The United States Air Force . 1n 

Southeast Asia, 1961-1973: 

An Illustrated Account 

Edited by 

Carl Berger 

The Authors 

Jack S. Ballard 

Ray L. Bowers 

Roland W. Doty, Jr. 

R. Frank Futrell 

William Greenhalgh 

J. C. Hopkins 

William B. Karstetter 

Robert R. Kritt 

Doris E. Krudener 

Kenneth L. Patchin 

Ralph A. Rowley 

Jacob Van Staaveren 

Bernard T. Termena 

Revised Edition 

OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 1984 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Main entry under title : 

the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. 

Includes index. 

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961 -1975-Aerial operations, American . 2. United. Air Force- History. 

I. Berger, Carl, Jan. 28, 1925- 11. Ballard. JackS. Ill. United States. Office of Air Force History. 

DS558.8.U54 959.704'348 76-608038 

For sale by the Superintendent or Docwnents, 

t:.S. Government Printing omcc 

Washington, D.C. 20W2 

ii 
United States Air Force 

Historical Advisory Committee 

(As of May 1, 1984) 

Lt. Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, 

USAF 

Commander, Air University, ATC 

Mr. DeWitt S. Copp 

The National Volunteer Agency 

Dr. Philip A. Crowl 

Annapolis, Maryland 

Dr. Warren W. Hassler, Jr. 

Pennsylvania State University 

Brig. Gen. Harris B. Hull, 

USAF, Retired 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Dr. Alfred F. Hurley 

Brig. Gen., USAF, Retired 

North Texas State University 

Gen. Bryce Poe II, USAF, Retired 

Alexandria, Virginia 

Lt. Gen. Winfield W. Scott, Jr. 

Superintendent, USAF Academy 

Dr. David A. Shannon (Chairman) 

University of Virginia 

Mr. Eugene R. Sullivan 

The General Counsel, USAF 

iii 

Foreword to Revised Edition 

While United States' involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict extended back 

into the 1950's, this volume covers the years of active American participation from 

the early 1960's to 1973. From the outset American officials regarded the conflict basically as a land war, with the fighting in South Vietnam commanding top 

priority. As a result air power rarely played an independent role during the war, 

and air operations served primarily to assist troops on the ground. For example, 

as the communists moved men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail-under 

the jungle canopy and often at night-the Air Force developed reconnaissance 

aircraft and surveillance equipment to pierce the enemy's cover, and gunships 

to hinder his combat effectiveness. The Air Force also flew hundreds of 

thousands of sorties to close air support, interdiction, airlift, and battle if lumina· 

tion inside South Vietnam. 

The most controversial periods for air operations occurred between 1965 and 

1968, and later in 1972, over North Vietnam. When attacking the North, U.S. airmen 

faced a formidable air defense network. Detailed rules of engagement governed 

the conduct of all U.S. air operations throughout Southeast Asia, not only to prevent escalation but also to avoid civilian casualities, which would turn world 

public opinion against the war and alienate the citizens of the government which 

the U.S. was trying to help. At various times U.S. aircraft were not allowed to at· 

tack surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, MIG airfields, and other targets judged 

too near to Hanoi and Haiphong, or considered especially sensitive for other 

reasons. The Air Force countered the North Vietnamese air defenses with 

formations flying evasive maneuvers that afforded both flexibility of action and 

adequate radar jamming from recently developed electronic counter measures. 

Bombing operations proved extremely complex, requiring coordination among 

several elements of air power. On a "typical" bombing run, escort aircraft fitted 

out for aerial combat or to attack radar sites, accompanied the strike group to 

protect the attackers from enemy SAMs and MIGs. Aerial tankers and airborne 

control centers contributed to the success of each day's operations, while rescue 

units stood by to recover downed airmen. Often support aircraft outnumbered 

the strike group. 

The Office of Air Force History is reissuing this book in revised form because 

of demand for a single-volume history of air activity in the Vietnam War. Although 

a comprehensive and analytical one-volume history must await completion of 

the entire series on The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, we hope that 

An Illustrated Account will help meet the present need. First published shortly 

after the end of the war, the chief merit of the volume lies more in depicting the 

complexity of the war than in offering dispassionate analysis. This edition corrects errors of omission, typography, or fact found in the original. 

Jacob Neufeld, Chief of the Special Histories Branch in the Office of Air Force 

History, directed the work associated with this revised edition. Special thanks 

are due to several members of the office who reviewed the original text and recommended changes or corrections, including Maj. John F. Kreis, Lt. Col. Vance 0 . 

