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00-inside cover.indd 1 7/29/08 12:14:58 
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

The Acme of Skill

Nonkinetic Warfare

Cheng Hang Teo

Major, Republic of Singapore Air Force

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 30

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2008

01-frontmatter.indd 1 7/29/08 12:15:42 
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

01-frontmatter.indd 2 7/29/08 12:15:42 
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best 

student research projects from the prior academic year. 

The ACSC research program encourages our students 

to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their 

own professional development and in “advancing air 

and space power.” The series title reflects our desire 

to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier 

generations of Airmen. Projects selected for publication 

combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid 

presentation in exploring war at the operational level. 

With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers

engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, 

organizational, and operational questions. Some of these 

studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. 

Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in 

pursuing new possibilities. By making these research 

studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC 

hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings 

and to stimulate further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

01-frontmatter.indd 3 7/29/08 12:15:43 
01-frontmatter.indd 4 7/29/08 12:15:43 
Abstract

Nonkinetic warfare, conflict that does not involve 

using force to inflict physical damage, is rapidly gaining 

in importance. Scholars of war even from the time of 

Sun Tzu have articulated that the enemy’s destruction 

is neither essential nor necessarily the best route to 

ultimate victory. The insurgency attributes that have 

characterized many wars since World War II suggest 

that the objective of warfare has shifted from the 

kinetic destruction of military forces to the nonkinetic 

impairment of the enemy’s will to fight. Four global 

trends identified in this paper—economic prosperity, 

freedom of information, the rise of nationalism, and 

globalization and interdependence—are possible causes 

for this shift because they make war a less attractive 

option than ever. 

As the last major conflict between major powers, 

the Cold War was won with barely a single kinetic 

conflict between the United States and the Soviet 

Union—an excellent model of nonkinetic conflict and 

perhaps a sign of things to come. In the Cold War, 

the military largely played a supporting role. In an 

age characterized by the information revolution 

and globalization, the information and diplomatic 

instruments of power will rise in importance. Even in 

a supporting role, the military instrument nonetheless 

remains relevant, not least because kinetic conflict can 

never be ruled out. However, the military’s nonkinetic 

potential needs to be developed in order for it to be 

more effective in today’s world. Three ways to achieve 

this end are to develop an interagency approach to 

the military, assign a supporting diplomatic role to the 

military, and develop a comprehensive and coherent 

information strategy not only for the military, but for 

all levels of government.



01-frontmatter.indd 5 7/29/08 12:15:43 
01-frontmatter.indd 6 7/29/08 12:15:43 


Introduction

The term nonkinetic warfare may seem to be an oxymoron. How can warfare be described as nonkinetic? On 

the other hand, how can something that is not kinetic 

be described as warfare? This paper requires the reader 

to discard conceptions of war and warfare that include 

only the traditional kinetic sense and instead think 

about forms of conflict that do not take lives or cause 

damage. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 

increasing importance of nonkinetic warfare, both now 

and in the future, and consider how states and their predominantly kinetic-minded militaries ought to respond. 

The terms kinetic and nonkinetic have not been covered 

to a great extent in military literature, although Sun Tzu 

during the sixth century BC had already alluded to the 

nonkinetic approach as the pinnacle of the art of war.1

After exploring the definitions and theories of nonkinetic 

warfare, this paper charts the development of warfare in 

practice and finds that the latest incarnation of warfare, 

by making the will of the people the primary target, has 

moved into the nonkinetic realm. 

Examining current global trends in the ordering of 

civilization sheds light on why the utility of the kinetic 

approach to securing interests and solving problems 

could be declining at this point in history. The largely 

nonkinetic Cold War is a noteworthy example of how 

future major conflicts and long wars may be decided. 

This paper then explores nonkinetic warfare in its various forms and explains how today’s strategic environment favors nonkinetic approaches and methods, just as 

tomorrow’s will. Finally, this paper tries to answer the 

question of how the armed forces of the world ought to 

transform in order to be as effective in the nonkinetic 

realm as they are in the kinetic. The paper concludes 

that, in addition to kinetic capabilities, a modern state 

must possess mature nonkinetic capabilities to project 

power, secure interests, and solve problems. Accordingly, the modern military, as a tool of state policy, must 

02-article.indd 1 7/29/08 12:16:32 


itself transform to become capable of offering developed 

nonkinetic capabilities in addition to kinetic ones.

Defining the Terms:

Kinetic and Nonkinetic Warfare

It is first necessary to define and differentiate the 

terms kinetic and nonkinetic in a military context. A 

survey of Department of Defense (DOD) resources reveals 

few explanations of the term kinetic. This word, at the 

time of writing, is absent from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and is not explicitly defined in 

the major doctrinal publications of the Joint Staff, Army, 

Navy, or Marine Corps.2 Air Force Doctrine Document 

(AFDD) 2, Operations and Organization, is perhaps the 

only major doctrinal publication to attempt to define 

kinetic or nonkinetic. In a discussion of effects-based 

considerations for planning, AFDD 2 distinguishes 

between kinetic and nonkinetic actions:

Kinetic actions are those taken through physical, 

material means like bombs, bullets, rockets, and 

other munitions. Non-kinetic actions are logical, 

electromagnetic, or behavioral, such as a computer 

network attack on an enemy system or a psychological operation aimed at enemy troops. While 

non-kinetic actions have a physical component, the 

effects they impose are mainly indirect—functional, 

systemic, psychological, or behavioral.3

While this definition is a good starting point for 

understanding kinetic and nonkinetic action, it 

could be refined further. AFDD 2 uses means to 

characterize kinetic actions, while using effects to 

characterize nonkinetic actions. This is an incongruent 

manner of distinguishing these categories of action, as an 

example will demonstrate: should the act of firing a warning shot into the air be classified as kinetic or nonkinetic? 

It satisfies both the definitions in AFDD 2—a physical 

02-article.indd 2 7/29/08 12:16:32 
means (kinetic) and indirect effects with a physical component (nonkinetic). 

What is needed is an “apples to apples” manner of defining both terms. This paper proposes that both kinetic

and nonkinetic be defined based on effects rather than 

means. Using means as a basis for defining actions has 

a significant weakness: like kinetic actions, nonkinetic 

actions can utilize physical means, such as airlifting 

supplies in a humanitarian mission. When using effects 

as a basis for defining actions, it is worth noting that 

singular actions can have both tangible and intangible effects, and often do. The line between kinetic and 

nonkinetic ought to be drawn according to whether the 

action has the direct effect of physical damage—that is, 

injuring, killing, or destroying—on an intended enemy. 

