious to visit the Lucky Dragon, and the committee not only 

arran,ced for this, but sugge!ited that while we were in Yaizu we should 

pay a courtesy call on the twenty-one fishermen who wcrr hospitalized 
102 

A.E.C.: STUDIES OF RADIOACTIVE FAI.LOUT 93 

there. On March 16, Morton, Dr. Lewis, who was an ABCC hematologist, and I, accompanied by several Japanese physicians and physicists, 

flew to Yaizu, ninety minutes southwest of Tokyo, in a C-4 7 provided hy 

the ll.S. Air force. 

When we arrived, we were welcomed impassively by the school children of Yaizu, who were lined up along the short airstrip. We proceeded 

to the hospital followed by a few carloads of reporters who had also met 

us at the field. The visit to the patients was only a courtesy call; they were 

cvillcntly Klad to see us. They were rcstinK on mats, surrounded by their 

fomilies who, in the Japanese custom, were prcp,uing looJ for tlu-111 011 

hibachis within the room. The reporters were not allowed into the hospital, but since the windows were at ground level and wide open, the photographers had no trouble taking all the photographs they needed. I had 

broken the Geiger-Mueller tube of one of the two radiation detectors I 

had brought with me, but with the remaining instrument I was permitted 

to scan the bodies of some of the fisherman. Although it was now nearly 

four weeks since the accident, their thyroids still contained readily measurable amounts of iodine 131. The information I obtained was very 

scanty because there was not time for more systematic measurements. 

Many of the men had skin burns, particularly on their scalps and along 

the line of their trouser behs where: the: fallout particles had become 

lodged as they stood shirtless on Jeck when the fallout was occurrinK. 

For some reason I never understood, the American media carried re· 

ports that I was not permitted to examine: the fishermen because I had 

neither an M.D. or Ph.D. The fact was that the Japanese scientists requested me to visit the fishermen when we visited Yaizu. Unreliable media rcporrs can be very mmblesome. 

We spent no more than thirty minutes with the fishermen and then 

went to a picturesque bay-front hotel where we were. greeted by the 

mayor of Yaizu who had arranged what must have been a very expensive 

lunch for the mayor of a small fishing community in postwar Japan. 

After our lunch we visited the fishing boat, where the Japanese scientists who accompanied us donned lab coats and gauze masks before 

boarding. We Americans brought no protection, nor did I believe it was 

necessary for the type of contamination we were to encounter. However, 

when we saw our pictures in the Tokyo papers next morning. I did regret 

that, compared to the Japanese, we seemed so cavalier in our attitude to· 

wanls radioactivity. Bdore leaving Tokyo I had requested that the ·em-
103 

'i-1 A. t .C: \Hlllll:S Ot IIAlllOA<:TIVt tAI.I.OllT 

ha,;"-Y provide me with a household vacuum cleaner, and this I used to 

rnllect fallout particles from some of the less accessible exterior surfaces 

of rill' hoar that I thought might have escaped the pickings of the many 

l,1pa11c!>e scicnrists who preceded me. On the roof of the cabin I found a 

lrn"l' piece of wood ahout eiKhteen inches long that was 1:oau.-tl with 

111;111y whire grains about 0.1 mm. in diameter. With the permission of the 

_Japanese, I took the board back to HASL as a souvenir of my visit. The 

du,;t collected by the vacuum cleaner was divided for study by several 

lahoratories in japan and the U.S. 

The first opponunity to meet members of the committee socially came 

after about one week, when William Leonhart and his wife entertained 

the .lapanese scientists at dinner. He and I were busy at the embassy and 

didn't arrive at his home until exactly 6: 30 r.M., when the reception and 

dinner were about to begin. We found that most of the Japanese were aln•;1dy there, my first experience with the customary_ promptness of the 

J;11Mncsc people. It was a rlcasant evening but the language rroblem was 

1nsurmoumable. Thirty years later I was entertained ill a reception in Tok yo following a talk in whkh I was invited to reminisce about the events 

of that period. Several members of the committee attended that pleasant 

reunion and I was greatly impressed with the ease with which we communicated in English. 

l>urinte the la!it week in March, nearly one month after their exposure 

to the fallout radiation, the white blood counts of most of the fishermen 

were continuing to decrease, and alarm increased over the possibility that 

,;ome of them would not survive. In one case the count dropped to 800 

cells per cubic millimeter and others hovered just above 1000. This is a 

dangerous phase of the acute radiation syndrome, in which the body is 

less able to resist infection. If infection can be prevented for a few weeks, 

the damaged bone marrow, which produces a reduced number of blood 

cells, will gradually repair so that recuperation of the white blood count 

can hegin. The ABCC physicians were of the opinion that they could pos· 

sihly make practical suggestions that would reduce the probability of in 

fecrions, but the Japanese doctors continued ro decline their assistance, 

and neither Morron nor his American assistants were ever consulted concerning medical management of the cases. Fortunately, the blood counts 

began to return to normal after four to six weeks, and the men returned 

to normal health after one year, except for the radio operator who developed jaundice in June (about three months after exposure) and died in 
104 

A . f .• <: . : STUl>ll'S 01' llAl>IOAC.:l'IVli fAI. I.OUT 95 

Septemher. The cause of death has been attri~uted to serum hepatitis, 

probahly a consequence of the large number of blood transfusions he received. It was accepted practice in Japan at that time to transfuse only 

ahout 100 cc at a time. This required a great number of transfusions, 

with ., proportionate im:rease in the risk of infc1:tion by the heplltiris 

virus. Although the radio operator did not die directly from radiation 

injury, his death was clearly a secondary result of his exposure. 

The 'fona Panic 

The I .11cky Dragon incident had implications beyond concern over t~e 

health of the crew. The l.ucky Dragon had landed with l.8,ooo pounds <>f 

fish that were quickly disposed of by burial. When reports were received 

of the Lucky Dragon incident, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

decided to monitor incoming shipments of tuna, which was a sensible 

precautionary step and would have created little problem because there 

was no ~cncral contamination of tuna. However, the U.S. tuna comp.,-

nies sent notice to Japan that they would not pay for shipments of fish 

unless they were certified as "nonradioactive" before the shipments left 

Japan. Consumption of tuna in .Japan dropped immediately as a result of 

this action. Concern-unwarranted, as it turned out-ahout the radioactivity of tuna had serious economic consequences in Japan, where rhc 

tuna flet·t 1:nnsisted of about 1000 vessels, with an .u~nual catch estimated to be worth twenty-six million dollars. 

When I arrived on March u, the Japanese had already monitored and 

cleared the first outgoing shipment of frozen tuna. Technicians had been 

trained in the use of Geiger counters, and were assigned to the five major 

ports at which tuna was received and shipped. All fishing boats were instructed to deliver their catches to one of the designated pons. Radiation 

detection instruments were loaned to the Japanese by the U.S. Far East 

Command. 

At a conference with Japanese officials two days after my arrival, they 

requcstt"d that I recommend monitoring procedures and standards to determine if the tuna could he cleared for shipment. Because of my unfamiliarity with the manner in which fish are proca;sed in rhe course of shipment, I requested and was given permission to inspect the loading of tuna 

at a dock in Yokohama. I was flabbergasted by what I saw. Hundreds of 

tons of frolen tuna were moved from a refrigerated warehouse to the 
105 

96 A.E.C.: STlllllFS OF RADIOACTIVE FALi.OUT 

dmk, from which 1hey Wl"re promp1ly 1mnslcrml IO lht• holll of 1hr ship. 

Wi1h only a few instruments available, and in the hands of inexperienced 

inspectors, how could the huge cargos be surveyed? 

I suggested that, as a first step, measuremems be made of one in every 

ten fi,;h before they were loaded on the ship. The fish should be examined 

for one minute by passing a Geiger counter over its surface, with particular attention to the gills, because they filter large volumes of water during 

the process of respiration. The instrument probe should then be inserted 

mto the mouth of the fish, and into the abdominal incision through 

which the viscera had been removed. Additional instruments would be 

nec-Jc.-J and the number of trained inspectors would need to be increased. 

There remained the question of the criteria for rejection of fish as contaminated. It is not a simple matter to estimate the risk to consumers of 

tish from measurements made in this way, and I told the Japanese officials that I could not recommend a standard without further study. However I did not believe fish with more than insignificant contamination 

would be found. Low levels of radioactivity on the skins and gills were a 

p«mibility, but this would not be important to the canners, who routinely 

snip the skins and remove the heads as the first step in processing. I suggested to the Japanese that since I would be in Tokyo for several more 

days, I wanted to be informed when contaminated tuna were found. I 

would arrange for immediate air transport as needed to any of the five 

ports that had been designated to receive and ship tuna to the states. My 

recommendations for certifying the tuna would depend on what I found. 

Many reports of contaminated tuna appeared in the newspapers, and 

several times I was alerted that I should fly to one or another of the five 

ports, but each time I was soon informed that we had received a false 

alarm and that no trip would be necessary. Between March 2.4, when the 

Japanese Foreign Office first discussed the matter with me, and April 9, 

when I left Japan, there were many such reports but I never saw radioactive fish. In some cases the reports were received after the catch was 

dumped at sea. It was suggested to me that the refrigeration systems on 

the boats sometimes failed at sea, causing the fish to spoil. With all the 

publicity being given to radioactive fish, a resourceful captain could 

dump his cargo and later claim that he did so because it was radioactive! 

Thi!i would make it possible for him to prepare a d.1im against the U.S. 

ttnvernment. The suggestion was only anecJ01al and I have no way of 

knowing whether it explains why I never saw radioactive fish despite the 
106 

A,E.C,: STUDIES OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 97 

focr rhar I h;,J a C-47 and helicopter at my disposal and could i111ickly 

reach any of the five Japanese tuna ports. 

WHATEVER WAS HArPENING IN WASHINGTON? 

During my stay in Japan I had excellent rapport with the AEC in Washington as well as with HASL in New York. There was hardly a day when 

I didn't cable for information, copies of literature requested by the Japanese scientists or, in some cases, equipment. I had excellent support and all 

my requests were ans~ered promptly. My only problem was personal, 

because Tokyo was ten hours behind the East Coast of the U.S. Soon after I tumbled into bed at II P.M. after a long hard day, my colleagues 

were reporting for work in Washington and New York with a thirst for 

the latest information from Japan. Each day I helped the embassy staff 

prepare a detailed telegram to Secretary of State Dulles. This was dispatched in the early evening Tokyo time, but could not possibly provide 

all the information that was needed, so many of the calls I received during the night were unavoidable. Had I anticipated the demands for information, I would have asked for assistance in Japan by other radiological 

specialists from the States, but by the time I realized how weary I was getting, it was too late to obtain help. The ambassador recognized what was 

happening and arranged to screen the night calls so that I could get some 

rest. One day he insisted that I get away for twenty-four hours and ar-

. ranged for me to be driven to a hotel near Mount Fuji which the U.S. was 

using as a rest and recreation center for field-grade officers. The hotel 

cost me one dollar for a twenty-four hour stay with meals. Thirty years 

later, when it had long since been returned to private hands, I stopped 

with my wife at the same hotel and the rate was $100 per person per 

night! 

My greatest concern with Washington was the near absence of official 

statements. A terse statement that a new test series had begun in the 

Pacific was issued to the press immediately following the BRAVO detonation, but no other information was given at that time despite the fact that 

it was already known that unexpectedly high levels of fallout had occurrell. No further information was released for many days. The evacuation of the natives and th<' dispatch of a team of medical specialists all 

took place without public announcement. But JTF-7 was a task force of 
107 

98 A.f .<:.: ~1 Ul>IB OF llAl>IOACTIVf. t-Al.l.t>UT 

many thousands of personnel, and the magnitude of the event was such 

chat i1 was impossible to keep rumors of the disaster from reaching the 

puhlic. It was not until March 10 that the AEC issued its second report in 

whi,h it announced that 2.36 Marshallese had been evacuated from their 

home atolls "according to plan as a precautionary measure."' This was a 

dt"ar undc-rstatement of the facts. The statement said nothing ahout the 

early dfects of the heavy radiation exposures that were already evident. 

The magnitude of the fallout became known everywhere in the world 

1111 Marl"h 16 when the Japanese newspaper,, announced that the l.11cky 

I >,,,Ro" had returned to its home port of Yaizu with twrnty-thrcc fishcrmt"n suffering from radiation sickness. The news created a sensation 

throu~hout the world, but no immediate statement was issued hy Washington. In the absence of information from the U.S., newspapers in west· 

t·rn ,ountries, including the United States, were forced to rely on reports 

(mm _laran which were in many cases exaggerated. 

On Ma"h 2.4, i.hortly after my arriv.,I in 'fokyo, the U.S. Kovcrnmcnt 

announced that it was expanding the restricted area around the Pacific 

test site, and that the surveillance procedures were being increased to 

provide greater assurance against unauthorized entry into the restricted 

wnt.t- The statement went on to say that because of the slow movement 

of the water around the Marshall Islands, the radioactivity would become harmless beyond a few miles. and would be undetectable within 

~oo miles or less. This last statement bothered me greatly because while I 

did not believe the contamination levels in the Pacific Ocean would be 

haurdous to consumers of tuna fish, the radioactivity would certainly be 

dcte,rahlc. 

Ry March 31 there were no additional announccmtnts from Washington and Ambassador Allison decided it would be necessary for me to conduct a background briefing for the American members of the Tokyo 

rress corps. Since it was assumed that the reporters, although a sophisticated group, would know little or nothing about fallout, contamination 

of c-cosystems, the effects of radiation exposure and, in particular, how 

1ht' fallout occurred, I was asktd to provide a two-hour nuorial as well as 

the oppommity to answer questions they would ask. It was understood 

that I could not divulge classified information, but I did not think this 

was .1 handicap for them or myself, since secret information about the 

lh(AVO device itself would add nothing to their understanding about the 

l'irrnmstances of the fallout. Besides, I knew next to nothing about the 

l b"ifinl aspccts of the matter. The briefing was off the record, which 
108 

,\,l• .• t:,: ~'l'lll>ll'!I 01' lli\UIO,\t:'l'IVI•. l'i\l.l.011"1' yy 

meant that the reporters could use the information to interpret what they 

were hearing, but could not quote what they were being told and could 

not refer to the fact that they had attended a briefing arranged by the embassy. 

What I could not explain to the reporters, because I did not know, was 

why our government had released so little information. It was now a full 

month since the fallout occurred, and about two weeks since the /,11cky 

Dragon had returned to Yaizu. The Japanese scientists were making 

statements that were being reported in the world press. The statc.·ments 

they were makin~ were frequently inlfammatory, whid, was uml,~rs1a11dable under the l.'ircumstances. Sensational stories were being published in 

the U.S. newspapers as well. The ambassador and his staff were puzzled . 

that so little information had been released. 

The press briefing took place during the afternoon of March 31, 

Tokyo ti,me, which was early on March .lo in Washington. Unknown to 

mr, Prl'si,lt•llf Eisenhower hnd 111:hrdulc,I n rclrvi11cJ l'H'lili c.·onkrrnn· for 

the following day and had invited Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, chairman uf 

the Atomic Energy Commission, to join him and to make a statement 

about the BRAVO fallout. I believe that it was a coincidence that the briefing in Tokyo coincided with Strauss's statement. The president was responding to the. same pressure for information that caused the ambassador to arrange the briefing. When the Strauss statement, which was made 

in the presence of the president, was received in Tokyo, it came as a 

shock to Morton and myself as well as to senior offil.'ials at the embassy. 

The statement said the fishermen "must have been well within the danger 

area," which could not he supported by any evidence of which I was 

aware, hut waii a convenient assumption from the point of view of the liability of the U.S. for damages susrnined by the fishermen and the owner 

of the Lucky Dragon. 7 

The statement then went on to say that the skin lesions "are believed to 

be due to the chemical activity of the converted material in the coral, 

rather than to radioactivity .... " In other words, the burns were due to 

the fallout of corrosive particles of calcium oxide produced by the ac.:rion 

of the gre:u heat of the fireball on coral. This was particularly painfol to 

read since it was not so, and because in the same paragraph that contained that statement, Strauss mentioned that the commission was represented in Japan by Morton and myself. There was every reason why the. 

Japanese scientists, whose confidence we were struggling to develop, 

should have believed that the misinformation originated with us. 
109 

100 A.F..C.: _STUDIES OF llADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 

On April 9 Monon and I decided that our usefulness was at an end in 

Japan and arranged to leave for what I thought would be a brief visit to 

Eniwetok to meet our colleagues who were ministering to the needs of 

the Marshallcse. The ambassador issued a press release in which he reviewed what we had accomplished, and the foreign minister delivered a 

note of thanks to us together with gifts of appreciation. I was concerned 

that a large doisonne vase he presented to me would be too heavy to 

carry home and tried to give it to one of the secretaries at the embassy 

who declined it with the advice that it was a beautiful piece of an that my 

wife would cenainly enjoy. This turned out to be so. 

One reason why I wanted to leave it behind was that I had promised 

our three sons that I would bring home some rice birds Uava sparrows), 

attractive gray and pink birds that can be easily tamed. I had found a 

dealer who had some week-old birds and bought a small bamboo cage 

containing six fledglings that required feeding every two or three hours 

during the day. I left Japan with both the large vase and the cage of birds, 

having arranged with Pan Am to keep the cage in the cabin with me. 

The story of the birds is in itself a saga. I thought I would be in the 

Marshall Islands for only a few days but it turned out that I remained for 

one month during which the birds outgrew their cage twice. All six of the 

bird& eventually arrived home with me, by which time they were full 

grown and brought many months of pleasure to our family. The birds 

were all given Japanese names, often had the run of the house, and frequently flew away on brief excursions that usually ended when a neighbor called to say that one or more of them had interrupted a picnic by 

lighting on a guest's shoulder! ' 

The fallout of March I had proved that we were correct in our belief 

that massive fallout covering large areas of land would be a consequence 

of nuclear war. But in my absence from the laboratory, the: staff recognized that it was important to obtain more quantitative information. It 

was necessary to define the area of fallout and the fraction of the radioactive debris that would be deposited. Our experiences had taught us that a 

nuclear explosion creates clouds of debris that behave in different ways. 

If a bomb explodes so high above the ground that the fireball docs not 

touch the ground, the paniclcs formed arc so small that they deposit very 

slowly and do not create a serious danger. If the bomb is big enough 

(greater than 100 kilotons of TNT equivalent), much of the debris will 

penetrate into the stratosphere, from which it will deposit gradually over 

a period of many months, by which time the short-lived radionudides 
llO 

A.E.<:.: STUl>IES Of RAl>IOACTIVf. FALi.OUT 101 

will have decayed. The fraction that does not reach the stratosphere will 

remain in the lower atmosphere from which the particles will deposit 

over a period of a few weeks, largely with rain or snow. Sm:h fallout will 

contain some of the short-lived radionudidcs, such as radioactive iodine, 

hut the dose to people will not be sufticicnr to result in radiation sickness. 

However, if the tirehall touches the ground, or if it is exploded so dose to 

the ground that relatively large particles of smoke or soil are convected 

into the mass of gases as it cools. the radionudides will deposit on the 

surface of large particles which will deposit within a few hours. It was 

important that this fraction of "dose-in" fallout be better understood so 

that the dangers of nuclear war could be better understood. 

William Harris and Harry LeVine, with typical HASL ingenuity, had 

reviewed the results of our failed oil slick experiments and had decided 

for the remainder of the CASTLE series to substitute styrofoam rafts that 

could be dropped in the expected fallout area, and could be surveyed 

from the air. They had calculated that a floating four foot square slab of 

styrofoam would be sufficient, and in the excitement of the weeks following BRAVO had no trouble in convincing the Air force to supply a pair of 

giant C-cns to transport hundreds of the rafts of Kwajalein. Each raft 

was equipped with a radio transmitter that would broadcast a homing 

signal to ;tssist the survey aircraft in finding it. My staff didn't bother to 

tell me ahout the plan, called Operation DUMKO, until I arrived in the 

Marshalls. The plan was well conceived hut there w,1s simply nor sufficient time ro develop all the details. After three weeks of frustrating trials, 

the project was abandoned. 

In hetween tests of rhe feasibility of DUMBO, Morton and I caught up 

with the srntus of the Marshallese who had been exposed ro fallout and, 

in turn, briefed our colleagues on the condition of the fishermen. Even on 

so somher :m ol·c.1sion there was time for fun ,rnd good humor. On the 

evening of our arrival a barbecue was arranged on an Eniwetok beach, 

and Morton and I were inducted into the "Eniwetok County Medical Society." He, being a physician, was made a full member and I, the nonphysician, was inducted as an associate member. This was not my last 

visit to the Marshalls, but it certainly was my most memorable one. I had 

several days to visit a number of atolls on which HASL had installed radiation detection equipment. I was able to see first hand how the natives 

lived, played, and worked on their remote strings of islands that i:irded 

cobalt blue lagoons like necklaces. Eai:h of the palm-co~ered islands 

rested on circular coral reefs that could be seen easily from the air 
111 

tot A.E.C.: STUDIES Of aADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 

through clear turquoise water. It was panicularly interesting to hover 

over the rttfs in a helicopter from which could be seen the intricate surge 

channd5 carved through the coral by the pounding surf. 

The most thrilling parts of my visits to the atolls were always the unJnwater explorations of the reefs. Scuba diving techniques were just 

rnminK into vogue and the lagoons were the perfect places for being intmJuceJ into the marvelous world of living coral and the Jensc populations of interrelated colorful creatures it suppons. The water is so clear 

rhat one can Stt for fony or fifty feet as though looking through unpolluted air. although sometimes the diver is enveloped by great schools of 

mulcicolored fish. and when this happens visibility can drop to zero for a 

few seconds. The giant clams, waving purple mantles. intricate coral 

shapes. giant rays. and countless brightly colored fish all combined to 

produce an unreal sensation at being in another world. I ~ave since had 

opportunities for underwater exploration in many other parts of the 

world. but I have never Sttn anything to match the beauty of those undisturbed Manhall Islands coral reefs, in water that must surely be as clear 

as any in the world. 

During th05C few days of Eniwetok I had time to reflect on what had 

happmcd in the previous weeks. I speculated on why the AEC had taken 

so long to announce what had happened, and why the press releases were 

so misleading. I have never learned what happened. but I can only assume the AEC was unable to obtain the required agreements of other 

agencies such as the Depanments of Defense and State. The fallout episode must have caused consternation at the Defense Department because 

they learned that it would be necessary to shelve the plans which, in the 

event of war with the Soviets, called for destruction of Eastern European 

air bases with megaton bombs that would create giant craten when exploded at ground level. They were building bombs they couldn't usel 

lliar is, unless they wanted to cover western Europe with lethal levels of 

fallout! The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) had only recently 

bttn formed and was depending on the U.S. nuclear shield to defend 

Wntern Europe. What would be the effect on the NATO alliance of the 

knowlcdge that thermonuclear bombs could produce such heavy levels of 

fallout? · 

I also rniewed the experiences I had had with the nuclear weapons 

testing program during the previous three years. The sophistication of 

our fall out studies program had increased from analyzing hastily colle~-aed fresh snow in the Northeastern states after the report we received 
112 

A.E.C.: STUDIES OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 10} 

from the University of Rochester, to measurement of the worldwide pat• 

terns of fallout, using sophisticated instrumentation of our own design 

and advanced radiochemical methods of analysis. We had been proved 

correct in our belief that the explosion of megaton bombs could cover 

thousands of square miles of territory with lethal levels of radioactivity. 

Because the instrument we placed on Rogerik provided prompt notice 

that he;ivy fallout had occurred after BRAVO, the doses m:eivcJ by the 

American airmen and Marshallese natives were much less than would 

have been the case had we not alerted the Task Force to the fallout. Some 

of their lives had undoubtedly been saved, despite the delay in implementing emergency procedures. 

Nuclear weapons were abhorrent to me, as they still are, but they ex· · 

isted and it was imponant that their effects be understood. Our studies 

were adding to that understanding, and perhaps the prospect that extensive areas of land would be blanketed with radioactive dust would be one 

more reason why nuclear weapons would never be used in war. 

In early May 1954, after an absence of nine weeks, I returned to New 

York to assume my new responsibilities as manager of the AEC's New 

York Operations Office. I had been so busy that I had had little time to 

think about the day on which I had received the phone call from Tokyo, 

just as I was being offered the new position. I looked forward to it with 

mixed feelings. At the age of thirty-nine I was being promoted into one of 

the more imponant positions within the AEC. I would be involved in the 

administration of large-scale government research and development contracts and would have the opportunity to panicipate in the application of 

nuclear.energy to civilian needs such as the production of energy and exploration of outer space. The immediate impact of this change in my career would be softened, however, by the fact that I would continue to 

serve as the director of HASL. 
113 

Professor EISENBUD. I call your attention to some of the key 

points in that book. One, the general lack of initial preparedness 

for fallout monitoring despite the experience after TRINITY. TRINITY was the test explosion in New Mexico in 1945. 

That AEC recommended a standby evacuation capability for Operation Castle which the task force declined to provide as being unnecessary. 

That had the instrument on Rongerik not been installed by 

HASL, there would have been no notification that the fallout was 

occurring with possible lethal consequences to both the Air Weather Service personnel and the residents of Rongelap. 

That had the people of Rongerik and Rongela_J> been evacuated 

by air, which was perfectly feasible when the HASL report was 

first made, the doses sustained would have been greatly reduced 

with far less severe consequences to the people of Rongelap. 

That the task force did not plan to provide a monitoring capability beyond Enewetak and Bikini. 

Because of his concern for the safety of residents of the Pacific 

islands, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, CINCPAC, located in Pearl 

Harbor, requested that HASL undertake the monitoring program 

and supported it with aircraft, personnel, equipment, and communications. 

That the task force support of the HASL program was limited to 

the single billet aboard the flagship for the use of the HASL coordinator. However, when the emergency arose, he was prevented from 

implementing the procedures which both JTF-7 and CINCPAC, 

and HASL, had agreed. 

That the AEC public announcements, particularly with respect to 

the Lucky Dragon, left much to be desired, and this is discussed 

in detail in the pages I refer to you. ·· And that, most amazing to me, to my knowledge, there has never 

been a formal investigation of the circumstances that led up to the 

BRA VO tragedy. In another few days, it will be 40 years since the events of March 

1, 1954, but today is the first time that I have ever been invited 

to report on my knowledge of the events. 

My prepared testimony is now completed, sir, and to the best of 

my ability I will answer your questions. 

[Prepared statements of Professor Eisenbud follows:] 
114 

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY PROFESSOR MERRIL EISENBUD 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

February 24, 1994 

I am Merril Eisenbud, Professor Emeritus of Environmental 

Medicine at New York University Medical Center, where I served 

for 26 years as Director of the Environmental Studies Laboratory. 

I went to New York University after a twelve year career with the 

Atomic Energy Commission where, for the most part of that period, 

I was Director of the Commission's Health and Safety Laboratory, 

located in New York City. For many years that laboratory was 

known by the acronym, HASL, but the name was changed in the mid1970's to the Department of Energy Environmental Measurements 

Laboratory. I hold the degree B.S.E.E. and two Sc.D degrees 

(honoris causa). I am a m~er of the National Academy of 

Engineering, and an Honorary Member of the National Council on 

Radiation Protection, a Fellow of the New York Academy of 

Medicine, a Foreign Member of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, 

and an Honorary Life Fellow of the New York Academy of Sciences. 

Since my retirement from New York University in 1985, I have 

resided in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. I currently hold the 

position of Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Duke University 

Medical Center, Division of Occupational and Environmental 

Health. 

I began my career in environmental science in the mid l930's 

nearly 60 years ago. At various times during these many decades 

I have been involved with research, teaching, and administration, 
115 

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in programs concerned with air and water pollution, occupational 

health, the urban environment, and both the ionizing and nonionizing radiations. Environmental radioactivity has been a 

major interest of mine for many years. I published the first 

edition of a textbook called Environmental Radioactivity in 1963, 

the 4th edition of which will be published by the Academic Press 

in 1996. I have published more than 200 peer-reviewed articles 

in the scientific journals, and in 1990, my professional memoir, 

titled An Environmental Odyssey was published by the University 

of Washington Press. A little later I will request that certain 

pages from that book which relate to the BRAVO tragedy be entered 

into the record of this hearing. 

For your purposes today, the period of my career that will 

be of most interest to you was from 1951, when I first became 

involved in studies of fallout from nuclear weapons tests, and 

the end of 1954, the year of the BRAVO explosion. It is 

important that I begin by telling you why HASL was organized, and 

how it became involved in fallout measurements. 

When AEC was created by Congress in 1947 it was realized 

that there were many contractors, both in academia and industry 

that would require assistance in dealing with their problems in 

industrial and radiological hygiene. It was decided that an AEC 

laboratory should be created in New York to provide the required 

technical assistance to the many plants and laboratories under 
116 

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contract with the Commission's New York Operations Office. The 

assistance provided by HASL in the first years was mainly to the 

uranium and beryllium industries, both of which were confronted 

with serious health problems. To provide this help, a laboratory 

of high quality was needed together with a staff of industrial 

hygienists, physicians, physicists, engineers, and chemists who 

were willing to work under field conditions. 

When the weapons testing programs began at the Nevada Test 

Site (NTS) in 1951, our staff was not initially involved in any 

way. We learned about Operation RANGER in the news broadcasts, 

just like most other people. A few days after the tests began, I 

received a call from Rochester that the Eastman Kodak Company had 

detected radioactive particles in the air intake filters of their 

film manufacturing plant. From telephone calls I made to 

Washington and the NTS I was amazed to learn that no fallout 

monitoring network had been established by AEC. This was 

obviously a major deficiency in planning since it had been known 

that fallout from the New Mexico test explosion called TRINITY in 

August 1945 had spoiled photographic film packaged with 

interleaving paper made from fallout-contaminated com-stalks 

harvested many hundreds of miles from the explosion . As a result 

of that experience, the Eastman Kodak Company wisely adopted the 

practice of routinely monitoring its plants and laboratories for 

radioactive dust. 
117 

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We received that call on a Friday afternoon when it was 

snowing throughout the Northeast. over the weekend we collected 

samples of snow throughout the northeastern states, and by early 

the following week we were able to draw a map showing the extent 

of the fallout. That experience was undoubtedly the first 

investigation of fall-out at great distances from the site of a 

nuclear explosion. 

As a result of that experience HASL was requested by the AEC 

Division of Military Operations to prepare a national network of 

fallout monitoring stations. This network was extended worldwide in the following year. The collection system was operated 

on an unclassified basis, and the first summary of our findings 

was published in the journal Science, in February 1953. This was 

the first of many publications on the subject in the open 

literature and they are noteworthy because they show that AEC at 

that time was not attempting to conceal the fact that fallout of 

radioactive dust from test explosions was occurring. 

Our early studies led me to become very much concerned about 

the possibility that lethal levels of radiation might occur at 

great distances from explosions in the megaton range of TNT 

equivalent. In addition to the global network of monitoring 

stations we then maintained, HASL requested and was granted, the 

assignment to monitor fallout intensively in the 200 to 500 mile 

annulus around the test site. We first undertook these studies 
118 

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in Nevada during Operation JANGLE in the Fall of 1951. This 

series consisted of two small explosions, one on the surface, and 

one just below the surface. My associates and I became 

particularly concerned about the levels of fall-out measured in 

northern Nevada, about 400 miles from the test-site . The 

measured fall-out intensities we measured were not so high as to 

be alarming of themselves, but they were the result of explosions 

equivalent in explosive yield to no more than about one KT of 

TNT . Since explosions more than ten thousand times larger were 

being planned for the tests in the Marshall Islands, it took but 

a simple calculation to show that very dangerous fallout might 

occur at great distances. 

Using aerial survey methods of our own design, we undertook 

intensive monitoring of all the North Pacific atolls after the 

MIKE detonation in the Fall of 1952, but found no significant 

fallout. We concluded that whatever fallout had taken place was 

in the open ocean, in which the small atolls were thinly 

distributed. 

We then began to prepare for CASTLE, scheduled to begin on 

March l 1954. In the interim we had been consulting with Col. 

Lulegian, an Air Force meteorologist, who took quite seriously 

our concerns about the potential dangers from massive fall-out 

following explosions in megatons range of yields. He sent me a 

highly classified report he had prepared, in which he confirmed 
119 

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by rigorous analysis that what we had concluded almost 

intuitively based on our limited field experience: i.e. Lethal 

levels of fallout could occur at great distances from nearsurface explosions of megaton weapons. For some unexplained 

reason, that report was recalled within days after I had received 

it. I have not seen it since. 

What happened on March 1 1954 as a consequence of BRAVO is 

now a part of history, but the full story is largely untold. The 

fact that heavy fallout was occurring was first recorded about 

seven hours post-firing by a continuous gamma radiation detector 

placed by HASL in the care of Air Weather Service personnel on 

the atoll of Rongerik. The HASL representative aboard the Task 

Force flagship was immediately notified by radio. What happened 

thereafter is still a matter of mystery. There were delays in 

confirming that the fall-out had occurred and in measuring its 

extent. I was then in the New York laboratory, and was notified 

of the Rongerik report immediately. Thereafter there was a 

blackout of information for many hours. The reasons why aerial 

confirmation was not permitted and why prompt evacuation 

procedures were not implemented has never been explained. 

My knowledge of the events prior to the explosion and 

immediately afterwards are summarized from my notes as well as 

official documents in An Environmental Odyssey. Of particular 

interest to you will be the material on pages 72 to 103, which 
120 

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also covers the effects of the BRAVO fallout on the Japanese 

fishing boat Fukuryu Maru (The Lucky Dragon). These pages have 

been made available to the Committee, and I request that they be 

included in the record of these proceedings. I call your 

attention to some of the key points made in my book: 

1. The general lack of initial preparedness for 

fallout monitoring despite the experience after TRINITY. 

2. That AEC recommended a standby evacuation 

capability for CASTLE, which the Task Force declined to 

provide as being unnecessary. 

3. Had the instrument on Rongerik not been installed 

by HASL, there would have been no notification that the 

fallout was occurring, with possible lethal consequences to 

both the Air Weather Service personnel and the residents of 

Rongelap. 

4. That had the people on Rongelap and Rongerik been 

evacuated by air when the HASL report was first made, the 

doses sustained would have been greatly reduced with far 

less severe consequences. 

5. That the Task Force did not plan to provide a monitoring capability beyond Eniwetak and Bikini. Because 

of his concern for the safety of residents of the Pacific 

islands, Commander-in-Chief Pacific {CINCPAC), located in 

Pearl Harbor, supported the HASL program and provided 

supporting aircraft, personnel, equipment, and 

communications. The Task Force support of the HASL program was limited to a single billet aboard the Flagship for the use of the HASL coordinator. However, when the emergency 

arose, he was prevented from implementing the procedures to 

which both JTF-7 and CINCPAC had agreed. 

6. That the AEC public announcements left much to be 

desired. 

7. That to my knowledge there has never been a formal 

investigation of the circumstances that led up to the BRAVO 

tragedy. In another few days it will be 40 years since the 

events of March 1 1954, but today is the first time I have 

been invited to report on my knowledge of the events. 
121 

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My prepared testimony is now concluded and, to the best of 

my ability, I will be pleased to answer any questions you may 

have. 
122 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Let me ask you with respect to the discussions that took place 

before the BRA VO shot about what the expectations were as to 

both the yield and what would happen with the radioactivity downwind or after that shot. What took place then? What was the context of those discussions? 

Professor EISENBUD. Well, the context is broader than that and 

was referred to early. You have got to remember that these tests 

were conducted at a time when we were teaching our schoolchildren to dive under desks to escape the effects of the nuclear 

bombs. I mean this was the overall context in which the tests were 

conducted. There was great urgency on the part of our Government. 

My recollection was that the BRA VO test was going to be about 

the same size of MIKE, roughly 15 megatons. I have indications in 

my notes that confirm this, and I have requested many times over 

the years a letter of, I believe it was November 3, 1953, two 

months before the test, which provided me with the schedule of the 

tests and the yields. I have been unable to obtain that letter. 

Mr. MILLER. So your testimony this morning is that this was not 

an unexpected yield. There had been the discussion of a yield of 

this magnitude. 

Professor EISENBUD. I think this should be examined, and I have 

talked with your staff about this. 

I want to add, however, that had the yield been twice what it 

was expected to be, it would not have had a greater difference in 

the consequences. Cloud height for a 6-megaton explosion I believe 

is somewhere around 80,000 feet, would be the top of the cloud, 

and for a 15-megaton explosion it would go to 110,000 feet. This 

is not a great difference. And the fallout pattern would, of course, 

be different, but I think it would be different to a degree perhaps 

sufficient to have made a difference in the early effects on the 

Rongelap people. 

Mr. MILLER. But in terms of constructing what was given to the 

public after the shot-and after there was the realization that 

something publicly would have to be said because of the Lucky 

Dragon, that really appears to me spurred something to be said 

publicly-the suggestion is that there were sort of two components 

to this accident. 

One was that there was a last minute shift in the winds. We just 

heard from the previous testimony that, in fact, there is documentation to suggest that that wind shift was anticipated; it was 

dealt with in one fashion or another, may or may not have been 

discounted, but the fact is, this was not something that just came 

out of the blue. 

Now with respect to the yield, again, the suggestion was there 

that the yield was much higher than anticipated. Your testimony 

is, in fact, that that is not the case, that there was documentation 

of a discussion of a yield of somewhere around 15 megatons or 

more. Is that correct? 

Professor EISENBUD. What I would say is that there is no reason 

why we should have to speculate. 

Mr. MILLER. I understand that. 

Professor EISENBUD. If we ever find that letter--
123 

Mr. MILLER. This is the first of the hearings. Hopefully.. we will 

not have to speculate down the road, but at the moment we are 

trying to construct--

Professor EISENBUD. I repeat that the most amazing thing about 

this whole story is that there was, to my knowledge, no board of 

inquiry set up and no formal investigation conducted in Government, military and civilian. 

If you have an accident that damages $100,000 worth of equipment perhaps, injures a few people, you have a board of inquiry 

and a formal report. I know of no such report. I fully expected that 

I would be expected to testify before such a board. Apparently such 

a board was never constituted. 

Mr. MILLER. If the Navy runs a tugboat aground, we have a 

board of inquiry. So we know the threshold is not high. 

My concern is that Government officials use the term "accident" 

rather loosely. It is sort of an all-encompassing phrase to get you 

out of the room when you are trying to disclose to the public why 

something went wrong, and this kind of reminds me of the Challenger, the space shuttle. An accident, tragic accident, national 

mourning. But when we started to sift through what took place 

with the board of inquiry, we in fact found that the information 

was made available to the those people controlling the launch of 

the shuttle about the temperature, the problems, and some concern 

about the 0-rings, but that was simply overridden. It was discounted. A determination was made to go forward with that, and 

later we found out that was unfortunately a fatal mistake. 

Here, in fact, it appears that the parties had within their possession and their knowledge information as to the winds, information 

as to what might be expected of the flow of radioactivity, and in 

fact the expected yield and the resulting yield of the blast. So the 

accident isn't that this was unforeseen, the accident is that, when 

given the information, people made the decision not to react in a 

proper fashion to that information and to so discount it to allow 

them to continue on with an event that was already set in motion. 

Professor EISENBUD. We are getting into semantics. If a young lady is walking down the street in high heels and trips because she 

was wearing high heels, that is an accident; but I might have 

warned that young lady well in advance that she should get rid of 

those high heels because she was going to have an accident. 

I think that what we should say about the circumstances on 

March 1 was that those people running the task force apparently 

did not expect that there would be serious fallout. From my perspective, it was unavoidable. 

It was an accident to the extent that it was an unforeseen event 

from the perspective of the people that were conducting the test. 

From my perspective, it was avoidable, and had they been lucky, 

it would have fallen into the ocean again, which was highly probable because the percentage of the ocean surface that is covered by 

atolls out there is very small, must be less than a fraction ·of 1 percent. 

But I don't think we should get into the semantics. 

Mr. MILLER. I think it goes to the issues of what transpires later, 

because a pure accident-and this is somewhat semantic-but with 

a pure accident you can start to discharge your obligations with re-
124 

spect to that event rather easily because that is an acceptable term 

that was not avoidable. 

But the question of whether people made decisions that may border on negligence or malfeasance then goes to what people think 

they have to do to save a reputation of a program or personnel or 

what-have-you for legal obligations that stem from those actions. 

The public generally is fairly dismissive of an accident, but if the 

public finds out that people had information and said, you know, 

"Well, that doesn't matter, we are going to go forward," the public 

gets a little less dismissive and wants to know who is running the 

show here, as we found out again with the shuttle. We all of a sudden said, ''Wait a minute, who is running the show here? Who had 

the decisionmaking capability? Why did they not bring this to another level for decisionmaking?" 

There is a difference in the inquiry that takes place based upon 

what knowledge was available to people prior to their taking actions. 

Professor EISENBUD. Normally, this would be determined by inquiry. That was done for the shuttle accident and should have been 

done for the BRAVO test, but I know of no such inquiry. I think 

I would have known about it had there been one. 

Mr. MILLER. So far, there is no evidence that there was one. 

Professor EISENBUD. One bit of information, sir. I think that as 

we look at this whole problem of classification, and I have got a 

feeling of deja vu here because some of you must remember that 

this question came up sometime during the reign of Chairman 

McComb as chairman of the Department of Energy, and he ordered 

all documents relating to health be declassified. Everybody scurried 

around for months, and they thought it was done. We are going 

through the same exercise again. 

I think in many cases people don't even know where to look. 

Forty years is a long time, and with our personal affairs, we know 

what happens after just a few years when we try to find papers. 

But let me try to simplify the problem. My feeling is-and I 

think that this will be discussed later by others, in particular Dr. 

Simon-that the information needed for purposes of risk assessment (namely, the levels of radioactivity, the extent of the fallout), 

I think that that information is probably available in unclassified 

form. In any case, if some of it is still classified, it could be easily 

retrieved. 

I could certainly have helped at that, and it is interesting that 

apparently people have been looking for this information some 

months now. Had they come to me, I could have told them where 

to look and given them the name of one secretary that probably 

could have found it for them. That is one category of information, 

and I think that is the information that is of most concern to the 

people of Micronesia. 

The other category is one of culpability and responsibility: What 

were the circumstances pre-shot? What were the weather forecasts? 

What were the predictions? Who voted to shoot, and who voted not 

to shoot? And why was there a several-week delay in informing the 

public what happened when the Japanese knew about it and were 

spreading the information all over the world? 
125 

The first meaningful statement was made, I believe, on April 9, 

and it was full of misinformation, particularly with respect to the 

fallout on the Lucky Dragon, which at that point I happened to be 

heavily involved in. I was in Japan trying to unravel the many 

problems that arose out of that fallout. 

So I would differentiate between the secrecy associated with 

what happened on March 1 at the time of the shot and why my 

representative on the flagship could not send a telegram to 

Kwajelein to get his aircraft off the ground to Rongerik to confirm 

whether there was a fallout or not and why they didn't send flying 

boats in. 

They sent flying boats in-but 24 or 26 hours late-to get the 

servicemen out, and they should have done the same to get the 

Marshallese out. I believe they sent an LST. That is why it took 

50 hours to get them off. That should have been investigated. It 

should have been a matter of public record. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. de Lugo. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor, I think that when you were discussing the BRAVO 

shot and the after effects on March 1, the identification of heavy 

fallout, you said heavy fallout was occurring and it was identified 

seven hours after the firing by your health and safety organization. 

I believe you digressed from your written statement and you made 

mention of a message that was sent regarding this. 

Professor EISENBUD. I didn't think I digressed at that point. The 

message was sent by the Air Weather Service personnel on 

Rongerik--

Mr. DE LUGO. Right. Professor EISENBUD [continuing]. Was received by my representative, who was Alfred Breslin on the flagship, and he immediately 

put a prepared operating procedure into effect. 

One of the first things he was supposed to do was notify me at our headquarters in New York, which he did, and then he was supposed to request the three aircraft assigned to him that were based 

on Kwajelein to confirm the fallout, and measure the extent of it, 

which we could do by aerial measurements. 

I was later informed he was prevented from the use of radio facilities at that point for about a day. 

Mr. DE LUGO. I believe you made mention of the message, and 

you said you still had the message. You don't have that in your 

statement, but I thought that you made that statement when you 

were reading that portion of the--

Professor EISENBUD. Well, the message I got was a military-style 

communication which probably exists in the file somewhere. I recall it. I don't have it. I am sorry. 

Mr. DE LUGO. All right. 

In your book you found the radiation level at Kwajelein about ten 

times the normal level. Is that dangerous? 

Professor EISENBUD. I don't think so, no. No. Ten times the normal level would be-well, let's say we take as normal what it is on 

the sea coast of the United States. It is two or three times that in 

Denver. 

Mr. DE LUGO. I just wanted to establish that in my own mind. 

79-784 0-94-5 
126 

Professor EISENBUD. Particularly since it is going to be falling off 

with the short half-life. 

Mr. DE LUGO. All right, Professor. You said that your recommendation for evacuation plans was not acted upon by the joint 

task force because the tests would not be conducted "if there was 

any possibility of fallout on the atolls." 

Now since you clearly knew that there was a possibility of fallout, why was this explanation given to you? Why did they refuse 

to act on your warning? 

Professor EISENBUD. Well, I think you would have to ask them. 

Again, this is a question that should have been investigated at a 

proper inquiry held while people were still alive. Unfortunately, 

most of the people involved in the decisions at that time are no 

longer with us. 

Mr. DE LUGO. In your book you say, "Our staff was less optimistic and predicted that dangerous levels of fallout could occur for 

hundreds of miles downwind of the explosion," and you have stated 

here today that it was known that radiation levels were high seven 

hours after the firing, after BRAVO, and that the proper course 

would have been to evacuate by air the people of Rongelap and 

Rongerik. 

Professor EISENBUD. Yes, an amphibious aircraft could have been 

dispatched from Kwajelein, confirmed that fallout had occurred 

within an hour, and probably gotten those men and the 

Marshallese out probably in the next few hours. I don't know how 

long it would have taken, maybe 2 or 3 hours, certainly not 50 

hours, which is as long as it took for the Rongelapese to be evacuated. 

·Mr. DE LUGO. A comment that you made in 1956 about the people of Utirik living on the atoll which was subjected to fallout has 

been widely quoted as being insensitive to the people in suggesting 

that the people were being monitored for research rather than 

health purposes. Is there a context that we should understand 

about that statement? 

Professor EISENBUD. Yes. I had hoped it would not come up because this has come up repeatedly in the media. Mr. DE LUGO. Well, I am giving you the opportunity to put it on 

the record. Professor EISENBUD. I understand, and I have prepared a supplementary statement that deals with that. If I may, I would like to 

read it into the record. · Mr. MILLER. Sure. 

Professor EISENBUD. I wish to place into the record my response 

to comments that have been made about a statement contained in 

an unedited transcript of a meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine in January 

1956. 

I had long ago forgotten about the meeting and had never seen 

the transcript until about 4 years ago when four of the 327-page 

record was made public by the Washington representative of the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands. That representative is here 

today. It is Mr. David Weiman who may wish to comment on what 

I am saying. 
127 

Since that time, it has been quoted in the media on a number 

of occasions and has been the subject of inquiries I have received 

from reporters during the past few days. 

In one page, I mentioned experiments that were then being planned for the atoll of Utirik in the Marshall Islands. These experiments did not involve studies of the effects of the fallout on the 

health of the residents. We wanted to study the relationships between the amounts of fallout on the ground, the amount that is absorbed into food, and how that correlates to the amounts excreted 

in human urine. 

This is the kind of data that is essential for purposes of risk assessment and by January 1956 was already being gathered by 

many countries in many parts of the world, including many places 

in the United States. The United Nations Scientific Committee on 

the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which was just being organized 

and had had its first meeting the month before, placed great emphasis on the need for such data. 

The same quotation also made it seem that I was guilty of a cavalier reference to the advantages of data obtained from Marshall 

Island residents compared to mice. I have my own brief notes of 

the meeting which indicate that there had been mention of laboratory mouse experiments then under way in an AEC laboratory. 

However, the experiments did not involve fallout or the Marshall 

Islands in any way. The discussion of the mouse experiments was 

not on the agenda of the advisory committee meeting but might 

have taken place during a coffee break or at lunch. 

The statement as it appears in the transcript makes no sense. It 

is somehow out of context. The exact wording of the transcript suggests that I referred to the mice involved in a specific experimental 

context and not in a generic sense. 

After nearly 40 years, I have no way of knowing how to explain 

what appears in that transcript. However, I can appreciate why the 

reported statement, although out of context, may nevertheless have 

offended the people of the Marshall Islands. I regret that misunderstanding, and I apologize to them. 

Mr. DE LUGO. One final question. Do you consider the resulting 

effects of the BRA VO test to be an accident, as was described by 

the joint task force, or given the fact that there can be no question 

that there was a high probability that there would be significant 

fallout from this test and that seven hours after the test the warning was given that there was a high fallout and yet there was no 

effort made to evacuate the people of the atoll, do you consider it 

an accident? 

Professor EISENBUD. I consider it negligence. Whether it is an accident or not is a matter of semantics. As I say, if a person perceives it to be an accident, then it is an accident, just like the 

young lady in the high heels going downstairs. To me, if she falls 

because of the high heels, it is not an accident, she should have 

known not to wear them. But to the young lady, it was an accident. 

This was an accident, I think, in a semantic sense. It probably 

could have been avoided, but, having happened, the effects could 

have been minimized. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Chairman, no further questions. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Faleomavaega. 
128 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor Eisenbud, I appreciate your testimony, and I just want 

to raise specifically my questions on the BRA VO test that was 

taken in 1954. 

I think at the height of the Cold War because the Soviet Union 

had exploded a hydrogen bomb in 1953, I suppose this was part of 

the competition. We had to do something likewise; we were somewhat behind on the testing effort. I wanted to ask you, it is ironic 

that next week will mark the fortieth year of the BRA VO test 

which was exploded on March 1, 1954. Can you explain what is basically the difference between a hydrogen bomb and an atomic 

bomb? I know the two bombs that were dropped at Nagasaki and 

Hiroshima were atomic bombs. What is the diffe~nce? Is the hydrogen bomb more lethal than an atomic bomb? 

Professor EISENBUD. It is bigger. There are two processes involved in the hydrogen bombs. You have fission, the splitting of 

plutonium or uranium from which you get energy, and you have 

that in both the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb. In the hydrogen bomb you also have a mechanism for producing high 

energy--

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. By fusion, I know that, yes. 

Professor EISENBUD. Through fusion, you produce high energy 

neutrons which then makes it possible to have a third stage of fission, and most of the yield of those megaton explosions of that vintage were due to fission in that third stage. 

So from the point of view of the products of the explosion, there 

wasn't much difference. They both produce almost the same ratio 

of strontium to cesium to iodine and so on per megaton. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. But the magnitude of this BRAVO test that 

was conducted in 1954, was this considered the largest and most 

powerful hydrogen detonation? 

Professor EISENBUD. Of course, it is debatable. I guess it was 

roughly the same magnitude as MIKE in 1952 so you could say it 

was as large as anything that had been fired up to that time. 

Within a few years though, the Russians went as high as, I 

think, 70 megatons, and we went considerably higher than 15. I 

don't remember, maybe as high as 20. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. I didn't get from your testimony, were you 

physically present in the vicinity of the area where the testing took 

place, or were you in the United States? 

Professor EISENBUD. I was on the flagship for MIKE but not for 

BRA VO. For BRA VO I was in our laboratory. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. And from your statement, you were not 

aware of the precautions those who administered the whole program had taken before the detonation of the BRA VO test? 

Professor EISENBUD. I never saw the pre-shot briefings. Normally, as has been described, there were briefings at various intervals starting maybe 24 hours in advance, and I have never seen 

those documents. 

Also, it ought to be a matter of record as to who voted to shoot 

and who voted not to shoot. I know from my visit out there, about 

six weeks after BRA VO I was there, and a number of people who 

were present at the briefing volunteered that they had voted 

against shooting. 
129 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. But was it a matter of voting or was it 

someone responsible had to make the final decision whether to take 

the shot? 

Professor EISENBUD. The decision was made by the task force 

commander, who in that case was General Clarkson. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Okay. Our whole program at the time was 

conducted by the Department of the Army. Am I correct? 

Professor EISENBUD. It was conducted by a joint task force that 

had the Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, and civilians from 

the AEC laboratories. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Again, I guess the question: Was the Administration aware that the winds had shifted prior to the testing 

of the BRA VO? 

Professor EISENBUD. I don't know. I don't know. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. And wasn't--

Professor EISENBUD. This should not be a matter we should have 

to speculate about. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Well, that is why I am asking. I want to 

know specifically to your knowledge. 

Professor EISENBUD. I do not know. I wasn't part of the task 

force. This is from my participation and the participation of my 

staff. 

Mr. F ALE0MA v AEGA. Wasn't the usual practice at that time that 

the islanders would be evacuated prior to any of these tests? 

Professor EISENBUD. There wasn't any established pattern. There 

were no evacuations for MIKE. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. But the islanders were evacuated at other 

times when the tests were conducted. But on this specific one, 

there was no warning, no efforts on the part of the Navy to evacuate the 278 people living on Rongelap? 

Professor EISENBUD. My judgment, which was transmitted to the 

task force through the Division of Biology and Medicine in a memorandum which should be made available, was that there was no 

need for pre-shot evacuation, that it would be sufficient to have 

standby evacuation capability, because if you could get people off 

in an hour, they are not going--

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Were you aware that there were 28 Americans on the island of Rongelap at the time of the BRA VO test? 

Professor EISENBUD. Yes. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Were these Americans aware in any way by 

communication that perhaps telling the flagship that the winds are 

shifting and there should be reconsideration for the shot to take 

place? 

Professor EISENBUD. I don't know. These were airmen attached 

to the Air Weather Service. They were meteorologists and technicians. I don't know how much they knew. 

Mr. F ALE0MA v AEGA. I would hope that we do have records of 

those 28 Americans that were on that island on that date. We do 

have records. 

Professor EISENBUD. Those records are available. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Okay. 

I have a book here, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just for a minute. 

It is a book written by Ms. Jane Diblin called The Day of Two 

Suns. It was published in 1988 by the New Amsterdam Book, and 
130 

I just want to quote a couple of things here I wanted to ask your opinion on. I quote, 

The pale powder continued to fall late afternoon-this was, the tests had taken 

place-by which time it was about one and a half inches deep. The _powder was one and a half inches deep on the island of Rongelap. Later it eme~ed that it was, in 

fact, a particle of lime which is calcium oxide formed with Bikini s coral reef. A formation of calcium carbonate, melted in the intense heat of the bomb and was sucked 

up and scattered for miles. The exact dose of radiation received by the islanders was never measured, but it was estimated that people on Utirik received 14 rems. 

Professor EISENBUD. People on? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. On Utirik people received 14 rems,1 and 

those on Rongelap 175 rems. 

Now the understanding here is that the International Commission on Radiological Protection recommends that a maximum permissible total body dose to a member of the general public be .5 

rems. What does that mean in scientific terms? If my body is exposed to 175 rems after this explosion, what does this do to me? 

Professor EISENBUD. If you are exposed to 175 rems, there is a 

high probability that you are going to show the effects of the acute 

radiation. You are going to lose some hair, you are going to show 

signs of nausea, you will become nauseated, your blood count is 

going to be affected, and perhaps others after me can testify as to 

what the risk of mortality is at that point. Certainly the risk of developing cancer in the future is increased. 

Of course, the dose to the thyroid was very much higher than 

175, as I recall. 

Mr. F ALEOMA V AEGA. It is 100 times over? 

Professor EISENBUD. Well, I would not say $1,000, maybe between 10 and 100. 

I must put into the record something which I hope is known to 

the committee, and that is that all of these numbers have never 

been classified. Did she say that there were no measurements of the radiation? 

That is not so. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. They did not take measurements until after 

two days, and that was going to lead to another question. 

Professor EISENBUD. But let me say that there have been a whole 

string of reports, mostly out of the Brookhaven Laboratory, dealing 

with the levels of exposure and the health consequences. I myself 

have had no trouble by 1963. Of course, that was nine years later, 

when I wrote the first edition of Environmental Radioactivity. I 

had a whole chapter on BRA VO and had access to plenty of information in the open literature. 

I don't know of any information on health effects that was ever 

classified. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You stated earlier that these people could 

have been rescued in a matter of hours after the explosion. According to some documentation, they were not rescued until at least 

two or three days after the explosion. Why the delay? 

Professor EISENBUD. Well, that is something that should have 

been the subject of inquiry. The airmen were taken off, I think, in 

26 hours as I recall, maybe 28. They were taken off by air. The 

Rongelapese were removed by, I think, LST after 50 hours, and 

1 Roentgen equivalent man. 
131 

that was a dreadful error on somebody's part because they could 

have been evacuated. There were plenty of amphibious aircraft out 

there at the time. We used to use them in our work regularly. 

When we visited the atolls, we did it with amphibious aircraft and 

had no trouble getting in and out. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Mrs. Mink. 

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am somewhat confused by your testimony because I think that 

much of what has been written and certainly the testimony of the 

prior witness and my own personal investigations indicate that 

there are justified conclusions by people that have been researching 

this whole matter of prior knowledge, prior information, failure to 

assess that information so as to prevent unnecessary hazards to 

people who were living in that area, and yet you insist in characterizing what happened after BRA VO as an accident. 

I am confused. How could it possibly be an accident of misery or 

tragedy that occurred on these people if there was the possibility 

of forewarning to the Government that could have prevented this 

tragedy from having occurred? 

Professor EISENBUD. I am being drawn into a semantic argument. 

Mrs. MINK. No, it is not a semantic, it is a very important argument. You insist that information that has heretofore been kept 

classified and secret is available to you. My question is, Have you 

attempted to make an inquiry of the Government for yourself, as 

other individual investigators have done, to determine the extent 

to which the Government should have known that hazardous conditions did exist at the time that would indicate that there would be 

a very dangerous fallout on the people of the Pacific islands? 

Professor EISENBUD. The predictions by some people, including 

myself and Colonel Lulegian, and there were others, was that the 

danger that massive fallout could be lethal, even out to hundreds 

of miles, was very real. 

At the time, not everybody believed it. There were reputable 

physicists who said that this explosion was going to be so big that 

it would blow the radioactive particles into outer space and that 

would never come back to Earth. I am serious. That is what some 

people believed. I didn't believe that. 

Mrs. MINK. But you believed that there was a sufficient hazard 

to the people there from the dangers off allout. 

Professor EISENBUD. That was why I recommended a standby 

evacuation capability. I didn't see the need for evacuating them for 

a period of two or three months, whatever would be required. I 

thought that either boats--

Mrs. MINK. So if you believed firmly that that possibility existed 

when the bomb was detonated and the fallout occurred and the 

hazard was put upon the people out there, that is not an accident. 

That was something you could have foretold from your own personal conclusion, and that is all I am asking you to do today. I am 

not asking you to make a conclusion on behalf of the Government. 

I am asking you to render your best conclusion insofar as the information you had at that time and the expertise that you possessed 

at that time. 
132 

Professor EISENBUD. If you review the things that I have written 

on the subject, Mrs. Mink, I don't think you will find many places 

where I have said that it was an accident. 

Mrs. MINK. I am only referring to the record that you are creating today, and I want to make sure that the record states precisely 

what your belief was at that time and as you are reporting it to 

the committee today. 

Professor EISENBUD. I believe it was an accident just as the shuttle Challenger event was an accident. The Challenger accident 

could have been prevented, and this could have been prevented. 

That is as far as I will go. Now, I have heard suggestions that perhaps this test was conducted under the conditions that existed because somebody wanted 

to conduct an experiment, a human experiment. There is no evidence to that. There is no reason for it. It would be a cruel thing 

to accuse anybody of doing, and the information was not needed. 

Unhappily, as a result of the events in Japan, there were about 

100,000 survivors of the two bombings that provided enough material so that we knew quite well what the effect of radiation was. 

It is inconceivable to me that there would be anybody in a position 

of responsibility who would want to conduct an experiment of this 

kind. It would be murder. It wasn't done. 

Mrs. MINK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't quite know how to assess the witness's answers on his definition of an accident. However, I do want to note for the record, Mr. Chairman, that 

as one who wears high-heel shoes, I don't consider it my fault if 

I should stumble on the sidewalks of the District of Columbia. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MILLER. Professor Eisenbud, let me ask you a question following on to that. The Lulegian report that you referred to, this report more or less predicted what later occurred. Is that a fair characterization of that? 

Professor EISENBUD. It concluded that megaton bombs exploded 

so close to the surface that the fireball would touch the ground, 

would be capable of producing radiation for thousands of square 

miles-lethal radiation for thousands of square miles-and this 

was what we had been saying simply by extrapolating the information we gathered after the Jangle test in Nevada. But we did not 

have the technical expertise to really go at it in an organized, scientific way. Lulegian agreed to do it for us, and he came to that 

same conclusion. 

Mr. MILLER. So the genesis of his report was what? You asked 

him to do this or to take this into consideration? 

Professor EISENBUD. I wouldn't say we asked him to do it, but 

we had many discussions with him. We sort of used him as an advisor, and he decided to take a good look at it and put out a report, 

which I have the number of. It is ARDC, Report C3-36-417, classified secret November 1953, and I don't understand why that report 

can't be made available and why nobody seems to know that it exists. 

But again, we should not be speculating about these things 40 

years later. The culpability is in those people who decided not to 

have a formal investigation. Mr. MILLER. I understand. 
133 

What was the circulation of that report, to your knowledge? 

Professor EISENBUD. Oh, I don't know. I got a copy, and then it 

was recalled. 

Mr. MILLER. Recalled by? 

Professor EISENBUD. I remember it was somebody from Los Alamos, but I can't be more specific than that. 

Mr. MILLER. From the AEC. 

Professor EISENBUD. From the AEC laboratory. 

Mr. MILLER. Was that report intended to be circulated to members of the joint task force, do you know? 

Professor EISENBUD. I don't know. I had heard afterwardsMr. MILLER. Why did you get it? 

Professor EISENBUD. Why did I get it? Because I had been having 

discussions with him, and I think the motivation was the studies 

that we were conducting--

Mr. MILLER. Do you know of anybody else that got it. 

Professor EISENBUD. Let me just complete this, sir. 

The motivation for what we were doing-and we were putting a 

lot of effort in that that could have been devoted to other thingswas that we felt that we needed to find out, the world needed to 

find out, whether these bombs could be used in the way they were 

planned to be used. 

Mr. MILLER. You say we. I assume you are referring to the HASL 

organization. 

Professor EISENBUD. HASL, supported by the Division of Biology 

and Medicine. 

Mr. MILLER. Did other members of the HASL organization get a 

copy of this report? 

Profe~r EISENBUD. They wouldn't have gotten a copy, but they 

would have read it, probably three or four people who were my immediate associates. 

Mr. MILLER. Do you know that that is the case, that others within HASL read it? 

Professor EISENBUD. It is 40 years later. I don't know. 

Mr. MILLER. Was it sent to the organization? Was it sent only 

to you? I am trying to determine whether there were other people 

who would have, in fact, read this report, because this apparently 

was a matter of general discussion-What can we expect if we detonate it in the following manner?-is what you were saying. 

Professor EISENBUD. It was sent to me, and I read it, and I don't 

remember my reaction except that I know, because it made such 

an impression on me, I probably would have called my immediate 

branch chiefs in and reviewed it with them, but I don't remember 

that I did that. 

Mr. MILLER. So you haven't had subsequent discussions about 

that report with others who were involved in HASL or in the general discussions of the impacts of various types of detonation. 

Professor EISENBUD. Oh, we had much discussion about it because it influenced what we--

Mr. MILLER. Did you discuss this report? Did you six months 

later or a year later or ten years later with your colleagues, did you 

say, "Gee, you know Lulegian said this, that or the other thing"? 

I mean was this report a matter of comment? 
134 

I appreciate it was recalled, but did people understand the contents of it in terms of discussing what may have been expected or 

not expected or how you would modify this report based upon what 

you subsequently learned within the field? 

Professor EISENBUD. It definitely affected our planning for Castle. Mind you, his report was right after Mike, and we were beginning to plan for the Castle, and it affected our planning. Our plans 

were just that much more sophisticated. Do you want me to go into 

that? 

Mr. MILLER. Well, I think it is important because, again, I am 

looking at your background and your training, and apparently a 

question was raised about what would our expectations be if we 

continued to detonate bombs in a certain manner, and then a report was written, and then it went into your planning process. 

Now whether or not that was followed through with or not is a 

different issue, but the report had some currency in discussions 

among people who were scientifically involved in constructing the 

tests? 

Professor EISENBUD. Very much so, and I remember discussing 

the implications of the Lulegian report with field grade officers and 

perhaps one or two admirals at the CINCPAC headquarters in 

Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. MILLER. And the purpose of those discussions was? 

Professor EISENBUD. Well, it had been explained to us-and I 

may not be legally correct on this-but it had been explained to us 

that the Marshall Islands were assigned by the United Nations to 

the United States for administration and that within the United 

States Government the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, a military 

person, had responsibility for the security of the natives. 

I use that word again, but they were natives, natives of the Marshall Islands. I am a native of New York and North Carolina. 

And when we had our first discussions with CINCPAC prior to 

MIKE, it was on the basis that there could be no assurances of the 

safety of the people not only on the Marshall Islands but the Carolines and even out as far west as Guam unless there was a very 

sophisticated monitoring program installed, and he agreed to support it. The task force did not see the need for it, and we were just 

as happy because we got good support from CINCPAC, and it 

worked very well. 

I should explain what we did at HASL because it has some relevance and emphasized the urgency that we saw in the Castle series. 

We had mixed feelings about Castle. We, of course, didn't want 

to see any fallout on the atolls. But we knew that if the same thing 

that happened as happened at MIKE, all of the· fallout went into 

the ocean, this enormous expanse of ocean between the atolls, that 

we would not get the information that we needed, and we conceived 

the idea of spreading oil slicks on the surface of the ocean downwind of the blast. We would wait for the test, see which way the 

cloud was going, and then we would fly in and dump oil on the surface of the ocean and allow the fallout particles to collect on the 

oil so that we could then fly over the oil slicks with our 

scintillometers and make measurements. We had trouble finding 

oil that had the properties we needed, and the reason I stayed in 
135 

New York and didn't go forward to the Marshall Islands was that 

I felt it was very important that we carry on that experiment 

which was under way on both coasts of the United States in the 

ocean up to the last minute. As it turned out, we didn't need the 

oil slicks. 

Mr. MILLER. The oll slicks which didn't turn out and the discussions with CINCPAC were moving forward from the Nevada test 

and your New York experience and the recognition of no monitoring, and yet radioactivity is showing up at least across the country 

from Nevada to New York. I think you said in Iowa that this was 

happening, so you said, "We need a monitoring program." 

In the discussions with CINCPAC where they said, "Fine, we 

agree we should do this," because you were thinking this could conceivably go as far as Guam or elsewhere, the discussion of that and 

of the type of device to be detonated was clearly an ongoing discussion of the potential of really substantial amounts of radiation traveling very, very long distances. 

Professor EISENBUD. That was what motivated our interest in it. 

Actually--

Mr. MILLER. What I am trying to determine here is not that you 

tied down every corner-recognizing that you were dealing on the 

frontier of a lot of knowledge here about what to expect-I mean 

we look backwards and say that was one hell of a lot of explosions, 

but at the time, you were at the front end of a series of tests. You 

are not looking back 40 years; you are there at that moment. 

But this was not a surprise that radioactivity would be carried 

long distances. You didn't know whether it would turn out to be so, 

but apparently there was the discussion that this was clearly within the possibilities and then started taking actions based upon that 

to determine kinds of monitorings and what you might do to collect 

the data so you would know whether or not that was so. 

Professor EISENBUD. We were concerned about two kinds of fallout. It was recognized by 1952 that there would be worldwide deposition of fallout particles. It may seem cruel 40 years later to even 

discuss it, but there was a Project Gabriel that was carried on for 

some years, starting I think in 1946, to answer the ugly question 

of how many atom bombs could you explode before you contaminated the world so badly that everybody was going to get cancer. 

It doesn't seem possible that there could be such a study, but there 

was. HASL took the theoretical calculations and put them into 

practice by establishing a worldwide network so that we could 

make measurements throughout the world. 

This is a different kind of fallout than the fallout that occurs 

within a matter of minutes or hours after the blast of very high 

level fallout. It was that kind of fallout about which there was considerable argument. 

Not everybody agreed with me on what my view was, but my experience came from two tests. The TRINITY test was about a 15-

kiloton test from a tower which produced particles that burned 

cows some miles away and contaminated cornstalks in Iowa which 

were then processed by Eastman Kodak into that black interleaving paper that goes between x-ray films, and the films came out 

spotted. I have got a sample with me if you want to see it. 
136 

Mr. MILLER. I guess my point being that this wasn't a matter of 

first impression with the BRA VO detonation and what happened 

after that; this wasn't all hindsight. There were theoretical discussions going on prior to and in the construction and the design of 

the test and of the monitoring that fallout could travel long distances and may, in fact, have harmful impact and that we ought 

to know that. 

Professor EISENBUD. Certainly, and the astonishing thing, as I 

said earlier, was that having had the TRINITY experience and 

knowing that they were going to explode nuclear bombs on towers 

or air bursts relatively low to the ground, it is astonishing and inexplicable that at least a nationwide monitoring program wasn't in 

place by the time they started. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Any further questions? 

Congressman Evans. 

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor Eisenbud, you stated that there was no need for such 

human experimentation because there was significant data from 

Hiroshima, but that was an atomic test. Wouldn't BRAVO, being 

the first hydrogen bomb being detonated, wouldn't the effects of the 

radiation fallout from that test be the first important scientific data 

we have concerning fallout and other health impacts as far ashydrogen bombs were concerned? 

Professor EISENBUD. There is not a significant difference between 

the kind of radioactivity produced by the hydrogen bomb and the 

nuclear bomb. There is some difference, but it is not a significant 

difference. 

Mr. Ev ANS. How did we discover that there was no difference, or 

virtually no difference? 

Professor EISENBUD. Well, on theoretical grounds, most of the 

bang from the thermonuclear bombs comes from fission, the difference being that it involves fission uranium-238 rather than uranium-235, and the distribution of fission products that are produced by the two mechanisms was known. 

Now having said what I have said, let me say that there is another difference between the Japanese experience and what happened on BRAVO, and that was that the Japanese did not sustain 

fallout. These bombs were exploded high in the air, and there was 

essentially no fallout at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. There was 

some, but it resulted in very small doses. 

At BRA VO, we had the combination of about 175 rem of external 

exposure plus the concomitant exposure from internal emitters. 

These are the radioiodine and the cesium that gets inside the body 

and irradiates the body from the inside. 

Mr. EVANS. So there was significant data collected in these tests 

at Bikini in terms of fallout for whatever reasons they might have 

been conducted for the purposes of gathering data, if that was one 

of them; there would have been significant in terms of the return 

of information that was received. 

Professor EISENBUD. There was very valuable information obtained after BRA VO. Whether it is an accident or an act of nature 

or deliberate sabotage, generally there are lessons to be learned, 
137 

and people would be remiss if they did not go in and get whatever 

scientific information that can get out of it. 

Mr. EVANS. You basically indicated that data was sufficient from 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I take it, for purposes of determining the 

impact on human beings. Professor EISENBUD. The data from the Japanese experience was 

much more meaningful because the numbers of people were very 

much larger. 

Mr. EVANS. Except for fallout. 

Professor EISENBUD. Except for fallout. 

Mr. EVANS. Which is a pretty important reason to be conducting 

tests, I would assume. 

Professor EISENBUD. I think I am trying to differentiate between 

what one does after you have the fallout. You say, "Well, these poor 

children have had 1,000 rem to the thyroid; we had better have a 

medical team monitor them to see what is going to happen." Now 

that may produce new scientific information, but the initial motivation, hopefully, is that you want to look after the health of those 

children so that, if there are signs of their developing nodules or 

premalignant changes, necessary intervention can be arranged. 

Mr. Ev ANS. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much for your testimony, Professor 

Eisenbud. 

As I predicted, we are running into a time problem. I am going 

to combine panels three and four to make sure that we can get all 

of this testimony on the record, before we start to get disrupted by 

votes and the committee has an opportunity to question these. 

So I would ask Mr. David Weiman, and Howard Hills and Dr. 

Thomas Hamilton, Dr. Steven Simon, and Dr. Edward Radford to 

come forward, please, to the committee. This is occasioned both by 

the fact that people have irrevocable travel plans and we are about 

to start Floor consideration of the education bill. 

As you can see, the questions are numerous, so to the extent to 

which you can please summarize your testimony to the points that 

you think are most important for this initial hearing. We will obviously be following up with additional questions by the committee 

and by all of the Members. 

Mr. Weiman, welcome to the committee. 

PANEL CONSISTING OF DAVID M. WEIMAN ON BEHALF OF THE 

PEOPLE OF RONGELAP; HOWARD L. HILLS, ESQ.; THOMAS E. 

HAMILTON, M.D., CHIEF OF ENDOCRINOLOGY, DEPARTMENT 

OF MEDICINE, PACIFIC MEDICAL CENTER, SEATTLE: 

STEVEN L. SIMON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, NATIONWIDE RADIOLOGICAL STUDY, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS; AND EDWARD RADFORD, M.D., CONSULTANT TO 

THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WEIMAN 

Mr. WEIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 

here. 
138 

For two and a half years I represented the people of Rongelap, 

between 1988 and 1990. What I am presenting to you today are 

some of the results of research I completed at the end of 1990 and 

gave to Rongelap. 

This is an important hearing, and today your real constituents 

are the afflicted, the powerless, the irradiated, and, Mr. Chairman, 

a group of people who are uninformed. 

During my work for Rongelap, one of the things that we subsequently discovered is that medical and environmental programs in 

the Marshall Islands, established years after the BRA VO test, were 

being managed inside the Department of Energy by the Weapons 

Division. The Weapons Division was making medical and environmental decisions, management decisions, budget allocations, about 

what would be done and what wouldn't be done. 

Secretary Watkins in the Bush administration found this unacceptable, and he transferred the program. Senators Nunn, Warner 

and Exxon and others in the Senate, Senator Glenn in particular, 

found it unacceptable and put an amendment on the 1990 DOD 

bill. The program was transferred. 

AB a result of that revelation, Senator Anjain asked me to begin 

looking at other programmatic aspects of the program. I began a 

search that took me through tens of thousands of pages of historical documents, and at this point I want to pause and say particu- larly to Mr. de Lugo and to this committee condolences for Pat 

Krause. Pat was one of the members of this staff who greatly assisted my effort. Senator Glenn's committee, Mr. Chairman, Dan 

Beard, and the staff here, Ms. Doherty, and others were very instrumental several years ago in helping to assemble a body of information that we went through. We went through page after page, and during that search one of the things that we found was this. 

All the discussion this morning has been on BRAVO. BRAVO was 

one of 66 tests, and most of the literature will have you believe 

that the only off-site fallout came from BRA VO, and that is simply 

not the case. The BRAVO cloud went further, it exposed more people, it contaminated more land, and a lot of that, most of that, has 

remained undisclosed as of 1994. 

The Department of Energy's official position as to who got what 

is found on the basis of a 1978 survey. Within a year of that survey 

President Kabua of the Marshall Islands came to the United States 

and had a meeting down at the Interior Department with the U.S. 

Government. He said, "Our people don't believe that only 13 atolls 

got hit." That was a 1978 survey, and his concerns were expressed 

in 1979. The Department of Energy was firm, only 13 atolls. 

One of the things we found in the files was a draft report done 

in 1973 that indicated 17 or 18 atolls got hit from BRA VO alone, 

but more tests produced off-site fallout. The real question is not 

where did BRA VO go. That is a question but the real question is, 

What is the footprint, the radiation footprint, the fallout footprint, 

from the entirety of the tests? 

In 1982 the Defense Department published a history of the Castle series. It has got a table in there, and instead of 13 atolls and 

islands, there are more than double that listed as having received 

some off-site fallout. We know about the acute fallout. We know 

about Rongelap. We know about Rongerik. We know about 
139 

Ailinginae. We know about Utirik. Those have been well established in the literature, but it is incomplete. All of the maps they 

show you, report after report, they show a picture of the fallout 

cloud. 

But, Mr. Chairman, that cloud is frequently listed as the intermediate boundary, if it is listed that way at all. We never get to 

see the entire boundary. One of the interesting things about the 

planning documents for the 1978 survey, they acknowledge that 

seven or eight of the tests had fallout, and in the planning document they show the BRA VO fallout cloud. They have six other 

tests; no fallout pattern is shown for them. Why is that withheld? 

But that survey led to something that happened in this very 

room. In this very room, this committee approved enabling legislation for the Compact of Free Association. Mr. Weisgall earlier referenced article 8. Article 8 is very important in today's discussion 

because it is your yardstick. We can talk about bombs, and we can 

talk about fallout, but you have got to have a yardstick. The yardstick was this committee. The people of the Pacific, the people of 

the Marshall Islands, they were told everything that there was to 

know, and that is simply not true. The U.S. Government knew it 

not to be true at the time, and the supporting evidence of that is 

found in scores of memos, letter, documents, and other things. 

Right after the Castle series-the Castle series concluded in May 

of 1954--eight weeks later there was a conference. The conference 

was convened here in Washington, DC. There was a 250-page transcript from that conference, and it is a veritable Who's Who of the 

AEC at this conference. They sit and discuss what studies they will 

make about the Castle series, and in the course of the transcript 

there is a discussion about taking a body counter out to the islands 

to deal with the Marshall Islanders who received fallout. And they 

said, ''Well, where can we put it?" And there is some discussion 

about that, and it ends up with a comment that, "Majuro got a 

pretty good sock." Well, the significance of that is, Majuro is never 

listed as an atoll as having had fallout. 

Last night we saw on ABC an interview with a woman in New 

England who was a young woman at the time in Kwajelein. The 

significance of what you saw on television last night is, Kwajelein 

is listed as not having had fallout. But Kwajelein is where they 

evacuated the victims to. So we are taking people who were irradiated acutely, and we take them to an area that itself received fallout. Then three months later Utirik people go back to Utirik, and 

three years later the Rongelap people go back. They live in a chronically contaminated area now. 

Now the interesting thing about the 1978 survey is that at the 

very time this survey took place, and the need for this survey was 

recognized, scientists within the AEC at Brookhaven National Laboratory were looking up and they were troubled. Why were they 

troubled? Because about nine years after BRA VO the first thyroid 

cancers and thyroid abnormalities showed up. This was not supposed to happen. It was unexpected. That is acknowledged in the 

Eterature. In laymen's terms I will characterize it as the first 

spike. Six years later, where the doses were still lower at 

Ailinginae, a second spike occurs, and in the mid-1970s at Utirik 
140 

a spike occurs. It is very upsetting in the Marshalls, and it is very troubling. 

The Brookhaven team assembles, and they ask the question, 

maybe, just maybe, the fallout went to a different place. Maybe the 

cloud was a little different. Maybe the direction of BRA VO and 

some of the other tests-and they begin a study. None of this is 

disclosed during the compact negotiations, none of it. 

This study goes on for eight years, and, coincidentally, does not 

get completed until March of 1985 at the very time that Chairman 

Seiberling in this very room is getting ready to move the enabling legislation for the compact. 

And what did that study conclude? The dose assessments for 

Rongelap and Utirik for thyroid were 10-100 percent higher. The 

question turns, what about the people in the outlying zones? We 

now know that people out there were getting hit, and if we understate in 1978, 1979, and 1980-and, coincidentally, this is exactly 

when in the compact terms the negotiations began. This is exactly 

when they started to figure out what to do with the nuclear claims 

settlements, but this information is withheld. This information is 

not advanced. 

One of the things we saw in a recently declassified documentwe knew about Rongelap, we knew about Utirik, we didn't know 

about Ailuk. Yet in 1954, six weeks after the test in the official 

memorandum of the record-which I obtained about three years 

ago from the Defense Department, it was still classified in 1985 

when the committee was considering the compact legislation, and 

it wasn't declassified until later-there is another populated atoll 

that is acknowledged to have received fallout, Ailuk. 

But they made a decision, they made a decision. There were too 

many people to evacuate, so they didn't. They made a medical judgment at the time that they thought that the doses those people 

would receive over time would be medically insignificant. But over 

time those doses were larger than the people at Utirik got. They 

never go back when the Utirik spike occurs. They never go back. 

To this day, I don't think that has happened. 

March of 1985 is a very interesting month because it is also the 

month-and I don't want to preempt Dr. Hamilton's statementbut that month a confidential statement he writes based on his 

medical work two and a half years in the Marshalls in looking at 

7,000 people, that comes to this committee. 

Chairman Seiberling takes the confidential statement, which 

raises the specter that the cloud went the wrong way, it went further than admitted and exposed more people than acknowledged. 

The chairman takes that letter, that confidential statement, and he 

sends it down to the Interior Department and to the DEO negotiators. They write back to the committee in April of 1985, "I'm 

sorry, we can't comment. We can't comment because there is pending litigation and the physician was hired by the litigants." 

If the Department wasn't on notice from its own file material, it 

was surely on notice because of what the people, the Marshall Islands victims community, provided this committee, and they chose 

to do nothing. They chose to ignore this body of evidence, and today 

because of that there was a special provision added to the compact 

at the last minute. The Marshall Islands Government got sperial 
141 

funds to conduct their own radiological survey. You will get the report of that subsequently. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked how did some of this all happen and 

how did it happen in the compact? Well, there is a very interesting 

little correlation. The individual within the Department of Energy 

who was overseeing the Brookhaven study and deciding that this 

would somehow be a seven- or eight-year study was a man named 

Roger Ray. He is here today. He is in the audience. The same person was assigned by the Department of Energy to the compact negotiations team. So the very person who is making a recommendation on claims settlements is also in charge of the studies that reveal that the clouds go further. That information never makes it 

out on the table, notwithstanding the victims stepping forward and 

saying, ''We don't believe it," notwithstanding President Kabua, 

notwithstanding Phil Burton, notwithstanding Mo Udall, notwithstanding John Seiberling, notwithstanding Ron de Lugo, and now 

yourself. This committee asked; they asked the right questions. The 

people asked the right questions, and they knew they weren't getting straight answers. 

Mr. MILLER. We need you to wrap this up so we can give this 

panel its due time. 

Mr. WEIMAN. Whatever BRAVO was, BRA.VO was not an accident. 

One of the things we also found-Mr. de Lugo made reference to 

it earlier-was the Pate-Palmer report. You were asking Professor 

Eisenbud a lot of questions about the decisions associated with the 

BRA VO test. Let me take just a quick moment to tell you about 

that report. 

In 1953, eight months prior to BRA VO, a report is made directly 

to the commander of the joint task force, and this is by weather 

experts. They said, "Folks, you don't have a clue about the tropical 

weather patterns, and when you explode or detonate a thermonuclear device, you could lose control of it. It could react with condensation in the atmosphere, and you could lose control of this 

thing." 

That report was circulated; it was criticized. That was written in 

June of 1953, eight months before BRA VO on December 21. Christmas Eve, 1953, there is a letter from the commander of the task 

force, General Clarkson, to Al Graves, I believe, at Los Alamos. He 

says, "Look, when I disagree with my staff'-! am characterizing 

now; the committee has been provided a copy of the report and 

these letters-"! think we should recall all the copies, stick it in the 

file, and kill it," and they do. It disappears, and interestingly 

enough, in some of the histories that are discussed about what happened, we see nothing about that. 

Mr. Chairman, I had the pleasure and the privilege to represent 

Jeton Anjain for two and a half years. He died last year of cancer, 

and in many ways I think this hearing today and the reason we 

are gathered here today, all of us, is as much to do with the work 

of Jeton Anjain and his belief that he was not told the truth. He 

demanded to know more. He was not told more. 

