NTSB/MAB-18/22

National Transportation Safety Board

Marine Accident Brief

Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

Accident no. DCA17FM023

Vessel name Mia S

Accident type Allision

Location Lower Mississippi River near mile 101, New Orleans, Louisiana

29°54.87’ N, 090°07.72’ W

Date August 18, 2017

Time 1920 central daylight time (coordinated universal time – 5 hours)

Injuries None

Property damage $2 million est.

Environmental

damage

None

Weather Visibility clear, winds calm, air temperature 93°F 

Waterway 

information

The Lower Mississippi River has a project depth of 45 feet for over 233 miles, from 

Southwest Pass near the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico to Baton Rouge, Louisiana

(about 135 miles above New Orleans). At the site of the accident, the river 

measured 1,800 feet wide, and the current was approximately 1 knot. 

On August 18, 2017, about 1920 local time, the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged bulk carrier 

Mia S was traveling downbound on the Mississippi River near New Orleans, Louisiana, 

experiencing intermittent engine slowdowns. As the fully loaded vessel began to enter a bend of 

the river at Six-Mile Point near mile 101, its propulsion engine program restricted the engine to 

dead slow ahead.

1 Within minutes, the vessel allided with the Nashville Avenue Wharf, damaging 

its bow above the waterline and the wharf. No pollution or injuries among the 19 crewmembers 

were reported. Damage to the Mia S and the Nashville Avenue Wharf each amounted to an 

estimated $1 million.

Bulk carrier Mia S before accident. (Photo courtesy of Reederei Rudolf Schepers)

 1 In this report, all miles are statute miles.
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

2 NTSB/MAB-18/22

Location of accident where Mia S allided with Nashville Avenue Wharf on Lower Mississippi River 

near New Orleans, Louisiana, following an engine casualty. (Base map and satellite image from 

NOAA ENC® Viewer)

Accident Events

Built in 2010, the Mia S was a 623-foot-long-by-106-foot-wide bulk carrier powered by a 

slow-speed, direct-drive diesel engine. On August 11, the vessel arrived at Southwest Pass, an

entrance to the Mississippi River, and continued upriver. On August 16, after anchoring at two 

separate locations along the way, the vessel arrived at the Bunge Destrehan facility at mile 120, 

where the crew began loading a full cargo of soybeans. The Mia S was scheduled to deliver the 

soybeans to Columbia, South America.

After the cargo operations were completed, a pilot boarded the Mia S on August 18 at 1545 

for the outbound transit. Prior to getting under way, the master completed administrative tasks and 

conducted a master-pilot exchange of information. All pre-departure tests on the bridge and in the 

engine room were conducted; no anomalies were identified. In addition to the pilot, the bridge 

team consisted of the master, the chief mate, and a helmsman.

After the lines were released by 1705, the pilot ordered dead slow ahead at 1709 and then 

slow ahead at 1711. With the assistance of two facility tugs, the Mia S was turned around in the 

river to head downbound toward New Orleans. The engine order telegraph log showed an engine

“safety slowdown” at 1713, after the pilot had released the assist tugs. At that time, the engine 

alarm logs recorded alarms sounding regarding the vessel’s main propulsion engine. These engine

safety slowdown alarms were the first of several that the vessel experienced intermittently on the 

bridge and in the engine room. The slowdown feature of the engine’s automated system was 

designed to protect the engine from damage. 

The master and the pilot were aware of the engine slowdowns that were causing the rpms 

to fluctuate. As the alarms sounded, the engineers attempted to restore the engine’s full 

maneuvering capabilities. The chief engineer later told investigators that a fuel pump for one of 
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

3 NTSB/MAB-18/22

the six engine cylinders was not providing fuel. Over the next 20 minutes (between about 1717

and 1738), the slowdown alarm was acknowledged by the master each time it activated. An engine 

order of full ahead was recorded at 1729, but as the engine’s speed increased to 100 rpm, another 

safety slowdown occurred. In slowdown mode, the engine was limited to dead slow ahead, which 

was 5 knots at 45 rpm according to the vessel’s pilot information card. 