A kinetic action is one that inflicts physical damage 

on the intended target; a nonkinetic action does not. 

For example, North Korea’s nuclear test-firing ought to 

be categorized as a nonkinetic action—although it does 

involve physical destruction, the intended effect on the 

enemy is in fact demonstration and deterrence. As a 

final note on terminology, war is commonly understood 

as conflict in the kinetic sense; this paper will follow 

that usage. Any reference to nonkinetic conflict will be 

explicitly labeled so.

Warfare in Theory

The Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, in his treatise 

on strategy, The Art of War, describes the best way to 

conduct a war:

Generally in war the best policy is to take a state 

intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the 

enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take 

intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad 

is better than to destroy them. For to win one 

hundred victories in one hundred battles is not 

the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without 

fighting is the acme of skill.

02-article.indd 3 7/29/08 12:16:33 


Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to 

attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his 

army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack 

cities only when there is no alternative. . . .

Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s 

army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations. Your aim must be to 

take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops 

are not worn out and your gains will be complete. 

This is the art of offensive strategy. . . .

Now there are five circumstances in which victory 

may be predicted: He who knows when he can 

fight and when he cannot will be victorious.4

Although Sun Tzu’s influential work on the art of 

war is indeed about the way of fighting, it is clear that 

he did not see kinetic operations as the ideal route 

to victory. Sun Tzu preferred the cleaner way to win; 

keeping the state and the armed forces of the enemy, 

as well as one’s own military, intact in any conflict is 

the ideal. He preferred to win through ideas and strategy 

without resorting to arms, killing, and destruction. If 

kinetic operations were necessary, it remained imperative to keep them to a minimum. According to Sun Tzu, 

if all strategies were to strive for the ideal, they would 

aim to achieve victory without fighting. Any strategy 

that results in fighting falls short of the ideal. In Sun 

Tzu’s eyes, therefore, a nonkinetic winning strategy is 

superior to a kinetic one.

Clausewitz’s seminal work On War discusses conflict principally in its kinetic form. Clausewitz was 

conscious of the limitations of war as an instrument 

of policy. Uncertainty, passion, and chance are inherent elements in war that make it an enigmatic and unpredictable instrument. Clausewitz contends that in war 

there are always countless unforeseeable minor incidents that “combine to lower the general level of perfor02-article.indd 4 7/29/08 12:16:33 


mance, so that one always falls far short of the intended 

goal.”5 Friction, as Clausewitz calls this phenomenon, 

makes difficult in war what would have been easy in 

peace and is closely associated with chance.6 War, out of 

all human activities, “most closely resembles a game of 

cards.”7 As a result, guesswork and luck are major factors in the outcome of war.8 Military strategist Bernard 

Brodie notes Clausewitz’s association of war with human emotion, which “distorts the clear conception of the 

object.”9 In On War, Clausewitz famously characterizes 

war as an instrument of policy but, oddly, never judges 

its efficacy. He does state that genius is required to conduct such a complex activity as war “with any degree of 

virtuosity.”10 Its unpredictable nature, though, suggests 

that its effectiveness as an instrument of policy is not 

guaranteed and that its results are mixed. For the immense cost that often accompanies war, the returns of 

war are not guaranteed.

On nonkinetic operations, it may appear that Clausewitz has his doubts. In the opening chapter of On War,

he writes:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there 

was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an 

enemy without too much bloodshed, and might 

imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. 

Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be 

exposed: war is such a dangerous business that 

the mistakes which come from kindness are the 

very worst.11

At first glance, Clausewitz may seem to disagree with 

Sun Tzu’s proposition of “overcoming without warring.” However, Clausewitz’s treatise, as its title states, 

is indisputably on the subject of fighting (as Liddell 

Hart has noted—see discussion below). On War is not 

principally about the nonkinetic domains of conflict. 

Therefore, when Clausewitz discourages the hope that 

an enemy might be defeated “without too much bloodshed,” he is speaking of the conduct of kinetic war, 

02-article.indd 5 7/29/08 12:16:33 
where war has already begun. Furthermore, closer 

analysis suggests that Clausewitz’s fundamental disagreement is with kindness rather than the lack of bloodshed. Later in On War, he writes, “We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. 

The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must 

make us take war more seriously, but not provide an 

excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name 

of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along 

with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.”12 Yet like 

Clausewitz’s kinetic war, nonkinetic means can just 

as well be used without compunction to achieve the 

desired ends.

B. H. Liddell Hart astutely notes that lesser students 

of Clausewitz would “reach the conclusion that in war 

every other consideration should be subordinated to 

the aim of fighting a decisive battle.”13 Once again, On 

War was never meant to cover more than the kinetic 

domain of human conflict. Liddell Hart sees strategy at 

a higher plane than the conduct of war—war is a supporting element and only one of the various means 

to the strategic end.14 He characterizes strategy along 

the same lines as Sun Tzu: while tactics is about the 

kinetic domain, the purpose of strategy is the reduction 

of kinetic operations “to the slenderest possible proportions.” The aim of strategy must be to bring about 

battle under the most advantageous circumstances, 

which Liddell Hart takes to mean the conditions under 

which there is less fighting: “The perfection of strategy 

would be, therefore, to produce a decision without 

serious fighting.”15

The history of warfare has been bloody, but since the 

sixth century BC, scholars of war have suggested that 

kinetic means of conflict are perhaps one of the costlier 

routes to victory. Sun Tzu would agree with Liddell Hart 

that the strategic objective is fulfilled if the enemy is led 

to abandon his purpose—the enemy’s destruction is not 

essential and certainly neither the easiest nor the optimal 

route to victory.16 As the most eminent scholar of the 

02-article.indd 6 7/29/08 12:16:33 
kinetic method, Clausewitz makes no conclusion on its 

effectiveness as an instrument of policy but cautions 

its users about the element of fortune and uncertainty 

associated with its use.