He would come here frequently, and he would testify before Congress. In the private conversations that I would have with him, he 

knew that he could not change BRAVO, he knew that for his gen-
142 

eration BRA VO was fixed in history and was fixed in their bodies 

for whatever would happen, but he cared about the children. He 

cared about the future. Every statement that Jeton Anjain gave to 

Congress ended with, "I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you on 

behalf on Rongelap and especially the children." 

Jeton Anjain is not here today, so, Mr. Chairman, on his behalf, 

on behalf of him for all the Marshallese people, I thank you, especially for the children. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Weiman follows:] 
143 

DA YID WEIMAN 

SUMMARY KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 

1. FAI.LOtrr 

(a) Fallout extended further, exposed more people, contaminated 

more land than ever admitted by DOD or DOE. 

(b) DOE never displays or reveals "radiation footprint" fallout pattern 

of aU 66 tests ( critical for establishing who might have received 

fallout). 

(c) Approximately one-in-three of 66 tests created offsite (other atoll) 

fallout at some level. 

Findings supported by: 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

DOD and AEC/DOE file materials, studies, reports, letters, 

memos and other documentary evidence 

Radiation measurements by ships, airplanes and hand-held 

meters, as reported in DOD reports 

Medical analysis (Dr. Hamilton, 1985) 

Medical prediction (Conard, 74) 

Testimonials (first hand accounts) 

2. UNDISCLOSED CLASS OF RADIATION VICTIMS IN MARSHALL 

ISI.ANDS 

(a) Entire generation of nuclear orphans in the Marshalls. 

(b) Risk never evaluated, medical condition never ascertained. 
144 

2 

3. COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION (1986) 

(a) US, in C.Ompact with Marshall Islands, declares full disclosure 

about radiation from atomic testing program. but US declaration 

false, and US either knew it to be false or had responsibility to 

know it was false. 

(b) US lied to UN, C.Ongress, Marshall Islands Government and public. 

4. BRAVO TEST- SUPPRESSED WEATHER REPORT 

(a) DOD killed, at highest command level, weather report warning of 

weather-wind risks 8 months prior to Bravo. 

(b) H-Bomb test C.Ommander recalled report and it remained classified 

until recently. 

5. 40th ANNIVERSARY OF BRA VO COVERUP 

(a) March 1, 1954, 40th anniversary of Bravo test. 

(b) Story remains incomplete. 

6. IMPLICATIONS 

(a) Thryroid disease among "unexposed" Marshallese popluation not 

anticipated. 

(b) Opportunity to avoid thyroid disease - early detection -- ignored 

by DOE. 

( c) Integrity of Compact threatened. 

DA YID M. WEIMAN 

635 Matyland Aw:nue, N.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20002 

(202) 54M11S 
145 

SfATEMENT OF DAVID M. WEIMAN 

ON 

MARSHAIL !SI.ANDS RADIATION 

BEFORE TIIB SUBCOMMfITEE ON OVERSIGI-IT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

HOUSE COMMITfEE ON NATIJRAL RESOURCES 

February 24, 19<J4 

The invitation to appear before this Committee is appreciated. 

Mr. Chairman, you are to be commended for holding this hearing -- on the eve of the 40th 

Anniversary of the infamous Bravo thermonuclear test. The nation and the world owes you 

and this Committee an enormous debt of gratitude. This investigation is one of the most 

important to be undertaken by the 103rd Congress. Today, the afflicted, the powerless and 

the irradiated are your constituents. 

RDngelap Representation. From 1988 until 1990, I represented the Rongelap Atoll Local 

Government and its leader, Senator Jeton Anjain. Throughout this period of representation, 

the Department of Energy vigorously opposed Rongelap's work. An atoll government -- for 

the members of this Committee not familiar with the Pacific -- is, politically, roughly 

equivalent to a State. My client relationship ended October 1, 1990. 

65,000-Page Review. During the course of my work for Rongelap, historical materials from 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) were extensively 

reviewed - approximately 65,000 pages of documents. What I am presenting has been taken 

from this large body of information. In addition, a series of interviews with individuals who 

participated in the Pacific testing program -- at the time or since -- was conducted. 

Bravo Falwul Pattern Bigger than DOE Ever Admitted. 

FALL.OUT FROM THE MARCH 1, 1954 "CASTLE-BRA VO" 

TEST WENT FURTHER AND DIRECfL Y EXPOSED 

MORE PEOPLE AND CONTAMINATED MORE lANDS 

THAN AEC/DOE OR THE MILITARY'S JOINT TASK 

FORCE 7 EVER ADMITTED. THE IMPLICATIONS 

TODAY -- MEDICAL AND POLITICAL -- ARE FARREACHING. 
146 

2 

Falloul "Footprint" - All Tests - Bigger than DOE Ever Admilted. Offsite fallout occurred 

(fallout on atolls outside the test site), not just from Bravo, as most of the official literature 

indicates, but perhaps from more than one in three tests (20-25 of the 66 tests), according 

to DOD and AEC/ERDNDOE files. 

Medical ConJrols Likdy "Exposed" to FallouL Immediately after Br11vo in 1954, when 

AEC/DOE established the medical program, it created medical "controls" •· a group of 

individuals, similar in age and sex, but who were not exposed to fallout, for purposes of 

medical evaluation. The "unexposed" class of individuals, however, were selected from atolls 

which likely received some exposure to radiation directly from fallout or were individuals 

who lived in contaminated areas after the tests. In other words, the medical controls were 

themselves "exposed." The medical evaluations over forty years, at the very least, are, 

understated or otherwise compromised. 

DOE and DOD FallouJ Records Unavailable Al 7ime of Compact. According to DOE and 

DOD documents and records unavailable at the time (a) when the Compact was negotiated 

and (b) when Congress considered the Compact, radioactive fallout from the US Pacific 

nuclear testing program extended throughout the Marshall Islands to Kwajelein, Amo, 

Majuro, Ailuk and many other atolls and islands. Bravo's fallout •· at significantly lower 

radiation levels - even reached populated areas in the Caroline Islands (Federated States 

of Micronesia) such as Kusaie and Ponape 400-600 miles to the south and southwest of 

Bikini. 

Throug/wul 17-Year Compact Negotiations, Key Falloul Data Wllhheld. Marshall Island 

leaders and their representatives demanded full disclosure regarding the nuclear testing 

program. The US Government negotiators assened that everything was disclosed. The 

negotiators had access to DOD and DOE fallout data, but failed to disclose it or the 

resulting health and safety implications to the RMI Government, the Marshallese people, 

the Rongelap people, the High Commissioner of the Trust Territories, the United Nations, 

the U.S. Congress or the public throughout the 17-year negotiations on the Compact and its 

subsidiary agreements. 

Implications. There are rwo primary implications of DOE actions. 

(1) Nuclear Orphans. By neglect, deliberate or 

otherwise, DOD and DOE have created a 

generation of "nuclear orphans," individuals, 

Marshallese and Non-Marshallese, exposed to 

radiation from the 66 atomic tests, but never 

examined or treated during or since the program 

was established in 1946. 

(2) Compact Declaration False. Significant data and 

previously unavailable information have been 
147 

3 

obtained which overwhelmingly suggests that a 

key baseline declaration in the Compact is false 

and that the US knew it was false. 

Compact of Free Association - Diplomatic Framework &~em US and Marshall Islands. On 

June 25, 1983, the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) signed the 

Compact of Free Association and enabling legislation from the US Congress, advanced by 

this Committee, was enacted on January 14, 1986 (Public Law 99-239). Consistent with the 

UN Charter, RMI began the process towards self-governance and the United States 

concluded almost 4Q_years of trusteeship pursuant to the UN Charter. 

US 9'mplict Declaration - Radiation Testing History Disclosed. From the Marshallese 

-6'ovemment's perspective (notwithstanding intense local opposition) the Compact's 

centerpiece was the comprehensive nuclear claims settlement provisions, known as the 

Section 177 Agreement. In Article VIII, the US Government declared that: 

111e Government of rhe Unired Srares has 

concluded that: (a) The Northern Marshall Islands 

Radiological Survey and related environmental 

studies conducted by rhe Government of the Unired 

Srates presem rite best effort of that Government 

accurarely ro evaluate and describe radiological 

conditions in rite Marshall Islands. 

Compact Declaration - False - and US Knew IL The Compact's declaration was not 

accurate. It was not true. It was not close. Almost every aspect of Article VIII was false. 

The US Government negotiators either knew it was false or surely had the ability to know 

it was false. The US Government had the responsibility to disclose. It elected not to do so. 

The US Government -- and DOD and DOE in particular -- sought to limit liability and 

restrict accountability. The basic premise, that the US evaluated and described "accurately" 

the radiological conditions in the Marshall Islands, was plainly wrong. 

Had Negotiotors Been More Forthcoming, US Would Have Revealed: 

John Harley, AEC scientist, stated at July 1954 

AEC meeting shortly after the conclusion of the 

six-test Castle series in Room 1201, Temporary 3 

Building in Washington, "Majuro got a prerry good 

sock." Majuro, according to the DOE in past 40 

years of official reports, was not among those 

atolls listed as having received fallout. Majuro is 

the Capitol of the Marshall Islands. 
148 

4 

Kwajelein Atoll, one of the largest and most 

populated atolls, received fallout from US 

atmospheric tests conducted in the Pacific. Like 

Majuro, 40 years of official DOE reports do not 

acknowledge Kwajelein as having received fallout. 

DOE's scientists at Brookhaven and Lawrence 

Livermore, following unexpected thyroid problems 

at Utirik in mid-70's, began to realize that fallout 

was more widespread and began 

programmatically to address the possibility. This 

work, performed while Compact negotiations 

were pending, was not fully disclosed in a timely 

or forthright manner. 

DOD stated, in April 1954, that the "only other 

populated atoll which received fa/lout of any 

consequence at all was Ailuk," but the Ailuk 

people have not been told or considered pan of 

the 40-year medical follow-up program. Given 

the medical problems at Utrik, Ailuk, which was 

estimated to get a similar dose over time, should 

have been included in a comprehensive medical 

review at least beginning in the mid-1970's. 

In 1974, Dr. Rohen Conard, head of the AEC's 

Marshall Islands Medical Program at Brookhaven 

National Laboratory, stated a repon, " ... from our 

surveys of the unexposed people of Rongelap and 

Likiep (a nearby atoll not exposed to [8ravoj 

fallout)." Likiep did receive fallout, but the. error 

has never been acknowledged or corrected. 

Fallout extended to populated and unpopulated 

atolls in approximately one out of three tests, but 

much of this story remains unknown and 

undisclosed. 

Files Reveal and the Files Conceal Documentary evidence supporting this information is 

contained in DOD or AEC/ERDNDOE files. Some of it was classified and some of it 

wasn't. During the 1980's, and particularly after 1985, DOD and DOE began to declassify 

some important documents, although many are only panially declassified. Declassification 

does not mean "instant access" or even awareness. 
149 

5 

DOE 1978 Survey Pfan - Stated Purpose. The stated purposes of the 1978 DOE Survey' -

- referenced in the Compact (Article VIII, Section 177) - were: 

... to provide a documentation of the remaining radioactivity from 

nuclear testing and to provide support data for an assessment of 

the radiation dase to people befon lhe taminaJion of lhe United 

Nations Dust AgrumenL ( emphasis added) 

DOE Ddermines Which AIOlls and Islands in Northern Marshalls IO be Surveyed. There were 

four formal objectives of the survey, the first of which was to, "obtain aerial photos and aerial 

radiological maps of the Northern Marshall Atolls and islands." 

The DOE survey plan then stated: 

A study has identified 11 atolls and 2 islands as those most likely 

to have received fallout from one or more nuclear tests conducted 

at Bikini and Enewetak during the U.S. Pacific testing program. 

The 13 AIOlls and Islands. The survey plan then identifies the individual eleven atolls and 

two islands included in the survey: 

. Ailinginae . Ailuk . Bikar • Bikini . Likiep . Rongelap 

• Rongerik . Taka 

Ujelang • Utirik 

• Watha • Jemo Island . Mejit Island 

Significance - List of 13. This list is significant for two reasons. First, the DOE has never 

been able to produce this "study" cited in its planning report. DOE is unable, to this day, 

to explain how or why these determinations were made. Apparently the unidentified study 

no longer exists. Second, this list more than doubled the number of atolls acknowledged to 

have received fallout from the nuclear testing program. DOE's Brookhaven National 

Laboratory (BNL) regularly published reports from 1954 to the 1980s on Bravo and its 

follow-up, but specifically indicated that six atolls, not 13, received fallout from Bravo. 

DOE ConJractor Survey Report - Conlradiction as to Purpose. In DO E's 1977 internal memos 

and the 1978 planning document for the 13-atoll survey, it was characterized as a "screening" 

survey, but by the time the report was completed, it was transformed into a "complete and 

Rtulinlogical Survey Plan for the Nonhem Marshall ls/ands, August 22, 1978, U.S. Depanment of 

Energy. 
150 

6 

comprehensive radiological survey" according to EG&G, a DOE contractor. In their report, 

EG&G stated: 

The United Nations trust agreement i.s presently scheduled 10 end 

in 1981. II was felt that a comple1e and comprehensive 

radiological survey was required, prior to the termination of the 

agreement, over those atolls known to have been, or suspected of 

having been, contaminated during the U.S. Pacific testing program. 

Real Purpose of Northern Marshalls Survey Una:rtain - EW!II Today. Today, a question 

remains: what was the purpose of the DOE smvey? Was it a "screening" survey or was it 

the "complete and comprehensive radiologicaf' survey? How and why was EG&G able to 

make its stated claim? EG&G concluded that Ailuk, Llkiep, Wotho, Ujelang, Mejit and 

Jemo "do not appear to have received a11y significant direct contamination from the Bravo event 

or the other tests ... " What does "do not appear' mean? What does "significant" mean? Those 

phrases and terms are never defined. 

DOE Repon on Fallout from Pacific Tests. The 1978 DOE Northern Marshall Islands Survey 

Plan contained two documents identified as "Fallout from Pacific Tests," and "Fallout PallemBravo Event 1954." The first is a one-page listing which identified the specific atolls in the 

fallout area and identified the specific atmospheric tests which affected these atolls. This 

listing indicates that seven2 different atmospheric nuclear tests contaminated 13 atolls and 

islands. The contaminated areas are limited to the "northern" Marshall Islands. 

Bravo Fallout Panem - As Reported In Survey Plan. DOE displays what is reported to be 

the Bravo fallout pattern on a regional map which identifies each of the 11 atolls and 2 

islands in the Northern Marshalls (except Ujelang). This map suggests the fallout pattern 

is definitive and in no way suggests any uncertainties. 

Undisplayed Fallout Patterns. The only fallout pattern displayed, though incomplete, is 

Bravo, one of the seven acknowledged tests that deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands. 

Fallout patterns from the six other identified tests are not displayed, including: 

• 

• 

Sandstone Zebra 

Castle Union 

Castle Yankee 

Hardtack Maple 

Ivy King 

Hardtack Magnolia 

3 There were 66 announced tests. Acrording to the DOE study plan, seven or these tests produced 

rauout which impacted 13 atolls and islands during the 12-year period or testing. 
151 

7 

Yidds From Other Off$iu Tests Similar to Bruvo. Bravo was a 15 Megaton (MT) test and is 

the largest thermonuclear device ever detonated by the US in its history. Castle Union was 

estimated to be 6.9 MT and Castle Yankee was 13.5 MT. It should be noted that the Castle 

Series produce, from six tests in ten weeks, a collective 48 MT yield. Offsite fallout may 

have scattered across all atolls and islands in the region. 

Bravo - FalloUI PatUm Ratricled, Jncomplele. What is displayed from the Bravo test in the 

Survey Plan is also limited. Only seven of the 13 identified atolls are within the displayed 

Bravo fallout contours. The Survey Plan only displays fallout from two conditions •· the 

"High Level Contours" (Bikini, Ailinginae, Rongelap, Rongerik) are shown identifying four 

specific areas with solid lines. A second zone, identified with dash-lines, indicated the 

boundary of the "Estimated lnrennediate Conrour" for the Bravo event. Three additional 

atolls - Bikar, Utirik, and Taka •· fall into this category. Wotho, Ujelang, Ailuk, Likiep 

atolls, and Jemo and Mejit islands are outside the two identified fallout zones. Bravo's 

ultimate boundary is not displayed. 

DOE Aware That Falloul .Extended Further Than Reported - Resulting in Serious Medical 

Implications. DOE knew that fallout extended further than ever publicly revealed. This data 

and information, however, was not included in the Nonhern Marshalls Survey, which, as 

previously indicated (Page 3) according to the Compact3

, represented "rhe best effort of [rhe 

US] Government accurately to evaluate and describe radiological conditions in rhe Marshall 

Islands." Significantly, this statement is not restricted to the "Nonhern" Marshall Islands. 

It references the entire Marshalls. In general, consider the following: 

• 

• 

Brookhaven staff, medical and radiologica~ were 

concerned by the une:xpected development of rhyroid 

disease at Urrik in mid-70's. As a result, an eightyear programmatic effort was iniriared beginning in 

1977 10 examine rhe cause including rhe possibility 

that rhe Bravo and other fallout clouds e:xtended 

further than ever known. Funding for the BNL 

review was provided by DOE. This effort, its 

questions and findings, are not disclosed to 

Marshall Islands Government or atoll governments 

in any timely fashion. 

Lawrence Livennore National Laboraro,y (LLNL), 

under contract to Brookhaven, in an unpublished 

study, e:xamines direction of Bravo. 

• The Compact of Free Association, Section 177 Subsidiary Agreement, Atticle VIII. 
• 

• 

• 

* 

• 

152 

8 

AEC, in a 1973 draft report, had determined that 

the Bravo fa/lout cloud !!!fil'. have contaminated as 

many as 18 atolls and islands, including populated 

atolls such as Kwajelein and Majuro. 

Official reports published by DOD/DNA in 1982 

indicate that as many as 25 atolls and islands, 

including islands in the Caroline Islands, were 

contaminated by Bravo. 

Rongelap consultant Dr. Thomas Hamilton 

submilled a "Confidential Statement" to the House 

Interior Commillee in March 1985 in which he sets 

forth the proposition that the Bravo fallout pattern 

extended further. As a result, many more 

Marsha/Iese citizens, categorized as "unexposed" 

where actually exposed in 1954, which may distort 

DOE Marshall Islands medical analysis. It suggests 

that these cancers can occur with very small 

exposures. Chainnan Seiberling requests, 

immediately prior to markup of Compact 

legislation, DOE and DOI response to Hamilton. 

The Administration refuses comment on the 

grounds that litigation was pending. 

Dr. William Bair, Chainnan of DOE's Marshall 

Islands Advisory Group, reported his Commi11ee's 

opposition to the Northern Marsha/ls survey. The 

opposition was based on the stated assumption that 

Bravo fall out pattern "was well characterized." 

However, in the same memo, Bair reveals that 

"learned that the fallout patterns were modeled by 

several agencies, that the models differed 

substantially ... that characterization of the fallout 

pallems were not precise ... Some surprises could 

result from the survey." 

Marshall Islands Government, in May 1979, 

immediately after approving their new 

Constitutional Government, attended a meeting in 

Washington with US officials at which they asserted 

the fallout from Bravo and other tests extended 

further than the acknowledged 13 atolls and 

islands. They then demanded all documentation 
• 

• 

• 

153 

9 

on the tests. It is not known whether or not this 

request was ever complied with, and if so, how. 

DOE never wavers in its declaration that 13 atolls 

and islands represent Bravo's boundary. 

DOE has not published a complete and 

comprehensive radiation fa/lout footprint of Bravo. 

DOE has not published a comprehensive radiation 

fallout footprint of, singularly or collectively, all 66 

tests. 

Finally, DOE has had full and complete access to 

all classified documents regarding the 66 

announced tests and their collective f al/out pa11ems 

from the inception of the testing period. DOE has 

had full and complete knowledge of the fact that 

the fallout pattern was more extensive than 

admitted in the Compact. 

Comparison - Fallout From Bravo and Other Tests as Revealed by AEC!DOE. The following 

table displays ''fallout disclosure" at different times and from different sources. Brookhaven, 

in their reports, defined fallout for more than 20 years in the most limited manner. DOE, 

during the Compact, defined the parameters of fallout exclusively by the Northern Marshalls 

Radiological Survey. However, some five years before that survey was initiated, the AEC, 

in a draft staff paper on fallout from the Pacific tests, estimated that fallout from Bravo and 

the other tests reached 18, not 13 atolls and islands. The DOD, in 1982, defined fallout 

from just Bravo as being far more extensive. From the AEC and the DOD, it is learned that 

Ailuk with 401 individuals would have realized a dose over time similar to that experienced 

in Utrik at the time of the test. Many of the most heavily populated atolls, such as 

Kwajelein and Majuro were exposed to Bravo fallout. 

Somewhat ironically, the disclosures from the Defense Department are far more forthcoming 

than similar disclosures from DOE. 
154 

JO 

FAILOUT - AFFECTED ATOI.LS - PACIFIC NUCLEAR TFSfS 

BROOKHAVEN NORlHERN 

MEDICAL MARSHAUS AEC(1973) DoD (1954, 

REPORTS SURVEY (1978) 1982) 

1954-1990 

Rongelap Rongclap Encwetat Lae 

Rongcrik Utirik Bikini Ujae 

Ailinginae Taka Ailinginae Wotho 

Utirik Bikar Rongelap Ailinginae 

Bikini Rongrik Rongerik Rongelap 

Bikar Ailinginae Taka Rongerik 

Taka Likiep Bikar Taongi 

Ailuk Utirik Bikar 

Jemo Ujelang Utirik 

Mejil Ailuk Taka 

Wotho Likiep Mejit 

Ujelang Jemo Ailuk 

Bikini Wotho Jemo 

Likiep Kwajelein Likiep 

Wotje Nam 

Taongi Ailinglapalp 

Ujae Arno 

Lae Majuro 

Aur 

Maleolap 

Erikub 

Wotje 

Kusaie 

Ponape 

Ujelang 

Pingelap 

Bikini 
155 

11 

lJroolchawm Medical Report& - Fallow OfJicialJy Defined For Quarter Century. The 

Department of Energy's most visible description of Bravo fallout was published by 

Brookhaven National Laboratory in a series of reports on the medical conditions of the socalled "exposed" populations of Rongelap and Utrik. These reports, until approximately 

1980 and published every few years, each contained charts of the Bravo fallout pattern. 

Over the years, Bravo fallout patterns were displayed by BNL at least three different ways. 

DOE/Brookhaven LJmil.s Scope of Exposed CommuniJia and Individuals. In addition to 

charts and figures, narrative statements in these reports affirm the limitation of the fallout 

profile. According to Dr. Conard, the long-time director of the BNL MI Medical Program, 

in September 1975, stated in the BNL Report, "A 1wenty Year Review of Medical Findings 

in a Ma~hallese Population Accidently Exposed 10 Radioactive Fallout:" 

The atolls involved in the 1954 accident are located in the 

northern Ma~halls: Rongelap and Ailinginae about 100 nautical 

miles east of Bildn~ Rongerik about 135 miles east of Bikini and 

Utirik about 275 miles east of Bikini. 

There is NO discussion in any of these reports the fallout extended further in any direction. 

AEC/DOE, FalloUl, and the Term "Significant'. In documents, reports and other materials, 

AEC/DOE consistently characterizes Bravo fallout as "significant." There was significant 

fallout here or there. Or, the opposite is stated. There was NO significant fallout in this 

place or that place. AEC/DOE consistently avoids identifyinii where the Bravo fallout 

pattern ends. A map displaying Bravo's complete fallout pattern has never been seen. 

Maps displaying other test fallout patterns have never been included in any Brookhaven 

reports. 

AEC DocummJs in 1954 Indicate that Ailuk Atoll Received As Much or More Fallow Than 

Utirilc. Ailuk Atoll lies approximately 75 miles south and slightly west of Utirik. The earliest 

AEC Bravo reports acknowledge that Bravo fallout reached Ailuk. According to documents 

declassified after the Compact was negotiated and submitted to Congress: 

The only other populated atoll which received fallout of any 

consequence al all was Ailuk. .. Based on the best estimate of 

fa/lout lime it was calculated that a dose lo infinite lime would 

reach approximately 20 roentgens. Balancing the effort required 

to move the 400 inhabitants against the fact that such a dose 

would not be a medical problem ii was decided not to evacuate 

the atoll. 

Utrik, By Mid-70's, Experiencing Thyroid Cancers From 10-15r Exposure - Whal Happened 

At Ailu/c?. Rongelap thyroid problems were acknowledged by AEC/DOE to have been 

unexpected when they began occurring in 1963. They were also unexpected when they 
156 

12 

occurred in the Ailinginae group beginning in 1969. The Utrik "spike" in thyroid related 

problems occurred in the mid-1970s. This was considered notewonhy because Rongelap 

received a dose estimated to be almost 20 times greater than Utrik. Ailuk was estimated 

to receive over time a dose greater than Utrik. In 1985, BNL reevaluated the Rongelap 

thyroid exposure estimates and increased them by factors of 10 to 100. DOE has not 

indicated what this means for thyroid doses at Utirik, Ailuk, and other Marshall Island atoll 

commumues. Would these exposures be higher by a factor of 10 to 100 as well? 

Remember, Ailuk was not evacuated because AEC determined the dose received over time 

would not be a health hazard. Giving AEC/DOE the benefit of the doubt (the March 1954 

decision not to evacuate was made in good faith), DOE should have gone back and 

undertaken a comprehensive medical review of the Ailuk people. It did not happen. 

Brookhaven's medical program has not, to the best of my knowledge, included Ailuk in its 

medical review program. 

IA. Hamillon - Fa/kJuJ Patterns and Thyroid Cancers - The Medical Connection. In the early 

1980's Rongelap retained Dr. Thomas Hamilton to medically evaluate persons injured by 

radiation from Bravo and the other tests. In March 1985, he completed his extensive report. 

Additionally, Hamilton submitted a three-page Confidential Statement to the Honorable 

John Seiberling, Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks. Given the 

significance of this statement, and its exceptional analytical insight, the complete portion of 

this statement is presented here. According to Hamilton: 

The second issue I wish to address is the geographical extent of the 

nuclear fallout from the 1954 BRA VO test and the potential 

health hazard to people presently living in these northern Marshall 

Islands. As you may know, the only inhabited atolls consi4ered by 

Brookhaven National Laboratory to have been "exposed" to 

nuclear fallout in March 1954 are Rongelap and Utirik. In the 

Brookhaven study, people from the remaining northern atolls are 

considered 10 have been unexposed to radiation and are designated 

as a "controf' group. However, while the external radiation doses 

to the people living on Rongelap and Utirik on March 1, 1954 

have been well published, 1 have been unable to find any 

documentation in the Brookhaven literature that the other 

northern atolls were actually detennined to be unexposed in 1954; 

I have found only assertio11S 10 that effect. In fact, an August, 

1978 Department of Energy document entitled "radiological Survey 

Plan for the Northern Marshall Islands contai11S an unreferenced 

statemem that, "in addition to Enewetak, Bikini and Rongelap 

atolls, there are eleven other atolls or single islands that received 

intennediate range fallout from one or more of the megaton range 

tests". 
157 

13 

In 1982, I began to find what I felt were excess numbers of thyroid 

nodules among people who resided in the nonhern rnarshall 

islands in 1954. I was also given vivid descriptions by people who 

saw and felt fallout powder from the BRA VO test on inhabited 

atolls other than Rongelap and Utirik. I therefore began a 

systematic evaluation of thyroid neoplasia in people living in the 

northern Marshall Islands.- I use the term thyroid neoplasia 

interr:hangeably with thyroid tumors and thyroid nodules; these can 

be either benign or malignant. 

By the end of this month, I will have performed thyroid 

examinations on over 7,000 people from the northern atolls and 

from 3 southern atolls; I consider these southern atolls to be the 

best available unexposed control group in the Marshall Islands. 

While I am just beginning to process this information for 

publication, there are two imponant patterns which have emerged. 

The first is that there are several nonhern atolls in which the 

prevalence rates of thyroid neoplasia (benign and malignant) are 

equal to or greater than those observed by Brookhaven on Utirik 

Atoll where the radiation dose is known. Secondly, the rates of 

thyroid neoplasia in two of the southern atolls are two to three 

times lower than the "controf' rates determined by Brookhaven for 

the nonhern islands, suggesting that these northern islands may not 

have been valid control groups. If these preliminary conclusions 

are substantiated, Mr. Seiberling, they will suggest that nuclear 

fallout from the 1954 BRA VO test (and possibly other tests) was 

considerably more extensive than previously assened. A critical 

question, therefore, is whether people now living in the nonhem 

Marshall ls/ands are at increased risk for developing cancer ( other 

than thyroid cancer) and genetic defects as a result of te"estrial 

and food chain contamination from nuclear fall out. 

I would like to elaborate on why my work suggests this may be the 

case. Thyroid nodules arising from radiation from nuclear fallout 

are caused chiefly by isotopes of radioactive iodine. These isotopes 

are very short-lived and decay rapidly within several months. 

Therefore, since radioiodine from that test would have decayed by 

Summer, 1954, people must have been present at the time in order 

to lzave received radioiodine from the BRA VO detonation. It is 

thus my opinion that the excess thyroid nodules which I am 

finding in people from the nonhem Marshall Islands had to have 

been caused by direct injury from radioiodine exposure in March, 

1954, rather than by chronic food chain contamination: If 
158 

14 

radwiodine was prese111 in the northern Ma~hall Islands in 1954, 

then il would have been accompanied by long-lived isotopes 

(cesium-137, srronmun-90 and plulonium-239) which most 

probably are still present in 1985. Evm in low levels, these longlived i.so«>pes in the food chain could be responsible for producing 

increase risk of developing cancer of all types. 

Congress Requests Response and Explanation of Hamilk1fl's Studio. Hamilton's "Confidential 

Statement" along with a second paper on medical findings was submitted at the March 1985 

Interior Committee hearing on the Compact. Chairman Seiberling submitted both reports 

by Hamilton to the Depanment of Interior's Assistant Secretary Montoya for immediate 

response. In April 1985, Interior responded for itself and DOE refused to comment on 

Hamilton's report on the grounds he was a consultant to Rongelap attorneys and litigation 

was pending. The DOI/DOE response, it appears, deliberately avoided Hamilton's 

statement regarding fallout and thyroid cancers. Regardless, DOE was "on notice" regarding 

the problem and DOE elected to be silent about it. 

Hami/Jon Worlc Never ConsidemJ During Kohn's Rongdap &assessmenl Project Repon. This 

Committee authored a special provision of the Compact mandating that a special review of 

the habitability of Rongelap be undertaken. Dr. Henry Kohn, whose work has been largely 

discredited, for reasons he has not been willing to reveal, elected to exclude Hamilton's work 

from the statutoiy review. 

Hamilton and Broolchavm Both Question Relationship .Betwttn FalloUl and Thyroid Cancer. 

Hamilton, based upon two and a half years (1982-85) of medical examinations in the 

Marshalls, drew a powerful connection between fallout and thyroid cancer. Brookhaven, it 

turns out, was doing the same thing. Both reported their findings in March, 1985. By 1976 

unexpected thyroid cancers began appearing in the Utrik community. BNL's resident 

physician (Kotrady) issued a highly critical report in January 1977 shortly after leaving the 

program. A few months later, BNL held meetings to discuss the medical and radiological 

inconsistencies between Rongelap and Utrik. This led to a major BNL review that would 

last eight years - until March 1985 - when BNL published a report. Brookhaven concluded 

that fallout went in different directions than previously known and doses to Rongelap and 

Utrik were understated, by 10-100%. 

Broolch/Iven Review - Excluded From Northern ManhaJls Surwy. The BNL review, funded 

and supported by DOE, included a full review of fallout from Bravo and the other tests. It 

began just before the Northern Marshalls Survey was initiated. It ended two and a half 

years after the survey was completed. Coincidently, it was published just as Compact 

legislation was finalized. However, none of this work and none of the findings would be 

integrated into the Northern Marshalls Radiological Survey. Brookhaven's investigation was 

held separate and apart from the Northern Marshalls Survey. Their findings failed to trigger 

a major review, which, given the findings, was fully warranted. 
159 

15 

BNL FalloUI Review ConlTIJCt. BNL speculated that perhaps, after a quarter of a century, 

the original belief about Bravo fallout was incorrect -- or at least insufficient. Perhaps the 

unexplained thyroid cancers were caused by direct exposure to Bravo fallout from the time 

of the test. New techniques and improved fallout modeling were available by the late 1970's, 

BNL contracted with UNL to review the Bravo fallout pattern using these new computer 

technologies. The LLNL investigator, Kendall Peterson, concluded the Bravo cloud went 

further south than previously believed in a "draft" report submitted to BNL in May 1981. 

It is believed that Peterson's report was never published by LLNL, though it was issued an 

LLNL number. BNL references Peterson's work in their March 1985 report on the subject. 

By 1985, the focus of the BNL effort is limited to the implications for Rongelap and Utrik, 

with little or no concern for the greater implication -- others in the Marshalls were exposed 

to low doses and the medical control group may have been exposed to fallout. 

LLNL Bravo Fallow Study - New Issues Raised. Peterson's computer generated fallout 

pattern showed the Bravo cloud turned south, but the issue is not developed, nor are the 

implications pursued. An additional issue, of considerable significance is raised. Peterson 

indicated that ingestion of contaminated water or food creates a "radiation multiplier effect" 

implying that a relatively low environmental dose from fallout can be multiplied many times -

- as many as 50 -- by ingestion (external radiation is multiplied many times to obtain an 

internal dose). If "rainouts" occurred, then the water catchment system would have, at the 

time, been highly contaminated and individuals could have received relatively high exposures, 

particularly for children's exposures and not even been aware of it. Again, these matters are 

not pursued. 

Fallout and the Compact Process. US officials with responsibility for the negotiation of the 

Compact had the ability to know and understand all of these radiological, scientific, medical 

and programmatic developments. First. all classified information was readily available. 

Second, the BNL study was undertaken by the overall management of DOE/NV and Roger 

Ray, DOE's Deputy for Pacific Operations. Uniquely, BNL's March 1985 Report is a report 

to "Roger Ray" (no other formal BNL report is "to" an individual). Since May 1981, Ray 

was DOE's official representative to the Status Negotiations Office. And, in November 

1982, following years of bureaucratic infighting, he took over management responsibility for 

the entire Marshall Islands medical and environmental monitoring programs. His first act 

was to deregulate radiation standards. Little was disclosed to Rongelap. Less was disclosed 

after December 1982 when the DOE's Bilingual Report was published. Marshallese leaders 

and their people were never informed of any of these revelations or concerns, or if they 

were, never in a way they could possibly understand. 

Bravo Test and Nuclear Typhoons in the Sky - DOD Suppresses Weather Repon. Bravo, the 

subject of endless study and speculation for 40 years, was always called an accident by the 

US Government. The winds, it was claimed, "unexpectedly" blew the wrong way. The "blew 

the wrong way" statement is correct. The "unexpectedly" part of it may not be accurate --

at all! A serious warning from DOD weather experts was in the hands of JTF 7 at least 
160 

16 

eight months prior to the test •· but was then deliberately suppressed. A report' submitted 

to the Military Commander concluded that the military knew almost nothing about the 

weather in the Marshalls, that the weather patterns were deceptive, and that a high yield test 

(such as contemplated in the Castle series) could create an uncontrollable nuclear typhoon 

in the sky. Six months to the day after the report was submitted, Major General Clarkson, 

Commander, JTF 7, wrote Dr. Graves at Los Alamos declaring the Pate-Palmer Weather 

Report "a troublesome item." Oarkson then advises Graves that he will not: 

... give anybody a copy of the repon from here on out, and I am 

proposing to General McGinley, Cowan and Bonnot that we recall 

all copies heretofore distributed and instruct Pate to do the same 

thing. In other words, I propose to treat the report the same as I 

would a report from any other member of my staff when I do not 

agree with him. In short, we will kill it and stick ii in the file. 

Pate-Palmer Weather Report - Ignomnce and Risk. The Pate-Palmer Report is dated June 

30, 1953. The following is a sampler of some of the more salient conclusions: 

1he behavior of the tropical atmosphere is little understood by the 

professional meteorologist and therefore, not surprisingly, by the 

majority of military and civilian staff officers at all levels. 

Seasonal variability of the imponant weather elemems does not 

con/ orm to the calendar. Casual statistical analysis of available 

weather records lead more often than not to erroneous operational 

conclusions. 

• • • • • 

It is entirely possible that a high yield detonation can "trigger'' a 

self-sustaining cin:ulation which will derive its energy through the 

condensation process. 

• • • • • 

With the larger bombs, provided they are exploded in an 

atmosphere with pronounced cyclonic shear, a cyck>nic system of 

approximately the size and intensity of the weaker tropical 

depressions in the Marshall Islands could be set up. Whether such 

a system could ever become self-perpetuating, through the supply 

of energy set free by condensation, is a matter about which it is 

s A Report to 1he Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, A Study of Corain Operational WeatMr 

Consideratiotis Involving tM Tut ON/ Delive,y of High Yueld Weapon.,, by Commander Elbert W. Pate, USN, 

Staff Weather Officer and Professor Oarence E. Palmer, Professor of Geophysics, UCLA, 30 June 1953. 
161 

17 

impossible to reach definite conclusions as yet; at the same time, 

it must be said that the triggering of such a self-sustaining 

circ:ulation is not at all impossible. The energy for the circulation 

would be derived, not from that inilially released in the jirebal~ 

but from the atmosphere, the energy source of tropical depressions 

and typhoons. Comparison of the relative energy release of 

typhoons and nuclear (or thennonuclear) devices is irrelevant . 

• • • • • 

The detonation of MIKE and KING induced spectacular and 

widespread weather changes which persisted for several hou~ . 

• • • • • 

Any comparison of bomb yield to the energy liberated in a tropical 

stonn is not an issue. The bomb, by establishing a definite venical 

and horizontal circ:ulation "trigge~" the atmosphere and the energy 

liberated through the condensation process dwarfs that originally 

released by the bomb itself. 

• 

In summary, God did not design the tropical atmosphere to AEC 

specifications. 

Pate-Palmer- Implications.. The explanation of Bravo, which has eluded scientists and bomb 

makers for more than three decades -- MAY -- have been in the possession of AEC eight 

months prior to the test. If this is verified, then the AEC/DOE is guilty -- at the very least -

- of gross negligence and the complicity to cover up this negligence. From the published 

literature, it is widely known that JTF-7 "lost control'' of the test within moments of 

detonation. Perhaps "nuclear typhoons" were unleashed in the Pacific skies above Bikini. 

And, perhaps they were warned of appropriate risks in advance. And perhaps, those risks 

were simply ignored. 

The Compact of Free Associatwn - All Is Not Disclosed. The Compact's Section 177 

Agreement -- the provision settling all nuclear claims issues -- contains an all-important 

Article VIII. In that Article, the U.S. Government, "concluded that" the Northern Marshalls 

radiological survey represented "the best effort ... accurately to eval1UJte and describe radiological 

conditions in the Ma~hall Islands." Simply stated, it did no such thing. As the DOE 

Marshall Islands programs are reviewed, it becomes quite clear the DOE was fully aware 

of the limitations to the document and more importantly, to the body of radiation knowledge 

in the Marshalls. DOE's own files powerfully contradict this "treaty-like" declaration. 
• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

162 

18 

Committee and DOESccrctaryO'LEARY should 

establish a formal independent Marshall Islands 

Program Review - Perhaps a San Luis Task 

Force type review should be considered, 

legislatively or administratively. 

Committee should ask DOE to undertake:, 

particularly with new modeling tedmiqucs now 

available, an independent study of fallout patterns 

from the entire Pacific testing program. 

DOD, DOE, State:, Interior and other 

departments must embrace a program to fully 

disclose all relevant documents. The problem, of 

course, is that these same agencies control the 

definition of "relevant.• 

Marshall Islands should be incorporated into 

DOE program priorities in human testing reviews, 

application of radiation standards, and disclosure 

initiatives. 

Consideration should be given to moving 

Brookhaven's medical program to the Marshall 

Islands. 

Given the recent preliminary report from the 

Marshall Islands Government regarding thyroid 

findings, a medical team, perhaps Brookhaven, 

should be organized. 

Brookhaven Medical Program should be 

independently reviewed. 

Committee should undertake full review of 

Compact, especially the Section 1 Tl Agreement. 

The Administration should publicly release all 

documents related to nuclear claims from those 

negotiations. 
• 

• 

* 

* 

* 

163 

19 

DOD conducted nuclear tests, and they should 

not be excluded, from a policy or budgetary 

perspective. This is not just DOE's problem. 

A full investigation of Safeguard C and why the 

Marshall Islands medical and environmental 

programs were incorporated into a standby 

readiness program to resume atmospheric testing. 

There should be a full review and disclosure of a longstanding civil war between two DOE labs involved in the 

Marshall Islands program, Brookhaven and Lawrence 

Livermore. 

DOE should conduct independent program 

reviews of Lawrence Livermore, Brookhaven 

National Laboratory, and the Nevada Operations 

Office. 

Committee investigation of this matter should 

continue. 

All of above, if it is to be successful, should be 

undertaken in cooperation with the Government 

of the Marshall Islands and the Marshallese 

people. 

Cold War Warriors - Ma~ha/Jese Role in Cold War. This testimony would be incomplete 

without addressing a fundamental, all to frequently glossed over proposition -- just who are 

the Marshall Islands people and what do they mean to the people of the United States and 

the world. When the Berlin "Wall" came down, when the USSR began to crumble, when 

global communism collapsed, the world neglected to thank the Marshallese. The 

Marshallese people were, and in so many ways, still are the front-line cold war waniors. For 

the cause of world freedom, Marshallese health was damaged, its culture was compromised, 

its food supply was poisoned and its land was contaminated. As a community, they have 

given as much as any and more than most. The United States Government •· and our 

friends and allies throughout the free world -- owe the Marshallese appreciation and dignity. 

The Marshallese oeserve a future with less pain, fewer anxieties, and far more respect. 

Outstanding Due Bill - TruJh. There is an outstanding due bill -- the Marshallese are still 

owed the truth. They can handle it. For 48 years, they have lived with radiation, 

contamination, death, disease and illness resulting from the Nuclear Testing Program. 
164 

20 

Senator Anjain - Especially for w Children. 

Thank you. 

For two and a half years, Senator Jeton Anjain was my client. 

Senator Anjain was the leader of the Rongelap people. A 

simple, direct, and softspoken man, he did not believe 

Rongelap's people were being told the truth by DOE. His lifelong quest - find out that truth, whatever it is. He was 

relentless, stubborn and uncompromising when it came to the 

health and safety of the Rongelap people - especially the 

children. 

The Senator's insatiable demand for truth came from his inner 

hope and prayer the children wo.uld never confront that which 

so greatly challenged his generation. He would close every 

statement to Congress with "/ thank you on behalf of the 

Rongelap people, and especially the children." 

Mr. Chairman, the Senator is not here to close with those 

words. So I conclude for him and say, thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, and your fellow Committee members. This 

statement is submitted on behalf of Senator Anjain for 

Rongelap and all of the Marshallese people, and yes, especially 

the children. 
165 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Hills. 

STATEMENT OF HOWARD L. HILLS 

Mr. HILLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

George Shultz said that nothing is ever over in this town, and 

I think the fact that I am back here with Jonathan Weisgall and 

some of the Members and staff and others that have been present 

throughout this process is an illustration that he spoke the truth. 

I wanted to begin, Mr. Chairman, with a procedural housekeeping matter by disclosing and notifying you that I have an attorney-client relationship with the people of Rongelap right now. 

The committee invited me to come up and provide some testimony 

not as an advocate or in my capacity as counsel to Rongelap but, 

rather, to bring sort of an historical, legal perspective to this section 177 agreement and some of its provisions. I got permission 

from my clients to do that, and I do not represent the people of 

Rongelap on the claims that were settled by the section 177 agreement. My affairs are in order, but I am a registered agent and I 

do have an attorney-client relationship with Rongelap. 

Again, in an effort to cooperate with the committee, they gave me 

permission to accept the invitation to come and testify about the 

section 177 agreement, and I am pleased to do that. Rather than 

spending a lot of time going into a lot of gory details, maybe I 

should just make a general statement and then invite at the appropriate time some questions, because it is perhaps in questions that 

we could get into some of the issues that are of most concern or 

interest to you and the members of the committee. 

I think by way of overview, what I want to say is that I think 

this committee was put in an exquisite dilemma in the mid-1980s 

because there was the prospect of the U.S. Government, this committee, this Congress, holding the decolonization of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands hostage to the fully satisfactory resolution of all of these claims arising from the nuclear testing program. 

You had competing values involved there because decolonization of 

Micronesia, getting the Federal Government out of the role of being the landlord, culturally, politically, legally, and economically, and 

putting the people there in control of their own lives and their own 

futures was something that was a positive value that I think was 

recognized by the members of this committee. The competing value 

of making sure that the United States honorably and responsibly 

acquitted itself of its obligations with respect to people who were 

injured and people who had their lands contaminated by the nuclear testing program was a set of problems which required the 

United States to continue to have a great deal of control over local 

affairs that in the context of decolonization properly would be 

turned over to the constitutionally democratically elected governments. There was example after example after example of where, 

when the United States Government tried to do things for people 

out there it didn't do a very good job, and when the people took 

responsibility for their own affairs they did a much better job. 

And so, as I say, I think this committee was put in an exquisite 

dilemma. I think the Marshall Islands, the new constitutional government of the Marshall Islands was put in an exquisite dilemma. 
166 

I would also add that I think the claimant groups here themselves 

were in a very difficult position because in the 30 years that had 

transpired since the nuclear testing program, frankly, the amount 

of compensation and the amount of assistance that these people 

had received under the policies and practices of the Federal Government, including the appropriations and the programs and whatnot that had been produced by this committee, did not redeem in 

an entirely honorable way, I think it is on understatement to say, 

the U.S. obligations. So in the context of the political status change that was being 

offered and the more comprehensive element of nuclear claims that 

was being offered in the context of the Compact of Free Association, they faced the prospect of receiving much larger compensation 

payments than they had ever received. I think that there is an accurate, objective, historical argument to be made that the political 

status process was used to acquire for them from the United States 

Government more in the way of recovery than they would have if 

the status quo had been maintained. 

I think one way of looking at it is that the need that the United 

States Government had to redeem the commitment to 

decolonization and make the transition to self-government was 

used to leverage $150 million out of the David Stockman 0MB in 

1982, which was pretty rough going at that time. If that had not 

been going on, the question is, What kind of compensation could 

have been obtained for the people at that time? The prospects were 

not very good. That is why they had brought court actions, that is 

why they were pursuing their claims, that is why this committee 

had the interest that it did in this set of issues. 

I think that against that backdrop people need to know that 

there was an intense internal debate within the executive branch 

about how to proceed, and there were those who thought that this 

was something that Congress should handle, that . Congress should 

deal with it on an ad hoc basis whenever they could get appropriations. 

But if you think about it, in the 30 years that had transpired 

since the testing program, the total compensation that was paid 

over 30 years was less than $50 million. In one year we were in 

a position to deliver $150 million. And so, Mr. Chairman, I think 

the question was: Would we wait until all the lawyers and doctors 

and scientists and medical people got through debating the ultimate issues here while the people languished in the islands, or 

would we try to do something to put them back in control of their 

own destinies? 

And that was the theory of the Compact of Free Association, the 

section 177 agreement. It was that these issues are going to be debated for years. It is going to go on and on. What can we do short 

term in the context of decolonization to do something more comprehensive than had ever been done? And the decision was not to 

leave the fate of the nuclear claimants in the hands of the scientists and lawyers and doctors and others who were debating 

these issues and would be debating them for years but in the context of ending the trusteeship, self-government for the Marshall Islands, to have an agreement that would deliver some economic 
167 

empowerment to the victims rather than leaving them 

disempowered while everybody debated the long-term issues. 

Against that backdrop, the 177 agreement was negotiated. I am 

prepared to answer questions about the statements I have just 

made about the historical process, and I have some documents and 

research I have done, too, in terms of some of the internal debates, 

but I want to switch, because I know the committee is concerned 

about time, to the present, having made those historical comments. 

With respect to the present, I think the important thing is, I 

have heard a lot of talk recently about what is going on here. New 

information that has come out, the openness initiative of the Department of Energy, the press attention that is being given to these 

issues now, and the fact that there is speculation that the Marshall 

Islands may invoke its rights under article 9 of the section 177 

agreement, changed circumstances, and seek additional compensation. 

And I am very concerned that people understand clearly, both 

people in the U.S. Government and people in the claimant communities, and people in the Marshall Islands, and people up here, that 

when you talk about article 9 you are not talking about reopening 

the negotiations. You are not talking about reopening the settlement. You are not talking about reopening claims. You are talking 

about invoking a provision of the agreement. You are not talking 

about unraveling it; you are not talking about undermining it or 

overturning it. 

When we got down-and I think Mr. Weiman's account of it actually had some very accurate elements to it-when we got down to 

the wire on this agreement, it was obvious to us that the facts, all 

of the facts, were not nailed down. It was obvious to us that the 

potential scope of damage and injury to people, persons, and loss 

of property was not entirely nailed down. 

In fact, I think it is safe to say that the United States would 

never have agreed to the article 9 provision if it hadn't been the 

conclusion of the Department of the Interior, the Department of 

Energy, the State Department, and others involved that we had to 

leave open the possibility that new information or newly discovered 

information-and that would include information that existed but 

hadn't been discovered by the Government of the Marshall Islands 

or the claimant groups-would come out and would provide a basis 

for this Congress to conclude that as a matter of moral responsibility the United States had to provide additional compensation. 

The way the solution to the problem was handled was to leave 

the matter with this Congress and with this committee. Frankly, 

given the fact that this Congress and this committee was not decided-and I think their judgment was correct-not to stop 

decolonization in order to get complete and total satisfaction on 

these issues. Because it was clear that that wasn't going to happen, 

this committee, I think correctly, made the decision to let the process go forward, as did the Government of the Marshall Islands and, 

frankly, as did the claimant groups, because even those who voted 

against it and even those who had lawsuits in the end ended up 

accepting the money and moving on with the process and successfully using the state of U.S. law and policy to vindicate their rights 

to the extent it was possible. 
168 

Now, this committee, I think, also welcomed having included in 

the agreement a provision which would leave reposing with this 

committee a procedure that was recognized in U.S. law, recognized 

by the Executive Branch, and recognized within the context of the 

government-to-government relationship between the Marshall Islands and the United States that there would be a possibility to 

pursue a request for further compensation. I think I will conclude, 

Mr. Chairman, by saying that article 9 of the compact is a somewhat extraordinary provision because article 10 closes the door to 

the Federal courthouses, or at least that is what its intent is, and 

terminates legal claims. The section 177 agreement is a full and 

final settlement of legal claims by its terms. 

But then article 9 basically says we recognize the appropriateness of a foreign government coming to our Congress directly with 

requests to provide additional compensation given the possibility, 

the recognized possibility, that there could be-and I think, frankly, that there was some anticipation that there would be-further 

claims and matters which the Congress would want to take up as 

a matter of moral responsibility by the United States. 

I have a lot of additional material, but in deference to the Chair's 

expressed concern about time, I will forego them. I have got some 

very good stuff here, but perhaps I should close here and wait for 

some questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Hills follows:] 
169 

STATEMENT OF 

HOWARD L HILLS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

COMMITTEE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

February 24, 1994 

The decision of this Subcommittee to conduct a hearing on the legacy of the U.S. 

nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands could not have been more timely. 

This is not merely because the 40th anniversary of the Bravo incident is just a few 

days away, or because the U.S. Government's nuclear science and technology 

program during the Cold War is a hot news item here in this country. 

Rather, this hearing is necessary and appropriate at this time because the United 

States needs to renew, and in my own view expand, its commitment to 

understanding the effects of the nuclear testing program on the Marshallese people 

and their islands. It is in the U.S. interest to do so for two reasons. 

First, the U.S. Government is going to need to respond to new information being 

developed about radiological conditions in the Marshall Islands. In order to 

respond in a way that is credible, appropriate and consistent with applicable U.S. 

law and treaties, the U.S. needs to have the most accurate and complete information 

available. 

The second reason is that, by providing the people of the Marshall Islands and their 

government with all available information relating to the effects of radiological 

contamination on the health of people and the environment there, the U.S. may be 

able to make further contributions to mitigation of harm to individuals which can 

be attributed to the testing program. 

It also is the right thing to do, and we owe it to the people concerned. My view in 

this regard is based in part on what I saw and heard during recent visits to Majuro, 

the capital of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. It is my observation that recent 

press accounts of experimental medicine in this country involving radiation, as well 

as reports on contamination of lands and waten near weapons production facilities, 

has stirred very deep feelings among the people or the Marshall Islands. 

I do not presume to know precisely what all the attention to these issues means to 

the Manhallese, but there are a few observations I can share with you. 

For example, it does not appear the Manhallese view the new scrutiny of U.S. Cold 

War nuclear programs merely as an occasion to express outrage or launch broadside 

condemnations of the U.S. for contaminating their people and islands. There will 
170 

be some of that, because outrage is not an irrational or abnormal human response to 

the stress associated with an insidious health threat such u that faced by these 

islanden. 

However, generally it did not appear to me that many Manhallese see the value of 

increased press interest as being limited to coverage of pyrotechnic allegations of 

racist and genocidal intent on the part of the United States. Again, we will see that 

coverage, and anyone who knows the true story of how the Manhallese people were 

treated undentands why the "guinea pig scenario" is compelling to many concerned 

people. 

But instead of turning up the volume on these themes of suspicion and anger, I 

sensed among the individuals and officials to whom I spoke a more complicated 

array of emotions and ideu. There is, for eumple, a sense of sagaciousness among 

the Manhallese about dealing with the legal, political, economic and cultural impact 

of radiological damage. They also seem very serious about the question of whether 

the new scientific findings about radiation effects since the Section 177 claims 

settlement constitute changed circumstances under Article IX of the settlement. 

The Marshallese have u much experience living with radioactive contamination and 

dealing with the risks of nuclear science and technology u any other population. 

Irrespective of what may or may not have been done in secret, that which wu done 

openly in the Manhall Islands testing program, and the meuures taken to deal with 

the consequences, certainly represents one of the most sustained efforts to manage 

radiation damage and on-going hazards ever experienced by a civilian population. 

So the Manhallese undentand the anxiety among communities in the U.S. u more 

is disclosed about radiation carried by the winds and waten, plants and animals, in 

our own countl')'. In a senae, Manhallese leaden are seasoned veterans or the 

nuclear era, and have a more 1ophisticated undentandin1 of the risks associated 

with nuclear science and technology than most Americans. 

Forty yean of experience managing the devastating effects of the nuclear testing 

program now is tramlatiag itself into a calm resolve to direct anger and fear into 

constructive problem-solvins- For eumple, eight yean of experience managing the 

implementation or one of the most comprehensive radiation claims settlements has 

given tile Manhall Islands government unparalleled hands-on experience with 

nuclear claims administration. 

Undentanding risks, providing legal remedies, supporting individuals and 

communities in cuhural and economic recovery, replacina distrust with confidence 

building cooperation - these are skills which the Manhallese have acquired. It 

hun't been all smooth sailing, but I suspect we could leam from their experience. 
171 

The Manhallese are in recovery from over forty yean of being victims, and they 

have a mature attitude about what has happened to them. A critical transaction in 

their transition from disempowered victims to recovering victims taking control of 

their own futures was the nuclear claims settlement negotiated on a government-togovernment basis between the Republic of the Manhall Islands and the United 

States in implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association (U.S. 

Public Law 99-239). 

The principles underlying the Compact and most of its basic provisions, including 

Section 177 which authorized the nuclear claims settlement, were originally 

negotiated and initialed by representatives of the Carter administration and the new 

constitutional governments instituted by the people of the former Trust Territory of 

the Pacific Islands - including the government of the Republic of the Manhall 

Islands. The Reagan administration negotiated the actual terms of the Section 177 

settlement itself. 

Having served as counsel and Department of Defense Adviser to the NSC 

negotiating team and during Congressional hearings on the Compact, I am pleased 

to provide testimony today and answer questions you may have about the history 

and nature of the Section 177 Agreement. The points I can make which perhaps 

will be most useful to the Subcommittee are as follows: 

1. The United States had "settled" penonal injury and land claims arising from 

the nuclear testing program previously by making payments and executing releases 

with the peoples concerned, but new illnesses in the claimant communities and 

upward revisions in dose assessments at some islands rendered these arrangements 

ineffective. There was an active debate within the NSC system as to whether the 

nuclear claims should be part of the political status negotiations at all for the very 

reason that the record of attempts to quantify damages and limit liability through 

settlements and compensation had failed due to what one senior official called "a 

dismal record of miscalculation" by the U.S. with respect to assessments and 

predictions on contamination and health effects, respectively. Opponents of a 

comprehensive settlement argued for ad hoc measures funded from appropriations 

to be sought as the need might arise. The counter argument was that the need for 

resources to meet the needs or the victims was chronic and no political status 

agreement would be politically viable in the Manhall Islands which did not address 

the nuclear claims in a comprehensive way. 

2. It was determined that ad hoc measures and limited settlements were part of the 

problem rather than a solution, and that a more comprehensive approach was 

required to resolve outstanding legal claims in existence at that time, and to satisfy 

the political demand for a serious program of compensation and assistance to the 

affected peoples. The Section 177 Agreement provided $150 million to be invested 

and managed for the benefit of the affected people. In the entire thirty yean prior 

to the Section 177 agreement the total amount of funding and ad hoc measures to 
172 

compensate the affected people was less than $SO million. Although the settlement 

wu controvenial and less than satisractory to all concerned, the amount or runding 

in the Section 177 Agreement proved sufficient to overcome claimant community 

political opposition to the Compact. Indeed, in the U.N. plebiscite the approval rate 

ror the Compact and the Section 177 Agreement wu higher among the entire class 

or those who had nuclear test claims fded in the rederal courts than it wu among the 

general population in the Manhall Islands. The Bikini people voted against the 

Compact, but later agreed to a settlement providing $90 million in addition to the 

more than $100 million in grants and assistance they bad received under the 

Compact and other U.S. programs ror their benefit. The Rongelap people also 

voted against the settlement, but that community is still awaiting the additional 

runding required to provide ror their resettlement. Having made this observation, 

it probably is incumbent upon me to note here that I am acting as counsel and a 

registered agent ror Roogelap in its quest ror resettlement assistance. Rongelap 

resettlement wu not addressed in the Section 177 negotiations in which I was 

involved while serving u a rederal official 

J. The concepts underlying the Section 177 Agreement included empowerment or 

the affected people by providing each or the communities concerned with its own 

resource bue so that each such community could begin to recover its identity and 

control its own ruture to a greater extent. Ending virtually total claimant 

community dependence on the Department orinterior and DOE, as well as other 

rederal programs, was an objective or the settlement u well The setdemeot also 

was structured to settle legal claims and cut off U.S. liability in the rederal courts ror 

damages arising rrom the nuclear testing program. However, it wu recognized that 

the settlement should not completely close the books on U.S. responsibilities with 

respect to the nuclear claims. This wu due to the history or AEC and DOE 

difficulty in defining health risks and island rehabilitation requirements. The result 

was Article IX or the settlement agreement. 

4. Read carerully, Article IX constitutes U.S. recognition or the appropriateness or 

a request rrom the government or the Manhall lslaods to the U.S. Congress ror 

additional compensation and usistaace ir new inrormation emerges in light or which 

the terms or the settlement appear manirestly inadequate. The underlying theory or 

Article IX is that the Section 177 Agreement was a good deal ror both sides since it 

significantly increased U.S; compensation to the people concerned but also closed 

the rederal courthouse door to rurtber claims. However, everyone recognized that 

the state or knowledge about radiological conditions in the islands wu not adequate 

to justify final termination or access to rurther U.S. assistance or compensation. 

S. As new inrormation emerges about the effects or the testing program, it should 

not surprise anyone that the affected communities and their national government 

are considering an Article IX request. It should not be viewed as clever, 

opportunistic or devious ror the Manhallese parties to proceed under Article IX. It 

was fully contemplated and intended that this would be the case if credible evidence 
173 

came to light to indicate that the definition of affected people was too limited in 

scope. or that there were injuries and damage that reasonably could not be viewed 

as fully and fairly compensated by the agreement. 

6. The U.S. got what it bargained for in the Section 177 Agreement because Article 

IX is essentially a commitment to ensure that a request from the Manhalls will be 

accepted and considered. While the U.S. obligation is primarily of a moral nature 

rather than a matter of legal compulsion, the use of a treaty provision to give a 

foreign government direct access to the U.S. Congress strengthens the case that a 

changed circumstances request for further measures to address test related 

problems was allowed and perhaps even anticipated based upon the history of 

changed circumstances and on-going efforts to improve our undentanding of the 

effects of the testing program. 

I hope the preceding discussion is helpful to the Subcommittee as it considen the 

options available to it in addressing issues that may arise from the disclosure of all 

existing information and the discovery of any new information concering the effects 

or the nuclear testing program in the Marsllall Islands. 
174 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Hamilton. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. HAMILTON, M.D. 

Dr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have been asked to provide this committee with information resulting from my experiences and studies of the Marshallese people 

from 1982 to 1985. 

I am a practicing endocrinologist and a clinical researcher in Seattle. My present position is chief of endocrinology in the Department of Medicine at Pacific Medical Center in Seattle. I am also 

on the clinical faculty in endocrinology and environmental health 

at the University of Washington. I am also the clinical director of 

the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study, which is a congressionally 

mandated study to determine if excess thyroid disease resulted 

from radioiodine emissions from the Hanford facility during nuclear weapons production in the 1940s. 

I would like to summarize three areas of information for you 

today relevant to radiation exposure from the BRA VO test. The 

first is a study I published in 1987 reporting excess thyroid tumors 

or nodules in Marshall Islanders who were residing on islands 

which were not previously thought to be exposed by BRA VO fallout. 

Second, I will summarize a collection of personal histories from 

Marshallese who provided their observations to me from their islands during the first few days of the BRA VO test. These persons 

resided on six northern atolls said to be unexposed to nuclear fallout. 

Third, I wish to make some specific comments relative to the 

Rongelap exposures and regarding the decisions to evacuate the 

Rongelapese. 

During my comments today, you may find it useful to refer to figure 1 on page 7 of my testimony which is a map of the Marshall 

Islands. The first topic, the study I published in 1987, culminated 

a three-year investigation of thyroid nodules in the Marshallese 

population. The field work for this study was conducted from 1982 

to 1985 when I served as a consultant to a litigation project. The 

analysis and the publication of this data occurred at the University 

of Washington from 1985 to 1987. 

During this study, I examined over 7,000 Marshallese people for 

thyroid nodules. These individuals lived on 14 northern and southern Marshall Islands, atolls, not previously said to be exposed-12 

of these atolls were said not to be previously exposed to BRA VO 

fallout. 

Now the reason for conducting these examinations was based on 

both anecdotal information and at least three internal Government 

documents which suggested that BRA VO fallout extended farther 

than Rongelap and Utirik, and I have referenced those for you in 

Appendix A. 

The results of this study show two important findings. First, the 

prevalence or percentage of palpable thyroid tumors in persons living on these 14 atolls varied very widely, from less than 1 percent 

in the southern Marshall Islands to over 30 percent on Rongelap 

Atoll. If Rongelap and Utirik are excluded, there is still a wide 
175 

range of thyroid tumor rates, ranging from less than 1 percent to 

over 10 percent. 

Second, there was a striking relationship between the percent of 

thyroid tumors in people on each of these atolls and the distance 

of each of those atolls from the Bikini blast site, specifically the 

BRA VO test site. 

There was a strong inverse linear relationship such that high 

rates of thyroid tumors found in atolls close in to Bikini, with decreasing rates the further the distance from the Bikini blast site. 

This relationship was highly statistically significant, meaning that 

whatever factor or factors were responsible for causing this finding, 

that it was highly unlikely to be due to chance. 

This finding did not prove that radiation exposure from nuclear 

fallout caused excess thyroid tumors. However, one must ask, what 

other known risk factors for thyroid nodules exist in the Marshall 

Island? There was no evidence of iodine deficiency in the Marshall 

Islands, no prior head and neck radiation therapy for benign diseases of the head and neck as was done in the United States, and 

there were no known dietary goitrogens, which are substances that 

might cause thyroid enlargement. 

In my opinion, the absence of any other known risk factors for 

causing thyroid tumors and the presence of the statistically significant findings of this study using distance from the BRA VO test site 

as a proxy for radiation exposure and radioiodine exposure suggested that radioactive fallout, specifically the radioiodines, was 

the most likely cause of these thyroid neoplasms. These findings 

also suggest that these excess thyroid nodules were not limited to 

just the atolls of Rongelap and Utirik but occurred throughout 

other northern atolls. 

Now the methods used in this study were validated by a second 

thyroid specialist. These findings were extensively peer reviewed 

by colleagues at the University of Washington, some of the most 

noted epidemiologists and biostatisticians that worked there. They 

were presented at local and national scientific meetings, and finally, this information was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1987. Now the second area that I want to cover is a set of unpublished 

personal histories from Marshall Islanders who lived on atolls 

which were said to be unexposed to nuclear fallout, and I have the 

details of these histories located in Appendix B. I obtained these histories by asking open-ended questions of people that were living on some of these northern atolls other than 

Rongelap and Utirik and asked for their observations for the first 

few days immediately after the BRA VO shot. These individuals 

were present and lived on the atolls of Lae, Ujae, Likiep, Ailuk, 

Wotje, and islands in Northern Kwajelein. These histories are remarkable because of their similarity despite the fact that these 

people lived on very different atolls hundreds of miles from each 

other. 

There were three common themes. The first is that on the day 

of the BRA VO test, people described powder or ash falling from the 

sky which covered plants and leaves. The color was variably described as yellow or white or off-white. . 
176 

The second common observation was that the leaves from the cocoanut and breadfruit trees turned color or began dying within 

days after the BRA VO test, and there were some reports that 

chickens were sick and dying as well. 

The third and most striking observation in my mind was obtained from several groups of people on Ujae Atoll. This is an atoll 

that is south of Bikini, and this observation was that there were 

individuals, especially children not wearing clothes, who developed 

lip and skin burns. These anecdotal, personal histories provide compelling information that BRA VO test fallout likely extended to other atolls in the 

Marshall Islands, and it is particularly remarkable to me that the 

histories from the people on Ujae Atoll, an atoll that I suspect 

many of you have not heard much about, that suggest the possibility of acute radiation sickness correlate with the high prevalence 

of thyroid nodules found in my 1987 study. 

Now the third issue I want to discuss relates strictly to the highdose exposures incurred by the Rongelap people, which is an issue 

that I have to say has troubled me greatly over the last ten years. 

As you know well, the people suffered acute radiation sickness as 

well as long-term health effects, particularly thyroid neoplasms secondary to their exposure from BRA VO test fallout. 

There were at least three factors which contributed to their high 

radiation doses. We are not talking about low-dose radiation here; 

these are high radiation doses. The first was that they were not 

evacuated to prevent radiation exposure as they had been during 

the 1946 Crossroads series. 

Second, as Mr. Weisgall has covered fairly well, the wind direction was due east toward Rongelap prior to the detonation of 

BRA VO. Several weather briefings, as he has already told you, indicate that at 20,000 feet they were headed due east to Rongelap. 

Now there was a question raised earlier about what action might 

have been taken on that. I have at least one DNA document that 

indicates that they felt that the predicted speed of these winds was 

low enough to be. of no concern, and I have referenced that in my 

Appendix C for you. 

Third, the Rongelap population was allowed to remain on their 

home island for at least two days before they were evacuated. During these two days before they were evacuated, as you have already 

heard, they continued to live on an island that was contaminated 

with fallout snow and continued to eat contaminated food and 

water. Therefore, one of the key determinants of their high whole 

body radiation dose was the two-day length of time they were allowed to remain on Rongelap. 

Now Professor Eisenbud has indicated that there may have been 

some air capability to evacuate these islanders, and I would like to 

focus on another means of transportation. A DNA agency report 

published in 1982 provides data which show that there were naval 

vessels in position so that it at least appeared possible to evacuate 

the Rongelap people on the day of the BRA VO test. This is reference 7 in Appendix C. 

This 1982 report documents the operations and the radiologic 

safety of U.S. military personnel during the BRAVO test, and it in-
177 

eludes the nautical positions and the radiation monitor logs of all 

naval vessels at the time of detonation of BRA VO. 

Figure 2 of my testimony shows a map for you that indicates 

that the USS Gypsy lay within a few miles and just outside the lagoon of Rongelap 80 miles southeast from the Bikini test site. 

In addition, there were six other naval vessels that were in position between Rongelap and Bikini at the time of detonation. I came 

by this information by seeing these ships on a map in this DNA 

report, and having traveled to all the Marshall Islands, I was 

somewhat stunned that there were no islands on the map, only Bikini and all of these ship locations. 

Having had access to nautical maps, I plotted all of the ship locations on this map, and that is what appears in Figure 2 of this testimony which was taken from an article that I published in 1991, 

Appendix C. 

So despite the presence of these vessels, no evacuation took place 

until two days after the BRA VO shot. I want to say the obvious: 

I am not a military expert; I am not knowledgeable about military 

operations; I have very few details about naval or air operations on 

the day of the BRA VO test. However, I have been long concerned 

about the apparent possibility to have evacuated Rongelap earlier 

and spared them the significant radiation exposure. 

I have been unable to find any public information as to why 

available transportation was not used to evacuate the Marshallese 

people when radiation monitor logs on board ship showed increasing levels that morning on March 1. 

While there might be numerous reasons for the failure to evacuate these people, such as risk of exposure to U.S. military personnel, poor communication, poor weather, lack of available landing 

craft, one conclusion seems inescapable to me, and that is that the 

personal safety of the Rongelapese was not a high priority on 

March 1, 1954. 

As we approach the fortieth anniversary of BRA VO, I wish to 

emphasize that the full understanding of radiation-related health 

effects of Marshall Islanders as well as U.S. military servicemen 

and U.S. citizens has been repeatedly compromised by incomplete 

or classified information. There is no justifiable reason why information from the nuclear testing program relating to public health 

continues to be kept secret from U.S. taxpayers or the Marshallese 

people. I urge this committee to mandate full disclosure of classified documents pertaining to the U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing 

program. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today and thank you 

for your efforts in elucidating this problem. 

[Prepared statement of Dr. Hamilton follows:] 
178 

Thomas E. Hamilton, MD, PhD, MPH 

Testimony Regarding Marshall Islanders Exposed to Nuclear Fallout 

From the BRA VO Test 

February 24, 1994 

Presented Before 

United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Natural Resources 

lnvestigati ve Hearing 

Radiation Exposure from Nuclear Tests in the Pacific 
179 

My name is Tom Hamilton. I have been asked to provide you with 

information resulting from my experiences and studies of the 

Marshallese people from 1982 to 1985. I am a practicing 

endocrinologist and a clinical researcher in Seattle, Washington. My 

present position is Chief, Division of Endocrinology in the Department 

of Medicine at Pacific Medical Center in Seattle, and I am on the 

clinical faculty in endocrinology and environmental health at the 

University of Washington. I am also the Clinical Director of the 

Hanford Thyroid Disease Study which is a congressionally mandated 

study to determine if excess thyroid disease resulted from 

radioiodine emissions from the Hanford facility during nuclear 

weapons production in the 1940's and 1950's. 

I would like to summarize three areas of information for you today 

relevant to radiation exposure from the Bravo hydrogen bomb test 

on March 1, 1954. The first is a study I published in 1987 reporting 

excess thyroid tumors in Marshall Islanders who were residing on 

islands which were not previously thought to be exposed to nuclear 

fallout from the BRA VO test. 

Second, I will summarize a collection of personal histories from 

Marshallese who provided their observations on their islands during 

the first few days after the BRA VO test. These persons resided on 6 

northern atolls said to be unexposed to nuclear fallout. 

And third, I wish to make several comments specific to the Rongelap 

exposures from the BRA VO test regarding the decisions to evacuate 

Rongelap on the day of the BRA VO test. 

I. Thyroid Nodularity in Marshallese from atolls previously 

said to be unexposed to BRAVO test nuclear fallout. 

In 1987 I published a study which culminated a 3 year investigation 

of thyroid nodules in the Marshallese population. The field work for 

this study was conducted from 1982-1985 when I served as a 

consultant to a litigation project. The analysis and publication of the 

data occurred at the University of Washington from 1985 to 1987. 

During this study I examined over 7,000 Marshallese people for 

thyroid nodules. These individuals lived on 14 atolls in the northern 
180 

and southern Marshall Islands including 12 atolls not ·previously said 

to be exposed to BRA VO test fallout. 

The reason for conducting these examinations was based on both 

anecdotal information and at least 3 internal government documents 

which suggested that BRA VO fallout extended farther than Rongelap 

and Utrik (Appendix A, ref 43,44,46) 

The. results of this study were based on 2273 persons from 14 atolls 

who were present during the 1954 BRA VO test and born during or 

before 1954. This is important because the radioactive iodine from 

the BRA VO test decayed within weeks to months. Therefore only 

those persons born during or before 1955 could have been exposed 

to radi'oactive iodine. Most of these individuals resided on 12 

northern and southern atolls which were said to be unexposed to 

nuclear fallout. 

The results of this study showed two important findings: First, the 

prevalence, or percentage, of palpable thyroid tumors in persons 

living on these 14 atolls varied widely, from less than 1 % in the 

southern Marshall Islands to over 30% on Rongelap atoll. If Rongelap 

and Utrik are excluded, there was still a wide range of thyroid tumor 

rates from less than 1 % to over 10%; Second, there was a striking 

relationship between the percent of thyroid tumors in people on each 

of these atolls and the distance of each atoll from the Bikini test site. 

Specifically, there was a strong inverse linear relationship such that 

high rates of thyroid tumors were found in atolls close to Bikini with 

decreasing rates the further the distance from the BRA VO test site. 

This relationship was highly statistically significant, meaning that 

whatever factor or factors caused this finding, it was highly unlikely 

to be due to chance. 

This finding did not prove that radiation exposure from nuclear 

fallout caused these excess thyroid tumors. However, one must ask 

what other known risk factors for thyroid nodules exist in the 

Marshall Islands? There is no evidence of iodine deficiency in the 

MarshaHs, there is no prior head and neck radiation therapy for 

benign diseases as occurred in the United States, and there are no 

known dietary goitrogens which could cause thyroid enlargement. 

Thus, if unknown risk factors for developing thyroid disease are 

present in this population, it must be postulated that these factors 

exert their effect in a manner that decreases with distance from the 

BRA VO blast site on Bikini atoll. It is my opinion that the absence of 

3 
181 

other risk factors for thyroid tumors in the Marshall Islands and the 

presence of the statistically significant findings of this study, that 

radioactive fallout, specifically radioactive iodines, was the most 

likely cause of these thyroid neoplasms. The findings also suggest 

that excess thyroid nodules were not limited to the atolls of Rongelap 

and Utrik, but occurred throughout other northern atolls. 

The methods used in this study were validated by a second thyroid 

specialist, the findings were extensively peer-reviewed by colleagues 

at the University of Washington, they were presented at local and 

national scientific meetings, and published in the Journal of the 

American Medical Association in August, 1987 (Appendix A). 

II. Historical Observations from Marshallese people living 

on atolls in March, 1954 which were said to be unexposed 

to nuclear fallout. 

The second area I want to cover is a set of unpublished personal 

histories from Marshall Islanders who lived on atolls which were 

said to be unexposed to nuclear fallout (Appendix B). I obtained 

these histories by asking open-ended questions of these people about 

what they observed during the days following the 1954 BRA VO test. 

These individuals were present on the atolls of Lae, Ujae, Likiep, 

Ailuk, Wotje, and northern Kwajalein at the time of the blast (Figure 

1 ). 

These histories are remarkable because of their similarity despite 

the fact that they lived on different atolls. There were three 

common themes. The first is that on the day of the BRA VO test 

people described powder or ash falling from the sky which covered 

plants and leaves. The color was variably described as yellow or 

white. The second common observation was that leaves from 

coconut and breadfruit trees turned color or were dying during the 

days following BRA VO and there were some reports of chickens 

becoming sick or dying. The third striking observation obtained 

from several groups of people on Ujae atoll, was that on the day of 

the BRA VO test there were individuals, especially children not 

wearing clothes, who developed lip and skin burns. 

The details of these histories are located in Appendix B. These 

anecdotal personal histories provide compelling information that 

BRA VO test fallout likely extended to other atolls in the Marshall 

4 
182 

Islands. · It is remarkable that the histories from Ujae atoll, which 

suggest the possibility of acute radiation sickness, correlate with a 

high prevalence of thyroid nodules found in my 1987 study. 

III High dose radiation exposure to Marshall Islanders on 

Rongelap. 

I would like to present some information relating strictly to the high 

dose exposures incurred by the Rongelap people which has troubled 

me during the past ten years. As you know well, the Rongelap 

people suffered acute radiation sickness as well as long term health 

effects, particularly thyroid neoplasms, secondary to their exposure 

from BRA VO test nuclear fallout. There were at least three factors 

which contributed to their high radiation doses. The first was that 

they were not evacuated to prevent radiation exposure as they had 

been during the 1946 Crossroads test series. Second, the wind 

direction was due east, toward Rongelap, prior to the detonation of 

BRAVO. Several weather briefings before the detonation indicated 

that winds at 20,000 feet were headed for Rongelap, however, it was 

felt that the predicted speed of these winds was low enough to be of 

no concern (Appendix C, ref 7). Third, the Rongelap population was 

allowed to remain on their home island for at least two days after 

the BRAVO test before being evacuated. During these 2 days before 

they were evacuated, they continued to live on an island which was 

contaminated with "fallout snow" on the ground and ate and drank 

contaminated food and water. 

One of the key determinants of their high whole-body radiation dose 

was the two day length of time they were allowed to remain on 

Rongelap. No formal investigation regarding this issue has ever been 

made public. However, a Defense Nuclear Agency report, published 

in 1982, provides data which show that naval vessels were in 

position, such that it appeared possible to evacuate the Rongelap 

people on the day of the BRA VO test (Appendix C, ref 7). This report 

documents the operations and radiologic safety activities of US 

military personnel during the BRA VO test and it includes the nautical 

positions and radiation monitor logs of all naval vessels at the time of 

detonation of BRA VO. Figure 2 shows that the USS Gypsy lay within 

a few miles and just outside of Rongelap lagoon, 80 miles southeast 

from the Bikini test site (from Appendix C). In addition, 6 other 

naval vessels were in position between Rongelap and Bikini at the 

time of detonation. Despite the presence of these vessels, no 

evacuation took place until two days after the BRA VO detonation. 

5 
183 

I am certainly not knowledgeable about military operations nor do I 

have many details about the naval or air operations on the day of the 

BRA VO test. However, I have been concerned about the apparent 

possibility to have evacuated Rongelap earlier and spared them 

significant radiation exposure. I have been u11able to find any public 

information as to why available naval transportation was not used to 

evacuate the Marshallese people from Rongelap on the day of the 

BRA VO test, at a time which radiation monitor logs on board ship 

were steadily increasing. While there might be numerous reasons 

for the failure to evacuate these people, such as risk of radiation 

exposure to US military personnel, poor communication, poor 

weather, or lack of landing craft, one conclusion seems inescapable to 

me: the personal safety of the Rongelapese was not a high priority on 

March 1, 1954. 

As we approach the 40th anniversary of the BRA VO hydrogen bomb 

test, I wish to emphasize that the full understanding of radiationrelated health effects in Marshall Islanders, as well as in US 

servicemen and citizens, has been repeatedly compromised by 

incomplete or classified information. There is no justifiable reason 

why information from the nuclear testing program relating to public 

health continues to be kept secret from US taxpayers or the 

Marshallese people. I urge this committee to mandate full disclosure 

of classified documents pertaining to the US atmospheric nuclear 

testing program. Thank you. 

6 
184 

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185 

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FIGURE 2. Locations of naval vessels (solid circles) at the time of BRAVO detonation in 

relation to Rongelap Atoll . Adapted from Defense Nuclear Agency report [7]. 
186 

Appendi X R 

HISTORICAL COMMENTS 

19R3, 1984 

- Age 64 - Lae Atoll. 

This man was on Lae Atoll during the March 1, 1954 Bravo hydrogen bomb detonat · "I was in a coconut tree and saw a bright light and explosion. I do not 

remember anything falling overhead, but saw yellow smoke at a distance. The sky overhead was clear. • 

- Age 46 . - Likiep Atoll 

This man was age 16 on ~.arch 1st, 1954 and remembers coming froD the 

church. The church was shaking and the ground was shaking. He saw a bright 

light over the entire sky like a bright sunset. He saw a yellow powder over all the plants. He could take the leaves and wipe layers of yellow powder- off of the leaves. The powder was in the water. A Navy plane landed and 

the man took a metal machine (Geiger counter) and this person heard sounds 

from the Geiger counter and states he saw the needle go off the scale 

whenever he would put the machine near a cement water catchment. He stated 

that there were no restrictions on water and that they drank water. Be 

also states that the Navy also took a tetherball pole away after it was measured with a Geiger counter. 

- Age 40 . - Likiep Atoll 

This man was about 10 years old when he was fishing with his father ocean- side on March 1st, 1954. They were told of the blast ahead of time and were told not to expose themselves and to preserve water and food. He saw the lightning corne from the sky. There was no smoke. Maybe one week later a ship came from Kwajalein and stayed there for one week. They examined the 

ground and water and trees. They took one canoe and burned it and threw it 

away. He doesn't recall anything on the ground . 

- Age 73 ~ Ujae Atoll 

This woman was on Ujae Atoll on March l, 1954. She remembers the light and 

explosion and describes the sky as a "flame in the sky". She also states that the next day there were leaves of the plants that were dying. She 

does not specifically recall anything falling from the sky. 

- Age 53 - Lae Atoll 

This woman moved to Lae Atoll in 1947 and then to Ebeye in 1955. She was Lae Atoll during the 1954 Bravo detonation. She remembers seeing a rainbow 

in the sky. She was sleeping on that morning and the lantern fell to the 

ground and woke her up. She states that later in the day the sky was very 

foggy. She is not sure how to describe it but states the sky was not clear 

and that the foggy color was similar to a white color, but not exactly 

white. 

THOMAS HAMILTON, M . D . • INTERNAL MEDICINE • BOX 141, MAJURO. MARSHALL ISLANDS 96960 
187 

Historical Com.rnents - 1983, 1984 Page 2 

• Age 69 - Kwajalein Atoll 

This man was on Ebeye during the 1954 Bravo detonation. This conunent, 

however, is relative to his experience in 1947 when he was on a ship 

(LST 1134) on Rongerik Atoll. They were delivering food to the Rongelap 

people who were living there. He distinctly remembers a 10 minute period 

where a yellow to green powder fell on the deck of the ship. They took 

hoses to wash the entire deck of the ship to remove this powder. Be is not absolutely sure of the date, but feels it was in 1947. 

· Age 42 - Likiep Atoll 

This woman was born on August 31, 1942 on Jabwor Island. She grew up on Likiep Island in Likiep Atoll and lived there during the March 1, 1954 

Bravo detonation. She vividly recalls the bright lights on the morning 

of March 1, 1954. She recalls a white dust in the air and remembers see- ing this white dust on the green canvas which was the roof of one of their structures. This woman moved to Majuro in 1960. 

