Air University

Lt Gen Allen G. Peck, Commander

Air Command and Staff College

Brig Gen Anthony J. Rock, Commandant

Col Robert J. Smith, PhD, Dean

Lt Col Kyle Gresham, PhD, Director of Research

Col Brett E. Morris, PhD, 

and Maj John L. Mansuy, Series Editors

Kevin C. Holzimmer, PhD, Essay Advisor

Air University Press

Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired, PhD

Director, Air Force Research Institute

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Please send inquiries or comments to

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The Wright Flyer Papers

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Virtual Wingman

Harnessing the Future Unstructured 

Information Environment to Achieve 

Mission Success

Galen K. Ojala

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 48

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 2010
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Information Management System website at http://research

.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press website at http://

aupress.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
iii

Foreword

It is with great pride that Air Command and Staff College 

presents another in a series of award-winning student research projects from our academic programs that reach 

nearly 11,000 students each year. As our series title indicates, we seek to promote the sort of imaginative, forwardlooking thinking that inspired the earliest aviation pioneers, 

and we aim for publication projects which combine these 

characteristics with the sort of clear presentation that permits even the most technical topics to be readily understood. We sincerely hope what follows will stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air war 

fighters in their continuing search for new and better ways 

to perform their missions—now and in the future.

ANTHONY J. ROCK

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

v

Acknowledgements

Information technology (IT) and its gadgets provide no 

allure. They are neither a marvel nor a toy but exist solely 

to help get something done. This impassive attitude allows 

me to avoid capability hype with what IT can do and ask 

“So, what does IT really do for me?” This attitude is partly 

due to my mechanical engineering background and to the 

practical systems engineering philosophies instilled in me 

by my father. I have successfully exploited IT capabilities to 

perform engine cold-start analyses, design coal crushers, 

train missile crews, simulate radar satellite constellations, 

track satellite parts and construction practices, and create 

intelligence fusion software. But with each success made 

possible through IT came scores of frustrations that sprang 

from IT solutions. While writing this paper I came to realize 

that this frustration comes from man having to manipulate 

IT rather than applying it as an extension of oneself. This 

fundamental disconnect between capability and utility 

comes from disconnects between developers and users, institutional restrictions on individual innovation, and general ignorance of available tools, practices, technologies, 

and the art of “market” timing.

If frustration is the fertile ground that bears innovation, 

then I hope to plant the seeds of ideas collected and cultivated through years of collaboration with astute, competent, 

business-savvy risk takers and visionaries. My thanks to 

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the 

Air Force Research Laboratory program managers who 

wrote their own scripts to examine contractors’ claims, the 

geologist-turned-programmer who set the geospatial intelligence standard for software ease of use, the political scientist who instigated asymmetric intelligence collection and 

exploitation schemas, and to many others no less significant. In particular, my thanks goes to Bryan Talbot for his 

ideas on tailored applications; Bob Stanton for allowing me 

to join his innovative discovery and application crusade; 

and my father, William Keith Ojala, for his lessons on practical 

and viable engineering and system architecting.

1

Setting the Stage

The Department of Defense (DOD) is quickly reaching an 

information technology (IT) crossroad; its choices will determine whether it achieves decisional superiority or becomes 

paralyzed and drowns in its own data. Information management technologies and practices currently used to exploit the exponentially growing volumes of data are rapidly 

becoming inadequate.

For instance, a battalion intelligence analyst requires 

time-critical information spread across 200 different networks in 20 different languages.1 Upon uncovering a bad 

lot of batteries, a satellite program manager must survey 15 

different contracts’ as-designed and as-built lists to ensure 

none of the faulty batteries are used. A deployed commander cannot write his or her subordinates’ promotion 

recommendation forms because the local area network 

does not host the requisite form’s viewer software. A Marine 

platoon commander’s intelligence requirements change as 

he moves from stateside training, to forward base operations, 

to patrol. These users must access and manipulate unstructured data, obtain and share contextually relevant information, 

and operate from and across dissimilar IT systems.

Unstructured Data—Data that does not fit the expected format of the reader is considered unstructured.

Differences in the hardware, operating systems, application 

software, and recording media used, all prone to obsolescence and version variety, compound the problem by introducing format differences.

The variety of ways data is recorded and information is conveyed 

provides additional complexities: text documents, e-mails, maps, 

images, text messages, spreadsheets, sounds, drawings, and dynamic web pages (web pages generated on the fly from databases 

and existing only during the viewing session).2

Effective information management capabilities are a critical 

requirement, not a luxury. In their testimony to the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
2

representatives of the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) stated that “the ability to find, organize, use, share, 

appropriately dispose of, and save records—the essence of 

records management—is vital for the effective functioning 

of the federal government.”3 Beyond meeting basic information management capabilities, the DOD requires the ability 

to simultaneously and remotely share maps, imagery, and 

video among commanders at all echelons across mounted 

or dismounted ground terminals and airborne and seaborne 

assets to support decision making.4 The DOD’s underlying 

problem is the inability to collect, gather, organize, exploit, 

share, and store data that comes from multiple dissimilar 

systems, venues, and media. Dissimilarity transforms carefully structured data into unintelligible unstructured data.

Structured data is organized into a format that an individual user’s software can read. If that format is then 

unrecognizable to a different individual’s software, the 

data, no matter how innately valuable, becomes unstructured and is rendered worthless. This is a problem when 

considering the approximately 281 billion exabytes of data 

in cyberspace as of 2006. By 2011 this number is expected 

to increase by a factor of 10.5 With a wealth of data tied to 

incompatible formats and buried within a multitude of 

evolving networks, the unifying problem becomes how the 

DOD can best posture itself technologically and doctrinally 

to harness the rapid growth of unstructured data and infrastructure to achieve mission success. Though many organizations share this problem, military requirements tend to 

be more challenging than commercial and civilian requirements. The combination of mission diversity, changing operational environments, and the variety of joint and coalition 

electronic formats and architectures available pose IT challenges more complex than those faced by shipping, health 

care services, manufacturing companies, and other civilian 

business sectors or private use.

Exabyte—a million times a million megabytes. (A gigabyte, a 

common memory size, is only 1,000 megabytes).
3

This paper goes beyond identifying singular technologies 

and implementation strategies to propose a comprehensive 

solution construct called the “Virtual Wingman.” The Virtual 

Wingman construct demonstrates how current and nascent technologies and practices can be integrated and tailored to contextually provide the right information at the right 

time and in the right form. The Virtual Wingman is not a 

point solution. Rather, it embodies capabilities the DOD 

must develop and embrace to avoid decisional and operational paralysis when faced with mounting volumes of unstructured information and increasingly complex systems 

of systems.

Defining the Current Problem

The DOD’s first major challenge is to define the variety of 

existing hardware, applications, operating systems, and networks and to determine how their lack of interoperability contributes to the current systems of systems’ overwhelming 

complexity. US Army colonel William Davis, deputy director 

for the Pentagon’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) task force, offers the situation in Kandahar, Afghanistan, as an emblematic example: “Right now there are 

over 200 [coalition] systems at Bagram Air Base, Kandahar, 

and other places that don’t talk to each other; even if they did, 

the information is scattered across 20 different languages.”6

Though each system holds a piece of the puzzle for intelligence analysts, insufficient means exist to access, filter, 

and combine the scattered pieces into a coherent information picture. Additionally, network security complexity creates an environment as difficult to share as it is to steal. 

With increasing operations tempos, Colonel Davis worries 

that the entire coalition intelligence effort “will collapse under the weight of systems that do not communicate.”7

Data format standards are an oft-tried interoperability 

approach to homogenize interfaces between functional, 

physical, electrical, or informational entities. This sometimes 

useful approach does not guarantee success; the inherently 

positive aspect of agreed-upon formats makes interfaces inflexible. This is especially a problem when current systems 

are too highly centralized and tightly coupled to respond to 

man-made and natural variance discontinuities within 
4

Middleware—software that is applied to reconcile dissimilar 

software formats by translating one format into another and 

back again.15

complex systems of systems.8 The US Navy’s experience in 

adapting Link 16 for data sharing between its ships and 

F-18 fighter jets showed that even with strict standards, 

subtle internal system differences in the sender’s and receiver’s 

computer operating speeds and internal logic processes 

still created disconnects.9

In addition, current systems of systems are complex; a 

single organization rarely owns the entire system. Such distributed ownership and operation can hamper timely propagation of updates and changes across the entire distributed architecture and user base to ensure interoperability. 

This problem forced the DOD to halt the Defense Integrated 

Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), a 12-year attempt at integrating 90 different automated military pay 

and records systems costing $1 billion.10 The problem 

stemmed from a software design philosophy based on creating rigid input/output interfaces to work with 90 different 

and independently controlled, designed, and sustained 

sources. Each interface could not be standardized because 

new incentive plans would come and go, veterans’ benefits 

would change, and so forth, or the services adopted new 

network and software standards independent of DIMHRS 

requirements. Such version disparity creates systems that 

are susceptible to massive and coordinated failures, either 

by cyber attack or by sheer system complexity.11

Rather than creating a system focused on understanding 

and managing unstructured data, rigid data translator 

middleware. Middleware is a costly solution. Its code must 

be altered whenever the connected software changes, which 

is often unannounced.12 The end result of the DIMHRS’s 

rigid centralized approach is a defunct personnel system.13

Overall, standards alone do not ensure interoperability.14
5

Computer-to-computer interface is not the only source 

of trouble. A Slovenian computer interface study cited humanto-computer interface as a growing source of information 

and capability disconnect. As the number of computer users and systems grow, users are becoming less experienced in the systems they use.16 People do not have the 

time to master the variety and versions of operating systems or software applications and still accomplish their 

primary jobs. Consider the frustration individuals feel 

when relearning how to format page numbers after each 

Microsoft Word version change. Though each new version 

is typically more intuitive, the new interface requires time to 

learn, while work deadlines loom closer. Multiply this example across an entire range of evolving mission-related 

software. The result is extracting less utility out of technology despite its increasing inherent capabilities.