Warfare in Practice

In order to understand present and future warfare, 

it is useful to examine how warfare has evolved in the 

past. A good framework for discourse is the four generations of warfare described by William S. Lind and 

his coauthors in 1989. According to their schema, 

first-generation warfare was reflected in the tactics of 

line and column formations used by Napoleon’s conscripted troops. The second generation was based on 

fire and movement, when firepower largely replaced 

manpower as the instrument of mass. World War II 

saw the emergence of third-generation warfare on the 

battlefield. The blitzkrieg tactics of the German army 

sought to use overwhelming maneuver to bypass and 

collapse enemy forces rather than to destroy them, 

which was the hallmark of the previous two generations of warfare. The authors attribute the evolution 

of warfare largely to the advancement in technology 

and ideas in the military realm.17

The authors posit that the emerging fourth-generation 

warfare will be dispersed and undefined, with a nonexistent distinction between war and peace.18 However, their conception of fourth-generation warfare is 

based rather narrowly on advancing technology and 

ideas restricted to the military realm, plus the trends 

of the previous three generations. In 2004 Thomas X. 

Hammes expanded the scope of the discussion when he 

suggested that major changes in political, economic, 

social, and technical segments of society always precede major changes in warfare.19 The proliferation of 

international organizations, the growth of world financial 

markets, and the information revolution, to name a few 

developments, have combined to cause the emergence 

02-article.indd 7 7/29/08 12:16:34 
of fourth-generation warfare.20 This kind of warfare, 

according to Hammes, uses all available networks—

political, economic, social, and military—to convince 

the enemy’s leaders that their strategic goals are either 

unachievable or too costly to achieve.21 Whereas in 

the previous three generations warfare entailed the 

destruction of physical military forces, the fourth 

generation targets the enemy’s will to fight. In the 

fourth generation, the physical engagement of the 

military becomes just a means to this end.

In fourth-generation warfare as described by 

Hammes, the objective of warfare has moved from the 

kinetic destruction of military forces to the nonkinetic 

impairment of the enemy’s will. Fourth-generation 

warfare has been the choice of the military underdog 

to great effect. It accounts for the failures of both the 

Cold War superpowers at the heights of their respective 

powers, the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet 

Union in Afghanistan. 

What is the appropriate response to this new kind 

of warfare that targets the intangible will instead of 

tangible troops? I suggest that any kind of response 

must involve moving the preponderance of conflict and 

strategy into the nonkinetic realm because, based on 

sociopolitical and economic factors that have evolved 

over the course of human civilization, kinetic warfare 

today is more of a liability than at any time in human 

history. This paper argues that the use of war as the 

primary instrument of policy plays directly into the 

hands of the practitioners of fourth-generation warfare. As a tool of policy, the utility of war has diminished 

over the course of human progress. An analysis of global 

trends in human civilization provides some evidence of 

this phenomenon.

Global Trends in Civilization

In a constitutional republic or a democracy, the 

will of the people, by definition, determines whether a 

02-article.indd 8 7/29/08 12:16:34 
country goes to war. In such political systems, the will 

of the people is also always a chief center of gravity of 

the war-making effort, and it determines whether a 

country stays in a war or whether a nation fights the 

war with the required vigor. However, civilization has 

developed in such a way as to make war much less 

palatable, at least for the common people. In German 

philosopher Immanuel Kant’s essay Eternal Peace 

(1795), he writes, “The republican constitution does 

offer the prospect of . . . eternal peace. . . . If . . . the 

consent of the citizens is required in order to decide 

whether there should be war or not, nothing is more 

natural than that those who have to decide to undergo 

all the deprivations of war will very much hesitate to 

start such an evil game.”22

Kant’s ideas form the basis of what is today called 

the democratic peace theory. Although this theory has 

its detractors, it is at the same time widely embraced 

by many, including various US presidential administrations. Both the current president, George W. Bush, and 

his predecessor, Bill Clinton, have stated unequivocally 

their belief that democracies do not fight one another.23

Two hundred years after Kant, the rise of the constitutional republic is just one of various factors that make 

war an unattractive option. The development of human 

civilization in four other areas—prosperity, freedom of 

information, nationalism, and globalization and interdependence—produces the same effect, such that Kant’s 

prerequisite of a constitutional republic is no longer a 

necessary condition for making war unattractive. 

Prosperity

Economic growth for most of the globe has been phenomenal in the last century. Wealth continues to increase. In the 16 years from 1980 to 1996, the world 

gross domestic product (GDP) quadrupled. The increased wealth reduces people’s tolerance for fighting 

and destruction because they have more to lose. Scholar 

02-article.indd 9 7/29/08 12:16:34 
10

James A. Nathan claims that since the end of the Cold 

War, “trade has been displacing security worldwide as 

a means of determining priorities and interests.” He 

quotes former secretary of state Madeleine Albright: 

“For as long as I am Secretary of State, America’s diplomatic influence will be harnessed to the task of helping 

America’s economy to grow.”24

Thomas L. Friedman’s “golden arches” theory of conflict prevention, which notes that no two countries that 

both have McDonald’s have fought a war against each 

other since each got its McDonald’s, is an insightful 

theory of how prosperity prevents states from going to 

war.25 In the book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman 

points out that 78 days of airpower could achieve in the 

“McDonald’s nation” Serbia what 10 years of full military 

engagement in “non-McDonald’s” Vietnam could not.26 A 

closer look at their respective economic data suggests one 

reason why. Serbia and Montenegro in 1997, just before 

Operation Allied Force, had a GDP per capita of 1,570 in 

today’s US dollars, almost 20 times that of Vietnam in 

1975, which had a GDP of 81 US dollars.27 To put things 

in proper perspective, there are surely other factors that 

influenced the dynamics of each war. However, it remains 

clear that states with little wealth and prosperity are less 

constrained by the need to preserve wealth and are less 

inhibited from involvement in war as a result. States with 

more have more to lose, and this is a big disadvantage in 

the conduct of war. 

Greater prosperity also increases the value of human 

life. Loss of life is intolerable today; for example, North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies were willing 

only to use airpower to restore order in the Balkans 

in Operation Allied Force. The rich countries in NATO 

did not show convincingly that they were prepared to 

undertake significant losses in order to end the genocide in Kosovo. On the other hand, a prosperous nation 

may be tempted to go to war if it thinks that a quick 

and decisive victory would be in the offing and the costs 

associated with victory would be minimal. 

02-article.indd 10 7/29/08 12:16:34 
11

One could furthermore deduce that states which 

aspire to be prosperous will refrain from war. One 

theory suggests that the expectations of future trade 

prospects affect the likelihood of war. When trade 

prospects are dim or trade sanctions are not expected 

to abate, war may seem a reasonable option to break 

out of economic decline. However, when there is expectation of increasing trade and its benefits, states 

have less reason for war.28 To go to war risks not only 

the benefits of current economic prosperity, but that 

of the future as well.

