[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12605

____________________

HAMZA MALDONADO,

JAMES HILL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

BAKER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

SCOTTY RHODEN,

EVELYN BLUE,

Captain,

JAMES MESSER,

Defendants-Appellees.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-00193-HLA-PDB

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

Hamza Maldonado and James Hill filed a complaint against 

the Defendants in Florida state court, asserting violations of their 

federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their 

religion. After Maldonado and Hill applied for and were granted in 

forma pauperis status by the state court, the Defendants—the 

Baker County Sheriff’s Office and Scotty Rhoden, Evelyn Blue, and 

James Messer, three employees of that office—removed the case to

federal court and paid the requisite federal filing fee required under 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). After removal, Maldonado and Hill did not 

seek in forma pauperis status in federal court. The district court 

subsequently dismissed Maldonado’s claims under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g)—the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)—and dismissed Hill’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

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As to Maldonado, this appeal requires us to determine 

whether a case commenced in state court by a prisoner and removed by a defendant to federal court—with the defendant paying 

the filing fee after removal—is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). We hold that it is not. 

And as to Hill, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Maldonado and Hill’s claims. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Both Maldonado and Hill were prisoners detained in the 

Baker County Detention Center when they filed their pro se1 prisoner civil rights action in Florida state court. Maldonado and Hill 

allege that the Defendants violated their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their Muslim faith by preventing 

them from attending Jummah prayer services.2 In state court, Maldonado and Hill both filed applications to proceed in forma pauperis, which the state court granted.

1 Although Maldonado and Hill sought appointment of counsel on multiple 

occasions, they proceeded pro se in the district court. They subsequently obtained pro bono counsel for this appeal. We thank Mr. Amir H. Ali for accepting this case and for his thoughtful presentation of the issues raised on appeal.

2 Jummah is “a weekly Muslim congregational service” that is “commanded 

by the Koran and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith.” 

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987); see also Greenhill v.

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Maldonado is a frequent pro se prisoner litigant. At the time 

this case was being considered by the district court, Maldonado had 

nine different civil actions pending against various employees of 

the Baker County Sheriff’s Office. Prior to the filing of those actions, Maldonado had filed four other civil rights actions, each of 

which was filed in federal court in the first instance, and three of 

which were the cases relied on by the district court in determining 

that Maldonado was a three-strike litigant under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). Indeed, it is undisputed that Maldonado has three strikes 

against him under § 1915(g).

When the Defendants removed this case to the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the Defendants, as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), paid the full federal filing fee. Following removal, Maldonado and Hill did not apply for in forma 

pauperis status in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

The Defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the district 

court granted the motion on two grounds. As to Maldonado, the 

district court dismissed Maldonado’s claims based on his threestrike litigant status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). As to Hill, the district court dismissed Hill’s claims based on his failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This timely 

appeal ensued. 

Clarke, 944 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2019) (observing that Jummah prayer “constitutes one of the central practices of Islam”).

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). Daker v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 

1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). We likewise review de novo whether 

a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 

1155 (11th Cir. 2005). “We review de novo the district court’s grant 

of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and construing them in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Chaparro v. Carnival 

Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cinotto v. 

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 674 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012)).

III. ANALYSIS 

There are three issues at the heart of this appeal: (1) whether 

Maldonado’s claims are now moot; (2) whether the district court 

erred in dismissing Maldonado’s claims under the three-strikes rule 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and (3) whether the district court 

erred in dismissing Hill’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We address each issue in turn.

A. Whether Maldonado’s Claims are Moot 

The Defendants argue that Maldonado’s claims are moot. 

Specifically, the Defendants argue that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) precludes Maldonado from seeking compensatory and punitive damages because he failed to allege any physical injury arising from his 

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detention.3 Because mootness is a threshold jurisdictional issue, 

we address this argument first.

We conclude that Maldonado’s claims are not moot. First, 

§ 1997e(e) states that: 

No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner 

confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, 

for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the 

commission of a sexual act.

Section 1997e(e), however, is not applicable in this case because, as 

discussed below in Part III.B.,“[n]o Federal civil action [was] 

brought by” Maldonado. See Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 973–

76 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that, in the context of 

§ 1997e(e), the bringing of a suit is defined as the commencing of 

the suit, but not the maintaining of the suit). Indeed, “§ 1997e(e) 

does not apply to prisoner lawsuits unrelated to prison conditions 

filed in state court based solely on state law and removed by defendants to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.” Mitchell 

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th 

Cir. 2002).