The pilot told investigators that he would have 

immediately anchored the vessel due to the engine 

problems; however, the closest anchorage downriver that 

could accommodate a laden bulker the size of the Mia S

was the Lower Ama Anchorage at mile 115.5

(approximately 3 miles downriver), which was full. He 

therefore determined that at dead slow ahead the vessel

would be able to safely continue the transit farther down 

the river to the next available anchorage, Belle Chasse

Anchorage, south of New Orleans at mile 75.

At 1738, because of the frequent reductions in engine rpms, the pilot requested tug 

assistance via radio. Although the vessel operated between 76 and 100 rpm for the next 10 minutes, 

the rpms dropped to less than 50 at 1747, according to the engine order telegraph log. At that time,

Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) New Orleans was notified when the Mia S pilot used his cell phone 

to brief the pilot on watch at VTS. At 1749, the vessel passed the Ama Anchorage in the Kenner 

Bend of the river at 44 rpm. The command center for the US Coast Guard Sector New Orleans 

learned soon afterward of the situation concerning the Mia S, when the pilot contacted the Coast 

Guard in a separate phone call. At 1804, as the harbor tug Ervin Cooper approached the Mia S at 

the Kenner Bend Anchorage near mile 115, the Mia S pilot told the tug’s captain not to attach any 

lines but to accompany the vessel downriver instead, in case he needed tug assistance.

For about an hour, while the vessel continued its voyage, which included passage through 

the bend at Twelve-Mile Point (mile 109) and the approach to the bend at Nine-Mile Point 

(mile 105), the slowdown alarms continued, as the rpms fluctuated between 50 and 70.

At about 1850, with the Mia S’s speed at 7 knots and engine at 45 rpm, the chief engineer

informed the master that the issue with the fuel pump was resolved and thereby full speed could 

be attained. Based on that report, the pilot ordered full ahead at 1857. The vessel attained a speed 

of almost 13 knots at 103 rpm just as it entered the bend at Nine-Mile Point. The pilot called VTS 

at 1901 to report that the engine was at full speed and the problem was resolved, but he still planned 

to anchor the vessel at the nearest anchorage past New Orleans. When the VTS watchstander asked 

if he still needed a tug escort, the pilot acknowledged that he did. The engine order telegraph log 

recorded that the vessel maintained the speed and rpm until 1916, during which time the vessel 

was in the 108-degree bend at Six-Mile Point (mile 102) turning to port.

Following a 20-minute period of no alarms, the engine’s automated alarm system warned 

of high exhaust temperatures, and seconds later, the slowdown feature again activated and limited 

the rpm. At 1916, the pilot contacted the captain of the Ervin Cooper to inform him that the bulk 

carrier had again experienced an engine slowdown, just as he began to steer the Mia S through the 

bend at Six-Mile Point.

Excerpted from pilot card for Mia S.

Engine order Rpm Speed

Full ahead 115 14

Half ahead 90 9

Slow ahead 80 7

Dead slow ahead 45 5
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

4 NTSB/MAB-18/22

Trackline of Mia S over last 4 minutes leading up to accident shows change in vessel’s 

heading and speed over ground following engine slowdown. (Background from Google Maps)

As the Mia S continued its transit downriver, the slowing speed reduced the rudder’s 

effectiveness in the following current, which was flowing at 1 knot. Despite the pilot’s order of 

hard to starboard (35 degrees) at 19:17:30, the vessel’s heading continued to swing to port.

At 1918, the pilot ordered the sounding of the vessel’s whistle to warn the personnel on the 

Nashville Avenue Wharf and aboard the vessels moored alongside, as the Mia S continued at

approximately 10 knots in the center of the bend, less than 0.3 miles from the wharf. The pilot also 

ordered the crew to put a line on the Ervin Cooper. However, less than 15 seconds later, he

countermanded that order and told the tug’s captain to “get out of here.” The pilot then ordered the 

crew to let go the port anchor and warned vessels nearby on VHF channel 16 of the impending 

allision, saying, “Thirty-four [the pilot’s number] going into the dock.”

Neither the rudder at hard right nor the anchor on the river bottom had a significant effect 

on the Mia S as the vessel continued to swing to port and move toward the left descending bank.

