J-A01011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYRON DIXON TILDON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1126 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 11, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008638-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2023

Tyron Dixon Tildon (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on May 

11, 2021, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his 

timely petition for collateral relief filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA).

1

 Appellant seeks relief from an aggregate sentence of life 

imprisonment, imposed on August 5, 2013, after a jury found him guilty of 

first-degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and recklessly 

endangering another person (REAP).

2

 On appeal, Appellant raises a myriad 

of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Based on the following, we affirm

on the basis of the PCRA court opinion.

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 6106(a)(1), and 2705, respectively.
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The PCRA court summarized the underlying facts as follows:

On the evening of October 6, 2006, Denise Chandler drove 

to the intersection of N. Cleveland Street and W. Cumberland 

Street, intending to purchase a bag of heroin from Mark Jordan. 

Chandler arrived at the intersection and found Jordan standing 

outside of a bar. Chandler drove to Jordan, asked if he was 

carrying heroin, and invited him to the car. Once Jordan entered 

the car, Chandler parked on the corner of Cleveland and 

Cumberland Streets.

As Chandler gave Jordan money for the drugs, gunshots 

rang out. Chandler attempted to pull out from her parking spot, 

but Appellant crossed in front of her car on foot with a black 

revolver in his hand, forcing Chandler to wait until he entered the 

car in front of her. Jordan looked down Cleveland Street and saw 

“a lot of people running, but [Appellant] was the only one coming 

down Cleveland. They [were] all running away from where Bilal[3]

was. He ran right past the car and he looked right at me when I 

was in the car.”

After . . . Appellant stepped into that car, Chandler forced 

her way [in] the front of Appellant, honking her horn and speeding 

out of her parking spot onto York Street. Suddenly, Jordan 

exclaimed “Stop, stop, that’s my boy.” Chandler stopped the car; 

Donnell Goulbourne ran up to Chandler’s car yelling, “Let me get 

in, let me get in, they shootin!” Chandler let Goulbourne into her 

car. Upon entering, Goulbourne said, “I been hit [sic].” “He was 

asking how long to the hospital and he was saying he was short 

of breath and that he was going to die. He kept saying that. I 

didn’t know he was shot until he said Bilal shot him when he was 

chasing us in the car.”

Goulbourne then suddenly exclaimed, “There he is!” 

Chandler turned towards the driver’s side window, through which 

she saw . . . Appellant point a gun in her direction from his position

inside of the car. Goulbourne exclaimed, “Pull out, that’s who shot 

me.” Chandler sped off; a car chase ensued, during which 

Chandler ran at least two red lights and nearly collided with a van. 

Prior to getting to the hospital, Chandler spotted two police cars 

____________________________________________

3 “Bilal” was a nickname for Appellant.
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and pulled up to them. Jordan exited the car and helped to move 

Goulbourne into the back of one of the police cars. Goulbourne

was taken to Temple [U]niversity Hospital, where he was 

pronounced dead at 11:40 p.m. 

Five days after the shooting, Appellant traveled to the 

Middle East, where he remained for five and one-half years. 

Appellant was arrested in Amman, Jordan and brought back to the 

United States by United States Marshals on April 29, 2012.

PCRA Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 1-2 (record citations & footnote omitted).

Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, carrying a firearm 

without a license, carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia, 

possession of an instrument of crime,4 and REAP. The matter proceeded to a 

jury trial in the summer of 2013. Appellant’s trial counsel was Lawrence S. 

Krasner, Esquire (Trial Counsel).

5

 On August 5, 2013, the jury convicted 

Appellant of murder, carrying an unlicensed firearm, and REAP.6 After the 

verdict was read, Appellant’s counsel made an oral motion for judgment of 

acquittal regarding the carrying an unlicensed firearm charge, which the trial 

court granted. See N.T., 8/5/23, 64-65. That same day, the court sentenced 

Appellant as follows: (1) a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole for the murder conviction; and (2) a concurrent term of nine to 24 

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4 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6108 and 907(a).

5 Krasner is currently the District Attorney of the City of Philadelphia. 

6 The remaining charges were nolle prossed.
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months’ incarceration for the REAP conviction. Appellant filed a post-sentence 

motion, which was denied on December 3, 2013.

Appellant then filed a direct appeal. A panel of this Court affirmed his 

judgment on sentence on June 16, 2015, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied his petition for allowance of appeal on December 31, 2015. See 

Commonwealth v. Tildon, 3438 EDA 2013 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. June 

16, 2015), appeal denied, 443 EAL 2015 (Pa. Dec. 31, 2015).