3 The Defendants also assert that, even though Maldonado did not request 

injunctive relief, the district court properly dismissed any potential claim for 

injunctive relief as moot because Maldonado was no longer confined at the 

Baker County Detention Center. Because Maldonado does not challenge that 

part of the district court’s ruling on appeal, however, we do not address the 

merits of that argument in this opinion. 

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Second, even if § 1997e(e) applied to Maldonado, the Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by this Court’s en banc decision 

in Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2021). In 

Hoever, a state prisoner filed a § 1983 civil rights action against various prison officials, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim 

and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and seeking injunctive relief and compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. 

Id. at 1356. The district court in Hoever, based on our earlier interpretation of § 1997e(e), dismissed the First Amendment claim 

insofar as it sought compensatory and punitive damages because 

the plaintiff failed to show a physical injury. Id. This Court, sitting 

en banc, receded from that earlier interpretation and held that the 

plain text of “§ 1997e(e) permits punitive damages absent a showing of physical injury.” Thus, pursuant to Hoever, Maldonado can 

assert a claim for punitive damages absent an allegation of physical 

injury. 

B. The Three-Strikes Rule 

Turning to the merits, Maldonado argues that the district 

court erred in dismissing his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) based 

on his classification as a three-strikes litigant because he did not 

bring his action in federal court but instead filed it in state court.

In order to determine whether the district court’s dismissal 

was proper under § 1915(g)’s three-strikes rule, we begin “‘with the 

language of the statute itself,’ giving ‘effect to the plain terms of the 

statute.’” United States v. Henco Holding Corp., 985 F.3d 1290, 

1297 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Valone, 784 F.3d 1398, 1402 

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(11th Cir. 2015)). Section 1915(g)—the three strikes provision of 

the PLRA—states as follows:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under 

this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 

States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

(emphasis added). The two operative terms in the statute for purposes of this case are “bring a civil action” and “under this section.”

To “bring” an action has long meant to initiate or commence it, not to prosecute or to continue it. See Black’s Law Dictionary 192 (6th ed. 1990) (“To ‘bring’ an action or suit has a settled 

customary meaning at law, and refers to the initiation of legal proceedings in a suit.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 

held that to “bring” an action means to commence it. See, e.g., 

Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960) (holding that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)—which permits the transfer of “any 

civil action to any other district or division where it might have 

been brought”—unambiguously means at the time the lawsuit was 

filed); Goldenberg v. Murphy, 108 U.S. 162, 163 (1883) (determining that a legislative requirement that an action be “brought within 

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90 days” means it must be commenced in that time period and finding the terms “brought” and “commenced” as meaning the same 

thing and are used interchangeably). 

And this Court likewise has held the same, including where 

“bring” or “brought” are used in other sections of the PLRA. See, 

e.g., Harris, 216 F.3d at 974 (finding that the text “[n]o federal civil 

action may be brought by a prisoner confined” in § 1997e(e) means 

that the statute’s bar on monetary relief absent a showing of physical injury applies only to actions that were commenced at the time 

that the plaintiff was confined in prison); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 

1190, 1193 (11th Cir.1999) (determining that “brought” in 

§ 1997e(a) means the filing of the action and holding that “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a state prison, thus, must first comply with the 

grievance procedures established by the state department of corrections before filing a federal lawsuit under section 1983.”); EEOC 

v. E. Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 635, 639–40 (11th Cir. 1984) (determining that the plain meaning of “to bring” a private action under 

§ 7(c)(1) of ADEA means “only ‘to commence,’ rather than to 

‘commence or maintain’”). 

“This long history of established meaning is important, because we readily presume that Congress knows the settled legal 

definition of the words it uses, and uses them in the settled sense.” 

Harris, 216 F.3d at 974; see also Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (explaining that Congress is 

presumed to be aware of settled judicial and administrative interpretations of words when it writes them into a statute). As such, 

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to “bring” or to have “brought” an action in the context of the 

PLRA unambiguously means to file or commence the action. Indeed, “brought” and “commenced” mean the same thing and are 

used interchangeably.