Maj Gen John Custer III, commander of the US Army 

Intelligence Center, sums up the second major unstructured data issue when describing the challenge of finding 

insurgents among the indigenous population as “trying to 

find a needle in a stack of needles.”17 Herein lie two challenges: targets are difficult to discern from the background 

and needed information is buried within a growing mountain 

of unstructured data. Finding insurgents requires collecting, 

filtering, sorting, and making sense of numerous loosely associated information snippets that only provide a useful 

picture when compiled in context.

To quickly find and extract subtle clues from vast stores 

of data poses a substantial problem. Full motion video 

(FMV) data from remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) exponentially expands the volume of available data. FMV is popular 

because it allows commanders, deployed forces, and analysts 

not only to monitor areas or individuals in real time but 

also to perform trend analysis using historical video comparisons. The downside is that FMV produces gigabytes of 

data a day. This creates an information pool too large for 

human and computer resources to filter and exploit. To 

make it worse, the US Army is looking to field 32 Class IV 

RPAs, all with electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras 

and nine with radar imagery capabilities. The imagery data 

collected will be so voluminous that it will require four analysts 

to exploit imagery from just one RPA. With 18 RPAs flying 
6

The third major unstructured data issue concerns conveying information to those who need it. To win quickly 

evolving fights and counter asymmetric threats, General 

Custer stresses that “Soldiers must get access to information, not just commanders, and intelligence dissemination 

architectures must extend to Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, 

and Seamen.”22 This strategy has two components: access 

and dissemination of information and the acquisition, 

training, and fielding of capabilities.23

Need to know has always determined access to classified 

information. Commanders argue that in high operations 

tempo and counterinsurgency fights, the individual Soldier 

has the need to know.24 The platoon leader needs situationally 

tailored intelligence products—if an ambush is imminent, 

for instance—and not the collection sources used to create 

the warning. Unfortunately, the intelligence community (IC) 

has yet to widely decouple highly classified collection methods 

from lower-classified intelligence information to produce useful and easier-to-distribute reduced-classification intelligence 

products. Though it does not have the human resources to 

parse large volumes of data, the IC is not ready to trust automated information parsing and classification-downgrading 

algorithms to quickly deliver down-classified information 

at any given time, analysts will have to examine one petabyte of FMV data every six months.18

Improvements in search engines also cause data overload.19 New search engines perform more penetrating “deep 

web” searches to find otherwise buried databases.20 The resulting increase in search returns multiplies the burden of 

culling additional unstructured, partially or fully duplicative, 

irrelevant “dirty data” to extract pertinent information.21

Petabyte—To provide a reference point for comparison, 

the ubiquitous one gigabyte of computer memory stores 

roughly 25 minutes of video (230 bytes). One petabyte 

stores 53 years worth of video (250 bytes or roughly 

1,126,000 times larger).
7

extractions. The stated risk is that automated systems 

could allow classified information to be leaked.

Not trusting automated systems creates a missed opportunity, as decoupling intelligence products from their 

sources often results in smaller file sizes. A one-gigabyte, 

top-secret imagery and signals intelligence file transmittable 

only across high-bandwidth, secure communications systems 

could have been disseminated as a 50-byte unclassified text 

message alert over a local communications infrastructure. 

Successful dissemination delivers requested information in 

a format that fits the users’ local dissemination architecture and satisfies the intended need.

Another component focuses on the inability of traditional 

acquisition processes to acquire, train, and field capabilities to meet frontline units’ rapidly changing battlefield 

needs, with their unique IT limitations and resources. Due 

to traditional acquisition’s failings, combat-intelligence 

Soldiers are increasingly writing their own code to gather 

information.25 These from-the-field products draw upon the 

latest open-source techniques, scripts, and software to create 

fast, efficient, and functional, yet Frankenstein-like, patchwork solutions. While theater commanders endorse such 

efficacy, continental US installation commanders tend to 

shun untested and unofficial software solutions that are not 

supported by either program offices or commercial vendors.

Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software provides what 

seems to be a cornucopia of information management solutions. Tapping uReach Technologies Inc., Verizon Communications enables business professionals to remotely work 

and stay connected with customers from any network interface, such as a desktop, laptop, cell phone, or iPhone.26 Initiate Systems is helping health care provider Sutter Health 

extract and create virtual consolidated individual records 

from distributed records spread across 30 hospitals and 

100 databases.27 The DOD can also use these capabilities.

These COTS solutions are alluring because vendors provide plug-and-play capabilities supported by established 

customer service, training, and maintenance plans, and the 

DOD does not have to pay for their development or infrastructure. The catch is that the vendor determines the customers’ visibility into how the products and services work 

and also how, where, and for how long they are supported.
8

COTS, moreover, is only COTS if it is unaltered from 

commercially offered versions; it cannot be modified. DODdirected changes require vendor development, testing and 

recertification, and manufacturing expenses, which are 

paid for by the DOD. As alluring as COTS solutions are, 

they rarely meet stringent war-fighter requirements because 

military needs are constantly changing.

Enemy tactics, available local infrastructures, and other 

battlespace variables change quickly. The Verizon suite 

works because it is tailored to US communications infrastructure. Initiate Systems’ software works because Sutter 

Health eliminated access issues and implemented version 

control by controlling the hospitals’ databases. The DOD’s 

variety of networks, security protocols, infrastructure, and 

missions, along with changing requirements, creates a 

complex need that is difficult and costly for COTS vendors 

and traditional acquisition cycles to support.28

From-the-field software may be patchwork, but its utility, 

tailorability, and intuitive interfaces signal a shift in IT 

trends. In a Military Review article, “Reach: Leveraging 

Time and Distance,” General Custer posits a “seamless 

worldwide connectivity at multiple levels of security with 

facilitating protocols and permissions to access and interact with hundreds of databases that National Agencies, the 

Department of Defense, Joint Commands, and coalition 

partners maintain.”29 This can be accomplished by drawing 

upon commercial and academic open-source standards 

and techniques to create interoperable solutions whereby 

petabytes of data can be searched, filtered, and recombined 

to create situation-appropriate presentations. A common 

enabling future element will be computational intelligence 

(CI)–aided software code adaptation. In Clausewitzian 

terms, patchwork capabilities will be brought together to 

reduce rather than increase what Daniel J. Boorstin, the 

librarian of Congress who ushered the computer age into 

the Library of Congress, called the “fog of information.”30

Despite many technological and acquisition challenges, 

the greatest roadblock to harnessing unstructured data 

and systems comes from organizational policies, practices, 

and culture. Gen Kevin P. Chilton, commander of the US 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the parent command 

to the subunified US Cyber Command, acknowledges the 
9

role institutional inertia and fear of the unknown play in 

thwarting the adoption of new technologies and practices. 

In his “Cyberspace Leadership” article, General Chilton 

states, “We need a change in our culture, conduct, and 

capabilities if we are going to advance the state of the art 

and provide the protection and freedom of action we need in 

this [cyber] domain.”31 When armed with evolving technologies 

and approaches to creating and fielding solutions, the 

means exist for the DOD to harness the growing sea of unstructured data to deliver war-impacting information.

The Official Need

The trend of IT’s increasing complexity is a growing concern. From national policy to service doctrine, US leaders 

recognize the importance of harnessing multiple information sources and systems to make and communicate timely 

decisions across the entire US government structure. The 

2004 National Military Strategy states that “joint forces will 

require new levels of interoperability.”32 It also declares that 

the joint force will use superior intelligence and the power 

of information technologies to increase decision superiority, 

precision, and lethality of force. A networked force capable 

of decision superiority can collect, analyze, and rapidly disseminate intelligence and other relevant information from 

the national to tactical levels and then use that information 

to decide and act quicker than opponents.33

To achieve success requires the innovative employment 

of adaptable and decentralized decision authority.34 This 

includes “seamless multilevel security access [that] will empower distributed command and control and provide increased transparency in multinational operations.”35

Logisticians share the intelligence coordination problems 

described earlier by Colonel Davis. Joint Publication 4-0, 

Joint Logistics, declares that “logisticians face their greatest 

challenge at the operational level because of the difficulty of 

coordinating and integrating capabilities from many providers to sustain logistically ready forces for the Joint 

Forces commander.”36 Many providers include other services, government agencies, commercial vendors, and multinational sources, each using their own data formats and 

information systems. Melding unique logistics operations 
10

into a unified effort produces an unstructured data morass 

that planners must untangle, usually under crisis timelines. The US Transportation and Joint Forces commands 

are developing standard data formats and systems. However, rigid standards and inflexible bridging software do not 

create a flexible architecture to fuse ad hoc sources and 

processes during the short-notice crises that constitute 75 

percent of the DOD responses.37

Even without multinational involvement, the United 

States is swamped by much data which cannot be filtered 

through and fused on demand. In the US government alone, 

there are over four trillion paper documents—a stack that 

is growing at a rate of 22 percent each year.38 The National 

Archives and Records Administration required about 400 

days just to process 2 terabytes of data (1 terabyte is about 

1,000 gigabytes) created by Pres. Bill Clinton’s administration.39 This situation reveals but a tip of the data iceberg.