This woman has had six children. One child has a cleft palate. In 1972 at the third month of pregnancy, this woman delivered •grapes• by 

Dr. Wein at the Majuro Hospital. The woman says that Dr. Wein put these 

grapes in a large jar and that they are still present today in the Majuro 

Hospital. She stated the reason for doing this was because Dr. Wein 

stated he had never seen a delivery previously with this appearance. She 

subsequently has had a hysterectomy. 

Lae Atoll 

When I was visiting Lae Atoll in February, 1984, one person told me that 

people from Rongelap and Wotho temporarily moved to Lae prior to 1952 and 

stayed there for a short time and then returned home. A second individual 

stated that a camp was made for Rongelap and tlotho people and that they 

stayed there for a short while and returned home; this person could not 

recall the date. 

Ujae Atoll 

When I visited Ujae Atoll in February, 1984, I had a discussion with several 50-70 year old men . A few of these men recalled that there were some people on Enelamoj Island on Ujae Atoll who developed lip and skin burns 

after powder fell on their skin after the bomb blast in March, 1954. These men also said powder was seen on plant leaves. 

Anonymous - Ujae Atoll 

This woman was about 18 years old on Ujae Atoll during the 1954 Bravo test. Her first comments concern a conversation she had with her mother about one 

hour prio r to this dictation, and her mother told her tha t she was on 

Enelamoj Island on Ujae Atoll and that the bomb blast caused a powder to fall on the ground which appeared like ashes. She said the color was a white to gray appe arance . After a few days, all of the l e aves on the coconut and bread fruit tre e s turned bro wn and red and we r e no t areen. Some of 

the men' s skin became dark and bro wn a nd the y ac t ed as tho u9h they were 

drunk with l oss o f bala nce and d izz iness , but the y we re no t drunk. The r e 

THOMAS HAMILTON, M .D . • INTERNAL MEOICJNE • •nx U t. MAJURO, MARSHALL ISLANDS ,,.,o 
188 

Histor ica l Corr.rnents - 1983 , 1984 Page 

we r e two peopl e who had skin bur ns on t;1e face and arms , ~ nd a l ittle boy 

who wa s burneQ all o ver his body be caus e he h ad no clqthe s o n. 

The daughte r says she do es not reme mber very much, but does remember s e e ing 

a very big, red lightning o n the horizon and s he does remember seeing 

powder on the ground. She states that an American airplane came to the 

island and told them to stay inside their houses and to take their drinking water inside. She states the Americans spread a large canvas on the 

baseball field. 

(The above comments were told to me in Majuro, March 5, 1985.) 

- Ujae Atoll 

This woman was 10 years old during the 1954 Bravo test and was living on Ujae Atoll. She remembers seeing a very bri ght light and that the ground was shaking. She states that the sky was very dark and looked like black smoke. 

She states that all of her ducks and chickens died several days after the 

blast. 

- Kwajalein Atoll 

This woman was approximately 20 years old during the 1954 Bravo test when 

she was living on one of the northern islands in Kwajalein Atoll. She states the name of the island was "Ebtan•. She remembers the light and shaking of 

the ground. She states she was actually on Ebeye Island at the time of the 

blast but went to this small northwestern island about one or two days after the explosion. She states she saw white powder on the pandanus leaves. 

- Ailuk Atoll 

This man was 43 years old in March, 1954 during the Bravo e xplosion and was living on Ailuk Atoll. He remembers seeing the light and the shaking ground . He states that he saw ashes which were white colored falling from the sky. 

He does not remember anything on the plants or the ground. 

- Ujae Atoll 

This woman was 19 years old at the time of the Bravo detona tion on March 1 , 

1954 and was living on Ujae Atoll . . She remembers see ing t he light and 

feeling the ground shaking. She states that it rained in the afternoon and 

that the arms of some people (unclear if herself) looked like they were burne d with grease and people were havi ng seve re itching . There was no 

s now f rom the sky, but there was a fog in the sky. She states the skin f e lt 

better the next day . 

- Wo tje Ato ll 

Th is woman was 24 years old a t the time of t he Br avo de t o na t ion on Marc h 1, 

19 5 4 and was living o n Wo t je Ato ll . She remembe rs t he explosion a nd states 

that s he saw wh ite "snowf lake s " f all i ng from the s ky on the s ame day of the 

explosi on . 

THOMAS HAMIL TON, M .D . • INTERNAL MEQJ.CJNlt_ - aox_,.i, ... MAJURO, MARSHALL ISLANDS HHO 
189 

Historica l Comments - 1983, 1984 Pae 4 

- iiotje Atoll 

This woman was in her rnid-20's during the 1954 Bravo detonation and she was 

living on Wotje Atoll . She states that she remembers yellow "snowflakes" 

falling from the sky on that day. 

- Lae Atoll 

This man was approximately 40 years old during the 1954 Bravo detonation whe he was living on Lae Atoll. He states he believes there was a pre-announcement of the Bravo test. He saw a very bright light and states that he lost his vision for about 15 minutes. He was on a boat in the lagoon and was 

looking at the bright light. He went back to land and later saw a white 

powder oi~ the grass and coconut leaves. He says it was not exactly white, 

but an off-white color. 

- Lae Atoll 

This woman was approximately 34 at the time of the Bravo detonation on March 

1, 1954 when she was living on Lae Atoll. She remembers hearing the blast 

and seeing a light which looked like a rainbow in the sky. She saw yellow 

smoke far away. She does not remember anything falling on the ground. 

- Jaluit Atoll 

This woman was 35 years old during the 1954 Bravo detonation on Bikini and 

she was living on Jaluit Atoll. She recalls seeing the bright light of the 

explosion but recalls nothing else. She moved to Majuro in the summer of 

1954. 

- Jalui t Atoll 

This woman was 35 years old during the 1954 Bravo hydrogen bomb detonation on Bikini Atoll. She was living on Jaluit AEoll and states she remembers 

well the light and explosion and states that •trees were dying after the 

blast•. 

- Ailuk Atoll 

This woman was 25 years old during the 1954 Bravo hydrogen bomb detonation. She ~was l1ving on Ailuk a t that time. She states she saw a bright light and 

felt the ground shaking. She cannot remember if she saw anything falling from the sky, however, about three weeks after the blas t she stated that 

some fri~nds told her that they saw powder fall from the sky on the day of 

the blast. 

THOMAS HAMIL TON, M .D . • IN,U.ftN~DICl,,11£,,-• BOX 1 •1 , MAJURO. MARSHALL ISLANDS ttteo 

79-784 0-94-7 
190 

Response to DOE Comments received 2/19/94 to 1987 JAMA article on Marshall 

Islanders exposed to nuclear fallout from the 1954 BRAVO test. 

Tom Hamilton, MD, PhD, MPH 

February 22, 1994 

1. No formal or official critique or response received to this 1987 article until these 

congressional hearings and then only a one page unidentified discussion. 

2. DOE has never initiated studies to confirm or refute the 1987 findings. 

3. DOE claims that this study is an ecologic study and therefore offers "the lowest level 

of evidence for establishing cause and effect relationships". While this is a true 

statement about ecologic studies the statement that the JAMA study is ecologic is 

completely false. Ecologic studies involve assessment of disease occurrence by some 

population characteristic and not by collecting· individual exposure data and assessing 

individual outcome data. The JAMA article clearty states in the methodology that 

exposure data was collected on individuals prior to the determination of individual 

outcome data, eg diagnosis of thyroid nodules. The criticism by DOE stating that this 

study is ecologic are therefore completely without substance. 

4. DOE claims that using only one physician to perform the examinations is a 

weakness. This was acknowledged in the article and was the basis for performing an 

in depth validation study which is described fully in the article and demonstrates that 

there was excellent agreement of thyroid examination results between the author and 

an independent thyroid specialist from the University of Washington who travelled to 

the Marshall Islands to participate in the validation study. 

5. DOE claims that central atolls may have had a prevalence intermediate between the 

north and south. This of course may be true and would only serve to strengthen the 

"dose-response" nature of the findings and has no adverse bearings on the results of 

this study. 

6. DOE claims that residence at time of test was not verified. This is true however the 

unique nature of small atolls between hundreds of miles of ocean prohibits significant 

movement in a short time. In addition the detonation of a 15 megaton hydrogen bomb 

detonation is such a remarkable experience that it is likely very well remembered, 

similar to the JFK assassination for example. In any event, for this to be a problem one 

would have to propose that inaccurate recall of residence during BRAVO was somehow 

differential which is highly unlikely. 

7. The DOE 

recommends following the results of a recent thyroid study in the Marshall Islands done 

in collaboration with Japanese investigators. Did DOE in any way initiate or play any 

part in promoting this study? 
191 

Reprinted /rom the JAMA• Journal of the J\n»rican Medical Associm::tn 

Aug-UM 7, 1987, \lolume 258 

Copyright 1987, American Medical As.soc1atioo 

Thyroid Neoplasia in Marshall Islanders 

Exposed to Nuclear Fallout Thomas E. Hamilton, MD, PhD; Gerald van Belle, PhD; James P. LoGerfo, MD, MPH 

We studied the risk of thyroid neoplasia in Marshall Islanders exposed to 

radioiodines in nuclear fallout from the 1954 BRAVO thermonuclear test. We 

screened 7266 Marshall Islanders for thyroid nodules; the islanders were from 14 

atolls, including several southern atolls, which were the source of the best 

available unexposed comparison group. Using a retrospective cohort design, we 

determined the prevalence of thyroid nodularity in a subgroup of 2273 persons 

who were alive in 1954 and who therefore were potentially exposed to fallout from 

the BRAVO test. For those 12 atolls previously thoughtto be unexposed to fallout, 

the prevalence of thyroid nodules ranged from 0.9% to 10.6%. Using the distance 

of each atoll from the test site as a proxy for the radiation dose to the thyroid 

gland, a weighted linear regression showed an inverse linear relationship 

between distance and the age-adjusted prevalence of thyroid nodules. Distance 

was the strongest single predictor in logistic regression analysis. A new absolute 

risk estimate was calculated to be 1100 excess cases/Gy/y/1 x 10' persons (11.0 

excess cases/radly/1 million persons), 33% higher than previous estimates. We 

conclude that an excess of thyroid nodules was not limited only to the two 

northern atolls but extended throughoutthe northern atolls; this suggests a linear 

dose-response relationship. 

IT HAS been 21 years since the publication o( an early case series of thyroid 

neoplaSia (including thyroid cancer and 

From the Departments of Medicine (Ors. Hamilton 

and LoGerfo) and Biostatistics (Dr van Belle), University 

of Washington, Seattle 

The opinions, conclusions. and proposals in this 

article are those of the authors and do not necessarily 

represent the views of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation or the Marshall Islands Atomic Testing litigation 

Project 

Reprint requests to Occupational Medicine Program, 

Harbofview Medical Center, 325 Ninth Ave, Seattle, WA 

98104 {Dr Hamilton) 

JAMA, Aug 7, 1987-Vol 258, No. 5 

(JAMA 1987;258:629-636) 

benign nodules) developing in children 

of Marshall Islanders as a late effect of 

exposure to radioactive fallout. 1 This 

exposure resulted from the detonation 

of a 15-megaton thermonuclear device 

on March 1, 1954, on Bikini Atoll in the 

northern Marshall Islands (Fig 1). This 

atmospheric nuclear test, code-named 

BRAVO, heavily contaminated the islands ofRongelap Atoll (86 inhabitants), 

and to a lesser extent, Utrik Atoll (167 

inhabitants). The acute radiation sickness that developed in most of the people from Rongelap has been well described in previous reports. 2

-

1

~ The most 

common late effect from this exposure 

has been the development of thyroid 

nodules. Between 1954 and 1985, thyroid nodules developed in approximately 33% of the Rongelap population, 

including 63% of children less than 10 

years old at the time of exposure, and 

10% of the U trik population.'·" Previous 

investigators have assumed that Rongelap and U trik were the only two northern atolls exposed to fallout radiation; in 

their studies they used as unexposed 

controls those living on other northern 

atolls during the 1954 BRAVO test and found the prevalence of thyroid nodules 

in this comparison group to be 6.3%. '·" Although the estimates of thyroid dose 

for islanders from Rongelap and Utrik 

have been widely published, almost no 

information exists about the possible 

contamination of other northern atolls by radioiodines in 1954. 2.1,,n There is no 

verification that exposure to radioiodine 

did not occur on the other northern atolls. 

Radiation exposure to the thyroid 

gland in the Marshallese people resulted primarily from beta radiation from a mixture of radioiodines (

1311, 1321, 1311, 1151) and, to some extent, gamma 

radiation. 15•

11 Knowledge about radiation-induced thyroid neoplasia comes 

largely from two sources: (1) studies of 

children exposed to gamma radiation 

for benign diseases..,. and (2) studies of 

survivors exposed to gamma radiation 

Thyroid Neoplasia-Hamilton et al 629 
at Hiroshima and Nagaaaki. "" Studies 

of exposures to iodine 131 in humans 

have been limited largely to •• I therapy 

for patients with Graves' hyperthyroidism. It is unclear from these 

studies whether wI alone results in an 

excess of thyroid nodules.""' Much less 

is known about the health risks of exposure to short-lived radioiodines other 

than "'I. This information may be important in assessing the impact of radioiodine exposure from nuclear reactor 

accidents. 

While the people from Rongelap and 

Utrik have been exhaustively studied 

during the last 33 years, these previous 

studies of thyroid neoplasia did not include the total geographical extent of 

the Republic of the Marshall Islands. To define more carefully the risk of thyroid 

neoplasia from nuclear fallout containing radioactive iodines, we conducted a 

retrospective cohort study of thyroid 

nodules in 7266 · Marshallese people 

from 14 atolls, including several southern atolls, which served as the source of. 

the best available unexposed comparison group. 

METHODS 

Study Hypolheale 

The objectives of this study were as 

follows: (I) to determine the prevalence 

of thyroid nodules in people who were 

living on 14 northern and southern atolls 

at the time of the 1954 BRAVO detonation; (2) to test the null hypothesis that 

no difference existed in the prevalence 

of thyroid nodules among the 12 atolls of 

this study previously thought unexposed to radioactive fallout; and (3) if the null hypothesis is rejected, to deter- mine which factors might explain the 

variation in rates of thyroid nodules. 

Study Location 

The Marshall Islands are located 2400 miles southwest of Hawaii; approximately 35 000 people (1985) live on 24 atolls spread among 375 000 square miles in the central Pacific Ocean. This 

population is distributed roughly in 

thirds on the following atolls: Majuro 

Atoll, the administrative district of the 

government of the Marshall Islands; 

Kwajaleip Atoll; and the remaining 22 

atolls, known collectively as the "outer 

islands." This study took place between 

June 1983 and March 1985 on 14 of the 24 inhabited atolls in the Marshall Islands 

(Fig 1i Fbr this study, northern atolls were defined as those north of Majuro 

(Rongelap, Utrik, Mejit Island, Ailuk, 

Likiep, Wotje, Maloelap, Kwajalein, 

Lae, Ujae, and Wotho~ and southern 

atolls were defined as those south of 

Majuro (Jaluit, Ebon, and Mill• These 

830 JA~A. Aug 7, 1987-Vol 258, No. 5 

192 

14 study atolls were selected to include 

all northern atolls that could have possibly been in the path of fallout and as 

many southern atolls as logistically feasible. Atolls that were not studied included five central atolls, two currently 

uninhabited northern atolls (Rongerik 

and Ailingnae), one southern atoll, and 

two atolls west of Bikini. 

Study Design and Sample 

A population-based retrospective cohort design was employed. Among the 

7266 Marshallese people screened in 

this study, 2273 persons were alive in 

March 1954 and were residing on one of 

the 14 study atolls; they were, therefore, potentially exposed to the shortlived radioiodines, Since only these people were at risk for radioiodine-induced 

thyroid neoplasia, it is this group of2273 

persons that makes up the sample in 

this study. 

During the course of this study, all 

residents (age 5 years and older) of each 

island selected for screening were invited and encouraged to receive thyroid 

examinations. Extensive discussions 

with traditional leaders of each atoll 

were conducted prior to each trip to 

ensure maximal communication to residents of each island. One to two weeks 

were spent on each atoll performing the 

screening examinations. The population 

of each atoll at the time of screening was estimated from the 1980 Marshall Islands census data." 

To offset the effect of self-selection by 

islanders of each atoll population, we 

attempted to screen the entire population of 13 primary atolls. Since migration out of the country is rare, the primary problem was capturing those 

members of the population, especially 

the population oC 1954, who had moved 

to either of the two population centers, 

Majuro or Kwajalein. Screening programs were therefore conducted on Majuro and Kwajalein for those individuals 

and their families who had lived on any 

of the 13 northern or southern atolls 

in 1964. However, since we screened 

nearly a third of the population of Kwsjalein Atoll for thyroid nodules, we also 

included K wajalein as a primary atoll, 

making a total of 14 study atolls. 

Exposure Crllllrla 

Since the short-lived radioiodines 

("'I, •1, "'I, •I) all have half-lives of 

leas than eight days, the bulk of the 

radioiodine exposure from the BRA VO 

event occurred during the month of 

March 1964. Therefore, the most important historical information concerning 

the ndioiodine doee was the location of 

residence in March 1954. Because most 

individuals can provide vivid descripTable 1.-0istance and Direction d Study Atolls 

FromllildniAlol 

..... , 

-

U1"k 

Mejit ISlll'Wit ...... 

u,..,, 

-

Maloelap 

Lae 

KvraJalein 

~ 

Jalult 

Elion 

Mili 

-. -· 120 

321 

398 

342 

308 

376 

460 

198 

187 

112 

192 

500 

538 

... 

e,"t 

20 

6 

15 

18 

26 

25 

26 

71 

BO 

.. 

51 

54 

.. 

42 

•01stat1ee lrom atoll to BRA\Otest site on Bikini Atoll in statute miles. 

tAnglt, al atoll from 0- latitude line drawn through Bikini Atoll. t:JMiit ISiand is classified as an atoll for the purposes ..... ...,,,. 

tions of what they were doing during the 

dramatic BRAVO test, the question was 

posed in the following manner: "Where 

were you living when the 1bomb' caused 

the Rongelap and Utrik people to be 

moved from their homeland?" Individuals born after March 1, 1954, hut before 

Dec 31, 1954, were classified as in utero at the time of the blast, and their atoll of 

residence in 1954 was classified acconling to their atoll of birth. Because of the 

relative proximity of all the islands 

within each atoll and the long distance 

between any atoll aod the blast site, 

all individuals from different islands 

within an atoll were classified by the 

atoll name for the purposes of 1954 

residence status. Since the people live on small land 

masses, the atolls represent discrete 

points in the vast ocean area of the Mar8hall Islands. The distance from 

each atoll to the site of the 1954 BRAVO test (Bikini Atoll) was therefore selected as a proxy for the radioiodine 

dose received in 1954. 

A second variable was developed to 

better characterize the exposure status 

of the Marshallese people. A directional 

variable, 8, was selected as a proxy for 

meteorologic conditions, such as wind and precipitation, that may have influenced the distribution of the fallout 

cloud. We defined 8 as the angle in 

degrees, measured clockwise, of each of 

the 14 atolls from a O" latitude line drawn 

through Bikini Atoll, using Bikini as the 

vertex. Table 1 shows the distance of 

each atoll from the BRAVO test site as 

well as the angle 8 of each atoll from an 

east-west line drawn through Bikini. 

Dlagnoetlc Crlt8rta 

We defined a thyroid nodule as one 

that "88 palpable, discrete, and estimated to be 1.0 cm or greater. Findings 

of. indlscrete or uncertain lesions and 

Thyroid Neoplasia- Hamilton et al 
193 

Fig 1.- Marshall Islands. BRAVO test site is shown on Bikini Atoll. People on 

othef atolls were 9CtNl"l8d tor thyroid nodules. 

Fig 2.-Prevalence of thr.,ld nodules. Atolls ShoWn in color Inset were 

previously assumed Ul"l8'Jq)OSed to redioiodine from nuclear falout. 

35 .,,. 

-

~--~ 1 

' "" •.m p < .002 

0 -'-, - ~,oo- -c200...,----c300.,-----<00=---c,oo.,-----,,eoo-,----

Oiaunc:e lmiesl 

Ftg 3.-Weighted tinear regression. Ag.adjusted 

pnwalenc:e of thyroid nodules weighted by inverse of 

population Y8rianoe is pk>«led against dirlance from 

BRA\,O tes1 on Bikini Aloi. 

T-2.-P!q)o,tionsolAloll~-

lof Thyroid -.rny 

Atoll 

__ ... .-. 

201 

287 

278 

353 

419 

... 

534 

206 

,.. 

74 1296 

792 

681 

.... 10791 

8081 

22107 

T'"81No.(%1 

-122 {61) 

184 {84) 

263 1951 217 (61) 

137 (33) 

304 (781 

... (831 149 (72) 

187 (70) 

"4 (481 759 (59) 

517 (85) 

31D (47) 

3735 1141 1723 (18) 

1808 (30) .,...(32) 

•Projectedfrom1980Marshall1Nndacensusdlta.42 

tScreening d lhe entire K~n and M,Juro popu- ldons ,_ not an.n,ptect; 0/fV,f PlflOl"IS fromtt'l8N two 

lklltwho had ltV9d on lhe oi'181' 13 inrer,--.1n 1i54Wlllftl screened. 

--.-~~\;Fomales j • Males 

I 0 0 0 

i"~o 00 

• 0 • L~ .. D '--

. . 0-1------,- - - ~ --+-- -+-''---" 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 

Oistanoe(mles) 

Fig 4.-Logistic regl'fflion ana!ylil. Probability ol 

lhyroid nodule ~ In an lncllYidual (ln>m 

lillod logistic rnodoll is shown !of_, - gi,ol1 mean age,• fln:tion of diltance from Bikini Aloi. 

Actual pnNBlence data en, aleo plobd. Females, 

top oorw, and ma'9s, bottom curw. 

Ago.--~,s.Grllj)hshowsfitted~CONO<Qloflhyroid 

ealcutaled - "" - ccrnpu1ed '""""°""'""'log-"""""· C);etance - for each comour of fixed probability, glwrl mean aged fema6ee, for 

valUN d & from O'" 10 SO-. 

Thvroid Neor1asie M: rrihs · t al 831 
194 

T-3-~-ol1954COhofland_ol....,,_~ 

--- Alwln11N - ~! 

- -. .. - n,, -I I i 

- .. 45.9 54.5 17 

- tf1 47.4 58.7 5 

-- ,,,, 482 .... .... 177 4U 58.0 

.__ 11f1 47.7 53.8 12 

- 181 47.8 48.7 9 

- 183 48.5 53.5 

... .. 48.4 48.4 

Ujoe 108 48.5 511.8 

- 25 44.8 06.7 I 

·- 425 SU 49.8 13 12 

...... 313 48.8 58.2 15 2 

Ellan 258 ... 80.1 5 

"" ,,, 472 55.8 1 

-

._.,._.,_ 2273 ... ___ 48.8 55.0 """"" __ 97 _ .. 

--- - -.,_,, ~ -1.872 

Ago 0.01914• 

5"'t 1.313t 

- -0.01oat:$ 

-G.05312:t, 

-·· 0.0001457t 

•.P•.003. t'Malt•1 and fllmllle-2. 

:tP<.001. 

IE 

0.8310 

0.0082 

0.2180 

0.0021 

0.0132 

0.00004 

nodules less than 1 cm were classified 

as normal thyroid examination results. 

The term thyroid nodule does not connote the histologic characteristics of a lesion. We use the terms thyroid ,..,.,_ 

plasia and thyroid nodule synonymously in this article to indicate that 

such lesions may be either malignant or 

benign. 

Because the hypothesis of this study 

pertains strictly to solitary thyroid nodules, individuals with Graves' disease, 

multinodular goiter, or simple diffuse 

goiter were not classified as h.aving nodules for the purpose of this analysis. 

Individuals whose 1954 residence was not one of the 14 study atolls were 

excluded altogether from the prevalence data. 

PrevlOua Thyroldectomy 

Almost all individuals from Rongelap 

and Utrik in whom thyroid nodules developed lwl lwl thyroid surgery, generally in the United States under the direction of Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY.• This is also true for 

certain individuals in the comparison 

groups. The majority of the atoll popula1132 JAMA. Aua 7, 19117-Vc> 258. No. 5 

Odds---- 1.21/10 y (1 .07/10 y-1 .37/10 y) 

3.72 FIM (2.'2-5.70 FIM) 

0.3:.v100mllN(0.221100mllN-0.50l100mllN) 

0.58(10" (0.45110'"-0.7&'10") 

1.151100 mlN x trt" (1.07/100 mleax ta"• 

1.25/100 milNIC 10, 

tions, however, lwl lwl little access to 

physicians. As a result, most thyroid 

nodules in this study were newly diagnosed. Because cohort attrition from 

thyroid mortality is extremely low and 

because nodules generally do not spontaneously regress, we decided to count 

individuals with previous thyroidectomy as having lwl a thyroid nodule if 

the indication for surgery was the removal of a thyroid nodule. Fbr Marshall 

Islanders with prior thyroidectomy, the 

indication for the surgery was ascertained from available medical records. 

The histologic characteristics of theae 

malignant and benign neoplasms have 

been described previously.• Individuals with previous thyroid surgery for 

Graves' disease, simple goiter, or indications other than a thyroid nodule were not classified as having a thyroid nodule 

in this analysis. Individuals whose surgical histologic findings were "normal 

thyroid tissue• were also not classified 

as h.aving nodules. The net result of these classifications is that the prevalence data reported here are thought to 

approximate closely the C111Dulative incidence of thyroid nodularity since 1954. 

- Crudo .... -:..-:: -.. - _,. 17 31.0 372 

• 9.0 10.3 

2.4 2.4 

4.5 4.9 ,. ... 8.7 ,. 8.7 ... • 4.9 4.7 

7 10.8 102 

10 9.3 9.8 

2 8.0 9.8 

25 5.9 5.3 

17 5.4 5.2 

8 3.1 3.2 

0.9 0.8 

14Z 8.2 5.7 

Thyroid Carcinoma 

The prevalence of solitary thyroid 

nodules was the outcome variable in this 

study. Because many individuals with 

new thyroid nodules were trested medically rather than referred for surgery, 

ascertainment of thyroid carcinoma was incomplete in this study cohort. However, aince previous authors have provided absolute risk estimetes for total 

thyroid nodules as well as for thyroid 

carcinoma, our risk estimates for total 

thyroid nodules in this study can be 

directly compared.• 

Data Collection 

A physical examination of the thyroid 

gland was carefully performed by one of 

us (T.E.H.) on all 7266 study participants. Detailed drawings and explanations were recorded for all thyroid 

abnormalities, including evidence of 

pr,vious thyroid surgery. Nodules were 

described by location, consistency, contour, discreteness, and size. In addition 

to demographic information the following information was also obtained: a 

briefmedicsl and surq:al history, blood 

pressure, pulse, and examination of the 

cervical lymph nodes. Residence location in 1964 was recorded. Persons with 

thyroid abnormalities were referred for 

a comprehensive medical evaluation in 

the author's (T.E.H.) central office on 

Majuro Atoll. 

The same qualilied Marshallese interpreter was present at all screening examinations. Travel to the 14 atolls and 

islands within atolls was 8""0mpliahed 

by airplane, ship, small craft, and outrigger canoe. 

'lb diminiah observer bias, the thyroid examiner was masked to the his- tory of exposure: the Marshallese interpreter asked each person about his or 

Thyroid Neoplasia-Hamilton et al 
her 1954 residence in their native language. Individuals who were too young 

to remember the 1954 thermonuclear BRAVO test were asked where they 

were born, and their residence history 

for their first five years was noted. 

Risk Assessment 

The absolute risk coefficient for thy- roid neoplasia is expressed as the number of excess nodules/thyroid dose/ 

years at risk/1 million persons, where 

excess nodules are the observed minus 

expected nodules and the thyroid dose 

is expressed in grays (1 Gy = 100 rad). 

The most recent estimates for the mean 

dose of radiation to the thyroid gland in 

Marshall Islanders are 21 Gy (2100 rad) 

for Rongelap Islanders and 2.80 Gy 

(280 rad) for Utrik Islanders." Th calculate a single absolute risk coefficient 

for both of these populations, previous 

studies used the following information: 

a mean thyroid dose of 8 Gy (800 rad), 

the mean number of years at risk (18), 

the observed number of nodules ( 46), 

and the expected number of nodules (16) 

for the combined population of 251 

Rongelap and Utrik Islanders. The 

calculation for the expected number of 

nodules was based on a prevalence of 

6. 3% for atolls assumed unexposed to 

fallout. 16 

We determined a new value for the 

prevalence of nodules in unexposed 

Marshall Islanders. Th calculate a new 

absolute risk coefficient, we used the 

expected number of nodules determined with this new prevalence value as 

well as the above information concerning mean dose, mean years at risk, and 

observed nodules for the original 251 

Rongelap and Utrik Islanders. 

Internal Valldlty 

Since all thyroid examinations were performed by a single investigator 

(T.E.H.), it was important to validate 

these observations. A substudy was de- signed that compared, in a masked fash- ion, results of the author's physical examination of the thyroid gland with results of the physical examination by 

an expert in thyroid disease. A group of 173 individuals whom the author had examined during the previous two years 

was asked to participate in this study. 

Approximately 50% of these individuals 

had previously had normal thyroid ex- amination results and were randomly 

selected from northern and southern 

atolls. The remaining 50% had nodular 

thyroid abnormalities. Each of the 173 

people was examined separately by an 

experienced thyroid examiner from the 

University of Washington, Seattle. The 

second examiner had no prior knowledge of the author's previous examinaJAMA, Aug 7, 1987-Vol 258, No. 5 

195 

tions. In addition, Dr Hamilton repeated examination of any individual (masked to his previous examination) 

when there was disagreement between 

his results and those of the visiting 

thyroid examiner. Approximately 95% 

of this 173-person cohort complied with 

these examinations. Excellent agreement was obtained between the two 

examiners (87% observed agreement, 

kappa= .80). 

RESULTS 

Demographic Characteristics 

of Cohort 

A mean of 64% of the populations of 

the 13 primary atolls was screened, with 

a range of 33% to 95% (Table 2). As 

discussed in the "Methods" section, selected screening examinations were 

performed on Majuro and Kwajalein 

atolls to find those individuals who had 

lived on any of the 13 primary atolls at 

the time of the 1954 BRAVO test. Because nearly a third of Kwajalein Atoll 

was screened, it was added to the other 

13 primary atolls for the subsequent 

analyses, making a total of 14 study 

atolls. 

Prevalence of Thyroid Nodularlty 

Of the 7266 persons screened, 2273 

were alive at the time of the BRAVO 

test and were residing on one of the 14 

study atolls on March 1, 1954 (Table 3). 

Exposure to the short-lived radioiodines 131 1 1321 1331 and 1351 was therefore possible 'in this gl"Oup. Since these isotopes have half-lives of eight days or 

less, exposure to radioiodines from the 

BRAVO test fallout was not possible in 

persons born after 1954. 

The numbers of people with solitary 

thyroid nodules (mean estimated size, 

2.1 cm), previous thyroidectomy for a 

thyroid nodule, total thyroid nodules, 

and the prevalence of thyroid nodules 

for the reconstructed 1954 population appear in Table 3. For the 12 atolls previously thought unexposed to fallout 

radiation, the prevalence of nodules 

ranged from 0.9% to 10.6% (Fig 2). If 

these atolls were not exposed to radioiodines from the BRA VO test, we would expect, in the absence of other 

risk factors for thyroid nodularity, to 

see the same prevalence of thyroid nod- ules in all the atolls. To test this hypothesis, we performed a x2 analysis. The results reject the null hypothesis that 

no difference exists in the prevalence of 

thyroid nodules among these 12 atolls 

(x'=23.45, df=U, P<.025). 

Predictors of Risk 

for Thyroid Neoplasla 

Th better understand the wide variation in rates of thyroid nodules, we 

performed multivariate analysis. Since 

thyroid dose estimates for people living 

on these 12 atolls are lacking, the distance of each atoll from the Bikini test site was selected as a proxy for the dose of radioiodine received by the thyroid 

gland. Weighted linear regression using 

the age-adjusted prevalence of nodules 

by atoll of residence in 1954 as the dependent variable shows a highly significant inverse linear relationship with distance from Bikini (r= - .65, P<.002) 

(Fig 3). Although northern atolls used 

in previous studies as a source for unexposed controls were found to have a 

prevalence of thyroid nodules of6.3%,'·" 

the prevalence of nodules in our study 

continues to decrease to less than 1% as the distance from the site of the BRAVO 

test increases. We believe a better esti- mate for the prevalence of thyroid nodules in unexposed Marshallese to be 

2.45%, the mean prevalence of the two southernmost atolls. 

To examine risk at the level of the 

individual, we used logistic regression 

analysis, in which the presence or absence of a thyroid nodule was the dependent variable. Not only distance but also age and sex, 8 (the angle from (f' 

latitude), and the product of 8 and distance were all significant contributors 

to the logistic model (Table 4). The 

addition of inverse distance terms or 

higher order polynomial distance terms 

was not significant. 

The odds ratios obtained from the 

regression coefficients show that the 

probability of a thyroid nodule developing in a female is 3. 7 times higher than 

that in males (Table 4), a finding consistent with those of other studies of thyroid exposure.~ 

The odds ratio for distance is 0.33 per 

100 miles from the test site, and for e, 0.59 for every 10°. In other words, the 

probability of a nodule decreases ap- proximately threefold for every 100 

miles farther from Bikini and twofold for every 10° going east to west in a 

clockwise direction. Figure 4 shows the 

fitted logistic model for males and fe- males, given mean age, with the actual 

prevalence data plotted. Again, as seen 

with linear regression, the probability decreases as the distance from Bikini 

increases. 

To better illustrate the interaction of distance and 9, we developed a set of 

probability contours on the map of the 

Marshall Islands using the logistic 

model with all five variables. We set the 

variable sex equal to females and the 

variable age equal to the mean age of 

females. For each of seven fixed probabilities between .5 and .01, the distance 

was calculated for possible values of 8. 

The values of e selected were between 0° 

Thyroid Neoplasia-Hamilton et al 1533 
and 80", which bounds the area of this 

study. As shown in Fig 5, these probability contours illustrate that the chance 

of developing thyroid nodules is influenced by both distance and 8 in a variable manner. For example, for a fixed 

distance of 300 miles from Bikini, the 

probability decreases as 8 increases. 

However, for most fixed distances 

greater than 400 miles from the test 

site, the probability increases with 8. 

These results are consistent with previously published fallout patterns showing an initial eastern pathway of the 

BRAVO fallout cloud." They are also 

consistent with a computer simulation 

pattern that suggested that after 

a predominantly eastern direction, 

toward Utrik, the fallout cloud moved south and west from Utrik. ~ 

Absolute Risk Aueurnent 

The absolute risk coefficient has been 

used to compare the risk for thyroid 

nodules among exposed populations"6 

. and can be expressed as follows: absolute risk coefficient = number of excess cases/Gy/years at risk/I x 10' persons 

(number of excess cases/rad/years at 

risk/I million persons), where number of 

excess cases is the number of observed 

nodules minus the number expected. 

Using a prevalence of nodules of 

2.45% determined in this study for unexposed Marshallese, we determined a 

new absolute risk coefficient for the 

Rongelap and Utrik people exposed to 

radioactive iodines. Since estimates of 

the thyroid dose and years at risk for 

these populations were known from previous studie._,.., "Methods" section), we calculated a new risk coefficient of UOO excess cases/Gy/y/1 x 1()6 persons 

(11.0 excess cases/rad/y/1 million per- sons). 

COMMENT 

This study demonstrates a strong inverse linear relationship between the 

probability of thyroid nodules developing in Marshall Islanders and the dis- tance of their 1954 home atoll from the 

Bikini test site. The direction of each 

atoll relative to Bikini was also an important risk factor. Our results indi- cate that excess thyroid nodules in Marshall Islanders were not limited to the 

two northern atolls of Rongelap and 

Utrik but occurred throughout many of the Marshall Islands. These findings 

suggest that the geographic extent of 

radioiodine exposure from the 1954 

BRAVO test was much broader than 

previously assumed. 

Without thyroid dose estimates for 

people living on 12 of the 14 atolls in this 

study, radiation exposure cannot be 

proved as the cause of these neoplasms. 

634 JAMA, Aug 7, 1987-Vol 258, No. 5 

196 

Other risk factors for thyroid neoplasia, 

however, do not appear to be present. 

There is no evidence for iodine deficiency in this population: the diet of the 

Marshallese population is well known to 

have ample iodine content, especially on 

the outer islands, where the diet is high 

in fresh fish.'·' In contrast to the United 

States, no head and neck irradiation of 

Marshallese children was employed as 

therapy for benign diseases of childhood 

such as acne, presumed tonsilar or thymic enlargement, cervical adenitis, or 

fungal infections of the scalp. There are 

no known dietary or environmental 

goitrogens that are used in the Marshall 

Islands. If other unknown risk factors 

for thyroid disease are present in this population, it must be postulated that 

they exert their effects in a pattern such 

that the risk from exposure decreases 

with distance from Bikini Atoll. Thus, 

the absence of other known risk factors for thyroid nodularity and the presence 

of a strong inverse linear relationsl)ip 

between thyroid nodularity and the distance of each atoll from the BRAVO test 

site suggest radioactive fallout as the 

most likely cause of these neoplasms. 

Although authors of previous clinical 

studies of Marshall Islanders assumed 

that 12 of the 14 atolls in this study 

were unexposed, other environmental 

assessment studies reported evidence 

that suggests that fallout contamination 

was not limited to Rongelap and Utrik. 

Robison and colleagues" reported that 

several inhabited atolls other than 

Rongelap and Utrik contained low lev- els of long-lived radionuclides that were 

likely residual from intermediate-range fallout in the Marshall Islands. Al- though the dose extrapolations from 

1978 to 1954 were not done for these atolls, the low doses received from the 

longer-lived isotopes, such as cesium 

137 and strontium 90, would not have contributed significantly to the thyroid 

dose during these years. An additional report documented 

a gamma dose at Ailuk Atoll to be 0.01 Gy/h (1.0 rad/h) one hour after the 

BRAVO detonation;~ such data suggest 

that this atoll, previously thought to be 

unexposed, received fallout. A computer simulation of the fallout cloud 

utilizing all available meteorologic data 

predicted that after an initial eastern 

direction, the maximal point of radiation 16 hours after the detonation would 

have been midway between Rongelap 

and Kwajalein." This suggests that the fallout cloud may have shifted from an 

initial eastern path to a south or southwest direction. This simulation model is 

consistent with the results of our 

study, which show that, except for 

Rongelap, the prevalence of thyroid 

nodules was highest in this region on the 

atolls of Lae, Ujae, Wotho, and Likiep 

(Fig2i 

The thyroid doses of people living on 

atolls previously assumed to be free 

from exposure to radioactive fallout 

may have been affected by long exposure times. While people on Rongelap 

and Utrik were evacuated 48 to 72 hours 

after detonation, no such evacuation 

took place on other atolls." Thus, people on those atolls may have had lower 

peak exposures than on Utrik, but because of continued exposure for the 

entire decay process of the radioiodines, 

their cumulative thyroid doses may 

have been as high as or higher than 

those on Utrik. 

One methodologic advantage afforded by the Marshall Islands is that 

the geography of these islands has provided considerable variation on our 

proxy for exposure. While the thyroid 

doses for persons on these atolls is 

not known, the position of small land 

masses across thousands of square 

miles of ocean permits us to know the 

distance from the blast site exactly. 

Second, residents of these atolls could 

not easily move from atoll to atoll in 

short periods of time, especially in 1954, 

making it possible to ascertain on which 

atolls persons were living during the 

exposure period of the BRAVO test. 

These factors may in part explain why 

the variables distance and 8 appear to 

be such strong proxies for radiation 

dose or conditions that affected the 

dose. 

This study has several limitations that deserve mention. The ascertainment of exposure, which involves re- ports from participants, is subject to 

recall bias, especially in cultures such as the Marshall Islands that are not time 

oriented. Asking the question in terms 

of where one lived in March 1954 might 

yield answers of questionable accuracy. 

However, persons in this study were 

asked where they lived when the "bomb" exploded, causing the Rongelap 

and Utrik people to be evacuated from 

their homeland. The detonation of the BRAVO hydrogen test was a dramatic 

event: people on many atolls in the 

northern Marshalls could see the light, 

feel the blast, and see the fallout OJJ, 

vegetation hours after the blast. In 

much the same way as people recall 

clearly what they were doing,it the time 

of Pearl Harbor or the assassination of 

John F. Kennedy, this dramatic hydrogen bomb affected the Marshallese people in a way s11ch that they could provide 

vivid descriptions of what they were 

doing and where they were living in 1954 

ai the time of the test. For individuals 

-living on southern atolls who could not 

Thyroid Neoplasia-Hamilton et al 
see the blast, some misclassification of 

exposure status is possible, since they 

would not have had the personal experience of this dramatic event to date their 

1954 atoll of residence. However, if such persons incorrectly recalled their location in 1954, the error would have probably been another southern atoll, since 

they would likely have remembered the 

BRAVO test had they lived on a northern atoll. In addition, transportation to 

and from these islands in the 1950s was not frequent, so the likelihood of misclassifying exposure remains small. 

The issue of multiple exposures arises 

in this study population since there 

were 66 announced nuclear tests in the 

Marshall Islands between 1946 and 

1958. 41 Many of these tests, 43 however, 

took place on Eniwetok Atoll, which is 

located about 200 miles west of Bikini. 

In addition, most of these tests were 

conducted when the prevailing winds 

were heading away from the Marshall 

Islands. More importantly, the BRAVO 

test was the largest of the 66 nuclear 

tests; it is the only test that people on 

distant atolls recall having seen. Thus, 

while it is possible that atolls close to 

Bikini, such as Rongelap, may have 

been exposed on multiple occasions, it is 

unlikely that such exposure occurred on 

distant atolls. 

Because this study was a retrospective cohort design, the important issue 

of latency cannot be addressed. Prospective studies of the Rongelap and 

Utrik populations reported a mean latency for thyroid nodules of 13 years for 

Rongelap children exposed at ages less 

than 10 years.• The Utrik children, with 

lower thyroid doses, had a mean latency 

of 25 years. Whether persons exposed 

to smaller doses in the present study 

may exhibit even longer latent periods 

is unknown. Since latent periods at least 

as long as 34 years are thought to exist 

in other populations exposed to thyroid 

irradiation,zz.11 it will be necessary to 

continue close follow-up of this population. 

The results of this study suggest that the northern atolls used in previous 

studies as a source for unexposed controls, with a prevalence of nodules of 

6.3%, were inappropriately selected, 

since the prevalence in our study contin- ues to decrease to less than 1% for the 

southern atolls, which are located the 

-

1. Conard RA, Rall JE, Sutow WW: Thyroid nodules u a late aequela d radioactive fallout, in a 

Marshall Island population expoeed in 1964. N Engl 

J Mod 1966;27"1391-1399. 

2. Conard RA, Paglia DE, Lanen PR, et al: 

~ cf M«lU:Cl Find.i1191 in a Mar,Ju,,llae 

Popwlotion 16 Ytan After Accidental Ezpo111.n to 

Rodioadiw lbllowt, US Dept d Energy publicaJAMA, Aug 7. 1987-Vol 258, No. 5 •-~~ ... " ~ 

197 

farthest from the Bikini test site. We 

believe that a better estimate of the 

prevalence of thyroid nodules in unexposed Marshallese is 2.45%, the mean 

prev-ctlence of the two southernmost 

atolls. Since the prevalence continues to 

decrease to a value less than 1% for the 

atoll farthest from the blast site, 2.45% 

is probably a conservative estimate for 

the spontaneous or background rate of 

solitary thyroid nodules in the Marshall 

Islands. 

Because authors of previous studies 

used the prevalence of6.3% for presumably unexposed controls, their risk coefficient of 830 excess cases/Gy/y/1 x 10' 

persons (8.3 excess cases/rad/y/1 million 

persons)" underestimates the true risk. 

Using our estimate of 2.45% for the 

prevalence of nodules in unexposed 

MarshaUese, our new risk coefficient is 

1100 excess cases/Gy/y/1 x 10' persons 

(11. 0 excess cases/rad/y/1 million persons). This is 33% higher than the previous estimate and is quite close to a 

published composite estimate of 12.3 

(1230) for gamma radiation." 

The components of radiation dose to 

the thyroid gland in Marshall Islanders 

exposed to fallout are relatively unique 

among studies of humans in whom thyroid neoplasia has developed from ionizing radiation. While gamma radiation 

accounts for part of the total thyroid 

dose in the Marshall Islands exposure 

(4% to 16%), the majority of the thyroid 

dose came from the short-lived radioiodines, •1, m1, and ~1, and, to a lesser 

extent, 131I." There is little information 

in the literature, other than that from 

exposures in the Marshall Islands, concerning the effects of these radio iodines 

in humans. Although 0 'I alone is known 

to induce thyroid neoplasms in animal 

studies/'41 it is much less effective in 

the induction of human thyroid neoplasms, possibly 50 times less so than 

gamma irradiation. az Indeed, studies of 

"'I therapy in Graves' disease have led to doubts about whether isi1 alone induces thyroid nodules in humans. 37• uo 

One explanation for the ineffectiveness of ml as a carcinogen in these studies 

may be that autoimmune thyroid disease renders the thyroid gland resistant 

to the development of neoplasms from 

"'I irradiation. An additional factor 

is the nonuniform distribution of 11:11 

within thyroid tissue compared with 

tion (BNL) 51-261. Upton, NY, Brookhaven NationaJ Laboratory, 1980. 

3. Conard RA, Knudsen KD, Dobyns BM, et al: A 

IO-Yea,- RM,w cf Medical Finding, in a Ma.,.. 

,Wlut Population Accidentall11 Ezpoud to Radioadiw Fhllout, US Dept cL Energy publication 

(BNL) 50-424. Upton, NY, Brookhaven National 

Laboratory, 1975. 

gamma radiation; the dose from this 

type of distribution can ablate tissue at 

localized "hot spots" and result in a 

lower dose to the remaining thyroid 

tissue. Other explanations include the 

lower dose rate of beta-emitting 1311 

compared with gamma radiation and 

the decreased potential of the thyroid 

gland to undergo malignant transformation once ablative doses of 1311 have 

been received by the entire gland.~ 

However, while the role of 131 1 as an 

inducer of thyroid neoplasia remains 

controversial, it should be emphasized 

that radioiodine fallout contains not 

only ,ii i but a mixture of short-lived, 

higher-energy radioiodines. 

The public health implications of 

these results are important not only to 

the Marshallese people but also to populations that may be exposed to shortlived radioiodines from fallout such 

as may occur during nuclear reactor accidents. These isotopes include the 

higher energy beta-emitters 1321, 1331, and wr and do appear to be effective inducers of thyroid nodules. In our study, 

we found the absolute risk coefficient to 

be· nearly identical to the estimate for 

gamma irradiation. Thus, populations 

exposed to radioiodine fallout should 

not only be considered for potassium 

iodide prophylaxis at the time of contamination but should also be carefully 

followed up for the late development of 

thyroid nodules. We anticipate the expected rates of such neoplasms to be 

similar to those found from gamma radiation. 

TIM! Reid work ror this atudy wu supported by 

the M.anihall Ialamb Atomic Tuating Litigation 

Project, Lot An,eles. The analysis and preparation 

or this manuscript wu supported in part by a grant 

from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Princeton, NJ. 

We are indebted to the fuUawing Marshallese 

field staff: Staff Director Atta Lang, Leilani Lokboj, Julie Lloyd, Wmnie MacQuinn, Aida Nashion, 

Anibar Timothy, and Lijon Eknilang. Special grati- tude la expreNed for the cooperation afthe people 

rL the Manhall Islands, the local council government.A on the atol~. Minister al Heatt.b Dr Jeton 

Anjain(l98'l), repreeentativeacitbe Republic cl.the 

Manhall Islands, and to all memben d the Marshall Island.a Atomic 'n!sting Litigation Project. We 

are aJao indebted to Robert Griep, MD, and Lori 

Bernstein for participation in the validation upert.s 

d this study; to Bruct! Psaty, MD, MPH, Tom 

KoepoeU, MD, MPH, and Linda l!Doenotock, MD, 

MPH, rorcritieal reviewW.themanuaeript; to Mary 

Miller for usistance in data abetraction; and to Paulette Gilliam for preparation <ithe manuecript. 

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1384. 

42, Manluul ltland• Sta.tittical Abttract. M.aju.n:i, Office m Planning and Statistics, Republic of 

the Manhall lslands, 1985. 

43. Hawthorne HA (ed): CompilaJ.ion ff Local 

FhlloutData From Tut Detonation.t1945•1962 Ez. 

troct.edFromDASA.1151, US Dept of Defense pub,. 

Ucat.ion (DNA) 1261-2-Ex. Santa Barbara, Calif, 

Defenae Nuclear A&ency, 1979. 

44. Peterson KR: CaatJe.BRAVO Air COftcmtmtlon,andDq,otiti.on Pattern• FJ"O'ma :J-D Po.rlide- in-CeU Coat. publication (UASG) 81-20. Livermore, Calif, US Dept m Energy, 1981. 45. lnducticmffTh11roidCancnbylonizingRadiatWft. National Council on Radiation Protection and MeuW'l!menta, report 80, Mardt 1985. 

'6, Robiaon WL, Mount ME, Phillips WA, et al: 

TM No-rU&em Mo.nliall l•landl Radiological Sur- vey: 7emiatria.l Food Clt.ain and Total Dotu, US 

Dept o{ Energy publication 52-853. Livermore, 

University of California R•di.ation Labor:atory, 

1982. ,1. Cronkite EP, Bond VP, Dunham CL (eds): 

Some Ejfecta ff l 011izing Radio.ti.on on H11man 

Bringa: A Rq,o,1 Ott th.t MarahalLeu and Amerioona Accidentally E%J)Oatd to Radiation From Falwut and Cl Dilc1t1aim,. of Rodialion l'ttju.ry in 

rJr.e Huma.n BliJf{l, publication CAEC.TlD) 53-85. US Dept al Enern, July 1956. 

48. Ooniach I: Effect.I includin1 carcinorenesis <A 1-131 and x-nya on the thyroid cl experiment&I 

anhnall: A re"View. Htaltlt PA11t 1963;9:1357•l362. 4t. Doniach I: Carcinocenic effect al JOO, 250, and 

600 rad x-r:ay• on the rat thyroid gland. BT J C a:ru:er 1974:30:487-496. 

50. 1'7te Effect, on .PoJmlatio,u <;f Ez,powN W Low 

lAtirtt. of /Oftizing Radiation IBEIR Ill: 198l). 

Wuhincton, DC, National Academy Press, 1980. 

Thy,oid Neoplasia-Hamilton et al 
199 

The Health Effects of Radioactive Fallout 

on Marshall Islanders: Health Policy 

Issues of Nuclear Weapons Production 

Thomas E. Hamilton, M.D., Ph.D.* 

Between 1946 and 1958, the United States conducted 66 nuclear tests in 

the Marshall Islands. One such test, code-named BRAVO, contaminated 

individuals from at least two northern atolls. Decisions regarding this test, 

the details of which have not previously been published in the general 

medical literature, greatly affected the radiation dose received by the 

Marshallese people. Actions regarding resettlement of the Marshallese on 

their exposed atoll are examined as well as the epidemiologic health 

studies that have been conducted in this population since 1954. Analysis 

of these decisions and studies suggests that ensuring public health has not 

been a high priority of the Atomic Energy Commission or its successor 

agency, the Department of Energy. Furthermore, recent disclosures and a 

critical assessment by the Secretary of Energy indicate that similar problems 

characterize the Department of Energy policy of nuclear weapons facilities. 

An independent federal agency with a primary mandate to protect public 

health, worker safety, and the environment should be charged with all 

future monitoring and investigation of radiation-induced health effects in 

Marshall Islanders, as well as in populations surrounding nuclear weapons 

facilities in the United States. P5RO, ,.,..,,,,,s-21 

1 1991 Physicians for Social Responsibility 

TEH is Assistant Clinical Professor of Medicine and Environmental 

iea)th al the Univt"rsity of Washington. Address correspondence and 

eprint requests to T. E. Hamilton, M.D., FHCRC, 1124 Columbia Street, 

,tp 425, Se<1ttle, WA 98104 

Radiation and the Marshall Islanders 

Between 1946 and 1958, the United States conducted a total of 66 nuclear tests at the Pacific 

la- Proving Ground in the Marshall Islands. This 

country, consisting of approximately 30 atolls (coral 

islands surrounding a central lagoon), is located 

Hamilton 15 
200 

2,500 miles southwest of Hawaii (Fig 1). The testing 

of nuclear weapons on these islands, and particularly the 1954 BRA VO test, has had profound direct 

and indirect effects on the health of the Marshall 

Islands residents as well as on their environment 

and culture. 

The responsibility for conducting these nuclear 

tests and for protecting the islanders from potential 

consequences of nuclear testing has rested with the 

Department of Energy (DOE) or one of its predecessor agencies, beginning with the Atomic Energy 

Commission (AEC). The Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 

and 1954 specify the mandate of the AEC to protect 

and safeguard the public from hazardous activities 

stemming from nuclear testing and weapons productions [1]. 

In the last several years, the media and the public 

have given great attention to the health and environmental hazards from nuclear weapons production and testing facilities in the continental United 

States. These nuclear weapons production and testing sites include facilities in Washington, Idaho, 

California, Nevada, New Mexico, Colorado, Texas, 

Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, Missouri, Florida, and 

166' 168' 

C'-1 Roa1ellp 

Blklal =(f 

!Ailio&iHe 

Wotho 

Uj1e ~ Lie ~ K.wajalel• 

Marshall Islands 

South Carolina. The Marshall Islands continue to be 

a key weapons test site for activities relating to the 

Strategic Defense Initiative. 

The recent critical evaluation of safety and environmental violations at U.S. nuclear weapons facilities by Secretary of Energy James Watkins is laudable and long overdue. However, information that 

is available to the public concerning the extent of 

the problem is still quite limited, in part because 

health studies of populations surrounding these sites 

have not been conducted. 

On the other hand, information concerning the 

radiation exposure of Marshall Islanders from the 

1954 BRA VO test is accessible in technical reports 

of the Departments of Energy and Defense. This 

information, useful for what it reveals about the 

U.S. testing program in the Pacific, also bears directly on health policy issues at other nuclear weapons facilities. 

Although criticism by the Marshallese about the 

effects of nuclear testing on their health, their homeland, and their culture has been increasing for over 

30 years (2], this history is largely unknown to the 

majority of Americans. 

170' 172' 

12' 

Ulrik tr• 

Litiep Ailut ~ , Mcjit 

\;:. 10' 

t; :)Wotje 

Maloelap 

~ 

-~~ 8' 

Guam. LJ Hawaii 

Majuo 

N c::. 6,-

~,.:·r~- i Arno 

s ~hait C lMili . V 

} New >------i 

- Zealand 100 Miles 

6' 

FIGURE 1. Marshall Islands. The BRAVO test site is on Bikini Atoll. Drawings outline atolls, 

with the solid lines representing the coral islands of each atoll surrounding its central 

lagoon. 

16 The PSR Qu.irtPrly, M,uch 1991, Vol. 1, No.1 R,1diation and the Marshall Islanders 
201 

The purpose of this article is to examine the events 

surrounding the radiation exposures to the Marshallese people in 1954, to present the known health 

consequences from this exposure, and to assess the 

epidemiologic health studies conducted to date. Although the nuclear weapons testing program has 

had a significant impact on the culture and society 

of the Marshallese, this report focuses on the impact 

that the radiation exposure has had on health. This 

report also considers whether the problems now 

recognized in protecting public health in the Marshall Islands are applicable to nuclear weapons facilities within the United Stales, and if so, what 

changes are required. 

THE BRAVO TEST 

The most powerful of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in the Marshall Islands by the United States 

was the 15 megaton thermonuclear BRAVO Test 

detonated on the surface of Bikini Atoll on March 

I, 1954. Within 48 hours of exposure to radioactive 

fallout from this test, the majority of the small 

population (86 persons) from Rongelap Island, located at the southeastern tip of Rongelap Atoll (Fig 

I), developed symptoms and signs of acute radiation 

sickness. Two days later they were evacuated to 

Kwajalein Atoll. Over the next several months individuals developed varying degrees of nausea, anorexia, vomiting, pruritis, bela bums of the skin, 

epilation, leukopenia, and thrombocytopenia (3). 

Early health effects also included a transient increase 

in spontaneous abortions during the 5 years postexposure in highly exposed Marshallese women (4). 

A high level whole-body exposure (from external 

photon radiation) of approximately 190 cGy (rad) 

resulted from the 2-day post-BRA VO residence time 

on Rongelap, with lesser doses received by persons 

from Utrik farther east of Bikini (5,6). 

The whole-body radiation dose of the Marshallese 

people, especially those living on Rongelap, was 

directly affected by al least three factors. First, the 

Rongelapese were not evacuated to prevent possible 

radiation contamination, as they had been in the 

1946 Crossroads test series. Second, the wind direction was due east, toward Rongelap, prior to the 

detonation of BRA VO. Several weather briefings 

before detonation indicated that winds at 20,000 

feet were headed for Rongelap. However, it was felt 

that the predicted speed of these winds was low 

enough to be of no concern [7]. Third, the Rongelap 

Radiation and the Marshall Islanders 

and Utrik populations were allowed to remain on 

their home island for al least 2 days after the test, 

before they were evacuated. During this time, individuals wen· exposed to external whole-body radiation from the fallout cloud as it passed over the 

island, as well as fallout on the ground. In addition, 

children played in the "fallout snow• and many 

islanders consumed contaminated food and water. 

No fonnal investigation of the decision to conduct 

the test with the wind blowing toward Rongelap, 

and of the failure to evacuate these inhabitants 

immediately, has ever been made public. Although 

many details may be unrecorded or classified as 

secret, a Defense Nuclear Agency report published 

in 1982 provides data that indica te that it was logistically possible to evacuate these 86 people from 

Rongelap Island and nearby Ailinginae Atoll [7]. 

This report documents the operations and radiologic 

safety activities of U.S military personnel during the 

BRA VO test, including the nautical positions and 

radiation monitor logs of all naval vessels at the 

time of the BRA VO test. Figure 2 shows the position 

of some of the naval vessels relative to the location 

of Bikini and Rongelap, just prior to and during the 

BRA VO detonation. The U.S.S. Gypsy lay within a 

few miles and just outside the lagoon of Rongelap, 

80 miles southeast from the Bikini test site, and 

adjacent to Ailinginae. In addition, al least six other 

naval vessels (the U.S.S. Curtiss, Sioux, Tawakoni, 

Estes, Belle Grove, and Bairoko) were in position 

between Rongelap and Bikini at the time of detonation. 

If the people of Rongelap had been evacuated 

immediately or within hours after the BRA VO test, 

they could have been spared most of the wholebody doses from external radiation, and the organ 

doses from internal radiation exposure, that they 

eventually received. Why were the Marsha11ese people not evacuated on the morning of the BRA VO 

detonation when naval transportation was available? There is no public information that addresses 

this question. In fact, the above information concerning ship locations near Rongelap comes from a 

safety report of U.S. military personnel during 

BRAVO, which does not discuss safety issues of 

Marshall Islanders. Nor does the original map of 

naval ship positions include the inhabited atolls on 

it. In addition, none of the DOE or AEC health 

studies address this issue so that it is unclear whether 

any communication occurred between the AEC and 

Hamilton 17 
202 

164° 166° 168° 

12° 

Bikinie'\1 2: Rongelap Sh 

• • • 1 C 

~ 

4~ :er 2 Si 

c::> 

urtiss 

oux 

wakoni 

airoko 

3 Ta 

Ailinginae 4B 

5B elle Grove 

6E ates 

7G 

Wotho ~ 

ypsy 

100 

Ujae ~ Lac 

• ~ Kwajalein 

so I I I I I 

0 ZS so 75 100 

Nautical Miles 

FIGURE 2. Locations of naval vessels (solid circles) at the time of BRAVO detonation in 

relation to Rongelap Atoll. Adapted from Defense Nuclear Agency report [7]. 

the U.S. Navy regarding possible early evacuation 

of the Rongelap people. 

Although many reasons might be offered for the 

failure to act (such as risk of radiation exposure to 

the ships' military personnel, inadequate information about the extent of the fallout cloud, or poor 

communication)1 one conclusion is inescapable: the 

personal safety of the Rongelapese and other Marshallese people was not a high priority of the AEC 

in 1954. 

The Resettlement of Rongelap 

Three years after the Rongelap population was 

evacuated, the AEC decided that Rongelap Island, 

but not the entire atoll, was safe for habitation. 

Resettlement occurred in June, 1957 (3,4,8,9]. During the 5 years after their return to Rongelap, the 

Rongelapese people were monitored for body burdens of radioisotopes. The AEC found that the mean 

body burden of cesium-137 was 60 times higher in 

1958 than in 1957 and that the mean body burden 

of zinc-65 was 8 times higher [8]. In addition, the 

cesium-137 body burden increased through 1961. 

In 1959 it was 300 times higher than that of the 

administering medical team, which was used for 

18 The PSR Quarterly, March 1991, Vol. 1, No. l 

comparison. The mean strontium-90 body burden 

was 6 times higher in 1962 than in 1958. During 

1958 alone, the Rongelapese received an estimated 

bone marrow radiation dose of 559 mrad/year (68% 

from fission products, 32% from background radiation) [8). 

These DOE reports state that these doses were 

generally felt to be within U.S. •maximum permissible levels' [8]. However, two important questions 

remain unaddressed. Why, over a period of 5 years, 

during which body burdens of radioisotopes were 

steadily increasing, was there no investigation of 

whether or not this population should continue 

living in this environment? Second, what was the 

wisdom of comparing current body burdens of radioisotopes in these people to •maximum permissible levels' established for the general (and presumably unexposed) population, when these people had 

already been acutely exposed to 190 rad (cGy) of 

whole-body radiation? 

Thyroid Neoplasia in Marshall Islanders: 

Brookhaven Studies 

Since 1957, Brookhaven National Laboratory 

(BNL) has been under contract by the DOE to perRadiation and the Marshall Islanders 
203 

form medical examinations on Marshall Islanders 

exposed lo nuclear fallout . The results of these studies have been published primarily in the BNL or 

DOE literature [3-6,8-19], although numerous articles on this subject appeared in the general scientific 

literature during the 1960s and 1970s [20-32]. 

The most prevalent long-term health effect in the 

Marshallese population has been the development 

of benign and malignant thyroid neoplasms [3,33]. 

Approximately 30% of adults on Rongelap (and over 

60% of children exposed when younger than 10 

years of age) developed thyroid nodules, a small 

proportion of which were thyroid carcinoma (3]. 

Long-term health effects other than thyroid neoplasia have included hypothyroidism (3 I], growth 

retardation in several individuals, and most probably two deaths, one each from acute myelogenous 

leukemia and gastric carcinoma, among the 86 Rongelapese persons who were highly exposed (3,28]. 

In addition, chromosomal aberrations in this group 

were increased relative to comparison groups 10 

years after exposure to fallout radiation (3,20]. 

To evaluate thyroid neoplasia, Brookhaven researchers selected exposed and unexposed cohorts. 

Persons classified as exposed were present on Rongelap (and Ailinginae) and Utrik at the time of the 

detonation of BRAVO. Although dose estimates 

have been revised on several occasions (3,5,6), there 

is no question that persons residing on these two 

atolls, especially Rongelap, received significant radiation doses to the thyroid gland. The uncertainty 

around individual thyroid dose estimates is quite 

large, and there are large differences between the 

Rongelap and Utrik thyroid dose estimates; nevertheless, these people are correctly classified as exposed. These persons were prospectively followed 

and continue to be carefully examined on an annual 

basis by Brookhaven physicians. 

The unexposed cohort was defined and examined 

in an entirely different manner. This cohort initially 

consisted of Rongelap and Utrik persons who were 

not present on their home atolls at the time of the 

BRAVO detonation. Because of attrition among the 

unexposed cohort, several hundred persons from 

other northern atolls were added to this control 

group in the 1970s, and their thyroid glands were 

examined. These persons were not prospectively 

followed, but the point prevalence of thyroid neoplasms among them was combined with the prevalence in the original unexposed cohort to describe 

Radiation and the Marshall Islanders 

what was called the background rate of thyroid 

neoplasms in the Marshall lslands [3]. 

Although the assumption is repeatedly made in 

DOE and Brookhaven reports that these persons 

were unexposed to fallout radiation, no dosimetry 

information is available to support the contention 

that persons living on atolls other than Rongelap or 

Utrik were in fact unexposed. On the contrary, 

several reports from other agencies suggest that 

fallout radiation contaminated other northern atolls 

along with Rongelap and Utrik. 

One fallout pattern, derived from an experimental 

model that used wind data and field radiation data 

at the time of BRA VO detonation, indicated a significant gamma radiation dose on Ailuk Atoll (34], 

located southeast of Rongelap (Fig I). In addition, 

Peterson [35] used meteorological data to perform a 

computer simulation of the BRA VO fallout cloud 

with results suggesting that the fallout path changed 

from an initial eastern direction to a south or southwestern direction toward K wajalein. A third report 

also indicated that several inhabited atolls other than 

Rongelap and Utrik contained long-lived radionudides, which were likely residual from intermediate-range fallout in the Marshall Islands [36]. 

There are, therefore, several important design limitations of the medical surveillance program conducted since 1957. Although th exposed cohort 

appears to have been qualitatively correctly classified, and carefully followed and examined on a 

prospective basis, the unexposed cohort was not 

prospectively followed and examined, and it is not 

dear exactly how this group was selected. No evidence is available in the literature that indicates that 

the unexposed cohort was truly unexposed to radioiodine. Data from independent sources, described 

below, suggest that some members of the unexposed 

cohort may have resided on atolls that were exposed 

to fallout at the time of detonation. 

Thyroid Neoplasia in Marshall Islanders: 

Independent Studies 

Only one major epidemiologic study of thyroid 

neoplasia has been conducted in the Marshall lslands under auspices independent of DOE, and this 

study occurred more than 30 years after the BRA VO 

test. This retrospective cohort study of solitary thyroid nodules in approximately 7,000 Marshallese 

people was conducted from 1982 through 1985 (33]. 

Hamilton 19 
204 

The fieldwork was funded by a litigation project on 

behalf of the Marshallese people. The data analysis 

and publication were done at the University of 

Washington. 

The purpose of this study was to determine the 

prevalence of thyroid nodules by physical examination of persons who were living on the following 

atolls at the time of the 1954 BRAVO test: Rongelap 

and Utrik; seven northern atolls previously thought 

by Brookhaven to be unexposed to fallout radiation; 

and, as the best available, unexposed control group, 

three atolls in the southern Marshall Islands. The 

prevalence of thyroid nodules in Rongelap and Utrik 

individuals was found to be 39% and 9%, respectively, in dose agreement with prior Brookhaven 

data. The prevalence of thyroid nodules (including 

persons with prior thyroidectomy for thyroid nodules) in the remaining 12 atolls (which past researchers had assumed were unexposed to fallout), ranged 

from 0.9% to 10.6%. A strong, statistically significant, negative correlation exists between the prevalence of thyroid nodules on these 12 atolls and the 

distance of each atoll from the Bikini test site. The 

prevalence decreases in a linear fashion as distance 

from Bikini increases. Furthermore, the prevalance 

of thyroid nodules in people from the most distant 

atolls is two to three times lower than that among 

people from northern atolls who were previously 

assumed to have been unexposed to fallout radiation. These results strongly suggest that the geographic extent of the BRA VO fallout, and the distribution of health effects to the th} roid, were greater 

than previously reported. 

Although the study did not prove that the decreasing prevalance of thyroid nodules was associated with decreasing radioiodine doses to the thyroid (no radiation dosimetry is currently available 

on atolls south of Rongelap and Utrik), it strongly 

suggested that there is a correlation between the 

proximity of an atoll to the BRA VO test site and the 

risk that a person residing on that atoll at the time 

of the BRA VO test would develop a thyroid neoplasm. 

In order to provide additional data to determine 

whether the previously classified unexposed atolls 

may have received fallout radiation, a second study 

was conducted to determine the concentrations of 

cesium-137 (half-life of 30 years) in soils from the 

same northern and southern atolls used in the above 

study [37]. Preliminary results indicate that identi20 The PSR Quarterly, March 199 1, Vol. 1, No. I 

cally low concentrations of cesium-137 existed on 

the two southern atolls (Majuro and Mili) and that 

concentrations of cesium-137 on northern atolls previously thought unexposed to fallout were 1.5 to 3 

times higher than cesium-137 concentrations in soils 

from the southern atolls. These preliminary results 

do not yet provide a basis for estimating thyroid 

doses, but they are consistent with the results of the 

earlier epidemiologic thyroid study, and indicate 

that atolls in addition to Rongelap and Utrik probably received radiation contamination from test fallout. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

FACILITIES 

The information presented above indicates that 

the promotion and evaluation of public health in 

the Marshall Islands was not a high priority of the 

AEC or DOE, certainly not relative to their primary 

objective of producing and testing nuclear weapons. 

An important question is whether issues of public 

health have been given similarly low priority at 

nuclear weapons facilities within the U.S. Although 

much additional data are needed to answer this 

question definitely, several disturbing reports have 

surfaced recently. 

One report concerns the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington State, a major site for plutonium production. In 1986, the DOE, in response to 

requests filed under the Freedom of Information 

Act, released 19,000 pages of previously classified 

documents relating to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington State. These documents revealed that massive amounts of radioactive iodine 

(in excess of 500,000 curies) had been released to 

the atmosphere from Hanford during the late 1940s 

and 1950s. Although some details of these operations remain classified as secret, the major reasons 

for these environmental releases were the lack of 

technology to filter the radioactive emissions and 

shortened cooling times of spent fuel to increase 

plutonium production for nuclear weapons. 

As a result of these revelations, two studies have 

been initiated. The Hanford Environmental Dose 

Reconstruction Project, directed by an independent 

Technical Steering Panel, will estimate individual 

radiation doses that individuals may have received 

from Hanford off-site exposures. A recent preliminary Phase I report from July, 1990, has indicated 

Radiation and the M~rshall Islanders 
205 

that individuals exposed as infants in several counties from the states of Washington and Oregon may 

have received significant radiation doses to the thyroid gland from iodine-131 (38]. 

The Hanford Thyroid Disease Study is a second 

study, administered by the Center for Disease Control and funded by Congress in 1988. This study 

will attempt to determine whether thyroid disease 

is increased among individuals who were potentially 

exposed to radioactive iodine from the Hanford site. 

More recent insight into the extent to which the 

DOE has given priority to issues of public health 

has come from a critical evaluation of the nuclear 

weapons industry by Secretary Watkins. In 1989, he 

selected an investigative panel to evaluate the nation's health research activities at nuclear weapons 

facilities. This panel, the Secretarial Panel for the 

Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research (SPEERA), 

concluded that the health and safety mandate of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to conduct studies for 

'the protection of health during research and production activities' was an appropriate. mandate for 

the DOE (39]. They further concluded that the DOE 

'had not developed goals to guide people in carrying 

out the mandate.' The SPEERA report recommended that the long-term and large-scale epidemiologic research program be transferred out of 

DOE to the Department of Health and Human 

Services. 

If the United States continues to produce and test 

nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the public be 

both protected from, and informed about, potential 

risks emanating from nuclear weapons production. 

Rigorous and scientifically credible research must be 

conducted on past and future health hazards stemming from these production activities. Yet given the 

past history within the DOE, none of this is likely 

to happen unless the public health mandate is transferred from DOE to another agency, one that has 

expertise in public health and epidemiologic research and that does not have the competing mandate of nuclear weapons production. The scope of 

this mandate should include not only the Marshall 

Islands, but all facilities in the U.S. nuclear weapons 

complex. 

CONCLUSIONS 

I. The initial exposure of the Marshallese people 

to radiation from the 1954 BRA VO test could prob-

~adiation and the Marshall Islanders 

ably have been prevented entirely or significantly 

reduced by a) evacuating the residents prior to the 

test as had been done for earlier tests, b) postponing 

the detonation when it was known that winds were . 

in the direction of Rongelap, or c) evacuating the 

residents immediately after the detonation, by using 

naval vessels stationed near Rongelap, and thus 

reducing or eliminating their 2-day exposure time. 

2. Although acute exposure in 1954 was by far 

the most significant contribution to radiation dose, 

additional exposure to the Rongelap people could 

have been prevented by either postponing their 

1957 return or by evacuating them again during the 

subsequent 5 years, when it was known that their 

body burdens of radionuclides were steadily increasing. 

3. Thyroid dosimetry studies of Marshall Islanders have been limited to only two atolls in the 

northern Marshall Islands. The primary reason for 

this limitation appears to be the assumption that no 

atolls other than Rongelap and Utrik were exposed 

to fallout radiation. This assumption was not tested 

by DOE or its predecessor agencies, and there is 

now good reason to believe it is false. 

4. The available medical and epidemiologic studies of thyroid neoplasia performed by DOE on Marshall Islanders have significant limitations. Although 

a reasonable protocol has been followed for examining exposed persons, entirely different methodologies have been used for unexposed persons. No 

evidence has been provided to validate the classification of the unexposed cohort as an appropriate 

control group that did not have radiation exposure. 

There is a strong possibility that the exposed and 

unexposed cohorts were in fact both exposed, leading to an underestimation of the extent of thyroid 

health effects in the Marshallese people. 

5. No formal investigation of the BRA VO exposure, resettlement issues, or quality of the medical 

and research programs conducted by the DOE on 

Marshall Islanders has ever been conducted by an 

independent federal agency whose primary focus is 

to promote public health and environmental safety. 

6. Preliminary information, both from nuclear 

weapons sites within the United States and from the 

SPEERA report, suggests that insufficient priority 

has been given to addressing epidemiologic research 

and public health issues at these facilities as well. 

The record to date suggests that this situation is 

not just a matter of a few poor judgments by officials 

Hamillon 21 
206 

in government regarding the public health of the 

Marshallese. Instead, a series of decisions over almost four decades has endangered the health of the 

Marshallese and has limited rigorous investigations, 

both scientifically and politically, of the consequences of their exposure to fallout radiation. 

The intent of this report is not to impugn the 

integrity of individual scientists and physicians who 

have been involved with AEC, DOE, or BNL programs during the last 40 years. Indeed, clinicians 

and researchers who are well respected in their fields 

of expertise have been selected to participate in these 

programs and collectively and individually have 

contributed great effort in examining the Marshallese people. This report instead seeks to address 

a system that has failed to protect the Marshallese, 

and possibly Americans in general, from consequences of nuclear weapons production and testing. 

This failure has occurred despite the mandate given 

the AEC to protect public health and safety. 

Protection of public health and safety requires 

research and monitoring programs whose findings 

are given to peer and public review. A key factor in 

the DOE's failure to protect is the heavy veil of 

secrecy placed over activities at nuclear weapons 

production and testing sites since the beginning of 

the Manhattan Project in 1942. Such secrecy has 

prevented the public, independent scientists, and 

non-DOE federal agencies from knowing which 

studies have been done, and more importantly, what 

health and environmental studies should have been 

conducted concerning hazards that may have occun-ed. 

Nothing can reverse the radiation exposures of 

the Marshall Islanders, but changes can be implemented now. Permanent responsibility for health 

protection and health research can and should be 

transferred out of the nuclear weapons industry. 

Credible epidemiological research programs should 

be developed at all nuclear weapons sites. The results of such studies should be made easily accessible 

to the public and to independent investigators. As 

physicians and health care professionals we have an 

obligation to demand these reforms. .., 

REFERENCES 

t. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, August l, 1946, c. 724, 60 Stat. 

755. 2. Johnson G. Collision course at Kwajalein: Marshall Islanders 

in the shadow of the bomb. Honolulu, HI: Pacific Concerns 

22 The PSR Quarterly. March 1991. Vol. 1, No.1 

Resource Center, 1984. 

3. Conard RA, Paglia OE, Larsen PR, et al. Review of medical 

findings in a Marshallese population 26 yeaB after accidental 

exposure to radioactive fallout. Upton, NY: Brookhaven Na~ 

tional Laboratory, 1980. U.S. Department of Energy publi~ 

cation (BNL) 51-261. 

4. Conard RA, Knudsen KO, Dobyns BM, et al. A 20 year 

review of medical findings in a MarshaUese population accidentally exposed to radioactive fallout . Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1975. U.S. Department of Ene,gy pubHcation (BNL) S0-424. 

5. Lessard E, Miltenberger R, Conard RA, et al. Thyroid absorbed dose for people at Rongelap, Utrik, and Sifo on March 

1, 1954. Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory; 1985. 

U.S. Department of Energy publication (BNL) 51 - 882. 

6. James RA. Estimate of radiation dose to thyroids of the 

Rongelap children following the BRA VO event. Livermore: 

University of California Radiation Laboratory, 1964 . U.S. 

Department of Energy publication 12- 273. 

7. Martin EJ, Rowland RH. Castle Series, 1954. Report number 

DNA (Defense Nuclear Agency) 6035; Report date, April 1, 

1982:202, 207, Figure 55. 

8. Conard RA, Su tow WW, Lowrey A, et al. Medical survey of 

the people of Rongelap and Utrik Islands 13, 14, and 15 

years after exposure to faJlout radiation. Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1970. U.S. Department of Ene,gy publication (BNL) 50-220. 

9. Return of the Rongelapese. In: Dunning GM, ed. Radioactive 

contamination of certain areas in the Pacific Ocean from 

nuclear tests. Washington, DC: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; 1957:45-53. 

10. Adams WH, Harper JA, Rittmaster RS, Heotis PM, Scott WA. 

Medical status of MarshaUese aCOdentaUy exposed to 1954 

BRA VO fallout radiation: January 1980 through December 

1982. Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, (no date 

given). U.S. Department of Energy publicatioo (BNL) 51-

761. 

11 . Conard RA, Meyer t.M, Sutow WW, et al. Medical survey of 

the people of RongeJap and Utrik Islands 11 and 12 years 

after exposure to fallout radiation. Upton, NY: Brookhaven 

National Laboratory, 1967. U.S. Department of Energy publication (BNL) 50-029. 

12. Conard RA, Meyer LM, Sutow WW, et al. Medical survey of 

the people of Rongelap and Utrik Islands 9 and 10 years 

after exposure to fallout radiation. Upton, NY: Brookhaven 

National Laboratory, 1965. U.S. Department of Energy publication (BNL) 908. 

13. Conard RA, Meyer LM, Sutow WW, et aJ. Medkal survey of 

Rongelap people eight years after exposure to fallout. Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1963. U.S. Department of Energy publication (BNL) 780. 

14. Conard RA, MacDonald EH, Sutow WW, et al. Medical 

survey of Rongelap people 7 years after exposwe to fallout. 

Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1962. U.S. 

Department of Energy publication (BNL) 727. 

15. Conard RA. MacDonald EH, Lowrey A, et al. Medical survey 

of Ronge)ap people 5 and 6 years after exposure to fallout . 

Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1960. U.S. 

Department of Energy publication (BNL) 609. 

16. Conard RA, Robertson JS, Meyer LM, et al. Medical survey 

of Rongelap people, March 1958, 4 years after exposure to 

faUout. Upton. NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1959. 

U.S. Department of Energy publication (BNL) 534. 

17. Conard RA. Meyer LM, Rall JE. et al. March 1957 medical 

survey of Rongelap and Utrik people 3 years after exposure 

to radioactive fallout. Upton, NY: Brookhaven NationaJ Laboratory. 1958. U.S. Department of Ene,gy publication (BNL) 

501. 

18. Cronkite EP, Dunham CL, Griffin D, et al. Twelve month 

postexposure survey on Ma.rshallese exposed to fallout radiation. Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1955. 

U.S. Department o/ Ene,gy publication (BNL) 384. 

Radiation and the Marshall Islanders 
207 

19. Bond VP, Cunard RA. Robertson JS. et al. Medical examina -

tion of Rongelap people six months after exposure to fallout 

U.S. Department of Energy publication (WT) 937. Operation 

Castle Addendum Report, 1955, 4.IA. 

20. Usco H, Conard RA. Chromosome studil"S on Marshall lslanders exposed to fallout radiation. Science 1967;157:445-

447. 

2 1. Sutuw WW, Conard RA. Effects of ionizing radiation in 

children. J Pediatrics 1965;67:658-673. 

22. Conard RA, Rall JE, Su tow WW. Thyroid nodules'as a late 

sequt!la of radioactive fallout. in a Marshall Isla nd population 

exposed in 1954. N Engl J M,d 1966;274,139 1- 1399. 

23. Conard RA, Huggins CE, Cannon B. Lowrey A. Medical 

survey of M.irshallese two years after exposure to fallout 

radiation. JAMA 1957;164:1192- 1197. 

24. Sutow WW, Conard RA, Griffith KM. Growth status of 

children exposed to fallout radiation on Marshall Islands. 

rediatrics 1965;36:721-731. 

25. Conard RA, Hicking A. Medical fi ndings in Marshallese 

people exposed to fallout radiation: results from a IO-year 

studv. JAMA 1965;192'457-459. 

26. Rall )E, Conard RA. Elevation of the serum protein-bound 

iodine level in inhabitants of the Marshall Islands. Am J Med 

1966;40;883-886. 

27. Robbins J, Rall JE, Conard RA. Late effects of radioactive 

iodine in fallout. Ann Intern Med 1967;66:1214- 1242. 

28. Conard RA. A case of acute myelogenous leukemia following 

fallout radia tion exposure. JAMA 1975;232:1356-1357. 

29. Demuise CF, Conard RA. Effects of age and radiation e,cposure on chromosomes in a Marshall Islands population. J Gerontol 1972;27: 197-201. 

30. Conard RA, Demoise CF, Scott WA, Makar M. lmmunohema tological studies of Marshall Isla nders 16 years after 

fallout radiation exposure. J Gerontol 1971 ;26:28- 36. 

3 t. L..trst-n PR, Conard RA, Knudsen KO, et al. Thyroid hypoR;uti,llion ,md lhe M.:trshall lslandl:!'rs 

function after exposure lo fallout from a hydrogen bomb 

explosion. JAMA l982;247:1571 - 157S. 

32. Adams WH, Harper JA, Rittma.ster RS, Crimson RC. Pituitary 

tumors following fallout radiatiun exposure. JAMA 

1984;252,664-666. 

33. Hamilton TE, van Belle C, LoGerfo JP. Thyroid neoplasia in 

Marshall Islanders exposed to nuclear fallout . JAMA 

1987;258,629- 636. 

34. Hawthorne HA. ed. Compilation of local fallout da ta from 

test detonations 1954- 1962 extracted from DASA 1251. 

Santa Barbara, CA: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1979. U.S. 

Department of Defense publication (DNA) report number 

1251-2 EX, page 65. 

35. Peterson KR. Castle-BRAVO air concentrations a nd deposi• 

tion patterns from a 3-D particle-in-cell code. Livermore, CA, 

publication (UASG) 81-20. U.S. Departmen t or Energy, 

1981. 

36. Robinson WI. Mount ME, Phillips WA, Conrado CA, Sruart 

Ml, Stoker CE. The northern Marshall Islands radiological 

survey: terrestrial food chain a nd total doses. Livennore: 

University of -California Radiation Laboratory, 1982. U.S. 

Department of Energy publication 52-8S3. 

37. Greenhouse NA, Hamilton TE. Rosenstock L. Contemporary 

distributions of Cs-137 in Marshall Isla nd soils. Presented as 

an abstract at the 1989 International Chemical Congress of 

Pacific Basin Societies; December 17- 22, 1989, Honolulu, 

HI . 