Examples of the economic devastation of war are 

abundant through the ages. The Thirty Years’ War 

wreaked economic destruction in Germany, just as 

the Seven Years’ War reduced Austria to virtual bankruptcy. In France the costs of the Seven Years’ War 

were so debilitating that they brought about conditions for revolution.29 Post–World War II Britain was 

reeling from the costs of two massive wars so that it no 

longer had the financial might to sustain its colonies 

east of the Suez; economic factors were a central cause 

for the colonial withdrawal.30

To be sure, economic prosperity alone does not end 

all wars. The British writer Norman Angell, in response 

to criticism that the First World War had disproved his 

theory of the economic futility of war, writes that “the 

futility of war will never of itself stop war; . . . only when 

men realize the futility will it deter them.”31 Friedman 

contends that nations will think, not twice, but three 

times before choosing the military option to solve their 

problems.32 At the very least, economic interests form a 

set of factors that weigh against going to war. The greater 

the economic stake, the more these factors weigh.

Freedom of Information

Mass media and information technology today facilitate the flow of information at a lightning pace and in 

a way states are not able to control as they previously 

02-article.indd 11 7/29/08 12:16:35 
12

could. The common person’s access to information is 

limited only by the amount of time and attention he or 

she chooses to invest. How does the information revolution in the twenty-first century change the relationship of modern societies to war? The information revolution has caused a diffusion of power from the state 

to the individual. The Internet and media revolution 

means that states have lost control of the nature and 

flow of information within their own societies.33 They 

no longer possess the same kind of power they had to 

shape thinking in society. The individual who desires 

to receive information about war and transmit his or 

her views on it possesses the means to do both virtually instantaneously. Scenes of war appear right in the 

living room as they happen. At the same time, opinion 

polls in newspapers and television reflect public opinion 

with similar instantaneity. More crucially, information 

technology empowers people with the ability to mobilize 

and make their voices heard. During the Vietnam War, 

the first antiwar march in 1965 had 25,000 people, 

growing to half a million in 1969. Antiwar protesters 

in 2003 numbered more than 2 million over America 

and Europe—and this was before the war started.34 If 

the constitutional republics in Kant’s time lacked the 

means to voice their dissent to war, they definitely 

have it now, and those of tomorrow will have it in even 

greater abundance as information technology continues to advance. This phenomenon raises the cost of 

war in terms of public opinion.

Technology advancement in the field of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) has also diminished the prospect of war by taking away from the initiating party the element of surprise. This removes the 

significant advantage of the first mover and helps the 

defensive side. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis 

posits that this added transparency is the by-product 

of the Cold War strategic arms race, resulting in the 

creation of “a wholly new environment that rewarded 

those who sought to prevent wars and discouraged 

02-article.indd 12 7/29/08 12:16:35 
13

those who tried to begin them.”35 With today’s everimproving global ISR capability, military mobilizations 

and missile launches are quickly detected and therefore more effectively defended against. This reduces the 

probability of a swift and decisive victory for those who 

seek to start wars and raises the cost of starting wars.

Nationalism

The post–World War II era is surely the age of nationalism. From 50 countries at the end of the war 

in 1945, the United Nations (UN) has grown to 192

member states today.36 Since the UN was founded, 

more than 80 nations previously under colonial rule 

have joined as sovereign, independent states.37 Henry 

Kissinger has said that in the emerging post–Cold War 

international order, “nationalism has gained a new 

lease on life.”38 At first glance, nationalism implies the 

notion of competition between states and would seem 

to increase the likelihood of war. However, nationalistic 

peoples resist conquest, colonization, or occupation and 

are therefore very costly to invade and rule over. This 

was a major reason why the American venture in Vietnam and the Soviet foray into Afghanistan both ended 

in failure. Those nationalistically inclined populations 

proved too formidable to conquer.39 Another example 

of growing nationalism can be found in Iran. Whereas 

in 1959 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was able to 

successfully stage a coup—without the use of any military force—against the regime of Mohammed Mossedegh 

in order to install the America-friendly Shah, it was prohibitively costly to do the same to Ayatollah Khomeini’s 

nationalist revolution in 1979.40 Today’s nationalistically inclined populations will ensure that any victory 

by the aggressor will by no means come cheaply—if it 

comes at all. In today’s context, nationalism is not the 

exclusive domain of states. For example, it can come 

in the extra-state form of Shi’a nationalism existent in 

02-article.indd 13 7/29/08 12:16:35 
14

both Iran and Iraq or the nonstate Islamic nationalism advocated by Osama bin Laden. 

Globalization and Interdependence

The striking point about globalization today is not its 

spread but the accelerating rate at which it is spreading. In this age, anyone contemplating war has to consider not only the effects on those directly involved, but 

also those second- and third-order effects on those not 

directly involved. Why does a country like South Korea 

send aid and peacekeeping troops to far-flung Iraq and 

Afghanistan, countries which are seemingly geopolitically unrelated to itself? It does so because, in the era 

of globalization, problems such as political instability 

anywhere in the world can generate secondary effects 

anywhere in the world. The Pulitzer Prize–winning author Jared Diamond says that because of globalization, the whole world has become one interdependent 

“polder,” a term used to describe flood-prone reclaimed 

land; in the Netherlands, the polder requires the cooperation of all segments of Dutch society to keep the 

water out.41 Any problem is now the world’s problem. 

The rich interconnectedness of today’s world ensures 

that the destabilizing effects of war will touch not only 

the direct participants. Many more players will also be 

affected, further escalating the cost of war. 

Friedman improvised on his golden arches theory 

in 2005 by putting forward the Dell theory of conflict 

prevention: “no two countries that are both part of 

a major global supply chain, like Dell Computer, will 

ever fight a war against each other as long as they are 

both part of the same global supply chain.”42 He posits 

that countries woven into a global supply chain such 

as Dell’s stand to lose much economically—and for a 

long time—if they go to war. Indeed, today’s state of 

global interdependence ensures that each country’s 

interests and well-being are enmeshed with many 

others’—whether intended or not. The hastening of 

02-article.indd 14 7/29/08 12:16:35 
15

globalization would be an even greater restraint on 

military adventurism than prosperity. Countries that 

enjoy the benefits of globalization have ever greater 

incentives not to go to war and face ever greater costs 

if they do go to war. 