The Future Information Environment

The future information environment will consist of data, 

users, tools, and practices, much as it does today. How 

these elements come together determines how the fog of 

information will be navigated and exploited.40

The Fog of Information

Boorstin’s fog of information aptly applies to what may 

be referred to as the infosphere. The world’s infosphere has 

already reached an incomprehensible dimension. Composed of e-mails, books, databases, broadcast television, 

websites, and so forth, the 2002 worldwide infosphere was 

calculated to be roughly 18 exabytes in information volume 

and grew to 281 exabytes by 2006.41 Rather than trying to 

project its future size, future data sources and output rates 

must be understood.

Though individuals, companies, and governments will 

continue to grow the information domain by increasingly 

digitizing their practices, exponential growth in sensor use 

and the amount of data collected per sensor will account for 

the greatest raw data increases. Next-generation imagery 

systems’ pixel-resolution increases will produce an eight-
11

fold data increase per image frame, not including the trend 

toward employing multi- and hyperspectral collections.42

Sensor networks will become pervasive throughout homes 

and businesses to measure productivity, safety, and energy 

efficiency, for example. These ubiquitous networks will also 

become omnipresent in the battlespace and will produce 

their own data streams to add to the infosphere morass.

The infosphere’s size will escape one nation’s ability to 

encompass it. In reference to information, common war 

concepts of dominance and superiority will be neither realistic nor useful in any sense of overwhelming the enemy. 

Instead, “information effectiveness” is an achievable goal 

and the most useful to obtain.43

The Future Information User

In the information age’s beginning, organizations, not individuals, possessed the latest technologies. However, many 

of today’s users are technologically savvy, owning and operating more sophisticated and user-friendly hardware and 

applications than their employers’ IT departments.44 Users 

are increasingly mobile, regularly exploit shared knowledge, 

and demand the same capabilities and services at work as 

they have at home.

This capability divergence feeds workplace frustration 

expressed as a notional IT “Bill of Rights.” Bill Jensen, author 

of Work 2.0—Rewriting the Contract, points to fulfilling the 

basic modern workers’ needs by providing “a workplace 

where it is easy to get what [they] need to get [their] work 

done—the right information, the right way, in the right 

amount.”45 Instead of demanding shorter hours or safer 

working environments, workers are demanding “userfriendly applications and information/capability sharing 

policies that enable them to be productive from anywhere 

without compromising the needs of the enterprise from a 

security and manageability standpoint.”46

Personal computers (PC) made computer processing 

available to the populace but have not made computing 

personal. The human-computer interface has not changed 

significantly since the 1984 introduction of the Apple Macintosh mouse-menu interface.47 Users demand that the PC 

and its descendants (laptops, smartphones, etc.) be customiz-
12

able with tailored interactions to serve their needs and predict their desires. They seek technology that supports professional practices without distracting them from getting 

their work done.48

Today’s software still requires unnatural interactions to 

achieve desired tasks. From their multipaper research compendium, Paolo Remagnino, a Kingston University faculty 

member specializing in computing, information systems, 

and mathematics, and Daniel Shapiro from Stanford University’s Computational Learning Lab concluded that users 

are looking for their IT departments to “endow an environment with the computational power sufficient to sense its 

inhabitants and to interpret their actions and interactions 

in order to anticipate their needs, supply them with necessary information, and/or to act on their behalves.”49 The 

need goes beyond better search engines. It is the desire for 

proactive and anticipatory systems that forms the impetus 

for establishing ambient intelligence (AmI).

Information and Communication Technology

AmI is “an interdisciplinary approach borrowing methods 

and techniques from the computing fields of ubiquitous computing, context-aware computing, human-computer interaction and artificial intelligence.”50 Technologies such as virtual 

and cloud computing and cognitive radio will be exploited to 

provide the mobility, processing, security, and expandability 

required. The addition of mobility into IT across personal and 

work life has created the information and communication 

technology (ICT) descriptor.

AmI—analyzes local sensor data to tailor services. Example: 

Using a variety of sensors and the minimum of direct user 

input, a computer analyzes household usage and environmental patterns to provide interactive and personalized 

management of domestic services such as thermal control, 

security, health monitoring, and watering.51
13

ICT technologists Vivienne Waller and Robert B. Johnston 

note that ubiquitous computing is not a specific technology 

but an implementation theory based on the fact that users 

“don’t want to use a computer, they want to accomplish 

something.”52 Technology should become a seamless extension of the user, disappearing from the user’s awareness.53

This efficacy occurs by reducing unnecessary data entry by 

the computer, automatically updating and drawing actionable 

information from a model of the world created using information obtained from the embedded environment.54 The 

computer gains this awareness by comprehending the users’ 

environment, location, computer use, tasks, use history, 

preferences, workflows, and future events. In military 

language, the pervasive computer becomes an executive 

officer. Training, intelligence, and the ability to operate independently of its commander enables a computer to anticipate the commander’s needs; to gather, consolidate, 

manage, prepare, and present information in the commander’s preferred format; and to negotiate activity interfaces, freeing the commander to focus on duty-appropriate tasks. This 

support utility forms the Virtual Wingman’s functional 

foundation.

The term wingman denotes the subservient yet independent service provided to defensively protect and offensively 

enable the lead. Wingman also signifies a paired relationship 

that flows from the battlespace to noncombat life. In technical 

terms, the virtual wingman is a computational agent.

Agent—a virtual representative of the user. The user grants 

the agent the authority to act on his/her behalf, and the 

agent carries the access authorizations granted to the user. 

“Agents have the capability to make their own decisions 

about what activities to do, when to do them and what type 

of information should be communicated and to whom, and 

how to assimilate the information received.”55

The first step toward achieving the virtual wingman 

agent-user relationship is establishing more innate humancomputer interfaces. By presenting contextually relevant 

information and options, the user’s attention stays focused 
14

on the action and is not diverted to an artificial model of the 

world.56 Imagine an engineer taking a car trip to deliver a 

presentation. In planning the trip, an agent is used to see 

the route on a map, a current traffic model, and potential 

en route lunch stops. The resulting travel plan is transferred from the desktop computer to the vehicle. While the 

engineer is driving in traffic, the visual map is replaced by 

intuitive and less distracting audio directions.

AmI’s situational awareness differs from today’s global 

positioning car systems. An AmI travel system uses time, 

traffic volume, car speed, fuel status, personal schedules, 

and preferences to recognize that the car is low on fuel, 

traffic is bad, and there is insufficient time to stop for a 

lengthy lunch before the engineer’s upcoming appointment. 

Given that information, the AmI agent calculates and then 

audibly suggests stopping at the third gas station on the 

right to fuel up and purchase a fast-food sandwich from the 

collocated and driver-preferred food chain. A useful aspect 

is the agent’s ability to work with the user at the engineer’s 

desk and then appear elsewhere when needed. The agent 

appears in the vehicle and then in the smartphone to guide 

the engineer to the appointment. If granted network access, 

the engineer’s agent can preposition itself in the conference 

room network station to allow the presentation to be given.

Virtualization and Cloud Computing

Various current communications technologies enable an 

agent to move with or deploy ahead of the user, but virtualization enables the agent to operate across multiple dissimilar platforms as if it were operating from its original/

designed hardware.57 This is a tremendous liberating capability for the future user.

At present, software operates with specific operating systems, hardware, and networks. To ensure compatibility 

across a wide combination of operating systems, hardware, 

and networks, software developers must take on the expensive and cumbersome task of designing and testing software to operate with multiple system configurations or limit 

the customer to a fixed-system configuration. The first design path results in a complex “fit everything” software code 

that is a nightmare to maintain because operating systems 
15

and hardware change. The second path robs users of flexibility. Virtualization frees developers and users of many restrictions and costs by allowing applications to operate 

from any local or remote system as if they were operating 

on a designed-to-hardware-and-software operating system. 

For instance, the engineer in the scenario can present an 

engineering simulation on a different host computer without worrying about compatibility issues because the host 

computer will operate a virtual machine copy of the engineer’s desktop. While virtual machines are still not widely 

used in the DOD, by December 2010 they will account for 

half of all commercial server-based computing, including 

that of all Fortune 100 companies.58

An important inherent feature of this system is that upon 

completion of a task, the virtual session guest is wiped from 

existence, freeing the host computer to run a different 

guest.61 Virtualization’s customizable nature provides useful 

security protection options. In his article “5 Laws of Virtualization Security,” Pete Lindstrom, senior Burton Group security analyst for Web 2.0/SOA/Web Services, points out 

that virtualization allows “single set or multiple sets of applications to be run in a virtual machine guest separate 

from all other applications.”62 Because applications can 

operate as if they were on separate computers, applications 

can simultaneously run compartmentalized from each 

Virtualization—“A computer uses a software simulation of 

the hardware, called a hypervisor, to create one or more 

virtual machines that simulate real computers so faithfully 

that the hardware simulations can run any software from 

operating systems to end-user applications. The software 

‘thinks’ it has access to a processor, network, and disk drive, 

just as if it had a real computer all to itself.”59

When the hypervisor initiates a session on the host system, it 

creates a virtual operating environment called a guest.60

Only the software or discrete components to be used actively 

within a guest session are checked out from a software

repository.
16

other. This process enables users to work classified, unclassified, proprietary, source selection, and personal work 

sessions simultaneously using the same human-computer 

interface without fear of cross-systems data contamination.63

Though virtual machines operate an additional software 

layer to simulate the hardware host, virtualization enables 

more secure computing. In simple terms, virtualization reduces 

security risks by decreasing the “surface area” of code exposed 

to outside interfaces.64 Virtual machines operate only the 

software or functions needed at that moment, and code designed to one configuration is easier to secure than if designed to multiple configurations. Altogether, virtual machines provide fewer unguarded and exposed exploitable 

interfaces. If the guest session is maliciously altered, the 

user or system administrator can terminate the guest and 

restart the session from a known safe baseline configuration without affecting the software, the host platform, or 

other untainted guests.65

An operational benefit is that virtualization allows hardware to simultaneously run modern and legacy applications. This is a sustainability boon because users no longer 

need to purchase and maintain expensive stockpiles of old 

computers and operating systems to operate useful legacy 

software and equipment. An intelligence analyst can simultaneously process signals intelligence (SIGINT) from a 

1980s-era collection system while exploiting the data in the 

latest geographic information system (GIS) application and 

disseminate it across decades-old distribution architecture—

all from the same new computer the IT department placed 

on the desk 20 minutes ago.