38. Draft summary report: Phase I of the Ha nford environmental 

dose reconstruction projecl. Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest 

Laboratory. 1990. U.S. Department or Energy publication 

(PNL) 7410. 

39. Report to the Secretary: Secretarial panel for the evaluation 

of epidemiologic research activities for the Department of 

Energy, March, 1990. Washington DC: Department of En-

~rgy, 1990. 

Hamill on 23 
208 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Dr. Simon. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. SIMON, PH.D. 

Dr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy to be 

here today, and I am very happy that you have called this impor- tant hearing. 

I would like to assure you at this point in time of what my role 

is here. I was invited here to provide you with information, and in- deed I will attempt to do. I see the role that I play for the Marshall 

Islands as one in which I will not try and sensationalize or exaggerate any of the harm that has been done to them. 

I am a radiation scientist, and I have lived in the Marshall Islands for four and a half years and am employed by the Government there. I probably know as much as anyone does about the 

current radiological conditions there because that is my job, to find 

that information out. In these comments that I am providing, I also want to state that 

I am certainly not attacking any U.S. agency or bringing accusations against the Department of Energy, in which I know many 

other scientists that have very high levels of training and are very 

skilled in their work. I simply would like to give you a summary 

of factual information or information that I have been able to collect by, measurement and by objective observation. One concern, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to express before 

I go any further is that I participated in many meetings about 

what radiation means to the Marshall Islanders. These meetings 

have been in the Marshall Islands without any congressional committee present, and what I have learned from those meetings is 

that these issues are very hard not only for you and I to understand, but these are very difficult for the Marshallese people to understand. My concern at the moment is that much of the audience 

here today are from the Marshall Islands, and I sincerely hope that 

through the rest of today we can ensure that they have an understanding of what I am saying and what you are saying and what 

other people are testifying to. 

I want to remind everyone here today that we can talk about abstract concepts relatively easily because we have been trained to do 

so. The people that are here today from the Marshall Islands, English is their second language, and I have heard the testimony this 

morning, and it has become long and it is at some times difficult 

to follow. I hope that we can make statements during the course 

of the day that will be somehow succinct and provide real information not only to yourselves but to my friends from the Marshall Islands that sit behind me. 

One observation that I had during Dr. Eisenbud's testimony was 

that the issues were very hard to understand about what exactly 

took place, but I want to say very clearly that the information that 

Dr. Eisenbud has presented surely testifies that he had an immense insight that I certainly appreciate. I believe he is a friend 

of the Marshall Islanders, and I say that because it is a very complicated state of affairs that we are trying to interpret. 

How we go about assessing what happened to Marshall Island~rs 

in the past depends on the very small amount of historical data 
209 

that is available, and I attribute virtually all of that to Professor 

Eisenbud. I have made extensive measurements in the Marshall Islands myself, that is my job, but all those have been made within 

the past three years and those show a different kind of information 

about radioactivity than what might have been shown immediately 

after the test. I say that because part of the radioactivity decays 

very quickly. I have presented to you in graph form in my presentation here a very illuminating graph which was due to the foresight of the HASL laboratory in placing a monitoring station at 

Kwajelein. What I would like to do during this presentation is to 

make sure that you understand exactly what I have presented to 

you here in paper form. 

My objectives-I think maybe I have gone over those sufficiently. 

In addition, though, I want you to recognize that the Marshall Islands is a country that is attempting very strongly to take a sense 

of responsibility for their future with regard to these issues. Now 

I realize and you realize that there are not any trained radiation 

scientists within their community yet, but I live among them and 

I try and provide that level of information to them. 

I would like to brief you today as well on summary results from 

a study of thyroid disease that we have been conducting-when I 

say we, I mean the Nationwide Radiological Study. That study was 

a study commissioned by the Marshall Islands Government in 

1989, funded under the Compact of Free Association, and this is in 

evidence of their attempt to take responsibility and control for understanding what exactly has happened to them. 

I have provided you with some background information and a 

map that I think will be useful as you review my testimony and 

you review other people's testimony, and you will see that in Figure 1. [See page 229.] 

I live in Majuro, the capital city, and we have established there 

as part of the program under the Marshall Islands Government a 

radiation laboratory, a permanent laboratory in the sense that it 

has been an institution for several years now and has all capabilities of doing the kind of credible work that you might do at another 

more established institution. This laboratory uses assistance from 

the Marshall Islands, and we have attempted by this kind of mechanism to communicate what we are finding out. 

Now probably what may be of interest to you today I can't provide in its entirety, and that would be what exactly is the overall 

picture of contamination on all 29 atolls and 5 reef islands. That 

is information that we hope to finish this calendar year and release 

in peer-reviewed publications. At the appropriate time I would be 

glad to share it with this committee just as I will share it with the 

Marshall Islands Government. 

Similarly, as part of the background information I have provided 

you with Figure 2. Just so you will know what size of tests were 

actually conducted there, there are a lot of numbers bantered 

around about kilotons and megatons, and I have actually plotted 

for you all 66 tests so you can just see what size they were, and 

that is Figure 2. [See page 230.] 

Each one of those dots represents one test. If you will just look 

straight down to the horizontal line, it will tell you in kilotons what 

size that test was, and you will see on the right-hand side the very 
210 

largest one was 15 megatons. That was the BRAVO, and they extended over quite a range in sizes. 

Half of the tests, I might add, in the Marshall Islands were larger than the largest test at the Nevada test site. That is provided 

to you just to give you a frame of reference in which to judge -things, not for me to make any preliminary conclusions about the 

degree of damages there. 

I will say that what I have learned about working with 

Marshallese in my laboratory is, they have a very high level of concern about what has happened to them over the past years, and 

that is very understandable. We have seen tremendous interest by 

the American public in the past two months, and their interest is 

exactly the same. They want to know about their lives and exactly 

what happened. I applaud the recent efforts to release that kind of 

information, and as that information is released, I hope it will be 

kept in mind that the real audience for that and the real receptors 

should be the Marshall Islands. It is not just to be placed on a 

bookshelf in an archive library, but I believe furnishing this level 

of information to them. Even if it is technical, it is about their 

lives, and that is what is just. 

Now in the nationwide radiological study, just to brief you on 

what we hope to be able to report on in this next year, we have 

physically gone to every single atoll in the Marshall Islands and 

virtually every island of any size and made radiation measurements as well as taken samples of soil, coconuts, and other kinds 

of foods that are traditionally consumed. We have taken these back 

to our laboratory and made radioactivity measurements. Now this 

information can be used to supplement historical data to try and 

reconstruct not only what has happened in the past but to project 

what might be expected in terms of committed dose to people in the 

future. 

This will not be an easy thing for me ever to say to you, however, 

to definitively say which islands received fallout and which did not. 

There is this phenomenon of the large weapons that were tested in 

the world, that they have thrown fallout virtually around the 

world. Scientists call that global fallout, and so in the Marshall lslands it makes my job complicated. We have fallout there from 

China and from Russia and from the Nevada test site and from everywhere else, and likewise all over the world they have some fallout from the Marshall Islands. 

So the job of definitively telling you what islands were contaminated by the tests there will be difficult. And I have discussed this 

on pages 4 and 5 of my testimony, exactly how one can best attempt to do that. To do that I have tried to estimate just what the 

radioactivity would be there in the absence of the tests at Bikini 

and Enewetak, and there is a scientific and objective process for 

doing that. It is not precise, I will tell you that, but there is an objective process for doing that. 

So our objective for our nationwide studies is to determine the 

geographical extent and the levels of fallout in the Marshall Islands from the tests in the Marshall Islands. 

Now health studies are somewhat of a different matter. They are 

not made by radiation measurements. They involve people, and 
211 

they involve their lives, and they involve a different kind of work, 

and I will report on some of that as well. 

Let me move on to talk about some historical data that was 

made available from the worldwide monitoring program that was 

established by the HASL laboratory under the direction of Professor Eisenbud, and I have provided you in Figure 3 a graphic-a 

very telling graphic, incidentally-of measurements that were 

made at Kwajelein Atoll. [See page 231.) 

What I do not want to attach to this at this moment is any definitive interpretation. I am not claiming high levels of radiation; I am 

not claiming a terrible atrocity here; I am just showing you data 

that was collected. What it shows from early in 1954 through the 

end of 1959 is a very telling series of peaks, and these points are 

simply the amount of fallout collected on an instrument the size of 

a piece of paper, what fell out of the sky and then was measured. 

Now what is interesting to me is that this location was 

Kwajelein, and if you will look at my Figure 1, you will see that 

Kwajelein is virtually in the middle of the Marshall Islands. To me, 

it also says that it is on a line from the test sites to many other 

islands. 

Now without trying to understand exactly what these levels 

mean, what I see is that for every test of one megaton size or larger, it was detected by this relatively simple instrument at 

Kwajelein. The foresight to have built this program was incredible to me, 

and it is very, very important for us in understanding just what 

were the geographical boundaries of the fallout. So I hope you can 

appreciate the significance of this. The interpretation of it is something that scientists, myself and others, could argue about, and this 

is not the forum to do that, but it is a kind of documentary evidence which I think you might be interested in. 

I would like to move on, in the interests of time, to tell you very 

briefly of preliminary studies that we have done in investigating thyroid disease in the Marshall Islands. Virtually all adults in the 

Marshall Islands know that thyroid disease can be radiogenic. It 

can be linked to radiation exposure. The problem of that kind of 

information really is that most people believe that that is the only 

cause, and science knows that cancer and even benign thyroid disease is caused by other factors. 

As Dr. Hamilton testified, the evidence appeared to him that it 

looked like it was in a pattern that suggested the pattern of radioactivity-that is, the further you went from the test site, the lower 

the disease rate became. 

Now the one basic premise that scientists have to guide their actions is that you are always able to question another hypothesis, 

someone else's hypothesis, and retest it. When I and the scientific 

advisory group, which is five international scientists at the Marshall Islands Government, assembled, when we reviewed Dr. Hamilton's paper in 1990, we found it very interesting to our situation 

in trying to understand. We were rather new to this situation, and 

we felt it very important for us to look into this and try and confirm it. 

We have many anecdotal stories, and I don't suggest that his investigation is that at all. It is quite objective actually. But we have 
212 

various kinds of evidence, and the further that we can go to confirm these kinds of evidence, the closer we may be to the truth pos- sibly. That was the rationale partly as well as was the rationale 

for designing this study the expression that we received locally 

about people's concern about thyroid disease. To make this short, we have conducted a first phase of examinations of Marshallese people. This was conducted in Ebeye. Ebeye is 

the second largest population center in the Marshall Islands. It is 

located in Kwajelein Atoll. There are about 20,000 persons there, I believe, or perhaps 10,000. It was the location that was selected not because of the data that 

I showed you on Figure 3, but interestingly enough, I can look at 

this in a preliminary way and say, gee, we found some results 

there that seemed to be very correlated with other kinds of evidence. To be short on this, we have found a disease rate which 

leads us to the conclusion that we should investigate further. 

Objectivity here, in my mind, is a very crucial step to maintain. As we have collected this data, it is very important that I emphasize to you that we exercised caution in interpreting it because 

what I don't want to do is make statements before this committee 

or in the public literature that are unsubstantiated. However, we 

have found a higher than expected incidence of benign disease and, 

as well, a higher than expected incidence of thyroid cancer. 

Now I have provided to you in Figure 4 birth dates and locations 

about where the people lived and what years they were born that 

we feel have a high likelihood of having thyroid cancer. [See page 

232.] 

I will tell you those are unconfirmed at the moment except for 

five which are confirmed. So out of 23 persons which the examining 

physicians felt were very high risk for cancer, five of those are actually confirmed. 

We know from many other studies that children are at the highest risk-that is, if they are exposed as children-at the highest 

risk for eventually development of thyroid disease. As you will see 

from Figure 4 there was quite a number of this group that were 

y-0ung children at the time of the BRA VO test. Now I didn't plot the other tests on here in terms of when they 

occurred because you have that on other information, so the 

BRA VO test was just simply a focal point. But in 1952 and on 

through 1958 you have seen some of the data that I have presented 

from Kwajelein. This is information enough for us to want to examine this further, and I think it is very telling of possible relationship. 

Currently, I am seeking funding from the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention to continue this kind of thyroid investigation in the Marshall Islands, and I have received a very strong expression of interest. 

I would like to say that this study will have one additional 

strength over any previous study in that we will not have to speculate about the relationship of these cases to their radiation exposure. I have actually been to every atoll and measured it. Every 

other study has used a surrogate for exposure such as distance 

from Bikini, and I am not putting this kind of analysis down what-
213 

soever, but I am telling you that we hope within the coming 

months to do a more definitive kind of analysis. 

I would like to conclude and certainly welcome any questions and 

tell you that I have noted on the part of the Marshallese a very 

keen interest to know what has happened, and there is a very deep 

sadness on many people's part about the degree that their life has 

changed from traditional lifestyles that they knew. Just in this past week, I was at two different meetings with the 

Rongelap community. I traveled eight hours by boat with two of the 

visitors here today. I want to again emphasize that release of information to the appropriate audience for that is the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands Government, and I will be glad to assist them in 

that interpretation. I would like to thank you today for allowing me 

to testify and allowing our Marshallese visitors here who have actually lived through these. 

So thank you. [Prepared statement of Dr. Simon follows:) 
214 

NATIONWIDE RADIOLOGICAL STUDY 

P.O. Box 1808 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

MAJURO, MARSHALL ISLANDS 96960 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. SIMON, PhD 

Director, Nationwide Radiological Study 

Republic of the Marshall Islands 

Submitted to the 

United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

in respect to 

United States Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands 

February 24, 1994 
215 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

A great deal of interest exists among the citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands 

concerning the possibility of radioactive contamination outside of the northern atolls. Questions 

arc constantly raised about health effects which may have been caused by the atomic tests at Bikini 

and Encwctak Atolls. Undoubtedly, many cases of disease or personal or land damage arc the 

result of other causes. Y ct, until sufficient information is available to determine the past and 

present radiation levels, it will be hard to separate &ct from fiction. To better understand the 

true extent of damage, the Government of the Marshall Islands commissioned its own 

radiological evaluation of its nation in late 1989. The results from that study will be forthcoming 

in 1994. That information will likely be of interest to this committee and can be made available 

following a presentation to the leaders of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Today's 

presentation will discuss the type of data that is now being collected and analyzed. 

The second topic of discussion will be a limited amount of historical data which indicates that 

some degree of contamination did occur beyond the atolls of Bikini, Encwctak, Rongelap and 

Utirik. Similarly, there is some evidence that tests other than BRAVO also spread contamination 

to islands within the Republic. During most of the years of the testing program, there was little or 

no radiological monitoring on the atolls except at islands near the test sites, or at atolls 

immediately adjacent to the test sites. Even then, the monitoring activitie$ were spane. The 

exception to this is was a single passive monitoring device at Kwajalein which was part of a 

worldwide nccwork of surveillance devices. Although the data from that monitoring station has 

been available since 1960, it is not clear why it has never been analyzed and the results discussed 

with government leaders of the Marshall Islands. The clear indication from the monitoring 

station was that deposition of fresh fallout occurred at Kwajalcin Atoll within a single day 

following every one of the detonations over I megaton explosive yield. 

The implications of this data arc now being examined. For a number of years, the U.S. 

Department of Energy has implied that contamination did not occur at atolls outside of the 

northern group. Evidence for this is usually stated to be the low levels of 137-cesium at most 

atolls. The historical data at Kwajalein Atoll contradicts the assertion that there was no 

contamination. It is actually quite possible to have had measurable levels of fresh fallout and 

moderately high air concentrations of radioiodinc and still show little or no trace of cesium 

today. The dynamics of deposition mechanisms, such as rainfall, played a role in determining 

whether mca.iurable quantities of cesium were left behind as a tracer of the fallout. 

Finally, a summary of the findings of a study of thyroid disease among 1400 Marshallese 

citizens will be presented. A surprisingly high rate of benign thyroid nodular disease was found, 

as well as a number of thyroid cancers. Although it is premature to interpret these findings as 

having been caused by radiation exposure, the prevalence rate suggests that more people should be 

examined. 
216 

INTRODUCTION 

I would like to introduce myself. My name is Or. Steven L. Simon. I work for the 

Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and have done so for nearly 4 1/2 

years. I reside in Majuro, the capital cicy of the Marshall Islands. My areas of expertise arc in 

measurement of radiation, radiation risk assessment and, in general, radiation protection. I was 

hired by the Marshall Islands to conduct and direct studies to determine the geographical extent 

and degree of radioactive contamination on the atolls of the Marshall Islrds from atomic 

weapons tests conducted by the United States at Bikini and Encwetak Atolls. 

The financial resources to conduct these studies have been provided by Section I 77 of the 

Compact of Free Association. The funds designated for scientific studies allowed the 

Government of the Marshall Islands to begin to take responsibility for assessing possible damages 

to the land of their nation or to their people from the atomic weapons testing program. In late 

1989 the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands commissioned the independent 

scientific studies which I direct today. An international body of scientific advisors was 

assembled at that time to provide advice and guidance. The scientific advisors and I planned a 

nationwide monitoring program, thereby initiating the Marshall Islands Nationwide 

Radiological Study (NWRS). Although the U.S. Department of Energy has conducted extensive 

monitoring at Bikini and Encwccak Atolls and at a number of atolls near to the test sites, 70% of 

the land area of the over I 200 islands in the Marshall Islands was never monitored prior to the 

NWRS. 

OBJECTIVES OF THIS PRESENTATION 

The objectives of this testimony are several-fold. First, I would like to make it known to this 

Committee and others that the Republic of the Marshall Islands is conducting its own thorough 

and credible radiological evaluation, one that is peer reviewed by an international body of 

scientists and one that is winning a level of acceptance among the citizens of the Marshall Islands. 

This substantial body of work will not be reported on in detail today. However, I would like to 

brief you on the kinds of radiation related information that will be forthcoming this calendar 

year. 

Second, I would like to discuss two other specific topics which I believe arc of interest. to this 

Committee. It is my understanding that this committee is specifically interested in evidence of 

contamination of islands of the Marshall Islands other than those in the atolls of Encwetak, Bikini, 

Rongelap and Utirik. The two topics that I will present here both relate to this matter. One is a 

summary of historical data from the years of the weapons testing program. This data shows 

conclusively that radioactive fallout on the atoll of Kwajalcin was routinely detected during the 

years that the tests were conducted. Secondly, I would like to brief this committee on 

preliminary results from a screening program for thyroid disease conducted this past year at the 

nation's second largest population center, Ebeye Island within Kwajalein Atoll. 
217 

BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

The Republic of the Marshall Islands is a small Pacific nation comprised of 29 atolls and 5 

separate reef islands (sec Figure 1 enclosed) with the total number of islands exceeding 1200 and a 

total land mass of approximately 180 km2 (70 sq. miles). The nation's capital is located on 

Majuro Atoll in the southeast part of the nation, approximately 3800 km west of Honolulu, HI 

and 2700 km north of Fiji. The atolls arc arranged in two island cha.ins running roughly NNW to 

SSE: the western Ralik ("sunset") Cha.in and the eastern Ratalc ("sunrise") Cha.in. The atolls ate 

located within the latirude band extending from 4.5° to 14.50 N. 

The land area of the various arolls cover a wide range of sizes from about 0.5 km2 to 16.4 km2. 

The lagoon areas also vacy significantly, from 8.4 km2 co over 2500 km2, the latter belonging to 

Kwajalein Atoll, the world's largest lagoon. 

The total population today numbers dose to 50,000 and is one of the fastest growing in the 

world. There are numerous public health problems as there are in any country, particularly those 

which have incorporated western lifestyles and dietary habits within a few short generations. 

Almost every adult citizen of the Marshall Islands knows of the atomic weapons testing program 

conducted four decades ago. Most citizens, as well, believe that a variety of ailments, in 

particular, thyroid disease, are a result of that testing program. 

The NWRS was designed to fill a need for information on the radiological conditions at all 

atolls within the Marshall Islands and at all islands of any significant size. Early in the planning 

of this study, it was decided that to prevent a lack of trust in the participating scientists, the staff 

must be resident fulltime in Majuro and be in full view of the local population. Over three years 

ago, we built a radiological laboratory in Majuro to support the field studies and sample analysis 

programs. This laboratory currently employs six full-time Matshallese assistants, three of whom 

represent the community of Rongelap. 

The results of the NWRS arc to be filed with the Government and the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal and presented in an understandable fashion co the people of the Marshall Islands. Thus, 

there ate educational and advising roles the NWRS provides the Republic. 

Much has been wrirtcn about the weapons testing period. However, in December of 1993, 

previously classified explosive yields for 48 of the 66 tests in the Marshall Islands were 

declassified and released to the public. The release of this data was in response to a request from 

the Government of the Marshall Islands which had been submitted about rwo years earlier. The 

test yield information is useful for constructing a perspective co show che sizes of the test in the 

Pacific compared with the Nevada Test Site. 

The largest test at the Nevada Test Site was 74 kt (74 thousand tons) equivalent TNT. The 

largest test in the Marshall Islands was 15 MT (15 million cons) equivalent TNT. Fifty percent 

of the tests in the Marshall Islands were larger than the largest rest in Nevada. A plot showing the 

distribution of the sizes of the tests in the Matshalls is shown in Figure 2. 

2 
218 

I. THE NATIONWIDE RADIOLOGICAL STUDY 

The need for radiological information that could be both trusted and understood was translated 

into three closely related programs. 

( I) An international scientific advisory body was formed following a lengthy search for 

qualified and unbiased advisors. Late in the sclcaion process, the selcaion was limited to 

non-Americans. The RMI Scientific Advisory Panel was formed in 1989 drawing on 

cxpcnise of five individuals. 1 

(2) A diagnostic medical program was initiated with the purpose of providing evidence for 

personal injury ·claims. 

(3) A comprehensive study was initiated to determine the radiological conditions at all 

locations in the nation wi1h a reassessment of the conditions at Bikini, Encwccak, Rongelap 

and Utirik Atolls. 

Over the past three years, all atolls of the Republic have been monitored, including the most 

southern atolls as well as the nonhcrn test site atolls. Environmental measurements over the entire 

country have varied tremendously. Any pattern of contamination will be apparent from these 

measurements. State-of-the-art gamma spectrometry instruments have been used in an 

environmental monitoring program which emphasizes the evaluation of 137-cesium (137Cs) in the 

soil of the islands. The radiation monitoring ins1rumcnt measures the rate at which energy is 

deposited in its dctcaor crystal. Physicists refer to this measurement simply as a •count-rate". 

These count-races will be used in a lengthy calculation to estimate the amount of radioaaivity in 

the soil, what I call the "inventory of soil cesium." The end produa of collcaing and analyzing 

the environmental radiation data will be the capability to compare the soil cesium inventory a1 

each atoll, island or location of interest. 

Hundreds of samples have also been acquired for labora1ory analysis including soil, coconuts, a 

variety of native fruits and animal life. In the Majuro laboratory, all samples are measured to 

determine the conccntracion of 137-cesium, 241-americium, and 239+240-plutonium. 

Any locally grown food crop containing radioac1ivc cesium must be obtaining its nutrients 

from contaminated soil. Similarly, when crabs, pigs and other animals show radioactivity in their 

bodies, it is a direct indication of the radioactivity in the soil. Thus, soil measurements are 

specially informa1ive and contamination levels in plants and animals can be readily predicted 

from the soil measurements themselves. 

Sampling and radiological analysis of cenain na1ive vegetation species used in 1raditional 

Marshallcse medicine arc also being carried out by the NWRS 10 complement the assessment of 

potential exposure via ingestion of foods. The uptake potential of these plants has no1 been 

I Dr. Keith Bavers,ock, of the WHO European Center for Environment and Health (Rome, Italy), Dr. Herwig 

Parcalcc of the GSF lnstitut fur Si:nhlenschutt (Munich, Germany), Dr. Andrew McEwan of the National Radiation 

Laboratory of New Zealand (Chrinchurch, NZ), Dr. Klauss Trott of the Medical College of St. Bartholomew's 

Hospital, University of London (U.K.), and Dr. Krishna Sankaranarayanan of the Department of Radiation Genetics 

and Chemical Mutagencsis, Univenity of Leiden (Netherlands). 

3 
219 

extensively studied in the past and, although they likely conscirucc a small part of the plant 

material and radioactivicy consumed by Marshallcsc, the dose contribucion of chis pathway is yet 

unexplored. 

The environmental measurement data can be used in a variety of ways. For example, the soil 

inventory values can be used to determine the radiation dose to people living at a specific 

location. The dose is normally composed of two components, external exposure and internal 

exposure. External exposure refers the process of energy absorption in the human (or animal) body 

from gamma-ray emissions from radioactivity in the soil or environment outside of the body. 

Internal exposure is a measure of the radiation dose received from radioactivity within the body. 

Foods that arc contaminated with radioactivity can contribute the internal dose. Ocher small 

contributors to internal dose arc breathing radioactive dust particles and drinking contaminated 

water. These som of environmental radiation data can be used to predict the dose to inhabitants 

now and in the future. 

Measurements made today can also be used 10 some degree to estimate exposures that have 

taken place in the past. The process of historical dose reconstruction is a very active research area 

today; An example of chis is the study of the dose to Utah residents from fallout originating at 

the Nevada Test Site. I was an investigator on chat project from 1986 to its completion in 1993. 

There arc, however, numerous problems and uncertainties in trying to estimate past exposures. 

With the obvious level of concern expressed by the American people over the past few months on 

the subject of exposure of the public, chis area of research will surely continue. 

The interest of the American people is no different from the interest of Marshallcsc citizens. 

There is, however, differences in the cultural and educational background that arc needed to 

understand the difficult and abstract concepts of radiation physics. For those concerned about 

bringing truth and understanding about radiation to the Marshallese people, it is important to 

communicate radiological concepts without causing undue alarm. 

The results of chc Nationwide Radiological Study arc expected 10 be released and published 

in the open scientific literature chis year. The environmental monitoring has been completed for 

approximately 99% of the Marshall Islands. The only islands remaining to be monitored arc 

chose used by the military at the U.S. Army at Kwajalcin Atoll. Almost every island 0.5 km in 

length or larger has been . monitored. Thus far, the overall average spacial density of gamma 

measurements in the environment is approximately ten per square kilometer. 

Distinguishing Fallout From Ocher Nations 

It is widely known by scientim that there ue low levels of fallout radioactivity at all locations 

worldwide as a result of over 800 nuclear detonations conducted by the United States, the former 

Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Republic of France, the People's Republic of China and 

India. Radioactivity from large weapons is known to enter the stratosphere where it can circulate 

around the globe for a number of years before falling to the earth's surface. This phenomenon is 

termed "global fallout" by scientists. It is important for this study to determine the portion of 

4 
220 

the fallout radioactivity measured at.each island that can be attributed only co the weapons testing 

program conducted in the Marsh.all Islands. Nor only is that quantity relevant for the 

determination of land damage from the testing program in the Republic, but it will also serve to 

delineate those islands which did not receive any measurable fallout from Bikini and Enewetak. 

To determine rhe global fallout at each atoll, I have estimated the level of l37Cs from world 

wide events using a mathematical predictive model. This type of model is a tool commonly 

used by physicists. Every model requires data for calibration purposes. In this case, 137-ccsium 

data collected by other scicntim at a number of locations in the Pacific outside of rhe Marshall 

Islands has been used. These locations include Pohnpci (Federated States of Micronesia), Guam, 

Hawaii and others. The model specifically uses the latitude of the island and annual rainfall rate 

to predict the deposition. Although these predictions arc still under refinement, I have estimated 

an average value of 500 Bq/m2 of l37Cs from global sources for the atolls of the Marshall 

Islands.2 This value will be used as a baseline above which the contamination will be assumed to 

have originated locally. 

III. HISTORICAL CONTAMINATION DATA 

The responsibiliry of rhe NWRS is to not only measure current levels of residual radioactivity 

but to also attempt to understand what level of exposure might have taken place in the past. Any 

radioactiviry measured today can be precisely predicted at any other point in time whether it be 

in the future or the past. This is true because the race of decay of most radioactive clements is 

known fairly precisely. 

There is, however, a significant difficulty in estimating radiation dose from radioactivity 

which docs not exist any longer. There arc numerous radioactive clements created by atomic 

weapons that arc relatively shon-lived. In fact, there arc more than 300 different forms (isotopes) 

of 36 clements created as fission produces. Mose of these radioactive byproducts emit what 

scientists call as "beta particles." The largest amount of radioacriviry present immediately after 

the blast decays quickly. 

Because some radioactive species cannot be measured today, the value of historical 

measurements is immense. Although historical measurements may suffer from a lack of precision 

when compared to modern measurements, they still can play a very important role in retrospective 

dose estimation. I have conducted several literature searches in an attempt to find historical 

radiation monitoring data in the Marshall Islands. The paucity of this kin~ of data is surprising. 

One very illuminating piece of information has been reconstructed, however. 

The Healrh and Safcry Laboratory (HASL) in New York City under the direction of Merril 

Eisenbud during the 1950's made some of the most valuable measurements available today. This 

laboratory eventually became part of the Atomic Energy Commission and was later renamed the 

2 Bq/m2 is an abbreviation meaning Bcqucrcls per square meter. A Bequcrcl of cesium is equal co one disintegration 

per second. 

5 
221 

Environmental Measurements Laboratory. Today it is pan of the U.S. Department of Energy 

system and is world known for excellence in radiation measurements and associated research. 

HASL developed a simple but effective monitoring instrument to detect fresh fallout. Using 

pieces of sticky or "gummed" paper as a collection device, HASL placed monitors at over 100 

locations worldwide. The gummed film effectively collected fallout for 24 hours, after which 

the film was changed, and the used sheet mailed to HASL for measurement. The gummed film 

data represents the best available information on the quantity of early beta-activity deposition. 

The data were published over a number of years by Eisenbud and his collaborators in respected 

scientific journals. Since then, the gummed film data has been used extensively in the U.S. to 

assist in the reconstruction of doses to residents of Nevada and Utah and other states. 

Several gummed-film stations were established in the Pacific area and the data from them may 

be of interest to this Committee. These locations include Hawaii, the Phillipines, several 

locations in Micronesia and a single station in the Marshall Islands at Kwajalein Atoll. Although 

it seems a pity now that there were not additional monitoring stations in the Marshall Islands, the 

foresight to have staned this very valuable program is to be applauded. I have used the data from 

a 1960 rcpon to produce a plot of the deposition over the years 1954 through 1958. As can be seen 

in Figure 3, there were at least three periods during which significant deposition occurred. I have 

also noted in this graph the months in which the major bomb tests took place. The high level of 

agreement of the data peaks and the test dates is quite revealing. All seventeen of the tem of a 

size of one-megaton explosive yield or larger were detected on the gummed film at Kwajalein. 

Please note that the data in this figure is currently being examined in detail. Several analytical 

correction factors have been proposed by scientists since this data was collected. The data as 

shown is taken directly from a 1960 report and does not include any of the correction terms. 

The implications of detectable radioactivity in Kwajalein immediately following the large 

tests is relatively profound and deserves greater attention. First, it is important to note that 

Kwajalein has been a site of a sizeable population for many years. The 1958 census of the Marshall 

Islands indicates that 9% of the Marshallese population lived there then, nearly 1300 persons. 

Second, the early fallout is in many ways the most dangerous to human and animal health. The 

mixrure of radionuclides is quite complex; in particular, the fallout contains significant amounts 

of radioactive iodine. It is possible that barely measurable amounts of 137Cs now may have been 

accompanied by levels of radioiodine sufficiently high to give thyroid doses which arc great 

enough to cause the onset of disease many years later. 

Calculations of fission yields taken from the scientific literature indicate that the amount of 

131-iodine (1311) produced is about 700 times the amount of 137Cs. Whether any of the shortlived radioiodine (131J has a half-life of only eight days) existed at locations of interest depends 

entirely on the time interval between the explosion and the deposition at a location. Global 

fallout, because of its long residence time in the atmosphere is normally completely depicted of 

the short-lived radioiodincs. However, any location in the Marshall Islands that received local 

fallout could not have been more than a few days transit time from the test sites. Thus, fallout 

from Bikini or Enewetok deposited at any of the atolls could have likely contained significant 

6 

79-784 0-94-8 
222 

amounts of short-lived radioiodines. It is easy to see that a line drawn to Kwajalein from either 

Bikini or Enewetak intersects a number of other populated atolls. The implication here is that if 

early fallout radioactivity was in the air at Kwajalein, it could have also touched other atolls and 

exposed the residents of those islands. 

Finally, I would like to take note of at least one other mention of early radioactivity at 

Kwajalein. Merril Eisenbud in his autobiography vividly tells of the efforts of HASL to monitor 

the Pacific testS. He mentions that the flash from the fim thermonuclear test (MIKE) in the spring 

of 1952 was visible :i,t Kwajalein. Eisenbud goes on to state that in the early hours of the day 

following the test, environmental radiation levels were about 10 times higher than normal. The 

MIKE test took place before the gummed film station was operational at Kwajalein. However, 

the personal records of Eisenbud confirm that shot MIKE behaved similarly to the other large 

events in spreading early fallout to Kwajalein. 

III. THYROID SfUDY 

Introduction 

It is generally perceived in the Marshall Islands that the major health damage as a result of the 

testing are various forms of thyroid disease. The NWRS initiated a study of thyroid disease in 

the Marshall Islands to answer lingering questions about previous contamination by radioactive 

iodine and its effects on Marshallese citizens. 

Previous investigations mainly concentrated on the the the populations from Rongelap and 

Utirik which were known to have been exposed. Repeated surveys by medical teams from 

Brookhaven National Laboratory have maintained this surveillance. The last detailed and 

comprehensive report was published in 1989 as Brookhaven National Laboratory Report BNL52192 by W.H. Adams, P.M. Hcotis and W.A. Scott: Medi.al Status of Marshalkse Aa:idmtally 

Exposed to 1954 BRAVO Fallout Radiation: January 1985 to December 1987. The findings 

presented in this report can be summarized as follows: In the heavily exposed Rongclap and 

Ailinginae population totalling 86 people, 23 thyroids developed benign nodules and 5 

developed cancer. The majority of nodules and all cancers occurred in women. All cases were 

operated on in the United States, usually by total thyroidectomy. More than 50% of the people 

operated on developed hypothyroidsm as a consequence of the treatment, thus requiring life-long 

supplementation with thyroid hormone pills. In the much less exposed Utirik population which 

totalled I 67 people, 15 thyroids developed palpable (i.e., those capable of being felt by an 

examining physician) benign nodules, 5 others developed cancer. Between the two groups of 

people, there was a pronounced difference in latency time for manifestation of these nodules. In 

Rongelap, the first nodules were found 9 years after BRA VO; the incidence rose quickly and 

reached a plateau after about 30 years. In Utirik, the first nodules were found after 15 years; the 

incidence rose more slowly and in 1987 had not yet reached a plateau. Moreover, there was a 

7 
223 

pronounced difference in the incidence of thyroid nodules between age groups: In Rongelap, 59% 

of those who were children under ten years at the time of the BRA VO test developed nodules; 

25% of those who were 10-18 years old also developed nodules as well as 14% of those who were 

adults. The comparison group which was used for the last BNL report consisted of 227 people. 

Among these, 5 developed benign nodules and 2 developed cancer. 

Between June 1983 and March 1985, Dr. Thomas E. Hamilton examined 2,273 people from 

different atolls for the presence of palpable thyroid nodules. All of this group was alive in 1954 

and most of these individuals were from locations north of Majuro. Hamilton found 87 new 

nodular thyroids in addition to 55 others previously identified and surgically correacd. Twentythree of the cases lived in Rongelap or Utirik at the time of the BRA VO 1cs1. The remaining 119 

cases of thyroid nodules suggest an overall incidence of thyroid nodules in the portion of the 

Marshallese population which was not exposed to the heavy fallout of the BRA VO test of 

119/2162 or 5.5%. This value is similar to the comparison group in the Brookhaven study where 

the rate was 7/227 or 3.1%. Yet, there was a striking difference of prevalence among the different 

atolls with four groups apparent: 

• V cry high prevalence: 38% - Rongelap 

• High prevalence: 8-10% - Ucirik, Likicp, Wotje, Lac, Ujae, Wotho 

• Average prevalence: 4-6% - Ailuk, Maloelap, Kwajalein, Jaluit 

• Low prevalence: < 4 % - Mejit, Ebon, Mili 

The Hamilton study clearly suggests 1ha1 thyroid disease might also be a problem in many 

Marshal Iese who were not in Rongelap or Ucirik ac che time of the BRA VO ccsc. As a consequence 

of Hamilton's findings and che concern of che Marshall Island's government and citizens about 

radiation induced thyroid disease, the international Scientific Advisory Panel and the 

Nationwide Radiological Study recommended that a comprehensive nationwide survey of che 

prevalence of thyroid disease in the Marshall Islands should be performed. 

The study proposed 2 years ago was planned to build on Dr. Hamilton's investigations but also 

co collca new information. In particular, nearly ten years have passed since Dr. Hamilton's study. 

As the experience in Utirik has shown, latency to the development of radiation-induced thyroid 

nodules becomes longer if radiation doses are small, thus many cases with nodules might be found. 

Another area in which chis study hopes co improve is in using all locations of residence which an 

individual might have had. Dr. Hamilton related his findings 10 the place of residence at the time 

of the BRA VO 1es1. Yee there is evidence that ocher nuclear tests chat were conducted before and 

afi:cr BRA VO deposited radioactive contamination on ocher atolls. Therefore, a comprehensive 

residence history of every participant will be examined. Both benign and malignant thyroid 

8 
224 

disease is also being be studied, thus building on Hamilton's study which only reported the 

prevalence of nodules. Progress in the development of ultrasound imaging has made it possible to 

objectively measure, document and record characteristics of the thyroid pathology. 

The Thyroid Disease Study in Ebcyc, 1993 

With the agreement of the Ministry of Health and the cooperation of the Ebcyc Hospital, the 

Ebcyc examination phase was begun early in 1993. Administration and financing was provided by 

the the Nationwide Radiological Study. Protocol development and general planning was assisted 

by Dr. Klauss Trott of St. Banholomcw's Hospital in London and medical examinations were 

conducted by three endocrinology surgeons from the Second Department of Surgery of Tohoku 

University in Sendai Japan. From January 15 to March 7, 1993, screening for thyroid disease was 

offered to all adult residents of Ebcyc. Every participants received a physical and ultrasound 

examination of the thyroid. A blood sample was taken from most participants to study TSH 

(thyroid stimulating hormone) levels as a test for hypothyroidism. In addition, basic health data 

was recorded as well as information on past health conditions, diet, and residence history. 

A main objective of the medical screening program was to examine persons alive at the time 

of the nuclear testing or those born a few years after it ended. Thus the study intended to 

concentrate on persons who arc now 35 years or older with those between 28 and 35 also of interest 

for comparison purposes. However, no younger person was refused an examination if he/she wished 

it. Altogether, 1368 Marshallese residents of Kwajalicn atoll were examined, Their ages ranged 

from 16 to 90 years. Of this group, 817 were female, 535 were male. Of the 817 women, 145 

were younger than 28 years. In the younger group were 2 cases with palpable nodules and 3 with 

non-palpable nodules. There were 75 men examined who were younger than 28 years. In that 

group, no palpable nodules were found bur two cases were identified with non-palpable nodules. 

There were several strong points to the study design. Each patient was examined by two 

different medical doctors and received both a standard palpation exam and an ultrasound exam. 

Through the use of high-resolution ultrasound, the examining physician could visually examine the 

thyroid using sound waves displayed on a special video screen. The ultrasound machine can 

measure the size of abnormalities (nodules) and generate a paper copy reproductions of the image. 

In the Ebcyc study, a photograph of the ultrasound image was given to each panicipant and added 

to the patient's medical chan with a written record of the sizes of any nodules detected. 

Palpable nodules are nodules which can be felt by the examining physician. Palpable nodules 

were on average larger than nodules which were not-palpable. The median size of nodules which 

were not-palpable was 7.5 mm (about 1/4 inch), the median size of palpable nodules was 16mm 

(about 3/4 inch) although there was considerable overlap between both distributions. The smallest 

9 
225 

palpable nodule was 7 mm diameter, the largest nodule not-palpable was 20 mm diameter. 

Nearly 20% of the palpable nodules were smaller than IO mm and nearly 20% of the nodules notpalpable were larger than IO mm. It is reasonable co assume that the size of a nodule is more 

strongly related to the potential impact on a person's health than the case at which it can be 

palpated. Systematic studies on this question have not been published; however, in view of these 

data, the requirement of palpability for determining the presence or absence of thyroid disease 

should be reconsidered. That is an issue that the medical community worldwide must eventually 

address. 

In the 128 patients with palpable nodules, a fine needle aspiration biopsy was performed. 

This is a procedure in which a very minute amount of thyroid tissue sample is removed for 

microscopic examination. The tissue sample was stained in Ebeye, sent to Japan and examined in 

the Second Department of Pathology of Tohoku University, Sendai. The percentage of biopsies 

which yielded sufficient material to permit an unequivocal diagnosis was about 60%. However, 

the experience of the surgeons who performed the ultrasound examination allowed them to make a 

probable histological classification of the nodule. In 16 patients, thyroid cancer is the most likely 

diagnosis. Five of this group had sufficient evidence to diagnose papillary cancer. Large 

follicular adenomas have a high tendency to contain malignant foci; there were another 6 of chis 

diagnosis. Thus, there were 23 persons found with a high likelihood of thyroid cancer. 

In agreement with most ocher studies, the prevalence of thyroid nodules was higher in females 

than in males. Also in agreement with ocher studies was a pronounced deperidence of prevalence on 

age: nearly 50% of women over 60 have nodular thyroid disease. From the data as they are 

presented here, one should not make premature conclusions as co the probable causes of these benign 

or malignant nodules. It has to be stressed, however, that the total incidence of palpable thyroid 

nodules is rather high in the population ofEbeye: 13.5% of women over 30 years and 6.7% of men 

over thirty years have palpable thyroid nodules. The results from the Ebeye study arc much higher 

than chose which have been found elsewhere in the world except in the areas with significant iodine 

deficiency. 

Preliminar1 Observations 

The interpretation of disease-rate data co determine causal relationships requires considerable 

expertise and care in analysis. Thus caution is being exercised in interpreting the thyroid disease 

prevalence data from the Ebeye study. The number of persons examined is still somewhat small 

for proper interpretation. However, there is at least one pattern which is striking and deserves 

mention. Figure 4 of chis briefing material shows the distribution of birth years for the 23 

possible cancer cases and the atoll of residence in 1954 at the time of the BRA VO test. Forty 

I 0 
226 

percent of these ca.scs were children less than eight years old at the time of the BRA VO test. Thar 

}-oung children expo~cd to external radiation or radioiodines arc at higher risk is consistent with 

all studies. Fifty-five percent of the children under eight years of age during the testing years were 

born and raised on Ebcyc in Kwajalcin Atoll. The high number of the Kwajalcin residents may 

only reflect the greater number of people living there. However, because the gummed film data 

indicates the presence of fresh fallout at Kwajalcin on numerous occasions, these results require 

further careful examination. 

Six of the persons in the group of possible cancers were born after rhc testing ended and their 

locations of residence as children is also shown. It is curiow that two of the five younger subjects 

were born and raised on Rongelap. It is relatively well accepted in the scientific community that 

only the short-lived radioiodines arc responsible for thyroid cancer. Since exposure ro shon-livcd 

iodines is impossible in this case, alternative explanations will be required. 

Consequences of the Findings 

In the compensation scheme implemented by the Nuclear Claims Tribunals, Marshallcsc 

citizens arc eligible to received payments from $12,500 for non-malignant palpable nodules to 

$50,000 for nodules requiring rhyroidectomy. Thus, to prevent unneeded and possibly dangerous 

surgery, the Thyroid Study has had the responsibility of recommending surgical intervention only 

when the ethics of proper medical care demanded it. The possibility of unneeded surgeries is a 

frightening scenario for an already overworked health care system. Therefore, careful but specific 

recommendations were made for the care of all patients. In particular, for those persons with 

nodules that arc not-palpable and for all people with palpable adenomatous goiter which docs not 

cause any difficulty with swallowing or compression of the trachea, no treatment is needed. No 

surgery should be performed on these cases. A follow-up examination has been scheduled for the 

spring 1995 for these persons to determine if any s.ignificant change in their condition has occurred. 

Surgery should only be performed on those people for whom ultrasound and/or fine needle biopsy 

examinations suggest either cancer or a large follicular adenoma. In a few patients, advanced age 

or other serious disease has suggested that thyroid surgery would not be in the best interest of the 

patient. After consultation with the doctors at the Ebeye Hospital, 14 patients have been selected 

for thy_roid surgery because of suspected malignant thyroid nodules. 

The possibility of 16 cancers out of 1368 pe11ons is a prevalence rate of 1.2%. Thyroid cancer 

is rare in the world, normally ranging from I to 10 per 100,000 people depending on ethnic group, 

sex and age. This figure, if proven right deserves concern. Simple extrapolation to the total 

population alive at the time of the atomic testing yields an estimate of 80 to 100 thyroid cancers 

in the adult Marshallese population. 

1 1 
227 

Plans fur Funher Study of Thyroid Disease 

Overall, the Ebcye phase of the Thyroid Disease Study was successful. The local population 

accepted the offer of a thyroid examination to dispel or confirm their individual fears concerning 

thyroid disease. The results of the study confirmed the suspected high prevalence of palpable 

nodules in the population and a possible higher than expected incidence of cancer. 

At a meeting with President Kabua and the ~ on August 30 1993, the leaders of the 

nation recommended an extension of the study to other atolls. Such a study would initially be 

based in Majuro and' later extended to outer atolls. Currently, I am seeking support from the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta to continue this investigation. 

The close association of the Thyroid Study and the Nationwide Radiological Study will 

provide an important analytical tool not previously available. Recently collected environmental 

radiation data at all the atolls can be extrapolated backward to estimate the likely exposure at the 

time of the testing for persons at locations throughout the Marshall Islands. Though this process is 

difficult and somewhat uncertain, it will be possible to compare the geographic pattern of thyroid 

disease with either the geographic pattern of present day residual contamination or with the 

geographic pattern of the exposure at the time of the bomb tests. The possibility of making these 

comparisons will improve the ability of this study to draw convincing conclusions over any other 

previous investigation. By using the largest database possible, the Nationwide Radiological 

Study and the Scientific Advisory Panel will be able to provide the most credible interpretation 

possible to date. Regardless of the outcome of scientific analyses which are intended to examine 

the relationship of thyroid disease and radiation exposure, many Marshallese citizens with 

heretofore unknown thyroid disease will be identified and provided the appropriate level of 

medical care. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS 

The United States atomic weapons testing program in the Pacific is now a part of the history of 

the Marshall Islands. Part of its legacy has been fear, misunderstanding, and, in some cases, rrue 

damage to persons or property. The passage of 40 years since the BRA VO test has not reduced the 

level of concern about radiation among adult Marshallese citizens. Even to trained scientists, it 

has never been apparent why the BRA VO incident was never openly invescigared. 

Today, there are still three communities of islanders displaced from their traditional home 

islands. Any hesitation of the islanders not to return to their homelands must be viewed with an 

undersranding of the difficult concepts which they are being asked to understand. There are also 

numerous opinions as to the safety of these islands, and the differences of opinion only compound 

the difficult decisions for islanders considering whether they should return to their land. The 

hearing today is one futther step to healing some long lasting scars. Openness and freedom of 

information can only serve to improve a situation in which misunderstanding and, in some cases, 

true damage, have obscured an understanding of the situation. Where real health effects are 

obvious, we hope they will be acknowledged and cared for. Where remediation activities are 

12 
228 

necessary to return island land to a hospitable condition, we hope that this need will be 

acknowledged and satisfied. 

On behalf of the Nationwide Radiological Study and the citizens and the Government of the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands, I express my thanks to this Committee for their openness and 

inquiry into these issues. 

l 3 
229 

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Fig. 4 Birth Years and Residence Locations in 1954 fo

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(or main locations of residences for younger case

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Birth Year 
Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Radford. 

233 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD RADFORD, M.D. 

Dr. RADFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to see you 

back. 

Nothing exemplifies more the status of the Marshall Islanders 

than the situation on Ebeye. Dr. Simon has indicated that he 

thought there were 20,000; there were actually 10,000 people living 

on it. That is a 78-acre island which was uninhabited when I first 

went to the Marshall Islands as a radiological protection officer in 

1947. Now it has 10,000 people. I have been on it. 

Kwajelein Island, which is four miles away and to which the 

Marshallese commute in order to carry out many of the functions 

on the Kwajelein test base, is a picture of a tropical isle with manicured lawns, very nice houses, and on which no Marshallese are 

permitted to live unless they are married to an American. So I just 

point that out for openers. 

I am a physician, and I graduated from Harvard Medical School 

in 1946. I have detailed some of my past experience, but I want to 

emphasize my experience on the BEIR committees-B-E-I-R stands 

for Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation-and these committees 

were established by the National Academy of Sciences to investigate all of the world literature on what the effects of radiation 

were, and the first such committee was the BEIR I Committee, on 

which I served, which issued its report in 1972. 

I was chairman of BEIR III, which issued its report in 1980, and 

that report was a controversial one, sufficiently that I submitted as 

part of the report as chairman a dissenting statement on the issue 

of cancer risks from radiation. This was an absolute bombshell to 

the National Academy of Sciences because it never happened before 

that a chairman dissented from his own committee. Well, the point 

is that BEIR III was what was available at the time of the signing 

of the compact as far as what risks of radiation are. 

Now the issue of changed circumstances is that we now have 

BEIR V, which was published in 1990. BEIR V essentially confirmed the position that I had taken in BEIR III, that the radiation 

risks were a lot higher. Subsequent data from the Radiation Effects 

Research Foundation in Japan have further buttressed the position 

that I expressed in 1980. So there is a changed circumstance which 

is of considerable significance to this committee. 

Now I received training in the military as a radiation protection 

officer, and I was detailed to Kwajelein in 1978 for Operation Sandstone, and I only want to make a few comments about that series 

of three tests. One was that we had meteorologic briefings every 

day or evening before the tests were carried out. The meteorologist 

would tell us, ''Well, the winds are going to blow this way and that 

way." 

Now it is important for this committee to realize that there are 

winds and winds. The winds up to, say, 10,000 feet can be very different from the winds above 10,000 feet. The winds aloft in general 

in the Pacific area, I think, at this time of year at least, are prevailing westerlies, due east from west, exactly the pattern that ex-
234 

isted at the time of BRA VO. So there is nothing mysterious about 

the fact that the winds aloft are going to go from west to east. 

Now the lower level winds might very well go south and various 

other places, and some of those could have changed. So that the 

idea that there was a change in the wind pattern at least has some 

possibility of support, but in terms of the winds aloft, it is quite 

likely they didn't. Indeed, as I have indicated, the chief of the 

weather group on Rongerik is now quoted as saying, at least in 

1983, that they had been measuring the winds, and they were 

steadily from the east, they did not change before the test, they did 

not change during the test, and they did not change after the test, 

there was no wind change. Now that may apply only to certain levels of the winds, but the point is that you have to take all of these 

into account. 

Now, I point out in my written testimony, and I won't go into details here, that there was a report written by Science Applications 

International Corporation in 1983 which went over the question of 

how much exposure did the servicemen-specifically the Navy 

which had the largest number of servicemen in Operation Sandstone-how much dose did they actually get. It turns out that the 

dose that they calculate-which takes account only of gamma radiation and does not consider the possibility of intake of any radionuclides, etc.-was higher on Kwajelein than on Enewetak. 

Now let me be clear. The amount of radioactivity on Enewetak 

was undoubtedly higher in the crater area where the bomb tests 

had gone off, but when you got outside of that where the personnel 

were, the actual fallout exposure was less on Enewetak itself than 

it was 400 miles away on Kwajelein. Obviously there is no information in that report about what happened on any other islands because nobody measured it. That has been the pattern through most 

of the bomb tests, even including BRA VO; despite the efforts of the 

HASL lab to carry out monitoring, and it is still pretty much a 

mystery. 

Now I recently returned to Majuro in connection with my position as a consultant to the public advocate from whom you will 

hear later on today. I have picked up a lot of new information that 

I did not know until I went back over the records, and I would just 

like to stress a few of that. 

The first thing, of course, is that there have been actually 67 

tests, but one of them was a fizzle, so I guess they don't count that. 

The total, as Dr. Simon says, is a big number. It comes to 107,000 

kilotons, kilotons of TNT, and that is equal to over 7,000 Hiroshima bombs, that have been detonated in the Marshall Islands. 

I would just like to close my brief comments here by pointing out 

some of the facts that came to light when I reviewed documents on 

the Marshall Islands themselves. The first, of course, is that the 

Marshallese knew that a lot of islands beside the four-Rongelap, 

Ailinginae, Rongerik, and Utirik-had fallout from test BRA VO. 

You have already heard about that from others. But I have listed 

at least another seven atolls and islands on which fallout was 

known to have occurred by the Marshallese, and now I would like 

to tell you a couple of anecdotes to close. 
235 

One of them is a story told me by Marshall Island Senator Tony 

de Brum who is in this room and he can confirm or deny whatever 

I say, but I will take his part here. 

He was nine years old at the time of BRAVO, living on Likiep, 

which is supposed to be one of the non-impacted islands, okay? He 

lived in a thatched house. Now they noticed the snow-like dust falling on their island too, not anywhere near as much as the 1.5-2 

inches that fell on Rongelap, but still detectable, and the water in 

the reservoirs turned yellow there too, as it did in some of the 

other atolls. 

Soon afterwards, after the bomb, he noticed that there were 

gecko droppings falling on his head. Geckos are little lizards and 

are supposed to be a good luck charm in the Marshall Islands. But 

then more and more gecko droppings came around, and finally a 

dead gecko fell out of the roof and then another and then several 

more. 

Now I don't know what he interpreted that to be, but my interpretation is that the beta radiation from the screened-out radioactivity in the roof of that thatched house was sufficient to kill the 

geckos from acute radiation problems. 

The next point is that Mr. de Brum reported that a Navy ship 

stopped at Likiep and took a boy and a woman aboard apparently 

for whole-body counting. This at least is the inference at this time. 

This was, I guess, a few days after the bomb. The ship sailed away 

after depositing the people back onshore without telling the Marshall Islanders anything, and subsequently the U.S. Navy has denied that any ship stopped at Likiep for years and years and years. 

Only recently they finally admitted it. Talk about covered-up 

knowledge. 

Finally, I would like to point out that it is known that fallout occurred on other islands such as Ujelang, and I have referred to that 

briefly. This is part of the documentation. 

I also point out that the whole question of abnormal pregnancy 

outcomes has not really been addressed in the Marshall Islands 

partly because the statistics are poor. The reason for this is that 

the birth of a deformed child is considered a terrible stigma for the 

family, and therefore no mention is made of it socially. So that in 

order to do a proper follow-up study, I think it would be necessary 

now to question the older women who no longer have the commitment, let's say, to keeping the subject covered up, and it might be 

possible to get adequate information on this important question, 

which, incidentally is one of the more sensitive indicators of radiation exposure. 

Finally, the anecdote that I heard about contamination of 

Kosrae. Now Kosrae is an island to the southwest of Majuro. It is 

actually just south of Enewetak, just below that blue map, and 

Kosrae isn't even part of the Marshall Islands. It is actually, I 

think,' a separate country in its own right. But at some point-and 

I was unable to get accurate information-the U.S. Navy unit on 

that island came to the people living on it and said, ''You can't eat 

your food or drink your water any more. You had better let us provide you with water and food," which they did for some time, I believe on the order of weeks. Then they finally came back, the U.S. 
236 

Navy personnel, and said, "Now you can eat your food-eat your 

food and drink your water." 

Kosrae is 600 miles south of Enewetak, and it certainly is at the 

limit of any island you would expect could have been affected by 

fallout. Now this is hearsay evidence and I don't put it forward as 

any scientific truth, but the fact is that the U.S. Navy could tell 

us: Did they have fallout on Kosrae, was it measured, how much, 

and did they tell the natives not to eat the food? It should not be 

a difficult problem, but it is obviously apparent from today's discussions that it is a difficult problem. The Navy won't tell us, and I 

just reiterate what others have said. I believe that the fallout that 

occurred on the Marshall Islands was widespread and it is going 

to be very difficult to establish evidence of this in spite of Dr. Simon's efforts. I am not denigrating what he is doing; I am merely 

saying it is not going to be easy. 

Then I have to say as my closing statement what I have written 

about this document, Operation Sandstone. This was given to all 

members of the task force after Operation Sandstone because of 

course we weren't allowed to have cameras. So they did a very complete photographic record of Operation Sandstone, and I find it interesting even today to recall memories of what actually happened 

at the test. 

But I call your attention to the last page of the report which 

says, "The atomic energy proving ground at Enewetak lies ready 

and waiting for man's next adventure in atomic wonderland." That 

was the attitude of the leaders of the Operation Sandstone, and as 

I have indicated in my written testimony, it may have been a wonderland for nuclear physicists, but for the Marshall Islanders it 

was part of their home, and the bomb test islands were not a wonderland but became a place of fear and danger. [Prepared statement of Dr. Radford follows:] 
237 

Testimony prepared for the 

Subcommittee oa Oftni&bt and Investiptioas 

0-mittee oa Natural Resoun:es 

U.S. House of RepreseatatiftS 

Febnuuy 24, 19'4 

by F.dwanl P. Radford, M.D. 

Oasultant to die Public Athocate 

Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

Rq,ublic of the Marshall Islands 
238 

Testimony o{ Edward P. Radrord, M.D. 

I am a physician who graduated from Havard Medi~I School in 1946. My career has 

been in research and teaching, most recently in the field of environmental public health. 

I am now retired from my academic position, although I continue to do consulting work, 

particularly on the health effects of ionizing radiation. I am presently a consultant to the 

Public Advocate of the Nuclear Oaims Tnbunal in the Marshall Islands. 

In my academic career I was involved with teaching and research on the effects of 

ionizing radiation, and developed the first courses offered in this field at the Harvard 

School of Public Health in the 1950s. In 1969 I was made a member of the U.S. 

National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation 

(BEIR). This committee issued its repon in 1972; the report is now known as BEIR I. 

In 1977, a similar committee was appointed by the Academy to review new evidence. and 

I was made Chairman of the full committee, as well as of the subcommittee on somatic 

effects ( cancer or other effects on the person irradiated). Its report (BEIR III) was 

issued in 1980. I submitted a dissenting statement in that report because I thought the 

evidence indicated significantly greater risks of cancer from radiation than was presented 

in the main report. The BEIR V report published in 1990 has vindicated my position in 

BEIR III. 

In 1983-84 I was a Visiting Scientist at the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in 

Hiroshima, Japan, the organization supported by the Japanese and the U.S. governments 

to investigate the long-term effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. At 
239 

that time I assisted in the epidemiological study of radiation-induced effects on the Abomb survivors. The most recent evidence in 1993 from these follow-up studies has also 

supponed my position in the BEIR III repon. 

My interest in radiation and its effects began in 1947 when, as a new flight surgeon in the 

U.S. Air Force, I was sent to the military Radiological Health School at Edgewood 

Arsenal in Maryland. After completing that course I was ordered in 1948 to join Joint 

Task Force Seven to panicipate in the second series of atomic bomb tests in the 

Marshall Islands, Operation Sandstone (the first was Crossroads at Bikini atoll). These 

three tests were carried out on Enewetak atoll. Most members of the Army and Air 

Force staff were based on Kwajalein atoll, 400 miles south-cast of Enewetak. I was a 

radiological safety officer attached to a B29 crew, whose responsibility it was to 

photograph from 30,000 feet the evolution of the fireball and the mushroom cloud as it 

rose from the detonation site on a 200ft. tower. The tests were exploded just before 

dawn. 

The night before each test we had meteorological briefings explaining the winds aloft to 

be expected at the next dawn's test. Meteorological conditions had to be such that there 

would be no likelihood of radioactive fallout on the American personnel in the area. No 

mention was made about Marshall Islanders, nor was any information then given to us as 

to where in the vast expanse of these islands the Marshallese were living. The 

imprcs.sion I have now was that the Marshall Islanders, a few of whom were then living 

on K,.,-ajalein, were not considered to be imponant in the minds of the test organizers. 

2 
240 

Despite the meteorologists' assenions, we did have fallout on Kwajalein after the second 

( and largest) of the three tests. About 14 hours after the test, rain began falling on 

Kwajalein, and our unit of radiation safety officers, about 25 men, was ordered to take 

our Geiger counters and measure the radioactivity coming down in the rain. We were 

assigned different areas to monitor, and proceeded for the next two or three hours to 

take readings in the rain on the ground, on tent surfaces, and on any other surfaces 

present. My experience was that the count rates were high. much greater than 

background. Both gamma and beta radiation was measured; the beta radiation showed it 

was fresh fallout. We turned in our results to our commander, but at that time there was 

no funher comment that I can recall about the significance of this "rainout", certainly not 

about any possible health implications of it. 

In 1983 a repon prepared by Science Applications International Corporation reviewed 

the radiation exposures of the 7,000 Naval personnel taking pan in Operation Sandstone 

in 1948. A single measurement of gamma radiation (only) from fallout recorded for 

Kwajalein (presumably from our survey) at about midnight on May 1, the date of the 

second (YOKE) test, was higher than any of the greater number of measurements made 

at Enewetak during ~he tests. There is little comment in the repon about beta radiation, 

I 

which evidently was much higher than the gamma measurements. The highest integrated 

gamma dose measurements to personnel through May 31 were recorded for Kwajalein 

residents. These were higher than the Enewetak values, and those for people on ships 

which remained in the Enewetak lagoon during all the tests. No comment is made about 

the fact that the fallout on Kwajalein was 400 miles away from the test, and that fallout 

on other islands could have been higher than on Kwajalein. The distinct impression is 

3 
241 

that radiation exposure estimates in this repon were determined solely by where 

measurements were available. The conclusion of their repon is tha: "film badge" doses 

of gamma radiation were less than 0.1 rad to all Sandstone personnel. 

Retrospective reconstruction of doses in this fashion 35 years later a.epended critically on 

two repons and one memorandum complied at the time of Sandsto:::.e and apparently all 

unpublished. One of the reports was stated to be a draft. Questior::!' of inhalation or 

ingestion of fission products, the variability of ground measurements (noted by me during 

my monitoring), or other details about possible exposures were not .::iscussed. For 

example, on Kwajalein tent roofs and walls gave the highest read~ but these were 

dismissed as not peninent to human exposure. It is likely that some cJf these issues will 

never be resolved, especially as there is no way to check the basic c!;;.ta. In any case, I do 

not have much confidence in the results presented in this repon, u=ttling to me as one 

of those exposed. 

Recently I have returned twice to Majuro in the Marshall Islands tc meet with the 

Nuclear Oaims Tnbunal with one return visit to Kwajalein. In this period I have 

learned about the later tests up to 1958 and their consequences. It !!i significant that the 

Marshall Islanders did not know radioactive fallout had occurred oc Kwajalein in 1948 

until I told them of my experience in Operation Sandstone. We no,,. know that 67 bomb 

tests were carried out on Enewetak and Bikini from 1946 to 1958, cc which at least 17 

were thermonuclear de,ices. The total kilotons of nitroglycerine eq-..:ivalent explosive 

power of all these tests "''35 107,000 kilotons, or equal to over 7,000 Hiroshima type 

bombs. 

4 
242 

Although the Bravo test was the largest U.S. bomb detonated, there have been many 

other large thermonuclear tests, and in any case the amount of radioactive fallout 

depends not only on the bomb energy but also on how close it was to the ground or 

lagoon floor at detonation. The Bravo tests in May 1954 was noteworthy because it was 

the first test whose fallout was recognized as hazardous to Marshall Islanders and the 

Japanese crew of the "Lucky Dragon", as well as to Americans. American military 

meteorological staff on Rongerik were evacuated to Kwajalein two days after the bomb. 

The Marshall Islanders on Rongelap, Rongerik and Utirik atolls were evacuated to 

Kwajalein three to four days after the test. Both Americans and Marshallese suffered 

from skin bums (presumably primarily from energetic beta radiation exposure) as well as 

nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and hair loss. The press release by the Atomic Energy 

Commission at the time state~_Jha• the evacuation was "precautionary", no burns were 

present, and all evacuees were reported well. 

Fallout on these atolls was attributed by the test staff as due to "sudden wind shifts" 

before the test, but in 1982 the senior weather technician, who had been stationed on 

Rongerik in 1954 at the time of the test, said that the wind was blowing straight at 

Rongerik from Bikini before, during and after the test. There was no wind shift. This is 

not surprising in view of the prevailing westerlies at this latitude, particularly at upper 

altitudes. Neither the Marshallesc nor the U.S. Air Force and Army men on Rongerik 

knew when the test would take place. On Roogelap the white dust-like fallout (including 

vaporized coral from Bikini) accumulated to two inches thick. 

5 
243 

Although the test authorities and the Brookhaven Laboratory medical teams that 

subsequently studies those exposed Marshall Islanders have emphasized that fallout only 

affected Rongelap, Ailinginai, Rongerik and Utirik atolls, the Marshallese know that 

many more areas received substantial fallout from test Bravo. These include Ailuk, Bika. 

Likiep, Taka and Wotho atolls, and Jemi and Mejit islands. (Wotho atoll is 400 miles 

from Bikini). Let me tell a story told to me by Marshall Islands Senator Tony de Brum. 

111,·ho may be present in this room. He was 9 years old at the time of Bravo, living on 

Likiep atoll in a thatched house. He and the other residents noted a snow-like dust 

falling after the test, turning the water reservoirs a yellow color. Soon afterwards he 

noticed that gecko droppings were falling on him and other members of his family. 

(Geckos are small lizards.) then a dead gecko fell out of the roof thatch. Then another 

gecko fell dead, and finally a whole rain of dead geckos fell from the thatch, something 

unique in his experience. My interpretation of this phenomenon is that the thatched roof 

filtered out much of the fallout particles, and the high radiation doses in the thatch, 

especially from beta radiation energetic enough to pass through a small animal, was 

enough to kill the geckos. Mr. de Brum also reported that a Navy ship stopped at Llkie;i 

and took a boy and a woman on board, evidently for whole body counting. The two 

111,'Cre returned, but nothing was said about this to the Marshallese, and the ship sailed 

away. For many years the U.S. Navy denied that any ship visited Likiep, although 

recently they have finally admitted it. 

Undoubtedly there was radioactive fallout on many of the inhabited islands, for example.. 

on Ujelang atoll after test King in 19S2, and test Magnolia in 19S8. You will hear from 

Dr. Thomas Hamilton about his thyroid study, a biological indicator of thyroid adenoma£ 

6 
244 

as a radiation dosimeter showing contamination of many of the islands south of Rongelap 

from Bravo and other tests. I also heard in Majuro that at the time of the bomb tests a 

number of abnormal babies were born. When asked about pregnancy outcomes at the 

time, the mothers affected denied that there had been any problems because of the 

stigma in the Marshallcsc culture attached to a family when an abnormal baby is born. 

Now as older and wiser mothers and grandmothers they arc prepared to discuss the 

problems they had. 

Finally I would like to share another anecdote I heard in Majuro. During the bomb 

testing period, exact date unknown, the people living on Kosrae island were told one day 

by men from the U.S. Navy unit on the island not to eat the local food nor drink the 

water. For a substantial period of time, many days or weeks, the Navy provided food 

and water to the people from their own (presumably covered) stores. Finally the 

islanders were told that it was once again all right to take their food and water from local 

supplies. Now Kosrae is not even a Marshall island. and lies slightly south and about 600 

miles west of Majuro. 1.1 is also about 600 miles due south of Enewetak. Certainly this 

episode sounds as though radioactive fallout had occurred on this relatively remote 

island, far from the test site. I realize that this hearsay evidence, but there is no question 

that the facts can be provided by the U.S. Navy if they choose to do so. H they state that 

no such episode occurred, they will not be believed by the Marshall Islanders. 

In conclusion I strongly suspect that radioactive fallout from the many American atomic 

and thermonuclear bombs detonated at Encwetak and Bikini atolls up to 1958 had 

caused exposure of many Marshallese to significant radiation doses. It will be difficult to 

7 
245 

establish objective evidence of this exposure, though Or. Simon's survey will help. At the 

very least the U.S. government owes compassion and attention to the Marshallese people 

for the way that the use of their islands to advance the military purposes of the U.S.A 

has disrupted the Jives of many of the people of the Republic. 

When Operation Sandstone of Joint Task Force Seven left the Pacific and returned 

home, eventually all members of the Task Force were sent a book containing a 

photographic history of the bomb tests. This book still brings back many memories to 

me. On the last page of the book, opposite a color picture of a fireball rising above an 

Enewetak island, is the following text: 'The atomic energy PrO\ing Ground at Eniwetok 

lies ready and waiting for man's next adventure in atomic wonderland." It may have 

been a wonderland for nuclear physicists, but for the Marshall Islanders it was part of 

their home, and the bomb test islands were not a wonderland but became a place of fear 

and danger. 

8 
246 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Simon, on page 6 of your statement, in the middle there, you 

talk about the gummed film stations that were established in the 

Pacific area and data that was collected in a 1960 report. You say 

at one point that all 17 of the tests of the size of one megaton explosive yield or larger were detected on the gummed film on 

Kwajelein. 

Dr. SIMON. Yes, sir. Mr. MILLER. That was part of the HASL data collection? 

Dr. SIMON. Yes, it was. That a worldwide program of well over 

100 stations. Mr. MILLER. Are we to draw from that statement that the detection on the film is related to each of those explosives? It wasn't 

testing in general atmospheric radiation; it was testing the relationship to those--

Dr. SIMON. I can tell you how it was conducted, and I think it 

will be clear, although Professor Eisenbud is the expert on this, it 

was his program. But let me just briefly tell you, it was a piece of 

gummed paper as you understand, but it was changed every day. 

It was put out into the environment, a new piece everyday, and 

yesterday's piece was collected and sent to the HASL laboratory. 

Mr. MILLER. So the 1960 report says, if you look at the evidence, 

what you are saying is, there was an explosion and there was radioactive material following that explosion on Kwajelein. Dr. SIMON. The station was located on Kawjelein, sir, and I have 

made this photograph myself, and I have interpreted it. I have 

notated on the peaks, which is peaks, which is the data. I have 

notated that the test occurred during that month. These round circles are a sum of all the monthly measurements. So during July they would add up all the measurements on those 

gummed film, and that represents one data point here, and as I 

began to look at when the test occurred and when these points are 

above the background, they all fell into place. 

Now this is my interpretation. It is fairly simple at this point in 

time, but there could be no other source that I can think of for that 

contamination on the gummed film than those local tests. 

Mr. MILLER. I understand, and I am not going into whether there 

is or not, but what you are relating to us is your belief that that 

was the source and, in fact, that happened even with relatively low 

yield weapons compared to the BRA VO? 

Dr. SIMON. Well, yes sir, I am saying that, but I don't consider 

one megaton to be a low yield weapon. 

Mr. MILLER. Compared to BRA VO, where there is some question 

what happened there. 

Dr. SIMON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Hamilton, you discussed the procedure that you went 

through with your study and that it was peer reviewed, and you 

presented it at some local conferences, and later it was published 

in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1987. What 

reaction was there to that study by anybody at that time? 

Dr. HAMILTON. That study was published in an annual issue that 

is put out by the Journal of the American Medical Association 

which had a number of interesting articles. I think my article was 
247 

the second one. The first article got most of the press. But for the 

next probably four to eight weeks, I was interviewed extensively by 

the press. 

Mr. MILLER. What about your peers or the people who said you 

did the study the wrong way? Was there a critical analysis of ityou did it the wro}!g way, you did it the right way? 

Dr. HAMILTON. Usually what happens in that situation is that, 

you know, when an article is published, then people who have expertise in that area will look at it and will write in criticisms in 

the form of letters to the editor. 

I have to say that I was surprised that I never saw any such letters submitted to JAMA or in any other journals such as Health 

Physics, for instance, and presumably the individuals that would 

most likely have expertise in this area would be, you know, people 

that are within either the Department of Energy or Brookhaven 

who have extensively evaluated and followed the Rongelap and 

Utirik people. 

Mr. MILLER. You didn't hear from Brookhaven at that point or 

the Department of Energy or Department of Defense? 

Dr. HAMILTON. No, I have never heard from Brookhaven or the 

Department of Energy or Defense and have never seen actually 

until today any written commentary about this study, and the only 

information I have received today and in the . last week has been 

correspondence from your committee. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

I am unfortunately going to have to abbreviate my questions a 

little bit because I have an amendment on the Floor, but just a couple of points. 

Mr. Hills, you construct a scenario which would lead us to believe that the Marshallese people, in their quest for independence 

or decolonization or drive to start the process of decolonization, leveraged this agreement into compensation benefits, however people 

want to describe it, far in excess of what had been possible the previous 30 years. Is that fair? 

Mr. HILLS. That is an element of my view of how it went down, 

yes. 

Mr. MILLER. Did you ever give any thought to the fact that 

maybe the Federal Government was leveraging the Marshallese 

people's interest in independence and not to be a colony into compensation far less than they would have otherwise had to pay? 

Mr. HILLS. Yes, I have thought about that, and that was very 

much part of the debate that took place. I think, as I look back on 

it, it was kind of a very, very difficult and agonizing process whereby this committee and this Congress became sort of the crucible in 

which you forged a way of moving forward. I think what happened 

is, all the various interests, the competing interests, the compatible 

interests, came here, and we moved the process to its next stage. 

I see this committee as poised at this time to now take it and move 

it to its next stage. 

But I will just say in response to that, that the situation that 

would have occurred when you talk about leveraging their desire 

for independence in a way that caused them to give up the potential of a great deal for more compensation-for example, I presume 

you are alluding to the possibility of them having gone to court-
248 

I think that what you would have had there, Mr. Chairman, if the 

matter had been dealt with in litigation-I think Mr. Weiman referred to it-you couldn't get any answers out of anybody because 

as soon as you tried to ask the question, the answer was, ''Well, 

that is in litigation, we can't talk about it." 

Now the fact that the litigation was dismissed has not produced 

a satisfactory result in that you still are not getting the documents 

you want, it is just that the litigation is not being used as the excuse not to give you the documents. 

But I will say this, Mr. Chairman, if they had gone into court, 

it would have reinforced the reluctance and it would have given a 

legal basis for refusing to tum over information We would have 

gone in and it would have been an entirely adversary process, and 

you would have increased the Federal Government's tendency not 

to disclose information, and the desire would have been at that 

point to defeat their claims. 

Now I will agree with you, you know, the question of what would 

have happened in the court is an interesting one, but I think the 

process produced an outcome where it is not going to be decided in 

court, and they may have been thrown out of court and not collected a dime on jurisdictional grounds. - Mr. MILLER. I think you are misunderstanding my question. The 

question isn't whether or not, had they chosen to go to court, something different would have happened. The question is, they had 

even the information that we have this morning whether something different would have happened in the context of that agreement and/or the Congress of the United States, Clearly if they 

would have had available to them all of the information that we 

suspect is out there, would something differently have happened, 

not would they would have gone to court. I think the suggestion 

that there is a confluence here to the best of intentions theoretically by this committee to decolonize the Marshall Islands and the 

desire of the Marshallese people to be decolonized, and therefore 

somehow we got a settlement that is both fair and in excess of anything that they could have expected in court, is not the test. That 

cannot be the test. 

Mr. HILLS. I agree with your analysis. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. I am a little worried about the suggestion 

that somehow this all worked out because they got something more 

than they could get when the entire Federal Government was in 

motion against them for the previous 30 years. 

Mr. HILLS. No, I think it is not a matter of being in motion 

against them. I think what happened represented what was doable 

at the time when you take into account the allocation of interest, 

and I am not saying that the outcome was a perfect outcome. I 

think the compact and the 177 agreement fall far short of perfection. 

Mr. MILLER. With all due respect, you are acting like everybody 

is playing like it is on the level. One party has all of the information, and they are in no way prepared to share that information 

with the other party. That is not an allocation of whatever you just 

said. 

Mr. HILLS. Well, no, but I think that the good news-and I think 

there is good news here-is that because of the very point that you 
249 

just made, we knew all of the information that was of concern to 

people-and the Government of the Marshall Islands was vecy, 

vecy adamant about this in its negotiating position. They said, 

"Look we are not satisfied. We are not going to be able to close this 

deal if it means that we are not going to be able to seek additional 

remedies if it turns out that we are not getting all the information." 

That is why article 9 went into the agreement, and I agree with 

you, Mr. Chairman, and what I am saying is, the good news here 

is that article 9 puts this committee and this Congress in a posi- tion, as the information flow gets better. And the point is, Is this 

Administration and this Department of Energy and this Department of the Interior going to do perhaps a better job getting the 

information out than they did in the past? And if it does, and if 

it turns out that there is a basis for concluding that what was done 

in the 177 agreement was inadequate, then it is within your power 

to redress that. I think that when you compare that to a lot of 

things that go on where the Department of Justice leverages people 

into settlements, in most cases the door is closed. 

I think what article 9 represents is that this committee and 

Chairman de Lugo did a vecy, vecy good job in tcying to deal with 

the competing interests of preserving the possibility of further 

measures if it turns out that further measures are required to 

achieve something more nearly resembling American justice and 

fairness. 

Mr. MILLER. It is always troublesome, obviously, when you go 

back with new evidence in hindsight, and you have to attribute motives and knowledge and everything to people who were there at 

that time. I am just not quite sure that is the way this was pre- sented to this committee at that moment because I don't know how 

you would construct it in that fashion if you didn't know the extent 

to which other evidence was available about the activities. I don't 

know how you could leap forward in that time frame to tell the 

committee there is all this out here that we can't get our hands on, 

so this is the best evidence we can get. In fact, most people didn't 

know what was out there. 

Mr. HILLS. I agree with you, and in constructing the scenario 

that I did, I did not mean to imply that everybody felt good or was 

happy about the situation. In fact, I think it is a tribute to this 

committee, to the Government of the Marshall Islands, and to peo- ple like Mr. Weisgall and others who said, "Look, this thing is not 

going to close; we are not going to be able to achieve closure." Either there was going to be termination of the trusteeship or there 

wasn't going to be. Either there was going to be a settlement or 

there wasn't going to be a settlement, and the effort was to produce 

a settlement. Either information was going to come out or it wasn't 

going to come out. 

The point is that the people involved in this process were vigilant 

enough about the vecy concerns that you are expressing that article 

9 was put into this agreement. Article 9 empowers this Congress 

and it empowers the people of the Marshall Islands through their 

Government to say: Okay, it is 1994 now, Bill Clinton is the President of the United States, Hazel O'Leary is the Secretary of Energy, Bruce Babbitt is the Secretary of the Interior, and we are 
250 

going to get this information out, and we are going to respond to 

what we now have in the way of control over information. 

I can tell you as somebody that was involved in the section 177 

negotiations, every time I ever asked anybody from the Department 

of Energy a question to try to satisfy myself intellectually more 

than I had been about what the radiological conditions were in the 

Marshall Islands, I ended up almost regretting that I asked the 

question because it just was extremely byzantine and an inordinately complicated dilemma that they were in trying to assess. 

Every time they made an assessment, it was proved wrong and 

they got embarrassed, and every time they did it again. It was a 

very difficult and intractable problem. 

That is why, Mr. Chairman, the United States Government 

would never have paid $150 million in a settlement and put article 

9 in if it did not recognize that there was a problem of certitude 

about injuries to people as a result of radiological conditions in the 

Marshall Islands. Article 9 did not go in there as a throw-away. It 

went in there because there was a recognition that additional information could come out in the future. 

Now as to what information people had at that time and what 

they were withholding or not withholding, those were matters that 

weren't debated in the negotiations. The question was: How do we 

move the process forward? 

Mr. MILLER. They probably would have never put it in if they 

had known Hazel O'Le~ was going to be the Secretary of Energy. 

But thank God they didn t. 

Well, let me thank you. 

Mr. Weiman, let me thank you. I know how many years you have 

dedicated to this issue, and I think it is fair to say as the Chair 

of this committee that this hearing would not have taken place 

without your efforts and your countless hours on behalf of these 

victims, and we appreciate that. 

I am going to have to run over to the Floor to take care of an 

amendment on the education bill, and I hope to return right away. 

I would ask if Chairman de Lugo could take over the committee. 

Bob, it is your tum for questions. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you very much, and similarly, I would 

like to congratulate and thank Mr. Weiman for his --efforts on this 

particular issue and also the remaining members of the panel on 

their contributions to our understanding of this issue. 

Actually, my interest is a line of questioning which the chairman 

was pursuing with Mr. Hills. I think somewhere along the line 

what is trying to be expressed here is the sentiment for more than 

requesting an answer from Mr. Hills. 

In your testimony you seem to indicate kind of a justification for 

article 9, and you dealt with a series of perspectives about article 

9 and section 177 which I think are really not the issue here. The 

issue here is, no one is questioning whether it would unravel the 

compact or whether it is useful at this particular time. The real 

question is whether the U.S. Government side to the negotiation 

knowingly withheld information or knew something about the testing which would have either led to a great deal of embarrassment· at the time or would have threatened the negotiations from their 

point of view or would have, in fact, led to the arrangement of a 
251 

whole different series of compensation packages and issues pertain- ing to the testing. I think the question is not whether this is useful 

at this particular time. 

I wasn't here, of course, at the time that was dealt with, so I am 

not sure about the exact origin of article 9 and section 177, but I 

rather doubt that that was an initial position of the U.S. Government side. I would like to point out that our responsibility here in 

the committee is in a sense, to look into this issue, but also examine the U.S. Government side and whether they, in fact, were taking an appropriate position. 

You indicated that you have a client relationship now with some 

people from Rongelap, and I know in your testimony you referred 

to an exquisite dilemma. I don't know whether you are in this exquisite dilemma because you personally now seemingly are on the 

other side of the fence, so to speak, but at least for my understanding of the issue and in terms of your own participation in that process at the time, did people know more or did they suspect that 

there was more to it? Did they deliberately avoid finding out more 

about it, or did they ignore this information, or did they withhold 

this information in the process of negotiations? 

Mr. HILLS. Congressman, my response is that I can't think of 

anything more embarrassing to the United States than that which 

is known. In other words, it may be that there are documents, that 

there is information, that there are scientific findings or knowledge 

or data that are classified that would be very, very inflammatory 

or very provocative if it were revealed, but I know of nothing that 

I have ever seen. There may be. Jonathan Weisfall has done some 

great research out at Suitland Parkway, and have spent some 

time out at Suitland Parkway myself going through the old boxes 

of records and whatnot, and many times you find documents that 

shed light on who did what. 

I mean I think Mr. Weisgall's analysis that the high commissioner sitting up there, you know, writing that letter about whether 

or not people ought to be evacuated, is very interestinf and illuminating. But in terms of knowledge that people had, think for 

those of us who were on the negotiating team, that which was open and notoriously done in the Marshall Island was, whether you think of it as a shame or embarrassment or whether you feel that 

the United States failed to live up to its duties and responsibilities 

to the people, you know, what was done speaks for itself. As we approached the negotiations, we weren't given information about radiological conditions out there that we knew about and held secretly and didn't talk to the other side about. 

Basically, it was pretty much all out on the table that we had 

gone out there and detonated 66 nuclear devices in their islands. 