Thus even in the absence of Kant’s requisite of a 

constitutional republican system of government, there 

are already other substantial factors that discourage 

the use of force. The need to protect wealth and to 

provide freedom of information for the masses, along 

with the rise of nationalism, globalization, and global 

interdependence, all make kinetic options less useable 

in the competition between interests in this world. 

Global Players

However, the war-deterring factors discussed above 

do not necessarily apply to all actors. In almost a fifth of 

the world’s territories, the people are still living on less 

than five dollars a day, including those in the world hotspots such as North Korea, Somalia, and Chad.43 There 

will be countries that remain poor, enjoy no freedom 

of information, and resist globalization. Furthermore, 

the rise of combative nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda 

means that there exist asymmetric players who do not 

need to protect wealth and to whom interdependence 

with states does not apply. If there is to be any kinetic 

conflict, it would more likely involve a poor, backward 

nation, a nonstate actor, or both. 

This point is substantiated by the record of wars that 

have taken place since 1945. In evaluating the status of 

war since World War II, Martin van Creveld in 1991 observed that the United States has been engaged in conventional wars only in Korea (1950), Lebanon (1958), 

Vietnam (1964–72), the Dominican Republic (1965), 

Cambodia (1972–75), Lebanon again (1983), and Iraq 

(1991). He argues that the United States is inclined to 

employ military force only in situations where its vital 

interests are not at stake.44 Van Creveld also notes that

02-article.indd 15 7/29/08 12:16:35 
16

almost three quarters of all military conflicts since 1945

have been “low-intensity conflicts,” which he characterizes as follows: first, they tend to occur in the lessdeveloped regions of the world; second, they rarely involve regular armies on both sides; third, most of them 

do not rely primarily on high-technology weapons; and 

fourth, they are bloody and yield high death tolls.45

Van Creveld also predicts that low-intensity conflict 

will be the predominant warfare of the future.46 Political scientist John E. Mueller focuses on what he terms 

the “nonwars” that have taken place since 1945, pointing out that with a single minor exception—the Soviet 

invasion of Hungary in 1956—there have been no wars 

among the 44 wealthiest countries during this time. 

The wars since 1945, he claims, have occurred almost 

entirely in the Third World.47

There are great implications for the way the world conducts business. The use of military force is no longer 

likely to be profitable. Any use of kinetic actions is likely 

to be against poor, failed states or nonstate actors. Those 

who initiate such actions are at a severe disadvantage because their opponents have nothing to lose. The wealth, 

freedom, and connectedness that ostensibly favor their 

owner in war become the proverbial albatross around the 

neck that diminishes the will to fight. When developed 

states fight, they contend not only with an enemy that 

is willing to fight, but at the same time deal with their 

own constituents who are less willing to do the same. Indeed the track record of leading powers in such engagements, whether van Creveld’s low-intensity conflict or 

Hammes’ fourth-generation warfare, has not been good. 

The United States did not win in Vietnam, Lebanon, 

and Somalia; France lost in Algeria and Vietnam; and 

the Soviet Union had to pull out of Afghanistan.48 The 

current global war on terrorism fits exactly into this 

mold: the developed world in conflict with a nonstate 

actor that tends to operate in weak and failing states.

Since kinetic methods are not preferred in the developed world and are deficient against poor, failed states 

02-article.indd 16 7/29/08 12:16:36 
17

and nonstate actors, we must now look to nonkinetic 

means to secure interests, defend the homeland, and 

project power. However, I am not suggesting that kinetic 

methods are of absolutely no use against poor, failed 

states and nonstate actors. Rather, the indicators point 

to the notion that fewer kinetic operations may be better than more. Increasingly, the global actors of today 

and tomorrow need to look to the nonkinetic domain to 

serve their ends.

The Nonkinetic Domain:

Soft Power and Then Some

The nonkinetic domain is wide ranging and far reaching. It consists of the diplomatic, information, and 

economic instruments of power, as well as the nonkinetic elements of the military instrument. Harvard 

dean Joseph Nye first coined the term soft power in 

1990 as the “ability to get what you want through 

attraction rather than coercion or payments.”49 Three 

sources of soft power exist: culture, political values, and 

foreign policy.50 For example, Spain’s military presence 

in postwar Iraq is a way to boost its diplomatic profile 

and international reputation in the eyes of the world. Terrorism in particular, Nye says, depends crucially on soft 

power for its ultimate victory because it depends on its 

ability to attract support from the masses.51 However, the 

nonkinetic domain is more than just soft power. Military 

deterrence and economic sanctions are examples of hard 

power in this domain that do not operate on the basis of 

attraction. They can be as effective as soft power methods 

in producing desired outcomes. Nye acknowledges that 

the key to success today and in the future is having the 

right combination of hard and soft power.52

Perhaps the Chinese military already has a grasp 

of the nonkinetic domain. In 2002 two senior colonels 

of the People’s Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang 

Xiangsui, published a book called Unrestricted Warfare.

53 Though captivated by the American-led coalition’s 

02-article.indd 17 7/29/08 12:16:36 
18

awesome victory in the first Gulf War, the colonels 

are unconvinced that abundant wealth and cuttingedge technology alone will tip the scales in war.54

They suggest that, in the age of globalization and 

advanced technology, war has become indistinguishable from peace, combatants from noncombatants.55

They see an expanded domain of security and conflict 

that includes “politics, economics, material resources, 

nationalities, religion, culture, networks, geography, 

environment, and outer space, etc.”56 Foreseeing a new 

methodology of future war, Qiao and Wang suggest a 

combination of no fewer than 24 methods of operation 

to wage war against the enemy.57 They claim that “it is 

becoming obsolete to automatically consider military 

action the dominant means and other means supporting means in war.”58 Against a backdrop of globalization 

where the distinctions between combatants and noncombatants and between war and the lack thereof are 

virtually nonexistent, they regard unrestricted warfare, 

literally translated “no-limit war” (my translation), as the 

key to conducting warfare.59

In the midst of the ongoing information revolution, the 

information instrument of power deserves to be singled 

out as a rising and already-major element of nonkinetic 

warfare. However, there seems to be much confusion 

about this instrument. Certain students of warfare take 

information operations (IO) to include the entire domain 

of nonkinetic operations.60 Others consider IO too narrowly based on the DOD-defined “core capabilities 

of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception 

and operations security.”61 Therefore, before proceeding with any further discussion on the use of information 

as an instrument of power, some clarification is in order. 