An associated technology is cloud computing. In cloud 

computing, software resides and processing and data storage occur at a remote computer center, often without the 

user realizing it.66 Though it is reliant on network connections, tremendous processing and storage performance and 

efficiencies can be gained by accessing mainframe supercomputers. When combined with virtualization, cloud computing allows multiple guests for many users or different 

projects, contracts, and so forth to tap excess memory and 

processing capacities. Technology Review reporter Erica 

Naone interviewed Amazon, Intel, Enomaly, and SUN Microsystems executives concerning cloud computing use. They 
17

suggested that this practice “allows cloud providers to reap 

massive economies of scale and . . . gives cloud users access to as much computer power as they want, whenever 

they want it.”67

Cloud bursting offers a hybrid solution that allows users 

to tap supplementary processing power and memory when 

resident capacity is surpassed.68 Cloud bursting allows users 

to operate through peak loads without losing clients or 

breaking service. Through virtual cloud computing and 

cloud bursting, users can muster supercomputing capabilities through the interface of their smartphones.

Cognitive Radio

Though not a critical component of ubiquitous computing, 

mobile communications technologies provide users and 

their agents with flexible connectivity. Paradoxically, wireless bandwidth is a scarce commodity, but a great deal of it 

is unused much of the time.70 To exploit this paradox, 

developers are pursuing cognitive radio (CR). IEE [Institution of Electrical Engineers] Review contributor John Walko 

states that “the goal of cognitive radio is to sense whether a 

particular frequency band is being used and, if it isn’t, to 

utilize the spectrum without interfering with the transmission of other authorized users.”71

CR is built upon software-defined radio (SDR).72 Currently, US military-developed SDR suffers from reliability, 

security, and operating problems because the system is trying to do everything on all systems, all the time from a rigid 

internal architecture. Virtualization will likely be SDR’s salvation, as it facilitates streamlined operations and simultaneously simulates multiple current and legacy radio configurations. Despite ongoing DOD debates about SDR’s 

future, in 2003 the Federal Communications Commission 

Cloud Computing—By using a thin-client interface, users tap 

data processing and storage capabilities of several distributed facilities. These remote facilities typically host super 

computers that allow clients to access the resources needed.69
18

(FCC) informed the commercial sector on how to implement 

CR yet safeguard existing license holders.73 Foreseeing the 

opportunity for tailoring the manufacture of nonoriginal 

equipment, the FCC proactively issued reasonable security 

guidelines to ensure transmitter operations under FCC 

rules yet allow flexible tailoring of capabilities.74 Seeing the 

demand, the FCC is positioning the community to build a 

capability around a security strategy, rather than waiting 

and trying to force retroactive patches to an already established architecture.

A virtualization shortcoming that could affect SDR/CR is 

that the extra layer of simulation abstraction decreases 

performance.75 Though this makes some applications such 

as streaming video difficult to replicate, two solutions are 

possible: (1) institute paravirtualization (hybrid virtual 

machines) to directly access hardware for some functions 

to provide processing speed increases; and (2) employ faster 

processors.76 Given the trend for processor speed, driven by 

market demand for increased operating speeds in ever-smaller 

products, there is little concern that sufficiently fast systems will soon be available to support virtual machine CR. 

More illuminating is that the FCC recognizes that SDR will 

follow the ICT community’s desire for tailored applications, 

a feature that virtualization can support.

By 2020 CR should be mature enough to replace the 

shaky joint tactical radio system (JTRS), a DOD-wide program designed to develop, build, and field interoperable, 

secure software-defined radios that are audio-, data-, and 

video-capable for dismounted/mounted, air- and sea-platform 

use. The JTRS’s importance and expense are seen by comparing its $12 billion price tag to the $10.8 billion Virginiaclass attack submarine program.77 As a $220,000 ground 

vehicle radio (as compared to the $20,000 legacy radio), the 

JTRS provides a data rate of five megabits per second 

(Mbps), whereas current smartphone technology provides 

100+ Mbps.78 With gigabits-per-second data rates in the 

works, the JTRS is an expensive improvement topped out 

at yesteryear’s capabilities.79
19

Future of Software Development and Acquisitions

The National Defense Strategy emphasizes timely innovation. 

Technology and equipment are the tools of the total force, 

and service members must have the best resources to get the 

job done. First-class technology means investing in the right 

kinds of technology at the right time. Just as adversaries 

adapt and develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures, 

the United States, too, must be nimble and creative.80

While the DOD’s intent is sincere and appropriate, the 

processes for developing and fielding technology are not 

achieving its aspirations. Analyzing the defense acquisition 

process for its application across the entire spectrum of 

technologies and goods is not within this paper’s scope. It 

does propose a shift in how the DOD views the acquisition 

of ICT. The three required changes are (1) greater acceptance of COTS in an as-is configuration, (2) transition to 

open-source hardware/software development, and (3) empowerment of users to develop and field their own solutions.

Information and Communication Technology 

Consumables

Commercially developed and sold multifunction electronics 

such as smartphones and electronic tablets will continue to 

outpace DOD-created capabilities. As mentioned earlier, 

COTS products are typically not made to survive the entire 

range of military rigors. However, as COTS products surpass military specifications (mil-spec) products in capability, 

the DOD may need to start accepting “good enough” more 

often in a compromise between physical robustness and 

purchasable numbers. The cost of fielding the JTRS forced 

a 71 percent reduction (328,514 to 95,551 units) in handheld, man-pack, and small form-fit radios.81 This decrease 

in available tactical radios comes as the United States increases its fielded forces and has to communicate within 

fluid joint and coalition operating environments. If a COTS 

ICT product is not rugged enough, a purpose-built protective case may be a more cost- and mission-effective solution 

than an entirely mil-spec product. Throwaway COTS products 

may provide a good business- and mission-sense alternative to the high cost of sustaining the infrastructure of the 

DOD’s government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) products. Though 
20

the hardware may be COTS, all the supporting software 

need not be. Using the Apple iPhone’s application toolkit 

business model, many military-centric applications can be 

created and tailored by Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, Marines, 

or Coast Guardsmen.

Software Development Reinvented—Service-Oriented 

Architecture’s Promise and Pitfalls

The evolving commercial sector is pulling away from the 

proprietary-centric, closed-architecture DOD business models. 

Service-oriented architecture (SOA) has been hailed throughout the DOD as ICT’s savior. Within an SOA, a softwarebackbone-capability application is established whereby 

expanded capability software modules can be plugged using 

published, configuration-controlled, standardized interfaces. 

SOA has proven a successful systems engineering construct. Failures do not occur because the SOA concept is 

flawed but because managers and developers do not account for two critical programmatic pitfalls: (1) open architectures do not guarantee interoperability; and (2) uncertainty 

exists over who pays for third-party module development, 

testing, and sustainment.82 Unless the backbone’s developer 

provides source codes in an open-source format, interoperability problems arise because module developers must guess 

at the backbone’s internal process and operating characteristics that may affect their module. The more complex and 

timing-dependent the SOA system becomes, the more this 

pitfall becomes a problem.

The second pitfall pertains to code sustainment. In such 

highly interconnected systems, generally any major backbone 

code change requires adaptations to plug-in modules. Part 

of SOA’s allure is that development is decentralized by enabling 

third-party users to develop their own plug-in modules to 

satisfy specific needs. This lowers the cost of expansion. 

However, sustainment problems arise because third parties 

cannot afford to incur the unwelcomed costs of planned or 

unplanned backbone code changes. This results in thirdparty capabilities’ temporary or permanent termination 

and the end of the symbiotic relationship.

Two practices can help avoid these hazards and unlock 

SOA’s promise. The first is virtualization, which simplifies soft-
21

ware development, reduces costs, produces more reliable and 

secure code, and promotes modularization, especially within 

an SOA context.83 The second practice is open-source coding.

Open-Source Coding, App Stores, and Repositories

Open-source coding is anathema to traditional software 

development businesses. Andrew Aitken, open-source business consultant and managing partner, said, “Open-source 

started as a noncommercial response to inefficient technologies 

and distribution models” and “the desire to solve problems 

not being solved.”84

A Swiss team investigating code reuse concluded that 

open-source development is based on “informal and virtual 

communities of practice who share the expectation that 

open-source software developers are to build on each other’s 

work.”85 The team explained that “open-source licenses convey the basic rights to the developer to retrieve the code, inspect, and modify it, and to freely redistribute modified or 

unmodified versions of the software to others.”86 This applies 

to software, hardware, and interface standards. The motivation to use open-source is strong. It can tap the collective 

knowledge of those who have already overcome challenges 

and therefore avoid reinventing common functions such as 

saving files and accessing networks. Thus, developers are 

freed to focus on the “long poles” of the program.87 This practice helps to cut the average commercial public release time 

to 44.5 days.88 The open-source practice bolsters innovation 

and “helps young projects to gain the necessary momentum 

to reach a critical mass.”89 An added benefit of open-source 

code is its robustness, as other coders can inspect it to highlight problems and to propose improvements or fix it.90

Long Poles—a project’s or program’s most difficult challenges. The 

term is drawn from the analogy that the most difficult task in setting 

up a tent is to erect the long poles that support the tent’s canopy. 