They were powerless; they had no legal rights; they had no legal 

standing; they had no remedies; they were not in a position to protect themselves or to seek protection from any legal or political institution. They were completely disempowered people who had been 

dislocated. Their islands had been contaminated and some of them 

had been returned when they shouldn't have been. I mean, the 

saga of the people and what the United States did in its most negative and unpleasant and brutal reality was a matter of public 

record. So we didn't, in conducting the negotiations-
252 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I have to disagree with you on that because I 

think the implication of almost all these testimonies is that something more was known, as if indeed what was already known was 

not already embarrassing enough. It would, I guess, be left to the 

imagination how much more embarrassing and how much perhaps 

more from the U.S. Government side their position would have had 

to shift had more information been released. 

So you have, in a sense, danced around the issue except to say 

that what you were dealing with was already public information. 

Was your side trying to find out more about what was going on? 

Was it actively looking for more information? There must have 

been people from Defense and Energy who were sitting on your 

team who had more information. You must have had some kind of 

discussions about this. 

Mr. HILLS. I think that the answer to that question is that our 

experience in that regard was probably fairly similar to anybody 

else's experience. 

We sat down and said, "What is the story here? How do we proceed?" The Department of Justice was responsible for preparing the 

legal cases. We were responsible for the negotiations. The Department of Energy was responsible for management of its information. 

The answer to your question-not to dance around it-is that no, 

I was not at any point given information about radiological conditions and told, don't tell anybody about this, or this is just for us 

to know, or let's keep this from the other side. 

In fact, I think that, when we went out to the Marshall Islands, 

it was a very painful experience going out to the Marshall Island 

and spending day after day after day negotiating with the Government and talking to the claimant groups. We were learning more, 

frankly, from Jonathan Weisgall than we were learning from the 

Department of Energy. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. That in itself is a major indictment of how you 

guys were proceeding with the process, is it not? 

Mr. HILLS. No. I think, Congressman, you have to look at how 

the U.S. Government operates, how the executive branch operates, 

and I think that is what you are doing. 

The answer is that the people in the Department of the Interior 

responsible for running programs to assist the people-compensation programs if you will-the people in the Department-these are 

the realities of the way the executive branch works-do not become 

experts in everything that the people in the Department of Energy 

are experts in. A lawyer working in the Micronesian Status Negotiations Office becomes an expert on the status negotiations, does 

not deal with the Department of Energy. Within the executive 

branch, there are arm's-length negotiations. 

Let me answer you this way, Congressman. Everybody likes to 

beat up on the Department of the Interior. It has become very popular these days. But the Department of the Interior during these 

negotiations, I think you have to understand, was avidly opposed 

to trying to settle these claims. Let me read you a letter that Undersecretary of the Interior Joseph wrote to the Micronesian Political Status Negotiator during the Carter Administration. It was the 

Carter Administration that put the section 177 in the compact. He 

said, "This Department remains opposed to an attempt by the 
253 

United States to negotiate a settlement on nuclear claims. In our 

view, this subject should be carved out from the negotiations." 

And then, referring to the repeated embarrassments to the U.S. 

when DOE assessments and predictions regarding contamination 

and health effects were proven wrong, the undersecretary went on 

to say that: 

Because of this dismal record of miscalculation on a subject that remains rife with 

uncertainty, we should not today assume that we can responsibly know now or predict for the future the fate of the damaged Marshallese, their offspring for generations to come, or their land. If that is so, then we believe that the United States 

should continue to remain responsible and should treat the damage problem on an ad hoc basis, obtaining legislation and appropriations to meet such needs when they 

arise. I recognize this is untidy, but so is the problem of nuclear damage. 

So, you know, there you have a situation where, within the interagency process, there was a debate going on. 

So you may say that every single official of any department in 

the executive branch is responsible for knowing what every other 

official of any other department in the executive branch knows, but 

that is not the way it works. There was a debate going on. The Department of the Interior opposed even trying to settle these claims. 

The Department of Energy, I can't speak for them. I don't know 

what they were thinking about at the time. Maybe they would prefer not to have settled. There were people in the Department of 

Justice who were arguing, "Let's take this to court; we can beat 

these cases in court; we are going to knock these cases out on jurisdictional grounds." So there were competing interests, and you 

have to have a more complicated understanding of how things transpired. 

There were people in the Department of Justice who told us-so 

you talk about what we as negotiators know-there were people in 

the Department of Justice who told us, "These cases will be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, let's go to court." There were 

other people who said if we did that and these cases were thrown 

out on jurisdictional grounds, that would be politically unaccept- able because then we would deny any recovery and any compensa- tion to the people. 

You know, I don't think I am dancing around your question. I 

think I am going right to the heart of your question. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. No. I understand the issue of division of labor 

and the responsibility for the negotiations, and I understand the 

issue of how complex some of this scientific data is, but I don't 

think any of us up here are scientists. I don't think it takes a great 

deal of scientific knowledge to know that something was amiss in 

the process, and we are not talking about having the scientific data 

to understand whether something was amiss or not. I think we are 

talking about having enough moral sense to do the right thing, and 

that is, I think, the crux of the issue. Certainly I think, knowing 

some of the Marshallese negotiators, they must have pointed out 

the inconsistencies along the process, and I think the response was 

not adequate. 

In any event, I just want to make a brief comment because I was 

struck by something. Dr. Simon, you went to great pains in presenting your data, and I know having some familiarity with people 

who present information and research, that you went to great 

pains to talk about factual information and presentation in an ob79-784 0-94-9 
254 

jective manner, and not wishing to sensationalize, you characterize 

your whole presentation in that manner. 

Just to elicit a brief comment from you, do you sense that there 

is some effort by others to sensationalize data? I mean that seems 

to be the flip side of your remarks. And why would they want to 

do that? I mean this is pretty sensational stuff. 

Dr. SIMON. That is a difficult question, Congressman. I am not 

sure I could comment on why someone else might want to sensationalize. 

I don't know that anyone sensationalized data. I wanted to emphasize that I was going to present data as opposed to emotional 

arguments, and there were many emotional arguments here. 

The Rongelap and other Marshallese people are very close 

friends of mine, and I feel very deeply for them for any damage 

that has been done to them. So there are emotional issues here, but 

it is not up to me to present that to this committee. There will be 

other presentations that, I guarantee you, will evoke emotion, and 

maybe that could be termed sensational. But I did want to present 

to you what level of objectivity is possible, and that was the source 

of my comment. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DE LUGO [presiding]. I think we may be having a vote. It 

may be in the Committee of the Whole. We may have to recess in 

a few minutes. 

Well, Mr. Hills, in your written testimony you state you were 

legal counsel and the Department of Defense advisor to the National Security Council. At that time you were a naval officer. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. HILLS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DE LUGO. You were a naval officer. What level of security 

clearance did you have at that time? 

Mr. HILLS. I had a top secret clearance at the time. 

Mr. DE LUGO. You had top secret clearance, so you had access to 

classified information. 

Mr. HILLS. Yes, I did. 

Mr. DE LUGO. You made reference to article 9 many, many times 

today. You didn't make any reference to article 8. I am going to 

read you article 8 from the compact. 

Section 177 agreement, Article 8. Northern Marshall Islands radiological survey. 

The Government of the United States has concluded that the northern Marshall Islands radiological survey and related environmental studies conducted by the Government of the United States represent the best effort of that Government accu- rately to evaluate and describe radiological conditions in the Marshall Islands. 

What is your reaction to that statement? 

Mr. HILLS. I think it represents the expression by the U.S. Government of the understanding of the state of affairs that existed at 

the time by the people who were responsible for negotiating the 

177 agreement. 

Mr. DE LUGO. When the negotiations for the 177 agreement were 

going on, were the Marshall Island negotiators told time and time 

again that there had been no fallout in the four atolls? Were they 

assured time and time again by the American negotiating team 

that there had been no fallout beyond the four atolls? 
255 

When President Kabua asked whether there was any information 

and whether there had been any fallout beyond those four atolls, 

what was the answer of the American negotiating team? 

Mr. HILLS. I never participated in a discussion between President Kabua and--

Mr. DE LUGO. You were not part of the negotiating team? 

Mr. HILLS. Well, now, Congressman--

Mr. DE LUGO. You have no idea what was discussed in these negotiations? 

Mr. HILLS. I think that there was a lot of discussion about what 

measures were going to be taken to deal with the effects of the 

testing. program in the Marshall Islands, and one of the questions 

was, Were you going to continue the four-atoll health care program 

that was created by statute? You know, did the four-atoll health 

care program define the scope and the extent of the problem? 

Mr. DE LUGO. The point is that this committee is to believe that 

a naval officer with the highest security clearance had no knowledge that there were questions of additional fallout beyond the four 

atolls? 

Mr. HILLS. No, no. Congressman, please, you know, I want to be 

responsive, but the fact of the matter is that that is not how the 

issues were framed. 

We were very well aware of the fact that the Marshallese position was that they have never gotten the truth about the scope of 

the problem, and please, you know, I am here as a friendly witness. 

I understand your concern. 

Mr. DE LUGO. You know, every time there has been a question 

asked of you, you have had all day to answer it. Now I am asking 

you some specific questions. 

Mr. HILLS. Yes, I know. What I am telling you is, the answer is 

yes to your question. The answer is yes, that we were well aware 

of the fact that it was the Marshall Islands Government's position 

in the negotiations-and these don't come down to discussions between people sitting in a room. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Hills, you know, this committee has some 

knowledge of how these things are worked out. We have some 

knowledge of how the Administration works. I have served in the 

House for 20 years, so I have some knowledge of these things. So 

I don't need to be lectured, nor does this committee need to be lectured, on how the Federal Government works. What we want to 

find out is how the Federal Government worked in this instance. 

Mr. HILLS. Okay, and the answer is this. The Government of the 

Marshall Islands took the position that they did not know all of the 

truth about what had happened in their island. We as negotiators 

at that point said we are not ourselves satisfied that we are not 

going to find ourselves in a situation where 5 years from now, 10 

years from now, 15 years from now, it turns out that a lot of 

information--

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Hills, let me read to you again from article 8 

since you say that you yourself had questions. What is said in article 8 is that this represents the best effort of the Government of 

the United States and that the Government accurately evaluates 

and describes the radiological conditions in the Marshall Islands. 

Is that truthful? 
256 

Mr. HILLS. I think that the way you develop a document like that 

is, you have an agency of the Government, and it is going to be the 

same thing that is going to happen right now--

Mr. DE LUGO. I understand how we develop these things, and I 

understand that there was a court case going on. What I asked 

was, Is this a truthful statement-not whether it was going to jeopardize your court case or anything else-but was this a truthful 

statement? 

Mr. HILLS. You mean article 8? 

Mr. DE LUGO. Article 8. It comes just before article 9 that you 

have been ref erring to. 

Mr. HILLS. Yes. Well I think that the answer is that article 9 is 

in there as, in essence, an admission on the part of the United 

States Government that if the situation arises where the assertion 

or the certification made in article 8 turns out to have been inadequate, then that is when article 9 kicks in. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Well, let me put it another way, Howard. I'll take 

the same statement you have made, and I will phrase it a little differently. Article 9 is in there just in case we find out that article 

8 is not truthful and that there is a problem. 

Mr. HILLS. I accept that characterization, and I am not here to 

defend what any particular person at the Department of Energy 

was saying at any particular time. What I am saying is this. Article 9 is something that is important and good and valuable. Article 

8 represents what the position of the United States Government 

was at the time the agreement was signed but that included--

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Hills, Mr. Hills, we agree that article 9 is a 

good provision. Thank God it is in there. 

Dr. Radford cited a study that was done. 

Dr. Radford, what study was that you cited that you felt was a 

changed circumstance clause? 

Dr. RADFORD. The report of the BEIR III committee came out in 

1980, so that as of the time of the negotiations which I believe 

started in 1983, that was the prevailing wisdom on the risk of cancer induction by radiation. What has occurred since then of course 

is, in the first place, the Japanese A-bomb survivor study has gone 

on further and has become improved by better dosimetry and so on. 

But, more important, another committee of the National Academy 

of Sciences, now known as BEIR V, issued its report in 1990. 

Now BEIR Vindicated that the risks of cancer induction by radiation were indeed substantially higher than the BEIR III report 

had said and relatively close to what I had said in BEIR III. So 

that the current view-indeed even more so since 1990-the current view is that the radiation risks are substantially higher than 

was known in 1983 or at least believed in 1983 and on which these 

negotiations were made. 

Mr. DE LUGO. All right. We are up against time here because 

there is a vote on the Floor and we have got to go over and vote. 

And then we had Dr. Hamilton's study that was brought to the 

attention of the committee, and the committee sent back to the Interior Department for its comment very troubling findings that 

were provided to the committee by Dr. Hamilton. 

The Interior Department said that it could not comment because 

there was a lawsuit. All of this brings us to article 9 in that provi-
257 

sion, article 9 which is the changed circumstances clause. But at 

the time that section 177 in the compact was presented to the Congress, it was presented to the Congress as a full and final settlement thereof. 

Isn't that correct, Mr. Hills? 

Mr. HILLS. It is a full and final settlement of legal claims, and 

I think that--

Mr. DE LUGO. Let me interrupt you right there. In the compact, 

the Government of the Marshall Islands espoused its claims; isn't 

that correct? 

Mr. HILLS. The Government, under article 10-

Mr. DE LUGO. The claims of its citizens. So they espoused the 

claims of their citizens under article 10? 

Mr. HILLS. Yes, the legal claims. 

Mr. DE LUGO. All right. So as a result of that, as a result of that, 

the claims of the citizens, the court threw the case out and said 

they had been espoused by the Government of the Marshall Islands; is that correct? 

Mr. HILLS. Yes. They had been settled under the agreement that 

was approved by the U.S. Government and the Government of the 

Marshall Islands. 

Mr. DE LUGO. All right. Would you agree that there appear to be 

very changed circumstances here, that it would seem to be that article 9 should certainly be looked at very carefully? 

Mr. HILLS. Mr. Chairman, I know you have got to go. I just want 

to take one minute to answer that. Article 8, article 9, and article 

10 go together; they work together. It actually is a good arrangement if you look at it because at this point the Cold War is over. 

We have got a Secretary of the Interior who wants to release information. 

We are now going to be free to know of the contents of litigation 

where people are denying things and trying to defeat each other 

through litigation tactics-not through leveraging everything into 

the negotiations on the political status, but just looking at it based 

on the information we are going to get now. Because of the work 

that these people are doing and because of the information that is 

going to come out, we are going to be able to look at it not from 

the standpoint of the legal liability, but of moral responsibility. 

And that is where we are, and we are here because of the work 

you did and because of the work that this committee did and it is 

because of what the Marshall Islands Government did. 

So there is a lot of good news here. The Marshall Islands Government did a good job of preserving this ability, working with you so 

that you could address it with a question of moral responsibility, 

not legal liability, and my hat is off to you because I think it is a 

good provision. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you very much. We are going to have to recess for--

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I have purposely skipped my 

vote because I do want to ask some questions. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Well, let me have you take over the Chair, will 

you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is fine. Thank you. 

Mr. DE LUGO. I have got to go vote. 
258 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA [presiding]. Mr. Hills, you had indicated earlier that we are being somewhat unfair to the Department of the 

Interior, that we are beating them on the head. 

Mr. HILLS. They deserve it sometimes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I think that is an unfair characterization of 

certainly some of us here on the committee. I think in fairness to 

the Department of the Interior, my understanding, at least my 

recollection was the fact you may have been housed physically in 

the Department of the Interior, but the negotiations were done exclusively under the auspices of the White House. 

Am I correct on that? 

Mr. HILLS. The Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations was 

an interagency office that was instituted or established under the 

National Security Council system, which is obviously a White 

House organization. The President's personal representative for Micronesian status negotiations was somebody who was an ambassador-rank appointee, who was technically in the executive office of 

the President, so the answer to your question is, yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In your capacity, I think you have answered 

earlier that you were at that time an officer in the Navy. 

Mr. HILLS. Yes. I had been a Peace Corps volunteer and served 

in Micronesia as a Peace Corps volunteer. After I left the Peace 

Corps and completed my Peace Corps service, I then became a 

naval officer and through the /'rocess of personnel assignment by the Department of the Navy, ended up working on these issues 

as well. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You were a member of the negotiation team 

in that capacity. What exactly were your duties and responsibil- ities? 

Mr. HILLS. Well, they were to help finalize negotiations on the 

Compact of Free Association that had been initialed by Ambassador Rosenblatt on behalf of the Carter Administration. 

In 1980, the Carter Administration signed the compact with the 

three Governments that were emerging from the trust territory, 

but they didn't finalize the negotiations and there were a lot of separate agreements to be negotiated. The section 177 agreement was 

one of those agreements, so I guess--

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You were directly involved in the section 

177 negotiations? 

Mr. HILLS. What is that? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You were directly involved in the section 

177 negotiations? 

Mr. HILLS. I was a junior staff lawyer in the process. I am not 

trying to disclaim anything. I am just saying that I wasn't, you 

know, driving the process, but my job was to help finalize the 

terms of the compact and the various separate agreements negotiated pursuant to it. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You were a member of the negotiating team 

during the entire Carter Administration? 

Mr. HILLS. No, no, no. I came in in 1982, after the Reagan Administration had conducted a policy review on the compact and decided to go forward with it. You may remember at that time the 

Reagan Administration came in and they did a policy review on everything that the Carter Administration had done, and for exam-
259 

pie, they decided not to sign the law-of-the-sea agreement and they 

decided not to do a number of things, but in the case of the compact that is one of the things that they decided to move forward 

with. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You feel that the provisions that were discussed by Chairman de Lugo will definitely have a bearing on future hearings and issues affecting the republic of the Marshallese 

and I want to make that a question. 

What will be the year that we will initiate renegotiations after 

the 15-year period? 

Mr. HILLS. The compact calls to begin a dialogue in the thirteenth year, which I think would be 1999, on the overall political 

status relationship. With respect to the section 177 agreement, article 9, really the Government of the Marshall Islands is empowered by that provision. They could initiate discussions under that 

at any time. 

It would really be a matter of that Government determining that 

sufficient new information had been discovered that would provide 

the basis for a request--

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So under the current provisions of the compact, the Marshallese Government can reinitiate another round of 

discussions based on any new findings concerning this very issue? 

Mr. HILLS. The procedure that is prescribed in article 9 is for the 

Government of the Marshall Islands to make a request to the 

CongressMr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I understand, but they can make the request? 

Mr. HILLS. Yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Hamilton, you raised a question about 

the fact that you did examine over 7,000 Marshallese as part of 

your study and that the Department of Energy has somewhat questioned the fact that you are the only one conducting the study. 

Do you care to comment about the Department of Energy reaction in your response questioning the integrity of your findings? 

Dr. HAMILTON. It is a reasonable concern in any scientific investigation, particularly the evaluation of thyroid disease, whether one 

or more individuals are doing the physical examinations. 

And that was something that I acknowledged and realized early 

on, which was the basis for an in-depth validation study that was 

part of that whole effort and was published in the 1987 article 

which showed that there was excellent agreement between myself 

and the thyroid specialists from the University of Washington, so 

that issue in my mind has been dealt with completely. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How many other thyroid studies have been 

done? How many other studies have been done besides yours? Have 

there been several Gther studies conducted on this? 

Dr. HAMILTON. In the Marshall Islands? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes. 

Dr. HAMILTON. Of course, the major studies are from Brookhaven 

National Laboratory. I don't believe there was any other major 

study before the current one that has been done out there in the 

Marshall Islands other than mine. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Okay. Mr. Weiman, I also would like to echo 

my sentiments in expressing my appreciation for your patience and 
260 

your efforts in bringing this issue now to the forefront. I want to 

ask you now that we are where we are, and you probably know 

more than anyone to my knowledge, understanding the whole sad 

legacy of what has happened with the residents of Rongelap specifically to the situation that we are discussing. 

Where do we go from here in your opinion? What should we do? 

The committee and the Congress, the Federal Government, what 

should be our responsibility now that more and more information 

is going to be bearing on this kind of thing? And it seems to me 

that the only reason that there is . . . national attention is because 

many Americans were affected unknowingly. 

We have been talking about this for the last 15 years-about the 

Marshallese having been affected by nuclear testing all this time. 

What should our responsibility be now that this is coming to the 

forefront? 

Mr. WEIMAN. Thank you. The discussion in the last hour has 

been fascinating, and science and politics have sort of crisscrossed 

one another. This committee has accomplished something this 

morning that is extraordinary. 

It is not what do we do about article 9. The first thing we have 

to do is recognize that article 8, the statement that, "we have told 

you everything," is in fact wrong. And they knew it was wrong. 

They had to have known it was wrong. Dr. Simon has gone out and 

looked.at some of the film badges and some of the other things that 

were available. 

You have file material that shows where Kwajalein was hit, 

Majuro was hit. Dr. Radford brought up some of these things. 

Well, if people 40 years later can find these things, people with 

top security clearances at the time can find the same things. There 

was a decision-I don't know who made it-not to allow this information to come out. 

What is significant about Kwajalein is, Kwajalein is expressly 

considered outside the zone considered to have received fallout. 

That attacks the very premise that is in the compact. 

What we also know is almost every aspect of this program has 

doubts, whether you start with the planning for the BRA VO tests 

and some of the other tests, you know, the weather reports, the 

bomb itself, how it was detonated, who was told, how the evacuation was done. · Professor Eisenbud pointed somethir.g out, and he educated me 

three years ago to a very simple question. There has never been 

an inquiry, not just into BRAVO, but into the totality of the program. 

You get into Brookhaven. Dr. Simon said something that is powerfully important this morning, and I think we rushed by it. He 

talked about an audience, the audience being the Marshallese people. I don't know how many studies Brookhaven has published over 

the year. If you stack them all up, they would probably be measured in feet. It is a huge pile. In 40 years, there is not a single 

Brookhaven report published in Marshallese, not one. 

Now, Mr. Miller, when you go home to Martinez and go to your 

family doctor, your doctor doesn't race out and publish a study 

about the findings about you and the Miller family. But that is 

what happened at Brookhaven. 
261 

And yet, if our audience is in fact the victims' community, why 

is it that to the best of my knowledge in the 40-year program there 

are four bilingual reports that were produced and they happen to 

deal with the environmental problems and radiological characterizations, not one on the medical. 

That brings me to, what should we do. Mr. Chairman, in this 

very room in 1977, you put together some legislation looking at another issue, but one that had an equal number of complexities, the 

San Luis unit, the Westlands Water District. I spent a lot of time 

looking through those files, too. But one of the things that came up 

was, as much as we knew, there is so much we don't know. 

Mr. Chairman, I guess my one recommendation to you is not to 

squeeze this issue into the Executive order. The Department of Energy is overwhelmed with their existing plan that has already been 

put together. I think a formal review, whether it is negotiated with 

the Secretary or something that this committee legislates, that is 

for you and the members of this committee and the leadership of 

the administration to resolve. 

But I think that formal review needs to take place. I think there 

is so much we don't know. If there is a class of people in the Marshall Islands who have not been told that they have been irradiated, albeit at lower levels than those who have received acute 

doses, there is an attention distortion. We have distorted attention 

towards the acute doses. Three days of doses have gotten 99 percent of the attention in this debate for 40 years. 

What we are now learning, and the significance of the fact is that 

the cloud may have gone further on one or more tests. If that is 

true, and in fact people are getting radiation-related cancers and 

health-related problems from that at the lower levels, then the implications for what is happening today and the information that is 

coming out, then A, it goes to the Marshall Islands people; and B, 

it goes to everybody else, because this is not restricted to the Marshalls. We need to know the answers to that. Those are profound questions. 

And I think that, Mr. Chairman, maybe the San Luis task force 

legislation can be dusted off, looked at in a different light, do a little cut and paste, substitute some-instead of the delta and excess 

lands, we can talk about radiation and cloud formations and some 

other things and put together the same kind of prestigious, independent panel. Do it in cooperation with the Marshall Islands Government, and do all of the things that protocol requires. You have 

asked how do you do it. It has got to be in an organized way. Most 

importantly, it has got to be an inclusive way. Almost every study 

that has taken place up to now has had some form of exclusion to 

it. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Weiman. I am afraid my 

time is running out. I just have one quick question for my friend 

Professor Eisenbud. 

I understand there were about 7,000 military involved in the 

whole Sandstone operation. How were our fellow Americans treated 

during the time when these tests took place? Were there elaborate 

records kept of these American soldiers and sailors who were involved? Do we have that? 

Mr. MILLER [presiding]. Dr. Radford or Professor Eisenbud? 
262 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Radford and Professor Eisenbud. 

Dr. RADFORD. With regard to Sandstone, no accurate records 

were kept. The basis of the SAIC report were two unpublished documents that had been prepared by RadSafe people at the time of 

the Sandstone tests. · Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Those are probably shredded by now. 

Dr. RADFORD. For all I know they don't exist any more, and one 

memorandum which really added very little. And all those were 

unpublished, so there is no real record, certainly no record that 

anyone could review. And, of course, it was very incomplete at that 

time. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. One real quick question to Dr. Simon. I am 

sorry, Professor Eisenbud. 

Protessor EISENBUD. Would it be improper to add something? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes. You were there at the flagship, Dr. 

Eisenbud. I think according to the record, there were 7,000 military 

people involved. 

Professor EISENBUD. I think what the tests themselves show in 

round numbers--! wasn't on Sandstone, but in the subsequent 

test-it was around 10,000. Altogether there were about 220,000 

military personnel involved in tests in some way or the other. 

And several years ago, I think it must be five or six years ago, 

the DNA, Defense Nuclear Agency, completed a dose reconstruction 

project. Now, some of the personnel, not all of them, but many of 

them did have film badges. Others worked in groups where maybe 

one had a film badge and the others didn't. And in various ways 

they reconstructed the doses. 

And I chaired a National Academy of Sciences Committee that 

was asked to look at the methods used by DNA in that dose reconstruction, and our report is available. We concluded that the methods were quite sufficient, quite adequate. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Just one more question, Dr. Simon. I am 

sorry, Mr. Chairman, just very quickly. I am somewhat puzzled by 

your referring constantly to let's not sensationalize the issue. I am 

not one to sensationalize, but I think you and I can really appreciate the fact that we have been to these islands, we met some of 

these people. I don't know how you can think otherwise, not only 

expressing a sense of outrage and emotion on my part, it almost 

seems to speak-my friend, Henry Kissinger, says of Micronesia, 

"There are only 90,000 people on there. Who gives a damn?" This 

is the kind of thing that kind of bums inside me and to think that 

perhaps we should have some sense of emotion involved here so we 

can be more committed to really getting to the bottom line and get 

some solutions to this very problem we are discussing. 

The bottom line I want to ask you, Dr. Simon, does your study 

bear out the fact that the thyroid studies you have done are quite 

prevalent in the Marshalls as it is contrasted to other areas of the 

Pacific? 

Dr. SIMON. I was going to comment on your first comments, but 

let me answer your question because it is a very difficult question. 

In most of the Pacific nations, there are not long-standing health 

records to establish the--
263 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So, in other words, your study is very difficult to put together because you weren't there in 1954, so 

obviously--

Dr. SIMON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA [continuing). 25, 30 years later there is not 

much left to study on. 

Dr. SIMON. Well, there is plenty to study, but it is very difficult 

to know what are the causes of the disease that you are fmding. 

It can be argued that it is natural disease in that population anyway. And that is why it is very important to have available some 

other measure and that measure will be the radiological measurements. If those two things correlate together, then you have a very 

powerful argument that it doesn't matter what the baseline disease 

is. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Simon. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Thank you very much to the entire 

panel. Again, I would make the same request that we have the opportunity to continue to work with you as we continue to work our 

way through this issue. Thank you very much for your time and 

all of your effort. The next panel, representing the Republic of the Marshall Islands will be made up of Mr. Wilfred I. Kendall, who is the Republic of the Marshall Islands Ambassador to the United States, and 

those individuals accompanying him: Peter Oliver, William C. Graham, Johnsay Riklon, Billiet Edmond, Henchi Balas, Tomaki Juda, 

Hiroshi Yamamura, Ismael John, and Toko Henry. 

If there are not enough seats at the table, some of the witnesses 

can certainly come around and sit at the committee dais here. 

Ambassador Kendall, welcome to the committee. Do we have 

your entire panel here yet? 

Ambassador KENDALL. I believe so, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Welcome. Any introductions you would like to make, 

certainly feel free to do so. We look forward to your testimony. 
264 

PANEL CONSISTING OF HIS EXCELLENCY WILFRED I. KENDALL, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY PETER 

N. OLIVER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR COMPACT IMPLEMENTATION; WILLIAM C. GRAHAM, PUBLIC ADVOCATE, NUCLEAR 

CLAIMS TRIBUNAL; HON. JOHNSAY RIKLON, SENATOR FROM 

RONGELAP TO THE NITIJELA OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS; 

HON. HENCW BALOS, SENATOR FROM BIKINI TO THE 

NITIJELA OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS; HON. HIROSW V. 

YAMAMURA, SENATOR FROM UTIRIK TO THE NITIJELA OF 

THE MARSHALL ISLANDS; HON. ISHMAEL JOHN, SENATOR 

FROM ENEWETAK, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. AND MRS. 

NEPTALI PETER, MAYOR OF THE ENEWETAK, UJELANG 

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL, JOHNSON HERNEST, COUNCIL MEMBER, AND DAVOR PEVEC, ESQ., LEGAL COUNSEL; 

AND HARRY J. PE'ITENGILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN E. RUDOLPH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

TRANSPORTATION, SAFEGUARDS AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

STATEMENT OF ms EXCELLENCY WILFRED I. KENDALL 

Ambassador KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to 

take one minute of your time to express my Government's condolences to the professional staff of yours for the loss of Pat Krause. 

We want the record to reflect our sincere appreciation for the help 

she has given us. We surely will miss her. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. That is very kind of you and we all 

grieve Pat's loss and recognize her contribution not only to this 

issue, but to the overall policy of this committee with respect to the 

Pacific territories. Thank you very much for those remarks, Mr. 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members 

of the subcommittee. On behalf of the government and people of 

the Marshall Islands, I would like to express our gratitude to you 

for investigating the effects of the United States nuclear testing 

program that was conducted in our country for a 12-year period 

during the height of the Cold War. 

I know that you, Mr. Chairman, and many members of the Committee on Natural Resources have long been concerned about the 

harm that was caused to the Marshallese people. We very deeply 

appreciate your concern, and we thank you for holding the hearing 

today and inviting our participation. We strongly urge this committee to continue regulating the disturbing questions that have been 

raised in testimony today and we will encourage the subcommittee 

to reconvene in the months ahead to consider the response of the 

Department of Energy to these questions. The legacy of the nuclear testing program is a central feature of 

the relationship between the United States and the Marshall Islands. The two nations are alike in the Compact of Free Association, which came into effect in October 1986. Section 177 of this 

compact and the related subsidiary agreements established a mechanism for compensating the people of the Marshall Islands who 
265 

suffer physical injury or loss of property from the nuclear testing 

program. 

The compensatory programs administered by my Government included payments to the communities affected, tribunal adjudicated 

disputes and makes awards to claimants, continuation of the 

health care program originally established by U.S. law and a Nationwide Radiological Study, as Steven Simon discussed in his testimony. The Marshall Islands Government also administers supplemental health and food programs for the nuclear victims and assisted people in administering the Rongelap Resettlement Project. 

Mr. Chairman, the many nuclear programs administered by the 

Marshall Islands Government are further described in a July 8, 

1993, letter to you from my Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I request that this letter be included in the record of this hearing. 

I would like to provide for the record a report on implementation 

of the section 177 agreement during fiscal year 1993. Finally, I ask 

to be included in the record of this hearing a recent letter from my 

Government to the Department of Energy requesting additional information about the nuclear testing program. 

[The information follows:] 
266 

• 

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPU ULIC (.)F f HE MAll) H.I\. LL ISL .I\.!':! 1,;, 

MA_IUP1.) . ~1AR SH:\l L ISL.~ N I)', 'N,•~,, 

Congressman George Miller 

Chairman 

July 8, 1993 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Longworth House Office Building, Room 1324 

United states House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Congressman Miller: 

The Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands in 

Washington, D.C., has provided me with a copy of the May 10 news release from the Committee on Natural Resources announcing that 

it would be investigating the effects of American nuclear tests on the people of the Marshall Islands and other indigenous 

peoples. The Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands 

(RMI) welcomes such a review by the United States congress of the 

harm that was caused to citizens of our country and the 

environment of our islands by the sixty-six nuclear detonations 

conducted by the U.S. Government in our nation between 1946 and 

1958. If the Committee on Natural Resources intends a comprehensive review of the aftereffects of th~ U.S. Nuclear 

Testing Program in the Marshall Islands, I request that the RMI 

Government be invited to contribute to the review process. 

I believe the Committee will find it especially helpful to 

consult with officials of the RMI Government who work with these 

matters. In accordance with certain provisions of the Compact of 

Free Association (U.S. Public Law 99-239), the RMI Government is now directly involved in evaluating the personal injury and 

environmental degradation caused by the nuclear tests and in 

administering compensatory services to people who were either 

forcibly removed from their ancestral homes at Bikini and 

Enewetak Atolls, which became nuclear test sites, or injured by 

radioactive fallout. Many of these services are undertaken i n fulfillment of the subsidiary Agreement Between the Government of 

the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands for 

the Implementation of Section 177 of the compact of Free 

Association ("the Section 177 Agreement"). Provision for 

additional services to the nuclear victims is made in other 

sections of the Compact legislation. Certain of these programs are admi nistered by U.S. federal agencies, principally the U.S. 

Department of Energy. A succinct summary of these compensatory 

programs is set forth in the September 1992 report of the U.S. 

General Accounting Office on "Marshall Islands: Status of the 

tclq,hone: 3181 telex: fYJ27 FRN AFS fax: 692 3~5 k 69:!: J64q 
267 

Congressman George Miller 

July 8, 1993 

Page 2 

Nuclear Claims Trust FUnd" (GAO/NSIAD-92-229), which was prepared 

at your request. 

In accordance with the Compact legislation, the RMI 

Government is responsible for administering the following 

programs and services: 

• investment and administration of the RMI Nuclear Claims 

FUnd, capitalized at $150 million by the U.S. Government 

in 1986, which generates the income disbursed quarterly 

to the four Marshallese communities most severely harmed 

by the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program and expended on other compensatory programs as specified in the Section 

177 Agreement; 

* operation of a Nuclear Claims Tribunal having 

jurisdiction to render final determination upon claims 

of the Government and citizens of the Marshall Islands 

related to the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program and disputes 

arising from the distributions of the proceeds of the 

Nuclear Claims Fund; 

* the scientific work of the Nationwide Radiological 

Study, which is nearing completion of a characterization 

of radiological conditions throughout the Marshall 

Islands; 

* the scientific studies of the Rongelap Resettlement 

Project, which will help determine the habitability of 

Rongelap Atoll and assist the people of Rongelap in 

decisions about rehabilitation and resettlement of their 

traditional homeland; 

* the Section 177 Health Care Program, which, as a successor to the Four Atoll Health Care Program established by the U.S. Department of the Interior, 

provides special medical services to RMI citizens who are shown to have been affected by the consequences of 

the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program; 

* administration of a USDA Special Food Assistance Program 

for the four communities most directly affected by the 

nuclear tests; and 

* administrative support to the Enewetak Agricultural and 

Food Program, which is now operated directly by the 

Enewetak Local Government Council. 
268 

congressman George Miller 

July a, 1993 

Page 3 

To bring the co-ittee up-to-date on the progress of the RMI 

Government in implementing these programs, I am pleased to send 

you two recent reports: first, the Fiscal Year 1992 Report to 

the Nitijela of the Republic of the Marshall Islands by the 

Nuclear Claims Tribunal and, second, the narration pertaining to 

implementation of the Section 177 Agreement from the 1992 Annual 

Report of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, which earlier 

this year was presented to the President of the United states and 

the United states Congress in accordance with the report requirements of Title I, Section 103(e)(5), and Title II, Section 

2ll(c), of the Compact of Free Association. 

The RMI Government would be prepared to assist the Committee on Natural Resources in reviewing the adequacy of the framework 

established by the Compact of Free Association for resolving the 

legacy of the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program. As requested by the 

staff of the Committee, I would like to draw the attention of the 

Committee to several specific concerns that have come to light 

through the work of my government. 

* It has become increasingly apparent that the Section 177 

Agreement did not provide sufficient funding to 

compensate citizens of the Marshall Islands afflicted 

with radiogenic medical conditions and Marshallese 

communities that were denied access to their land or had 

land contaminated by fallout. (A discussion of this 

situation is set forth on pages 43-45 of the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal report.) 

* In the Marshall Islands and elsewhere in the world, the most widespread medical effect of exposure to 

radioactive fallout has been development of thyroid 

nodules, including cancerous nodules. Regrettably, the u.s. Government did not conduct thyroid examinations of 

the Marshallese people aside from the residents of 

Rongelap and Utrik Atolls where the fallout from the 

March 1954 Bravo test was heaviest. A recent medical 

survey by the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study of the 

thyroid glands of the residents of Ebeye Island who were alive at the time of the nuclear tests may provide additional evidence regarding the extent of the medical 

harm caused to the Marshallese people. These findings 

will be shared with the committee when they become 

available within the next few months. It is the 

intention of the RMI Government to expand the program of 

thyroid examinations so that every Marshallese person 

who may have been exposed to radiation from the nuclear 

tests will have access to a thyroid examination. 
269 

Congressman George Miller 

July 8, 1993 

Page 4 

* In conjunction with the thyroid examinations, the RMI 

Government has sought financial assistance from the U.S. 

Government to determine the presence a rare isotope of 

the element iodine in the environment. In this study, 

samples of soil that have been gathered by the RMI 

Nationwide Radiological study at all of the inhabited 

atolls and islands of the nation will be subjected to a complex chemical analysis to determine the quantities of 

129-iodine that remain in the environment. The U.S. 

Department of Energy has long acknowledged that the high 

incidence of thyroid nodules and thyroid cancers in the 

communities of Rongelap and Utrik could be attributed to 

their exposure to radioactive iodines contained in the 

fallout of the 1954 Bravo test. However, it has not 

been established that radioactive iodine in the fallout was a factor in the development of thyroid disease at 

other locations in the nation. The proposed measurement 

of 129-iodine will help resolve this question. While 

the Nationwide Radiological Study will provide detailed 

information about residual levels of radiation in the 

Marshall Islands environment and, by extrapolation, the 

quantities of fallout that were deposited in the past, it has recently been postulated by scientists that the 

dispersion of radioiodines in nuclear fallout may not 

have coincided with the distribution of other 

radioactive elements. In the proposed project, the 

Nationwide Radiological study will determine whether the 

deposition of radioiodines corresponded to that of other 

radionuclides, thereby gaining a better understanding as to whether past exposures are related to present-day 

thyroid disease. 

* From the extensive environmental monitoring that has 

been conducted by the Nationwide Radiological Study, it 

is shown that certain areas in the northern region of 

the Marshall Islands remain severely contaminated from 

the American nuclear tests. The three locations most 

severely contaminated are the test sites at Bikini and 

Enewetak Atolls and certain portions of Rongelap Atoll 

that were contaminated by the fallout of the 1954 Bravo 

blast. steps have been taken to rehabilitate all three 

locations: In accordance with the Compact legislation, the U.S. Government has provided funding for the cleanup of Bikini Atoll and the Bikini community is currently planning and implementing this project; the Rongelap 

Resettlement Project, also provided for in the Compact legislation, is well underway; and in 1977-1980 the 

Defense Nuclear Agency conducted a cleanup of sorts at 

Enewetak Atoll that allowed the exiled community to 

return to certain portions of the atoll. It is not 
270 

Congressman George Miller 

July 8, 1993 

Page 5 

apparent that the environment at any of these locations can be decontaminated to U.S. standards. Even after the 

extensive cleanup at Enewetak Atoll, 731 of the land mass is still too heavily contaminated to be used for 

the production of food crops. 

* Runit Island in Enewetak Atoll is the disposal site for 

plutonium-contaminated soil collected from throughout 

the atoll. This radioactive material was plowed into a crater left by a nuclear explosion, mixed in a cement 

slurry, and covered with a concrete dome. The disposal 

of radioactive waste in this manner would not be 

permitted in the United States. Furthermore, the 

Defense Nuclear Agency did not complete the cleanup of 

Runit Island, leaving chunks of deadly plutonium metal 

in the surface soil of the island instead of plowing the 

contaminated soil into the crater. Despite this hazard, 

the island is readily accessible to the residents of 

Enewetak. There are no fences to keep them away, the 

few warning signs have faded or toppled over, and, since 

the island has become a nesting place for birds~ there 

is evidence that birds and eggs are being harvested from 

this dangerously contaminated site. In addition, we are greatly concerned by a recent (unconfirmed) report that 

the Defense Nuclear Agency has decided to discontinue 

its annual safety inspections of the Runit disposal 

site. 

* There are shortcomings to the USDA Special Food 

Assistance Program for the nuclear victims. These have 

to do with (1)the considerable length of time it takes 

for the commodity foods to be shipped from America to 

Majuro and then transshipped to the beneficiary 

communities and (2)the short-term authorization of the 

program (the current authorization extends only through 

Fiscal Year 1996), which requires a specific 

congressional appropriation each year and results in an interruption in the provision of commodity foods at the 

beginning of each program year. The Committee is 

encouraged to explore with USDA practical improvements 

that could be brought to the program. 

These are the present concerns of the RMI Government 

regarding the legacy of the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program in the 

Marshall Islands. In addition to the practical experience that our governments have gained in working to resolve this legacy, 

the officials of the U.S. Government and the RMI Government who 

framed the Section 177 Agreement prudently recognized that the 

full effect of the nuclear tests might not become apparent until 
Congressman George Miller 

July 8, 1993 

Page 6 

271 

after the Agreement had come into effect. For this reason, 

Article IX of the Sectton 177 Agreement makes provision for 

changed circumstances that would "render the provisions of this 

Agreement manifestly inadequate". Among the concerns that I 

sought to highlight in this letter are changed circumstances 

which I believe should be of concern to both of our governments. 

I hope that information set forth in this letter and the 

enclosures will be of assistance to the committee in its 

deliberations. The RMI Gouern:ment would be pleased to work with 

the Committee in devising ways to improve services to the nuclear 

victims and ensure that they receive a full measure of justice. 
272 

• 

• 

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPU BLIC OF T HE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

MAJURO. MARSHALL ISLANDS'"'""' . 

February 14, 1994 

Dr. Harry J. Pettengill 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health 

United States Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585 

Dear Dr. Pettengill: 

I regret that I was unable to meet with you and other 

officials of the Department of Energy in Hawaii in December. In 

my absence, I was ably represented by Chief Secretary Phillip 

Kabua. I am told that the discussions were very productive for 

the many participants from the u.s. Government and the Marshall 

Islands. I was especially pleased that you were able to release 

to officials of the RMI Government information on the yields of 

nuclear tests conducted in the Marshall Islands that previously 

had been classified. 

The declassification of Marshall Islands test yields 

coincided with a broader declassification by the Department of 

Energy of information about medical tests that the Atomic Energy Commissi on conducted on human subjects in the United States. 

These revelations are of grave concern to the leadership and 

general public of the Marshall Islands. To address some of the 

issues that have been raised in recent weeks, I request your assistance in providing the RMI Government with additional 

information about the tests in the Marshall Islands. 

First, my government requests confirmation of the actual 

number of nuclear weapons tests conducted in the Marshall 

Islands. It is commonly understood that there were a total of 

sixty-seven such tests, with twenty-three at Bikini Atoll, 

forty-three at Enewetak Atoll, and the April 28, 1958, "Yucca" 

device that was detonated from a high-altitude balloon northeast 

of Enewetak Atoll. Please provide confirmation as to whether 

these totals are complete and accurate and whether any additional 

tests were planned or implemented at Bikini, Enewetak, or any 

oth~r locations, whether on land, on water, or in the atmosphere within the currently recognized international boundaries of the 

Republic of the Marshall Isiands, In the December 7, 1993, news release that you provided to Chief Secretary Xabua with the 

declassified test yields, it was announced that one-fifth of all 

United States nuclear tests had previously been kept secret; this 

telephone: 3181 telex: 0027 FRN AFS fax: 692 3685 • 692 3649 
Dr. Harry J. Pettengill 

February 14, 1994 

Page 2 

273 

news has been received with considerable alarm in the Marshall 

Islands and is the basis of this first request. 

second, it is requested that the Department of Energy provide information on the fission yields of the thermonuclear tests 

conducted in the Marshall Islands. It is my understanding that 

this information may be readily available from the Department of 

Energy or its contractors and may not have to go through the 

process of declassification. This information will be of 

importance to the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study as it 

completes its work in the months ahead. 

Third, the RMI Government requests that it be provided with 

copies of all information, including newly declassified 

documents, that the Department of Energy presents to the U.S. 

House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources in reply 

to the January 3, 1994, letter to President Clinton from Chairman 

George Miller in which the Committee requested documents from the 

Department of Energy and other agencies giving information on the 

true scope and full effects of United States nuclear testing in 

the Marshall Islands. 

Fourth, my government requests all documents, including weather reports and any subsequent summaries or investigations, pertaining to the decision by the U.S. Government to proceed with 

the March 1, 1954, Bravo test. 

Fifth, the RMI Government requests all reports pertaining to 

the radiological condition of Runit Island in Enewetak Atoll. In 

particular, my government would like all documentation on the 

discontinuation by the Defense Nuclear Agency of the 1977-1980 

Enewetak cleanup without Runit Island having been completely decontaminated. 

Sixth, my government requests that it be provided with all 

documents relating to fallout fro111 the "Mike" test that was detonated at Enewetak Atoll on October 31, 1952. My government 

is especially interested in obtaining information about fallout 

from this test that was deposited at Ujelang Atoll . 

Seventh, please provide a complete listing of•· all islands 

used at any time during the testing program as monitoring stations, including information as to how much land on each 

island was used for such stations and for support of monitoring 

personnel, for what periods -0f time, and to what extent trees or vegetation were removed from the land used for these stations. 

Eighth, the Department of Energy is asked to provide any and 

all data relating to fallout and other radiation exposure 

measured at monitoring stations within the Marshall Islands 

during the testing program. 
or. Harry J. Pettengill February 14, 1994 

Page 3 

274 

Ninth, the RMI Government requests a complete and detailed 

accounting of any and all monitoring visits to islands and atolls 

throughout the Marshall Islands, including the dates of such 

monitoring, the fallout and exposure data measured, and the means of transportation for monitoring personnel (such as the names of 

the vessels that carried them to and from the monitoring sites). 

Tenth, the Department of Energy is asked to provide a complete and specific listing of all instances in which any 

people of the Marshall Islands were relocated in connection with 

the u.s. Nuclear Testing Program. This information should 

include the . nlllllber of people removed from each location, the 

destination and duration of each relocation, and the physical condition of each individual prior to and at the conclusion of 

the relocation. 

In light of the very strong concerns of my countrymen about 

the medical and environmental effects of the U.S . Nuclear Testing 

Program in our country, I hope that responses can be provided to 

these inquiries on an expedited basis. This information is 

requested in accordance with Article XIII, Section 3{a) of the 

Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the 

Government of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation of 

Section 177 of the compact of Free Association. 

I remain most grateful to you for arranging the 

declassification of the yield data. I expect that the additional 

information requested in this letter can be made available on the same cooperative basis that has characterized the working relationship between the Department of Energy and the RMI 

Government during the past several years. 
275 

REPUBLIC OF THE .\IARSHALL ISLANDS 

1993 ANNUAL REPORT 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

Report on Implementation of the Agreement Between 

the Government of the United States and 

the Government of the Marshall Islands for 

the Implementation of Section 177 of the 

Compact of Free Association 

Fiscal Year 1993 

Presented to the President of the United States and the Congress 

of the United States in partial fulfillment of the report requirements of Title I, Section l03(e)(5), and Title II, Section 

2ll(c), of the Compact of Free Association as ratified by United 

States Public Law 99-239 and Marshall Islands Nitijela Resolution 

Number 62 of 1986. 
276 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS FOR 

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 177 OF THE 

COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION 

FISCAL YEAR 1993 

Table of Contents 

1. Nuclear Claims Fund ••••••••..•••••••••••••••• 1 

2. Nuclear Claims Tribunal •..••••••••••••.•••••• 3 

3. Nationwide Radiological study ...••••••••••••• 9 

4. Health care Program ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 23 

5. Enewetak Agricultural and Food Programs ••••• 26 

6. Rongelap Resettlement Project ••.•••••.•••••• 31 
2:77 

• Wak~ (Enenkio) 

Bokak (Taongi) o l 

l i Bikar 

! : l 12 ··· ·· ······Enewetak ... ················•···Bikini' .. Ron ela ·········+······························,. ·································,················ 

p O , ,_Cl g p ;ongerik I 

~ .. : 

I ' Ailinipnae I Taka Ailuk I Wotho l Jemo~ • Mejit;; 

10 -•Ujelan~ . ·-·---· ~ KwajaleinLikiep~ • i Wotje ··--· ' ·- ·- -·· 

.., ; Ujae ~ ! ~ Mal~lap 

'\ • \}l Erikup ~ , 

' Lae • ,Namu CIA~ 

8 ----+--·····-·--·········-·· -· ...... - • Lib .. - ~ - ·-- Jabwat .... •··- ·-·· • ·····-······ I r::::} Majuro Arno 

Ailinglaplap C:::::::. ~ 

1

1

' . r Mili 

Namorik ~aluit········· ···A.· ... , , Kill. . • :. ' Knox ! i (Nadikdik) 

6 ········ 1·· 

1 ] 

. : 

4 - - - -+-- - ---- - ,------,......-Ebon __ ! .... - -·--·-· · . ·-- · ......... . 

162 164 166 168 170 172 

0 1000 

kilometers 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 
section 111 Implementation 

1. Nuclear claims Fund 

278 

Attached to this report is the annual report for Fiscal Year 

1993 prepared by the Bank of New York, Fund Manager of the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Fund. Section 

103(e) (5) of U.S. Public Law 99-239 requires that the RMI 

Government transmit annually to the U.S. Congress such a report 

detailing disbursements from the annual proceeds of the Fund. In 

accordance with section 177 of the compact of Free Association, 

the Fund was capitalized by the U.S . Government in the amount of 

$150.0 million when the Compact came into effect in October 1986. 

The RMI Government is pleased to report that all of the 

required quarterly disbursements from the Nuclear Claims Fund were made to . the four beneficiary co-unities. In accordance 

with Article II of the Section 177 Agreement, during Fiscal Year 

1993 a total of $5.0 million was disbursed to the Bikini 

Distribution Authority, $3.25 million to the Enewetak 

Distribution Authority, $2.5 million to the Rongelap Distribution 

Authority, and $1.5 million to the Utrik Distribution Authority. 

In addition to the disbursements to the four beneficiary 

communities, regular quarterly disbursements have been made to 

Mercy International Health Services to continue the special 

medical support of the Four Atoll Health Care Program in 

accordance with Title I , Section 103(j), of the Compact of Free 

Association: a total of $2.0 million was disbursed for the 

medical program in Fiscal Year 1993. Additional disbursements 

have been used to pay for the operation of the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal from the proceeds available for this purpose pursuant to 

Article II, Section 6, of the Section 177 Agreement and for the 

extensive radiological monitoring activities carried out by the 

RMI Government pursuant to Article II, Section l(e), of the 

Section 177 Agreement. 

To date, the moneys generated pursuant to Article II, Section 

6(c), for the payment of monetary awards made by the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal have not been disbursed in the maximum amounts 

available. In Fiscal Year 1993, a total of $4.7 million was transferred to the Tribunal for disbursement to successful 

claimants. At the close of the year, an additional amount of 

$9,050,000 r-ained available in the Fund from previous years for 

awards payaents. 

At the end of Fiscal Year 1993, the value of the Nuclear 

Claims Fund stood at $128,787,000. This figure represents a decline of $2,482,000 in the value of the Fund over the course of 

the year. During this twelve-month period, the Fund earned an 18.541 rate of return on its investments. (For the sa• e twelvemonth period, this investment income may be compared to an increase in the Consumer Price Index of 2.961 and an increase in 

the Standard and Poor's 500 index of 13.00I.) The above average 

-1-
279 

performance of the Fund may be attributed to excellent returns 

from the U.S. bond market and strong earnings from interest rate 

sensitive cyclical sectors of the U.S. equity market, such as capital goods--let by technology--and consumer durables, and from 

special niche stocks. (The Section 177 Agreement permits the RMI 

Nuclear Claims Fund to be invested only in instruments of United 

States nationality.) Nevertheless, the 18.541 rate of return was not sufficient to maintain the previous value of the principal and meet the disbursement schedule required by the Section 177 

Agreement. During Fiscal Year 1993, a total of $19,650,000 in 

beneficiary payments was disbursed from the FUnd in accordance 

with the Section 177 Agreement. The 1993 disbursements included some of the moneys that had remained in the FUnd from previous 

years for the awards by the Nuclear Clai- Tribunal and for 

scientific studies. The attached report fro• Smith Barney 

Shearson, the investment advisor to the RMI Government, provides a summary of the investment holdings of the Nuclear Claims Fund . at the end of Fiscal Year 1993. 

-2-
~ 

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J'OllK 

ONl"AU.SIUD 

ND'Y'Oa. )LY'. 112M 

4. PAYltEN'l' TO VARIOUS BANl<S 

a. GOVT. OP IIARSHALL ISLANDS 

BANI or HAWAII 

b. IIERCT IN'!" L HEALTH SERVICES 

COHitlCA SAKI 

C, ENIWETH 

PLEET BANI 

d. NUCLEAR CLUIIS TRIBOIIAL 

, BANK OP HAWAII 

e. BIUNI 

ANEIICAN SECURITY 'l'RIJS'l' 

f. UTRIK 

BANI 07 HAWAII 

g. RONGELAP 

PLEIT BANI OP KAINE 

h. COIPE!ISATION 

BANK OF HAWAII 

MARSHALL IS

SCHEDULE 

SI

BEGINNING PUIID BALAJICE AT IIAllET (9/J0/921 

ENDING FUND BALANCE AT IIARIET (9/J0/93) 
~. 

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~ 

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~ 

~ 

§ 

~ 

~ 

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~ 

§ 

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l7lll 

Ml«OF 

l'OIIK 

- --•AU.ITIIZII' 

HIW YOU. N. Y. MDI 

I. ACTIVITY PEE 

2. CUSTODY FEE 

3. INVESTMEN'1 MANAGERS PEES 

IIARSHALL IS

SCHEDOLE 

S

a. NEW SOUTH CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 

b. PROVIDENT INVESTMENT COUNSEL INC . 

FIXED INCOME CUS70DY 

c. GAIUlNER , PRESTON IIOSS 

FIXED INCOME CUS700Y 

d. NBIIBOLD ASSET MAN.t.Gl!MENT 

e. SHEARSON LEIOUJI HUTnOII 

CHEIIIC.lL BANK 

f. BOSTON REAL ESTATE 

q. NWO lNVESTMRNT MANAGEIIEN'l' 

h. t<AVELLIER , ASSOCIATES 
~ CONSULTING 

~GROUP 

282 

SMITH BARNEY SHEARSON 

CONSULTING GROUP 

MARSHALL ISLANDS 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE REVIEW 

September 30, 1993 

Danid A. Roland 

Vice President/Fi1W1cial Consultant 

Smith Barney Shearson 

Suite 701, B111k of Guam Building 

111 Chal111 S111to Papa 

Agana, Guam 96910 
283 

MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

September 30, 1993 

This investment evaluation is directed only to the client for 

whose account the evaluation was created. The underlying data 

has been obtained from sources considered to be reliable: the 

infonaation is believed to be accurate, but there Is no assur- ance that it is so. This evaluation is for infonutional 

purposes only and is not intended to be an offer, sol 1citat1on, or reconnendat1on with respect to the purchase or sale of any 

security or ii rec011111endation of the services supplied by any 

1ROney management organization. 

IJA.. CONSULTING 

~GROUP 
284 

NUCLEAl(CLAIMS • SUMMARY OF ENTIRE MANAGED FUND 

In Percent 

Periods Greater Than One Year Are Annualized 

ENTIRE FUND 

TOTAl FUHO 

ENTIRE FUND 

COMPOSITE 

MEDIAN BALANCED FD 

90-DAY T-BILLS 

CPI 

#--.. CONSULTING 

'7'GROUP 

4.43 18.54 11.58 

2.65 11.44 11.73 

3.20 12 .37 11.33 

0.72 2.94 5.64 

0. 49 2.69 4.09 

2 
Ti 

ENTIRE FUND 

EQUITIES 

NWQ INVESTMENT MGT 

EQUITIES 

NEVBOLO'S 

EQUITIES 

NEIISOUTH CAPITAL 

EQUITIES 

NAVELLIER 

EQUITIES 

S&P 500 INDEX 

RUSSELL 2000 

S l P MIDCAP 

LARGE CO . VALUE 

SMALL CO . GROWTH 

SMALL CO . VALUE 

285 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS - SUMMARY OF EQUITY FUNDS 

In Percent 

Periods Greater Than One Year Are Annual ized 

5.88 24 .44 12.83 

0.68 17 .50 N/A 

4.08 11.69 13.89 

6.15 33 .94 14.43 

19.83 49.15 N/A 

2.59 13 . 00 13 .23 

8.74 33.14 11.07 

5.03 24.04 15.98 

5.32 23.98 14.06 

9.80 36.03 11.34 

6.87 28.38 13.99 

e CONSULTING GROUP 3 

A di..,. ol'Sailh --
286 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS - SUMMARY OF FIXED INCOME FUNDS 

In Percent 

Periods Greater Tllan One Year Are Mnualtzed 

ENTIRE FUtl) 2. 52 12.37 9.H 

FIXED INCOME 

INVESCO 1.56 9.88 9.99 

FIXm INCOME 

PAOVIIIOIT 3.66 15. 12 10.02 

FIXm INCOME 

LB GOVT /CORP 80111S 3.32 11,46 9.93 

LB AGGREGATE BOlll 2.61 ,.,e t.93 

LEIIWI BROS.- 111S BD O.H ·,.64 J0.08 

LB TREASURY 80IIIS 3.23 11.08 t.60 

4 A_tl __ _ 
287 

MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCL£AR CLAIMS FUND P•ge I 

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SUMMARY FOR ENTIRE FUND 

from December 31, 1986 To September 30, 1993 

Jlme-Wejghted Rates of Return Current,,+%· Tral11ng J/ Since 

Quarter ;:,il)J.2 Mont~I X 12/31/86 

Investment Ob1ect1ve Proaress 

ENTIRE FUND 4.43 18.54 11.58 Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.49 2.69 4.09 

Objective I : 12.00,, Annualized 2.87 12.00 12.00 Objective 2: CPI + 4.00S 1.48 6.69 8. 09 

~iDl91C Asset !] ] Q,1thin b:1]111Uan 

Manager's Co11posite Index• 2. 65 11.44 11.73 Maxi- Equity Exposure• 2.88 12.44 12 .48 

Maxi- Fixed lncoae Exposure• 3. 10 11.98 11 .32 Preferred Asset Mix COlll)Osite• 2. 79 11.92 12.08 

Equity Index : S&P 500 2.59 13.00 ll.60 

Fixed lncoae : Leh.an Brothers Govt/Corporate 3. 32 11.46 9.93 

Cuh I Equiv. Index: 90-Day T-Bllls 0. 72 2.94 S.64 

tiiDl9t:r Sl!iYC11X S1]1u;;UQD Ei1]111t1DD 

Manager's Total Fund 4.43 18.54 11.58 Manager's Coaposite Index• 2.65 11.44 11.73 

Manager's Equities 5.88 24.44 13.43 SIP 500 2.59 13.00 13 . 60 

Dow Jones Industrial Average 1.82 11.95 13.56 

Manayer' s Fixed lnco• 2.52 12.37 9.84 

Sa 011an Brothers 4.35 15.58 11.21 

Lehaan Brothers Govt/Corporate 3.32 11.46 9.93 

Manager's Cash l Equ1 YI 1 ents 0.79 3. 22 6. 62 

90-Day T-Bil ls 0.72 2.94 5.64 

1 A collbin•tfon of CM S&P 500 INDEX, LB GDYT/CORP BONDS, 90-/MY T•BILLS •nd CDA BANX RE 

in the .. ,.., uset aix u Che client portfolio. This aix changes with changes In the 

portfolio. 

• NEE is coaprfsod of 60 .00% of the SIP 500 and 40. 00% of the LB Govt/Corp Bond Index . 

' NFI is coapri sed of 70 .00% of the LB Govt/Corp Bond Index and 30.00% of the S&P 500. 

~ 

• Index coaprised of 55 .00% of the S&P 500, 40 .00% of the LB Govt/Corp Bond Index ind tfMiiM"o,, T-Bi11 lndox . 

~GROUP 
288 

MARSHALL ISi.ANOS NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

SUMMARY RATES OF RETURN (\) FOR ENTIRE FUND 

IS of September 30, 1993 

Current Trailing >/ F1scll . Annua11zed . . . . :v:c'.< f,;,<);; Q!ia,ttei:,_:·,t'::t l!,JIC?.' ••'i0c(f;,J;]:sD\,\m ~ .l:,-1?/,~,';ji;!;;\;,. 

TOTAL FUND 

EQUITIES 

FIXED INCOIIE 

CASH l EQUIYS 

REAL ESTATE 

COMPOSITE 

SlP 500 INDEX 

LARGE CO. VALUE 

SMALL CO. GIIOIITII 

LB G/C INT BONDS 

CDA BANK RE 

90-DAY T-BILLS 

CPI 

TOTAL FUii) 

EQUITIES 

FIXED INC<»IE 

CASH l EQUIYS 

REAL ESTATE 

~ CONSULTING 

'1'GROUP 

4.43 

S.88 

2.52 

0.79 

0.45 

2.65 

2.59 

5.3? 

9.80 

2.25 

1.04 

0.72 

0.49 

5.74 

9.68 

1.23 

0.00 

N/A 

18.54 

24.44 

12.37 

3. 22 

-9.82 

11.44 

13.00 

23.98 

36.03 

8.21 . -0.01 

2.94 

2.69 

5.52 

3.42 

8.51 

6.62 

N/A 

6 

18.54 

24.44 

12.37 

3.22 

-9.82 

11.44 

13.00 

23.98 

36.03 

8.21 

-0.01 

2.94 

2.69 

11.58 

13.43 

9.84 

6.62 

N/A 

11.58 

13.43 

9.84 

,.,2 

N/A 

11.73 

13.6() 

14.59 

12.01 

9.24 

1.00 

5.64 

4.09 
289 

MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR ENTIRE FUND 

Unannual ized Time-Weighted Rates in Percent 

Quarterly Periods 

TOTAL FUND 

EQUITIES 

FIXED INCOME 

CASH & EQUIYS 

REAL ESTATE 

COMPOSITE 

S&P 500 INDEX 

LARGE CO. VALUE 

SMALL CO . GROWTH 

LB G/C INT BONDS 

CDA BANK RE 

90-DAY T-BILLS 

CPI 

TOTAL FUND 

EQUITIES 

FIXED INCOME 

CASH & EQUIYS 

REAL ESTATE 

COMPOSITE 

S&P 500 INDEX 

LARGE CO. VALUE 

SMALL CD . GROWTH 

LB G/C INT BONDS 

CDA BANK RE 

90 -DAY T-81LLS 

CPI 

~ CONSULTING 

~GROUP 

3.65 6.04 3. 28 4.43 

5.94 7.09 3.60 5.88 

0.25 5.31 3.82 2.52 

0.85 0.74 0.81 0.79 -8.48 1.89 -3. 73 0.45 

3.04 4.09 1.21 2.65 

5.03 4.37 0. 48 2.59 

5.70 9.17 2. 02 5.32 

18.53 0.89 3.60 9.80 

·0.36 3. 96 2. 16 2.25 

0.31 -0.55 -0.80 1.04 

0.74 o. 71 0. 73 0.72 

0.42 1.19 0. 56 0.49 

18. 54 14. 37 7.85 

24 . 44 17. 46 9.69 

12.37 12.09 6.44 

3.22 2.35 1.60 -9.82 -1.46 -3 . 29 

11 . 44 8.15 3. 90 

13.00 7 .58 3.08 

23.98 17 .30 7 .45 

36.03 14. 76 13. 75 

8.21 8.60 4.46 

-0.01 -0.32 0.24 

2.94 Z.18 1.46 

2.69 2.26 I.OS 
290 

HARSKALt -ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUii> 

QUARTERLY ASSET ALLOCATION .(\) FOR ENTIRE FUND 

PY•ctec Ending 

,ja~QUITIE~~~~~-1~;M:~,w~rEc:~.:;s;;~~i1;t~s:,i~.,-~i·,:;:~;,;1' 

12/86 51.49 39. 96 8.64 0.00 

03/87 56.49 32 .96 10.54 0.00 

06/87 56.18 27.34 16.52 0.00 

09/87 54.64 24.15 21.21 0.00 

12/87 47 .52 

03/88 51.77 

06/88 52 . 98 

09/88 54 . 51 

12/88 55.36 

03/89 56.75 

06/89 55.50 

09/89 57.35 

12/89 58.06 

03/90 56. 94 

06/90 57 .62 

09/90 53.16 

12/90 44 . 71 

03/91 56.41 

06/91 56.25 

09/91 57.86 

12/91 57 .27 

03/92 56 .89 

06/92 58 .87 

09/92 57 . 79 

12/92 60.10 

03/93 61.05 

06/93 61.68 

09/93 61.88 

~ COI\IIJL11NG 

~GROUP 

30.82 21.66 0. 00 

31 . 45 17 . 11 0.00 

31.58 15.44 0.00 

31 .84 13.65 0.00 

33.53 11.12 0.00 

27 .16 16.09 0. 00 

24.83 19 . 67 0.00 

28. 76 11.58 2.31 

33.14 5. 96 2.83 

30. 42 9. 68 2.96 

30.48 8.97 2.93 

34.47 9. 03 3.34 

41.94 10. 37 3.21 

36.28 4.34 2.96 

33.18 7 .59 3.01 

35. 56 3.64 2.93 

37.48 2.44 2.82 

34 .37 5.79 2.70 

33.69 4. 70 2.64 

34.62 4.95 2.64 

31 .91 5.51 2.48 

28.76 7.92 2.l7 

30 .ZI 5.95 2. 16 

29.26 6. 73 2. 12 
291 

MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

QUARTERLY ASSET ALLOCATION(\) FOR ENTIRE FUND 

ouarter Endjna 

AVERAGE ASSET 

ALLOCATION 56.14 

lfA... CONSULTING 

~GROUP 

31. 76 9.26 0.93 

9 
292 

MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

BREAKDOWN OF CHANGE IN VALUE (SI FOR ENTIRE FUND 

TOTAL FUND Beginning Mkt. Value + Sponsors Net Contr + lnc011e Received 

+ Rea 11 zed/Unrea 1 i zed 

Capital Gain/(Loss) • Ending Mkt. Value 

EQUITIES 

Beginning Mkt. Value + Net Flow + 1 ncome Race 1 ved + Rea 11 zed/Unrea 11 zed 

Capital Ga1n/(Loss) • Ending Mkt. Value 

FIXED INCOME 

Beginning Mkt. Value 

+ Net Flow + Income Received 

+ Rea 1 i zed/Unrea 1 i zed 

Capital Gain/(Loss) 

• Ending Mkt. Value 

CASH & EQUIVS 

Beginning Mkt. Value 

+ Net Flow + Income Received + Real i zed/Unrea 11 zed 

Capital Gain/(Loss) • Ending Mkt. Value 

~ CONSULTING 

'7'GROUP 

A divi,ioa o(Smith llamoyas of September 30, 1993 

EJscaJ X11r: En!IID!I. Fiscal 

09/91 O?m Y-T-D 

128,086,400 137,309,100 130,443,200 

-19,038,000 -18,478,000 -20,621,884 

7,214,900 6,292,900 5,678,847 

21,045,800 5,319,200 15,439,665 

137,309,100 130,443,200 130,939,828 

68,089,504 79,452,300 75,381,400 

-8,922,600 -9,894,500 -11,125,203 

2,467,600 2,296,500 1,961,992 

17,817,796 3,527,100 14,812,124 

79,452,300 75,381,400 81,030,313 

44,149,600 48,831,800 45,159,600 

-2,839,500 -9, 778,000 -11,374,322 

4,046,300 3,716,200 3,461,027 

3,475,400 2,389,600 1,071,894 

48,831,800 45,159,600 38,318,199 

11,571,800 4,996,600 6,460,000 

-7,188,600 1,236,900 2,115,342 

613,400 226,500 235,675 

0 0 0 

4,996,600 6,460,000 8,811,017 

10 

12/31/86 

To Date 

130,860,000 

-98,537,670 

48,462,410 

50,155,088 

130,939,828 

67,384,096 

-50,479,903 

17,372,292 

46,753,828 

81,030,313 

52,287,700 

-42,850,622 

24,419,727 

4,461,394 

38,318,199 

11,307,800 

-8,862,658 

6,365,875 

0 

8,811,017 
293 

MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

BREAKDOWN OF CHAHGE IN VALUE (S) FOR ENTIRE FUND 

as of September 30, 1993 

REAL £STATE 

8eg1nn1ng Nkt. Value + Net flow + lncoae Received + Rea11zed/Unrea11zed 

Cap1til Ga1n/(Loss) • £nd1ng Nkt. Value 

~ OONSULTING 

~GROUP 

4,275,600 

-87,500 

87,500 

-247,400 

4,028,200 

11 

4,028,200 

-92,200 

92,200 

-586,000 

3,442,200 

3,442,200 

-331,900 

114,200 

-444,200 

2,780,300 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 
NUCLEAR CLAIMS - REVIEW OF ENTIRE MANAGED 

UNIT 

VALUE 

220 

12/31/86 - 09/30/93 

200 -

180 

160 -

140 -

, - I 

------✓ /\ / / ,\ / ,-----,'' / ,' 

120 _ 

/ ,' 

_,-'\ ,,,' 

/------\\ ,,, ,,,. -::-:.,' 

100 j/ \/ ,----- ,, 

80 

/'- / 

I 

/ ,---

12/86 12/87 12/BB 12/89 12/90 12/91 

DATE 

ANN

RE

/

/--," 

/ ,' 

/ ,' / , 

12/92 

The Unit Value Graph depicts the cumulative growth of $100 invested with t

the same $100 invested in appropriate capital market indices. Annualized r

tnception are depicted on the right nand axis. 
295 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS - AEVIl!W IP ENTIRE MANAUD l'\IND 

1987 1988 , ... ::.7-,------------------ --------~ ~---"-G_END ___ _ 

23 

,. .. .. 15 

11 

-•+---------------------------! 

lZ/ M -

lZ/87 

JZ/ 17-

12/ 915 

12/ M12/ 99 

E3 ENTIRE~ 

TOTM.. FlNJ 

• ~ .. Ti l=l: 111.JNO 

-:iJMP'~JJE 

Ra t•• annuel u eo for P•r1oos greater tr-.an one year 

. • 

T 

E 

a 

F 

. 

E 

T 

V 

A 

H 

n , , Mu ltiple Ti• P1 r10d Graph oepicu tne P•'"'or-..nce Of tn, fund YS . eppropr 1a te flarket 

aencnaerks for soeclfled tlN 01:r·1<>oa . 

27 

23 

19 

.. 

-1 

-• 

SMITH 8AANE Y SHEA ASON 

NUCLEAR CU.IMS - REVIEW DF ENTIRE NANMIED FUND 

1990 

13'~ ..,. --

12/H -

12/90 

195H 199a 1993 H O 

aa.o au, 

~ 

§ 

~ 

~ tAA 

~ I ~ 

= '11]71 1-. 1·· i - IJ ~ -

12/ 90-

12/'iU 

JZ/Gl12/92 lZ/92-

9 / 93 

LEGEM) 

B ENTIA! flN) 

TOTAL '1.N> 

&1 EHT~,UC, 

a»FO!iiJTE 

~ t ea annu1l1led tor Ptrlodl gr eater than one vt ar . 

r r-.a Mu a 101, 111111 Pa l'loO f.l" eph oept c ta t he pa rror ... nc a ot' tne runo v• . 1ppropr11 ta IMl"ktt 

0tnch11arks for , oe c1 tiad t1 N p,r1oow 

SMlTH SARNE Y SHEARSON 
NUCLEAR CLAIMS - SECTIONALIZED REVIEW OF ENTIRE 

UNIT 

VALUE 

260 

240 -

220 -

200 -

12/31/86 - 09 / 30/93 

/ 

/ , _,/ 

180 -

I 

/ I _,,; . ----•' 

" I I_,....._ / \ I,--' 

I ' - - - , ,, I ' 

/ \ ,' -- .,,/ , 

,✓- - • /, - /_., " ,;,' . ,-_.-' 

160 

140 _ 

120 

I '.\ / _ _..:,, ___ __ ___ ,_,,,-

100 -¥---- ',\ --:-. :..:.<- / ·•- •• .,,,,,,,. ·1;...--" 

,, 

80 

/ _ __ ,,,.,, 

_ _., 

ANN

R

/ -~

/ 

-- - / 

12/86 12/ 87 12/88 12/89 12/90 12/91 12/92 

DATE 

The Unit Value Graph depicts the cumulative growth of $100 invested with t

the same $100 invested in appropriate capital market indices . Annualized r

incept1on are depicted on the right nana axis . 
297 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS SECTIONALIZED REVIEW 01' eNTIFE NANAIIED FUND 

J987 1988 , ... "~-------------------------~ r ___ LE_G-ENO ___ ~ 

31.:' 

33 

J~Q] 

-7 ~-

~ ,.-1·· 1.·• .. ··.·.·•.·.····. I _- 16~ t· \ It , . ; ill ~ I~ gi ~ l1, l

=i 

I 

-17+-----------------------------i 

12/815-

12/!!17 

l.i!/87-

12/915 

1Z/1!!11!!1-

12/"9 

E3 FNTTJ:11" RH) 

EQU[TlfS 

C SGP 500 U-OEJC 

~ LS ~/C INT SO.OS 

Retes annuallzed tor periods ;reeter tr,an one yeer. 

0 

R 

. 

T 

u 

R 

N 

The Multiple TiN Period Grapr, e11p1cts tne performnc• of ttte fund vs. •11propr1ata Mrkat 

oench•• rks for spec1'1l!O t1M per-100• 

.. 

32 

22 

,. 

-• 

-•• 

SMITH BAl=INEY SHEARSON 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS - SECTIONALIZED REVIEW OF ENTIRE NANAED FIN> 

1000 

12/l!Ul12/90 

12/SI0-

12/91 

, ... 

12/91-

12/02 

19Sl3 YTO 

2 3 

lii!/92-

11/113 

LEG£11l 

E3 ertTIRI!' A.IC) 

l!IIJITJ!S 

~ SliP 500 IN)EX 

111 LB G/C INT BOCJS 

Rates annual3zed for oertode: greater than one year. 

Trie Multiple TUNII Parioo Grapn aapicts tna parfor1111nca of tna runa va. approprl•ta 1Urkat 

cench• arks for spaci.fied tulle p1r1ods 

SMITM BARNEY SHEARSON 
298 

REPUBLIC OF MARSHALL ISLANDS 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS FUND 

AccoWlt Value Summuy 

Equity Mana~n 

Newbolds 

NewSouth 

NWQ 

Navdlier 

TOTAL 

['axed Income ManaKCQ 

Invesco 

Provident 

Real Estate ManaKCQ 

September 30, 1993 

S 25,961,600 

S 27,632,600 

S 19,874,900 

I 12 218.000 

I 21,941,100 

s 20,sJt.SOO 

AETNA S 2,329,600 

Bonon Co. I 4S0,700 

S 85,687,100 

S 42,472,600 

TOTAL I 2,780,300 

TOTAL MARICET VALUE 1130.9:19,000 

ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL S 150,000,0QO 

BENEFICIARY DISTRIBtmONS I 112,262.500 

ADJUSTED ORIGINAL VALUE I 37,737.SOO 

TOTAL EARNINGS INCEPTION TO DATE 

.... CONSULTING 

~GROUP 

f 93,202,soo 
299 

2, Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

As had been the case three years earlier, 1993 was a year of 

extensive personnel change at the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. 

Nevertheless, progress occurred in numerous areas: appointment of two new Tribunal judges, including the first of Marshall 

Islands citizenship; expansion of the list of medical conditions 

administratively presumed to be the result of the nuclear testing 

program; acceptance of death certificates as prima facie 

evidence in the absence of any medical records to document 

conditions suffered; and completion of preliminary procedural 

matters necessary to prepare for the formal hearing of claims for 

damage to land. 

Personnel Changes 

In August James H. Plasman became the first Tribunal Judge to 

complete his three-year appointment. Judge Plasman and his 

family moved back to the mainland United States, but he will 

return to the Marshall Islands from time to time in connection 

with his appointment as Special Master for the Enewetak class 

action land compensation case. 

In October the Cabinet appointed Ambassador Oscar de Brum and 

former RMI Attorney General and Cabinet Legal Advisor Gregory J. 

Danz as Tribunal Judges, replacing Judge Plasman and former Judge 

Peter Crane, whose position had been vacant since his resignation 

in April 1992. The appointments of Judge de Brum and Judge Danz, 

for statutory three-year terms, were confirmed by the Nitijela in 

its January 1994 session. 

In December c. Sebastian Aloot became the first Tribunal 

Chairman to complete the statutory three-year term of 

appointment. Originally appointed as a Tribunal Judge in August 

1990, Mr. Aloot was appointed as Chairman by the Cabinet in 

December 1990. Mr. Aloot was not reappointed by the Cabinet and 

has relocated to Hawaii. Efforts have commenced to recruit a third judge to serve on a full-time resident basis. 

Defender of the Funds. Joshua Berger resigned his position and departed from the Marshall Islands in early June to accept a position in a private law firm on Saipan. Subsequent to his 

departure, Mr. Berger was retained as a consultant to his former 

office. Kester Albert, who had been appointed Assistant Defender 

of the Fund in March 1993, served as Acting Defender from June 

1993 through January 1994. In November 1993, Majuro-based 

attorney Philip Okney was retained as a part-time legal counsel 

to the Defender's office and effective February 1, 1994, he was appointed to a temporary three-month term as Defender. Efforts are underway to recruit a new full-time Defender of the Fund for 

the statutory two-year term. 

In the office of the Public Advocate, Claims Officers Melissa 

Note resigned in April and moved to Honolulu. Claims Officer 

Thelita Juda resigned in October to accept a new position with 

-3-
300 

the Social security Administration. In July Hackney Takju was appointed as Assistant Public Advocate, a position, formerly 

titled Claims Supervisor, which had been vacant since Dunstan 

LOlcboj resigned in late 1992 to accept an appointment· at Social 

Security. Also in July, Riten Batol was appointed to be a full-time Claims Officer in the Majuro office. 

In October Gerald Smith was appointed as Assistant Financial 

Officer. Mr. Smith had previously served as a part-time 

consultant to the Tribunal Chairman in the areas of computerized financial tracking and reporting. The duties of this new position include assistance to the Financial Officer in the areas of accounting, disburs-ents and computer network management and 

financial analysis of both the Compensation Fund and the 

Operations Fund, 

compensation Program 

Article IV of the Section 177 Agreement and Section 4 of the 

Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal Act of 1987, as amended, 

give the Tribunal jurisdiction "to render final determination 

upon all claims past, present and future of the Government, the 

citizens and nationals of the Marshall Islands which are based 

on, arise out of, or are in any way related to the Nuclear 

Testing Program.• 

To date the Tribunal has awarded compensation only for 

certain medical conditions defined by regulation as •presumed• to 

be the result of radiation created by the testing program. However, progress was made during 1993 toward preparing for 

formal hearings focusing on claims seeking compensation for 

damage to property and for personal injuries consisting of 

non-presumed medical conditions. 

Personal Injury Claims 

Section 23(13) of the Nuclear Claias Tribunal Act authorizes 

the Tribunal to issue regulations establishing •a list of medical 

conditions which are irrebuttably presumed to be the result of 

the nuclear testing program.• In accordance with section 23(13), 

the Tribunal adopted regulations in July 1991 identifying twenty-five medical conditions that are presumed to be caused by 

exposure to radiation created by the testing program. For each 

of those conditions, there is credible medical and scientific 

evidence d-onstrating a significant relationship between 

exposure to radiation and the subsequent develop-nt of the 

listed medical conditions, or statutory precedent in the United 

States, for providing compensation based on a presumption of 

causation. 

Acting primarily on the basis of recent studies of Japanese 

atomic bomb survivors by the Radiation Effects Research 

Foundation (RERF) in Hirosnima and findings reported by the U.S. 

National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological Effects 

of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR V), in late 1993 the Tribunal amended 

-4-
301 

its regulations to include two additional conditions on the 

presumed list (see Attachment 1). 

The medical and scientific evidence, or statutory precedents recognized by the Tribunal, provide a "presumption of causation" 

for each of the twenty-seven conditions. In addition, the 

regulations provide a "presumption of exposure" for all citizens 

who were physically present in the Marshall Islands during the 

testing period (1946-1958). The latter presumption recognizes 

the difficulties of proving exposure, a burden that most 

claimants would be unable to meet because of the limited 

monitoring of exposure carried out by the United States during 

its conduct of the testing program. 

As 1993 began, compensation awards for presumed medical 

conditions had been made to 427 individuals for a total of 526 

individual conditions. The net amount of compensation awarded 

the 427 individuals totaled over $18.5 million, of which more than $6.1 million (331) had been paid. 

During 1993 new awards of nearly $4.3 million were made to, or on behalf of, an additional 145 individuals for 150 presumed 

conditions. As of December 31, 1993, compensation in a net 

amount of $22.8 million had been awarded to or on behalf of 572 

individuals for 676 conditions (see Attachment 2) and a total of 

$9.1 million in compensation payments had been distributed. As 

shown in Attachment 3, compensation awards have been made to 

people from every atoll in the Marshall Islands. 

Most of the new awards were for benign thyroid nodules 

diagnosed during a thyroid disease survey conducted on Ebeye by 

the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study. Some of the new awards were made on behalf of deceased individuals for whom no medical 

records could be found and for whom a certificate of death was the only evidence to indicate the medical condition(s) suffered. 

A determination was made by the full Tribunal in June 

providing that death certificates may be considered as admissablE 

evidence and that, with certain restrictions, "any [death] 

certificate admitted for the purpose of showing that a decedent 

suffered from a compensable condition should constitute prima 

facie evidence of that issue." This decision limited to five 

days the acceptable period between time of death and signing of 

the certificate by the attending physician. Subsequently, the 

Tribunal determined that the weight to be accorded certificates 

signed more than five days but less than one year after death 

presented a question of law involving a matter of public importance and ordered the filing of written views and arguments on that question. 

Additional briefs were filed by the Public Advocate and the 

Defender of the Fund in December 1993. In January 1994 the full 

Tribunal issued a decision stating that it "will admit death 

certificates which are signed up to one year after death as prim~ 

facie evidence of the existence or non-existence of a medical 

condition." 

-5-
302 

While all of the awards made to date by the Tribunal have 

been for pres11111ed personal injuries (i.e., medical conditions 

listed in the regulations), the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Act also 

provides that compensation may be awarded for certain other 

medical conditions where the claimant can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence on record, that the condition was a result of the nuclear testing program. An example of such a condition is lung cancer, which is highly associated with 

radiation exposure but is not on the pres11111ed list because of a strong causal link to smoking. 

It is expected that resolution of claim• for such 

"non-pres11111ed personal injuries" will begin during the coming 

year through individual or group hearings conducted by the 

Tribunal. Before those hearings can be scheduled, however, 

radiation exposure dose estimates must be prepared on an individual basis for each claimant who suffered from a non-pres11111ed medical condition that. could have resulted from 

radiation. The need for dose estimates has been discussed with 

officials of the RMI Nationwide Radiological study, but the 

Tribunal has not yet begun to work with the Radiological Study in 

developing this information. 