Mitchell, Mr. Bernard C Nalty, Lt. Col. John F. Shiner, and Dr. Wayne W. Thompson. 

Others whose participation was most helpful included three authors of chapters 

in the book, Col. Ray L. Bowers (USAF, Ret.); Mr. J. C Hopkins, History Office, 

v 
Strategic Air Command; and Mr. Jacob Van Staaveren. Col. John Schlight (USAF, 

Ret.) earlier contributed a detailed list of needed corrections. Finally, this 

volume owes much of its improvement to the expert scrutiny of several individuals 

serving throughout the USAF history program: Mr. Gerald T. Cantwell, Historian, 

Air Force Reserve; Capt. George W. Cully, History Office, Air Force Operational 

Test and Evaluation Center; Mr. Ben Goldman, Historian, Tactical Air Command; 

Mr. R. Cargill Hall, Chief, Research Division, USAF Historical Research Center; 

Dr. Charles O'Connell, History Office, Tactical Air Command; and Mr. David W. 

Shircliffe, Historian, Air Training Command. The editing tasks were ably performed 

by Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek and Ms. Bobbi Levien of the Office of Air Force History. 

RICHARD H. KOHN 

Chief, Office of Air Force History 

vi 
Foreword 

The year 1973 saw the end of direct American combat involvement in the 

Southeast Asia conflict-a conflict sometimes referred to as the Indochina War, 

the Vietnam War, and by other assorted sobriquets. This is an illustrated 

account of United States Air Force activities in that war from 1961 to 1973. It 

makes no pretense of being a comprehensive history of the war, or even of 

Air Force participation therein- not because it lacks historical authenticity (it 

contains only verifiable material), but simply because it is, by design, limited 

in scope and depth. Official, definitive histories are in progress but will not 

be widely available for several years. In the interim, this book can help fill a 

void in public knowledge of the Air Force's experience in Southeast Asia. 

That experience was marked by great frustration-frustration flowing from the 

lack of a clear, definable, attainable objective and means for measuring success 

in achieving that objective-frustration arising from constraints that could only 

appear unreasonable to airmen-frustration from stringent rules of engagement 

which tended to offset advantages in skill and technology. This, however, 

should not be permitted to obscure the great dedication and zeal with which the 

men and women of the Air Force invariably carried out the job given them in 

Southeast Asia-despite the fact that missions, tactics, and targets frequently 

seemed inconsistent with their experience, training, and doctrine. The entire 

episode provides eloquent testimony to the disciplined professionalism of Air 

Force people. This effort to chronicle and depict some of their wartime activities 

should contribute to a broader understanding of the Air Force role in the Vietnam War. 

General

~~Er , USAF 

Chief of Staff 

vii 

Acknowledgements 

Historians in the Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF and in such 

field organizations as the Strategic Air Command, Air Force Log istics Command, and Military Airlift Command wrote or otherwise contributed to the preparation of this narrative. Many civilian and military personnel of the Air Force, 

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Office of the 

Secretary of Defense read and commented on the draft manuscript. Most of 

these reviewers possessed expert knowledge of specific aspects of the war, 

acquired through personal participation in it or years of research and writing on 

the subject. Their suggestions and criticisms were invaluable in eliminating errors of fact and correcting distortions. 

General William M. Momyer (USAF, ret) , who served as commander of the 

Seventh Air Force in Southeast Asia (1966-1968), provided an especially helpful commentary. Others who offered significant comments included Samuel A. 

Tucker, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Charles B. MacDonald, Chief, 

Current History Branch, U.S. Army. Center of Military History; and several faculty members of the Department of History, Air Force Academy. Special thanks 

are due to Capt. Robert H. Whitlow, U.S. Marine Corps, who kindly provided a 

portion of his manuscript dealing with attempts to recover several downed aircraft, which clarified an air rescue mission. 

Work on this volume began in August 1973 under the direction of Brig. Gen. 

Brian S. Gunderson, Chief, Office of Air Force History between 1972 and 1974. 

Mr. Max Rosenberg, Deputy Chief Historian, prepared the plan for writing the 

book and helped shepherd the manuscript through several stages of writing 

and production. Mr. Rosenberg and Dr. Stanley L. Falk, Chief Historian of the 

Air Force, also reviewed drafts of the book and suggested revisions which substantially improved it. Mr. Carl Berger, Chief, Histories Division, served as overall editor. 