Until this most difficult and risky task is completed, little useful work 

can be accomplished in and around the tent.

The temptation is to accomplish the easy short-pole tasks first to 

show progress. The inevitable result is uprooting all the short poles 

when the long poles are erected.91
22

Open-source benefits companies, work groups, and individuals by enabling them to produce capabilities at lower 

costs than traditional practices allow and to expand more 

rapidly the use base through utility and a sense of ownership.92 Embracing open-source use often requires an organizational culture shift but does not mean sacrificing profitability or utility. As Sun Microsystems chief executive officer 

Jonathan Schwartz states, “The money in open-source is 

found and sold in peripheral services and courting the 

developer community to eventually depend on [your] 

products.”93

Open-source code can be shared directly between two entities (companies and/or individuals) or by the common practice of maintaining source code repositions for communities of 

interest. The most popular repository is SourceForge.net, 

which in February 2009 had over 230,000 projects with 

more than 2 million registered users downloading more 

than 2.6 million projects.94 Projects vary from function 

scripts to complete applications. The site is organized into 

project categories such as communications, databases, and 

desktop environments.95

Source Code Repository—a site where software developers 

can post software codes, in whole or part, along with supporting documentation for other developers to view, comment on, use, and modify. Submissions are commonly called 

“projects.” Projects can be a complete application or a single 

subroutine.96

Open sourcing is not an entirely new practice for the 

DOD, as communities of practice (CoP) within the IC are 

creating internal code repositories. However, the efficiencies gained by code repositories come from the free, selfmanaged community practices and collective motivation of 

individual developers to post and maintain code both as a 

matter of professionalism and utility for later self-use. 

These practices tend to be lost in smaller, forced internal 

organization repositories and result in additional development costs.97 The larger the repository’s developer popula-
23

tion, the more robust and self-maintaining it becomes. Thus, 

within the IC, repositories should be opened along classification levels (top secret, secret, etc.) rather than functional 

communities (geospatial intelligence, SIGINT, etc.). The 

concept of code storehouses can be taken one step further 

to create repositories of completed applications, or “apps,” 

from which users can draw.

Some hardware and operating system vendors provide 

open-source software development toolkits encouraging 

third-party developers to create new applications using the 

vendor’s product. This approach simultaneously provides 

users with access to more capabilities while creating a robust and profitable third-party developer infrastructure 

with little risk to the vendor and, at the same time, making 

the vendor’s products more relevant and indispensible. 

This confluence of practices opens the door to making tailored apps a common ICT element.

Apple was the first company to encourage this movement 

by releasing a software development kit in March 2008 to 

help companies and individuals create and modify apps for 

the iPhone, iPod Touch, and now the iPad.98 Apple then 

opened the App Store in July 2008, and by October 2008, 

7,000 third-party apps were for sale. This number climbed 

to 50,000 by August 2009 and to 100,000 by January 

2010.99 By 24 April 2009 users had downloaded over 1 billion apps. The hardware represents mobile information and 

communication technology with the capacity to record 

sound and video, locate itself geospatially and in three-axis 

orientation and acceleration, and act as an interface to 

cloud computing. The marriage of tailorable software to 

standardized hardware contributed to the sale of over 36 

million smartphones in the first quarter of 2009.100

Apps—the colloquialism for software applications. Apps are 

typically associated with third-party or personally created, 

tailored, specific-function software. Apps are commonly developed using a hardware or operating system vendor’s opensource software development toolkit.
24

The US government is tentatively getting on the bandwagon. The General Services Agency (GSA) has created Apps.

Gov, a virtual store for GSA-approved and cost-negotiated IT 

products and services.101 Though a step in the right direction, Apps.Gov strictly markets commercially developed 

business, productivity, and social media applications and 

cloud IT services. It does not feature or host GOTS apps. As 

mentioned, within the ICs are pockets of in-house developers. Unfortunately, sharing is informally accomplished, and 

attempts at formal sharing are impeded by network security bans on tracking applications. These allow developers 

to track user employment to justify software sustainment 

budgets and to notify users of and push updated patches, 

products, and training. In short, the government as a whole 

and the DOD in particular must expand the Apps.Gov model 

to allow military personnel, civil servants, and DOD supporting contractors to freely post and download governmentcreated open-source development tools, scripts, and applications to facilitate their daily work.

Coding’s Future—Novice and Computer

Self-Generated Code

While open-source practices make it easier to tailor code, 

developers strive to create systems that free users from 

having to break focus on work to manipulate technology. 

The goal is to achieve on-the-fly tailoring where either the 

user or the user’s agent adapts the baseline software as the 

need arises. In the latter case, to successfully modify software requires a high level of computational capability. A simpler hybrid approach to achieve user-based tailoring is “programming by example,” otherwise known as programming 

by demonstration.102 In this approach the user demonstrates examples of the desired behaviors or results to the 

computer, which generates the corresponding software 

code to achieve the objective.103 The significance of this 

practice is that even novice users can be empowered to debug software as problems occur without waiting for a patch. 

To achieve this future capability, software must be dynamic 

(the code is easily changeable at any time) and introspective 

(the user is allowed access and visibility into the inner 

workings).104
25

When a problem arises, the user should be able to ask 

the computer what it is doing, why it did that, what it did, 

and how it can be fixed. The next level of abstraction occurs 

when an artificial agent recognizes when a problem arises, 

determines various work-around solutions, selects a solution, and implements it without the user being aware there 

is a problem. On-the-fly debugging will require the nascent 

discipline of artificial intelligence (AI).

After 30 years of pursuing AI to no avail, researchers at the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have decided to 

depart from the goal of achieving artificial self-cognizance and 

concentrate on realizing contextual awareness.105 The MIT 

team abandoned the human-mimicking Turing test to pursue the goal of having a computer read a children’s book 

and understand what is happening in the story.106 According to British Telecom’s foresight manager and eminent 

futurist Robin Manning, this new focus on obtaining contextual awareness will help to put “more intelligence into 

raw information so that it can be more meaningful to humans 

and computers.”107 Rather than trying to mimic human responses, this AI research stresses reducing “artificial stupidity” in human-computer interactions.108

This research holds tremendous potential for harnessing 

unstructured data by replacing current “matching” search 

engine strategies with contextual strategies whereby data’s 

utility is judged.109 In on-the-fly interoperability problems, 

AI agents can be used to determine how to repackage and 

present data to optimize user receipt and synthesis. Creating artificial decision capabilities will increase users’ employment of software features while reducing frustration 

and distraction. This is in keeping with Manning’s premise 

that simplicity in technology’s use should be the primary 

goal.110 These AI capabilities will draw upon CI techniques 

such as fuzzy logic, neural networks, and genetic algorithms to enable computational learning of the user’s style, 

interests, and requirements to provide adaptive user support.111 Computational learning allows software to recognize use patterns and contexts to adapt proactively to 

changing operational environments, ensuring interoperability 

and relevance.112 Though many CI and AI development 

challenges lie ahead, the greatest challenge is in how users, 
26

managers, and leaders embrace these new technologies 

and practices.

General Chilton believes that “we need a change in our 

culture, conduct, and capabilities if we are going to advance 

the state of the art and provide the protection and freedom 

of action we need in this [cyber] domain.”113 This statement 

sounds good, but are DOD leaders ready to trust their operators and artificial agents to tailor war-fighting capabilities on the fly? In creating a self-correcting software-coding 

capability, researchers Matjaz Gams and Borut Hribovšek 

found that the most problematic aspect associated with 

employing their intelligent personal-agent interface was 

getting users to trust the agent even when it was correct 99 

percent of the time.114 They found that “since computer systems are not able to display intelligible performance, humans do not trust them.”115

Virtualization may help assuage the distrust that leaders 

and administrators harbor against allowing users and artificial agents to alter established software. When a virtual 

session is initiated, software is “checked out” from a repository on an as-needed basis. If the software is accidentally or maliciously corrupted, the virtual guest can be terminated, and the last configuration-controlled software 

version can be checked out again.116 The technique establishes the means to achieve nonuniform operations without 

devolving established capabilities and architectures.

Security—Moving Past the “Sky Is Falling” Mentality

“To provide greater security” is the traditional argument 

for centralized ICT services control. The reality is quite the 

opposite. System administrators and traditional software 

development along with sloppy user practices have created 

security vulnerabilities.

In researching web security breaches within the IT community, senior Google developers and security specialists 

found that “many administrators neglect to update their 

installations.”117 Thirty-eight percent of Apache installations and 40 percent of PHP installations in compromised 

sites were unsecure and out of date.118 Besides sloppy network administration practices, software developers inadvertently discourage good practices because patch installation 
27

requires work-disrupting network reboots or system reconfigurations. In other cases, developers took as long as 284 

days to create and disseminate major web-browser patches. 