With this definition of to “bring” an action in mind, we turn 

to the second operative phrase in the statute—“under this section.” 

That phrase unambiguously refers to § 1915 itself. To bring an action under § 1915, the prisoner must seek and be granted the ability 

to proceed in forma pauperis in a “court of the United States” by 

submitting “an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such 

[person] possesses” to prove indigency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). As 

defined for purposes of Title 28, “[t]he term ‘court of the United 

States’ includes the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of 

appeals, [and] district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 451. Significantly, the 

statutory definition does not include state courts. Thus, the plain 

meaning of § 1915(g) is clear—it applies only to actions commenced by a prisoner in federal court who seeks and is granted in 

forma pauperis status in that court. 

Maldonado commenced his action in state court; the fact 

that the case proceeded in federal court was a result of the Defendants’ removal, not any affirmative act on Maldonado’s part. Moreover, Maldonado never sought in forma pauperis status in federal 

court after removal. As a result, Maldonado did not “bring” an action “under this section.” 

The Defendants advance a number of policy-based arguments in support of the district court’s dismissal of Maldonado’s 

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claims. But applying § 1915(g)’s prohibition to the facts in this case 

would require us to override the statutory language. “Language 

sets limits.” See Hill v. Madison County, 983 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 

2020). The statutory language Congress chose when it enacted 

§ 1915(g) establishes a specific rule, not a generalized standard to 

be elaborated on later by judges. Id. And courts are not free to 

turn such statutory rules into standards. See Rodriguez v. United 

States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (“[N]o legislation pursues its 

purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will 

not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the 

very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever

furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”). Instead, 

it is the job of the courts “to apply faithfully the law Congress has 

written,” see Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 

1718, 1725 (2017), and policy arguments that § 1915(g) should apply 

to a removed case like the one here must be directed to Congress, 

not to the judicial branch.

Moreover, even if we were to take into consideration the 

policy goals underlying § 1915(g), those goals are not subverted by 

our conclusion that Maldonado’s claims are not barred by the 

three-strikes provision. Section 1915(g) limits the number of frivolous suits that prisoners can bring in federal court, without at least 

paying something for the exercise. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 

521, 535 (2011); Hill, 983 F.3d at 907. As an initial point, the federal 

filing fee was paid in full here by the Defendants who removed the 

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case, so the federal courts are not burdened by an action without 

payment. Moreover, the three-strikes rule was intended to deter 

prisoners from filing meritless lawsuits in federal court, see Skinner, 562 U.S. at 535, and that goal is not offended by Maldonado 

pursuing his claims in Florida state court. Indeed, it was the Defendants, not Maldonado, who chose the federal forum. 

Finally, the fact that § 1915(g) does not prohibit Maldonado 

from proceeding here does not leave the Defendants without recourse against frivolous claims. Instead, “[c]ourts have ample 

other means to penalize the pursuit of frivolous suits that are removed to federal court.” Hill, 983 F.3d at 907. For example, Rule 

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to all papers filed 

in federal court, including those filed pro se. Admittedly, disposition of a prisoner’s frivolous claim brought may be more efficient 

when § 1915(g) applies. But that is no reason to apply the three 

strikes provisions beyond the boundaries of its statutory language.

The plain and ordinary meaning of § 1915(g) is clear—it only 

applies to cases commenced in federal court by a prisoner who 

sought and was granted in forma pauperis status in that court.4 As 

4 With this holding, we join every other circuit to address the applicability of 

§ 1915(g)’s three-strikes rule to cases initiated by a prisoner in state court but 

later removed to federal court by the defendants. Each of these courts has 

concluded that § 1915(g) does not apply to such cases. See Woodson v. 

McCollum, 875 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2017) (reversing dismissal under § 1915(g) 

of a case virtually identical to the one here and finding that, based on the plain 

meaning of the text, § 1915(g) did not apply); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 

377 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that an action brought or submitted to the state 

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such, § 1915(g) does not apply to actions, like the one here, brought 

by a three-strikes litigant in state court that was removed to federal 

court by another party. We therefore reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Maldonado’s claims.