Acknowledgements also are due to Gerard E. Hasselwander, Historical Research Branch, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala., who compiled the list of key Air Force civilian and military personnel for 

the war period, and to Lt. Col. Raymond E. Fredette (USAF, ret), who wrote the 

accounts of the Air Force Medal of Honor recipients. Mr. David Schoem and 

Mrs. Gail Guido, Chief and Archivist, respectively, in the Support Division, Office 

of Air Force History, provided general administrative and research assistance 

while Mr. William Mattson, Mrs. Eleanor C. Patterson, Mrs. Elizabeth B. 

Schwartzmann, and Mrs. Selma Shear typed the several drafts. 

Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek, Chief Editorial Branch Office of Air Force History, 

prepared the manuscript for publication. He and Mr. Deane J. Allen of the Editorial Branch collected and selected most of the illustrations. Their sources included the photographic collections of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, 

as well as those of other government agencies. Mrs. Frances Lewis and Mrs. 

Mabel B. Sneed, 1361 st Photographic Squadron, Aerospace Audio-Visual Servix 
ice, provided substantial research assistance in this effort. Mr. Andrew Poggenpohl, Art Editor, National Geographic Magazine, kindly supplied a number of 

color and black-and-white photographs. Several other private sources also 

loaned illustrations from their collections. Acknowledgements will be found 

in a separate section in the back matter. 

This casebound book containing battle area maps and over 600 photographs was designed by Dudley Kruhm, Typography and Design Division, 

Government Printing Office. 

The paintings are reproductions of the originals in the official Air Force Art 

Collection, administered by the Office of Information. 

X 
Contents 

FOREWORD TO THE REVISED EDITION ......................................................... v 

FOREWORD ........................................................................................................... vii 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... ix 

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 3 

by Carl Berger 

Origins of the War ...................................................................................... 3 

The U.S. Air Force in Indochina ................................................................. 5 

Kennedy Administration Policies .............................................................. 10 

II. AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM , 1962-1964 .................................. 15 

by Dr. R. Frank Futrell 

The National Campaign Plan ..................................................................... 18 

Effects of the Buddhist Crisis ................ ...... .... ...... ........ ...................... .... .. 25 

Efforts to Revitalize Military Operations ................................................... 28 

Continuing Military Reversals ................................................................... 32 

Ill. THE IN-COUNTRY AIR WAR, 1965-1972 ................................................... 37 

by Lt. Col. Ralph A. Rowley 

The Combined Campaign Plan ......... ......................................................... 49 

The 1968 Tet Offensive ............................................................................... 52 

Vietnam ization and Withdraw a I ........ ............ ............................................ 61 

IV. THE AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ............................................... 69 

by Jacob Van Staaveren 

Rolling Thunder, 1965-1968 ....................................................................... 74 

The Bombing Pauses ................................................................................. 79 

The Communist Spring Offensive, 1972 .................................................... 94 

The 11-Day Air Campaign .......................................................................... 95 

V. INTERDICTION IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE ....................................... 101 

by Jacob Van Staaveren 

Introduction of New Tactics ........................................................................ 101 

Commando Hunt .. ....................................................................................... 109 

Lam Son 719 ................................................................ , ............................... 114 

Additional Commando Hunt Campaigns ................................................... 117 

Air Power Shifts Again ................................................................................ 119 

xi 
VI. AIR OPERATIONS OVER NORTHERN LAOS ............................................ 121 

by Historical Staff 

The Effects of Weather .......................................... : .................................... 122 

The Loss of Lima Site 85 ............................................................................ 126 

A Major Government Victory ···················· ····~·· ···· ·· ·· ···· ··· ········· ·· ·· · 134 

VII. AIR WAR IN CAMBODIA ............................................................................ 137 

by Carl Berger 

Mr. Nixon Orders the Bombing of Cambodia .......................................... 141 

Congressional Criticism .................................................... ....................... 147 

VIII. B-52 ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS ................................................................ 149 

by Dr. Robert R. Kritt 

Supporting the Ground Forces ................................................................ 150 

The Laotian Incursion ............................................................................... 160 

B-52's Over Hanoi ...................................................................................... 165 

IX. TACTICAL AIRLIFT .................................................................................... 169 

by Col. Ray L. Bowers 

Forces and Organization .......................................................................... 169 

Airlift in the Ground War .................................................... ....................... 171 

Other Applications of Tactical Airlift ........................................................ 183 

X. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT ................................................................................. 187 

by Kenneth L. Patchin 

Bases and Routes ...................................................................................... 191 

Airlifting Troops ......................................................................................... 196 

Return of the POW's .................................................................................. 198 

XI. AIR REFUELING .................................................................................. 201 

by J. C. Hopkins 

Increasing Demands for Fuel .................................................................... 205 

The 1972 Surge ...................................................................................... .... 207 