Darley provides what is probably a more comprehensive description of IO as “a specific purpose and 

emphasis within an overall plan of action.”62 However, 

this description is about information at the operational 

level, which cannot be the be-all and end-all of the infor02-article.indd 18 7/29/08 12:16:36 
19

mation instrument. The operational level serves strategy; 

accordingly, IO serves a strategic level of the information domain. While operational art is the expression of 

strategy in the military realm, in the information realm 

IO ought to be the expression of information strategy. IO 

is about the means of acting out and communicating the 

message; information strategy is the message itself.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt attribute information strategy 

to two poles: technological, pertaining to cyberspace 

affairs; and ideas, pertaining to the harnessing and 

expression of soft power.63 However, this paper posits 

that the technological realm is tied to the means of 

propagating the message and therefore ought to reside 

at the operational level; the other pole, ideational, correctly belongs to the strategic level of the information 

domain. Arquilla and Ronfeldt introduce the concept 

of the noosphere, the realm of the mind, and the term 

noopolitik, the politics based on ethics and ideas.64

With knowledge fast becoming an ever stronger source 

of power, what may matter most in the information 

age is the “story” being told. In this era, instead of the 

one whose military wins, victory may go to the side 

whose message wins.65

Another prominent feature of the information age is 

the massive volume of information being exchanged 

and inundating the consumer. What is actually consumed among the mass of transmitted information 

depends on the information-filtration process of the 

individual. Whether information is received, believed, 

ignored, or distrusted depends on the standing of the 

sender in the eyes of the beholder.66 Reputation and 

credibility will be the watchwords of power in the information age. In addition to a convincing story, the 

status of its teller will be important. A convincing story 

with an unconvincing teller will not convince. Neither 

will a compelling teller with an uncompelling story 

compel. The reputation and credibility factor relates 

closely to the diplomatic instrument of power. An actor’s standing in the eyes of the global community, 

02-article.indd 19 7/29/08 12:16:36 
20

augmented by the relations it keeps, will determine its 

success in having its message accepted.

The diplomatic instrument of power becomes ever 

more important in a globalizing world. The conflicts, 

problems, and security threats of today and tomorrow possess a transnational nature and exist in global 

proportions. Empowered by globalization, their purveyors are stateless, agile, and networked.67 It is no 

longer sufficient to address them by national means 

alone; unilateralism will be less effective in a context 

of globalization. Solutions will increasingly be found in 

regional and global mechanisms of cooperation and coordination.68 As such, diplomatic avenues will more and 

more be central to policy. The same applies to the pursuit of interests and the perpetuation of desired values. 

Kissinger, referring to the United States, wrote that the 

test of history will be whether it can turn its predominant 

power into international consensus and its own principles into widely accepted international norms.69

While the kinetic domain is less relevant today, the 

military instrument of power maintains a considerable 

role. Even in the nonkinetic domain, the military remains 

relevant. Its most prominent nonkinetic trait is the ability 

to deter without the kinetic application of force. A senior 

statesman, discussing the importance of American military presence to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific 

region, remarked that a military need not be physically 

used in order to be useful—its mere presence makes a difference.70 Even if it is not used, it is at the back of leaders’ 

minds and foremost in their calculations. Military power 

will always play a background role regardless of whether 

or not it is put to action. A skillful user can wield it effectively without having to bring it to bear on anyone. 

The military is more than just an instrument to apply 

or demonstrate force. Its deployability and rapid response 

make it the best tool for projecting goodwill—supporting 

humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and reconstruction. 

Humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts in Indonesia 

after the 2004 tsunami and in earthquake-ravaged Paki02-article.indd 20 7/29/08 12:16:37 
21

stan improved public opinion of the United States and its 

war on terror in those countries.71 The ability of the military to react quickly and deploy far was crucial in getting 

timely aid to those regions. At times, getting aid to where 

it is needed is a race between adversaries. When the 

usually violent Mahdi Army of the Shiite cleric Moqtada 

al-Sadr was able to get assistance to victims of a sectarian attack before the Iraqi government and US troops, 

al-Sadr claimed the soft power that was up for grabs.72

In most crisis situations, the military remains the most 

responsive and well-equipped agency to take action.

Taking a Leaf from the Last Long War

In 1979 Pope John Paul II visited his home country of Poland. Formerly Karol Wojtyla, he was the first 

non-Italian pope in 455 years, and perhaps more bizarrely, the leader of world Catholicism was a citizen 

from a socialist, atheist state. Gaddis writes that on 

the day of 2 June 1979, John Paul II “began the process by which communism in Poland—and ultimately 

everywhere else in Europe—would come to an end.”73

Clearly, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin underestimated 

the nonkinetic potential of a pope such as John Paul II 

when he disparagingly asked of the pope, “How many 

divisions has he got?”74

The popular perception was that, even though the 

two protagonists of the Cold War fought numerous 

wars with the other’s proxies, they never engaged in a 

direct military confrontation. Gaddis asserts that there 

indeed was one instance of such a confrontation during the Cold War. Soviet fighters flown by Soviet pilots 

in the Korean War did exchange fire with American 

fighters. However, not only did the two superpowers 

consider nuclear war to be too catastrophic to start, 

conventional skirmishes in the air over a third country were deemed too dangerous to be made known. 

The Soviets and the United States agreed to cover up 

the fact that a kinetic encounter ever took place in the 

02-article.indd 21 7/29/08 12:16:37 
22

skies over the Korean peninsula.75 With both sides not 

willing to allow even a smidgen of kinetic exchange to 

exist in the public perception, one could, at that point, 

surmise that full-scale war between them was not 

likely—and one would be right. For the next 40 years, 

the two superpowers of the Cold War were content to 

slug it out in the nonkinetic realm until an outright 

victor was declared.

With both powers unwilling to fight, what was it 

that won the war for America? Though it remains unresolved whether the end of the Cold War signified the 

“end of history,” Francis Fukuyama’s claim that Western 

liberalism won an ideological victory over communism 

does aptly describe the war of ideas between the United 

States and the Soviet Union.76 According to Fukuyama, 

the decline of totalitarian communism in the Eastern 

European states, China, and finally the Soviet Union left 

Western liberalism with no competitors in the ideological realm.77 Fukuyama goes on to predict that this will 

lead to “the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale 

conflict between states.”78 Kissinger thinks the victory 

was won not only in the ideological realm but also on 

the diplomatic front. Soviet Russia would have been 

much stronger had the United States not protected its 

alliances and rebuilt democracies.79 Yet another major 

factor was the weakness and vulnerability of the inflexible Soviet command economy, which the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried in vain to reform.80

Overall, the primary instruments of power involved in 

the defeat of Soviet communism were the diplomatic, 

informational, and economic ones.