At 1919, again broadcasting on VHF channel 16, the pilot urged anyone listening to help evacuate 

crewmembers on the Dredge Reed, which was moored at the wharf. At 19:19:25, he also ordered 

full astern to slow the vessel, just after ordering the sounding of the danger signal. At 19:20:06, 

the Mia S allided with the Nashville Avenue Wharf, on a heading of 044 degrees and at 6.1 knots. 

The vessel had just missed the dredge that had been secured for the evening. 

Immediately after alliding with the wharf, the starboard anchor was let go. The Mia S

remained anchored on the left descending bank until the next evening.
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

5 NTSB/MAB-18/22

Damage to the wharf included destruction of the concrete dock—reinforced with rebar, 

crossbeams, stringers, and timber pilings—where the Mia S struck at a 90-degree angle. The vessel

incurred damage above the waterline: to the hull plate, web frames, and stiffeners; to the forward 

bulkhead of the no. 1 ballast tank on the port side; and to the main and forecastle deck.

Damage to Nashville Avenue Wharf where vessel left impression of bow. (Photo by Coast Guard;

satellite image from Google Maps)

Additional Information

The chief engineer told investigators that the fuel pump for the no. 2 main diesel engine 

cylinder had not been providing fuel. He said that the exhaust temperature for the cylinder did not 

rise when the engine began operation, which indicated that the fuel injection system for that

cylinder was not operating properly. The exhaust temperature was only about 100 degrees Celsius

(212 degrees Fahrenheit), when it should have been near 275 degrees Celsius (527 degrees 

Fahrenheit). The chief engineer said the non-return valve for the fuel pump “remained stuck, not 

injecting fuel [into the cylinder]” and that attempts were made “to unstuck” the valve, but the fixes 

were temporary as the problem persisted.
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

6 NTSB/MAB-18/22

According to the chief engineer, the engine control system on board the Mia S monitored 

exhaust temperatures on each cylinder and compared them to one another. When temperatures 

reached a differential greater than 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), the control system 

would automatically protect the engine through a “safety slowdown” by reducing the engine’s rpm 

(and subsequently the vessel’s speed) to dead slow ahead. The reduced rpms required less fuel and 

thereby kept the cylinders from overheating, which otherwise could have led to damage of the 

engine’s internal components. The safety slowdown meant that the Mia S could not exceed 45 rpm

(a speed of about 5 knots), compared to full ahead at 115 rpm (a speed of about 14 knots).

Bow damage sustained by Mia S.

In addition to fuel not flowing to the no. 2 cylinder, the bulk carrier experienced the same 

issue with the fuel injection pump for the no. 5 cylinder the day following the accident, during a

nearly 2.5-hour transit to Belle Chasse Anchorage. While anchored there, each non-return valve 

for the six fuel injection pumps of the main engine were replaced by the crew. The previously 

installed valves had another 833 hours of service until they were due for an overhaul at 

8,000 hours. 

In assessing why the non-return valve did not function during the time leading up to the 

accident, the crew considered the use of low-sulfur fuel. Considering that sulfur improves the 

lubricating properties of the fuel, the lack of sulfur in the fuel oil may have caused the non-return 

valve to seize and thereby prevented fuel from injecting into the cylinders. The fuel required for 

usage when the vessel was within 200 miles of land contained less sulfur (to reduce emissions)

than the “heavy” fuel used when the vessel was in the open ocean. Also, given that the fuel injection 

valves were scheduled to be replaced soon, based on the engine’s operating hours, the crew 

believed that the non-return valves may have been worn. Non-return valves have precision 

tolerances and can malfunction when those tolerances are not met.
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

7 NTSB/MAB-18/22

The Coast Guard, international regulators, and class societies are aware of potential 

problems to marine engines caused by switching from heavy fuel oil (HFO) to low-sulfur fuel 

(sometimes referred to as marine gas oil [MGO]). Advisory notices from these stakeholders note 

that most machinery was not designed to operate on low-sulfur fuel and difficulties can arise from 

the switching process and sustained operation. According to the American Bureau of Shipping, 

“these [difficulties] stem from the effects of the low-sulfur and low viscosity MGO on machinery 

plants designed for HFO.” 