XII. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE ................................................................ 211 

by William Greenalgh 

Yankee Team ............................................................................................. 212 

North Vietnam ............................................................................................ 213 

South Vietnam ........................................................................................... 21 7 

xii 
The Post-Tet Era ...................................................................................... 219 

Reconnaissance Winds Down ................................................................ 220 

XIII. CONTROL OF STRIKE AND DEFENSE FORCES ................................... 223 

by Roland W. Ooty, Jr. and Doris A. Krudener 

Expand ing the Radar Net ........................................................................ 223 

The EC-121 Task Force ........................................................................... 226 

Air Defense ............................................................................................... 227 

Air Traffic Control .................................................................................... 231 

XIV. AIR RESCUE .......................................................................................... 235 

by William B. Karstetter 

The SAR Task Force ............................................................................... 237 

The Problem of Night Rescue ................................................................ 242 

XV. LOGISTICS .............................................................................................. 245 

by Bernard J. Termena 

Base Materiel ......................................................................................... 245 

Prime Beef and Red Horse .................................................................... 251 

XVI. BASE DEFENSE .................................................................................... 257 

by Historical Staff 

The Enemy Threat ................................................................................. 257 

Allied Defenses ...................................................................................... 259 

The 1968 Tet Offensive .......................................................................... 265 

XVII. MEDICAL SUPPORT .............................................................................. 271 

by Carl Berger 

Facilities and Suppl ies ........................................................................... 273 

Aeromed ical Evacuation ........................................................................ 277 

XVIII. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ...................................................................... 285 

by Lt. Col. JackS. Ballard 

Funding Program ....................... _ ......................................................... 288 

Medical Services ................................................................................... 289 

Tet Recovery Activities .......................................................................... 293 

xiii 
XIX. TRAINING AND MANNING THE COMBAT FORCE ....... . ..... . 297 

by Carl Berger 

The Pilot Deficit ........ ............ . . .. . .. . .. . .. . ..... .... 297 

Airl ift and Special Operation Crews . ............... ..... ..... 299 

Technical Training ........ ..... . .. .. . ... . . .. . .. .. ........ . . 302 

Officer Recruitment . . .. . .. ......... ........... . . ..... . .. . . . 306 

Survival Training ....................... ..... ..... . .. . .. . ... 306 

XX. VIETNAMIZATION ................. . . . . . . . . .......... ...... 309 

by Historical Staff 

The Language Problem ........ .. .... .. .... . ................ 308 

Integrated VNAF Training ........ ...... . .. ... ............ . . . 318 

XXI. AMERICAN POW'S AND OPERATION HOMECOMING .. . . . . . . .. . 321 

by Carl Berger 

Hanoi Threatens "War Crime" Trials ...... .... . ............. .. 326 

Planning the POW Recovery . ... . . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . .. ..... . .. 339 . 

APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 

1. List of Key Wartime Commanders . .. .... .. .. . ......... 341 

2. Air Force Medal of Honor Winners .... .. . .... .. . . ... .. 355 

3. Aces of the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 

4. USAF Air Munitions Consumption (WW II, Korea, SEA) . . . 368 

5. Air Force Losses- Cumulative .................... . ... 369 

GLOSSARY ..... ...... . . . . .. . ...... . . . . .... . . . .. . .. . ........... 370 

PHOTO CREDITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 

INDEX ... .. .......... . . ...... . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . .... .. . .... . . . .. . . . 374 

xiv 
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
0 

THAILAND 

SOUTHEAST 

ASIA 

50 

I 't 

Nautical 

100 Miles 

0 50 100 Kilometers 

22" 
Chapter I. Introduction 

U.S. Army Air Forces' fighters and 

bombers flew their first combat missions in Southeast Asia during World 

War II. From bases in India, China, and 

the Philippines, they went into action 

against Japanese land, sea, and air 

targets throughout the area, including 

those in enemy-occupied French Indochina. Among targets attacked by 

AAF planes in 1942-1944 were Haiphong 

harbor, Hanoi's Gia Lam airfield, and 

Japanese shipping in the Gulf of 

Tonkin. Beginning in June 1944 B-29 

crews joined the air campaign. Flying 

from Indian bases, they bombed 

Japanese ammunition and supply 

dumps, oil storage facilities, naval 

installations, and other targets at 

Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, 

Rangoon, and Singapore. The Superforts also mined nearby Cap St. 

Jacques (Vung Tau), and Cam Ranh Bay. 

In the spring and summer of 1945, 

Philippine-based fighters and bombers 

swept the coastal railroad, hitting 

targets at Phan Rang, Nha Trang, Tuy 

Hoa, and Tourane (Da Nang). On 15 

August 1945, following the atomic 

bomb attacks o n Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki, Japan surrendered. 