What then of the military role in this victory? Doubtlessly, the military instrument was applied kinetically, 

but this was done in support of the grand strategy of 

containment. When it came to direct confrontation with 

the Soviet Union, the American military played a largely 

supporting, nonkinetic, and indirect role. It supported 

the economic instrument of power through an expensive arms race that the Soviet economy was not able 

02-article.indd 22 7/29/08 12:16:37 
23

to finance.81 Its nuclear arsenal kept the Soviet’s missiles at bay through deterrence. The American military 

instrument also supported the diplomatic instrument 

by offering nuclear protection to its European allies, 

thus keeping the anticommunist coalition together.82

The long Cold War was clearly won in the nonkinetic 

domain, but though there was no overt use of force, the 

military instrument had no small role in this war.

Looking back, Gaddis points out that the Cold War 

was the point in history at which military strength 

ceased to be the defining characteristic of power.83 The 

rapid progression of technology combined with a philosophy of caution in the face of apocalyptic nuclear 

destruction caused the nature of power to shift. In 

the intervening years between the end of World War 

II and the end of the Cold War, the power and means 

of survival of states transformed to much more than 

just the capacity to fight and win wars.84 The Cold War 

showed in practice what the four global trends mentioned above show in theory: war is a lesser option in 

power projection today than it used to be. Even so, the 

Cold War also showed that the military instrument of 

power is by no means less crucial.

Implications and Recommendations

for States and their Armed Forces

If the nature of power is shifting from kinetic to nonkinetic, there will be implications for the armed forces 

of today and the ways they transform for the future. 

By no means does this shift in the nature of power 

suggest that the kinetic domain is no longer relevant. 

In order for the military to be effective at all, the potential for causing devastating kinetic effects must exist. Even in the event kinetic capabilities are not used, 

military presence must be seen as credible in order 

to have any effect on the enemy. Thus the military’s 

kinetic potential is a primary requisite that must be fulfilled before nonkinetic possibilities can be explored. 

02-article.indd 23 7/29/08 12:16:37 
24

Few recommendations have addressed military transformation in the nonkinetic realm, but indications are 

that the military-intellectual community is coming 

around to the notion. William E. Odom’s piece in 1997 

was entirely about kinetic power, discussing military 

force structures.85 In 2002 then-Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld wrote that modern wars will increasingly require all elements of national power.86

However, he stopped short of providing concrete suggestions on how the nonmilitary elements of power should 

be harnessed. Max Boot’s ideas for transformation in 

2005 contained nonkinetic elements such as human 

intelligence, media management, and nation building, together with other kinetic capabilities such as 

emphasizing irregular operations, increasing ground 

troop levels, and recruiting foreign fighters.87

Three recommendations are in order. The first is 

an interagency approach to projecting military power. 

While US security policy at the grand strategic level is 

coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC), 

there is not a similar interagency organization at the 

military-strategic level and below to translate and 

implement grand strategy in a coherent manner. The 

NSC is primarily an advisory unit whose design is 

multiagency—its non–White House members include 

the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the director of 

national intelligence.88 The assistant to the president 

for economic policy, attorney general, director of the 

office of management and budget, and the heads of 

other executive departments and agencies are invited 

to attend meetings when required.89 Such an interagency model is essential to combining the other nonkinetic instruments of power with the military instrument. The Department of Homeland Security is such 

an entity, coordinating with myriad agencies including the NSC for the purpose of homeland defense.90

There are three possible approaches to an interagency 

model for military power projection. The first is to set up 

02-article.indd 24 7/29/08 12:16:38 
25

an entirely new interagency security-coordination organization—staffed by members of all relevant agencies—

which would be empowered to coordinate and direct interagency operations outside the homeland. A second 

possibility is to inject interagency officials into the military planning staffs at various levels in order to add the 

required nonkinetic element to military operations. The 

third is to establish military offices within relevant government agencies to act as liaisons and lend the military 

access to the other nonkinetic instruments of power. 

Irrespective of the approach, the critical factor underlying the interagency idea is the interagency mind-set 

to projecting power and answering challenges. Leaders 

of military and nonmilitary agencies have to develop the 

correct mentality for interagency processes and structures. This is a significant leap from present conventional wisdom and, therefore, would probably prove to 

be the greatest stumbling block to success. A gradual, 

phased-in approach is likely to be most practical.

The second recommendation is to assign a diplomatic role to the military. An organization that sees 

much action away from home, the military would not 

be out of place in this role. In fact, it is an undeniable responsibility for any agency operating outside 

the homeland. US regional combatant commanders 

already play a growing diplomatic role through activities such as hosting regional conferences on defense issues, providing training for friendly foreign 

militaries, and engaging foreign politicians in diplomatic dialogue.91 Military-to-military relations provide additional and alternative diplomatic channels. 

Such channels are especially influential in countries 

where the military either holds sway over the civilian 

government or controls absolute power in the country, 

such as Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey. 

The military diplomatic channel can be a surrogate 

means of bilateral contact when formal diplomatic relations turn frosty or break down altogether. Finally, 

the military can be a good way to express goodwill in 

02-article.indd 25 7/29/08 12:16:38 
26

the forms of humanitarian and military aid, as well 

as to forge people-to-people relations through the bilateral or multilateral conduct of military exercises. 

Such relations increase diplomatic understanding 

and goodwill and are a source of soft power. Military 

leaders at all levels must be highly conscious of the 

diplomatic implications of military activities overseas. 

They ought to factor them into their calculations in order 

to fully exploit the diplomatic potential and at the same 

time avoid the possible diplomatic pitfalls.

The third recommendation is to develop a coherent information strategy, essential to synchronizing 

actions at all levels of both government and the military. Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest that decision 

makers ought to be “thinking about information 

strategy earlier, and more often,” thereby precluding the ineffective or inappropriate early use of other 

policy instruments.92 Furthermore, armed forces for 

the information age must embrace the information 

realm, understand the information strategy, and be 

equipped to carry out the strategy. Troops will be 

required to be not only information conscious but 

also information savvy. In the information realm, 

even the individual soldier, sailor, or Airman can 

cause strategic effects—recall Abu Ghraib. To ensure 

that actions at all levels of operations are in accordance with the information strategy, a certain degree 

of indoctrination—equivalent to training and equipping troops to fight in the information realm—may 

be necessary. Each individual needs to be confident 

and possess sufficient conviction such that his or 

her words and actions become an expression of the 

message. The question of whether the job of indoctrination belongs to the commanders or a bespoke 

information corps is minuscule compared to the 

magnitude of the task. This issue will require much 

more discussion than this paper can provide if militaries are to pursue this end.