On August 25, while the vessel was still in Belle Chasse Anchorage, a test was conducted 

on the main engine; the newly installed non-return valves were found to be operating satisfactorily. 

Clockwise from left: cylinder nos. 1 through 4 of the direct-drive diesel engine on Mia S; fuel pump 

for no. 2 cylinder; and non-return/suction valve for no. 2 cylinder fuel pump. (Photos by Coast 

Guard)

Analysis

All pre-departure tests on the Mia S were satisfactory, but the first automatic main 

propulsion engine safety slowdowns began shortly after the tugs were released and the engine 

order of slow ahead was given. The master and the pilot decided that they could successfully 

navigate the vessel at dead slow ahead until they reached the next available anchorage, about

40 miles downriver. The anchorage approximately 3 miles downriver where the pilot and the 

master would have preferred to anchor was full.

After about 2 hours of the engineers’troubleshooting the frequent “safety slowdowns” that 

caused the engine to drop to 45 rpm at each occurrence, the chief engineer informed the master 

that the no. 2 cylinder was operating properly. However, in his report, the chief engineer did not 

convey the potential for recurring engine slowdowns in view of the previous 2 hours of temporary 
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

8 NTSB/MAB-18/22

fixes and failures. Based on his conversation with the chief engineer, the master therefore

determined that the fuel pump issue had been resolved and allowed the vessel to proceed at full 

ahead, reaching nearly 13 knots at the approach to the bend at Six-Mile Point. Based on the chief 

engineer’s assessment, the master likely believed that the engine would perform as expected, thus 

permitting the vessel to travel at a higher speed. Furthermore, the 20 minutes during which the 

vessel operated without an engine alarm or slowdown after the chief engineer’s report likely 

strengthened the master’s confidence that the problem had been fixed. The pilot nevertheless was 

still intending to anchor south of New Orleans so that the crew could attend to the engine problems.

Given the Mia S’s speed while turning through the bend near the accident site after the 

engine slowdown, the Ervin Cooper was unable to assist the laden bulk carrier and therefore 

prevent the vessel’s allision with the wharf. Following the allision, the tug escort, in conjunction 

with the Mia S letting go the starboard anchor, was then able to provide assistance by arresting the 

bulk carrier’s continued movement and drift.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the allision 

of the bulk carrier Mia S with the Nashville Avenue Wharf was the chief engineer’s poor 

communication to the master regarding the potential for additional protective engine slowdowns 

at orders above dead slow ahead, and the master and pilot’s decision to proceed at full ahead,

which resulted in a reduction in engine speed and subsequent loss of maneuverability while 

navigating through a sharp river bend.
Allision of Bulk Carrier Mia S with Nashville Avenue Wharf

9 NTSB/MAB-18/22

Vessel Particulars

Vessel Mia S

Owner/operator Navesco S.A.

Port of registry St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda

Flag Antigua and Barbuda

Type Bulk carrier

Year built 2010

Official number (US) N/A

IMO number 9456147

Classification Society Lloyd’s Register

Construction Steel

Length 623.3 ft (189.99 m)

Draft 42.7 ft (13.0 m) aft; 39.0 ft (11.9 m) forward

Beam/width 105.8 ft (32.26 m)

Gross and/or ITC tonnage 32,987 ITC tons

Engine power; manufacturer 12,713 hp (9,480 kW); Man-B&W

Persons on board 19

NTSB investigators worked closely with our counterparts from Coast Guard Sector New Orleans

throughout this investigation.

For more details about this accident, visit www.ntsb.gov and search for NTSB accident ID 

DCA17FM023.

Issued: October 16, 2018

The NTSB has authority to investigate and establish the probable cause of any major marine casualty or any marine 

casualty involving both public and nonpublic vessels under Title 49 United States Code, 1131. This report is based on 

factual information either gathered by NTSB investigators or provided by the Coast Guard from its informal 

investigation of the accident.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for a marine casualty; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “[NTSB] 

investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties . . . and are not conducted for

the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person.” Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, 831.4. 

Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety 

by conducting investigations and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the 

admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages 

resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. Title 49 United States Code, 1154(b).