Annual Pro Rata PaVJ11eots 

Under the Section 177 Agreement, funds for payment of 

compensation awards made by the Tribunal are disbursed annually each October. When the first awards were made in August and 

September 1991, initial payments were distributed to recipients 

in the amount of 20\ of each award. Annual pro rata payments were made for 5\ in October 1991 and for 8\ in October 1992. 

For 1993, annual payments were set at 7\ of each award, 

bringing the c11111ulative payout to 40\. In determining the amount 

of the 1993 annual pro rata payment, the Tribunal reiterated its concern that there will not be sufficient fund• availal:>le for 

full payment of the awards it has made. The Tribunal observed 

that the 7\ rate for 1993 recognizes the need to balance two 

competing interests: the interest of existing recipients to 

receive full payment of their award as soon as possible and the 

interest of future recipients to receive payment in an amount 

equal to that received by individuals previously paid. 

Property Damage claims 

During 1993 the Tribunal also made substantial progress in 

preparation for hearing of claims seeking compensation for damage 

to property resulting from the testing progrlllll. The first 

property damage claim to be heard will be the consolidated claim 

filed in the name of the People of Enewetak by the 

Enewetak/Ujelang Local Government Council. That claim will 

proceed before any other for several reasons: (l)as a claim on behalf of a large group, the final determination of the Tribunal 

will resolve the claims of many individuals: (2)at the request of 

-6-
303 

the Tribunal, the results of the Nationwide Radiological study will be available for Enewetak before the results from other 

atolls; and (3)of the four atolls most clearly affected by the 

testing program, Enewetak was the first to file such a claim with 

the Tribunal. 

The Enewetak claim has been certified as a class action and 

preliminary statements identifying the issues to be addressed in 

hearing the claim have been filed by counsel for claimants and by 

the Defender of the Fund. In addition, a memorandum of 

understanding was entered under which the Tribunal provided $71,567.24 to assist the Enewetak Local Government in contracting 

for an appraisal study of the atoll to be used by claimants in 

pursuing the claim. 

Similar class action claims for property damage have also 

been filed separately by the people of Rongelap and the people of 

Bikini. In addition, thousands of individual clailD& have been 

filed for damage to property, with clai1D& arising from every 

atoll in the nation. Resolution of the Enewetak claim will 

provide an important precedent on which determination of other 

property damage claims w111 be based. 

In addition, it should be noted that the Tribunal Act (Sec. 

23(1)] specifically provides for filing of "clai1D& by owners of 

lands used or conveyed by the United States in its program to 

relocate those made homeless by the nuclear testing program." To 

date, no such claims have been filed with the Tribunal. 

Financial Expenditures for operations and Proceedings 

During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1993, the 

Tribunal expended a total of $901,493 for its overall operations 

(see Attachment 4). Of this amount, $544,588 was for the 

Tribunal's general administrative operations and $356,905 was for 

the operation of the offices of the Defender of the Fund, the 

Public Advocate, and Medical Diagnostics. The expenses of these 

three offices are de-ed by the Tribunal to be •costs of 

proceedings• and, as is typical in mass tort settlement progrm, are charged against the funds availa))le for payment of clai1D&. 

As in the previous two-years, costs of proceedings for each 

fiscal year are charged against the compensation Fund during the 

subsequent year. Combined with the $346,475 charged for Fiscal 

Year 1991 and the $328,344 charged for Fiscal Year 1992, a total 

of $1,031,724 has been charged against the Compensation Fund for 

costs of proceedings. 

Revenues for administrative operation• during Fiscal Year 

1993 included the $500,000 provided annually under the Section 

177 Agre-ent and an additional $81,513 in interest income and 

miscellaneous receipts. As shown in Attachllent 4, administrative revenues exceeded expenditures by $8,364 during the year, 

increasing the Operations Fund surplus fro• $503,397 to 

$511,761. Due primarily to extended personnel vacancies, overall 

-7-
304 

Fiscal Year 1993 Tribunal expenditures decreased $86,605 from the 

previous year, a reduction of 9.61. 

-a-
305 

Attachment 1 

Marshall Island.I Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

Notice of Regulations: Compensation for Damage to Person 

Pursuant10§23(13)ofdleMarshalllslandsNuclearClaimsTribunalAc1l987,asamended,dleTribunal 

adopted regulations in August 1991 establishing a list of 2S medical conditions which are irrebuuably 

presumed 10 be die result of die Nuclear Testing Program. Those regulations were amended by die Tribunal 

in January 1994 IO add two additional conditions (numbers 26 and 27 below) 10 die presumed lisL 

For eligible claimants who were present in die Marshall Islands during the testing program period, die 

administratively presumed medical conditions and die amounts of compensation for each that will be paid 

in pro rata annual payments are as follows: 

1. Leukemia (olhcrlhan chronic lymphocytic leukemia) ..................................................... Sl2S,OOO 

2. Cancer of die thyroid 

a. if recurrent or requires multiple surgical and/or ablation ............................................... $75,000 

b. if non-recurrent or docs not require multiple treatment ................................................. $50,000 

3. Cancer of the breast a. ifrecurrentorrequiresmasu,cromy ......................................................... ____ $100,000 

b. if not recurrent or requires lumpccromy ........................................................................ $75,000 

4. Cancer of die pharynx ....................................................................................................... $100,000 

5. Cancer of the CSCJphagus ................................................................................................... $125,000 

6. Cancer of the 5101118Ch ....................................................................................................... $125,000 

7. Cancer of die small intestinc ............................................................................................. $125,000 

8. Cancer of the pancreas ...................................................................................................... $125,000 

9. Multiple mycloma ...................................................................................... ____ $125,000 

10. Lymphomas (except Hodgkin's disease) ........................................................................... $100,000 

11. Cancer of the bile ducts ..................................................................................................... $125,000 

12. Cancer of the gall bladder ................................................................................................. $125,000 

13. Cancer of the liver ( except if cirrhosis or hepatitis B is indicaled) .................................. $125,000 

14. Cancer of the colon (but not cancer of the rectum) ............................................................ $75,000 

15. Cancer of die urinary bladder ............................................................................................. $75,000 

16. Tumors of the salivary gland 

a. if malignant .................................................................................................................... $50,000 

b. if benign and requiring surgery ...................................................................................... $37,500 

C. if benign and not requiring surgery ................................................................................ $12,SOO 

17. Non-malignant thyroid nodular disease ( unless limited 10 occult nodules) 

a. if requiring total thyroidecromy ..................................................................................... $50,000 

b. if requiring partial thyroideclOmy .................................................................................. $37,SOO c. if not requiring lhyroidec:IDllly ......... ___ ........................................................... $1:Z.SOO 

18. Canccrofthe'ovay ........................................................................................................... $125,000 

19. Unexplained hypothyroidism (unless thyroidilis indicaled) ............................................... $37,SOO 

20. Severe growth relanlalion due 10 thyroid damage ............................................................ $100,000 

21. Unexplained bone manow failure .................................................................................... $125,000 

22. Meningioma ......... ---.. ·--- ___ ................................... $100,000 

23. Radillioa sickness diagnosed between JIDIC 30, 1946 and August 18, 1958, inclusive ..... $12,500 

24. Bela bins diagnosed between JIDIC 30, 1946 and August 18, 1958, inclusive .................. $12,500 

25. Sewn menial retardation (provided born between May and September 1954, inclusive, 

and modlcr was pn,sent on Rongelap or Utirik Atolls at any time in Man:h 1954) ......... $100,000 

26. Uncxplaine byperparathyroidism ................................................................... ___ ... $12,500 

27. Tumors of the parathyroid gland 

a. if malignant ____ .......................................................................................... $50,000 

b. if benign and requiring surgery .............................................................. ____ $37,500 

C. if benign and not requiring surgery ................................. ,___ , ____ $12,500 

The regulations adopted by the Tribunal also provide a mechanism and set out applicable standards for 

(1) the consideration of non-presumed conditions for compensation in individual cases; (2) the periodic 

evalualion of possible modifications to the list of presumed conditions; (3) the assignment of compensation 

levels 10 non-presumed or future presumed mcdical conditions; and (4) adjusunents to the amounts of 

compensation based on age and prognosis. 

To review or obtain copies of the regulations, cootact Calhlina 1. deBrum, Clert of the Tribunal, P. 0. 

Box 702, Majwo, MH 96960; telephone (692) 625-3396; facsimile (692) 625-3389. 
MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TR

ADMITl1IDCLAIMSBYCONDmONANDAMOUNTSAWARDED

COMPENSATION 

Acute l'Bdiation sickness $12,500 

Benign salivary gland tWDOr toquiring surgery $37,500 

Benign salivary gland tumor without surFI)' $12,500 

Beta bums $12,500 

Breast cancer -lwupectomy or no surgery $75,000 

Breast cancer - llllSICCIOllly $100,000 

Breast cancer - end Slage or cause of deadl $125,000 

Cancer of the coloo $75,000 

Cancer of the coloo - cause of death $125,000 

Cancer of the liver SI 25,000 

Cancer of the ovary $125,000 

Cancer of the panaeas $125,000 

Cancer of the pharynx $100,000 

Cancer of pharynx - end stage or cause of death S 125,000 

Cancer of the sromach $125,000 

Cancer of the urinary bladder $75,000 

Hypodlyroidism $37,500 

Leukemia $125,000 

Lymphoma $100,000 

Lymphoma - end Stage or cause of death S 125,000 

Malignant Sllivmy gland tuan $50,000 

MminpJma $100,000 

Meningjoma- end stage $125,000 

Mulliplemydoma $125,000 

Scw:tegrowtb.-dalioo $100,000 

Thyroid cancer SS0,000 

Thyroid cancer -mulliple IIUl'p,rics $75,000 

Thyroid nodule • Jmlial lllyroidct:tcmy $37,500 

Thyroid nodule • -1 tbyroidecllllmy $50,000 

Thyroid nodule without IUIJl'IIY $12,500 

TOl'ALS 

#ADM[J]Ep 

64 

12 

3 

61 

5 

14 

14 

2 

I 

3 

II 

5 

4 

8 

4 

2 

13 

7 

7 

6 

2 

3 

I 

I 

2 

37 

15 

136 

8 

---22.1 

676 .. 

JU[ALOO

$800,00

$450,00

$37,50

$762,50

$375,00

$1,400,00

$1,750,00

$150,00

$125,00

$375,00

$1,375,00

$625,00

$400,00

$1,000,00

SS00,00

$150,00

$487,SOO 

$875,00

$700,00

$750,00

$100,00

$300,00

$125,00

$125,00

$200,00

$1,850,00

$1,125,00

$5,100,00

$400,00

ll.112.m

$25,225,00

• Deduc1ioas include bod, prior compensation for the same medical condition and .i;i-,ts 

•• The 676 edmlned claims involve 572 individuals (many of whom had main, dlan one admiaie

individuals (totaling. 87 of the conditions) died without having submittal a claim and have be
307 

Attachment 3 

ADMI I I Ell CLAIMS ar ATOLL QE amm AND Re:iWW~ 

(AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1993) 

ar BIRTHPLACE D:X: 1223 RES!l2EtlCE 

ATOLL ~ Conditions ~ C1mditions 

Ailinglaplap 33 35 13 14 

Ailuk 20 20 3 3 

Amo 11 11 0 0 

Aur 6 6 3 3 

B ilcini/Kili 6 10 1 1 

Ebon 23 24 0 0 

Encwctak/Ujclang 9 9 5 5 

Jaluit 71 72 11 11 

Jcbat 2 2 1 1 

Kwajalcin (excluding Mcjatto) 75 90 184 227 

Lac 17 19 4 4 

Lib 2 2 0 0 

Likicp . 29 31 5 5 

Majuro 51 51 166 186 

Maloclap 17 17 5 5 

Mcjit 21 22 3 5 

Mili 9 9 2 2 

Namodik 22 22 5 5 

Namu 11 12 4 5 

Rongclap/R.ongcrik/Mcjatto 59 131 16 28 

Ujae 19 22 2 2 

Utrik 28 28 12 12 

Wotje 19 19 12 12 

Wotto 5 5 4 4 

Other (outside RMI) 7 7 12 15 

Ocoeased _Jl _Jl ~ _12l. 

TOTALS 572 676 572 676 

NOTE: Many individuals bave been awardec:I c:ampeourioo by the Tribunal for more than one 

medical condition. In most of these cues, the awmls have been made to people who were oo 

Rongelap oo March 1, 1954 11111 who sufl'aed the COlldirions of ICUte ndialion sickness, beta 

bums and some thyroid abnormality. 
308 

FY 1993 REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 

UNAUDITED STATEMENT OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 

OPERATION FUND 

FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1993 

REVENUES FY 93: 

COMPACT FUND 

INTEREST & MISC. RECEIPT 

TOTAL REVENUES FY 93 

ADMIN. P.A. DOF MED. 

Attachment 4 

$500,000 

$81,513 

$581,513 

TOTAL 

EXPENDITURES FY 93 ========= ======== ========"========'-aw•••••• 

WAGES AND SALARIES 

OTHER PERSONNEL BENEFITS 

OFFICE RENTAL 

OFFICE EQUIPMENT 

OFFICE SUPPLIES 

TRAVEL 

VEHICLE'-

CONTRACTUAL SERVICES 

ADVERTISING 

TRAINING 

LIRARY BOOKS 

TELEPHONE 

MEDICAL AND LABORATORY 

ADMINISTRATION/MISC 

HEARING 

EBEYE OFFICE SUPPORT 

ASSISTANCE GRANT 

TOTAL EXPENDITURES 

REVENUES OVER EXPENDITURES 

OPERA TING TRANSFERS 

$143,866 

$79,156 

$46,198 

$15,430 

$13,913 

$60,330 

$1 ,757 

$65,000 

$960 

$695 

$12,780 

$35,000 

$0 

$2,219 

$42,283 

$0 

$25,000 

$544,588 

EXCESS OF REVENUES AND OTHER 

SOURCES OVER EXPENDITURES AND 

OTHER USES 

FUND BALANCE, BEGINNING OF YEAR 

FUND BALANCE, END OF YEAR 

$103,5TT 

$27,567 

$6,000 

$0 

$1,668 

$20,439 

$500 

$38,957 

$0 

$0 

$0 

$1,000 

$0 

$0 

$0 

$2,000 

$0 

$201 ,708 

$49,024 $25,948 $322,411 

$18,259 $1,065 $121,047 

$0 $5,760 $57,958 

$0 $0 $15,430 

$265 $310 $11,157 

$4,529 $12,722 $98,021 

$0 . $116 $2,372 

$24,609 $1 ,708 $130,274 

$0 $0 $910 

$0 so $695 

$0 $0 $12,780 

$0 $3,261 $39,261 

$0 $7,620 $7,120 

$0 $0 $2,219 

$0 $0 $42,283 

$0 $0 $2,000 

$0 $0 $25,000 

$96,687 $58,510 $901,493 

($319,980 

$328,344 

$8,364 

$503,397 

$511,761 

====-=== 
309 

J. Nationwide Radiological study 

This report describes the progress and activities of the 

Nationwide Radiological study over the time period from 

October 1, 1992, to September 30, 1993. The RMI Government has 

undertaken the scientific investigations of the Nationwide 

Radiological Study in accordance with the provisions of Article 

II, Section l(e) of the Section 177 Agreement. The activities of 

the Nationwide Radiological study described in this report 

pertain mainly to (l)the collection of further radiological data 

from field survey expeditions, (2)a continuing program of 

refinements to the laboratory facility in Majuro, (J)activities 

associated with the laboratory staff and Scientific Advisory 

Panel, (4)a continuing contribution to the scientific studies of 

the Rongelap Resettlement Project, and (S)the first phase of a nationwide survey to determine the prevalence of thyroid disease 

in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 

collection of Radiological Data from Field surveys 

In the past year a significant amount of new environmental 

radiological data was gathered from atolls and islands of the 

Marshall Islands by the Nationwide Radiological Study, despite 

the lack of a dedicated ocean-going vessel to support the study. 

As in the_previous year, field surveys mainly used the locally 

chartered -fishing vessel M/V Charlie's Angel. although- work at 

Rongelap Atoll was supported by the M/V Offshore Venture. a ship 

contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy. 

In the time period October 1, 1992, through September 30, 

1993, field survey expeditions were made to ten atolls and one reef island (Lib): 

October 22-29, 1992 

November 19-24, 1992 

December 12-20, 1992 

February 23-March 6, 1993 

March 23-April 6, 1993 

April 14-27, 1993 

May 12-19, 1993 

Ujelang 

Namu 

Kwajalein and Lib 

Kwajalein and Namu 

Utrik, Taka, Bikar, and Bokak 

Rongelap 

Bikini. 

On all atolls and islands, in-situ gamma spectrometric 

measurements were made and soil and plant samples were collected. In addition to the soil samples, at certain locations 

the samples collected included coconut milk and coconut meat, 

breadfruit, pandanus, banana, pumpkin, arrowroot, clam, coconut 

crab, and wild pig. Also, the leaves of eight medicinal plant 

species and the fruit of one medicinal plant were collected. 

-9-
310 

All field survey work in the nation is completed except for 

about one-third of the islands of Kwajalein Atoll, including the 

USAKA-held islands, and Wake Island (Enenkio). The survey of 

both of these locations is planned for early 1994. 

During the reporting period, the following numbers of soil 

samples were prepared at the Majuro laboratory and measured for 

gamma emitting radionuclides (e.g., 137-cesium, 241-americium, 

and 60-cobalt): 

16 deep ·soil profiles (rom Enewetak (a total of 80 samples) 

112 surface soil samples from Enewetak 

42 deep soil profiles from Rongelap (a total of 210 samples) 311 surface soil samples from Rongelap. 

During the reporting period, the following numbers of samples were prepared in the wet sample facility at the Majuro laboratory 

and measured for gamma emitting radionuclides (e.g., 137-cesium, 

241-americium, and 60-cobalt): 

154 coconut juice samples 

141 coconut meat samples 

181 leaf samples (medicinal plants) 

52 other samples (if)cluding other fruits, crab, and pig meat). 

The table on the next page shows the total number of samples under study by the Nationwide Radiological Study as of December 

1993. 

Environmental Radiation Laboratory 

Personnel 

As various milestones have been met, a number of changes have 

been made within the. Nationwide Radiological study organization 

and laboratory. With the field survey work neared completion, 

two junior scientists employed by the laboratory returned to the 

United States. Both Dr. Steven L. Simon, the Director of the 

Study, and Mr. Jim Graham have remained on staff, as have Mr. 

Alexander Noah and Mr. Dante Demanarig. Several new Marshallese 

staff have been added to assist with the high workload of sample 

preparation and processing. The new employees added to the 

Nationwide Radiological Study staff were Mr. Renny Ohwiler, Mr. 

Alee Jonas, Mr. Tom Schmidt, Mr. Ransey Larrone, and Mr. Randy 

Thomas. Ms. Shiela Como also returned to the United States after 

serving as laboratory radiochemist for a year. She was replaced by Mr. Andy Borchert. 

Mr. Alee Jonas is a citizen of the Federated States of 

Micronesia (Chuuk) and Mr. Renny Ohlwiler is a Marshallese 

citizen; both are members of the Rongelap community by either 

marriage or birth. The hiring of these two employees was made 

possible by the separate funding of the Rongelap Resettlement 

Project. 

-10-
De~mbcr 1993 

Number of Mcuva:mcnu a

RMI N11ionwi

AIDII Atoll or 

Refu,oce hlHd 

N•mkr Naae 

I Ailin•iHe 

2 Aili• -IIDIH 

' Aih•., 

4 Ar•• 

l Aur 

6 Bitar 

7 Bitial 

I l!boa 

• e.. .. iu 

10 Erit•• 

II Jabet lslaad 

12 Jaluh 

I' Ja-o ••laad 

.. Kil" s-•--

I! Kw•ia1a1.J 

16 ,,... 11 Li~ bl•d 

I Litle• 

19 KnoK 

20 Maiaro 

21 Maloelu 

2l Mc'~ r.i. .. 23 Mili 

24 N••-i 

2l Nuau ,, Ro••ela• 

27 R-•••lk ,, T ••• , 

., Tah 

30 IIIIH 

]I Ui, .... 

32 Utirit 

33 Wollio 

34 WOiie 

Tea.I• 

Arn ND. or No. Df 

iobl2 /11-Sit• o ...... Ounrna •euure 

measure -menu 

-menu per km2 

2.1 6' 22 .16 

14 .7 36 2.•l 

l.4 31 1.04 

13.0 31 2.31 

l.6 17 3.04 

O.l l 10.00 

6.0 99 16.lO 

l .1 21 3.62 

l .9 161 21.47 

u 7 4.67 

O.l7 2 3.ll 

11.3 36 3.19 

0.1" 4 2:'i .00 

0.01 4 4.30 

16 .• l6 3.4 

l.l 10 6.67 

0.93 l l .31 

10.3 55 S.34 

1.0 4 4 .00 

9.2 44 4 .71 

9.1 27 2.76 

3.l 2l 7. 14 

14.9 32 2.ll 

2.1 7 2.lO 

6.3 43 6.13 

1.0 21, 1l.63 

1.7 40 23 .l3 ,., 16 l.00 

O.l7 10 17.l4 

1.9 13 6 .14 

1.7 36 21.11 

2.4 49 20.42 

4.J 7 3.9! 

1.2 27 J. 29 

•IIJ IJJJ 9. 57 

(awa.) 

No. of 

Soil 

Proriles 1 

12 

• 

3 

l 

4 

I 

I 7 

3 

27 

2 

I 

4 

I 

I 

6 

3 

2 

6 

I 

I 3 

4 

2 

4 

2 

4 

42 

9 

3 

4 

3 

7 

l 

3 

4 

212 

1each profi .. (0-30 c:m) comilll of 6 sunples (S cm iftc::faHala) 

No. or 

Gamm

per So

Profil

. ., 

9 00 

12.67 

6.20 

• .2l 

l .00 

5.12 

7.00 

6 .22 

3.lO 

2.00 

9.00 

4 .00 

, .oo 

"·" ' " 2.lo 

9.17 

4 .00 

3.3 1 

6.ll 

12 so 1.00 

3.10 

I0.7l 

6.79 

4.44 

' ·" 2.lO 

4 .33 

l . 14 

9.10 

,.67 

6.7l 

,.u (awa.

2ach COCOftYI resulla in lhroe aamplu: COCODUl milk, medo (10(1 IMll), •N 

'Kwajaleia 110II 11,1,rveJ ii ooly -65"1, complete M preaen1 1i1M 
312 

Mr. Randy Thomas resides permanently with the Rongelap 

co-unity now living on Mejetto Island in Kwajalein Atoll. He 

has worked in the laboratory since June 1993 to help improve 

co-unication between the laboratory and the Rongelap co-unity. on previous occasions, he had assisted the Nationwide 

Radiological study in field survey work. 

Mr. Tom Schmidt and Mr. Ransey Larrone are both Marshallese 

citizens with h~mes in Majuro. 

Mr. Andy Borchert was hired from Colorado. He had graduated 

with a degree in chemistry from Colorado State University where 

he was employed as a laboratory chemist in the Departaent of 

Radiological Health Sciences. Before relocating to the Marshall 

Islands, Mr. Borchert received specialized training at Colorado 

State University in plutonium chemistry, as had Ms. Como before 

hb. ' 

Laboratory Building 

The laboratory itself has undergone some ainor but iaportant 

modifications over the past year to improve its efficiency. In 

particular, an enlargement of the soil preparation facilities was added to the building in November-December 1992. Thi• additional 

space was added to acco1111Dodate a second soil drying room and a room for crushing rocks and sieving soil: this expansion opened 

extra space in the original soil preparation room for a second 

ball mill, which is used to crush soil samples into powder. This 

enlargement of facilities provides for more efficient operation of the soil preparation steps. 

Additional seawall protection was also constructed in 

November and December 1992 on the west side of the laboratory. Although storms originating out of the west are somewhat unusual 

in Majuro, they are often the most damaging because waves can 

build to significant intensity along the length of the atoll. An 

additional 60 feet of seawall was added to ensure the protection of the laboratory. 

The trailer acquired the previous year fro• USAKA was outfitted this past year with adequate work space for exposing soil samples collected on Rongelap to plastic track detectors. 

This project is a component of the Rongelap Resettlement Project scientific studies. Plastic track detectors are a specialized 

type of plastic that registers microscopic pits, or •tracks•, 

after absorbing alpha particles emitted from certain radioactive 

elements, especially plutonium. Exposing the track detectors to 

soil is relatively simple, although it requires leaving batches 

of small ,: ,ntainers of soil, into which the track detectors have 

been inserted, undisturbed continuously for a month. 

-11-
313 

Laboratory operations 

The plutonium wet chemistry laboratory under the operation of 

Mr. Andy Borchert significantly increased its throughput this 

year due to several changes in procedure. Around June 1, 1993, 

the Radiochemistry Laboratory responsibilities and management was transferred from Sheila Coma to Andy Borchert. The beginning of 

Mr. Borchert's radiochemical analysis of samples was delayed from 

June 1 to July 20, 1993, due to the inability of Hawaii Chemical 

scientific and Fisher Scientific to deliver scientific supplies 

that had been ordered seven months previously. 

During this lag time, the laboratory was reorganized into 

specific workstations including: a muffle furnace station, 

radioactive spiking area, leaching area, acid reduction, column 

extraction, and microprecipitation. The benefit of workstations was demonstrated when batch production went into effect. A new and more appropriate radioactive standard was made to better fit 

the geometry of the alpha detectors. During the first month, 

however, a vacuum problem was diagnosed with one of the alpha 

spectrometry chambers forcing the laboratory to return one of the 

chambers back to the manufacturer, Canberra Industries of 

Meriden, Connecticut. 

Chemical analysis of plutonium resumed in August 1993 with 

the addition of Mr. Randy Thomas as a laboratory technician. 

After twelve plutonium samples had been processed, it was determined that the chemical procedures needed to be reviewed and 

streamlined. At this point, on the basis of information gained 

from previous mass spectroscopy measurements made on Marshall 

Islands soil and following a literature review, the procedure for 

calcium-oxalate co-precipitation was determined to be 

unnecessary. The same twelve samples were reprocessed without 

calcium-oxalate co-precipitation. The recovery of plutonium from 

the soil improved from approximately 501 to approximately SOI. 

The spectra showed no interfering peaks and, due to this higher chemical yield, the count time was decreased from twenty-four 

hours to a six- to eight-hour count time. 

The processing of samples for plutonium analysis was also 

streamlined by organizing samples into batches. The benefit of 

the batch method allows for continuous processing of samples one after another. To assist in the new processing system, a seven outlet PVC manifold and clean box was constructed for the 

microprecipitation procedures. This equipment allowed for 

produc~ion of six times as many samples at a time in comparison 

to the former method. The extraction workstation was also 

modified by a stationary column apparatus that enabled better access and stabilization. The extraction columns were modified 

by the addition of a 50 mt reservoir that allowed for more freedom of the operator to proceed with other laboratory 

procedures at the same time. 

The improvements made in the methodology have resulted in the 

production of thirty or more samples a week, a significant increase over the previous capacity of the laboratory of six to 

eight samples a week. Improvements were also made on the 

-12-
314 

computerized database to improve the clarity of the data 

reports. In December 1993 another delay was experienced as one of the alpha particle detectors proved to be defective. 

Sample production for the first six months was approximately 

300 samples. A 70t increase in sample output has been 

accomplished. Not only did the volume of samples increase, but 

also the quality and precision was stabilized. 

Considerable d1fficulty was experienced this past year with 

all of the laboratory's radiation detection instrumentation. The 

laboratory instruments are operated in an air-conditioned 

environment, yet they have suffered more problems than the 

instruments used in the field survey. In late April 1992, one of 

the two laboratory high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors began 

to develop problems. After conferring for several months with 

the manufacturer, Canberra Industries, the detector was returned 

to the factory in Meriden, Connecticut, in late September 1992. 

It was back in operation in mid-December 1992, although about seven months had elapsed without its use. That detector was out 

of operation again for two weeks in January 1993 and one week in 

May 1993. The detector again went down in late August 1993 and was returned to Canberra in late September 1993. (It arrived 

back at the Majuro laboratory on January 31, 1994.) 

This second laboratory detector began experiencing problems 

in mid-April 1993 and worked erratically for several months 

thereafter. In late August 1993, this machine also had to be 

returned to Canberra. Canberra determined that the germanium 

crystal of this unit could not be returned to its original 

operating condition, although the company agreed to replace it. 

Because these particular detectors have an enhanced low energy detection range to facilitate the measurement of 241-americium, a replacement detector had to be custom built. As of this writing, the new unit is still undergoing testing at the factory and is 

not yet back in service. 

In order for the measurement of cesium in samples to continue 

during this past year, the laboratory's portable field HPGe 

detectors were installed into the lead shields in the measurement 

facility. These detectors, although similar to the laboratory 

units, possess different energy response characteristics and, for 

this reason, required separate calibrations. 

The alpha spectrometry system for measurement of plutonium exhibited numerous problems during the entire year that Ms. Como 

worked in the laboratory. Canberra was consulted numerous times 

and replaced several components during 1992. In late spring of 

1993, one of the alpha spectrometry vacuum chambers was sent back 

to Canberra and replaced with a new unit in July. The 

solid-state detectors which fit inside the vacuum chambers were also returned to Canberra for testing. On one occasion, in 

September 1993, Canberra sent the wrong machine back to Majuro. 

Even after the components were replaced, difficulties still 

plagued the system and in late November 1993, the full alpha 

-13-
315 

spectrometry syst- was disassembled and returned to Canberra for 

testing. As of this writing, the system is not yet back in 

service. 

Despite numerous difficulties with instrumentation, the 

Nationwide Radiological Study laboratory continued its 

participation in international intercomparisons. In November 

1992, the laboratory submitted its measur-ents of salllples 

distributed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

Laboratory of Narine Radioactivity in Monaco. These salllples included sediment& from the Irish Sea and marine cockle flesh. 

Additionally, the Nationwide Radiological study continued its 

program of direct comparisons of samples with Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory, a u.s. Department of Energy contractor. 

Activities of the staff and the scientific Advisory Panel 

Through the Scientific Advisory Panel; the Nationwide 

Radiological Study is advised and monitored by an international 

oversight co111111ittee of five senior radiation scientists. 

During Fiscal Year 1993 no meeting was ·held of the entire 

scientific Advisory Panel. However, four members of the panel visited Majuro in work related to various projects of the 

Nationwide ~diological Study. 

In mid-March 1993, Dr. Herwig Paretzke from the GSF Institut 

fur Strahlenschutz (Institute for Radiation Protection) in 

Germany visited the Nationwide Radiological study laboratory. 

During his visit, he reviewed the calibration procedures of the 

ga111111a spectrometry measurements being made in the laboratory. 

In late March through early April, Dr. Andrew McEwan, 

Director of the National Radiation Laboratory of New Zealand, 

visited the Marshall Islands and participated in the radiological field survey of Utrik and Taka Atolls. The Utrik leadership had 

earlier voiced a desire for international participation and 

oversight of the monitoring project. Dr. McEwan's dedication of 

nearly two weeks of his time was a significant contribution. 

or. Klauss Trott, a radiobiologist and physician on the 

faculty of st. Bartholomew's Hospital in London, has provided medical guidance to Dr. Simon in implementing the first phase of a thyroid disease screening study. Dr. Troll visited Ebeye in 

early January 1993 for about a week to assist in the first 

examinations. He next visited Ebeye and Majuro in late August 

and early September to report the clinical results to individuals 

who participated in the Ebeye study. Dr. Trott also travelled to 

Japan in late August 1993 on behalf of the Marshall Islands 

Thyroid Study to review all the patient charts and diagnoses. 

Dr. Keith Baverstock, trom the World Health Organization in 

Rome, visited the Marshall Islands twice during the reporting 

period. He visited in February 1993, at which time he 

accompanied Dr. Simon to Mejetto to brief the Rongelap co-unity 

-14-
316 

on progress of the Rongelap Resettlement Project. Or. Baverstock 

also visited the Marshall Islands in late August coincident with a visit by a tea• from the U.S . National Academy of Sciences. 

This visit also entailed travel to Rongelap and Mejetto. 

staff of the laboratory travelled several times in this 

period in support of the various laboratory projects. In late 

January 1993, the scientific staff of the Nationwide Radiological 

study laboratory attended the 26th Midyear Topical Meeting of the 

Health Physics Society. The meeting focused on enviro11111ental 

health physics and was held in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Dr. Simon 

presented an overview of the Nationwide Radiological Study which was subsequently published in the proceedings. Or. Si• on and his 

colleagues also presented a poster display on the field survey of 

the Nationwide Radiological -Study. Proceeding from Coeur 

d'Alene, Dr. Simon went on to • eet with scientists at the U.S. 

Department of Energy Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New 

York city. The methods of in-situ ga-a spectrometry used by the 

RMI Nationwide Radiological study were pioneered by scientists at 

the Environmental Measurements Laboratory and they have been 

quite helpful with providing guidance and suggestions. Dr. Simon 

continued on to Amherst, Massachusetts, to meet with faculty of 

the School .of Public Health at the University of Massachusetts 

(UMass) C?ncerning the conduct of a soil ingestion study for the 

Rongelap Resettl-ent Project. While at UMaaa, Dr. Si• on presented a guest lecture on the Nationwide Radiological study to a graduate-level course in Risk Assessment at the School of 

Public Health. Two members of the Rongelap co-unity, Ms. Abacca 

Anjain and Mr. Aisen Tima, accompanied or. Simon to UMass for 

these discussions. 

In late February or. Simon, accompanied by Ms. Anjain, Mr. 

Tima and or. Keith Baverstock, went to Mejetto Island for 

discussions with the Rongelap co-unity on the progress of the 

Rongelap Resettlement Project. 

In late March and early April, or. simon travelled to 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, to meet with officials of Scientific 

Instrument Company, Inc., developers of a specialized computer imaging system for performing analysis of plutonium tracks. This 

work has been funded by the Rongelap Resettlement Project. During this trip, upon request of the faculty at Colorado State 

University, Department of Radiological Health Sciences, Dr. simon 

presented a lecture on the Nationwide Radiological Study. This 

lecture was videotaped and broadcast on the National Televised 

university as part of a graduate credit class in Radiation Public 

Health. 

In early May, Dr. Simon accompanied a delegation from the 

Marshall Islands to annual budget hearings in Washington, D.C., 

where he provided testimony on the progress of the Rongelap 

Resettlement Project. 

-15-
317 

During late May Dr, Simon traveled to Washington State to 

participate as one of five invited peer reviewers for the Hanford 

Dose Reconstruction study. That study is being conducted by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory to assess the radiation 

exposure of residents of Washington State to radioiodine released 

during the 1940's and 1950's from the Hanford plutonium 

production facilities. The results of the peer review were published as a Battelle report. Dr. Simon also traveled on this 

trip to New Mexico State University in Las Cruces to meet with 

software developers for a computerized track imaging syst- being 

developed as part of the Rongelap Resettlement Project. 

In early June, Dr. Simon again travelled to Ebeye and to 

Mejetto to accompany visitors from the U.S. Department of 

Interior, Department of Energy, and the Senate Energy co-ittee 

for meetings with the Rongelap communities living there. 

Dr. Simon and Mr. Graham attended the annual Health Physics meeting in Atlanta in mid-June. This was a technical conference 

for radiation protection specialists. Dr. Simon also travelled 

to Las Cruces, New Mexico, for a second meeting with the software 

developers. 

August 1993 was a busy month for the Nationwide Radiological Study with a total of sixteen visitors coming to the laboratory. 

In the second week of August, Dr. Russel Carey, a technical sales 

representative from Scientific Instruments, Inc., came to the 

Nationwide Radiological study laboratory to install a computerized imaging system built specifically for the Rongelap Resettlement Project. From August 26 through· September 5, Mr. 

Terry Jenner from the Medical Research Council in Didcot, United 

Kingdom, provided assistance to the Nationwide Radiological Study 

laboratory in acquiring the first alpha track data using the 

computerized imaging system. In late August, fourteen additional 

visitors came to the Nationwide Radiological Study laboratory, 

including Dr. Keith Baverstock, an advisor to the Nationwide 

Radiological Study and the Rongelap Resettlement Project, thirteen persons from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences 

(NAS), and an official of the U.S. Department of Energy. The NAS 

group is responsible for reviewing the Department of Energy's scientiric programs in the Marshall Islands. The NAS tea• visited the Nationwide Radiological Study laboratory to gain 

insight into the various scientific questions and to better 

understand the difficulties in conducting research in the 

Marshall Islands. Dr. Simon and Randy Thomas then accompanied the group to Bikini, Rongelap, and Mejetto. Dr. Simon and Mr. 

Thomas provided the NAS group with a tour of Rongelap Island and 

substantial background information on the Rongelap Resettlement 

Project. 

Ronaelap Resettlement Project 

The Rongelap Resettlement Project (RRP) encompasses a number 

of different scientific studies with the overall goal of 

determining the suitability of reinhabiting Rongelap Island and 

-16-

79-784 0-94-11 
318 

the southern islands of Rongelap Atoll based on whether 

compliance is met with (l)a dose limit and (2)a soil 

contamination level. Th• dose limit of 100 mrem/y_above 

background was agreed upon several years ago by the U.S. 

Department of Energy and representatives of the Rongelap 

community. Subsequently, the two compliance limits were written 

into the memorandum of agreement for the project between the U.S. 

Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the 

RMI national government, and the Rongelap Local Government. Both 

of the compliance limits must be satisfied. In addition to the 

dose limit, a maximum level of transuranic radionuclides (238, 

239, ~40-plutonium, as well as 241-americium) in the soil of 0.2 

uCi/m was agreed upon. The progress of the past year in 

completing the scientific studies has been in keeping with the 

overall goal of determining compliance. 

Radiological Monitoring, Possibly the largest component of 

the study has been an evaluation of the radiological 

conditions at Rongelap Island and the other southern islands 

of Rongelap Atoll. This study component is the 

responsibility of the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study. Three full field missions to Rongelap have been carried out 

for the purpose of making environmental _measurements and 

collecting samples. On these trips, all of the islands were sampl~d using a systematic grid sampling program. To 

accomplish this, the thick underbrush was cut through to form a periodic array of sampling points. Over 165 high resolution gamma spectrometry measurements were made on Rongelap Island alone. 

At each site, surface soil samples were collected for 

evaluating transuranic levels since these radionuclides 

cannot be measured by gamma emissions. These samples have 

been analyzed by a combination of wet chemistry and alpha 

spectrometry techniques. First, however, the soil is 

prepared by drying and crushing. Consequently, the total 

number of steps is fairly extensive. The analysis of these 

samples is nearly complete. Deep soil profiles were also 

acquired on the field trips: data from these are used to 

interpret all th• other measurements. 

In addition, coconuts, breadfruit, arrowroot, coconut crabs, 

and pig meat collected from Rongelap are also being 

analyzed. All sample analysis is nearly complete. 

compliance Evaluation, The methods used to evaluate 

compliance with dose limit and soil radioactivity limit 

prescribed in the four-party memorandum of agreement are relatively complex. The difficulty arises because the dose 

calculated is a projection. rather than a measured quantity. Extreme care is required to maintain scientific credibility: this projection, in particular, requires extensive 

documentation of the assumptions involved in th• calculations 

and for the evidence supporting those assumptions. Methods 

which have been proposed are now being reviewed 

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internationally for credibility. Dose calculations are expected to be carried out early in 1994 using all of the 

available data from the studies. 

Microdistribution of Plutonium in soil, The object of this 

study is to evaluate the microscopic characteristics of 

plutonium in the soil. The results from this study do not 

directly factor into the compliance calculations, but rather 

will provide supplementary scientific data to better 

understand the health risks from plutonium in the environment 

of Rongelap. This study component is also the responsibility of the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study. 

The study uses a special plastic detector material that 

registers microscopic pits or "tracks" from the alpha particles emitted by plutonium; the tracks can be made 

visible after a month-long exposure and after etching in a strong NaOH base solution. The pattern of the tracks mimics 

the pattern of the plutonium in the soil, i.e., it can show 

whether the plutonium is distributed evenly as very small 

particles or whether larger granules of plutonium are present. The risk from plutonium depends in a complex way on the size of these particles and, for this reason, learning 

about the particle size is of fundamental interest. During 

the year, a research grade computerized microscope and 

imaging system were developed in conjunction with an American 

microscope supplier and several subcontractors. This system 

enables data to be collected from the plastic track detectors 

indicating the size and quantity of plutonium granules in the 

soil. A collaborator from the Medical Research Council in 

Didcot, United Kingdom, spent two weeks in Majuro helping collect the first set of data in August 1993. Analysis of 

this data is proceeding under the guidance of a statistical 

collaborator at the University of Lancaster in the United 

Kingdom. Analysis of the track images produces tremendous 

volumes of data because of the microscopic scale being examined. Data collection from the many soil samples will 

continue over a period of many months. 

Trace Element Intake study. One possible contributor to 

internal dose, particularly from plutonium, is the direct 

ingestion of soil into the body. This seemingly unlikely occurrence is documented to be a worldwide phenomenon--

sometimes accidental and sometimes intentional--by both 

children and adults. This study component, also the 

responsibility of the Nationwide Radiological Study, is 

designed to directly measure the amount of soil being ingested by children on Mejetto by analyzing feces for trace 

elements found in the soil. This study has a number of 

relatively difficult logistical problems to accommodate and, 

for these and other reasons, has not yet taken place. 

Nevertheless, considerable time this year was devoted to 

literature review, community meetings on Mejetto, preliminary 

data collection, and outside contractor negotiations. Part 

of the difficulty lies in the collection of fecal samples 

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from children over a one-week period, which must proceed 

without any contamination by dust or dirt. At the same time, a carefully controlled selection of food must be supplied to 

the children for all meals in order to eliminate the 

possibility of eating the same trace el-ents that are found 

in the soil. With this study design, samples can be 

collected at one time from only about 251 of the 120 children 

residing at Mejetto. Complete sample collection for the 

children of Mejetto will take about a month. During this 

time, samples require freezing and, therefore, electricity and reliable freezer storage will be required. 

During the past year, extensive negotiations were undertaken 

with the University of Massachusetts to assist in the sample 

analysis. Sample analysis requires a mass spectrometry 

laboratory, a facility available at only a few major research 

institutions. UMass backed out of the project and currently a new contractor is being sought. 

Other progress included the conduct of a food inventory 

survey at every household on Mejetto from which a list of all 

available foods was compiled. From this list, suitable 

dietary choices can be made to design the "tracer 

suppression" diet. · During the course of the study, the foods 

will be analyzed to find the optimal diet for dwellers of the 

rural .areas of the Marshall Islands. 

The completion of this study cannot be foreseen before 

mid-1994. However, the conclusions of this study will not be 

needed to determine compliance with the established dose 

limitations. Plutonium normally contributes very little of 

the total dose; it is likely that the cesium exposure alone 

will determine if compliance _is possible. 

In early November 1993, Dr. Simon attended the second 

Technical oversight Group meeting of the Rongelap Resettlement 

Project. This meeting was held in New Orleans, Louisiana, and was attended by a delegation of the Rongelap leadership and 

scientists from Europe, Japan, and New Zealand. At the New 

Orleans meeting, Dr. Simon presented a substantial document on progress of the four scientific studies for which the Nationwide 

Radiological ·study is responsible. 

Thyroid Study 

Although this study had been long delayed, several important 

steps were made in late 1992 to prepare for a nationwide study of 

the prevalence of thyroid disease. In November 1992, Dr. Simon was visited by two Japanese physicians fro• Tohoku University who were invited to participate in a first phase of the thyroid 

study. Dr. Simon and the physicians held a successful -•ting 

with the medical staff of the Ebeye Hospital for purposes of 

planning the study proposed to begin in Ebeye. 

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The study on the prevalence of thyroid diseases in 

Marshallese had been formally proposed to the Ministry of Health 

in 1992 by the Nationwide Radiological Study and the Scientific 

Advisory Panel. With the agreement of the Ministry of Health and 

Environment and the cooperation of the Ebeye Hospital, the Ebeye 

examination phase, funded by the Nationwide Radiological study, 

commenced early in 1993. Protocol development and general 

planning was assisted by Dr. Klauss Trott and medical 

examinations were conducted by three endocrinology surgeons from 

the second- Department of Surgery of Tohoku University: Dr. 

Keisei Fujimori, Dr. Tatsuya Takahashi, and or. Hiroshi Ohtomo. 

From January 15 to March 7, 1993, screening for thyroid disease was offered to all adult residents of Ebeye. Every participant 

received a physical examination of the thyroid. A blood sample was taken from most participants to evaluate TSH (thyroid 

stimulating hormone) levels as a test for hypothyroidism. In 

addition, basic health data was recorded as well as information on past health conditions, ttiet, and residence history. 

A main objective of the study was to examine persons alive at 

the time of the nuclear testing or those born a few years after 

it ended. Thus, the study intended to concentrate on persons who are now thirty-five years of age or older, with those between 

twenty-eight and thirty-five years of age also of interest for 

comparison purposes. No younger person was refused an examination if requested. Altogether, 1,368 Marshallese 

residents of Kwajalein Atoll were examined . Their ages ranged from sixteen to ninety years. 

There were at least two very strong points to the study design. First, high-resolution ultrasound was used in order that 

the physician could visually examine the thyroid using sound waves displayed on a special video screen. Second, each patient was separately examined by two different medical doctors, one giving a standard palpation examination and the second 

administering an ultrasound examination. The ultrasound machine was used to measure the size of abnormalities (nodules) and 

generate paper copy reproductions of the image. A photograph of 

the ultrasound image was given to each participant and added to 

the patient's medical chart and the sizes of any nodules were recorded. The smallest nodule found by ultrasound was 2 mm and 

the largest was 60 mm diameter. 

Palpable nodules were on average larger than nodules that were non-palpable. The median size of nodules which were non-palpable was 7.5 mm (about 1/4 inch), while the median size 

of palpable nodules was 16 mm (about 3/4 inch), although there was considerable overlap between both distributions. The 

smallest palpable nodule was 7 mm in diameter, while the largest nodule non-palpable was 20 mm in diameter. Nearly 201 of the 

palpable nodules were smaller than 10 mm and nearly 201 of the 

non-palpable nodules were larger than 10 mm. 

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A fine needle aspiration biopsy was performed for each of the 

128 patients with palpable nodules. This is a procedure by which a very minute amount of thyroid tissue sample is removed. The 

tissue sample was stained in Ebeye, sent to Japan, and examined 

by Dr. Norioko Kimura in the second Department of Pathology of 

Tohoku University in Sendai. The percentage of biopsies yielding 

sufficient material to permit an unequivocal diagnosis was about 

601. In twenty-three patients, thyroid cancer is the most likely 

diagnosis; this diagnosis will only be confirmed at the time of 

surgery. Results of the biopsies, however, did indicate 

papillary thyroid cancer in five patients. 

In agreement with most other studies, the prevalence of 

thyroid nodules was higher in females than in males. Also in 

agreement with other studies was a pronounced dependence of 

prevalence on age: nearly 501 of women over sixty years of age were found to have nodular thyroid disease. The total incidence 

of thyroid nodules appears relatively high in the population of 

Ebeye: 13.51 of women over thirty years of age and 6.71 of men over thirty years of age have palpable thyroid nodules. The 

results from the Ebeye study are generally higher than those 

found elsewhere in the world except in the areas with significant iodine deficiency. However, it is also known that sensitive 

screening methods can yield higher nodule prevalence rates. The 

Nationwide ~diological Study is proceeding cautiously in drawing 

conclusions as to the probable causes of these benign and 

malignant nodules. Of most immediate concern is the rate of occurrence of the thyroid cancers and providing the appropriate medical care. 

Medical reports on all i,368 people have been filed at the 

Ebeye Hospital with the patients' medical charts. In addition, 

letters have been distributed to all participants. For those 

persons found to have nodules, the letters were delivered 

directly to them by Dr. Trott during his visit to Ebeye early in 

September 1993 or were sent by mail to those who did not attend 

any of the announced meetings. 

Recommendations for treatment are as follows. For those 

persons with nodules that are non-palpable and for all people with palpable adenomatous goiter which does not cause any difficulty with swallowing or compression of the trachea, no treatment is needed. No surgery should be performed on these cases. A follow-up examination has been scheduled for Spring 1995 for these individuals to determine if. any significant change in their condition has occurred. Surgery should only be 

performed on those people for whom ultrasound or fine needle 

biopsy examinations suggest either cancer or a large follicular 

adenoma. In a few patients, advanced age or other serious 

disease suggests that thyroid surgery would not be in their best 

interest. After consultation with the doctors at the Ebeye 

Hospital, fourteen patients have been selected for thyroid 

surgery because of suspected malignant thyroid nodules. 

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overall, the Ebeye phase of the Thyroid Disease Study was successful. The local population accepted the offer of a thyroid 

examination to dispel or confirm their individual fears 

concerning thyroid disease. The Japanese doctors were very popular and the cooperation and communication with the physicians 

and medical staff in the hospital were excellent. The results of 

the study confirmed the suspected high prevalence of thyroid 

disease in the population, which indeed was higher than 

predicted. 

At a meeting w~th President Kabua and the Nitijela on August 

JO, 1993, the leaders of the nation recommended an extension of 

the study to other atolls. Such a study would initially be based 

in Majuro and later extended to outer atolls. 

The data from the Ebeye study were transferred to computer 

disk using a program supplied by the Department of Preventive 

Medicine at St. Bartholomew1 s Medical College, London. In the 

analysis of this data, the following three hypotheses, as stated 

in the original proposal, will be studied: 

1. People who were children between 1946 and 1958 and who 

lived close to Bikini and Enewetak during those years have a higher risk of thyroid disease than those who lived further 

away. 

2. After 1958, the atoll of residence during childhood had no influence on the risk of thyroid disease. 

3. For persons who became an adult from 1946 to 1958 or who were older, the atoll where they resided at the time of the 

nuclear testing had less influence on the risk of thyroid disease than for those who were children at the time. 

The close association between the Thyroid Disease study and 

the Nationwide Radiological study also provides an important analytical tool not previously available. Recently collected 

environmental radiation data from all atolls can be extrapolated 

backward to estimate the likely exposure at the time of the 

testing for persons at locations throughout the Marshall 

Islands. Although this process is difficult and somewhat 

uncertain, it will be possible to compare the geographic pattern 

of thyroid disease with either the geographic pattern of 

present-day residual contamination or the geographic pattern of 

exposure at the time of the bomb tests. The possibility of 

making these comparisons will improve the ability of this study 

to draw convincing conclusions over previous investigation. 

Other hypotheses may be suggested from closer analysis of the 

information collected during the Ebeye phase of the Thyroid 

Study. However, because more than 6,000 Marshallese who were alive at the time of the bomb tests have yet to be examined, 

other hypotheses will be explored only after the next phase of 

medical examinations and the collection of similar information 

about more participants. By using the largest database possible, 

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the Nationwide Radiological study and the Scientific Advisory Panel will be able to provide the most authoritative 

interpretation. Regardless of the outcome of scientific analyses 

examining the relationship of thyroid disease and radiation 

exposure, many Marshallese citizens with heretofore unknown 

thyroid disease will be identified and provided with appropriate 

medical care. 

summary 

Fiscal Year 1993 was one of significant progress toward 

completion of the radiological field survey of the atolls of the 

Marshall Islands. The size of the laboratory staff remained 

relatively stable, although there was significant change in 

personnel. The plutonium chemistry laboratory and soil sample 

preparation facilities both greatly increased their throughput. 

Despite numerous difficulties with equipment, a significant 

number of samples were meas~red for radioactivity in the 

laboratory. 

The Nationwide Radiological Study was successful in 

conducting the first phase of a Nationwide Thyroid study, 

screening nearly 1,400 Marshallese residing at Kwajalein Atoll. 

Significant progress was also accomplished in the scientific 

studies of the Rongelap Resettlement Project. 

4. Section 177 Health Care Program 

In accordance with Section 103(j) of U.S. Public Law 99-239, 

since April 1987 the Government of the Republic of the Marshall 

Islands has operated the Section 177 Health Care Program as a successor to the Four Atoll Health Care Program that had been 

established and administered by the United States Government. 

Following the precedent established by the Four Atoll Health care Program, the present program serves the Marshallese people with 

ancestral ties to Bikini, Rongelap, Utrik, or Enewetak Atolls. 

These people may live in one of the four principal communities or elsewhere in the Republic. In addition to these enrollees of 

long-standing, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal has assigned to the 

program those citizens of the Marshall Islands who have been 

awarded compensation for physical injury that may have been 

caused by the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program. 

Program overview 

The Section 177 Health Care Program succeeded in providing 

primary, secondary, and tertiary care during 1993, limited only 

by the constraints of a fixed annual budget. Solutions continued 

to be developed to overcome the principal challenge facing the 

program: to provide comprehensive·medical services to the large 

number of people enrolled in the program, while accommodating the 

increasing costs of health care services within the $2.0 million 

annual ceiling established for the program by Article II, Section 

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1 of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States 

and the Government of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation 

of section 177 of the Compact of Free Association. 

The program emphasized decentralized treatment at primary care dispensary sites, with a clinic in Majuro. Central support was provided from Majuro to the health assistants who man the 

dispensaries. Patient referral to secondary treatment facilities 

(the hospitals in Majuro and Ebeye) was arranged and coordinated 

by the administration and medical staff in Majuro. Tertiary care for procedures no~ available within the Marshall Islands was also 

coordinated by the program staff in Majuro and provided under 

contract at the Queen's Medical Center in Honolulu. 

The program continued to evolve to meet the needs of its 

beneficiaries and to adapt to the changing health care environment in the Marshall Islands. Because of a continuing urban migration of people fTom the outer atolls to Majuro, the 

primary care patient load in Majuro continued to increase . Additional primary care resources are now being provided in the 

Majuro clinic, in addition to those in place in the outer atoll 

dispensaries. 

The program had an enrollment of 6,773 at the close of Fiscal 

Year 1993. ·(It is important to note that this figure is 

significantly smaller t~an the 9,907 enrollees at the close of 

Fiscal Year 1992, and even smaller than the approximately 7,300 

enrolles who belonged to the Four Atoll Health Care Program when 

the RMI Government assumed responsibility for the program in 

early 1987. The leaders of the beneficiary communities, 

especially Utrik were able to accomplish this reduction by revising the enrollment lists.) The six operating dispensaries 

and one clinic saw an average of 798 patients per month, a rate 

that approximated nearly one-and-a-half visits per year by 

individuals enrolled in the program. 

In accordance with the Compact legislation, funding for the 

medical program is fixed at $2.0 million per year. The 

fluctuation in the number of people to be served, compounded by 

increases in health care service costs, has often exhausted the 

available funds before the end of the program quarter or year. 

This shortage of funding has caused suspensions in key elements 

of the program for significant periods of time. During Fiscal 

Year 1993 travel support for inter-island referrals was suspended from February 22 through April 21 and again from August 2 through 

the end of the fiscal year. Tertiary care was suspended in 

January 1993 for the remainder of the fiscal year. The program previously provided enrollees residing in Honolulu with the 

opportunity to make a quarterly walk-in visit to the outpatient clinic of the Queen's Medical Center; this feature of the program was suspended in Fiscal Year 1992 and remains suspended. 

For most of the first seven years of the Section 177 Health 

Care Program, it has been a policy that referrals for tertiary care were to be made by the Medical Referral Committee of the RMI 

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326 

Government, with the decisions of the CoJDJDittee subject to a veto 

by the senators from the four atolls. The exercise of this 

privilege by the senators was often described as a "political"-- as opposed to "medical"--referral. Starting with Fiscal Year 

1994, all referrals will be based solely on medical 

considerations. 

A new Health Care Information System was institutionalized 

during the year. This project was supported by a grant and 

technical assistance from the Office of Territorial and 

International Affairs of the U.S. Department of the Interior. 

The system has made possible improved patient referral and 

tracking, recording of medical information, control of expenses, 

and provision of data on patient load and utilization planning. 

During the year, the Section 177 Health Care Program aggressively pursued provider discounts for medical services and 

supplies. Discounts were granted by the major tertiary care provider, Queen's Medical Center of Honolulu, and also by ophthalmological and pharmaceutical suppliers. 

Improvements were made in outer island dispensary equipment as a result of equipment donations obtained from member hospitals 

of Mercy International Health Services. More can and will be 

done to imp~ve the conditions of some of the outer island 

dispensaries in Fiscal Year 1994. 

The RMI Government's Nationwide Radiological Study commissioned a group of Japanese thyroid doctors to screen the 

adult population of Ebeye for the prevalence of thyroid disease. 

The study had two aims. The first was to provide baseline 

information on the prevalence of thyroid disease in the general 

population of the Marshall Islands. The second aim was to 

determine the correlation of the prevalence of thyroid disease 

with suspected causes, such as dietary factors and exposure to 

radioactive iodine during childhood. Of the 1,368 people screened, 128 patients were diagnosed with palpable thyroid nodules, among whom were twenty-three patients with suspected cancers. Most suspected cancers and several cases of large 

non-malignant nodules will require surgery during Fiscal Year 

1994. While this survey is planned to be expanded to other 

locations throughout the nation, the Section 177 Health Care 

Program will have to bear the expenses for treatment of those 

people found to have thyroid nodules. 

The Section 177 Health Care Program continued its emphasis on primary care by sending medical teams to the outer atolls to 

provide on-site medical care. Patients who could not be treated 

at their home atoll were referred to Majuro or Ebeye for .further 

evaluation and treatment. Patients requiring procedures that are not available at Majuro or Ebeye can be referred to Honolulu for 

medical care. In addition to these services, the Section 177 

Health Program operates an outpatient clinic in Majuro. 

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The program is changing in many respects. There is a greater need for outpatient ambulatory care in Majuro, as many residents 

of the outer islands continue to migrate to this urban center. 

The 177 Health Care Program is feeling the effect of this trend 

every day as patients fill the clinic. The RMI National Health 

Plan began operation in October 1991; this plan has a subrogation 

clause which makes the Section 177 Health Care Program the 

primary insurer for all medical expenses of its beneficiaries. 

Improvements were made in the Health Information systems, which 

will provide more accurate and detailed.information for better 

operational planning. The Honolulu referral program was expanded 

to include the Tripler Army Medical Center as a tertiary health care provider. The administrative operation of the Section 177 

Health Care Program was adjusted to accommodate these and other 

dynamics. ' 

s, Enewetak Agricultural and Food Programs 

Background 

Title I, section l0J(h) (2) of the Compact of Free Association 

(U.S. Public Law 99-239) makes provision for a supplemental food 

program for the resettled community at Enewetak Atoll, which had 

been the site of forty-three American atomic and nuclear tests. 

(This section of the Compact also assures that USDA commodity foods will be provided to the people of Enewetak and the three 

other communities in the Marshall Islands that were most directly 

affected by the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program. These programs 

have been extended by law through Fiscal Year 1996.) 

Beginning in Fiscal Year 1988 the Government of the Marshall 

Islands assumed responsibility for those components of the 

agricultural and food program at Enewetak that had formerly been 

administered by TTPI Headquarters: 

a. the Government of the Marshall Islands entered into 

contract with the incumbent captain and engineer of the 

Wetak II motor sailer for a continuation of their services; 

b. beginning with calendar year 1988, the Government of the 

Marshall·Islands paid the annual insurance premium for the 

Wetak II: and 

c. a nutritionist employed by the RMI Ministry of Social 

Services was made available for quarterly trips to Enewetak 

to review the nutritional needs of the.community and make 

recommendations regarding the supplemental foods ordered for 

the community. 

The costs for services administered by the Government of the 

Marshall Islands were covered by a grant from the Office of 

Territorial and International Affairs. Other aspects of the 

rehabilitative work, agricultural maintenance, and food support 

at.Enewetak were performed by the U.S. Department of Energy 

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through its contractors, Holmes and Narver and Raytheon Services 

Nevada. 

The Government of the Marshall Islands and the Office of 

Territorial and International Affairs established similar 

administrative arrangements for the Enewetak Agricultural and 

Food Program in Fiscal Years 1989, 1990, and 1991. 

Throughout this period, management of the program was progressively transferred to the people of Enewetak. To provide training in sever~l areas of expertise, especially for the senior 

managerial positions, the program continued to be administered by the U.S. Department of Energy contractors through Fiscal Year 

1991. With the exception of the indirect support administered by the RMI Government, the Enewetak Council assumed full 

responsibility for the program in the second quarter of Fiscal 

Year 1992, with technical advice provided by the DOE support 

services contractor and the' captain of Wetak II employed by the 

RMI Government. For several years previously, management decisions regarding the Wetak II motor sailer had been made by 

the Enewetak Local Government Council, which owns the vessel. 

Program Highlights -- Fiscal Year 1993 

The bud~t for Fiscal Year 1993 was devised by the Enewetak 

Local Government Council with the assistance of the DOE 

management advisor and RMI Government officials. 

The DOE/Raytheon Services Nevada advisor ended his work at 

the project site on January 31, 1993. The buildings and 

equipment of the field station were transferred by DOE to the 

Enewetak Local Government Council in February 1993. 

The new community pier, which had been completed the previous 

year, facilitated the off-loading of supplies, including the 

supplemental food, delivered by ship. 

With the financial support of the supplemental food program, 

the Enewetak Local Government engaged the services of an American 

health and nutrition consultant to conduct training in nutrition 

for the women of Enewetak. 

Procurement of supplemental Food and Kerosene 

The procurement ot food was coordinated by the Enewetak Field 

station and the Majuro Support Office. The ordering, 

procurement, shipping, and payment were administered by project 

personnel. The quantities of food brought to Enewetak by the 

program were increased to better meet the nutritional needs of 

the community; a total of 3,023 cases of food were shipped to 

Enewetak during the year. In addition, the program shipped 

10,000 gallons of kerosene to Enewetak, the same volume provided 

by the program in Fiscal Year 1992. The·schooner Wetak II 

continued to transport most of the supplemental food and 

kerosene. 

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Agricultural Activities 

. The principal objective of the agricultural program has been 

to re-establish and maintain the traditional food crops of 

coconut, pandanus, breadfruit, taro, lime, and banana. Food 

crops have·been cultivated on the inhabited islands of Enewetak, 

Medren, Japtan, and Ananij. An annual program of brushing and 

weeding is undertaken at each of these four islands. The number 

of food bearing plants at each island are summarized in the table 

below. 

LIVE PLANT STATUS AS OF OCTOBER 1993 

ISLAND COCCIIUTS PAHOAIIUS BREADFRUIT IIAIIANAS LIMES 

Present Nlllbers Present Nuimer Present N....,, Present Nlaler Present 

NUllbers Bear;ng Nuimer Bearing Nuimer Bearh,g Nud>er Bearing Numer 

Enewetak 4n6 2861 1896 629 182 97 59 59 39 

Medren 8435 5630 1550 73 45 22 15 15 18 

Japtan 3555 3505 282 197 21 17 2 2 1 

Anani 5n 566 128 100 0 0 0 0 0 

TOTALS: 1nss 12562 3856 999 248 136 76 76 58 

The agricultural field crew performed crop ·ma.intenance, as well as replanting, constructing windbreaks, cleaning taro pits, 

and watering. The agricultural crew enlarged six of the fifteen 

taro pits adjacent to the Enewetak runway. It is planned that 

other taro pits will be expanded in Fiscal Year 1994. 

In November 1992 Typhoon Gay passed just south of Enewetak 

Atoll. The typhoon brought winds of 60 knots, gusting to 80 

knots, with seas of 15 to 20 feet. The storm caused extensive 

damage to crops, windbreaks, and taro pits. The windbreak 

vegetation was completely swept away at the shoreline. In the 

recovery effort, the agricultural crew replanted the seashore 

windbreak on Enewetak Island with casuarina seedlings. 

The Enewetak Local Government Council established an ordinance requiring pigs to be penned. The ordinance was enforced by the local constables. It is reported that the 

enforcement succeeded in keeping the swine out of the food crop areas. 

Plans and a budget were developed for Fiscal Year 1994 with 

strong emphasis on the planting of food crops, reestablishment of 

nurseries on Enewetak and Medren, and expansion of the planting areas along the Enewetak runway. The plans make provision for 

-28-
the involvement of landowners in the agricultural prograa, 

including the establishment of a garden area on each~ 

(co-unally owned parcel of land), in addition to enlargement of 

the taro pita. The agricultural prograa will be aided with the 

technical assistance of consultants aponsored, in part, by the 

USDA Land Grant program, the United Nationa Oevelop• ent Program, 

and the University of the south Pacific. 

Motor sailer watak II 

During Fisc~l Year 1993 the trading schooner wetak II 

completed eighteen voyages, with trips to Rwajalein, Pohnpei, 

Kosrae, and Ujelang. These -trips were made for the purpose of 

transshipping to Enewetak supplemental foods, kerosene, and other 

supplies. Two inter-atoll charters were contracted to transport 

to Ujelang Atoll (temporary home of the Enewetak co-unity during 

the period of the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program) .members of the 

Enewetak Local Governmen~ Council and a survey team from the RMI 

Nationwide Radiological Study. 

The vessel is now crewed entirely by men from the Enewetak 

community. All except two of the voyages during the past year--

to such destinations at Ujelang, Pohnpei, Kosrae, and Kwajalein-- were made without the presence of the American training captain 

who had previously directed the Wetak II. For each of these 

voyages, the training captain remained available at Enewetak to 

provide assistance via radio communication. In February 1993 the 

training captain relinquished to his Marshallese counterpart 

responsibility for operation and maintenance of the vessel, but 

remained at Enewetak as a management advisor for the program. 

In the transportation of supplemental food and kerosene the 

Wetak II made more voyages and spent more time at sea than in 

previous years. This was due, in part, to the increase in the 

quantities of the quarterly food shipments. The vessel · motorsailed more -than 13,000 nautical miles during the program 

year and transported more than 300,000 pounds of cargo to 

Enewetak. Further increases are anticipated in Fiscal Year 1994. 

Responsibility for planning the voyages remained with the 

Enewetak Local Government council. 

The high turnover of crew members continued to detract from 

efforts at seamanship training. It has been a policy of the 

Local Government council that all sailora on the vessel must be 

members of the Enewetak community, by either birth or marriage. 

consequently, there are very few individuals who are eligible to 

be crew members and are otherwise suitable. 

A priority of the program has been a maintenance program to ensure the safety of the ship and her crew. A special emphasis 

of the program has been to motivate the perfor• ance of routine 

ship maintenance and the application of new skills. 

-29-
331 

In March 1993 the trading schooner Wetak II came to the aid 

of a Japanese longline fishing vessel that had lost her way and was low on fuel. The Wetak II transferred fuel at sea, but the 

fishing boat was still unable to make way. The Wetak II then 

proceeded to tow the fishing vessel sixty nautical miles into the 

calm waters of Enewetak lagoon. There she made repairs with the 

assistance of field station personnel and proceeded to Majuro to commence commercial fishing. 

operation and Maintenance of field station 

The personnel. of the Enewetak Field Station were responsible for procuring and shipping the supplemental food and kerosene 

from Kwajalein, Majuro, Kosrae, and Pohnpei and making payment for these supplies. The shipments were coordinated with the help 

of the logistics coordinator in Majuro. The supplies from Ebeye, 

Kosrae, and Pohnpei were shipped on board the Wetak II, while the 

shipments from Majuro were -transported on intec-island vessels 

operated by the RMI Government. 

The Enewetak Field Station contributed to a number of 

community support projects, including school rehabilitation, road 

repair, and dock rebuilding. In the aftermath of Typhoon Gay, 

the personnel of the Field Station engaged in cleanup and 

reconstruction, including the clearing of debris from the roads 

and ~sand the rehabilitation of a house trailer and the 

carpentry shop at the Field station. 

Among the construction projects completed at the Field 

Station during the year were a new storage building, a toilet 

facility, and a shallow groundwater well to supply saltwater for 

the sewage system. 

Thirty-nine people were employed at the Enewetak Field 

Station. 

Majuro support Office 

From its office in Majuro, the Food and Agricultural 

Logistics Officer supported the Enewetak Agricultural and Food 

Program on a day-to-day basis. He coordinated the procurement and transportation of supplemental food, kerosene, and project supplies. He was also responsible for personnel data records, 

travel arrangements, facsimile communications, and other support services. 

Once the program began operating independently of the U.S. 

Department of Energy in February 1993, the Majuro support Office 

has had sole responsibility for liaison of the program with 

suppliers and other organizations. 

-30-
332 

6. Ronqelap Resettlement Project 

Background 

The residents of Rongelap Atoll were exposed to intensive 

radioactive fallout from the March 1, 1954, Bravo thermonuclear 

test 105 miles upwind at Bikini. Although the fallout was visible on Rongelap--some witnesses described it as snow-like--

the residents, not expecting such a disturbance and not being familiar with the substance, did not take precautions to minimize 

their levels of exposure. The sixty-four Rongelap residents were exposed to about half of a lethal dose of radiation during a fifty-hour period before the U.S. Navy evacuated them to a medical base at Kwajalein. Also removed to Kwajalein were eighteen Rongelapese who had been gathering food and copra on nearby Ailinginae Atoll and the 157 residents of Utrik Atoll who 

had been exposed to less severe levels of radiation. In June 

1954 the U.S. Government authorized the.construction of a temporary village for the Rongelapese on Ejit Island in Majuro 

Atoll, District Center for the Marshall Islands District of the 

U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 

It was later determined that Rongelap Atoll was so heavily 

contaminated that the islanders would not be able to return for an extended period. In February 1957, on the basis of field data 

and dose calculations, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 

with the concurrence of the High Commissioner of the Trust 

Territory of the Pacific Islands, announced that Rongelap Atoll 

had become safe for rehabitation. soon thereafter a repatriation 

program was begun with the reconstruction of the village. In 

late June 1957 approximately 250 Rongelapese who had been living in Majuro or Ebeye return home after nearly forty months of 

exile. Since then, the AEC and its successor agency, the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE), have provided environmental radiation 

monitoring and a radiological health care program for the fallout 

victims of Rongelap and Utrik. The continuation of medical care and its accompanying logistical support are assured through 

Fiscal Year 1997 by Section 103(h)(l) of the Compact of Free 

Association (U.S. PUblic Law 99-239). 

By the mid-l960s, damage to the thyroid gland made its 

appearance in persons in the Rongelap community who were under 

ten years of age at the time of the Bravo blast. Of the nineteen 

persons examined in this age group, seventeen tumors appeared, including one cancer. Of three persons who were exposed in 

utero, two have developed benign thyroid tlllllors. Several 

children became hypothyroidal, and growth was stunted in two boys 

who received very high doses of radiation at about one year of 

age. 

During the first four years following exposure, the frequency 

of miscarriages and stillbirths was higher among exposed women than it was among women who were away from Rongelap when the 

Bravo fallout occurred, but no difference has been observed since 

that time. 

-31-
333 

Low-level residual radioactivity remained on Rongelap at the 

time of the 1957 resettlement. It was found that the coconut 

crab, a much-favored food among Marshallese, tended to 

concentrate strontium-90 and consumption of local crabs was forbidden. Following resettlement of Rongelap, it was apparent 

from the DOE measurements that persons who were not living on Rongelap at the time of the Bravo accident were absorbing 

radioactivity through locally-grown food at the same rate as the 

exposed population. 

Through the 1970s more thyroid nodules appeared. Spokespersons for the Rongelap community, expressing grave concern for the health status of their people, requested an independent health review, which was not granted. 

Fearful of their continued exposure to radiation, all 295 

residents voluntarily abandoned Rongelap in May 1985, with the 

assistance of Greenpeace. The community now resides at Mejetto 

Island in the remote northwest quadrant of Kwajalein Atoll. 

Although DOE scientists agree that the northern islands in 

Rongelap Atoll are still too dangerous for habitation, they 

believe that the southern islands are safe. Uncertainties over this questio_n prompted the u. s. Congress to insert Section 103 ( i) 

in the compact of Free Association, requiring the Government of 

the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) to undertake a scientific project to review the sufficiency of the DOE data and 

conclusions. This study, known as the Rongelap Reassessment 

Project, concluded that: (l)adults may reside on Rongelap Island 

under ordinary conditions with no significant danger from 

radiation, (2)the northern islands of Rongelap Atoll should 

remain off-limits for food gathering until measures have been 

taken to limit the uptake of cesium into the food crops, 

(3)before Rongelap is resettled, the U.S. Department of Energy 

should resume the whole-body counting program for the protection of the settlers, and (4)further scientific inquiry was needed on several important questions. The report of this project was completed and submitted to Congress in 1988 and served as the 

basis for the petition to Congress by the Rongelap community and 

the RMI Government for an appropriation, authorized by the 

compact of Free Association, for the recommended scientific 

studies and the beginning of a resettlement trust fund, which has 

begun to be funded by Congress. 

With a $1.6 million grant from the U.S. Government, the RMI 

Government and the Rongelap Local Government jointly established a scientific project to examine the technical issues identified 

by the Rongelap Reassessment Project as requiring further study, 

including (l)the levels of residual radiation remaining at 

Rongelap Atoll, (2)the possible danger of Rongelap residents 

absorbing plutonium through oral intake, and (J)the dosage of 

radioactivity that infants and small children would receive from 

local foods. 

-32-
334 

The Rongelap Resettlement Project consists of several 

different scientific studies with the overall objective of 

determining the suitability of resettling Rongelap Island and the 

other southern islands of Rongelap Atoll. The determination of 

suitability will be based upon compliance with a dose limit and a soil contamination level. The dose limit of 100 mrem/year above 

background radiation was agreed upon in negotiations between the 

U.S. Department of Energy and representatives of the Rongelap community. The two compliance limits, both of which must be 

satisfied, were written into the agreements governing the 

project. In addition to the dose limit, a maximum level of 

transuranic radionuclides (238-, 239-, jnd 240-plutonium and 

241-americium) in the soil of 0.2 uCi/m was agree~ upon . 

Radiological Monitoring 

The largest study compoRent has been the evaluation of the 

radiological conditions on Rongelap Island and the other southern 

islands of Rongelap Atoll. This study component is the 

responsibility of the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study. Three 

full field missions to Rongelap have been carried out for the 

purpose of making environmental measurements and collecting 

samples. on these trips, all of the southern islands were examined using a systematic grid sampling program in which the 

thick underbrush was cut through to gain access to a regular 

array of sampling locations. over 165 high resolution gamma 

spectrometry measurements were made on Rongelap Island alone. 

These measurements require very sophisticated electronic 

measuring instruments as well as a supply of liquid nitrogen. The 

result is a complete evaluation of gamma emissions from any radionuclide which might be present. The data collected in the 

field is analyzed in the Majuro laboratory of the RMI Nationwide 

Radiological Study. All of these spectral measurements have now been analyzed and are being used to predict the whole-body gamma 

exposure to which a future inhabitant of Rongelap would be 

exposed. 

At each site, surface soil samples were collected for 

evaluating transuranic levels since these radionuclides cannot be 

measured by gamma emissions. These samples are analyzed by a combination of wet chemistry and alpha spectrometry techniques. First, however, the soil is prepared by drying and ·crushing, in a process of many steps. Typically, no more than ten soil samples can be analyzed in a week. The analysis of these samples will be 

completed in mid-November 1993. 

Deep soil profiles were also acquired on the field trips. 

Data from the soil profiles are used in interpreting all the 

other measurements. 

In addition, samples of coconuts, breadfruit, arrowroot, 

coconut crabs and pig meat collected from Rongelap are also being 

analyzed. All sample analysis is nearly complete. 

-33-
335 

A number of samples have been divided ("split") with 

scientists from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the 

prime contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, to evaluate 

the radiological conditions of Rongelap. The split sample 

analysis from Rongelap Island is now complete and a comparison is 

underway. Following confirmation of DOE data, additional 

measurements from Lawrence Livermore will be made available to 

the Rongelap Resettlement Project scientists as a supplement to 

their own data for use in the project assessment. 

Diet Study 

The evaluation of gamma exposure described above is only one component of the information that will be needed to determine 

compliance with the dose limit. Another major contributor to 

dose is the internal dose received from foods which contain 

137-cesium. The foods are being analyzed as described above. 

However, it is important to know the quantities of food typically consumed. The Memorandum of Understanding governing the project requires that exposure be evaluated on the basis of both a "local 

food" only diet and a mixed diet of local and imported foods. A 

study to determine a suitable diet for compliance calculation 

purposes is the responsibility of Mr. Bernd Franke. Mr. Franke 

has used the expertise of a professional dietician from the South 

Pacific Commission, with guidance from a diet expert on the 

project Oversight Group. A diet survey was conducted on Mejetto 

in May 1993 using about a dozen volunteers from the community who were trained in a workshop in Majuro early that month. Data 

analysis of the results of the diet survey are proceeding and 

should be available soon for external review and eventual use in 

the dose compliance calculations. 

compliance Evaluation 

The methods used to evaluate compliance, particularly for the 

dose limit, are relatively complex. This is because the dose 

calculated is a projection. as opposed to a measured quantity. Consequently, extreme care will be taken to maintain scientific 

credibility. This activity, in particular, requires extensive 

docum~ntation of the assumptions involved and the evidence in 

support of those assumptions. A method developed by Dr. Steven 

L. Simon, Director of the RMI Nationwide Radiological study, from 

his previous work in dosimetric evaluation was presented to the 

Rongelap oversight Group in August 1992 and was subsequently 

evaluated in England by a statistical consultant. This subject will be reviewed again by the Oversight Group at the scheduled 

meeting in New Orleans in early November 1993. Dose calculations are expected to be carried out early in 1994 using all of the 

available data from the studies. 

Microdistribution of Plutonium in soil 

The objective of this study is to evaluate the microscopic 

characteristics of plutonium in the soil. The results from this 

study do not directly factor into the compliance calculations, 

-34-
336 

but rather will provide supplementary scientific data to better 

understand the risks from plutonium in the environment of 

Rongelap. This study component is also the responsibility of the 

RMI Nationwide Radiological study. 

The study uses a special plastic detector material which 

registers microscopic "tracks" from the alpha particles emitted 

by plutonium: after being exposed for a month to soil samples taken from Rongelap, the tracks can be made visible by developing in a stron~ base solution. The pattern of the tracks aimics the 

pattern of the pl~tonium in the soil, i.e., it can show whether 

the plutonium is distributed evenly as very small particles or whether there are larger granules of plutonium present. The risk 

from plutonium depends in a complex way on the size of these 

particles and, hence, learning about the particle size is of 

fundamental interest. The past year has seen the development of a research grade computerized microscope-imaging system to record 

and analyze the track data .from the plastic detectors. The 

system was developed by a contractor from specific requirements 

written for the needs of the study. In August 1993 a collaborator from the Medical Research Council in Didcot, United 

Kingdom, spent two weeks in Majuro helping to collect the first 

set of data. Analysis of this data is proceeding under the 

guidance of a statistical collaborator at the University of 

Lancaster in. the United Kingdom. Analysis of the track images produces tremendous volumes of data because of the microscopic scale being examined. Data collection from the many soil samples 

will continue over a period of many months. 

Trace Element Intake study 

one possible contributor to internal dose, particularly from 

plutonium, is the ingestion of soil directly into the body. This 

seemingly unlikely occurrence is documented to be a worldwide 

phenomenon--sometimes accidental and sometimes intentional--in 

both children and adults. This study component, also the 

responsibility of the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study, is 

designed to directly measure the amount of soil being ingested by children on Mejetto Island by analyzing their feces for trace 

elements found in the soil. This study has had to overcome relatively difficult logistical problems and, for this and other 

reasons, the field work for this study has not yet been 

accomplished. Nevertheless, considerable time has been devoted 

to literature review, community meetings on Mejetto, preliminary 

data collection, and negotiations with an outside contractor. 

Part of the difficulty lies in the collection of fecal samples over the course of a one-week period without any contamination by 

dust or dirt. During this week-long period, the project will 

have to supply food for all meals in order to eliminate the 

possibility of the children eating the same trace elements, which 

might be present in their food. With the present study design, 

samples can be collected at one time from only about one-fourth 

of the 120 children residing at Mejetto. Therefore, sample 

collection at Mejetto will take about a month. During this time, 

samples will have to be frozen, thus electricity and reliable 

freezer storage will be required. 

-35-
337 

During the past year, extensive contract negotiations were undertaken with the School of PUblic Health at the University of 

Massachusetts to assist in the sample analysis. Sample analysis 

requires a mass spectrometry laboratory, a facility which is 

available at many institutions. This analysis cannot be 

performed in Majuro. currently, a new contractor is being sought as the University of Massachusetts recently backed out of the 

project. Securing a new contractor should not be difficult. 

For this component of the project, a food inventory survey was conducted at every household on Mejetto. From this survey a list was compiled of all foods normally consumed by the residents 

of Mejetto. From this list,. suitable dietary choices can be made 

to design the "tracer suppression" diet. During the course of 

the study, analysis will be conducted on the foods to find the 

optimal diet. 

The completion of this study cannot be foreseen before 

mid-1994. However, the overall issue of compliance can be judged 

without this component of the study. Plutonium normally 

contributes very little of the total dose, and it is likely that 

the cesium exposure alone will determine whether compliance is 

possible •. 

Plutonium in Bone study 

Long unanswered has been the question of how much plutonium is absorbed by the human body following exposure. Previous 

scientific data indicates that only a small fraction is absorbed, 

the remainder being relatively quickly eliminated. That fraction 

of the plutonium absorbed, however, becomes nearly permanently 

resident in the skeleton. There the risk arises from the bloodforming cells and the bone tissue being continuously exposed to 

the alpha particle emissions of the plutonium. A study of the 

plutonium in deceased Rongelap residents was contracted to Mr. 

Bernd Franke. In January 1993 bone samples were acquired from seven exhumed bodies that had been buried on Mejetto Island. Of 

the seven subjects, one was exposed to Bravo fallout, six others were exposed to only residual contamination on Rongelap after 

1957 and one was a control subject from Majuro. Analysis of the 

samples is proceeding at a laboratory in Germany; some split samples are being analyzed elsewhere for comparison. 

-36-
338 

Ambassador KENDALL. In addition, we understand that the preserved thyroid glands removed from approximately 77 Marshallese 

patients who were exposed to radioactive fallout from the U.S. 

bomb tests are in storage at the Brookhaven National Laboratory 

Medical Program. We respectfully request that the orders be returned to the Republic of the Marshall Islands as they are the perso~/ property of the Marshallese. 

Article 9 of the section 177 agreement has particular bearing on 

this hearing and at the risk of being redundant, I would like to 

quote that in full. 

If loss or damage to pr<>perty and person of the citizens of Marshall Islands, re- sulting from the Nuclear Testing Program, arises or is discovered after the effective 

date of this agreement, and said injuries were not and could not have reasonably 

been identified as of the effective date of this ~ment and if said injuries ren- dered the provision of this agreement manifestly madequate, the Government of the 

Marshall Islands may request that the Government of the United States _provide for 

such injuries by submitting such a request to the Congress of the United States for 

its consideration. 

We note that article 9 of the section 177 agreement, Mr. Chairman, also provides that Congress is not committed by the changedcircumstances provision to authorize or appropriate funds to additional compensation. Nonetheless, it is the view of my Government 

that the United States Government continue responsibilities arising from the effects of the nuclear testing program on our people 

and our islands and the environment. We believe that the United 

States carries the responsibility to compensate our people. 

The information which has been developed since 1983 when the 

section 177 compact agreement was negotiated, some of which we 

have heard about today and the nearly eight years of experience 

of the Marshall Islands Government in implementing the Compact 

of Free Association have made it abundantly clear that the state 

of our knowledge about the effects of the nuclear tests on our island and our people have changed in a material way since the compact was negotiated. 