This resulted in at least 98 days during which criminals 

could actively exploit these vulnerabilities.119

General Chilton pulled no punches when summarizing 

the source of the DOD’s cyber security problems and their 

impact on obtaining capabilities: “A lack of professionalism 

in the cyber realm imposes artificial barriers because we do 

not know what we have, thus we do not know how to protect it.”120 Several ICT security experts also express the need 

for hiring and retaining professional, vigilant, and competent ICT administrators, eliminating duplicative or overlapping regulations and policies, and conforming to basic best 

security practices.121

Beyond people and policies, the DOD must shift from 

practicing “design by fear” to “design to requirements,” with 

security as a requirement precondition. Pete Lindstrom, senior 

Burton Group security analyst, advises that security requirements must be tempered by “a measured approach 

that carefully considers the impact on the existing IT infrastructure; a factored analysis of threats, vulnerabilities and 

consequences; and an understanding of the impact on existing security solutions.”122 Senior Google managers have determined that leaders must avoid fear-based decision making 

and that developers must avoid the failures of earlier web 

applications and Internet infrastructure designers who did 

not have a well-thought-out security model as part of the 

design.123

Not every security concern can be addressed, but Lindstrom suggests a few key fundamentals:

1. Reduce, isolate, and eliminate exposed resources to 

limit vulnerability.124 System vulnerability is a function of a system’s attack surface, and input interfaces represent surface area.125 This goal is easier to 

achieve with virtual machines because users can 

tailor guest sessions despite the addition of the hypervisor software layer.

2. Use cryptographic and access-control protection 

measures for files and systems.126
28

3. Encrypt network traffic where possible, even internally.127

Virtual machines are not without pitfalls. The hypervisor—

the layer simulating the hardware—adds surface area exposed to outside exploitation.128 This can be mitigated by 

restricting and logging access to hypervisor controls.129 In 

all other respects, virtual machines share the same vulnerabilities as nonvirtual machines except that virtualization 

software exposure can be controlled, whereas conventional 

systems expose all software contained within the computer.130

New Technologies + New Practices = Future Capabilities

If the technologies previously discussed were implemented, the DOD stands to realize greater capabilities and 

efficiencies through the ability to reduce network load 

through intelligent agent network use; create robust and 

fault-tolerant infrastructures where agents help circumvent faults and software can be maintained and improved 

by users with limited software experience; optimize local effects by implementing forward control of services by users 

and agents that allow operations to be more closely tied to 

the local environment; and enable legacy and evolving systems interoperability through asynchronous and autonomous adaptive middleware.131 Consolidating these capabilities provides the impetus to assemble the Virtual Wingman.

Virtual Wingman Revealed

The Virtual Wingman demonstrates the potential payoffs 

from fostering enabling technologies and implementation 

practices, allowing innovation from within and outside the 

DOD to take root and bear fruit. The goal is to provide a 

semiautonomous, user-focused, roaming computational/

AI agent that proactively and contextually adapts ICT to 

reduce information management burdens and provide 

near-seamless ICT interoperability. Assigned to individuals, 

it assists locally and acts as a portal to tap the expertise of 

communities of interest and remote cloud computing supercomputer resources. As an extension of the user, the Virtual Wingman applies its user’s security authorizations to 

negotiate security protocols across multiple networks. As 
29

the user’s mind compartmentalizes information and activities, the Virtual Wingman similarly compartmentalizes itself. It learns the user’s habits, routines, and missions to 

recognize proactive opportunities to find, manage, coordinate, preposition, and present information to assist the 

user in accomplishing work. The agent interfaces with the 

user through virtual machine guest sessions on a variety of 

ICT hardware, including desktops, eNotepads, laptops, 

wearable computers, smartphones, and helmets.

The User and His Virtual Wingman

In this scenario, Lt Col Max Maxwell is the director of 

operations (DO) for an Air Force expeditionary intelligence 

squadron. The squadron integrates and deploys Airmen 

within other services’ and partner nations’ combat units to 

directly provide Air Force intelligence capabilities. This 

means that Colonel Maxwell’s Airmen operate within a variety of dissimilar networks.

Coordination of Life

The DO’s daily life is directed by numerous schedules 

from several organizational- and security-driven communities. Fortunately, Colonel Maxwell’s Virtual Wingman can 

negotiate the various networks and consolidate and deconflict the scheduled demands. The wing commander’s executive officer e-mails Colonel Maxwell an “invite” to brief 

the wing commander about the new training program at 10 

a.m. tomorrow. Colonel Maxwell’s Virtual Wingman agent 

coordinates this new event across his personal, squadron, 

wing, classified, and joint service/agency working group 

calendars. Although the time block is free, the agent recognizes that the squadron commander’s staff meeting is at 11 

a.m. on the other side of the base. Having learned from previous sessions, the agent recognizes that (1) the wing commander’s meeting takes precedence; (2) the wing commander’s meetings usually run long; and (3) it takes at least 20 

minutes to get from the wing commander’s office to the 

squadron ready room.

Consequently, the agent notifies Colonel Maxwell of the 

conflict and automatically presents a solution for approval. 
30

With an “OK,” the Virtual Wingman sends a text message to 

the squadron commander: “Tapped by Wing/CC for training program brief. Captain Smith will fill in.” Simultaneously, Captain Smith gets a message that he was tagged to 

fill in. Major Sharp, the assistant DO, would have been 

cited, but the Virtual Wingman’s scan of her schedule 

showed that she had a higher-priority engagement.

This opening event seems trivial until viewed in the context of our lives. Currently DOD employees have no way to 

merge their personal, unclassified, classified, and organizational lives into one unified calendar. The 10 minutes spent 

manually coordinating this single event could have been 

spent on value-added activities. During the course of the 

day, such trivial events rob productivity by taking up time 

and disrupting focus.

Keeping Life Compartmentalized and Consolidated

To prepare for his next deployment, Colonel Maxwell 

needs to coordinate collection support from Mr. Smart, an 

IC civil servant. Mr. Smart’s contact information originally 

came from a classified e-mail. Aspects of Mr. Smart’s contact information are classified, but the Virtual Wingman, 

using Colonel Maxwell’s security permissions, extracts, 

parses, and appropriately populates his various network 

accounts’ address books with Mr. Smart’s network-appropriate 

contact information. Using dirty work searches and security guides, the agent knows not to propagate classified information; yet unclassified and unattributable information 

is transferred.

The Virtual Wingman performs the same type of tasks for 

several purposes, from distributing recall rosters and forms 

to conducting customized intelligence searches and autopopulating briefing charts. The Virtual Wingman enables 

the old axiom “Train like you fight and fight like you train.” 

When Colonel Maxwell and his Airmen are due to deploy, 

each Airman’s Virtual Wingman copies and transfers user 

profiles, links, templates, software, and so forth to the destination network. For Colonel Maxwell, his contacts and 

lessons learned from past deployments and assignments 

follow him into theater and for the rest of his career. As he 

makes contacts, his Virtual Wingman maintains his elec-
31

tronic address book. Dynamically updating links are established to track both the contact and its past duty position’s 

contact information. This allows Colonel Maxwell to contact 

his friend Major Striker and provides him with the ability to 

contact the person now filling Major Striker’s old duty billet 

as the Fort Huachuca joint service training coordinator.

En Route, but Not Disconnected

While traveling at 40,000 feet en route to theater, Colonel 

Maxwell’s Virtual Wingman is both with and ahead of him 

at the forward operating base (FOB). There, his agent is 

creating and downloading middleware and mapping links 

to establish the same functionality in his new tent office as 

he had stateside. Meanwhile, he uses his laptop to view the 

latest intelligence by way of encrypted traffic over open 

commercial satellite links. Then he settles into his sling 

seat to work on his three captains’ promotion recommendation forms (PRF). Prior to departure, the Virtual Wingman 

scanned the administrative status of the squadron’s personnel. Because these three captains were approaching 

their promotion boards, the agent preemptively pulled their 

officer performance records (OPR) and forward-stored the 

files on Colonel Maxwell’s laptop for the deployment. As he 

selects past OPR performance statements and weaves them 

into the PRF narrative, the Virtual Wingman automatically 

maps the words and their sources to the required major 

command PRF source tracking sheet. In doing so, the Virtual Wingman is able to find, locate, and retrieve specific 

information from within a variety of current and legacy OPR 

formats and map it to the PRF source tracking sheet. 

Though this is an arcane example to outsiders, every Air 

Force field-grade officer can empathize with the countless 

frustrating hours spent mapping PRF lines that could have 

been spent honing testaments to the officers’ abilities.

Halfway there, Colonel Maxwell’s first sergeant reminds 

him that the new sensor pallet loaded on board will not fit 

into the previously assigned Stryker IIs. While still en route, 

Colonel Maxwell accesses US Transportation Command’s 

portal to the Army FOB motor pool to request a vehicle to 

accommodate the sensor pallet.
32

FOB Operations

The Airmen can now get to work when they arrive. Local 

training is minimized, as the Airmen have been training 

stateside on real data using theater software tools and the 

electronic tactics, techniques, and procedures that have 

been replicated between the sites.

Mounted Patrol Operations

Today, Colonel Maxwell is taking a combined team on patrol. 

Upon assignment to a next-generation Stryker II combat 

vehicle, his Virtual Wingman uploads and initiates itself as a 

virtual guest within the vehicle’s network. By the time the 

mounted patrol leaves the FOB, his agent has not only mapped 

that day’s available mobile command and control feeds and 

frequencies, blue force tracker, and threat, alert, and ISR 

feeds but also has downloaded the latest maps and mission 

orders. As the patrol rolls out, its Hunter II RPA is diverted, 

and it is reassigned an Army Sky Warrior II RPA. Recognizing 

that the downlinked feed has changed, the patrol lead’s agent 

uses the Stryker II’s CR system to initiate a data pull to download the mySkyWarriorII app software into the vehicle’s network server and populate it throughout the convoy.

As the patrols rolls onward, the gunner’s Virtual Battle 

Buddy (the Army’s version of the Virtual Wingman) monitors 

the surrounding roadways using the Sky Warrior II’s overhead 

video feed. The Virtual Battle Buddy applies a cognitive video 

analytics app that combines video computer vision with machine 

learning. After several patrols and many days of RPA surveillance of an area, the software can distinguish normal from 

suspicious activity.132 With time, the software learns patterns 

of behavior across the course of a day, week, and season as 

well as responses to events.