02-article.indd 26 7/29/08 12:16:38 
27

Conclusion

At this point, it is worth emphasizing that this paper 

does not suggest that the kinetic approach is no longer 

relevant. Neither does it propose that a strong kinetic 

military capability is of no use. It does point out that 

power consists of kinetic as well as nonkinetic elements. 

Furthermore, at this point in history, nonkinetic elements are becoming increasingly important, while conditions are becoming progressively less favorable for the 

use of kinetic options. Strength in the kinetic domain 

remains a necessary but insufficient condition for a successful modern military. The cultivation and strengthening of a nonkinetic aspect to its power will increase 

the military’s relevance in today’s context. At the same 

time, global trends point to the military acting more in 

a supporting role to the other instruments of power and 

less as the primary instrument.

Unfortunately, nonkinetic methods are underrated, 

especially in the military. Compared to kinetic methods, their consequences tend to be indirect and therefore sometimes do not produce immediately observable 

effects. Kinetic methods and their intended effects 

are much easier to grasp because they create direct, 

immediately perceivable effects. On the other hand, 

nonkinetic means tend to take longer to achieve their 

ends and therefore easily fall into disfavor. This is 

particularly true in democratic societies where impatient electorates demand quick results and governments 

strategize in four- to five-year time frames according to 

their electoral cycle. Moreover, the indirect nature of 

nonkinetic methods makes them harder to grasp and 

the effects harder to attribute. The challenge for modern militaries is to come up with the long-term solutions to achieve eventual victory and yet provide sufficient short- to medium-term successes to satisfy the 

government and the people in the intermediate. The 

temptation is to provide all the short-term answers at 

the expense of the long-term response—a dangerous 

02-article.indd 27 7/29/08 12:16:38 
28

recipe. A greater grasp of the nonkinetic domain of 

warfare and conflict is essential if leaders are to find 

the correct combination of kinetic and nonkinetic 

elements in their strategy. 

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. Complete citations are in the 

bibliography.)

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77.

2. Among the publications surveyed were Joint Publication (JP) 

1-02, DOD Dictionary; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning; Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations; and 

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

3. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 87.

4. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77–79, 82.

5. Clausewitz, On War, 119.

6. Ibid., 120–21.

7. Ibid., 86.

8. Ibid., 85.

9. Ibid., 643.

10. Ibid., 100.

11. Ibid., 75.

12. Ibid., 260.

13. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 319.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 324.

16. Ibid., 325.

17. Lind et al., “Changing Face of War,” 23.

18. Ibid.

19. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 16.

20. Ibid., 32–43.

21. Ibid., 208.

22. Quoted in Friedrich, Inevitable Peace, 251.

23. White House press release, “President and Prime Minister 

Blair”; and Clinton, State of the Union Address.

24. Nathan, Soldiers, Statecraft, and History, xi–xii.

25. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 248.

26. Ibid., 253.

27. UN Statistics Division, “GDP per Capita, Current Prices, 

US$,” UN Common Database.

28. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” 39.

29. Mueller, “Obsolescence of Major War,” 24.

30. Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal, 18.

02-article.indd 28 7/29/08 12:16:39 
29

31. Angell, The Great Illusion, 247–48.

32. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 251.

33. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 256.

34. Lee, “How Protesters Mobilized.”

35. Gaddis, The Cold War, 263.

36. UN, “UN Member States.”

37. UN, “Basic Facts about the UN.”

38. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 19.

39. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 11.

40. Paterson et al., American Foreign Relations, 277, 410.

41. Diamond, Collapse, 521.

42. Friedman, The World Is Flat, 421.

43. CIA, The World Factbook 2007.

44. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 14.

45. Ibid., 20.

46. Ibid., 205.

47. Mueller, “Obsolescence of Major War,” 21.

48. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 3.

49. Nye, Soft Power, x.

50. Ibid., 11.

51. Ibid., 22.

52. Ibid., 147.

53. I omit the rest of the title from the text, as I suspect the 

words “China’s Master Plan to Destroy America” in the translated 

version are an embellishment for the purpose of sensationalism. 

Nothing in the book suggests that the authors intend it to be a 

plan to “destroy” anyone.

54. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 77.

55. Ibid., 25–43.

56. Ibid., 96.

57. Ibid., 123. The methods of warfare are atomic, diplomatic, 

financial, conventional, network, trade, biochemical, intelligence, 

resources, ecological, psychological, economic aid, space, tactical, 

regulatory, electronic, smuggling, sanctions, guerilla, drug, media, 

terrorist, virtual (deterrence), and ideological.

58. Ibid., 143.

59. Ibid., 191.

60. Robinson, “Death of Information Operations.”

61. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 257.

62. Darley, “Clausewitz’s Theory of War,” 73.

63. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik, 1–2.

64. Ibid., 4–5.

65. Ibid., 53.

66. Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence,” 89.

67. Naím, “Five Wars of Globalization,” 29.

68. Allison, “The Impact of Globalization,” 84.

02-article.indd 29 7/29/08 12:16:39 
30

69. Kissinger, “Our Nearsighted World Vision.”

70. Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 108.

71. Kessler and Wright, “Earthquake Aid.”

72. Raghavan, “Mahdi Army.”

73. Gaddis, The Cold War, 193.

74. Quoted in Churchill, The Second World War, 121.

75. Gaddis, The Cold War, 60.

76. Fukuyama, “The End of History?” 1.

77. Ibid., 14.

78. Ibid., 18.

79. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 802.

80. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 135, 137.

81. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 800.

82. Ibid., 776.

83. Gaddis, The Cold War, 263.

84  Ibid.

85. Odom, “Transforming the Military,” 54–64.

86. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” 30.

87. Boot, “The Struggle to Transform,” 107–17.

88. Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, U.S. National Security, 119.

89. White House, “National Security Council.”

90. Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, U.S. National Security, 121.

91. Reveron and Gavin, “America’s Viceroys,” 2.

92. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik, 73.

02-article.indd 30 7/29/08 12:16:39 
31

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