The section 177 settlement is a significant and important measure taken by the U.S. Government and my Government which addresses the effects of testing, but it is incomplete and additional 

claims are existing at the time. 

Day by day, we are developing compelling evidence that the fallout from the detonation at Bikini and Enewetak was more widespread than previously disclosed, and that many more Marshallese 

people were exposed to higher levels of radiation than previously 

discovered. 

Acting on the basis of this mounting evidence the Government of 

the Republic of the Marshall Islands soon will determine if there 

are grounds to invoke article 9 of the section 177 agreement. Based 

on the new information already before us which did not exist in 

1983, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the section 177 agreement is manifestly inadequate. Because the evidence upon which 

a formal request under article 9 will be based is being developed, 

we will continue to gather evidence and information before coming 

to Congress with an official proposal. 

Our request will be formulated as we make final determinations 

based on the facts, and we look forward to working with the subcommittee in particular on this important matter. Mr. Chairman, 
339 

as you are aware, the people of my country were greatly harmed 

by the nuclear testing program. 

The physical harm to the people of Rongelap and Utirik is welldocumented, and we know of the deprivations endured by the communities of Bikini and Enewetak as a result of their compulsory relocation. 

In addition to these wrongs which have long been acknowledged 

by the United States Government, it is the conviction of my Government that many more Marshallese people were harmed than 

have been recognized throughout the prolonged negotiation of the 

compact. This was always our position. 

At that time, our evidence was anecdotal. It had arisen from 

daily life in the Marshall Islands during the testing era and now 

it depends on the government radio station, passed along by word 

of mouth, told people to cover their fresh-water systems or wrap 

their heads in arms if outside during a test. The Marshallese witnessed the glow of the blast. Many Marshallese people attribute 

their illnesses from the radiation from these tests. The Marshallese 

people are still haunted by uncertainty and fear about radiation. 

We are now assembling documentation to enable Congress to fully 

appreciate the impact of the testing on our people. 

It is important that the record of this hearing reflect the fact 

that radioactive contamination from the nuclear testing program 

remains a serious threat to human health and safety and to the environment. There are islands that continue to be severely contaminated. Indeed they remain off-limits to the people of the Marshall 

Islands. Other islands have various levels of residual radioactive 

contamination. 

Equally important, it must be recognized, that previous cleanup 

efforts failed to conform with standards that prevail today. It is obvious that the American public will never accept in the United 

States the kind of conditions that exist in the Marshall Islands. 

Under such circumstances, it is critically important that our two 

Governments work together to find a prompt, permanent and responsible solution to this problem. 

Mr. Chairman this concludes my remarks. Sitting with me this 

afternoon are other witnesses from the Marshall Islands whom I 

would like to introduce now. 

With me at the table I would like to address Mr. Peter Oliver to 

my right, Mr. Bill Graham, Senator Johnsay Riklon from Rongelap, 

Mayor Billiet Edmond of Bikini and Henchi Balas, Senator from 

Bikini, Ismael John, Senator for Enewetak, and Toko Henry, a citizen of Enewetak. 

Also in the audience is one of our negotiators who did a lot of 

work on the Compact of Free Association. I would like to introduce 

him. Also he is part of the delegation. I believe he will have something to say if the committee so desires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Ambassador Kendall follows:] 
340 

• ~- ,,0 

\ V 

· . ...___./ 

STATEMENT OP WILFRED I. DIIIDALL 

AMBASSADOR PROK 

THE REPUBLIC OF TBE MARSHALL ISLAIIIDB 

TO TBE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

BEFORE 

TBE SUBCOKKIT'l'BE 011 

OVERSIGHT I.KVESTIGATIOIIS 

COKKITTBE 011 IIATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

February 24, 1994 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, 

On behalf of the Government and people of the Marshall 

Islands, I would like to express our gratitude to you for 

investigating the effects of the United States Nuclear Testing 

Program that was conducted in our country for a twelve-year 

period during the height of the Cold War. I know that you, 

Mr. Chairman, and many members of the Committee on Natural 

Resources have long been concerned about the harm that was 

caused to the Marshallese people. We very deeply appreciate 

your concern, and we thank you for holding the hearing today 

and inviting our participation. We strongly urge the 

Subcommittee to continue investigating the disturbing 

questions that have been raised in testimony today, and we 

would encourage the Subcommittee to reconvene · in the months 

ahead to consider the response of the Department of Energy to 

these questions. 

1 
341 

The legacy of the Nuclear Testing Program is a central 

feature of the present relationship between the United States 

and the Marshall Islands. The two nations are allied in the 

Compact of Free Association, which came into effect in October 

1986. Section 177 of this Compact and the related subsidiary 

agreement established a mechanism for compensating the people 

of the Marshall Islands who suffered physical injury or loss 

of property from the Nuclear Testing Program. The 

compensatory programs administered by my government include 

direct payments each quarter to four communities affected by 

the nuclear tests, a Claims Tribunal that adjudicates disputes 

and makes awards to claimants, a continuation of the Four 

Atoll Health care Program originally established by U.S. law, 

and the Nationwide Radiological Study that Dr. Simon discussed 

in his testimony. The Marshall Islands Government also 

administers supplemental food programs for the nuclear victims 

and assists the people of Rongelap in administering the 

Rongelap Resettlement Project. 

Mr. Chairman, the many nuclear-related programs 

administered by the Marshall Islands Government are further 

described in a July 8, 1993, letter to you from Foreign 

Minister Tom Kij iner, and I request that this letter be 

included in the record of this hearing. 

2 
342 

I would also like to provide for the record a report on 

implementation of the Section 177 Agreement during Fiscal Year 

1993. 

Finally, I ask to be included in the record of this 

hearing a recent letter from my government to the Department 

of Energy requesting additional information about the Nuclear 

Testing Program. 

In addition, we understand that the preserved thyroid 

glands, removed from approximately 77 Marshallese patients who 

were exposed to radioactive fallout from the U.S. bomb tests, 

are in storage at the Brookhaven National Laboratory Medical 

Program. We respectfully request that the preserved organs be 

returned to the Republic of the Marshall Islands as they are 

the personal property of the Marshallese citizens. 

Article IX of the Section 177 Agreement has particular 

bearing on this hearing. This article provides as follows: 

"If loss or damage to property and person of the 

citizens of the Marshall Islands, resulting from 

the Nuclear Testing Program, arises or is 

discovered after the effective date of this 

Agreement, and such injuries were not and could not 

reasonably have been identified as of the effective 

date of this Agreement, and if such injuries render 

the provisions of this Agreement manifestly 

inadequate, the Government of the Marshall Islands 

may request that the Government of the United 

States provide for such injuries by submitting such a request to the Congress of the United states for 

its consideration ••• " 

3 
343 

We note that Article IX of the Section 177 Agreement also 

provides that Congress is not committed by the changed 

circumstances provision to authorize or appropriate funds for 

additional compensation. Nonetheless, it is the view of my 

government that the United States government has significant 

continuing responsibilities arising from the effects of the 

nuclear testing program on our people and o~r islands, and the 

responsibility of the U.S. includes as yet uncompensated 

injuries and other damages resulting from its nuclear testing 

program which are still being discovered. 

The information which has been developed since 1983 when 

the Compact Section 177 Agreement was negotiated, some of 

which we have heard about today, and the nearly 8 years of 

experience of the Marshall Islands Government in implementing 

the Compact of Free Association -- have made it abundantly 

clear that the state of our knowledge about the effects of the 

nuclear tests on our land and our people has changed in a 

material way since the compact was negotiated. The Section 

177 settlement is a significant and important measure taken by 

the u. s. and my government which addresses the effects on 

t;esting, but it is incomplete and based only on claims 

existing at the time. 

4 
344 

Day-by-day, we are developing compelling evidence that 

the fallout from the detonations at Bikini and Enewetak was 

more widespread than previously disclosed, and that many more 

Marshallese people were exposed to higher levels of radiation 

than previously discovered. Acting on the basis of this 

mounting evidence, the Government of the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands soon will determine if there is grounds to 

invoke Article IX of the Section 177 Agreement. Based on the 

new information already before us which did not exist in 19t!3, 

it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Section 177 

Agreement is manifestly inadequate. 

Because the evidence upon which a formal request under 

Article IX will be based is being developed, we will continue 

to gather evidence and information before coming to Congress 

with an official proposal. Our request will be formulated as 

we make final determinations based on the facts, and we will 

look forward to working with the Subcommittee in particular, 

on this matter. 

Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the people of my country 

were greatly harmed by the "nuclear testing program". The 

physical harm to the people of Rongelap and Utrik is well 

documented, and we know of the deprivations endured by the 

communities of Bikini and Enewetak as a result of their 

5 
345 

compulsory relocation. But in addition to these wrongs, which 

have long been acknowledged by the United States Government, 

it is the conviction of my government that the many more 

Marshallese people were harmed than had been recognized. 

Throughout the prolonged negotiation of the Compact, this was 

always our position. 

At that time, our evidence was anecdotal. It had arisen 

from daily life in the Marshall Islands during the testing 

era. Announcements on the government radio station, passed 

along by word of mouth told people to cover their fresh water 

cisterns or wrap their heads and arms, if they ventured 

outside when a test was scheduled. Many Marshallese people 

witnessed the glow of the Bravo blast on their northern 

horizon. Many Marshallese people attribute their illnesses to 

the radiation from these tests. And the Marshallese people 

are still haunted by uncertainty and fear about radiation. We 

are now assembling documentation to enable Congress to fully 

appreciate the impact of the testing on our people. 

It is important that the record of this hearing reflect 

the fact that radioactive contamination from the Nuclear 

Testing Program remains a serious threat to human health and 

safety and to the environment. There are islands that 

continue to be severely contaminated, indeed, they remain offlimits to the people of the Marshall Islands. Other islands 

6 
346 

have varying levels of residual radioactive contamination. 

Equally important, it must be recognized that previous cleanup 

efforts fail to conform with standards that prevail today. It 

is obvious that the American public would never accept in the 

United States the kind of conditions that exist in the 

Marshall Islands. Under such circlllllstances, it is critically 

important that our two governments work together to find a 

prompt, permanent, and responsible solution to this problem. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. Sitting with me 

this afternoon are other witnesses from the Marshall Islands. 

I would like to introduce them as they offer their testimony. 

Once again, I thank the Subcommittee for its interest in 

this vitally important matter. 

7 
347 

Mr. MILLElt. Are there other members of the panel who have 

statem~)lts to make or comments? 

/ STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. GRAHAM 

/Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I am Bill Graham, the public advocate at the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. We have the statutory responsibility for advising, assisting and representing claimants before the tribunal. I think that my statement encapsulates the compensation program that the tribunal has been able to put in place 

since its establishment in mid-1988. I believe that speaks for itself. 

I would just like to state that I think that the testimony that has 

been made before the committee already today clearly documents 

the changed circumstances in the medical and scientific knowledge. 

I believe there are many changed circumstances in other areas as 

well, but I would like to note that the medical and scientific knowledge of the effects of radiation, which I think has been sufficiently 

documented as having changed since the date the 177 agreement 

was signed is not based on studies that have been done in the Marshall Islands of effects of the radiation on humans, but it is more 

based on the effects that have been done by the Radiation Effects 

Research Foundation in Hiroshima and other groups. In fact, there 

have ,not been the studies conducted on the effects of radiation on 

the people of the Marshall Islands that were envisioned in Public 

Law 96-205, which required, and I quote, "comprehensive periodic 

survey and analysis of the radiological status of the atolls, development of updated radiation dose assessments, and risk estimates of 

residing on the atolls." 

As the public advocate, I have had opportunities to talk with Dr. 

Radford and Dr. Hamilton about this and many others of the doctors who have been involved, they are always looking at the reports 

and the studies that have been generated on other people and not 

on the people of the Marshall Islands, per se. These studies have 

not been done that would enable us to state with any certainty what the real effects of the testing program and the radiation created by it were and have been and will be on the people of the Marshall Islands. 

In addition, although it may not be my place to do so, I don't 

know that anyone else will do so. I would like to introduce into the 

record of this hearing a resolution that was adopted by the Nitijela 

of the Marshall Islands earlier this month. I am inserting a certified copy. 

In accordance with the statement at the end, the resolution will 

be provided to President Clinton, to Secretary O'Leary, to Senator 

Johnston, as well as to yourself, Chairman Miller, but their resolution deals with the issue that I was just speaking to and it respectfully requests the Government of the United States to provide for 

the construction and operation, maintenance and staffing of a specialized hospital in the Republic of the Marshall Islands to diagnose and treat patients with thyroid cancers and other related 

medical conditions resulting from the nuclear testing program and 

to further provide funding for medical and radiological studies with 

respect thereto. 

As much as the declassification of past information is important, 

this, I believe, is as important, if not more so, that we begin to deal 
348 

with those effects and begin to really assess and analyze what 

those effects are and will be in the future on the people of the Marshall Islands. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:] 
349 

BEFORE THE UNITED ST ATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

STATEMENT OF BILL GRAHAM, PUBLIC ADVOCATE 

MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 

FEBRUARy/24, 1994 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, 

The Agreement for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association, 

signed by Marshall Islands President Amata Kabua and United States Ambassador Fred Zeder in 

Majuro in June 1983, formally recognized as yet unspecified "contributions and sacrifices made by 

the people of the Marshall Islands in regard to the Nuclear Testing Program." 

In Article VIII of that Agreement, the Government of the United States concluded that the 

Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Survey and related environmental studies conducted by it 

represented "the best effort ... to evaluate and describe radiological conditions in the Marshall 

Islands" and that those studies "can be used for the evaluation of the food chain and environment 

and estimating radiation-related health consequences of residing in the Northern Marshall Islands." 

The state of the art scientific reference available at the time for estimating such radiation-related 

health consequences was the report "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of 

Ionizing Radiation" issued in July 1980 by the National Academy of Sciences/National Research 

Council's Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. 

That report, commonly known as BEIR III, acknowledged that there were unresolvable 

differences among committee members concerning the methods of extrapolating to the most 

probable effects of low doses of radiation. Because of those differences, the somatic effects 

section of the initial final draft report that had been approved by the Academy in 1979 was 

modified by a subgroup of the committee, resulting in the writing of a strong dissenting statement 

to the report by Dr. Edward P. Radford, Chairman of the overall BEIR III Committee and of the 

Subcommittee on Somatic Effects. 

Dr. Radford stated his support for the linear no-threshold model originally adopted by the 

subcommittee for estimating cancer induction by radiation, as opposed to the linear-quadratic 

model frequently employed in the final version of the report. He observed that the approach used 

"has the effect of reducing the cancer risk estimates ... " and that this conclusion "ignores the 

considerable body of supportive data ... which indicate that as the follow-up of human study 

populations has been extended, evidence of cancer risk is increasing, the doses at which effects 

have been observed have progressively decreased, and the number of different human cancers in 

which radiation exposure has shown an effect has been extended." [BEIR III, page 250] 

- 1 -

79-784 0-94-12 
350 

In 1990, the National Research Council and National Academy of Sciences issued a new report 

entitled "Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation-BEIR V." Citing 

"significant developments in our knowledge" and "new data on the late health effects of radiation in 

humans," thc Executive Swnnwy section of the SEIR V report states (at page 6): ''The cancer rislc 

estimates derived with the preferred models used in this repon arc about 3 times larger for solid 

cancers (relative risk projection) and about 4 times larger for leukemia than the rislc estimates 

presented in the BEIR ill rcpon." 

Clearly, circumstances had changed with regard to accepted medical and scientific knowledge 

about the effects on humans of exposure to radiation since the 1983 consummation of the Section 

In Agreement 

In the meantime, in accordance with Article IV of the Agreement, the Government of the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands had established the Nuclear Claims Tribunal in mid-1988, giving 

it statutory jurisdiction "to render final determination upon all claims past, present and future of the 

Government, the citizens and nationals of the Marshall Islands which arc based on, arise out of, or 

arc in any way related to the Nuclear Testing Program." 

During the first year of its existence, the Tribunal received thousands of claims for an extensive 

variety of personal injuries, land damage and loss of personal property from and on behalf of 

individuals from every atoll in the Marshall Islands. In addition, the Tribunal had: 

Reviewed the rcponed results of the 1978 Northern Marshall Islands Radiological 

Survey, noting that the survey had been conducted strictly on an aerial basis and that 

K wajalcin and all atolls to the south had been excluded from the survey; 

Analyzed both the BEIR III report and the history of medical findings of Brookhaven 

National Laboratory visits to the Marshall Islands, and observed that the focus of the 

latter's examinations had been limited largely to the people of Rongelap and Utirik; 

Apprised itself of the programs established by Congress for the benefit of those people 

of the Marshall Islands deemed to have been affected by the testing program1 and 

ascenained what had been done to provide compensation and medical care and treatment; 

Sought information on the monitoring for illnesses, the comprehensive periodic survey 

and analysis of radiological status, and the development of updated radiation dose 

assessments and risk estimates mandated by Congress in 19802, and found no evidence 

of any such efforts beyond Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik; and 

For example: U.S. Public Laws 88-485 (1964) and 95-134 (1977), which provided compensation to lhe 

peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik "in full sclllcmcnt and discharge of all claims apinst lhc 

United Slates arising out of lhc lhcrmonuclcar dcronalion on Man:h I, 1954" and PL. 96-205 (1980), which was 

intended to "provide for lhc people of lhc atolls of Bikini, Encwctalt, Rongelap, and l}tirik alld for the people of 

siu:lt otkr a1olls as may be folUld ID be or ID have been upo:red to radialio11 fro,n tk ruu:lear lllff/lOIIS testillg 

program, a progran of medical CR and IRallnCm.- • (iialics added) 

2 Also provided for under U.S. Public Law 96-205. 

- 2-
351 

Taken notice of U. S. Public Law 100-321 (the Radiation-Exposed Veterans 

Compensation Act of 1988), which provided a "presumption of service connection" to 

veterans who panicipated in the testing program for 13 specified medical conditions. 

By mid-1989, the Tribunal had realized that it could not effectively carry out its mandate based 

on the limited information available to it. Most of the personal injury claims before it were not 

supported by a documented medical diagnoses and so could not be adjudicated in a fair manner. 

And without radiological survey results for half of the nation's atolls and islands, many of the land 

claims could never be heard. Accordingly, the Tribunal requested the Government of the Republic 

to utilize the $3 million available to it under Article Il, Section l(e) of the Section 177 Agreement to 

conduct medical surveillance and radiological monitoring activities on a nationwide basis. 

A medical diagnostics program, directed by expatriate M.D.s, was established by the Republic 

in early 1990 and was continued by the Tribunal, at its own expense, for an additional six months 

when the allocated 177 funds had been exhausted in late 1992. During the three years of its 

existence, the program's doctors examined and/or reviewed medical records of nearly 3,500 

personal injury claimants and filed with the Tribunal individual diagnostic reports on each. 

In addition, in late 1989, a nationwide radiological study was initiated by the Republic under 

the direction of a resident scientist working with an international scientific advisory panel. The 

activities of that study continue and will be reported on today by Dr. Steven Simon. 

With documented medical diagnoses of personal injury claimants beginning to come before the 

Tribunal and the release of the BEIR V report, the Tribunal was finally able to begin, in early 

1991, the actual process of establishing a compensation program for personal injury. In carrying 

out this task, an important guideline was provided by the United States Radiation Exposure 

Compensation Act of 1990 (P.L. 100-406). Under that law, Congress found that "fallout emitted 

during the Government's atmospheric nuclear tests exposed individuals to radiation that is 

presumed to have generated an excess of cancers among these individuals." (italics added) The 

law provides for "partial restitution" in the form of payments of $50,000 for any of 13 specified 

diseases suffered by people meeting certain physical presence requirements. 

Before, during, and after the testing program, the U.S. had failed to compile exposure data on 

the people of the Marshall Islands, had failed to investigate thoroughly the existing health and nonradiation risk factors of the population, and had largely provided medical diagnostic services only 

to the people of Rongelap and Utirik, whose radiation exposure levels it could only estimate. 

In light of the presumptions of service connection and causation extended by the United States 

to its own citizens, the Tribunal determined that it could do no less than provide for similar 

presumptions on behalf of the people of the Marshall Islands. Therefore, after much deliberation 

and review, the Tribunal adopted regulations in August 1991 identifying 25 medical conditions 

which it would administratively presume were caused by exposure to radiation created by the 

testing for those who were physically present in the Ma:rshalls Islands during the period of testing. 

In late I 993, the Tribunal amended its regulations to include two additional conditions on the 

presumed list, bringing the current total to 27 (see Attachment 1 ). 

- 3 -
352 

The first 13 of the Tribunal's presumed conditions arc the same as in the Radiation-Exposed 

Veterans Compensation Act and the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act. The additional 14 

were adopted based on research finding of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Japan and 

its Life Span Study of atomic bomb survivors, the conclusions contained in BEIR V, and on 

consultation with and recommendations of Dr. Roben Miller, a recognized expen in the area of 

radiation health effects who is the Chief of Clinical Epidemiology at the National Cancer Institute. 

Once the original list of 25 presumed conditions had been finalized, the Tribunal's attention 

was directed to setting amounts of compensation for each condition. With substantial input from a 

variety of medical professionals, a rating system was developed taking into account three distinct 

matrices: typical prognosis, general amount of pain and suffering, and level of treatment usually 

involved for each condition. This led to an overall ranking of the original 25 conditions with a 

wide range of impact between the top and bottom. · 

The Tribunal then re-examined the provisions of the U.S. Radiation Exposure Compensation 

Act. Of the 13 ·conditions compensated equally at $50,000 under that law, it was clear that thyroid 

cancer ranked well below the other 12 on the Tribunal's ranking of overall impact. Based on this, 

the Tribunal determined that the $50,000 RECA payment for thyroid cancer should be viewed as a 

benchmarlt and that compensation levels for the other 24 conditions should be established based on 

their relative impact and severity (again, see Attachment 1). 

To date, the only compensation awards made by the Tribunal have been for those 27 presumed 

medical conditions, as suffered by individuals who were physically present in the Marshall Islands 

during the testing program. 

Only a few awards have been made for presumed medical conditions suffered by deceased 

individuals for whom the only documented diagnosis is that contained on a cenificate of death. 3 

No awards have been made for any personal injuries suffered by individuals who had not been 

born (or were noc in Ulero) by the conclusion of the testing program. 

No awards have been made for other accepted radiogenic conditions such as lung cancer which 

may be proven by an individual to have resulted from the testing program but which arc not on the 

presumed list because of other risk factors.4 

3 A decision issued by the Tribunal ill JWle 1993 provided that, widl cenain restrictions, "111y certificate admilled 

ror the purpose of showin& lhlt a decCldenl suffcied rrom a compensable condilion should cansli111tc prima raae 

evidence of dial issue.• Thal decisiaa limited the accepcable period between lime of dead! atd signing of die 

certifltalc by the physician ID flw days. In January 1994, based on briers filed berorc it, die Tribunal issued a 

decision swing that it "will admit death catificata which are siped up ID one r-~ dead! as prima Cacie 

evidence or the existence or non«istenc:e of a medical condition.· Resolution of over 20 such claims is pellding. 

4 It is expected that resolution of claims for such •non-preswned penooal injuries" will begin durina this year 

through fcnnal individual and/or aroup hearings conducled by the Tribunal. Before those hearinp can be 

scheduled, however, radiation upollft dole estimala must be prepan:d on• individual bail for each ci.nwho suffcied from a non-presumed medical condition dial could have raultcd from radiation. The need for these 

dose estimates has been commuaicaled ID die llllionwide radiological study but i1 is unccnain when or if the 

Sllldy will be able to provide the ie:iucsud informalion. 

-4-
353 

No awards have been made for any of the genetic effects which have been diagnosed and 

which may be linked to parental exposure. 

No awards have been made for the many documented birth abnonnalities or anomalies that 

have been observed since the testing program began. 

No awards have been made for the side effects, intrusions on lifestyles, or inconveniences 

experienced by the people of the Marshall Islands. For example, Atomic Energy Commission 

doctors prescribed, on a preventive basis in the 1960s, daily thyroid medication for many of the 

people of Rongelap and Utirik for the rest of their lives. 

No awards have been made for exposure per se or for any other emerging effects of radiation 

that may be found. 

And no awards have been made for damage to, loss of, or loss of use of any land or property. 

Despite having made no awards in any of these areas, over half of the $45.75 million available 

to the Tribunal over the period of the Compact for payment of all types of damage has already been 

awarded5 since the first claims were approved and initial payments were made by the Tribunal in 

August 1991. Annual pro-rata payments, made every October since 1991, have resulted in actual 

distributions of $9.1 million, representing a current cumulative payment of 40% of each award. 

Current information leads one to conclude that the extent of the damage caused by exposure to 

radiation from the testing program, although presumably greater on Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap 

and Utirik, was by no means limited to those atolls. The fact is that compensation has been 

awarded to people from every atoll in the nation (see Attachment 3), suggesting that, as a biological 

indicator. there was widespread fallout throughout the Marshall Islands. 

In summary, the truth about the damaging effects of the United States nuclear testing program 

on the people and lands of the Marshall Islands will never be fully known. Nevertheless, any 

assistance which this Committee can provide in obtaining the release of presently declassified 

information about the testing program or in generating new and additional information through 

further study of its effects will be greatly appreciated by the Tribunal and the claimants before it. 

However. if the experiences of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal in auempting to establish and 

administer a fair and reasonable program of compensation for damages is an accurate indicator, I 

believe that it can safely be said that the information already known about the extent of those 

damages is sufficient to render the provisions of the Section 177 Agreement manifestly inadequate. 

5 As shown in Attachment 2, compensation in the net amount of $22.8 million had been awarded IO or on behalf 

of 572 individuals for a IOlal of 676 presumed conditions as of December 31, 1993. A number of individuals 

have been awanled compensation for more than one prcswned condition; most such individuals were on Rongelap 

or Ailingnae atolls at the time of the Bravo event on March 1, 1954, and have been awarded compensation for the 

conditions of bela burns, acute radiation sickness and some type of thyroid disorder. 

- 5 -
354 

Attachment 1 

Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

Notice of Regulations: Compensation for Damage to Person 

Pursuantto§23(13)oftheMarshalllslandsNuclc:arClaimsTribunalAct 1987,asamended,theTribunal 

adopted reau)ations in Augusl 1991 esllblishing a list of 25 medical conditions which arc irrcbuttably 

presumed IO be the result of the Nuclear Testing Program. Those regulations were amended by the Tribunal 

in January 1994 to add two addilional conditions (numbrn 26 and 27 below) 10 the presumed !isl 

For eligible claimants who weie present in the Marshall Islands during the testing program period, the 

adminisuatively presumed medical conditions and the amounts of compensation for each that will be paid 

in pro ra&a annual payments are as follows: 

I. Leukemia (other than chronic lymphocytic leukemia) .......................•.......•..........•.......... $125,000 

2. Cancer of the thyroid 

a. if recurrent or requires multiple surgical and/or ablation ..................................... , ......... $75,000 

b. if non-recurrent or does not require multiple lrealment .............................•.•................. SS0,000 

3. Cancer of the breast 

a. if recurrent or requires masteetomy ............................................................................. S l 00,000 

b. if not recurrent or requires lumpccr.omy .•..............••.••.............................•.........•........... $75,000 

4. Cancer of the pharynx ••...•........•......................................................••...........•...•..•............. $100,000 

5. Cancer of the esophagus •.......•.•.............•.........•.......••...................•..............................•.... S 125,000 

6. Cancer of the stomach .......••••...........•.•...............•..................•.................•.•....................••. $125,000 

7. Cancer of the small intestine ...............•••........................................................................... $125,000 

8. Cancer of the pancreas .......•.............................................................................................. $125,000 

9. Multiple myeloma ...........•••...........•....................•...................•....•......•.............................. $125,000 

10. Lymphomas (except Hodgkin's discasc) .....•...........•..............•....•.........•..•..•••...•..........••.•. $100,000 

11. Cancer of the bile ducts •••...............•.....•..................••....•... ~··············································Sl25,000 

12. Cancer of the gall bladder ................................................................................................. $125,000 

13. Cancer of the liver (except if cinhosis or hepatitis Bis indicarcd) •...........................•.•... $125,000 

14. Cancer of the colon (but not cancer of the rectum) ....•..........•.............••.•...•....•..•.....•.....•... $75,000 

15. Cancer of the urinary bladder ............•.........•.....................................•..............•.•....•.......... $75,000 

16. Tumors of the salivary gland 

a. if malignant ................................................................................................................ - SS0,000 b. if benign and requiring surgery .•.......•........•........••........•................................................ $37,SOO 

C. if benign and 1101 requiring surgery ..........................................•..................................... $12.500 

17. Non-malignant thyroid nodular disease (unless limited to occult nodules) 

a. if requiring total thyroidectomy ..................................................................................... $50,000 

b. if requiring partial thyroidcctomy .................................................................................. $37,SOO 

c. if not requiring thyroidcctomy ..•..............................•..................................................... $12,500 

18. '"Cancer of the ovary ···········································································································s 125,000 19. Unexplained hypothyroidism (unless thyroiditis indicated) ...................•....•...................... $37,500 

20. Severe growth relllldalion due 10 thyroid damage •••••..•••....•.•••••••••.••..••••••••••.•••...•.....••••••• $100,000 

21. Unexplained bone manow failure ....................................•............................................... $125,000 

22. Meningioma ...................................................................................................................... $100,000 

23. Radiation sickness diagnosed between ]WIC 30, 1946 and August 18, 1958, inclusive ..... $12,500 

24. Beta bmns diagnosed between Jwic 30, 1946 and August 18, 1958, inclusive .................. $12,500 

25. Severe mental retardalion (provided born between May and September 1954, inclusive, 

and mother was present on Rongclap or Utirik Aiolls at any lime in March 1954) .•....... $100,000 

26. Uncxplainc hyperparathyroidism ........................................................................................ S 12,500 

27. Tumors of the parathyroid gland . 

a. if malignant .................................................................................................................... SS0,000 

b. if benign and requiring surgery ...................................................................................... $37,500 

c. if benign and not requiring surgery ················································································s12,soo 

The regulations adopled by the Tribunal also provide a mechanism and set out applicable slalldards for 

(I) the consideration of non-presumed conditions for compensalion in individual cases; (2) the periodic 

evalualion of possible modificalions to the list of presumed conditions; (3) the assignment of compensation 

levels to non-presumed or fullln: presumed medical conditions; and (4) adjustments to the amounts of 

compensation based on age and prognosis. 

To review or obeain copies of the regulations, contact Cathlina J. deBrwn, Clerk of the Tribunal, P. 0. 

Box 702, Majuro, MH 96960; telephone (692) 625-3396; facsimile (692) 625-3389. 
MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS 

ADMITfED CLAIMS BY CONDITION AND AMOUNTS AWARDE

COMPENSATION #AlTMITffiD mTA!..C

Acute radiation sickness $12,500 64 $800

Benign salivary gland tumor requiring surgery $37,500 12 $450

Benign salivary gland tumor without surgery $12,500 3 $37

Beta bums $12,500 61 $762

Breast cancer - lumpectomy or no surgery $75,000 5 $375

Breast cancer - mastectomy $100,000 14 $1,400

Breast cancer - end stage or cause of death $125,000 14 $1,750

Cancer of the colon $75,000 2 $150

Cancer of the colon - cause of death $125,000 I $125

Cancer of !he liver $125,000 3 $375

Cancer of the ovary $125,000 II $1 ,375

Cancer of the pancreas $125,000 5 $625

Cancer of the pharynx $100,000 4 $400

Cancer of pharynx - end stage or cause of death $125,000 8 $1,000

Cancer of the stomach $125,000 4 $500

Cancer of the urinary bladder $75,000 2 $150

Hypothyroidism $37,500 13 $487

Leukemia $125,000 7 $875

Lymphoma $100,000 7 $700

Lymphoma -.end stage or cause of death $125,000 6 $750

Malignant salivary gland tumor $50,000 2 $100

Meningioma $100,000 3 $300

Meningioma - end stage $125,000 I $125

Multiple myeloma $125,000 I $125

Severe growth retardation $100,000 2 $200

Thyroid cancer $50,000 37 $1,850

Thyroid cancer - multiple surgeries $75,000 15 $1,125

Thyroid nodule - panial thyroidcctomy $37,500 136 $5,100

Thyroid nodule - total thyroidectomy $50,000 8 $400

Thyroid nodule without surgery $12,500 _ill s:zm~

TOTALS 676** $25,225

• Deductions include both prior compensation for the same medical condition and adjustme

•• The 676 admitted claims involve 572 individuals (many of whom had more than one adm

individuals (totaling 87 of the conditions) died without having submitted a claim and have 
356 

Attachment 3 

ADMfn EO CLAIMS BY ATOLL QE BIRIH AND RESIDENCE 

(ASOFDECEMBER31, 1993) 

BY BIRTHPLACE BY 1993 RESIDENCE 

AIQLL ~ C2ndili~ms ~ C2nditi2ns 

Ailinglaplap 33 35 13 14 

Ailuk 20 20 3 3 

Amo 11 11 0 0 

Aur 6 6 3 3 

Bikini/Kill 6 10 1 1 

Ebon 23 24 0 0 

Enewetak/Ujelang 9 9 5 5 

Jaluit 71 72 11 11 

Jebat 2 2 1 1 

Kwajalein (excluding Mejatto) 75 90 184 227 

Lae 17 19 4 4 

Lib 2 2 0 0 

Likiep 29 31 5 5 

Majuro 51 51 166 186 

Maloelap 17 17 5 5 

Mejit 21 22 3 5 

Mili 9 9 2 2 

Namodik 22 22 5 5 

Namu 11 12 4 5 

Rongelap/Rongerik/Mejatto 59 131 16 28 

Ujae 19 22 2 2 

Utrik 28 28 12 12 

Wotje 19 19 12 12 

Wotto 5 5 4 4 

Other (outside RMI) 7 7 12 15 

Deceased _Q _Q ----22 _w_ 

TOTALS 572 676 572 676 

NOTE: Many individuals have been awarded compensation by the Tribunal for more than one medical condition. In most of these cases, the awards have been made to people who were on Rongelap on March I, 1954 and who suffered the conditions of acute radiation sickness, beta 

bums and some thyroid abnormality. 
357 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. Are there any other statements or comments that people wish to make? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNSAY RIKLON 

Mr. RIKLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like 

to say that I endorse all these statements that were earlier made 

by the ambassador, our Ambassador Kendall. And the public has 

heard Mr. Graham. , 

I had a prepared statement, but I think most of what I was going 

to say has basically been stated today. The fact that there needs 

to be a further investigation, as far as the evidence to be able to 

expose or know more about what really took place during tests and 

starting from 1946 up to 1956, so I am not going to really state 

anything here formally, but I think on the part of the Rongelap, we 

would request the committee or the Congress of the U.S. to immediately take the necessary steps to remedy our situation. 

I think it is time to use the article 9 provision and also to use 

the section 13(i) immediately, and Rongelap is prepared to start the 

process as soon as possible. 

It is clear that Rongelap has been a victim for a long time, and 

it is time to move to remedy our situation. The former Senator 

Ajain, who I believe most of the members of this committee knew 

him, would be very happy today if he was alive, and I myself have 

to show my respect for the work that he has done. 

With all the statement that I prepared, I would ask the committee to please have it as part of the record and I also had a letter 

that I sent to you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the people of 

Rongelap to thank you for initiating the process of opening or disclosing the records that had been closed for years and I would also 

ask that this particular piece of letter be also included in the 

record. 

So with all this statement made, I have no further comments. 

Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Riklon and February 17, 1994 letter 

follow:] 
358 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSAY RIKLON 

MEMBER- MARSHALL ISLANDS NITIJELA 

BEFORE THE COMMITfEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

SUBCOMMITfEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

February 24, 1994 

The calendar measures the passage or time. Human experience is measured by our 

feelings and ideas about events in our lives. As we approach the beginning of a new 

century as measured by the calendar, the people or the world also are entering into a 

new era or human experience. The super power dominated world order that was 

imposed at the end of World War Il shaped human experience for the second half 

or this century more than any other political force. That order and the ethos of the 

Cold War is passing, but it will be replaced in the future by a better and higher 

order only if we take responsibility for making that happen. 

To do so we must look back over the last fifty yean and undentand better the 

events that have constituted our human experience and brought us to where we now 

stand. We owe it to those who did not survive the Cold War, we owe it to ounelves, 

and, most importantly, we owe it to our children, to examine the events and 

experiences orthe lut rive decades to see ifwe can improve the quality of life for our 

people by changing the way we manage our affain. -

This is a time or change for the Rongelap people. We are changing the way we 

manage our affain because we have learned from our experience, and we are 

dedicated to improving the quality or life for our community. Mayor Edmond, who 

is here with me today, is dedicated to promoting greater unity among our people 

and improving the administrative operations or our local government. We also are 

dedicated to coordinating our local policie1 and programs with those or our national 

government, and our views on U.S. obligations to Rongelap must be undentood in 

light or our status u patriotic citizens or the Republic or the Manball Islands who 

are represented diplomatically and olTacially by our constitutional government. 

Finally, we are dedicated to doiag a better job oftelling our story to you here in the 

United States, so that in making decisions that affect us this Congress can act in a 

manner that more truly reftects the values or the American people and the principles 

on which their government is founded. 

We view this hearing u part of the process through which the United States also is 

examining its actions and experience during the Cold War era to determine if it too 

should change the way it manages its affain - including its policies relating to the 

people ofRongelap. Specifically, we hope this hearing will help determine if this 

Congress bas bad sufficient information in the past to make appropriate decisions 

about how the U.S. should meet its continuing obligations arising from the nuclear 

testing program in the Manhall Islands. 
359 

It says a great deal about the chancter of the American people and their 

government that we are here today to determine if U.S. policies and measures with 

respect to the effects of the nuclear tests in our islands should be changed to reflect 

new knowledge being developed about radiological conditions in our homeland and 

among our people. Mr. Chairman, we believe your leadership in holding this 

hearing reflects the faith and confidence yo'u have that the United States is a nation 

great enough to correct and improve upon the measures it takes to meet its 

obligations - even to the least powerful of those to whom its moral duties run. We 

share your expectation that the U.S. will take further action as necessary to provide 

full and fair remedies for past injuries and injustices once it has more accurate and 

complete information about the problems the nuclear testing created for our people. 

We too need more information, not only in order to know what will be required on 

the part of the U.S. in the context of the Rongelap rehabilitation and resettlement 

process, but perhaps more importantly to know what our real options are and what 

will be required of us as a community in order for us to take control once again of 

our own destiny. The greatest obstacle to our empowerment as a people and our 

ability to become more self-reliant and self-sufficient is the lack of accurate, 

complete and reliable information about radiological conditions at Rongelap and the 

physical condition of our people. If you, Mr. Chairman, can bring about the 

disclosure of any information on these matters which is nofyet public you will be 

doing a great service for the Marshall Islands and Rongelap, as well as the United 

States. 

Of course, even if there were no secret information or significant data that has been 

withheld with respect to Rongelap, that in itself would tell an entire story. For 

what was done openly and notoriously to our people was quite enough. The fact 

that more of what happened to us was not kept secret demonstrates more than 

anything else our lack oflegal standing, rights or access to remedies. 

We literally have been victims for four decades, and we have been victimized 

repeatedly over the years every time DOE revised upward its dose assessments in 

order to explain some new test-related illness which has appeared in the community. 

We were victimized by not being evacuated with other islanders before the tests, we 

were victimized by the decision to go ahead with nuclear test code-named 

"BRA VO" under conditions which put us at risk, we were victimized by the acute 

190 rem exposure we suffered during the Bnvo incident, we were victimized by 

being returned to Rongelap in 1957, and we were victimized by being allowed to 

sustain additional external and internal doses of radiation poisoning at Rongelap 

from 1957 to 1985 (when we finally took a measure of control and went into selfimposed exile). 

We voted against the Compact and the Section 177 Agreement because important 

requirements for our recovery from victimization were not addressed. In a sense 

we've been victimized by scientists, medical personnel, lawyers, and a whole host of 
360 

othen, most well-intentioned but some not, who used our suffering to advance 

interests in addition to the well-being of our people, and whose penonal and 

professional loyalties did not always run to the individuals or the community they 

ethically were obligated to serve. We are optimistic but not assured that the 

current process to enable us to resettle our community based upon a conservative 

risk assessment will not leave us once again in the status of victims. 

Mr. Chairman, I am here today to state for the record that the people of Rongelap 

are tired of being victims. We are taking control of our own future and we are 

going to commit ounelves to a resettlement program that we determine. The 40th 

annivenary of the Bravo test also will be the beginning of a new program for the 

recovery of Rongelap from the effects - physical, cultural and economic - of the 

testing program. 

In describing our new strategy for recovery of the Rongelap people from the nuclear 

testing program, rather than starting with measures we seek from the U.S. - that 

will come later - let me begin by taking the time to share with you the evolving 

undentanding we have of our relationship to the U.S. and the events that have 

connected your people and mine. 

Instead of buing our thinking about recovery on the same old political clicbes, we 

are coming around to the view that Rongelap and the U.S. actually may have more 

in common than previously bu been considered. For fifty yean ago both the 

people of Rongelap and the people of your nation were caught up in events that 

were beyond our control and left us with few choices. Let me explain bow I see 

things. 

UNDERSTANDING THE U,S, EXPERIENCE 

Although the calendar meuures the second half of this century beginning in 1950, 

from the standpoint of human experience it can be said that the second half of this 

century I>esan for America nine yean earlier, on December 7, 1941. That is when 

the U.S. wu required by its will to survive, its moral character and heritage u the 

cradle or democracy, and ultimately by its very destiny, to become the nation 

primarily responsible - durin1 the next five decades - for survival of liberty and 

international law and order. 

But the difficulty, hardship and sacrifice that the U.S. would face in the yean ahead 

was beyond human comprehension in 1941. For throu1hout history wan had 

sparked human ingenuity to produce technological breakthrough,, and the U.S. 

knew it would have to invent and produce a massive modern anenal to defeat the 

Axis powen. But the people of the U.S. and their leaden bad no way of knowing 

that the struggle which beaan at Pearl Harbor eventually would produce a 

technological breaktbrouah that not only could enable the Allies to prevail in that 

conflict, but which could lead to destruction of the planet. 
361 

Thus, the leadership role the U.S. assumed after Pearl Harbor became more than 

your brave people could have imagined as they rallied to defeat the Axis powers. 

Ultimately, once weapons of mass destruction became a reality, the U.S. was 

responsible for the survival of civilization. The most critical strategic objective of 

the post- Hiroshima and Nagasaki era was to harness the "doomsday" weapons 

technology in service to international peace in a manner that prevented the use of 

those very weapons. In order for the U.S. to meet this most awesome and dreadful 

responsibility, the weapons development program that ultimately brought 

atmospheric nuclear testing to our islands was initiated. That fateful moment in 

history is what began the series of events that led us to this hearing room today. 

We recognize that the absolute necessity during World War II of producing a 

deliverable "atomic bomb" before Hitler could do so involved an unprecedented 

effort in which people were expected to make sacrifices for what was seen as no less 

than a struggle for the survival of humanity. In order to prevent a great and 

ultimate evil that could have brought an end to human liberty and possibly 

civilization itself, it apparently came to be accepted that many lesser evils would 

have to be tolerated to achieve victory. Brave men and women gave their lives, and 

others suffered greatly, to preserve secrecy and produce a weapon for military use. 

The crisis mentality of the World War II atomic weapons race transformed itself 

into the nuclear siege mentality of the Cold War, and it came to be accepted that 

even greater sacrifices would have to be made in order to ensure survival in the 

nuclear age. The notion of a world in which the totalitarian regime of the Soviet 

Union would be able to issue a nuclear ultimatum to the rest of the world was simply 

unacceptable, and was seen as being as bad or worse than living in the world which 

would have existed if the Axis powers had acquired the atomic bomb and been able 

to dictate terms of a WWII surrender to the Allies. 

Thus, the dark side of the 1950's for your country was a period of super-high tech 

weapons science and the politics of nuclear annihilation. A new tolerance for 

hazards associated with our own nuclear program seems to have been deemed 

necessary in order to defend against the greater threat posed by the enemy. It 

apparently was accepted that the imperatives of nuclear weapons testing and 

production would mean that people and the environment would be put at risk -

sometimes calculated, sometimes not, sometimes with the knowledge of the people at 

risk, sometimes not. 

This is how, increasingly, we understand your experience. Recent revelations about 

contamination of your own lands and injuries inflicted on your own people, though 

not on the order of our experience, help us see that desperate times produced 

desperate behavior. We think we are beginning to see how you, as civilized people, 

but subjected to the extreme "future-shock" stress of the atomic age, and possessed 

by a sense of mission arising from what was seen as the real and present danger 
362 

posed by the Soviet nuclear weapons development program, came to view it as 

appropriate to select our islands u a test site. Our anger and despair about what 

wu done still haunt us, but we are trying to undentand better your experience. 

We hope you can begin to undentand better our experience. 

UNDERSTANDING RONGELAP'S EXPERIENCE 

Measured, again, by the calendar, the second hair or this century began on January 

1, 1950. But in the experience or the Rongelap people, the second hair of this 

century began a little more than four years later, on March 1, 1954. It is one or the 

ironies, and for us the great tragedy, of the Cold War era that the nuclear arms race 

between the U.S. and the Soviet Union resulted in a decision to test weapons in the 

Manhall Islands. Were it not for the very nature ofthe task- testing nuclear 

weapons - Rongelap would have been literally one of the last places on earth the 

U.S. ever would have come. 

Before Wortd War ll Rongelap had been a place where human experience varied 

only somewhat, and our lives and our culture were sustained by the sea and the life 

in it, by the land and the plants that grew in our soil. The ocean and our islands 

were the one constant in our lives to which all else was related. 

Our people had no way or knowing that the events of March 19S4 would lead to four 

decades or hardship and sacrifice. There could be no people on earth more 

completely removed from the events which made the nuclear testing program 

necessary for you. Youn wu the most complex set or requirements for living, oun 

wu the most simple. Having been ruled by the Japanese under League of Nations 

system and during the war, we expected a better life under the Americans. But 

what we reaUy expected wu buicaUy to be left alone. 

The people ofRongelap fall into a small and highly unique class of Cold War 

casualties. We were not drawn into the arms race out or nationalism, self-interest 

or for profit. We gained pothing and lost almost everything that gave our lives 

meaning. We bad no legal standing or political rights except those granted 

unilaterally by the U.S. in the exercise ofthe absolute authority and discretion 

granted to the U.S. by the United Nations. In the name or the U.N. and 

international security the U.S. took complete control or our islands and our people, 

and in. so doing assumed complete responsibility for the effects of the nuclear testing 

program upon our people. 

The people ofRongelap were exposed to risks far greater, and we sustained injuries 

far more severe, than any other population except your enemy's population at 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, the weapons used over those Japanese cities 

involved high air-bursts that did not produce the much more severe radiological 

contamination to the land that we raced in Rongelap due to the Bravo shot. This is 

because Bravo's enormous ground level energy yield at Bikini - 1,000 times more 
363 

powerful than the Hiroshima blast - produced massive quantities of radioactive 

debris that was lifted in a cloud reaching 25 miles into the atmosphere. The fallout 

deposited at least 142 radionuclides on our islands. 

Of course, the effect of Bravo's 17-megaton-yield thermonuclear blast on our people 

and islands already has been made a matter of record before this body. The 

purpose of the preceding discussion is to underscore the central theme of my 

message to you today: The United States and the Rongelap people are bound to 

one another by historical and moral forces that transcend the political, budgetary, 

legal, medical and scientific questions which are at issue in 1994. Clearly, all those 

issues must be addressed and we are ready to roll up our sleeves and work in 

partnership with DOI, DOE and the rest of the federal government and our own 

national government to manage and resolve those issues. But restoration of moral 

rectitude to the relationship between the U.S. and Rongelap will require more. 

MEASURES NOW REQUIRED 

The most immediate task before us is to take those measures in cooperation with the 

U.S. required to deal with effects of the nuclear testing program which have not 

been addressed under the terms of the settlement of prior legal claims pursuant to 

Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association. For Rongelap that means doing all 

that is necessary to ensure that Rongelap is habitable and enable our people to 

resettle in their homeland. In our view, the provisions of Section 103(i) of U.S. 

Public Law 99-239 provide a framework for the U.S. to fulfill significant obligations 

in this regard which are above and beyond the important measures which were 

taken in accordance with the Section 177 Agreement. 

We note that there is considerable discussion about Article IX of the Section 177 

Agreement. That is a government-to-government matter, but one in which we have 

a great deal of interest. For the record I want to note that there is no need for 

further study to determine if material changes in circumstances have come about 

with respect to Rongelap since the Section 177 Agreement was signed. The only 

question still be debated by the scientists is the degree of changed circumstances, 

and under any of the assessments the discovery of plutonium contamination and 

repudiation of DOE findings in its 1982 report are grounds to invoke Article IX. 

Again, we are procedding under Section 103(i) to work with DOI and DOE, but I 

wanted to state our view on Article IX for the benefit of the Subcommittee. 

The people of Rongelap and their elected leaders understand that addressing 

outstanding requirements related to the nuclear testing program in the Marshall 

Islands is just part of a much larger and even more complicated set of requirements 

relating to the effects of almost fifty years of nuclear weapons testing and 

production. The U.S. and those nations which possess nuclear technology now 

must make the same total commitment to repairing damage done to lands, waters 

and people during the arms race as they once made to prevailing in the arms race 

6 
364 

itself. The same unconditional dedication of ingenuity, energy and necessary 

resources that went into inventing and improving nuclear weapons must now be 

applied to cleaning up and storing nuclear wute, caring for people who were 

harmed and preventing repetition of past mistakes and abuses. 

Engineering a new world order that will enable the people of all nations to thrive 

and prosper in political liberty and free enterprise will require that the U.S. provide 

leadenhip in a new approach to managing nuclear technology. Enabling those who 

were harmed during the fint four decades of the nuclear age to recover is the fint 

order of business in any rational plan to bring appropriate discipline and 

accountability to nuclear industries in the post-Cold War era. Thus, enabling the 

people of Rongelap safely to resettle is an imperative element of any U.S. program to 

repair the damage done in the name of U.S. national security and international 

peace during the Cold War. 

The cost of meeting this obligation must be seen as part of the cost of the weapons 

program and the national security policy of the U.S. throughout the Cold War. 

Spread out over forty yean, and considering its value to the U.S., the cost of 

winding up opentions at Rongelap by meeting your remaining responsibilities to 

the indigenous people of the island is very reuooable. Resettlement of the 

Rongelap people probably will be one of the leut cosdy projects which will be 

undertaken to deal with damage to lands and people related to your nuclear 

technology industries. 

Mr. Chairman, we believe you realize that failure now to meet its outstanding 

obligations to Roogelap simply is not the way the U.S. can do business. We think 

you also realize that the Cold War will not be over for the U.S. until the dilemma 

which is the legacy of Roogelap and the nuclear testing program is resolved. For 

the people of Rongelap will not be able to end the hardship of our exile and have any 

sense of well-being u a people until we become a self-directed and self-reliant 

community that works with but does not unduly depend upon the federal 

government. We want to work with the Department of Energy to advance our 

common interests and solve problems, but we must do that from a position of 

strength rather than a position of weakness. 

lo order for Roogelap to take control of its own long-term planning and day-to-day 

decision-making, we need to secure a resource base that literally provides a 

substitute form of self-suff"iciency to replace the self-sufficiency we had as a people 

prior to the nuclear testing program. The primary means by which this can be 

accomplished is for Congress to appropriate the funding authorized by Section 

103(i) of P.L 99-239 in an amount that ends the annual pilgrimage from Rongelap 

to Washington D.C. to beg for resources. There is limited efficacy for you and for 

us in continuing to appear here with tin cup in hand to seek only increments of the 

asset base we need to take responsibility for our own affain. This obsolete model 

7 
365 

for our relationship with the U.S. is actually contributing to the cultural 

deterioration and political disempowermeot of our people. 

Coosequeody, we will be working with the Ointoo Administration and the Congress 

in the months ahead, and will be making our case to the Appropriations Committee 

this year, in order to determine the level of funding that would be required to put 

Roogelap in the position to organize and manage itJ resettlement. We point to the 

resettlement and rehabilitation measures already taken with respect to the Bikini 

and Enewetak communities as an example of the level of support we too require. 

It is simply factual to note that above and beyond the paymeotJ made to Bikini and 

Enewetak under Article Il of the nuclear claims settlement reached between the U.S. 

and the Republic of the Manhall Islands in implementation Compact Section 177, 

past and presently obligated U.S. upenditures to restore habitability at Bikini and 

Enewetak and support resettlement of those peoples now substantially uceed $200 

.millilm.· The Bikini resettlement and rehabilitation funds alone involve more than 

SllO million. 

Mr. Chairman, the primary difference between the nuclear test related uperieoce of 

the people of Rongelap and those of the peoples of Bikini and Enewetak is that they 

were removed from their islands by the U.S. prior to the testJ to prevent radiological 

poisoning of the local population, while the people of Rongelap were not evacuated 

to safety and were uposed. Theo, in addition to being left in harm's way and 

receiving acute doses of radiation the catastrophic physical etTectJ of which need not 

be recounted here, our uperieoce cootrastJ with that of Enewetak and Bikini in 

that we were rescued after two days of 190 rem uposure only to be returned three 

yean later even though DOE was not able to make any reliable determination about 

the radiological hazards. The people of Bikini and Eoewetak were allowed to 

return to their islands only yean later and then were removed once again for their 

safety when DO E's scientific assessment of hazards once again proved to be 

unreliable. 

Apparently, because the U.S. was trying to move the Bikinians and Enewetakese 

back to their islands, there was an interest in keeping us at Rongelap. The U.S. 

dearly did not want to accept responsibility or admit the need for Rongelap 

resettlement. As a result, the people of Rongelap were not evacuated even though 

DOE never was able convincingly to certify that it was safe to remain. That is why 

we had to evacuate ounelves. We now share with the other two communities the 

uperience of being uiled from our homeland and discovering that the information 

DOE previously had provided about radiological conditions in our homeland was 

not reliable. Like the Bikinians and the Enewetakese, only after we had been put at 

risk repeatedly did we realize that we had been e:a:pected to live with and accept 

radiological conditions that no one from the federal government with whom we dealt 

would have accepted for themselves or their own families. 

8 
366 

Thus, this is not merely a matter or asking for runds. Rather, the support your 

government has given to those two communities on the very resettlement issues for 

which Rongelap now seeks support has a value that far exceeds the funding 

involved. The importance of the Bikini and Enewetak resettlement and 

rehabilitation process is that it provides that substitute resource base that represents 

a significant step toward making an exiled people masten once again of their own 

rate. We seek the same type of measures to promote our self-sufficiency and control 

over our own affain. We seek empowerment as a people so that we can stop being 

victims. 

The lessons of the last fifty yean were not lost on the U.S. Congress in providing for 

resettlement of the people of Bikini and Enewetak, and there is no rational basis for 

treating the people of Rongelap differently. Ironically, it is because the Rongelap 

people had not been relocated on a long term basis like the other two communities 

that our more aggravated circumstances may not have been fully recognized or 

undentood by the U.S. during the Section 177 negotiations. Resettlement was not 

provided for under the settlement and had to be addressed in the implementing 

legislation because we had not been evacuated. In this sense, compared to Bikini 

and Enewetak, we were victimized again for having been more severely victimized 

previously. 

While we did receive medical treatment and nominal compensation to individuals 

whose thyroids or thyroid nodules were removed over the yean, as a community we 

were never given the same protection from injury as Bikini and Eriewetak, and in 

that neglect the seeds were sown for the neglect we now face. It has always been 

our view that the children or those who were exposed and those who suffered illness 

as a result of residence at Rongelap after 1957 should have received care, and we 

have always believed the Section 177 Agreement should have extended to other 

islands, including Rongerik and Ailingnae. The fallout did not discriminate 

between the islands in its path, and the Section 177 Agreement should not have 

discriminated against people whose islands were affected. 

Notwithstanding our differences over some of these issues, DOI and DOE are 

working with us to acquire the information and develop the plans we need to 

manage our resettlement, but without knowing what resources will be available to 

us, without knowing what is oun, without having our own stake in the world, we 

continue to struggle to retain our identity as a people, and making long-term 

decisions as a community is almost impossible. 

We know that the U.S. government budget deficit has created a fiscal crisis, and 

that discretionary spending accounts are under severe pressure due to interest on 

the national debt and the requirements to fund non-discretionary entitlement 

programs. However bad the fiscal crisis may be, the measures required to meet 

basic U.S. obligations to Rongelap are not ones which will decide the success or 

failure of your efforts to manage spending. The stakes are high in your battle of 

9 
367 

the budget. but this is not another scenario like that which led to the testing 

prognm in our islands, where the survival of your nation means Rongelap must be 

sacrificed once again. 

I am not dismissing the magnitude of the request we will be making to the 

Appropriations Committee this year, especially in relation to the amounts needed 

for important domestic programs that may go without the funding needed. But 

when the domestic well-being of the people of this country was at risk and 

Rongelap's sacrifice became part ofthe cost of meeting the threat ofthe Cold War 

there was no hesitation by the U.S. in funding and conducting its nuclear testing 

program. 

Similarly, now that we as a people are ready to end our dependence on the U.S. and 

take control of our lives once again there can be no hesitation on the part of the U.S. 

in making us whole and empowering us to do so. For every dollar required to give 

us a resoun:e base so we can be masten of our own fate again, the U.S. got full value 

in the testing program, and arguably a good deal more. We are not looking for a 

windfall, but nther the resources to enable us to manage our own recovery as a 

people from our unique role in one of history's most dramatic episodes. 

10 
368 

NITIJELA OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS POST OF!='!CE BOX 24 

MAJURO, .~EPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL J5LAJl'05 96960 

Telepnon : 3679 or 3621 - CABLE ; NITIJELA MAJURO 

17 February 1994 

The Honorable George Miller 

Chairman 

Committee on Natural Resources 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The people of Rongelap realize that you probably never will win an election in the U.S. because you have supported our struggle as a community to recover from the devastating effects of the U.S. 

nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands. Even with the 

current publicity about the impact of Cold War era nuclear weapons 

programs on your own people, the voters in your district cannot be 

expected to recognize fully the importance of your work on behalf 

of a relatively small number of Pacific Islanders whose actual 

story of irradiation and dislocation during nuclear test explosions is probably beyond comprehension to most Americans. 

Thus, your work on our behalf must be understood not as politically 

beneficial to you, or even as simple human compassion for us. Rather, we believe your efforts represent a commitment on your part 

to ensuring that the U.S. Government acts in accordance with the 

values and principles that have caused the whole world to look to 

America as the champion of liberty and justice. By seeking to 

vindicate those principles in the case of the people of Rongelap, 

and others in the Marshall Islands, who were exposed to high level 

radiation and exiled from our homeland, you are representing all 

that is good and decent and strong about the United States. 

Those who understand that America is strong and decent enough to 

face up to the frightening and bitter legacy of the Cold War 

nuclear arms race will recognize the important contribution you are making to your nation's ability to maintain its moral leadership as we enter the next century. Your call for full disclosure about 

the open-air nuclear testing in our islands and measures to enable our people to recover after forty years of real human suffering is 

the type of leadership the U.S. needs in order to complete the 

historic process that began when the Berlin Wall fell. 

The Cold War will not be over until those who made sacrifices or 
The Honorable George Miller 

17 February 1994 

Page - TWO 

369 

who were victimized in connection with U.S. national security 

programs are empowered to take control of their own lives, their own hands and their own destinies once again. We do not want to 

be victims any longer, we do not want to be known only for our unique radiation-related medical problems, or as exiles from our contaminated home islands. · 

We want to recover our lands and recover our way of life as a 

people with our own culture and heri tage -- which now includes 

forty years of living daily with sickness and inability to settle 

down to a normal way of life. Even though very few human 

populations have ever experienced the type of radiation-related 

medical difficulties or prolonged dislocation we have, we do not 

want to focus only on recriminations or blame. 

We want the truth and we want to be able. to decide our own future. 

Your letter about the weapons development program in the Marshall 

Islands which was sent to President Clinton of January 3, 1994 

encourages us to believe that the U.S. will meet its obligations 

to enable us to accomplish these goals, and on behalf of the 

Rongelap Community I want to express our profound gratitude to you 

for standing up for what is right. 

·,'\(\)"'",·· 

~x~ senator 

Rongelap Atoll 
370 

Mr. MILLER. Anyone else? No comments. 

Ambassador, thank you for your statement. Mr. Graham, let me 

ask you a question. On the back of your submission to the committee, there is a chart, attachment 2, Marshall Islands Nuclear ,Plaims Tribunal admitted claims by conditions and amounts 

awarded as of December 1993. [See page 355.] That is for what period of time up to December 1993? 

Mr. GRAHAM. From the inception of the tribunal in mid-1988, but 

it actually goes back only as far as August of 1991. That is when 

the very first award was made. 

Mr. MILLER. From 1991, then. Am I to conclude from this that 

these compensations that were made in these admitted cases that 

the admission here is that these were caused from the radioactive 

activity by the nuclear blast during the tests? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. As is the case with the radiation exposed 

veterans and the Radiation Exposed Compensation Act, there is a 

presumption of causation that the tribunal extends based largely 

on the fact that there were no film badges issued to the 

Marshallese and there was no real way of detecting who was exposed, or if they were exposed, at what level. 

So there is a presumption of exposure that is involved in the tribunal's compensation program that effectively presumes that these 

admitted and awarded conditions were the result of radiation created by the testing program. 

Mr. MILLER. So if I took this table and I took the testimony of 

the previous panel about the thyroid spikes and about the anecdotal evidence and Dr. Hamilton's study, as a lay person I don't 

want to make this a scientific conclusion because, obviously, it is 

not, but there is a fair amount of cancer activity going on in the 

Marshall Islands. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think that this grossly underestimates the 

amount of cancer activity because I would like to make the observation that these claims that have already received partial compensation at this point for whom an award has been made are 

today based only on, for the most part, pathological documentation 

that the cancer existed. There may be many, many other people 

who have already passed away for whom we don't have a pathological diagnosis and there may be many others living right now and 

dying these days from cancer that will not be pathologically diagnosed because of insufficient medical treatment available today. 

Mr. MILLER. You are saying--

Mr. GRAHAM. Throughout the testing program as well. 

Mr. MILLER. You are saying we don't know. 

Mr. GRAHAM. We certainly don't know. 

Mr. MILLER. What are the official studies that are ongoing outside of the Brookhaven study? 

Mr. GRAHAM. There are none to my knowledge. There was a diagnostic program that was funded under some of the section 177 

monies for medical surveillance. That involved primarily diagnosticians who visited various atolls or each of the · atolls during the 

course of a three-year period, primarily to establish written diagnoses of conditions that personal injury claimants were suffering. 

Unfortunately, when these medical diagnosticians visited the 

outer islands, they were able to only take minimal equipment with 
371 

them. Certainly they had no benefit of x-ray machines or more sophisticated diagnostic equipment, yet, nevertheless, with the limited equipment that was available to them in the outer islands during visits of perhaps as short as one day to as long as one week, 

they were able to make a number of diagnoses that have resulted 

in compensation being awarded to people. But there is no ongoing study that I am aware of, and this is what I think is desperately 

needed. 

Mr. MILLER. So what we have really is, in the official capacity of the Government, what we have is a Brookhaven study. 

Mr. GRAHAM. If there is such a study. It seems to me it is a peri- odic examination of the people primarily of Rongelap and 

Enewetak. Whether there is analysis of the results of those examinations is another issue altogether that I wouldn't be prepared to 

speak about knowledgeably. 

Mr. MILLER. But however you characterize it, whether it is a 

study or monitoring or what have you, that is all we have from the 

U.S. Government side. 

Mr. GRAHAM. To my knowledge, that is all that exists. 

Mr. MILLER. The committee has received testimony that that 

study may have made some wrong assumptions about the control 

group; that somehow the control group may be subject to radioactivity as the study group and so when they find no variance, it 

may be because they are looking in the mirror. 

Mr. GRAHAM. That certainly is the belief that my office has. 

Mr. MILLER. I don't know if that is the case, but that has been 

the allegation more or less so we have one study that has some serious questions raised about how it was designed. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I would concur in those reservations. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Ambassador, on page 5 you talk about the issue 

of a formal request under article 9. Am I to understand from that 

statement that the Government is in the process of formulating a 

formal request, gathering information for the possibility of making 

a formal request under article 9 and the changed circumstances? 

Ambassador KENDALL. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. At the moment 

we are gathering evidence and other data to put forward a formal 

request. We are doing that at the moment and upon finding and 

having gathered all this information, we will submit the proposal 

to you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Ambassador KENDALL. Mr. Chairman, can I make one request of 

you? I believe other members of my delegation would like to have 

a chance to say a few words. 

Mr. MILLER. Sure. Excuse me. I thought the others had decided 

not say anything. 

Ambassador KENDALL. With your permission, sir, I would like to 

call on Senator Henchi Balos to either make a statement or put forward anything in writing. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HENCID BALOS 

Mr. BALOs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Please. 

Mr. BALOS. I thank Ambassador Kendall for extending the opportunity for me to say a few words. On behalf of my delegation from 
372 

Bikini Island and all the people of Bikini, I would like to, first of 

all, state for the record that we are very saddened to learn about 

the death of one of the resourceful staff of this Congress, Pat 

Krause. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. BAL0S. She has been very helpful to the people of Bikini. 

And I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, to please convey our 

condolences to the family of Ms. Krause and also to her friends. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. BAL0S. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, for your interest and your colleagues, distinguished members of the committee. We would like to make one request to you, Mr. Chairman, that is please expedite the process so 

that the result of the purpose of this hearing can come out sooner. 

Once again, thank you very much for your support and thank 

you for your interest in this matter. Having said that, thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for giving me the opportunity to speak. On behalf of the delegation from Bikini Island I also would like 

to say that the statement presented to you by Mr. Weisgall earlier 

this morning was the views and feelings of the people of Bikini. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Ambassador KENDALL. Next to speak on my delegation is Senator 

Hiroshi Yamamura. 

STATEMENT OF HON. mRosm v. YAMAMURA 

Mr. YAMAMURA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bear in mind, Mr. Chairman, I am here before your committee not to condemn the 

U.S. Government, but to seek your kind support in trying to discover at least the earnest disclosed information on the U.S. nuclear 

testing in the Marshall Islands. I believe you have a copy of my written statement, but I just 

want to touch one point in that statement, Mr. Chairman, about 

what has been said b_y the Advisory Committee on the Biological 

and Medicine, stated January 14, 1956. I quote, "the,statement was 

revealed that Utirik was by far the most contaminated place in the 

world." It further stated that people of Utrik do not live, I would 

say, as the Westerners do, civilized people. It is nevertheless also 

true that these people are more like us than the mice. This, Mr. Chairman, causes a doubt in my mind. I don't know 

what is in the mind of the American who made this statement, but 

I was here this morning and I believe it was stated by Mr. 

Weiman. In the Washington Times I read also the statement that 

he made a comment on this issue because he was too tired, and at 

that time he also further made a comment that maybe it was stupid of him to say such a statement. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that anyone could have made a 

stupid statement like that and if that statement has been stated 

in that newspaper, it seems like those meetings were wasted in 

those two days. I believe he was aware of what he was stating. 

That is the only thing I would bring up, Mr. Chairman, and I wish 

to compliment you and your committee for bringing up these issues 

before the Congress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamura follows:] 
373 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

MAJURO, MARSHALL ISLANDS 96960 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HIROSHI V. YAMAMURA 

MEMBERS OF THE "NITIJELA" OR THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT 

SENATOR REPRESENTING UTRIK ATOLL 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

SUBMITTED TO THE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE 

COMMI'I"I'EE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 
374 

Chairman and Distinguished members of the Subcommittee, 

on behal-f of the people of Utrik atoll, I wish to thank you 

and the members of your Subcommittee for granting me an opportunity 

to respectfully express and to unfold several genuine concerns of 

the people of Utrik who have been perpetually endured the ultimate 

aftermath of the United States Nuclear Testing from 1940's to 

1950's in the Marshall Islands. 

Bear in mind , Mr. Chairman , that I am here before your 

committee not to condemn the U.S. Government for such mishap, but 

primarily to seek your kind support in trying to discover at least 

the earnest disclosed information on the U.S. Nuclear Testing in 

the Marshall Islands. 

Well to begin with, Mr . Chairman, I have several fundamental 

components which I will briefly address before your committee: 

1. Activities of the u.s. Department of Energy on Utrik Atoll 

environment and its residents; 

2 . The validity of acquiring radiological information from 

the Republic of the Marshall Islands National Radiological 

study and the Scientific advisory panel; and 

1 
375 

3, Disclosure of Republic of the Marshall Islands Nuclear 

claim·s Tribunal Medical conditions affecting the people of 

Utrik Atoll. 

r. u.s. Department of Energy 

Although DOE claims to have been annually monitoring the 

radioactive level on Utrik Atoll as prescribed pursuant to Public 

Law 95-134 and 96-205, only one environmental radioactivity survey 

was made on April, 1993. The validity and the results of such 

measurement have not been available. In light of the limited 

restriction stated under the Public Law 99-239, out of 3,000 total 

population of Utrik Atoll, only about 98 remaining exposed 

individuals are medically or scientifically monitored by DOE twice 

a year. Since one group of Utrik Atoll has been monitored, 

thereafter, such restricted radiological bioassys can only signify 

inaccurate findings for the community. Unlike the restricted 

radiological monitoring of Utrik residents, I can only assume that 

the radiological bioassy on Rongelap residents is precisely valid 

since a controlled and an experimental groups are involved in such 

activities. Also, I can only predict that if DOE were eager to 

monitor a radiological bioassy on the 500 individuals who have been 

residing on Utrik atoll since 1956, thereafter, the prevalence of 

thyroid and other radiation related disease would have been higher 

than the expectation of many scientific findings. Mr. Chairman, 

please note that the Exhibit A disclosed an important message 

2 
376 

addressed by a U.S. advisory committee on Biology and Medicine on 

January 14, 1956 revealing that Utrik Atoll ,; is by far most 

contaminated place in the World •••• " Exhibit A further stated that 

the people of Utrik atoll"·•· do not live, I would say, the way 

Westerners do, civilized people, it is nevertheless also true that 

these people are more like us than the mice." 

II. RMI Nationwide Radiological Study 

I wish I could offer you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of 

your Subcommittee an explicit information on Utrik atoll 

Radiological survey made last year by the RMI Nationwide 

Radiological Program; however, such information has not been 

available. I believe Dr. Steve Simon will explicitly enlightened 

you on the issue. 

III. RMI Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

Among many Utrik claimants, thirty-six cases of thyroid and 

other radiation related diseases from Utrik have been confirmed by 

the RMI Nuclear Claims Tribunal. In fact, ninety-eight percent of 

the thirty-six individuals from Utrik, who were easily identified 

of the, radiation presumed medical conditions, did actually submit 

their medical documents from the U.S. Department of Energy. 

Unfortunately, many other claimants from Utrik who were not 

eligible for Nuclear Claims Tribunal award don't have the same 

3 
377 

privilege as the ones monitored by the DOE program where the only 

radiological bioassy is made available in the Marshalls. 

Mr. Chairman, I was informed that you have written a letter to 

the President of the United States requesting his benevolent 

support to impose on the Department of Energy to reveal all the 

classified informations in regard to the U.S. Nuclear Testing in 

the Marshall Islands. Up to this date, not a single DOE classified 

information has been revealed to my people and my government . 

I wish, however, to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, and your 

. • J~ .£~I • 

Subcommittee members for your kind effort in trying to bring 

justice for us who can hardly be recognized. Thank you. 
378 

,, ,·· 

£>,I73rr:A 

~ · 79281 

DELETED VERS\ON; ~NL y 

-~DVIs::m: co::!d:.·~ O~l BIOLOGY 

S.!ld m::DICI!lt 

_; US. DOE ~RG!UVES · . .i..- Jr:1u~r,- 1::, 1 14, 19 6 3-5 l./571.TOl\llC Ei"~"!ilG:O· ,-: 

nc ____ c_o_MMI_._s_s_r~~~~~'---

o£V CJF BIO.=; ;,~!:.C Co!lccl!on _______ __;.:=. 

Bo". 5'..:l t~ 

f-ul:lcr /~Cl'\\"\ l'-\<d:...;-:, ) 

tr. s. ,\'l'C!~!C t.'iE:'.:.-Y cc;.:1:Is::0:1 

tl!::f YO!'O:: O?:::?: \TIO:i!: O,:Ic== 

llZ.'.t.r?. ;:.nd Stsr:=Y Lf.SOR'\.TOBY 

1a Coli.li'ltug :..v,,uue 

ilev Yor!., l{e"4 '!c:-1: 

~ --
379 

. Cf.I BLT.· A--

----

Ye have & fey things tha.t ve a.re 

thinking about ror the 1mmed1a.te future a.~d 

I would 11ke to mention a rev ot the~e. 

~e think th~t one ver1 1ntr1gu1ng 

stud.1' C9ll be mnde and pl~ns are on the v~r 

to implement this -- 1 0terik1 Atoll 1a the . 

atoll furtherest from the March 1st !!hot 

vhere peopie ·vere exposed got 1n1t1ail1 a.bout 

15 roentgens end then the1 vere evacuated and 

they returned. 

Ther rui:d been living on that I~land; 

now that I!land 1! safe to live on but 1s b1 

tar the mogt contaminated pl~ce 1n the world 

and it ~ill be ver1 1nterest1nK to go· bRck and 

get good environmental dat~, hov man1 per 

square mile; vhAt i!lotopes Rre involved and & 

samole or food cha.ng!s in manr bum~ns throug:1 

their urines, eo as to get a measure or the 

human uptake, ·olben people live in & oontam1nated 

environ1un ~ • 

K~, data. o~ this tn,e ha.s never been 

ava1lablf., ~'h11is U ia t~e that the.u pec;,le 

do not 1i~t, t vould sat, the var Yesterner• 

do,- d:t>t1it•4 pe-0ple, it is nevertheless al.!!o 

true i-5'1-~ "hue J)eo'!)le are more 11ki, ,u than 

the d!id~. So t!l&t .1s sometll1ng ,..hich will be 

don~ this wititef'. 

2;2 
380 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Ambassador KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe 

Mayor Billiet Edmond is submitting a paper for the record, Mr. 

Chairman. I believe we have all the speakers here and have all had 

a chance to put whatever they want in the hearing today, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Hon . . Billiet Edmond follows:] 
381 

STATEMENT OF 

THE HONORABLE BILLIET EDMOND 

MAYOR OF RONGELAP 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 

In five days we will observe the 40th annivenary of the nuclear test code-named 

"Bravo." This hearing is timely for that reason, and because the people of 

Rongelap are observing the 40th anniversary of the Bravo test by adopting a new 

strategy for recovery by our people from the effects of the U.S. nuclear testing 

program. 

It is time for the Rongelap people to commit themselves to an organized recovery 

and resettlement program, and it is time for the U.S. to deliver on its commitments 

to support our recovery effort. As a community we need to make some decisions 

and commit ounelves to a resettlement program which includes support for those 

who are ready to accept the risks of living at Rongelap, and support for those who 

choose to resettle elsewhere in the Manhall Islands. In order to accomplish these 

goals we need two forms of assistance from the United States. 

First, with respect to the subject of this hearing, we need better information so that 

our people can make informed decisions about returning to Rongelap. The 

scientific efforts being made to develop more precise and practical information in 

this regard are underway, and we believe real progress that is being made will soon 

produce the framework for resettlement planning decisions. Of course, if there is 

information about radioactivity or other hazardous conditions at Rongelap in the 

possession of the U.S. government which has not been made public it is imperative 

that it be released immediately. 

In particular, I want to state for the record that if there is information relevant to 

the health of our community now or at any time since 1946 which has not been 

made public it should be released immediately. The Cold War is over, the veil of 

secrecy is being lifted on the U.S. nuclear program, and there is no apparent 

national security justification for anything but full disclosure. 

As Senator Riklon has indicated in his statement to the Subcommittee today, we 

already know enough about what has happened to Rongelap over the yean to know 

that we need to stop relying otben to protect our interests. Thus, the second form 

of assistance we need is to have the Rongelap resettlement program fully funded in 

the FY 1995 budget which will be approved this year so that our people can know 

79-784 0-94-13 
382 

the extent of the resources we can rely on and make a realistic assessment of options 

based on that knowledge. 

While the Department of Energy, independent scientists, lawyen, medical experts 

and the Department of Interior continue to work on outstanding issues, we need to 

begin making the political decisions we must in order better to plan our own future. 

We need DOE and DOI and appreciate the assistance provided. When we note the 

unreliability of DOE scientiric findings over the yean we do so without rancor. But 

rather than expecting us to wait for all the technical and logistical questions to be 

answered before seeking the funding authorized by Section 103(i) of P.L 99-239, we 

are uking the U.S. Congress to provide us with the resources needed to take greater 

control and responsibility for our own future now. 

We are uking, in essence, for economic empowerment in the form of an adequate 

recovery and resettlement fund that will give us self-suftkiency which substitutes for 

the self-sufflc:iency taken from us forty yean ago when the U.S. very nearly 

destroyed our people and our homeland. To undentand our proposal to proceed 

with funding now you need to undentand the way our people feel about their past 

and their future. 

ne people of Rongelap and the people of other islands throughout our nation must 

live every day witb the anxiety and anger of not knowing if the insidious effects of 

undetected or unreported radiological poisoning are attacking us, and our children, 

from within. 

We are told tbat it is probably safe to go home ifwe cooperate with DOE and follow 

dietary and other behavioral guidelines. But given tbe euspei'ating record of 

miscalculation by AEC and DOE scientuts. induding tbe frequent "surprises" we 

have come to expect like regular announcements that aew levels of contamination 

and related healtll problems have been discovered, we must uk ourselves many 

questions about what life at Rongelap will be like ia the future. Should our 

children be aDowed to pllly in the sand! How many times a day should we wash 

their bands! How do we keep their bands out of their mouths! Is it safe for a 

baby to driak itl mother'• milk! Bow macb local food can we eat! 

We no lolllff are focusing oa issue• of blame aad guilt about bow and why the 

conditions wen created that give rise to these quationL nese are our problems, 

and we are ready to begia maaging them. We have the couraae and the resolve to 

move beyond recriminatloa and •tart controlling our own liveL But the U;S. must 

have the courage to tell u everything that ii known •o our decisions will be 

informed. ne U.S. allo mut ead the badaetary limbo-that ii preventing our 

community from dealing with the real iuua Help u a•ite behind a prognm that 

ii real ud that can be qualified M that soand judgaeatl can be made. 
383 

It is not smart or even fair to require that we make the most important decisions of 

our lives when we do not really know yet what is possible. Just look at Bikini and 

Enewetak. Once the U.S. made a commitment to carry out a clean-up at Enewetak 

and fund rehabilitation and resettlement for Bikini important progress was made. i 

It is not good government or good program management to make plans and 

decisions in the abstract. When the decisions must be made by a community with 

our history, it is bad policy to frame the issues without establishing the resource 

base available to implement the decisions that ultimately are to be made. 

Approximately $5 million is now available for resettlement, and there is the hope 

that more will be made available. But hope is not sufficient incentive to enable a 

victim population to rise above its fear, anger and frustration and unite behind an 

agenda and set of solutions that it may or may not be able to implement depending · 

on the budget process in Washington. 

Recognizing this, Congress provided the Bikini community with a S20 million 

resettlement fund and a $90 million rehabilitation fund. This was in addition to the 

575 million provided to settle previous legal claims of the Bikinians under the 

Section 177 Agreement. Again, as Senator Riklon points out in his testimony, that 

approach does much more than provide funding, it puts the community back in 

control of its destiny, and that is what we too must achieve. 

The moral rectitude and practical logic of what we are proposing is compelling and 

is based on what the U.S. did in the case of Bikini and Enewetak. As the Mayor of 

Rongelap I am asking that this Congress do what only the Congress of the United 

States of America is capable of doing. Stop for just a moment in the middle ,of the 

debate over health care reform, welfare reform, and all the other vital issues before 

you, and recognize that there is a piece of unfinished business with the people of a 

tiny island in what in 1954 was the U.S. Atomic Weapons Proving Grounds. The 

surviving community remains in exile after enduring a brutal saga of grievous 

radiation induced illness and physical and psychological estrangement from their 

contaminated homeland, and Congress needs to act on the matter. We know you 

have more important things to do, but we hope you will decide that this is too 

important to be left undone. 

Mr. Chairman, we are ready to seize the challenge of managing change for our 

people, but we are able to do so because the commitment the U.S. has made 

punuant to Section I0J(i) of P.L 99-239 enabled us to tum our people from despair 

and outrage to a vision of being a self-reliant people again. It would be a dreadful 

thing for the U.S. now to convert them back into being victims all over again. 

I do not believe that is going to happen. That is why I am here instead of at home 

with my family. I will be back this Spring to work with your Appropriations 

Committee to achieve the goal of a fully funded recovery and resettlement fund. 

We look forward to working with you, and hope we will have your support. I thank 
384 

you for yoar leadenbip aad courage in brinpa1 these matten to the attention of 

tbil Congrea and the American people. 
385 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Chairman de Lugo. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask permission to submit some additional questions to the panel that preceded this one, Dr. Hamilton, Dr. Simon, Dr. Radford, Mr. Weiman, 

and some additional questions for Mr. Hills, if there is no objection. 

Mr. MILLER. Without objection. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Let me ask, Ambassador Kendall, when the compact was being considered, there was an obvious split between the 

Marshall Islands Government and the atolls. These are the atolls 

that were clearly affected by the U.S. nuclear testing. 

Is the Marshall Islands speaking now with one voice? I know 

that officially the Marshall Islands always officially spoke with one 

voice, but it was clear to us that there was not unanimity in the 

past. 

Are you speaking now with one voice? 

Ambassador KENDALL. Well, I think the statements will speak 

for themselves, I am sure. There may be differences in the way we 

approach the problems, but I believe we are all as a delegationgranted everybody is free to say what they have to say. I think the 

statements that have been submitted here have varying degrees of 

disagreement and all that. What you are saying is whether what 

I have here is a consensus as a united delegation here? 

Mr. DE LUGO. Well, there has been mention of the great work 

that was done by a great man who is not with us anymore. I guess 

the powers that be figured that if you can hold out long enough 

people will die and the problem may go away. And I couldn't help 

but think of that last year when Senator Ajain visited me for the 

last time and we met over in the Rayburn Room. 

To me, he was one of the most courageous individuals that I have 

ever met in my life. He was a simple man, but he had a great love 

for his people and he had a great concern for what had happened 

out there and he was very fortunate in that he had a very able advocate for him that worked with him tirelessly, David Weiman, 

who appeared before this committee. 

Mention has been made of the wonderful work of Pat Krause 

who spent countless hours working on this issue and making available records, going through the records, whatever could be found 

so that the truth could come out about this issue. It was always 

said that officially the Marshall Islands were speaking with one 

voice. The subcommittee, which I chair got the very clear distinction that Senator Ajain was not getting support in his efforts. 

Is that changed or is everybody together on this now? 

Ambassador KENDALL. Well, I said this much. As you know, we 

were not the only victims of this so-called seeking . the truth. You 

have your own people, a lot of information was declassified. Now, 

we are not going to wait and tell everybody, oh, let's put everything 

on hold until the United States gives us access to these materials. 

Senator .Ajain had the courage to go after the truth. He had the 

patience. We didn't have the patience, but he had the patience to 

go after the truth. And as always, in the nature of human events, 

truth reveals, and I am glad that what he did was not for nothing. 