Cognitive Video Analytics—BRS Labs’ AISight software exploits multiple black/white, color, and near infrared video imagery to monitor areas for abnormal activity. Using machine 

learning, AISight understands time-of-day, time-space-distance, 

and proximity factors. AISight is camera agnostic and works 

as well with four cameras as it does with 100.133
33

The gunner’s Virtual Battle Buddy detects a distant 

anomaly, but it does not distract the gunner with a warning 

because the gunner’s duty is to protect the patrol from near 

threats. Instead, the gunner’s agent routes the alert to the 

patrol leader’s agent. Acknowledging the alert, Colonel 

Maxwell views video of the suspicious activity. As he radios 

back his intentions to investigate, his Virtual Wingman 

comprehends the plan change and proactively plots the 

least provocative and lowest threat route to position the patrol 

for dismounted investigation. Upon entering the village, 

the Virtual Wingman calculates and color-codes a threedimensional village rendering, made from numerous drivethroughs and RPA overflights, that highlights likely ambush and sniper positions and cones of fire.134

Dismounted Operations

Before reaching the dismount point, the Virtual Wingman has reactivated the suspended agent in Colonel Maxwell’s 

helmet and gear. Soon after dismounting, a Coalition Texan 

II counterinsurgency light-attack plane enters the airspace 

and broadcasts its presence. The Virtual Wingman agent 

back in the Stryker II notifies the patrol leadership of the 

aircraft’s availability over the local CR network and initiates 

a two-way data link with the Coalition Texan II. Unfortunately, the targeting data link is not connecting. The Virtual 

Wingman initiates a software check and determines the coalition Czech Texan II is running a newer targeting system 

version than what the host nation Texan IIs uses. Not being 

able to quickly download a new version, the Virtual Wingman begins to auto-code and test a middleware solution to 

translate between the old and new versions.

Meanwhile, crouched behind a garden wall, Colonel Maxwell 

and the Army first sergeant activate the helmet lookthrough visor monitors. As they move their heads, they can 

see the village market “through the wall,” albeit from a 

bird’s-eye view. Helmet position cues the RPA’s sensor turrets. The merger of line-of-sight head position to imagery 

builds a sense of relational position between the viewer and 

the image. This is less disorienting than relating flat-screen 

panned images to physical space.
34

Shaded in flashing yellow is a congregation of teenagers 

looking out of place and nervous on the far side of the market 

square. Over the local wireless network, Colonel Maxwell, the 

flanking squad Army lieutenant, and the first sergeant coordinate a plan. Having fixed the enemy’s location, the lieutenant and sergeant lead their squads into position. Rather 

than using a map to navigate the alleys, their Virtual Battle 

Buddies guide them using a mixture of audible, visual, and 

tactile cues. If something goes wrong, precalculated panic 

directions will guide them safely back to the Stryker IIs.

At “go,” one of the Stryker IIs raises a boom with a microwave dish, aims at the teenagers, and pulses them with a 

burst.135 The youths reveal their weapons in involuntary response to the shock. The boom operator, seeing this through 

the RPA video, starts pulsing the youths into disorientation 

and stunned shock. As the secured youths recover, a few 

start talking in a language foreign to the patrol’s host nation 

sergeant. The lieutenant’s Virtual Battle Buddy initiates 

streaming audio back across his agent’s negotiated data 

link to the main operating base’s supercomputer for translation. Meanwhile, an Army specialist photographs each 

captured youth with a smartphone camera. The gigapixel 

camera captures and forwards details, such as partial 

retina images.136

An FOB intelligence analyst initiates a facial/retina 

search within the Federal Bureau of Investigation worldwide identity record bank and returns a match.137 Using a 

locally created app to search and pull information from local 

host-nation reports, a human intelligence report from last 

week links three of the youths to a previous attack. The 

analyst forwards a summary report to the patrol along with 

a public relations message automatically translated into local 

languages by the Virtual Wingman per standard operating 

procedures established during joint FOB stateside training. 

As the prisoners are being loaded, the Stryker II’s loudspeakers broadcast the translated public affairs message: 

“The captured youths are responsible for killing 16 women and 

children last week at a neighboring village market.”

As the patrol begins its return trip, recorded mission 

data streams back to the FOB. The collected video refines 

the cognitive video analytics rule sets, and conversation 

and troop movement recordings support after-action analysis.
35

Battle of Administrivia

After completing the after-action debrief and getting 

some chow, Colonel Maxwell wages a successful campaign 

against endless waves of administrivia (the necessary administrative paperwork after mission completion). Fortunately, his Virtual Wingman has already mapped the links 

and downloaded the patches that allow him to view Air 

Force forms from the Army host network. As Colonel Maxwell saves and closes his new training brief for the wing 

commander, his Virtual Wingman, detecting the completion 

of a task, interrupts with two alerts. His children’s bedtime 

is approaching, and Valentine’s Day is in two days. A list of 

hometown florists that deliver follows the second alert. Colonel Maxwell initiates a personal virtual machine guest on 

his computer, makes a video call home, orders flowers, and 

kicks back to play a game of Madden Football 2035 against 

the cocky battalion commander who beat him last week.

Choices and Consequences

This scenario demonstrates how unstructured data and 

systems can be harnessed. Technology does play a significant role, but success comes not from rote application of 

advanced technology but by weaving technology and practices into the fabric of the Airmen’s lives. Rather than manipulating technology to make up for weaknesses, Airmen 

work with technology as a trusted collaborator stitching solutions together. This subtle distinction differentiates the 

Virtual Wingman scenario from today’s operational employment of advanced technology. Success is born from allowing personnel to provide their own support tools and entrusting them to innovate and exploit ICT to its fullest 

potential.

Currently, the DOD stands at a crossroads on how to 

embrace and use technology. There are four choices, three 

of which are unacceptable. The first shuns advanced ICT 

and maintains centralized control of ICT development and 

use. The result is people at all levels drowning in information. Without informational efficiency, more information 

will be available, but there will be no means to make sense of 

it. Savvy adversaries will adapt to DOD tactics and capabilities and routinely operate inside the DOD’s decision loop.
36

The second choice is to delay accepting new technologies 

and practices. This forces lone-wolf pockets of initiative to 

buck the ICT bureaucracy and work within the seams of 

policy and doctrine to innovatively squeeze rigid institutional infrastructures, processes, and technologies for all 

they can deliver. Though they achieve short tactical victories, strategic success remains elusive because solutions 

are neither widely applied nor sustainable.

The third choice represents the DOD’s current path of 

overambitiously embracing technology but bureaucratizing 

its development and application. The result is that specific 

technologies are either prematurely rushed, resulting in a 

capability miscarriage, or are quickly touted but delayed in 

implementation until they are either out of date or no longer relevant. The GAO found that “the JTRS program for 

ground vehicles and helicopters began system development 

in 2002 with none of its 20 critical technologies sufficiently 

matured and the requirements not clearly defined.”138 Conversely, the DOD’s chiefs of information operations identified several useful commercial information management 

capabilities that are obsolete by the time the specific software or all of the supporting operating systems are installed. This was the case with Microsoft SharePoint’s implementation at the National Reconnaissance Office.139 The 

result is a costly and frustrating oscillation between premature insertion and catching up.

The fourth and only viable choice is to avoid costly ICT 

and system-of-systems collapse and to rapidly field capabilities to embrace new technologies and community practices as demonstrated in this paper. However, success requires another element—timing.

How to Harness Unstructured Data and 

Systems: Diagramming the Way Forward

Timing is an often overlooked element of success. If the timing is off, technologies and practices will not achieve their potential. Virtualization has been around since 1967 but only became widely accepted and used when the hardware to make up 

for its heavy processing demands became available.140 Though 

still requiring much algorithm development, artificial intelligence awaits practical and cost-effective petaflops hardware.
37

Timing in developing and fielding technology and practices in relation to each other is crucial for success. DIMHRS 

and JTRS are not bad ideas; however, they underwent acquisitions before the enabling technologies and practices could 

support the objectives. Sometimes the capability is available, 

but its form does not fit people’s lives, needs, or missions. In 

1998 Spotlight Mobile created a laptop application that delivered information based on the user’s location. Great idea, 

but the product flopped until a decade later when smartphones provided the requisite mobile platform.141

Similarly, a natural phasing order exists to realizing the 

Virtual Wingman’s embodied capabilities. This relative order 

of progression can be shrunk or expanded without causing 

integration problems as long as the relative order is maintained. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the links between critical 

maturing communities of practice that enable specific technologies to reach their potential.

This break from a traditional technology investment road 

map is intentional. The fostering of user communities is as 

important as funding the development of specific technologies. Without a viable and accepting CoP to create, support, 

and use specific technologies, needed technologies will remain 

only bench specimens and concept-of-operations theories.

2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035

Figure 1. Phasing of technology and practices
38

Conclusion

In “How to Think Outside the Box,” a Business Week Online article, Bill Buxton remarks that “our lack of attention 

to place, time, function, and human considerations means 

that these fancy new technologies fail to deliver their real 

potential to real people.”142 For the DOD, the answer to how 

it can best posture itself to harness the rapid growth of unstructured data and infrastructure to achieve mission success is tied not only to specific technologies but to specific 

practices, building CoPs, and timing the development and 

integration of the aforementioned pieces.

Virtualization and ambient and artificial intelligence are 

key technical enablers to focus on for investment purposes. 

However, these technologies will be made affordable and 

practical by ensuring open-source practices and a culture 

of sharing is widely embraced. To accomplish this, the DOD 

must reconsider the roles of centralized and decentralized 

acquisitions, development, sharing, and use. Only by enabling the tools to rapidly tailor capabilities and services 

can the DOD implement technology to tame modern infrastructure’s complexities and exploit the infosphere’s fog of 

information.143

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Fulghum, “Digital Goes Viral,” 74.