On May 17, 2016, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. 

Thereafter, new counsel, the Defender Association of Philadelphia, entered its 

appearance. On February 8, 2019, Appellant filed a counseled, amended PCRA 

petition, raising, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel claims in terms of 

Batson,

7 Brady,8 prosecutorial misconduct, defective jury instructions, 

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7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (holding the exclusion of 

jurors based on race is a violation of the equal protection clause of the United 

States Constitution).

8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “the suppression by 

the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).
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Ross9/speedy trial, and Kloiber10 instruction challenges. The Commonwealth 

filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s amended PCRA petition on June 21, 

2019.11 

The PCRA court heard argument on March 3, 2020, but did not provide 

a decision at the conclusion of the proceeding. Subsequently, on February 16, 

2021, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss the 

petition as meritless. 

On March 3, 2021, Appellant filed a witness certification in support of 

his amended PCRA petition, which identified Trial Counsel, and indicated he

would proffer the following testimony regarding his defense of Appellant: 

Specifically[,] if [the PCRA court held] a hearing[, Trial Counsel] 

will testify . . . that his theory of defense at trial was both 

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9 Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that in

determining whether the Commonwealth has unreasonably delayed the arrest 

of a suspect after a criminal event, the court must weigh the reasonableness 

of the delay against the prejudice to the defendant). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (holding whether a delay

violated a defendant’s right to a speedy trial requires a four-part constitutional

analysis); Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. Super. 2020).

10 Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954). “A Kloiber

instruction informs the jury that an eyewitness identification should be viewed 

with caution when either the witness did not have the opportunity to view the 

defendant clearly, equivocated on the identification of the defendant, or has

had difficulties identifying the defendant on prior occasions.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 577 n.15 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted).

11 During this time, the case was reassigned to the Honorable Tracy BrandeisRoman, following the retirement of the trial judge, the Honorable Teresa M. 

Sarmina.
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sufficiency of the evidence and self-defense and that he requested 

a jury instruction on self-defense. He will also testify that he 

reviewed two documents that PCRA counsel provided him that 

show that prior to trial the Commonwealth had conducted an 

investigation that revealed that “[Appellant] shot the victim[ ]

because the victim was selling drugs in [his] area” and also 

concluded that the “shooting was prompted over drug territory[. . 

. .” Trial Counsel] will also testify that he has no recollection of 

receiving these documents any time during his representation of 

[Appellant] and that these documents support his theory of selfdefense. [Trial Counsel] will also testify that he was not made 

aware that Police Officer [Andre] Daniels was unavailable to testify 

because he had been fired from the police force due to his guilty 

plea in federal court for numerous counts of prescription drug 

fraud.

Appellant’s Certification of Witnesses in Support of Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus and for Collateral Relief from Criminal Conviction Pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., 3/3/21, at 1-2 

(unpaginated). The Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s witness 

certification on April 7, 2021. Thereafter, on May 11, 2021, the PCRA court 

dismissed Appellant’s petition as meritless. This timely appeal followed.12

Appellant raises eight issues on appeal:

1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that [A]ppellate 

[C]ounsel were ineffective in failing to raise on appeal the issue 

that the Commonwealth used its peremptory strikes in a 

discriminatory manner to strike African Americans on the jury 

panel, in violation of [Appellant]’s rights to equal protection, due 

process of law, and a fair trial under the Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

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12 Following an extension of time, Appellant complied with the PCRA court’s 

directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal.
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2. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that the 

Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland when it suppressed 

material evidence favorable to the defense in violation of 

[Appellant]’s due process rights; specifically, the Commonwealth 

suppressed the records of its investigation into the decedent’s 

involvement in the drug trade, as well as the fact that Officer 

Andre Daniels had been fired by the police department and was 

convicted in federal court on drug and fraud offenses, and that 

[T]rial [C]ounsel was ineffective in stipulating to Officer Daniels’ 

testimony?

3. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that the 

prosecution mischaracterized the evidence in this case and misled 

the jury by stating that [Appellant] had not given a statement to 

authorities, and argued consciousness of guilt based upon that 

false claim, when [Appellant] had in fact given a statement to 

authorities, and that [T]rial [C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to this prosecutorial misconduct and for failing to introduce 

the statement to rebut the prosecutor’s misleading argument?

4. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that [T]rial 

[C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s 

defective instructions on burden of proof, in that by instructing the 

jury that their determination of whether the Commonwealth has 

satisfied its burden of proof should be based solely on the 

Commonwealth’s evidence, and failing to allow or compel 

consideration of evidence presented by the defense, the 

instruction violated [Appellant]’s constitutional rights to present a 

defense, to testify in his own behalf, and to due process?

5. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that [T]rial 

[C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to litigate a motion to dismiss 

the charges due to excessive pre-arrest delay or a violation of the 

right to a speedy trial, as the delay of more than six years between 

[Appellant]’s trial and the swearing out of the complaint violated 

the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law?

6. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that [T]rial 

[C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to move for judgment of 

acquittal at the close of the Commonwealth’s case where the 

Commonwealth’s evidence did not make out the violation of the 

Uniform Firearms Act [(the carrying a firearm without a license

charge)]?
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7. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that the trial 

court erred by refusing to give a “Kloiber charge” that the 

witness’ identifications should be viewed with caution as to 

witness Mark Jordan and giving a modified version as to Denise

Chandler, and that prior counsel was ineffective for failing to 

preserve the claim and litigate it on appeal?

8. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the claim that [Appellant]

is entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence because of 

the cumulative effect of [all] of the errors described in the PCRA 

petition?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-7.

Our standard regarding PCRA appeals is well-settled:

When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, an appellate court 

must determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by 

the record and free of legal error. Generally, a reviewing court is

bound by a PCRA court’s credibility determinations and its factfinding, so long as those conclusions are supported by the record.

However, with regard to a court’s legal conclusions, appellate

courts apply a de novo standard.

Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 2022) (footnotes &

quotation marks omitted).

Because Appellant’s claims concern ineffective assistance of counsel, we

also are guided by the following:

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

PCRA petitioner must satisfy the performance and prejudice test

set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This Court has recast

the two-part Strickland standard into a three-part test by 

dividing the performance element into two distinct components. 

To prove that counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must 

demonstrate: (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; 

(2) that no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure 

to act; and (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of 

counsel’s error. To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a 
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reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not 

chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than 

the course actually pursued. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a

petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability

that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different

but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be

effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness the

petitioner must adduce sufficient evidence to overcome this

presumption.

Drummond, 285 A.3d at 634 (footnotes & quotation marks omitted). We

further note: “Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of

the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Commonwealth v.

McGarry, 172 A.3d 60, 70 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, the relevant 

law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the PCRA court, we conclude there is no 

merit to Appellant’s issues, and we affirm on the basis of the court’s opinion. 

See PCRA Ct. Op. at 6-32 (finding there was no merit to any of the alleged 

errors and an evidentiary hearing was not warranted based on the following: 

(1) Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness regarding a Batson challenge was 

unavailing because (a) Trial Counsel did raise several Batson challenges, 

which the trial court denied relief based on race neutral reasons, including a 

juror whose brother had been convicted of third-degree homicide and another 

juror who felt her brother’s defense attorney failed to help him by advising 

him to take a plea agreement;

13 and (b) every reason provided to the trial 

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13 PCRA Ct. Op. at 11.
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court as to why a certain juror was struck was supported by the record and 

valid where “[t]hese jurors all had circumstances that would lead a reasonable 

person to believe that they would not have been likely to make a fair 

determination at Appellant’s trial[;]”14 (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel assertion regarding the Commonwealth’s purported withholding of

certain information concerning police investigator, Officer Daniels, and other 

exculpatory evidence was without merit because Appellant failed to prove that 

any of the alleged evidence would qualify as Brady material where (a) a 

stipulated statement was admitted into evidence that included statements 

from the police paperwork of Officer Daniels and another unavailable officer 

in which both officers indicated that at the time of the shooting, a witness 

stated that a vehicle approached and an extended arm shot into another car

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14

 See PCRA Ct. Op. at 12. In reviewing this claim, the PCRA court observed 

that Appellant did not address Trial Counsel’s purported ineffectiveness as to 

a Batson claim in his petition — instead, he focused his allegation that 

appellate counsel was ineffective — and therefore, the court found this

omission was fatal to his argument because he waived his underlying Batson

claim and any derivative claim of ineffectiveness necessarily fails. Id. at 8. 

The PCRA court acknowledged that Appellant briefly mentioned Trial Counsel’s 

ineffectiveness in terms of a Batson claim in his reply brief but pointed out 

that “[a] claim is waived if it is raised for the first time in a reply brief.” See

id. at 8, citing Commonwealth v. Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 990 (Pa. 2002). 

We find this conclusion is erroneous as the cited case was referencing an 

appellate reply brief. See id. at 990; see also Commonwealth v. 

Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 726-27 (Pa. 2000) (“A reply brief, however, is an 

inappropriate means for presenting a new and substantively different issue 

than that addressed in the original brief.”). Nevertheless, because the PCRA 

court addressed the merits of the claim, this error is harmless.
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containing the victim but the witness could not identify the shooter,15 (b)

evidence of Officer Daniels’ federal indictment and subsequent plea were 

public records and therefore, the defense would have been put on notice that 

he was not going to testify, it was debatable if the evidence could have been 

used as impeachment evidence because it was not clear that this was 

prosecutorial evidence since Appellant wanted the stipulated statement read 

to the jury, and his claim that the outcome of the trial would have been 

different was questionable since the relief he is now seeking would have 

precluded evidence favorable to his defense at trial, (c) evidence of a broader 

police investigation into a drug turf war would have gone against Appellant’s 

own trial strategy since he previously attempted to preclude this same kind 

evidence “along with speculation that the testing of [the victim’s] clothing was 

motivated by a theory that [the victim] too had fired a weapon[;]”16 (3) with 

respect to Appellant’s claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to purported prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, the 

underlying issue was previously litigated on direct appeal17 and therefore, 

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15 The only difference between Officer Daniels’ and the officer’s statements 

was that Officer Daniels described the vehicle as a silver car while the other 

officer said it was a gray Honda.

16 PCRA Ct. Op. at 16.

17 The panel concluded the trial court did not err in denying relief where the 

Commonwealth’s comments were in “fair response” to Trial Counsel’s 

reference to the absence of any statement from Appellant, and any resulting 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant failed to establish counsel was ineffective since counsel did object 

to the statement and appealed the issue; (4) Appellant’s issue that Trial 

Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an allegedly flawed jury 

instruction was meritless where the court utilized the relevant model jury 

instruction and may have omitted the word, “Commonwealth,” prior to the 

word, “evidence,” but still stated that it was the Commonwealth’s burden to 

prove each element of the crimes at issue which did not materially change the 

burden of proof requirement, and allowed the jury to consider evidence that 

benefitted Appellant (including Appellant’s evidence that he did not flee to 

Yemen to avoid prosecution but rather to learn about his faith); (5) Appellant’s 

claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate a Ross/speedy 

trial motion was unavailing because pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

DeBlase, 665 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1995),

18 he was required to present Rule 600 

analysis but failed to do so (most likely because he fled to a foreign country 

for more than five years), and therefore, the court could not proceed to the 

next step in the two-step Barker balancing test; (6) Appellant’s issue that 

Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for judgment of 

____________________________________________

prejudice was negated by the court’s curative instructions. See DixonTildon, 3438 EDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 4-9).

18 DeBlase discussed Rule 600’s predecessor, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 1100. See Pa.R.Crim.P 1100 (superseded). Effective April 1, 2001, 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was renumbered as Rule 600.
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acquittal for the carrying a firearm without a license charge prior to the 

conclusion of trial was meritless where (a) the claim lacked arguable merit 

because the law does not support the notion that there was insufficient 

evidence, considering the victim’s cause of death, (b) there was a reasonable 

basis for Trial Counsel’s action or inaction because if counsel had moved for 

an acquittal, “the Commonwealth would have likely asked to reopen the case 

to present evidence of the [gun’s] barrel length”

19 and counsel would not want 

the jury to hear more testimony about the murder weapon, and (c) Appellant 

did not suffer any prejudice where the carrying an unlicensed firearm charge 

was subsequently dismissed and the crux of the case was the identity of the 

shooter, so the length of the barrel would not have affected the conviction;

(7) Appellant’s claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective for not requesting a 

Kloiber charge regarding one witness, Jordan, and for not objecting to the 

charge being modified with respect to another witness, Chandler, was 

meritless as counsel did request Kloiber charges regarding both witnesses

and the trial court rejected one request based upon the view that it did not 

apply to Jordan since he did not make an in-court identification of Appellant 

and permitted a modified Kloiber charge as to Chandler, which included 

certain adjustments requested by Appellant; and (8) Appellant failed to meet 

his burden of proving that more than one error occurred and therefore, he 

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19 See PCRA Ct. Op. at 29.
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cannot establish he was prejudiced due to cumulative errors.). Accordingly, 

we do not disturb the PCRA court’s determinations as Appellant’s arguments 

are unavailing.

We direct that a copy of the PCRA court’s July 5, 2022, opinion be filed 

along with this memorandum and attached to any future filings of the 

memorandum in this case.

Order affirmed.

Date: 11/7/2023