C. Exhaustion 

Turning to Hill’s claims, Hill argues that the district court 

erred by dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. In dismissing Hill’s claim, the district court determined 

that it was clear from the face of the complaint that an administrative grievance procedure was available to Hill—based on Maldonado’s separate allegation that Maldonado pursued that procedure—and that Hill had not exhausted those remedies—based on 

Hill’s allegation in the complaint that “[t]here is no grievance remedy for Mr. Hill because the denial at issue in this case is absolute.” 

The district court failed, however, to follow the two-step inquiry 

related to exhaustion established by our precedent. 

court, not to “a court of the United States,” does not fall within the scope of 

§ 1915(g)); Hill v. Madison County., 983 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding 

that “§ 1915(g) does not apply to complaints brought to federal courts by defendants” and holding that a case filed in state court, removed to federal court, 

and dismissed on a listed ground does not count as a “strike” because the plaintiff did not “bring” his suit in a court of the United States); Harris v. Magnum, 

863 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that § 1915(g) “does not prevent an indigent prisoner-plaintiff with three strikes from proceeding in a case that someone else has filed in federal court”). 

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The PLRA forbids suits by prisoners “with respect to prison 

conditions” under any federal law, including the United States Constitution, “until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statutory exhaustion requirement is a mandatory pre-condition to suit. Alexander v. 

Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 1998). As used in 

§ 1997e(a), the word “remedies” “refers to the administrative process, not the particular forms of relief occurring at the end of that 

process.” Varner v. Shepard, 11 F.4th 1252, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021) 

(citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738–39 (2001)). But if remedies are unavailable to a prisoner, they need not be exhausted. 

Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 2008). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must 

be proved by the defendants; a plaintiff need not “specially plead or 

demonstrate exhaustion in [his] complaint.” Jones v. Bock, 549 

U.S. 199, 217 (2007). 

In Turner, this Court established a two-step process for resolving motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust: (1) looking to the 

defendant’s motion and the plaintiff’s response, the district court 

assesses whether dismissal is proper under the plaintiff’s version of 

the facts; and (2) if dismissal is inappropriate after step one, the 

court makes “specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.” 541 F.3d at 1082. Under step 

one, when determining exhaustion on the face of the complaint, 

the court must “accept allegations in a complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bingham v. 

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Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). If step two is 

reached, the district court’s findings must be specific enough to 

provide this Court with an opportunity to conduct meaningful appellate review. Danley v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1090, 1092 (11th Cir. 

2007). If a district court fails to properly apply the two-step Turner

test, remand is generally appropriate. See Whatley v. Warden, 

Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Here, Hill’s statement in the complaint that “[t]here is no 

grievance remedy for [him] because the denial at issue in this case 

is absolute” is ambiguous and lends itself to various interpretations. 

It certainly could, as the Defendants assert, refer to the administrative process, i.e., the legal meaning of “remedies” for purposes of 

the statutory exhaustion requirement. But taking that pro se allegation in the light most favorable to Hill, as this Court must, it 

could plausibly refer to the relief available to Hill at the end of the 

administrative process, i.e., that Hill was met with an “absolute” 

denial of his ability to attend Jummah prayer services after attempting to exhaust the administrative processes. And in his pro se response to the motion to dismiss, Hill stated that the Defendants 

“misconstrued the meaning” of that statement and specifically asserted that he had in fact “exhausted all remedies just like Mr. Maldonado.” At step one, then, dismissal was not appropriate under 

Hill’s version of the facts. 

The district court should then have proceeded to step two 

and made “specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual 

issues related to exhaustion.” Instead, the district court’s order on 

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this issue fails to address Hill’s response, in which he states that he 

did in fact exhaust administrative remedies, and fails to provide any 

“specific findings” for this Court to meaningfully review how the 

district court resolved the disputed facts. Thus, the district court’s 

order appears to adopt the Defendants’ version of the facts and 

their interpretation of Hill’s statements without mention or reference to Hill’s version—even though Hill’s version must, at this procedural stage, be taken as true. Because the district court failed to 

follow Turner’s two-step process, remand is appropriate to allow 

the district court to make these specific findings in the first instance. 

See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1213. We therefore reverse the district 

court’s dismissal of Hill’s claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of both Maldonado’s and Hill’s claims and remand for further proceedings. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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