2. US GAO, “Information Management,” 4.

3. Ibid., 3.

Develop a Culture

of Decentralized

Tailoring

Virtual &Paravirtual

Systems Become

Commonplace

Flourish

Ambient

IntelligenceApps

Become

Commonplace

Computational

IntelligenceApps

Become

Commonplace

Articial

IntelligenceApps

Become Feasible

Petaops Desktop/Laptop

Hardware Becomes

Commonplace

Critical

Supporting

Open Source Coding and Applications Culture Can

Figure 2. Cultural and technical critical paths
39

4. US GAO, “Defense Acquisitions,” 4, 6.

5. Mancini, “8 Reasons,” 6.

6. Fulghum, “Digital Goes Viral,” 74.

7. Ibid.

8. Jackson, “Direct Path to Dependable Software,” 78–88.

9. Fulghum, “Integration Nightmares,” 59. 

10. Philpott, “New Pay, Personnel System,” 1C, 3C.

11. Jackson, “Direct Path to Dependable Software.”

12. Delgado, Laplanche, and Krishnamurthy, “New Face of Enterprise 

Search,” 42. 

13. Philpott, “New Pay, Personnel System.”

14. Fulghum, “Integration Nightmares.”

15. Delgado, Laplanche, and Krishnamurthy, “New Face of Enterprise 

Search,” 42.

16. Gams and Hribovšek, “Intelligent-Personal Agent Interface,” 354.

17. Custer, address, 2008 National Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT) 

Agency Conference.

18. Ibid.

19. Delgado, Laplanche, and Krishnamurthy, “New Face of Enterprise 

Search.”

20. Ibid., 42.

21. Ibid.; and Li, Zhang, and Zhang, “Cooperative Strategy for Web Data 

Mining,” 443.

22. Custer, address, 2008 GEOINT conference.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Carlson, “Verizon Unifies Communications,” 1.

27. Bednarz, “Users Turn to Virtual Data Marts,” 56.

28. Coombs, Acquisition Leaders for Rapid Technology, 2.

29. Custer, “Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance,” 4.

30. Quote attributed to Daniel J. Boorstin in Gamarekian, “Working 

Profile,” B6.

31. Chilton, “Cyberspace Leadership,” 5–10.

32. US DOD, National Military Strategy, 13.

33. Ibid., 14.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 18.

36. Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, I-5.

37. Dail and Jones, “Deployment and Distribution Command and 

Control,” 168.

38. Mancini, “8 Reasons.”

39. US GAO, “Information Management,” 7.

40. Quote attributed to Daniel J. Boorstin in Gamarekian, “Working 

Profile,” B6.

41. Kramer, Starr, and Wentz, Cyberpower and National Security, 346; 

and Mancini, “8 Reasons,” 6.

42. Multispectral and hyperspectral imaging modes collect, respectively, 

tens and hundreds of different wavelength images per collection (the standard 
40

color camera collects three wavelengths: red, green, blue). Many ISR assets 

also collect the near-infrared wavelength. Eshel, “Off-The-Shelf Black Ops,” 46. 

43. Kramer, Starr, and Wentz, Cyberpower and National Security, 346.

44. Charles, “New Industry Norms,” 69.

45. Mancini, “8 Reasons,” 6.

46. Charles, “New Industry Norms.”

47. Michelis, Loregian, and Moderini, “itsme,” 71.

48. Ibid., 72.

49. Remagnino and Shapiro, “Artificial Intelligence Methods,” 393.

50. Rodríguez et al., “Agent-based Ambient Intelligence,” 201.

51. Ibid.

52. Vivienne Waller is a research fellow at the Institute for Social Research, 

Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia. Robert B. Johnston 

is director of the Centre for Innovation, Technology, and Organization and a 

John Sharkey professor of information systems and organization at University 

College, Dublin, Ireland. Waller and Johnston, “Making Ubiquitous Computing 

Available,” 128.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 129.

55. Rodríguez et al., “Agent-based Ambient Intelligence,” 205.

56. Waller and Johnston, “Making Ubiquitous Computing Available.”

57. Gomes and Buley, “PC Is Dead,” 51–53.

58. Cardwell, “Virtualization,” 26.

59. Naone, “Conjuring Clouds,” 54.

60. “Virtual Worlds,” 30.

61. Naone, “Conjuring Clouds.”

62. Lindstrom, “5 Laws of Virtualization Security,” 56.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid, 57.

65. Cardwell, “Virtualization,” 26.

66. Gomes and Buley, “PC Is Dead,” 51–53.

67. Naone, “Conjuring Clouds,” 54.

68. Ibid., 56.

69. Ibid., 54.

70. Walko, “Cognitive Radio,” 34.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 36.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Cardwell, “Virtualization,” 28.

76. Gomes and Buley, “PC Is Dead,” 51–53; and Lindstrom, “5 Laws of 

Virtualization Security,” 56.

77. US GAO, “Defense Acquisitions.”

78. Ibid., 6; and Bisker, “Progressively Smarter,” 94.

79. Bisker, “Progressively Smarter,” 94.

80. US DOD, National Defense Strategy, 19.

81. US GAO, “Defense Acquisitions,” 21.

82. Schley, “Stuck in the Middle,” 16.

83. Cardwell, “Virtualization,” 28.

84. Abejo, “An Opening,” 58–84.
41

85. Haefliger, von Krogh, and Spaeth, “Code Reuse,” 180.

86. Ibid., 183.

87. Biggs, “Revenge of the Coders,” 48–52; and Haefliger, von Krogh, and 

Spaeth, “Code Reuse,” 180–93.

88. Haefliger, von Krogh, and Spaeth, “Code Reuse,” 191.

89. Ibid.

90. Watson et al., “Business of Open Source,” 41–46.

91. Biggs, “Revenge of the Coders,” 48–52; and Haefliger, von Krogh, and 

Spaeth, “Code Reuse,” 180–93. 

92. Abejo, “An Opening.”

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Source Forge, http://sourceforge.net/about.

97. Haefliger, von Krogh, and Spaeth, “Code Reuse,” 191.

98. Jeffries, “Kickin’ Apps.”

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. General Services Administration, “Apps.Gov.”

102. Lieberman and Fry, “Will Software Ever Work?,” 123.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., 124.

105. Chandler, “Rethinking Artificial Intelligence.”

106. Ibid.

107. Mannings, “What Technology?” 13.

108. Ibid.

109. Castellano, Fanelli, and Torsello, “Computational Intelligence 

Techniques,” 258.

110. Mannings, “What Technology?”

111. Castellano, Fanelli, and Torsello, “Computational Intelligence 

Techniques.”

112. Ibid., 259.

113. Chilton, “Cyberspace Leadership.”

114. Gams and Hribovšek, “Intelligent-Personal Agent Interface.”

115. Ibid., 377.

116. Lindstrom, “5 Laws of Virtualization Security.”

117. Provos, Rajab, and Mavrommatis, “Cybercrime 2.0,” 46. 

118. Ibid.

119. Krebs, “Internet Explorer Unsafe,” and “Blogfight.”

120. Chilton, “Cyberspace Leadership.”

121. Lindstrom, “5 Laws of Virtualization Security,” 57; Provos, Rajab, and 

Mavrommatis, “Cybercrime 2.0,” 46; and Sweetman, “Net: Superglue,” 43.

122. Lindstrom, “5 Laws of Virtualization Security.” 

123. Provos, Rajab, and Mavrommatis, “Cybercrime 2.0.”

124. Lindstrom, “5 Laws of Virtualization Security,” 57.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. “Virtual Worlds,” 31; and Lindstrom, “5 Laws of Virtualization 

Security.”
42

129. “Virtual Worlds,” 32.

130. Lindstrom, “5 Laws of Virtualization Security,” 55.

131. Bolzani and Netto, “Engineering of Micro Agents,” 34.

132. Walsh, “Watch and Learn,” 25.

133. Ibid., 25–26.

134. O’Reilly and Battelle, “Web Squared.”

135. Air Force Research Laboratory Directed Energy Directorate, “HighPower Microwaves.” 

136. O’Reilly and Battelle, “Web Squared.”

137. Weinberger, “Fingerprints International,” 22.

138. US GAO, “Defense Acquisitions,” 11.

139. From the author’s personal experience at the National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO) while part of a working group to improve collaboration across the 

NRO’s various research and development, rapid prototyping, and fielding and 

sustainment organizations.

140. Naone, “Conjuring Clouds.”

141. Jeffries, “Kickin’ Apps.”

142. Buxton, “How to Think Outside the Box,” 24.

143. Quote attributed to Daniel J. Bonstin in Gamarekian, “Working 

Profile.”
43

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49

Abbreviations

AI artificial intelligence

AmI ambient intelligence

apps applications

CI computational intelligence

COTS commercial-off-the-shelf

CR cognitive radio

DIMHRS Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System

DOD Department of Defense

EO/IRI electro-optical/infrared

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FMV full motion video

FOB forward operating base

GAO Government Accountability Office

GIS geographic information system

GOTS government-off-the-shelf

IC intelligence community

ICT information and communication technology

IEEE Institution of Electrical Engineers

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IT information technology

JTRS joint tactical radio system

Mbps megabits per second

mil-spec military specifications

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NMS National Military Strategy

OPR officer performance record

OS operating systems

PC personal computer

PRF promotion recommendation form

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

SDR software-defined radio

SIGINT signals intelligence

SOA service-oriented architecture

USTRANSCOM US Strategic Command