So I would say that the Marshall Islands wasn't deserting .Ajain 

and Ajain wasn't deserting the Marshall Islands. I think we are 
386 

working on two different tracks trying to arrive at the same destination and trying to go after the facts. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Let me say, Mr. Ambassador, you and I know that 

to a large extent these hearings are being held today because of the 

work of Senator Ajain. 

Ambassador KENDALL. I know that. 

Mr. DE LUGO. He just would not give up and kept working on the 

issue and working on the issue with all of us. And you know in the 

past our mentor, the Chairman's mentor, my mentor, Phil Burton 

was one of the first and then there was John Seiberling. And I will 

be leaving this Congress at the end of this session and I am very 

grateful that we have a young, powerful, energetic Chairman who 

is taking over, taking over this issue. 

To those that would hope it is just going to go away, at this time 

it is not going to go away. AB you just said, the truth will always 

out and there are those in this Congress that will make sure that 

the truth will win out. 

That is why I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

these hearings and it makes me feel better as I leave this House, 

because it has been a very frustrating experience to try to get the 

information from these various agencies and, of course, we will 

have the Department of Energy before us in a little while and I am 

sure they are looking forward to that. 

Mr: MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Underwood. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all 

of you from the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Just a comment 

on your testimony, Ambassador Kendall. I know you made mention 

of organs that are being kept in Brookhaven. We have a similar 

problem in Guam with respect to organs that have been kept for 

almost 40 years in Rochester, Minnesota, in the Mayo Clinic for investigation of Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease and we 

seem to have the same problem in retrieving those organs. 

It seems that some people can't resist the temptation to look at 

Pacific islanders as guinea pigs rather than as people with rights 

and privileges who are due a measure of dignity. 

And perhaps I think Mr. Faleomavaega's earlier comment about 

Henry Kissinger has been changed. It is now, there are 180,000 

people in Micronesia and who gives a damn. So the numbers have 

gone up, but I think to some extent the sentiments still remain the 

same. 

I am happy to see Mr. Graham. At first I didn't recognize him. 

It has been a long time, and we go back many years together in 

a different setting. 

The question I have, Ambassador, is in terms of your formal request that you are currently formulating. I know there has been a 

series of discussions about the data, the kinds of data which is collected and how useful this data is. I would be interested to know 

what are your sources of information. What are your sources of 

data in formulating this request and do you have an anticipated 

time line? 

Ambassador KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I give the 

further question to our technical people, Mr. Oliver? 
387 

Mr. OLIVER. Thank you, Mr. Underwood. My name is Pete Oliver. I am a long-time resident of the Marshalls, and I work on compact implementation. There is no timetable at this stage. I have got 

to say that when it was announced that the committee was going 

to hold a hearing today in Washington, those of us from the Marshalls basically dropped what we were doing and flew on over . .I would say an estimate might be eight or nine months. There 

are several important components that will be taken into consideration. Certainly the work and the findings that will lead to conclusions that will come out of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal will be a 

key factor. Other factors include different components of the work 

that Dr. Simon described. 

The reason he came to the Marshalls was to do a Nationwide Radiological Study, and as he described this morning, he has visited 

every atoll inhabited or uninha.bited in the Nation, and by the end 

of this year that will be wholly completed and there will be a characterization that will enable him to reconstruct information about 

doses that were actually received by people at the time of BRA VO 

and other nuclear tests. 

When the Chairman asked the question about current studies, 

an important current study which Dr. Simon was also involved in 

is an expansion of thyroid study. The thyroid study has been completed at Ebeye where roughly 1,400 people who were alive at the 

time of the BRA VO or soon thereafter were examined. 

The study is now being expanded nationwide. The physicians 

that will be doing this work will arrive in Majuro next week. They 

will be based in Majuro, and of course, Majuro is the capital and 

the center of population for the nation. But in addition to reaching 

the older residents of Majuro, they will be able to get to other island locations as well. And the findings of that work will also be 

an important part of any presentation that comes back to the United States Congress in accordance with article 9 of the 177 agreement. 

President Kabua just in recent weeks has established a committee to begin to assemble this work, but at this stage we are at the 

very beginnings of the process. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe Mr. Oliver and Mr. Graham can answer this question. Where are we exactly with these $150 million as far as this fund is concerned? Is 

that $25 million given to these persons presently part of the allegations that is now being utilized? 

Mr. OLIVER. The--

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Who is using it? Are the people of these island groups? Are they getting the benefit of this $150 million fund 

or is it somewhere else? 

Mr. OLIVER. Mr. Faleomavaega, in the 1993 annual report that 

was submitted as part of the testimony for the Marshall Islands 

delegation, the first section of that report describes the current status of the fund. 

The fund was provided to the Marshall Islands Government in 

October 1986 and capitalized at the amount of $150 million. In accordance with the 177 agreement it has been invested in U.S. fi-
388 

nancial instruments. The value of the fund now stands at approximately $125,000. We have the year end--

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. $125,000? 

Mr. OLIVER. Sorry. Million, excuse me. 

Mr. MILLER. I didn't know that instruments were that bad. 

Mr. OLIVER. The fund is not holding intact. You can see at the 

bottom of page 1 it says at the end of fiscal year 1993 the value 

of the nuclear claims fund stood at $127.787 million. Also in the 

early section of the report, there is a documentation from the trustee, which is the Bank of New York, the compact legislation, that 

is U.S. Public Law 99-239 requires that a report of this sort be 

submitted annually to the U.S. Congress. And it points out quite 

clearly where the monies are going. 

Annually $18 million are generated. Of that amount, roughly 

three-fourths of it goes directly to the four communities that are 

most directly impacted. A certain amount has been available, a 

total of $3 million has been available for scientific work. Annually $2 miUion is provided for a continuation of the four atoll health 

care programs that were established by this committee a good 

many years ago. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In my last discussion with Mr. Ajain, some 

time back prior to his passing away, there was some concern the 

residents of Rongelap have had over the years with the central 

Government. I don't know. I think Rongelap has their own city 

council and doesn't Bikini have their own city council? 

Mr. OLIVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. There were some disagreements on how this 

money was to be funded in terms of whether or not the residents 

of Rongelap or Bikini are getting any direct benefit on this funding. 

Has this problem been corrected, these disagreements that the city 

councils of these different islands have had with the central Government? . . Mr. OLiv,ER. The local Governments for each of the four communities hw.a·· received the full amounts that are spelled out in the 

section 17 agreement. I think in some cases where disputes have 

risen wit in the communities, disbursements may have been administer by other authorities at the direction of the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal for short periods of times. I think that is all behind us. But the short answer is that all required payments have 

been made to all four of those communities. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And you say that the payments that )Vere 

made as of December 1993 to as many of the inhabitants that were 

affected directly by the testing, that they have been given proper 

compensation, the 676. Were there more than the 676, Mr. Graham? Are we still looking for more residents that were not duly 

compensated? 

Mr. GRAHAM. We have thousands of uncompensated claimants 

for whom we still don't have accurate diagnoses or we have diagnoses of conditions that my office and many of the other medical 

and scientific experts believe are radiogenic and they are caused by 

the testing program, but these claimants have not been compensated as yet. I think that the compensation program that is in 

place right now is very limited relative to what should be compensated, what I think can be documented with proper study and 
389 

release of documents as related and resulting from the testing program. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. What would be your recommendation so we 

could improve on this documentation and getting the proper claims 

for the residents of these islands that are still not compensated? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, we need further diagnosis of individuals who 

are suffering from conditions right now. The medical facilities for 

diagnosis, much less for treatment, remain highly inadequate. The 

medical program envisioned under the 177 agreement is serving far 

too many people to do more than just be a Band-Aid on the treatment problem, and it doesn't have the resources to develop any 

kind of epidemiological studies. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Would you be making that kind of a recommendation to the Congress to improve the commission's work on 

this? I am surprised to learn that it is very inadequate. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I believe the tribunal having been created by 

the parliament of the Nitijela of the Marshall Islands to date has 

viewed-those negotiations need to be conducted on a Governmentto-Government basis and the tribunal recommendations are made 

to various bodies in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. So the Government is not at all--

Mr. GRAHAM. So it wouldn't be able to make such a recommendation directly, I would say. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. You are saying that the Government is not 

involved at all at this time? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I don't think, if the request has been formally 

transmitted in the proper form. 

Mr. FALE0MAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador KENDALL. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Ambassador KENDALL. One more individual, here, a member of 

my delegation, wishes to speak also at this time. Mr. John Ismael, 

Senator. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ISHMAEL JOHN 

Mr. JOHN. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to introduce my staff and myself. My name is Ismael John. 

I am the Senator from Enewetak.. With me is Mr. Mayor and Mrs. 

Mayor and one of the council members, Hernest Johnson, and our 

legal counsel Davor Pevec. If you would, I want my statement to 

be in the record. 

Mr. MILLER. Fine. 

Mr. JOHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say a few 

words, not much. I just want to talk about MIKE. MIKE test somebody in 1952. My people were evacuated from Enewetak and taken 

in a big boat. Ninety days, this means three months, and after the 

three months, we come back to Ujelang. And our waters, everything look like there is a shine on top of everything we have. 

And because in all the discussion I heard today was mostly concern about the problem, but MIKE was the first atomic bomb in the 

world and it was tested in any weather in 1952, and it was the 

first hydrogen bomb dropped on place on the earth. That is what 

I understand. And look like nobody talks about MIKE. It is kind 
390 

of not powerful like BRA VO. MIKE was 10.4 megaton. It is not 

powerful like BRA VO. 

And to prove that we have fallout from that MIKE, I bring with 

me a witness that have thyroid disease-I know that it is from 

MIKE. And we got fallout from the MIKE. It has been one of the 

victims of MIKE from Ujelang and Enewetak. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared joint statement of Mr. John and Mr. Peter follows:] 
391 

STATEMENT OF THE ENEWETAK/UJELANG LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

February .22, 1994 

Submitted by . -The Honorable Ismael John 

Senator, Nitijela of the Marshall Islands; and 

The Honorable Neptali Peter 

Mayor of the Enewetak/Ujelang Local Government Council 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee: 

Thank you for providing this opportunity to the peopl.e of 

Enewetak to discuss issues relating to radiation exposure from 

fallout and the resultant health effects on our population . 

With us are Mrs. Tokko Henry Peter, Mr. Johnson Hernest, and 

Mr. Davor Pevec, our legal counsel. 

Mrs. Tolclco Henry Peter is Mayor Peter's wife. In 1947, Tokko 

along with the other Enewetak people, was moved from Enewetak Atoll 

to Ujelang Atoll by the United States because the United States 

wanted to use Enewetak Atoll as a nuclear test site. Ujelang is 

120 miles southwest of Enewetak. Because of the prevailing trade 

winds, Ujelang is downwind of Enewetak. 

Forty-three nuclear devices were exploded on Enewetak. The 

most powerful explosion was the "Mike" test which occurred on 

October Jl., 1952. Mike was the world's first thermonuclear 

(hydrogen) bomb test. The yield was 10. 4 megatons (750 times 

greater than the Hiroshima bomb), equivalent to 10.4 million tons 

of high explosives. The test was located on the island of Bokombako 

(sometimes refered to as Elugelab). Bokombako was vaporized by the 

Mike test and in its place was a crater more than a mile in 
392 

diameter and 200 feet deep. The United States' Defense Nuclear 

Agency described th• test as follows : 

"A large fireball, J-1/2 miles in diameter and followed 

by a wave of water, swept across neighboring islands. 

Trees and shrubs facing the test site on the island of 

Biken were scorched and wilted, although they were located 14 miles southwest of the Mike shot site." 

Prior to the Mike test, the United States came to Ujelang and 

placed the Enewetak people on a ship which sailed southwest from 

Ujelang towards an island named tc:osrae. We were told we must go on 

the ship for our safety because a test was planned. 

After a number of days of sailing, we were awakened just 

before dawn and told to look at a particular direction on the 

horizon. We then saw an enormous bright light in the direction of 

Enewetak. We were told that what had occurred was a test on 

Enewetak. We were terribly sad. Some of us cried because nothing 

could survive the enormity of such an explosion. We thought, 

surely Enewetak was no more; our ancestral homeland was gone to us 

forever. 

After the explosion, we were returned to Ujelang. When we 

came ashore we noticed that virtually everything was covered by a 

fine dust. We noticed a whitish film on all of our individual and 

community water catchments. 

The United States personnel from the ship came ashore and took 

away several instruments they had placed there when they came to 

pick us up . No one told us what the fine dust was or what the 

whitish film on our catchments was. We drank, cooked and washed 

with the catchment water. Within a few days our skin became 

2 
393 

extremely itchy. Rashes and sores developed on skin. Some people 

had their hair fall out. We had no idea what afflicted us. 

Several years later, we learned about fallout. It was then 

that we associated those ailments to the fallout from the Mike 

test. 

We returned to Enewetak in 1980. We live on the four southern 

islands. The rest of the islands in the atoll are contaminated by 

radiation to one degree or another. We understand that there is 

radiation contamination in the silt of the lagoon. 

We are told that living on the four southern islands is safe. 

We were told that living on Ujelang would be safe . Now we are not 

so sure. Over the years a number of our people have become 

afflicted with thyroid nodules, thyroid cancer and other types of 

cancers. Tokko herself is a victim of thyroid cancer. Nine other 

members of our community have developed thyroid problems and/or 

cancers. 

That is why we are here today. We are here to lend support to 

your Committee's quest to find out what really happened in the 

Marshall Islands as a result of the nuclear testing program. We 

also would like to have all documents declassified so that the full 

record can be reviewed and analyzed. 

In the meantime, it is imperative that Brookhaven National 

Laboratories, through funding provided to the Department of Energy, 

conduct thorough and adequate monitoring of our population. That 

monitoring includes whole body counting and urinalysis for 

plutonium detection. In recent meetings with Brookhaven and the 

3 
394 

DOE, representatives of both organizations stated that each member 

of our population should undergo whole body counting every two 

years. Unfortunately, that frequency has yet to be achieved. In 

addition, we understand that cesium cannot be detected after one 

year. Accordingl:ii,· annual whole body counting may be more 

appropriate. We are willing to discuss with the DOE and other 

scientists the optimal frequency of such monitoring. We would be 

pleased to report to this committee the results of such 

discussions. 

In addition to the whole body monitoring, our environment must 

be monitored to assure that our people are not adversely affected 

by the residual radiation contamination on our atoll. Runit island 

is a radiation waste storage site. It must be monitored as any 

storage site would be monitored in the United States. 

Unfortunately, monitoring over the past 14 years. has been minimal 

and superficial. A plan, consistent with U.S. monitoring 

regulations of nuclear waste sites, should be implemented and 

carried out. Also, the remainder of Runit should be surveyed to 

determine its current status and to detennine methods to render it 

less dangerous for our people. 

We have. ·for too long relied on the representations of others 

when it came to the effects of the testing program. It is time 

that we be provided all_data so that we can have such data analyzed 

to our satisfaction. Only in this way will be able to determine 

4 
395 

the origins of some of our afflictions and plan for a future free 

from the harm of the nuclear age. 

We thank the Chairman and the Committee members for their 

interest in our welfare and their pursuit of truth on our behalf. 

5 
396 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Anyone else? 

Mr. BALOs Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. BALOS. May I make one more comment? 

Mr. MILLER. Certainly. 

Mr. BALOS. Word of advice, Mr. Chairman, if I were to give you 

advice, there was an individual from the U.S. Government that 

used to come to Bikini Island, more frequently to Bikini Island and 

told us that there is no problem on Bikini Island in terms of safety. 

So based on his representation, my people went back to Bikini 

early 1970s, living there for almost ten years and then the same 

person advised the U.S. Government that there was a ~roblem with 

the people residing on Bikini Island. This individuals name, Mr. 

Chairman, for what it is worth to your committee, is Roger Ray. 

And I hope your committee make an effort to locate him to bring 

to your committee to testify. He has been lying to us and he has 

been lying to the U.S. Government as well. Thank you. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. Any other statements, or 

questions by members of the panel? 

Mr. DE LUGO. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Chairman, I know it has been a long day, but 

these witnesses have traveled a great distance and this is not the 

subject of the hearing, but because of the long distance you have 

traveled, I would like to ask the elected representatives of the 

atolls if they have any brief comments that they would like to 

make about the programs that ensure health care and supplemental food to the victims of the nuclear testing. 

Are there any comments that you want to make on those programs, if you would make them verbally or you can submit a statement for the record, whichever way you would like to approach 

that. 

Mr. John. 

Mr. JOHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Which is your atoll? 

Mr. JOHN. I am from Enewetak Atoll. Senator from Enewetak 

Atoll. Thank you. I just want to make an oral statement that I 

want the tomb on Enewetak and Ujelang to be monitored by the 

U.S. Government and I want my people to be monitored from those 

two agencies, like Brookhaven Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore, with DOE, if it is possible. I want them to be monitored 

every year. 

Mr. DE LUGO. You need more monitoring. 

Mr. JOHN. Yes, sir. Because of the tomb there, I don't know what 

inside this is. The tomb is too hot. We cannot go there. The island 

has been off limits for human beings. The population right now, 

they are on Enewetak. It is about eight miles from Rongela~not 

eight, maybe seven. So close we can't use it, because that thing is 

round. You can lay down and you can touch it and so close and I 

want that thing to be monitored. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Anyone else? Yes. Your atoll? 
397 

Mr. YAMAMURA. My atoll, I am from Utirik Atoll. There are three 

programs that we are getting. I believe this program is a good program for the people of all four atolls that are affected from the nuclear testing. The money that has been given to us is $2 million 

per year. And when it was started, there were only about 3,000 

people for a total of those four atolls. Now the number has gone 

up to 10,000 people. 

Mr. DE LUGO. From 2,000 to 10,000? 

Mr. YAMAMURA. From 3,000 to 10,000. 

Mr. DE LUGO. From 3,000 to 10,000 people? 

Mr. YAMAMURA. Yes. 

Mr. DE LUGO. What year was the program started that you refer 

to? 

Mr. YAMAMURA. I believe it started in 1984. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Has there been any increase from 1984? 

Mr. YAMAMURA. Yes. Mr. DE LUGO. In the funds? Not in the people, but in the amount 

of money. 

Mr. YAMAMURA. We still have the same amount-$2 million per 

year. And that will be going all away after the compact is ended, 

15 years. The total is $30 million. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you. That is helpful to us. 

Mr. YAMAMURA. One other thing, Mr. Chairman. The DOE program, I believe the DOE has been helping most of the people on 

Utirik and also the people from Rongelap except DOE nowadays is 

only examining the 98 remaining exposed people on Utirik, but the 

total residents on Utirik is about 500 people. And I believe that 

DOE should expand the program because we want to make sure 

those 500 are also affected from the fallout. 

I think DOE is, according to the Public Law 99-239, just to monitor all those remaining populations of the exposed. Thank you. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Is that it? Yes, sir. Mr. Balos from Bikini. 

Mr. BALOS. Thank you, Congressman de Lugo, Mr. Chairman, 

with regards to the health care, I would like to say that the funding under the compact under the section 177 agreement-first of 

all, let me state for the record that in the process of approving the 

Compact of Free Association, and I am not criticizing any individual or anybody here, but my people voted against the approval of 

the compact only for one reason: Because of the section 177 agreement. They were not satisfied with the arrangement in the agreement. 

They believe the fundings were not sufficient. And one of the 

fundings was health care. 

Today, Mr. Chairman, the population has increased, has doubled. 

The money has not been increased. The faru!!_ng has not been increased. Also, Mr. Chairman, the USDA program for the people of 

Bikini has not increased since 12, 13 years ago. The population has 

tripled and we are still using the same amount that was given to 

us 13 years ago. 

Mr. Chairman, one other concern we have is, the funding to 

clean up Bikini Atoll is not enough. Although we thank Congress 

for appropriating $90 million, but as you know, Mr. Chairman, that 

funding is not sufficient to do the cleaning up of all atolls. So 

please consider these concerns of our people. Thank you very much. 
398 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Mr. Abercrombie, did you have any 

questions or statements you wanted to make? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. DE LUGO. When we come back-I assume you are going to 

recess for this vote-when we come back, between panels, I would 

like to make a brief statement at that time. 

Mr. MILLER. Are we finished with this panel? 

Mr. DE LUGO. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much and let me just say on behalf 

of the committee and Members that it is hard to say we look forward to it, but we certainly want you to know that we do look forward to working with you both on the question of preparing your 

formal request for the Congress should you decide to do that and 

to helping you declassify the information. But I also think Mr. Graham makes a very important point that we need to expedite our 

obligations and the care that individuals in the Marshall Islands 

need as a result of this activity. 

While we ferret out what went wrong, those people who have 

paid a very severe price for what went wrong should not continue 

to fail to be treated when necessary. Also the issue of trying to determine and acquire better knowledge about exactly what is the 

risk that those individuals face that were subject to this event, I 

think, is a very important point, Mr. Graham, and for that matter 

to be expedited is very important. It is really almost an incredible 

admission that what we are left with on behalf of the United States 

40 years later is the Brookhaven study and that somehow, somewhere, somebody must feel that that discharges our obligation in 

this case or met our responsibilities prior to the compact and is sufficient enough to carry that on. 

Obviously, the testimony received today and additional information we have been given just suggests that this in no way can be 

an acceptable outcome in terms of this Government's obligation. So 

I appreciate the great distance that you have come and the time 

you have spent on this matter. It is going to be very helpful to this 

committee and we do look forward to your help and to your counsel 

as we proceed on this matter. 

We will recess to go make the vote and then when we come back 

we will hear from the individuals from the Det>artment of Energy. 

Thank you, again, very much for your time and your effort. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. MILLER. Let me see if I get our bearings where we are here. 

Mr. Pettengill, you are in the middle of making a statement? 

Dr. PETI'ENGILL. We are the last panel. 

Mr. MILLER. You haven't started yet. My apologies for the disruptions. That is the Congress, unfortunately. Why don't we go 

ahead and begin. We have used most of your day as it is. I appreciate you sticking with us here. 
399 

STATEMENT OF HARRY J. PETl'ENGILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR HEALTH. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN E. RUDOLPH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

TRANSPORTATION, SAFEGUARDS AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Dr. PE'n'ENGILL. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, J?ood afternoon. I am 

Harry J. Pettengill. I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health 

at the Department of Energy. My role and my responsibility is I 

am the current manager for the Marshall Islands program for the 

past three-and-a-half years going on four years, and that is my reason to be here today to speak to you about our roles and activities 

in the Marshall Islands. 

With me today I have Mr. John Rudolph. Mr. Rudolph was a 

past associate in the Marshall Islands program during the period 

when it was managed by the Office of Defense Programs from 1982 

through essentially 1990. All individuals I could offer to you that 

could give you any more historical perspective on OOE's involvement have essentially since retired so we are the two individuals 

that can give you any perspective at this point in time in terms of 

DOE's involvements and activities. 

We have entered a rather lengthy statement in the record and 

what I would prefer to do right now is just go through a more summarized statement that I have to off er. 

Mr. MILLER. All right. 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of 

Secretary O'Leary and Dr. Tara O'Toole, the Assistant Secretary 

for Environment Safety and Health. As you know, the Department 

of Energy is currently engaged in working with other Federal agencies such as the Department of the Interior, which has primary responsibilities, the Republic of the Marshall Islands directly and the 

numerous local Marshall Islands atoll Government representatives 

to provide our ongoing medical surveillance and radiological environmental monitoring on behalf of the Marshall Islands people that 

were exposed to radioactive fallout from atmospheric weapons testing in the South Pacific. 

For the record, there were 66 atmosphere nuclear tests conducted 

in the Marshall Islands with one additional test termed YUCCA, 

which was detonated from a high-altitude balloon northeast of 

Enewetak Atoll. I add that because there has been some concern 

and confusion about whether there were additional unannounced 

tests in the South Pacific. And after further review we are declaring that that was the number and there are no other additional 

ones. 

In 1954 one of the weapons tests conducted in the Pacific resulted in the deposition of fallout on inhabited islands. This test 

code name BRA VO was one of the tests in the operation castle series. In response to this unfortunate occurrence, the United States 

Congress has enacted several legislative initiatives to redress any 

harm or loss suffered by the Marshallese as a result of these weapons tests. 

It is important to mention that those legislative mandates provide a basis, a number of them for DOE's programs. They are best 

described, I think, under Public Law 99-239 of January 14, 1986, 
400 

known as the Compact of Free Association, which requires in part 

that: 

DOE continue to provide special medical care and logistical support to the remaining numbers of the population of Rongelap and Utrik who were exposed to radiation 

from the 1954 United States thermonuclear BRAVO tests. 

Most funding to support Marshall Islands' general health and 

support program needs are appropriated) and administered through 

the Department of the Interior under the Compact of Free Association. The Department of Energy receives its own separate appropriation for this very limited medical surveillance program and the 

environmental monitoring we do by its own separate appropriation. 

There are also some additional prior laws which impact DOE's 

responsibilities and they are Public Laws 95-134 and 96-205, 

which, in essence, were carried on and require DOE to continue to 

provide environmental monitoring to characterize the radioactivity 

remaining at the four affected atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap 

and Utrik. 

DOE's current Marshall Islands program is conducted primarily 

through the utilization of resources that we have at the National 

Laboratories that possess the specific expertise to provide the necessary individual medical surveillance and radiological monitoring. 

The personnel and scientific expertise that is associated with these 

laboratories have generally had a very long association with the 

Marshall Islands and have developed a very unique and lasting 

working relationship with the Marshallese people. 

Now, I will just briefly discuss the essential elements of DOE's 

Marshall Islands program. In terms of our medical program, the 

DOE conducts an ongoing field medical surveillance program that 

involves two medical missions into the field every year to evaluate 

those Marshallese that were exposed to fallout from test BRAVO. 

There are now 147 individuals of this population that are still 

alive and requiring continuing clinical care and follow-up for possible radiogenic illnesses. In addition to the field visits, in our medical program, additional care as needed is provided to those individuals when it is required to send them outside of the Marshall Islands for secondary and tertiary care. 

During the twice yearly surveillance visits the medical teams 

also as a humanitarian service do make themselves available to 

provide consultative medical services to the unexposed populations 

on the outer atolls after we have assured that we have attended 

to the needs of the exposed population that we are mandated to be 

there to look after. 

The DOE program is, of course, limited by that congressional 

mandate to only the exposed population. Those that were resident 

during test BRA VO and section 177 of the compact also provides 

for a separate, as you are aware, Marshallese section 177 health 

care program, which is independent of the DOE program. 

The section 177 health care program is funded under the compact and overseen by the U.S. Department of the Interior and provides additional health care for all the peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, 

Rongelap and Utrik. I think you have heard in testimony here 

today that the individuals involved in that program number somewhere around 10,000. 
401 

DOE physicians routinely refer all of our people that have been 

diagnosed as having medical problems that require referral care 

and that are in any way related to the radiogenic diseases referred 

to the 177 health care program. And recently in the past several 

years it has been my objective and we have had the physicians of 

the 177 health care program accompany our DOE medical missions. This has provided a unique opportunity to share our clinical expertise between the two programs. In addition it provides for expedited referrals where they are necessary and allows us to provide 

consultative services from our specialists as needed and physicians 

for all the resettled populations. 

In terms of our environmental monitoring program, the DOE's 

long-standing environmental monitoring programs are dedicated to 

the routine characterization of the residual levels of radionuclides 

on the four predominant and affected atolls, the ones that I had 

earlier mentioned. Currently, DOE conducts, again, two environmental missions a year where we send a large cadre of scientists 

into the field. 

A primary goal of our environmental monitoring program is to 

complete and upgrade grid sampling of vegetation and soil so that 

we can be assured of what the base lines are prior to resettlement 

of each and every affected atoll. Then we follow up with routine 

characterizations of the environmental conditions. In addition, because there is such an issue on mitigation prior to 

resettlement for many years, the program has devoted a significant 

amount of its effort to research on mitigation techniques that 

would help to reduce the consequences of exposure when popu- lations do resettle. In this regard in terms of environmental monitoring, in 1978, 

Lawrence Livermore, our primary environmental monitoring lab, 

and the DOE did conduct a Northern Marshall Islands Radiological 

Survey, which was a combination aerial, radiological, and photo- graphic and ground sampling program of 11 atolls and 2 islands in 

the northern Marshalls. 

The main purpose of this survey was to document the remaining external gamma levels for these atolls that may have received fallout from nuclear tests conducted at Enewetak and Bikini. The aerial portion of the survey was performed to quantify the levels of 

gamma-emitting radionuclides remaining on the ground, and. the 

ground segment involved selective sampling to provide more accurate and comprehensive information. In November of 1982, the DOE did publish the results of the 

Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Survey in the form of a bilingual report and in December of 1982 DOE introduced and presented in Majuro the report entitled, "The Meaning of Radiation for 

Those Atolls in the Northern Part of the Marshall Islands That 

Were Surveyed in 1978." 

In the spring of 1983, the report was further presented to each 

and every one of the populations in the four most affected atolls. 

DOE has continued its radiological monitoring activities between 

1982 and 1985 and during this period of time I think it is fair to 

say that we placed the major emphasis on the collection of samples 

and the continuation of environmental studies at the most radio-
402 

active contaminated atolls of Bikini and Enewetak, the site of the 

actual testing. 

Since that time, however, since 1985, radiological evaluations 

have been expanded to include greatly increased monitoring of 

Rongelap and Utirik Atolls. 

In addition to the primary environmental monitoring program 

and the medical program, DOE does carry on what I call a radiological assessment program. DOE provides continuing radiological 

monitoring of Marshallese people to determine and quantify the 

uptake and the presence of radioactive material which has been 

taken into their bodies. 

The program includes basically two types of monitoring techniques. The first one quantifies the amount of gamma-emitting radioactive material located within the body by means of a technique 

known as a whole-body count. This method is typically used to 

measure the predominant long-lived gamma fallout radionuclides 

such as cesium-137. 

The second monitoring technique involves the collection and 

analysis of urine samples to test for the presence of radionuclides 

which would emit alpha particles, such as plutonium being the predominant one, but since plutonium does not emit any gamma rays 

that can be readily detected using the whole-body counting technique, both techniques must be used together in order to get an accurate assessment of acquired radioactivity in the affected atolls. 

Mr. Chairman, an important issue and one that has been mentioned and discussed here today is the issue that the committee has 

reported elevated incident rates of thyroid disease in populations 

from the northern Marshalls, as compared to populations in the 

southern portion of the Marshall Islands. 

I would just attempt to provide you with the following DOE perspective on this subject. The Republic of the Marshall Islands, as 

provided for under section 177 is currently, as you are aware, completing a nationwide radiological study to establish residual environmental radiation levels throughout the entire Marshall Islands. 

The nationwide survey is most timely since it will document 

what potential for radiation exposure still exists on all the atolls 

and will provide data to assist in an effective dose reconstruction. 

That is where we go back and attempt to reestablish the dose that 

would have occurred historically. 

Clearly, the data from DOE's 1978 Northern Marshall Islands 

Survey will provide useful information for comparison to this new 

nationwide survey which is more extensive. However, such surveys 

do not answer the important questions about the short-lived 

nuclides such as iodine-131. 

In this regard the Nationwide Radiological Survey, to our understanding, is conducting a comprehensive thyroid disease survey utilizing an independent institute in Japan. A phase one thyroid survey was done using current inhabitants at Ebeye on Kwajalein 

Atoll. After that data has been fully evaluated-and as of this time 

we have only been apprised of it in its essential initial form-it is 

expected that the study would be expanded to include surveillance 

of thyroid disease in other parts of the northern Marshall Islands. 

The survey is noteworthy in that it utilizes an ultrasound imaging technique which provides for more resolution when defining 
403 ··, 

thyroid nodules. That is important to point out because I think if 

you look historically at other thyroid studies that have been done, 

a lot of those were done by physical palpation by clinicians and 

where the use of the ultrasound will allow you basically to detect 

a nodule with great accuracy essentially half the size that you 

could by physical palpation. 

DOE supports the need for and the essential benefits of this activity. Arrangements have already been made to include these 

same physicians using their ultrasound technique to accompany a 

DOE-sponsored medical mission to the outer atolls in 1994. 

Of unique interest in the survey is that it may add information 

of historic exposures to radioiodine which has since decayed. DOE 

and its predecessor agencies have conducted extensive environmental monitoring activities throughout the northern Marshall Islands even during the testing years. 

Our review of historic data indicates that the atolls to the south 

and east of Rongelap and Utrik were several orders of magnitude 

less than those levels observed on Rongelap atoll, with the high 

point being shortly after test BRA VO. Because the primary fallout 

radioiodine decays away quickly because of its eight-day physical 

half-life, significant exposure to any mid-belt inhabitants would 

likely have been small when compared to the very large, and I emphasize that even I consider them very large thyroid doses received 

by inhabitants of Rongelap and Utrik. 

Because of the low potential for exposure to thyroid in those individuals compared to those that we have seen on Rongelap and 

Utrik, any follow-up on the mid-belt atoll inhabitants we should 

understand may be somewhat inconclusive in those exposure levels 

and among a limited population. 

When you look at it in terms of an epidemio~c study, it would 

make it extremely difficult to detect statisti y significant increased traits of thyroid disease. 

Such studies often require significant increases in levels. I think 

the point to make here in terms of DOE, because we have been 

mandated under law to deal with a very defined population, if we 

were to attempt to expand our study and our involvement, much 

larger populations that reside in the entire area of the northern 

Marshalls, it is something that we would find very difficult to do 

within the resources that we have available in terms of manpower and the appropriation that we get. If this were a consideration for Congress then I would offer to the 

chairman of the committee this is something we would ask. You 

should require additional consideration to the fact that we simply 

don't have the resources to expand ourselves and not do harm to 

what we are already doing in terms of the quality_._ 

Mr. MILLER. What is the value of doing that? What would be the 

expected value of doing that? 

l>r. PETTENGILL. The value of doing the study is, I believe, is 

this: If we can assume that there may have been the possibility of 

significant exposure to those populations beyond the two atolls that 

we are actively involved in, then the value in doing the studies 

would be that . you would have an opportunity to find the occurrence of lesions before they had turned cancerous, and you could 

provide better care for those individuals. 
404 

As you are aware, the last issue that I would like to address is 

the openness issue. On December 7 of last year, in 1993, Secretary 

O'Leary announced the Department of Energy openness initiative. 

As a result, the Department is undertaking the declassification of 

many weapons testing-related documents. I am currently unaware 

of any previously classified documents which would add significant 

value to the immense database on health effects or medical information that already exists on this topic related to the Marshall Islands. Much information has been already published in the professional health journals since the time of the BRA VO test. And at 

your request, Mr. Chairman, in your letter to Secretary O'Leary of 

December 10 last year, I have asked my staff to look into it and 

we recently initiated a very comprehensive review and study to locate and identify any additional materials which remain classified 

that may have relevance to the issue on the Marshall Islands program. 

And I can report to you that as of last night, I was telephoned 

and told that the remaining classified information that resided in 

headquarters, which I am sure the Secretary spoke to you about, 

has effectively been declassified and will be delivered very shortly 

to you, to the committee. 

An additional request from the Marshall Islands will also be honored in that regard since they have asked for the materials as well. 

In addition to that, as committed to by the Secretary, we have located some additional materials which reside in the Federal repository at Suitland. They are in the process of being recovered. We are 

scanning all the national labs that have been involved in this activity. We are putting an additional task force of all the programs 

that were involved in this activity next week to do another scan to 

make sure that we have identified and located all materials. And 

we are placing the highest priority on a declassification of that information, and it will be provided in a timely manner. 

I thank you for this opportunity to share with you our program 

accomplishments and information on the subject of thyroid disease, 

especially. I would now be pleased to answer any questions that 

you may have, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Dr. Pettengill follows:] 
405 

Stateaent of 

Harry J. Pettengill 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health 

U.S. Oepartllent of Energy 

Before the 

Subca.ittee on Oversight and Investigations 

C0111ittee on Natural Resources 

United States House of Representatives 

February 24, 1994 
406 

Stateaent of 

Harry J. Pettengill Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health 

U.S. Departaent of Energy Before the 

Subc-ittee on oversight incl Investigations c-ittee on Natural Resources 

United Stites House of Representatives 

February 24, 1994 

I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of Secretary O'Leary and Dr. Tara 

O'Toole, the Assistant Secretary for EnvironllN!nt, Safety and Health. As you 

know, the Department of Energy (DOE) is currently engaged in working with 

other Federal agencies such as the Department of the Interior (DOI), the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands (RepMar) and local Marshall Islands 

government representatives to provide medical surveillance and radiological 

environmental monitoring on behalf of the Marshall Islands people exposed to 

the radioactive fallout from the at1110spheric weapons testing in the South 

Pacific. In 1954, one of the weapon tests conducted in the Pacific resulted 

in the deposition of fallout on inhabited islands. This test code named 

"BRAVO" was one of the tests in the Operation Castle series. In response to 

this unfortunate occurrence, the United States Congress has enacted several 

legislative initiatives to redress this circumstance. There were 66 

atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in the Marshall Islands with one 

additional test, "YUCCA", detonated from a high-altitude balloon northeast of 

Enewetak Atoll. The United States Congress has enacted several legislative 

initiatives to attempt.redress of any harm or loss suffered by the Marshallese 

as a result of these weapon tests. 
407 

2 

PrP9rM lkocltte 

Public Law 99-239 of January 14, 1986, known as the "COltpact of Free 

Association" requires that DOE: 

"continue to provide special aedical care and logistical support to the 

retnining IN!llbers of the population of Rongelap and Utrik who were exposed to radiation resulting from the 1954 United States thennonuclear 

'BRAVO' test• 

Most funding to support Marshall Islands health and support needs is 

appropriated through and administered by 001. The Department of Energy 

receives separate appropriations, however, for the aedical surveillance and 

the environmental monitoring programs. 

Public Laws 95-134 and 96-205 require DOE to continue to provide environaental 

110nitoring to characterize the radioactivity re111aining at the four affected 

atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik. On August 3, 1990, the 

Senate passed an aaend111ent stating that "all responsibilities .•• and all 

activities at the Departaent of Energy with respect to 111edical and 

environ111ental progra•s applicable (by law) in the Republic of the Marshall 

Islands shall be • anaged, controlled, and conducted through the Office of 

Environment, Safety and Health." During the period from November 1982 until 

April 1990, the Office of Defense Programs had provided this progra• 

• anagement role. 

Over the years, scientists and physicians have worked diligently to 1110nitor 

the health of the exposed populations from the four affected atolls of Bikini, 

Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik, and to characterize the persistence of 

radioactivity in the environaent for all of the Marshall Islands. OOE's 
408 

that possess the specific expertise to provide ·medical surveillance and 

radiological monitoring and evaluation. The personnel and scientific 

expertise associated with these laboratories have generally had a long 

associ ation with the Marshall Islands and have developed a unique working 

relationship with the Marshallese people. 

The Departaent of Energy Medical Prograa 

3 

The DOE conducts two field medical missions annually to examine and provide 

medical surveillance and follow-up medical care for the 253 Marshallese 

exposed at Rongelap and Utrik Atolls. There are now 147 of this population 

that still need clinical care and follow up for possible radiogenic illnesses. 

An initial unexposed control group of 86 Marshall~se people has been expanded 

over the years to include 135 people. The DOE medical missions treat up to 

300 persons annually . 

The Brookhaven National Laboratory conducts medical surveillance of the 

surviving people of Rongelap and Utrik Atolls who were exposed to radiation 

resulting from the BRAVO test . The medical surveillance results of the 

"exposed" population are compared to the results of the "control group" 

referred to hereafter as the "unexposed" group. Also, Brookhaven facilitates 

care for those exposed individuals with suspected radiogenic diseases who 

require referral to medical facilities outside the Marshall Islands. During 

twice -yearly surveillance visits, the Brookhaven medical teams also make 

themselves available to provide consultive medicine services to the unexposed 

populations after attending to the needs of the exposed population. 
4 

The 00£ progru fs lt• ited by congressional undate to the exposed populations 

of Rongelap and Utrik. Section 177 of the "C011Pact of Free Association" 

provides for a separate Nlrshallese 177 Health Care Progru, independent of 

the DOE progru. The 177 Health Care Progru 1s funded under the C011Pact and 

overseen by the U.S. Depart• ent of the Interior and provides health care for 

the peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik. The local atoll 

authoritive have expanded enrollaent in this progru to approxi• ately 10,000 

people. DOE physicians refer all non-radiation related disorders of its 

exposed and control populations to the Marshallese Section 177 Health Care 

Progru physicians who oversee the populations for the Atolls of Bikini, 

Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik. Recently, Section 177 program physicians began 

to acco•pany the DOE • edical • 1ss1ons. This provides an opportunity to share 

clinical expertise between the two progrus in addition to providing for 

expedited referrals and consultive practices for all resettled populations. 

The DOE and its predecessor agencies, the Energy Research Developaent Agency 

(ERDA) and the Ato• ic Energy Coaission (AEC), have had a long history of 

support efforts on behalf of the Marshallese people since Brookhaven National 

Laboratory (BNL) physicians first began to treat the exposed popu1atklns of 

Rongelap, Utrik, and Ailinginae Atolls shortly after the BRAVO test. A 

• edical tea• frm BNL, supplet1ented by a national corps of consultants, 

continued to i•ple.ent • edical surveillance and treat11ent progra•s under the 

auspices of AEC and later ERDA with the cooperative support fro• the 

Departments of Defense and Interior. From its inception, the primary 

objective of the DOE Nlrshall Islands Medical Progru has been the early 

detection and treataent of any aedical condition that might evolve as a 
410 

5 

consequence of radiation exposures resulting from the BRAVO test. Both 

scientific and humanitarian considerations led to the establishment of an 

effective field capability for DOE to administer routine and scheduled primary 

medical care, with facilities being made available outside the Marshall 

Islands for secondary and tertiary referral. 

QOE's EnyironaentaJ Proqraa 

From the time of the BRAVO test to recent years, the medical program has been 

augmented with long-standing environmental monitoring programs dedicated to 

the routine characterization of the residual levels of radionuclides on the 

affected atolls. Currently, DOE conducts two environmental monitoring 

missions annually. A primary objective of the environmental program is to 

afford complete grid sa11111ling of vegetation and soil prior to resettlement of 

each affected atoll. In addition, • any years of the program have been devoted 

to program research on mitigation techniques to reduce uptake of radionuclides 

by plants and local foods that could impact resettled populations. 

To fulfill the congressional mandate to conduct continuing environmental 

monitoring, Lawrence Livennore National- Laboratory (LLNL) has performed 

radiological monitoring of the environment at Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, 

Utrik and other atolls throughout the northern Marshall Islands. The 

110nitoring has been designed to detennine environmental concentrations of 

radionuclides in indigenous food products, vegetation, and soils and to 

evaluate agricultural restoration or utilization methods to diminish the 

uptake of cesium-137 into the food chain. In 1978, LLNL and DOE conducted the 

Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Survey, a combination aerial 
411 

6 

radiological and photographic survey and ground sampling program of 11 atolls 

which included Rongelap, Taka, Utrik, Bikar, Rongerik, Ailinginae, Likiep, 

Ailuk, and Wotho in addition to the two islands of Jemo and Mejit. The main 

· purpose of these surveys was to document the remaining external gama levels 

for these atolls that may have received fallout from the nuclear tests 

conducted at the Enewetak and Bikini atolls. The aerial portion of the 

. survey was performed to quantify the levels of gama emitting radionuclides on 

the ground, and the ground segment involved selective sampling to provide 110re 

accurate and comprehensive information. 

In November 1982, DOE published the results of the Northern. Marshall Islands 

Radiological Survey in the from of a bilingual report. In December 1982, DOE 

introduced and presented at the capital island of Majuro in the Marshall 

Islands~ a report entitled, "The Meaning of Radiation for Those Atolls in the 

Northern Part of the Marshall Islands That Were Surveyed in 1978." In the 

spring of 1983, the report was also presented to the populations at each of 

the four affected atolls. DOE has continued its radiological 1110nitoring 

activities between 1982 and 1985 but placed its 111in emphasis on collection of 

.samples and continuation of environmental studies at the most radioactively 

contaminated atolls of Bikini and Enewetak. Since that tiine, radiological 

evaluations have expanded to include Rongelap and Utrik atolls. Since 1985, 

the Lawrence liveraore National Laboratory team has collected soil and 

vegetation samples to detemine the levels of cesiu• -137 in locally grown 

foods and to detel"lline the concentration of plutoniua-239 and plutoni•-240 in 

the soil . .These ch1racterizations are continuing and the actual raw data, 
412 

results and reports generated on these data are shared with the Marshallese 

people. 

OOE's Dose Assessaent Program 

7 

Brookhaven National Laboratory conducts a radiological monitoring program of 

the Marshallese people to determine and quantify the presence of radioactive 

material which may have been taken into their bodies. The program includes 

two types of monitoring techniques. The first one quantifies the amount of 

gamma-emitting radioactive material located within the body by means of a 

technique known as a whole-body count. This method is typically used to 

measure predominant long-lived gama fallout radionuclides such as cesium-137. 

The second monitoring technique involves the collection and analyses of urine 

samples to test for the presence radionuclides which emit alpha particles such 

as plutonium, a secondary dose contribution. Since plutonium does not emit 

any ga11111a-rays that can be readily detected using the whole body counting 

technique, both techniques must be used to generate an accurate assessment of 

radioactivity that might have been acquired from weapon tests. 

Meaorand111 of Understandjnq for Resettleaent of RonqeJap Atou 

With the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the DOE and the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands in 1992, an entity known as the Rongelap 

Resettlement Project was established to conduct an independent assessment of 

the habitability of Rongelap atoll. DOE scientists from LLNL have at times 

split samples, shared and compared results with each other to assure the best 

science is applied to make the resettlement decision. The Rongelap 

Resettlement Project also sponsors a number of other independent studies in 
413 

8 

order to fully evaluate habitability. A final report on this action should be 

completed by May of 1994. 

Incidence of Thyroid Disease io the Marshall Islands 

Mr. Chairman, an important issue of great concern to the Comittee is the 

reported elevated incidence rate of thyroid abnonnalities in population fr1111 

the northern Marshall Islands as compared to population to population in the 

southern Marshall Islands. I wish to provide you with the following DOE 

perspective on this subject. 

The Republic of the Marshall Islands as provided for under Section 177 of the 

Compact of Free Association is currently completing a Nationwide Radiological 

Study to establish residual environ111ental radiation levels throughout the 

Marshall Islands. The Nationwide Radiological Study is 110st timely since it 

will document what potential for radiation exposure still exists on all the 

atolls and will provide data to assist in an effective dose reconstruction. 

The Nationwide Radiological Study is also conducting a separate thyroid nodule 

and disease survey utilizing independent physicians from an institute..in 

Japan. A phase l survey was done using current inhabitants at Ebeye on 

Kwajalein atoll. After the data has been fully evaluated, the study will be 

expanded to include surveillance of thyroid disease in other parts of the 

northern Marshall Islands. The survey utilizes an ultrasound imaging 

technique which provides more resolution when defining thyroid nodules. 

Arrange111ents have also been 111ade to include these same physicians using the 

79-784 0-94-14 
414 

9 

ultrasound technique ·to accompany the DOE sponsored medical •issions to outer 

atolls in 1994. 

The DOE and its predecessor agencies conducted extensive environmental 

monitoring activities throughout the northern Marshall Islands. During a 

recent review of the supporting doc1111entation that accOlll)anies the docuaent 

entitled, "Marshall Islan<ls Chronology, 1944 to 1990" which was cOlll)iled in 

January, 1990, we discovered radiological survey infonaation, conducted 

relatively soon after the Casile BRAVO test, which indicates that the fallout 

levels on the atolls to·the south and east of the four affected atolls (e.g . , 

Wotje, Maloelap, Likiep, Ailuk, Kwajalein, Lae, and Ujae) at about 3-4 

milliroentgen/hour.were typically several orders of •agnitude less than those 

levels observed at Rong~lap Atoll which ranged frota 2000 to 3000 

milliroentgen/hour initially. Because the pri11ary fallout radioiodine 

(iodine-131) decays away quickly because of its B day half-life, significant 

exposure to any mid-belt inhabitants would likely be saall when cOllll)ared with 

thyroid doses received by inhabitants at Rongelap and Utrik Atolls. 

Additionally, fallout levels measured during the 1978 aerial survey showed 

that levels at that time were cOt11parable to and consistent with gener..ally 

known worldwide fallout levels outside the four most affected atolls. 

However, there is a possibility that fallout fr011 the other 65 tests aay have 

deposited radioiodine and other short-lived radioisotopes that should be 

considered. 

In your Oecellber IO, 1993 letter to Secretary O'Leary, you referenced Dr. 

Th1111as Huiilton's confidential stateaent to your Coaittee. Since the tiae 
415 

10 

that Dr. Hamilton made his statement, his finding~ were subsequently published 

in the Journal of the American Medical Association (Vol. 258, No.5, August 7, 

1987, pgs. 629 - 635) . In summary, Dr. Hamilton suggests that a linear 

relationship between distance from Bikini Atoll and the prevalence of thyroid 

abnonnalities could be ascertained throughout the northern atolls and not 

limited to only Rongelap and Utrik. Dr. Hamilton suggests that these findings 

indicate that fallout from the BRAVO test extended much further south than is 

currently believed and resulted in exposures to more people than the 

populations of Utrik and Rongelap atolls. However, these mid-belt atoll 

contamination levels, as stated earlier, were significantly below those of the 

four affected atolls. 

A study related to weapons testing thyroid disease titled, "A Cohort Study of 

Thyroid Disease in Relation to Fallout From Nuclear Weapons Testing", a 

combined publication of 9. individuals, was published in the November 3, 1993, 

issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA Vol. 270, 

No.17, pgs 2076-2082) . In this study results were reported as a function of 

three separate histological categories which were identified as nodules, 

neoplasms, and carcinomas. The investigators report that "the assoc"iations 

found were specific to neoplasia and were not seen for non-neoplastic nodules 

or any other thyroid condition". An increased risk was cited for thyroid 

neoplasms at doses greater than 400 IIGy (40 rem). The mid-belt atoll 

exposures were significantly less than this. 

An additional source of infon1ation may have relevance to this issue. The 

National Research Council, acting in its capacity under the auspice of the 
416 

11 

National Acad~ of Sciences have prepared a series of reports to advise the 

U.S. gover1111ent on the health consequences of radiation exposures. The 110st 

recent report is .entitled, "Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of 

Ionizing Radiation" (alternatively known as the BEIR V report) and was 

published in 1990. This report contains a section devoted specifically to 

thyroid carcinoma. The data of Dr. Ha• ilton is reviewed in addition to other 

populations exposed to 1-131 or radiations of external origin. 

The BEIR V report observes that: 1) "the development of thyroid cancer from 

initiated cells is profoundly dependent on hormone balance."; 2) "there is 

wide variation among reports of spontaneous thyroid cancer incidence among 

different Polynesian populations"; 3) "ther~ are major differences in 

background thyroid rates among unirradiated individuals of different reported 

cohorts. Analysis suggests that these differences are related, at least in 

part, to life-style, although ascertainment may also play a critical role." 

Because of the low potential for exposure to radiation, any follow up study on 

the mid-belt atoll inhabitants probably would be inconclusive in that low 

exposure doses among such a small population would make it extremely ~ifficult 

to detect significantly increased rates of thyroid disease. Such studies 

would require significant increases in current levels of appropriations for 

the DOE Marshall Islands Program. 

OOE's Openness Initiative 

As you are aware, on December 7, 1993, Secretary O'Leary announced the 

Department of Energy Openness Initiative. As a result, the Department is 
417 

12 

undertaking the declassification of many weapons testing related documents. 

am currently unaware of any previously classified documents which would add 

significant value to the immense database of health effect or medical 

information already existing on this topic. Much information has been already 

published in the professional health journals since the time of the BRAVO 

test. My staff has recently initiated an effort to identify, locate and 

review information that remains classified on the subject of weapons testing 

in the Marshall Islands. The Secretary has directed that any documents 

relevant to the Marshall Islands be identified and declassified whenever 

possible. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to share with you our program 

accomplishments and information on the subject of thyroid disorders in the 

Marshall Islands. 

I would now be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 
418 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. On the question of declassification, the Secretary mentioned that the materials, I guess what 

you referred to from headquarters, would be delivered to us on the 

twenty-fifth. Are we still to assume that that is the case? 

Dr. PETrENGILL. Yes. Mr. MILLER. Okay, thank you. I am not in a position today to do 

dueling studies back and forth, and that is certainly not my field, 

but let me ask you, I am led to believe that you have a problem 

with Dr. Hamilton's study. Is that so? 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. Personally, I have no problem at all. 

Mr. MILLER. I don't mean personally. I assume you wouldn't have 

one personally. 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. No. In fact the first time that I reviewed the 

study was shortly before I met with your staff. I reviewed his journal publication, which occurred in, I guess, 1987, after he had provided confidential testimony to this committee. And I found the 

publication to be reasonable and a good one. 

The staff did as we normally do. I have a staff of epidemiologists. 

One of my offices is the Office of Epidemiology and Health Surveillance. They reviewed it, and they looked at it from a professional 

standpoint. They identified and pointed out a number of weaknesses, a view of which Dr. Hamilton himself has spoken to and 

even identified one himself in the publication. We offered those 

comments, and I believe they were transmitted on to Dr. Hamilton. Mr. MILLER. And so what conclusion are we to draw from that 

as laypersons? 

Dr. PETrENGILL. Well, from all the information that was put in 

front of me, it was a very credible study. I mean he surveyed 7,000 

people from the northern Marshalls. Approximately, 2,000 of those 

individuals were alive at the time of the BRA VO test. And he made 

some calculations and his survey showed that there was essentially, as I recall, a 33 percent increase in prevalence, in incidence 

of the disease. And based on his information and what is provided 

in his study, I have no reason to question that. 

Mr. MILLER. Should that have any impact on your ongoing work? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Not at this point in time, because as I indicated, 

the Department of Energy is operating under a very strict mandate 

where we were given the provision under law to provide medical 

surveillance and care for a defined group of individuals that were 

exposed directly to fallout from test BRA VO. That involved 253 individuals, approximately 86 that were on Rongelap and I believe 

167 on Utrik. Mr. MILLER. Does Dr. Hamilton's study set off any bells or whistles that might be of concern, just out of humanitarian reasons? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Well, to me, looking at it now, I would think 

that there is the possibility that there should be wider medical surveillance; it should be a consideration. And I believe that is what 

the chairman heard from the elected representatives of the various 

atolls. · 

Mr. MILLER. When you say wider medical surveillance, you mean 

both geographically and personnel? 

Dr. PETrENGILL. Right, number of people and geographically, for 

the areas where, if they were alive during the testing era and there 
419 

was the possibility of fallout having any impact on that population, 

then medical surveillance is a reasonable approach. Mr. MILLER. I followed you through this, but I am not sure I understood it. Your environmental monitoring assessments leads you 

to what conclusion in terms of safety or impacts? I am not sure I 

am using the right words, but you are going to have to educate me 

on this. 

Dr. PETI'ENGILL. What we attempt to do, primarily with our environmental monitoring programs--and again, we are mandated to 

look at the four most affected atolls, and that is important to emphasize-so that is why we look very closely at Rongelap, Utrik, Bikini and Enewetak. 

The main essential element of that is to develop routine characterization of those atolls in order to validate what the residual levels of radioactivity are in the soils, in the vegetation on those 

atolls. And as such, we have laid out a program. Livermore is 

working very diligently at that. We are doing what I would call 

baseline griding surveys of those four atolls, where we have at this 

point in time an understanding of what the activity levels are 

throughout the atoll, okay. And then over time with some frequency, you can go back and you can spot check, so to speak, Mr. 

Chairman. You wouldn't necessarily have to do the entire grid, but 

you would do primary areas on the grid. 

You go back and reevaluate and see whether the radioactivity is 

decaying slower, at or greater than the rate that you might have 

predicted. 

Mr. MILLER. What have you learned from the baseline? 

Dr. PETl'ENGILL. Well, we have learned a number of things in 

those areas that we have baseline. As we did understand, there are 

different elements here. The first element is the physical decay, 

which. is established by the half-life of the radioactive material itself. 

A second element, which is also an inducing factor, is what we 

call the environmental half-life, that while you have the actual 

physical decay of the radioactivity, there are other forces in the environment that are essentially removing that radioactive material 

from that location in the environment and transporting it somewhere else. As in the case of cesium-137, for example, which is the 

predominant dose contributor to populations because of its uptake. 

It has an environmental half-life, we are finding at the end of 

our research after many years in that area of the world, of approximately around 18 years, as compared to the 30-year physical halflife. So the good news is that the radioactive cesium will be leaving 

the environment a little quicker than one had assumed. 

Mr. MILLER. And that would lead you to anticipate what in terms 

of maintaining risk or potential danger? 

Dr. PETl'ENGILL. Well, in terms of that being the major, the predominant dose contributor to resettled populations because they 

would take in cesium by ingestion of local foods that had taken it 

up through the root system and into the fruit product, that would 

result in lower activities in the fruit and result in less uptake of 

the individual. Thus, less dose. 

Mr. MILLER. So that goes where on the scale? I am just not familiar with what would create a potential danger or something that 
420 

you would highlight. Is this sort of thing not a matter of concern, 

or is it a matter of concern in certain areas? 

Dr. PE'n'ENGILL. In m1. mind, it is always a matter of concern, 

but I think what it does 1s, it allows you to make a reasonable estimate of what the expected exposure to individuals living in those 

environs will be. And based upon that and based upon the risk estimate of that exposure, then they can make a judgment as to 

whether it is safe or not. 

Mr. Mn,LER. Would we have a different risk calculation or potential exposure with respect to children who are relocated in those 

areas, or do we know enough about that? 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. I don't personally, but from what I do understand, I think in terms of cesium, probably not, because it is taken 

up in the body in such a manner. There is something like iodine131, which we have discussed in terms of its uptake and specific concentration in the thyroid gland, that is much more· hazardous 

to a child because their thyroid is much smaller in physical terms. 

Mr. Mil.I.ER. That is no longer a risk? 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. That is no longer a risk because essentially the 

iodine-131 that resulted from these activities was decayed in a 

matter of three months. 

Mr. MILLER. So in that case, we are dealing with those who were 

alive at that time? 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. Right. 

Mr. MILLER. Not dealing with follow-on generations? 

Dr. PE'M'ENGILL. Exactly. 

Mr. MILLER. What is the threat to follow-on generations, if any? 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. From what we have seen from other studies of 

radiation in populations, we have seen very little genetic effect at 

these kinds of exposure levels, as evidenced by the studies that 

have been done on the bomb survivors in the Japanese populations. 

Mr. MILLER. But there have been no studies on this specific pop- ulation? 

Dr. PETI'ENGILL. No, because you are talking about a population that initially numbered 253 people. It is highly unlikely that you 

could have any kind of statistical powers to be able to apply to that 

kind of a study. · Mr. MILLER. On page 9 of your statement at the bottom, you say 

that fallout levels measured during 1978 aerial surveys showed 

that levels at that time were comparable to and consistent with 

generally known worldwide fallout levels outside the four most affected atolls. 

What are you saying there? 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. Well, another person who was here earlier today 

talked about contributions from all forms of atmospheric testing 

coming from the Chinese, the Russians, Nevada, the Marshall Islands, the French, and so forth, that contributed to the worldwide, 

global fallout level. I think it was Dr. Simon who discussed that. 

And in the area of the Marshall Islands, if you went back before 

atomic testing, you would find essentially a very low background 

level because of the way they were formed. 

The point I am getting to is, the measurement in the 1978 survey 

for those atolls outside of the four affected ones, the levels were so 

low that they were essentially the same levels that you would 
421 

measure throughout other areas of the world that were basically 

contributed to by the global fallout. 

Mr. MILLER. Then what does the sentence mean, "however, there 

is a possibility that the fallout from the other 65 tests may have 

deposited radioiodine and other short-lived radioisotopes?" What 

arei you telling me there? 

Dr. PETIENGILL. Because of the extreme interest in test BRA VO 

and the expectation that BRA VO is the major contributor to the 

thing, I think the general acknowledgment there is that there was 

fission product released from all the tests and that they may have 

been co-contributors to the other atolls as well. 

Mr. MILLER. So there may have been some cumulative impact 

here of the other tests? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Yes, and I think that I saw in Dr. Simon's testimony one graph that talked about cumulative yields, and you can 

just sort of plot along that there would be some cumulative effect. 

Mr. MILLER. On page 11, in the middle paragraph, they are referring to the BEIR V report. Your last sentence says analysis suggests that these differences are related, at least in part, to lifestyle, 

although ascertainment may also play a critical role. What are you 

telling me there? 

Dr. PETrENGILL. Pardon me? Would you go over that? 

Mr. MILLER. What is it you are saying there? You talk about the 

BEIR V report, and then you say that analysis of these differences, 

that difference is what, between Dr. Hamilton and the BEIR V report? I am on page 11 in the middle paragraph. 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Page 11. Oh, well, I would suggest that what 

that could mean there, Mr. Chairman, is that it could be a combination of any of these factors. BEIR V was also mentioned. BEIR 

V indicated that there was an increased risk of cancer induction in 

the range of 2-4 from low LET radiations, as opposed to what had 

been previously thought. And in the context of creating BEIR V, 

Dr. Hamilton's data was reviewed by the BEIR V committee and 

they did note in that and other studies there could be hormonal 

balances which can affect the prevalence rate of thyroid nodularity, 

that there was an evidence of higher incidences in Polynesian populations in general as compared to populations in the United States 

of thyroid nodularity, and that all these kind of things could have 

an additive effect. 

Mr. MILLER. That is not to suggest that that explains the high 

incidence Dr. Hamilton found? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. No. No, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Lifestyle in your last sentence refers to Polynesian 

populations or what? What does lifestyle refer to? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Well, in terms of the diet, that it was very high 

shellfish contribution in the diet of South Pacific islanders, and 

there would be a lot of iodine taken up which is concentrated in 

the thyroid, so it could help explain that. 

Mr. MILLER. But do we know that? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Not totally, no. Not totally. 

Mr. MILLER. Is this population being compared to a Polynesian 

population somewhere else that ate a lot of shellfish and got thyroid cancer? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. No, not to my knowledge. 
422 

Mr. MILLER. Well, what is it being compared to? I don't understand. Dr. PE'ITENGILL. Well, there were studies that they had available 

to them, the BEIR V committee, that they looked at and they felt 

that there were possibly other contributing factors which may have 

contributed to a higher incidence of thyroid nodularity in Polynesian populations, as compared to other populations throughout the 

world, that may be due in part to radiation, but may not be due 

in part to radiation. It may be due to dietary factors, hormonal factors, etc. That is what that is attempting to explain; even BEIR V 

felt that there are a lot of other contributing factors as well. You 

can't explain it totally on the basis of this. 

Mr. MILLER. Well, I think this is my concern. When I read that 

and I read the Hamilton study, my concern is that there may be 

a lot of things that explain it, but 65 nuclear blasts may explain 

it, too. And I just don't know how do you apportion the weight 

here. Eating shellfish and a nuclear blast are weighted the same? 

Can't be, I don't think so. 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. I think another factor, which may be important 

to point out, too, is that even in Dr. Hamilton's study, and the recent survey done under the Nationwide Radiological Survey, there 

was a significant portion of those populations that were surveyed 

which were born long after the testing era. And there was, to my 

understanding, there was increased incidence of thyroid nodularity 

in those population age groups as well, which would make one assume that there were other contributing factors as well. 

The underlying prevalence rate here in this population, short of 

the radiation exposure, may, in fact, be elevated over other populations throughout the world. 

Mr. MILLER. But we don't know that. 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. We don't know that totally. We don't know that 

totally. 

Mr. MILLER. Right, we don't know it or we don't know what we 

don't know, is what you are saying. Nobody has run a study. 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. To my knowledge,, nobody has run a study 

which subtracts that out totally and probably with extreme accuracy that all scientists would buy on to. However, I think the studies themselves do demonstrate that there is increased prevalence 

in populations that were born long after the testing. 

Mr. MILLER. Maybe it is in the shellfish for a different reason. 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. It wouldn't be iodine. 

Mr. MILLER. "Shellfish Institute" may not want to hear that, bl,lt 

we will go to Chairman de Lugo. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you very much. I am concerned about what 

you said about . Dr. Hamilton's findings and conclusions. I want to 

clarify whether you think that Dr. Hamilton's findings indicate 

t;liat the extent of serious fallout may have gone beyond the four 

atolls. You answered the chairman's questions, and I was wondering, did you rule this out? 

Dr. PE'ITENGILL. No, I believe that was the nature of our testimony. We are saying that you couldn't rule out the impact of not 

only the BRA VO test, but of other tests extending beyond those 

four atolls being a contributing factor to increased thyroid 
423 

nodularity in those populations that were alive during the testing 

era. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Okay. I want to say, Doctor, that I am pleased to 

hear about the May timetable for the study of habitability on 

Rongelap. h. you know, it has taken quite a long time to get to this 

point. And as you also may know, some of us thought that your office, Health, was more of an appropriate one to address these issues than your predecessor Defense programs. So we have waited 

on you to deliver a report that would meet the requirements of the 

law. 

What can you tell us now about the findings so far? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. I really can't tell you an extreme amount about 

the findings. I thank you first for your kind comments on the Office 

of Health. When we took over the program in 1990, we recognized 

that there was a major issue to be dealt with and that was the 

habitability of Rongelap, as provided for under the compact. And 

we worked very diligently with the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Rongelap local atoll government and with the Department of the Interior, and we were successful putting together 

what I think is a very credible scientific work plan that would go 

back and make an independent evaluation of the habitability issues. 

h. such, it was extremely important that those studies be carried 

out under the auspices of the Republic of Marshall Islands and 

Rongelap, being directed by scientists of their choosing. They have 

done that as such. Our contributions at the Department of Energy 

were to provide additional logistical support to provide expertise in 

doing split samplings and to contribute with the actual surveys 

that were done. We have done that. 

All the data has been analyzed that we split samples on. That 

has been very timely returned to the Marshallese scientists that 

were assigned this task to work on the thing. In reviewing the data 

by our own scientists, etc., I would offer that it seems very encouraging that the levels are at a level which, when you do the final 

calculations, may provide a possibility of resettlement. 

Mr. DE LUGO. While the study is going on, is the Department of 

Energy still telling the people of Rongelap that it regards Rongelap 

as safe, or have you suspended that pending the results of the 

study? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. No, sir, I do not tell anybody it is safe, espe- cially the people of Rongelap. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Doctor, when you say that the findings are encouraging, does that include dosage that individuals might have received personally from the fallout? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. No. What we are talking about is the estimated 

annual exposure the maximally exposed individual would receive 

from resettlement and living in Rongelap. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Resettlement, all right. 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Nobody is encouraged by the exposures that 

those individuals suffered on the actual· fallout. 

Mr. DE LUGO. We have heard a lot about what was known or 

knowable when the compact was being negotiated. The issue is 

largely the extent of serious contamination. Is it beyond that previous knowledge or other atolls affected? From previous testimony 
424 

it appears that all of the information that could have been discussed by all concerned wasn't made available during the negotiations. 

DOE seems to have control of the information flow within the 

Federal Government. Does the new leadership at DOE have any 

concern about the agency's handling of the matter in the past? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Yes, and I believe even the past Administration, 

That was one of the concerns that resulted in the realignment of 

the activity within the Office of Health. He wanted to give reasonable assurance to the people of the Republic of Marshall Islands 

and to the Congress that there were scientists, at least such as myself, with background and expertise in those areas that we could 

provide that kind of management. 

Mr. DE LUGO. What is your reaction to the information from Dr. 

Simon that the rate of thyroid cancer is 100 times the worldwide 

level? 

Dr. PETIENGILL. Well, I think that I would offer that I have only 

been given the preliminary information. Steve, Dr. Simon, has 

briefed us on the preliminary information on the thyroid survey 

that was done in Ebeye, and I think it bears a lot more scrutiny 

and that is why we were very interested in it. At his request we 

agree with the idea and we like the idea of including ultrasound 

as part of our survey technology that we use on our medical surveillance missions, as well as including the category of scientists 

that he has put together to operate with us on our mission and do 

surveys in the outer atolls, as well. We think it is quite beneficial. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Doctor, what is your assessment of the National 

Radiological Survey which is being undertaken by the Marshall Islands? Does it coordinate with DOE? And if so, how? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Yes, very much so. We have had the opportunity in a few circumstances, I believe, to provide some logistical support 

when Dr. Simon and his people may have wanted to come along 

with us on a mission, to be able to take his personnel and his 

equipment to one of the outer locations to do surveying. And I 

might offer that that surveying wasn't always necessarily a component of the Nationwide Radiological Survey, which he has been 

very busy on over the last several years, but also as essential element of the Rongelap resettlement activity, and that is where we 

have the most interface. 

Mr. DE LUGO. You look on this study as a highly creditable 

study? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. The Nationwide Radiological Survey is, very 

much so, and I think I have stated that in the testimony. 

Mr. DE LUGO. What is your reaction to the statements of Bikini 

Senator Balos regarding conflicting signals from Mr. Ray, who has 

played such a key role in the Department's Marshall Islands programs, as well as in the compact negotiations? 

Dr.· PETI'ENGILL. Well, I myself find it very difficult to answer 

that question specifically because, as I indicated, my history with 

the Marshall Islands is only from the period of 1990 on. John Rudolph, who was with the Office of Defense Programs and was a 

very close associate with Doctor Ray, may desire to answer that 

question. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Rudolph. 
425 

Mr. RUDOLPH. I can make some comments on this although this 

also happened before my time in this program. But my recollection 

is that the level of contamination on the Island of Bikini was such 

that it was deemed at the time within acceptable exposure limits 

for the people to be returned to the island, provided they limited 

their diet to food that was provided by the Department of Agriculture, and that they stayed away from locally grown food because 

of the cesium uptake in coconuts, which was a predominant component of the diet. · And so since the Bikini people wanted to go back, the resettlement was authorized. The people were monitored continuously during this resettlement period and the monitoring showed that they 

were beginning to notice an unacceptable uptake of radionuclides 

in the people. And so before that level reached any level that would 

have been hazardous to their health, they were evacuated again. 

And that is my recollection. I believe that the record will support 

that. 

Mr. DE LUGO. How long was the time period between their return 

and their subsequent evacuation? 

Mr. RUDOLPH. I think they went back in 1968, and evacuated in 

the middle 1970s, approximately ten years. But that is a matter of 

record. 

Mr. DE LUGO. They were there for a decade, ten years, a decade? 

Mr. RUDOLPH. Yes, ten years. During that time they were continuously monitored and when it appeared that the resettlement 

was not going to work as it was intended, they were evacuated. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Was this also the atoll where they were told that 

it was safe provided they didn't have children? 

Mr. RUDOLPH. I am not familiar with the not having children 

part, but I don't think the Department of Energy ever said that an 

atoll or an island was safe or unsafe. What we tried to tell the people was the level of contamination and the estimated dose commitment over time and let the people themselves decide whether the 

risk of going back and the desire to live on their homeland was 

more important than staying in the islands to which they were 

evacuated. But that was a decision that we chose to leave to the 

people. I believe we gave them all the information that was necessary, that we had available, for them to make that decision. 

Mr. MILLER. Did you have all the information available that was 

necessary to make that decision? 

Mr. RUDOLPH. Did we? All the information that we had available, 

we shared with the people. 

Mr. MILLER. But would that be enough information to make an 

informed decision? 

Mr. RUDOLPH. We believed it was, yes. 

Mr. MILLER. Was it? 

Mr. RUDOLPH. In my opinion, yes, it was. 

Mr. MILLER. All right. 

Mr. DE LUGO. When were they evacuated the second time? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. I believe 1978. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Oh, I see. Well, let me just say Secretary O'Leary's 

doctrine, or the O'Leary approach, is very encouraging to this 

Member. And it is encouraging to read in your statement, Dr. 

Pettengill, that the Secretary has directed that any documents rel-
426 

evant to the Marshall Islands be identified and declassified whenever possible. 

Thank you ver:y much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Abercrombie. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Pettengill, does the DOE's openness initiative extend beyond 

this immediate instance? Is it an across-the-board initiative in the 

Department of Energy? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. Yes, sir. It extends totally throughout the whole 

framework and the fabric of the Department of Energy. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ver:y good. Mr. Chairman, this has been a 

long day, but there are some difficulties, not directly associated 

with you today. I am raising the issue in conjunction with a point 

of inquir:y made by myself, by the chairman of this committee, and 

colleagues of mine representing .the South Pacific, as well as the 

Caribbean. Those of us who come from island areas-I come from 

Hawaii, Mr. Underwood comes from Guam, Mr. Faleomavaega, 

American Samoa-and as you know, we have a special relationship 

not only with the Marshalls, but with the Marianas, the whole 

South Pacific. 

We have had more interaction previously, not with the Office of 

the Secretar:y for Health in the Department of Energy, but with the 

Assistant Secretar:y for Environmental Restoration and Waste 

Management. I bring it up because in the capacity that I mentioned of representatives of island people, we have inquired about 

plutonium shipments. 

Now, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii and the Northern Marianas so 

far have made inquiries. My understanding is that the Marshall Islands will also be making inquiries with respect to plutonium shipments and the safety factor associated with them. We haven't received an answer. Are you familiar with this area at all? 

Dr. PETTENGILL. No, I am not, sir, but I can certainly check on 

it when I get back to the Department. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. The reason I raise it, and I won't 

carr:y it much further for purposes of this inquir:y, but I think that 

the Secretar:y of Energy should be put on notice that the report 

that we received to this point (not from your subsection, if you will, 

Dr. Pettengill, but from that of the area of environmental restoration and waste management) as it affects the shipment of plutonium to Japan through waters which might include the Marshall 

Islands, is unsatisfactor:y. 

I will be submitting material and inquiries further to the Chair 

on this issue. The reason I raise it, and I want to repeat, the reason I am raising it in the context of this Marshall Islands hearing 

is that the people of the Marshall Islands have been through such 

horror and been through such tragedy and been through such trauma for so many years, to fmd the Department of Energy stiff-arming them again at this stage with the possibility of perhaps an accident taking place in a typhoon or something of that nature, and 

then finding the Marshall Islands subject to plutonium radiation, 

the half-life of which is considerably greater by factors of thousands 

than some of the radiation that we have been talking about today, 

would be beyond irony. 
427 

And so because the Department of Energy has authority here 

and has obligation with respect to safety and health and environment where radiation is concerned, I raise that issue with you and 

would ask you to take it into account in the context of this hearing, 

even though you are not directly concerned. 

Dr. PETI'ENGILL. Okay. I shall and I will--

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. 

Chairman, on being able to raise this issue, and I will pursue it 

further with the committee. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. There are no further questions. I want 

to thank you. I have some additional questions, but I am not sure 

I can formulate them in an intelligent fashion at the moment, so 

we will try to see if we can put them down in writing and get them 

to you so that we will be talking on the same wavelength. 

Okay. Thank you very much for your help today and for your 

continued help in the future. 

Mr. de Lugo. 

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Chairman, I do want to put something in the 

record. I was pretty tough on one of the witnesses here today, Howard Hills, and I didn't want to give impression in any way that the 

fact that I was tough on Howard was I dislike Howard or there is 

anything personal in it. Far from it, I have a high regard for him. I happen to like him. But if that is the way I am going to treat 

my friends, be glad-the fact of the matter is that I feel I have a 

job here, the same as Howard has his job. And I felt that it was 

very important that we bring out some things for the record. So I 

know I was tough on him. It is much easier when you are on the 

dais than it is when you are sitting at the witness table and having 

these tough questions hammered at you. But I just don't want anyone in the audience to think that there is any animosity towards 

this gentleman who I have a high regard for. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I notice Mr. de 

Lugo left our names out of the last colloquy. 

Mr. MILLER. I think it is time to adjourn this hearing. Thank you 

very much and I want to thank all of the witnesses. It has been 

a long day and I appreciate you sticking with us. And to all those 

individuals that helped us put this hearing together, I want to 

thank them for their time and effort, and certainly to the people 

who came representing the Marshall Islands for their time and 

their travel. I know how difficult it is. Thank you. And to the staff 

of the committee, thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

APPENDIX 

FEBRUARY 24, 1994 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD 

~ .6. J,ou1t of Btprdmta .d 

<ommittu oa .llatural l\dourus 

llaqingua. K 2051~201 

Dr. Steven L. Si• on Director 

Karch 9, 1994 

Nationwide Radiological study 

C/0 bba•• y of the Nar• hall I• land• 2433 Na•• achu• ett• Ave N.W. wa• hington, D.C. 20008 

Dear Dr. Si• on: 

Attached are a f- que• tion• which I did not get a chance to 

rai• e with you at la• t • onth'• OVer• iqht heari119 on Nuclear 

Tasting in the Pacific. 

I would appreciate it if you could respond to the question• by Karch 25th. 

Thank you in advance, 

cc: Bon. George Miller 

Enclosure 

(429) 

RO DE WGO 

Chair• an ' 

Subco-ittee on Insular and 

International Affairs 
430 

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February 24, 1994 

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• Your preliminary findings of thyroid cancers 100 times the 

worldwide rate ~•re, of course, alarming. 

Do you have any reason to doubt these findings? 

• Hae the Radiological survey indicated cont1111ination of a serious nature beyond the four atolls? 

What does the survey information indicate, so far, about the 

habitability of Rongelap? 

• The Brookhaven National Laboratory's 20 year report on the 

Marshall• exposure for DOE said that thyroid tumors •have 

been seen as late as forty years after exposure• -aning that we only this year aay see them. (Bravo was in 1954.) 

What are the implications of such a stat-ent? 

Since nuclear weapons were less than 30 years old when 

that report was written, is it possible that it may take even longer than 40 years for the tumors to 

appear? 

• What, if anything, do you know about the health problems at 

Ailuk or Likiep Atolls? 
• 

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6 
Merril Eisenbud Sc.D. 

711 Bayberry Drive 

Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514 

FAX/TEL (919)967-4561 

Representative George Miller 

Chairman 

Conmi.ttee on Natural Resources 

U.S.House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Miller: 

February 28 1994 

I appreciated the opportunity you gave me to appear 

at the hearing you conducted on the legacy of the 

nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands. Aa I 

testified, it is significant that in the forty years 

that have passed since that tragic event occurred, this 

was the first time I have been asked to record my 

knowledge of the matter, despite the central role 

played by the laboratory I directed. Many of the 

unusual circumstances surrounding the BRAVO fallout, as 

known to me, are described in my autobiography, An 

Environmental Odyssey, to which several references were 

made during the hearing. 

I found myself in disagreement with much of the 

anecdotal information presented by others concerning 

the allegation that heavy fallout must have occurred 

far beyond the islands that have traditionally believed 

to have been affected. Aa I testified, the AEC Health 

and Safety Laboratory (HASL), of which I was then 

director, undertook extensive aerial surveys of the -islands of the Central and Western Pacific, and our 

findings are a matter of record.~ own participation 

in those surveys was limited to the D+l day overflights of the islands downwind of MIKE, and the D+6 

day over-flights of the islands north of Guam in the 

far Western Pacific. Other associates, the late Dr. 

John Harley, Mr. Mel Cassidy, and Mr. Alfred Breslin 

made similar flights over islands. 

A copy of my field notes from October 30 1952 until 

I left the islands on November 7 is attached to this 

letter. Note that I surveyed 20 islands from a height 
438 

of 200 feat. The ground level dose rates were all found 

to be lass than 0.3 mr/hr on BRAVO+ 1 Day. Of the 13 

islands surveyed by Mr.Cassidy on the same day, the 

highest reading was 0.5 mr/hr. Breslin reported 

negative findings. I do not have any recollection of 

the manner in which his flight was vectored, but that 

should be a matter of record. 

Somewhere there must be a compilation of the data 

obtained on these over flights for subsequent tests. 

Thus there need be speculation as to the extent of the 

fallout on the Islands of the Pacific, starting with 

the MIKE test on November 1 1952. 

Note that, early on rny flight of November 2, I 

found no fallout on Ujelang at 0845 local time. I don't 

remember the meaning of "passed word to LST", but it 

can only mean that it was the l:)oat on which the Ujelang 

inhabitants had been evacuated, and that I was asked to 

report to the LST that conditions were safe for their 

return. This is in contrast to the testimony of The 

Honorable Ismael John that everything was covered by 

fine dust, and that the inhabitants suffered from 

radiation effects. Incidentally, I am quite certain 

that HASL had located monitoring equipment on Ujelang, 

which would have required that the island be visited 

every few days for servicing purposes. 

As I said at the hearing, it is unlikely that any 

undisclosed information exists that will affect our 

understanding of the extent of the BRAVO fallout. 

However, after forty years, such documentation that 

does exist may be hard to retrieve except by a lot of 

searching at HASL (now EML), CINCPAC headquarters, and 

the files of the former AEC Division of Biology and 

Medicine to which HASL then reported. 

There are a considerable n~r of unanswered 

questions concerning the events prior to and subsequent 

to BRAVO. I think these questions should be answered 

for historical purposes, and I have been greatly 

impressed with the diligence with which Ms. Linda Chase 

has attempted to locate important relevant documents. 

If I can be of any assistance in this regard I hope you 

will call on me. 

Cordia;P~J 

cc : Dr. Steven L. Simon 

Dr. Harry J. Pettengill 

Ms. Linda Chase 
~'I?"-~ . :-· 

~ -
440 
441 
442 

Merril Eiaenbud 

711 Bayberry Drive 

Chapel Bill, N,C. 27514 

FAX/TEL (919)967-4561 

Repreaentative George Miller 

Chairman 

CCmnitt- on Natural Jteaourcea 

U.S.Bouae of Jtepreaentativea 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Miller: 

March 7 1994 

Thia is with further reference to the subject of my 

letter of February 28 in which I stated my objections to 

some of the anecdotal information presented at the hearing 

you held on February 24. You will recall that in that letter 

I acknowledged that there were a number of unanswered 

queation• about the event• prior to and i~ately 

following BRAVO, but that I was confident that that the 

extent of fallout fran all teats of the CASTLE aeries as 

well as those of the IVY and REDWING aeries had been fully 

documented in report• prepared by the AEC Beal th and Safety 

Laboratory (BASL), of which I was then Director. 

Imaadiately following the hearing I requested the help 

of Philip W. Krey, th• Acting Director of the DOE 

Enviro~tal MeaauraNnta Laboratory (BASL'a new name) in 

locating reports of the BASL monitoring activities during 

those teata. I - happy to report that he quickly sent me the enclosed report, Radioactive Debris fran Operation 

CASTLE, Ialanda of the Mid-Pacific. The report 1a dated 

January 18 1955 and waa prepared by Alfred J. Breslin, and 

Melvin N.caaaaidy. 

It ia particularly significant in view of the 

allegation• of aecrecy, that th• 73 page report was unclassified when iaaued. 

Twelve autanatic radiation monitoring atationa were placed on varioua ialanda, including Ugelang. The trac;inga 

fran thoae atationa are included in the report. Also 

included are the important -•uXWNnta -de by over flights 

after -ch teat of the CASTLE aeries, of more than 100 

ialanda in the Central and Western Pacific. The dose 

estimates for forty of the moat heavily exposed islands are 

Given in Table 1 on pages 37 and 38. 
448 

I have been told that reports similar to· the enclosed 

are aVltilable for IVY and REDWING and that copies will be 

sent to - aa soon aa they are located. You will recall that 

I sent the data obtained by me during the D+1 over !light• 

downwind of MIKE with my February 28 letter to you . 

I request that my two letters to you be added to the 

hearing record, toqether with whatever material from the 

-010,od _,t you :.;,:;;.y 

cc: Harry Pettengill 

Steven Simon 

Philip Krey 
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