Sixteen years later Air Force crews 

returned to several of the places 

bombed during World War 11-to Thailand and the territory of the beleaguered Republic of Vietnam (South 

Vietnam). The latter for several years 

had been subjected to guerrilla attacks supported by its northern neighbor, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).From bases in 

Thailand and South Vietnam, Air 

Force pilots during the early 1960's 

began flying the first of thousands of 

combat missions over the Republic of 

Vietnam and southern Laos, the latter 

tne location of the famous Ho Chi 

Minh trail. In time this new war spilled 

over into North Vietnam and Cambodia. For some of the participating airmen, Southeast Asia became the 

scene of the th ird war they had fought 

in less than a quarter of a century. 

However, for most members of the 

U.S. Air Force who served 1-year tours 

of duty (many of them had multiple 

tours) in the area, the war against the 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese was 

their first experience in com bat. Along 

with air veterans of World War II and 

Korea, they were ordered into combat 

by three Presidents of the United 

States. The first of these chief executives-John F. Kennedy-had concluded that the United States should 

provide additional military assistance 

to South Vietnam and the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) to preveqt 

their takeover by Communist forces. 

His successors, Lyndon B. Johnson 

and Richard M. Nixon, also reaffirmed 

their support for the preservation of 

non-Communist governments in the 

area. Initially backed wholeheartedly 

by Congress and the American people, their decisions ultimately resulted 

in the longest, most controversial, and 

financially most costly war in the nation's history. 

Origins of the War 

The conflict in .Southeast Asia had 

origins in the Vietnamese nationalist 

movement going back to the end of 

World War I, aimed at ending French 

colonial rule. The government of 

France, however, resisted all Vietnamese efforts to achieve their independence. Following Nazi Germany's conquest of France in 1940, Japan moved 

in on Indochina intending to incorporate that territory into its empire. But 

after the defeat of Germany in 1945, 

3 
the French determined to reassert 

their colonial rule. However, President 

Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943 had 

urged the freeing of all colonial peoples, including those of Indochina, in 

the postwar period . 

During the last months of the war, 

U.S. agents had been parachuted into 

the hills of Annam where they joined 

up with insurgent forces led by Ho Chi 

Minh. These local forces, known as 

the Viet Minh, included both Communist and non-Communist elements, 

all united in their desire for independence. The Americans brought with 

them a small supply of rifles, mortars, 

machineguns, grenades, and bazookas and began training Ho's troops to 

use them against Japanese occupation troops. On 15 August 1945, following Japan's surrender, President 

Harry S. Truman issued General Order 

No. 1 governing procedures for disarming Japanese forces in the Far 

East. In the case of Indochina, he designated the 16th parallel as the line 

north of which Chinese Nationalist 

troops would disarm the Japanese. 

South of that line British forces were 

to accept the Japanese surrender. 

On 9 September 1945, when advance elements of about 200,000 

Chinese troops arrived in Hanoi, they 

found that Ho Chi Minh's forces had 

already taken control of the northern 

region, replaced all French street 

signs with Vietnamese ones, and issued a Declaration of Independence 

on 2 September establishing the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On 

12 September British Commonwealth 

forces landed at Tan Son Nhut airfield 

outside Saigon accompanied by a 

detachment of 150 French troops. 

Three weeks earlier British authorities 

in London had determined to restore 

France's administration of Indochina. 

By 23 September the French, with the 

help of the British, reassumed control 

of Saigon. The French subsequently 

began negotiations with the Chinese 

to permit French military forces to 

4 

move into the northern part of Vietnam. 

An agreement was reached and, in 

March 1946, a French military force 

arrived at Haiphong to relieve the 

Chinese Army of its responsibilities 

under General Order No. 1. The 

French commander, Gen. Jacques 

Leclerc, began negotiations with Ho 

and, on 6 March, an accord was 

reached . Under its provisions, the 

French agreed to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam "as a free 

state, having its Government, its Parliament, its army, and its finances, and 

forming a part of the Indochinese 

Federation and the French Union." 

Further negotiations spelling out 

details of Vietnamese independence 

got under way in the spring of 1946 at 

Dalat, at a time when Vietnamese 

guerrilla warfare was under way in 

southern Vietnam (Cochinchina). But 

the discussions foundered on the issue of Vietnamese autonomy, whereupon the French announced the establishment of an "independent" 

Cochinchina within the French Union. 

This act only exacerbated the situation and stimulated guerrilla warfare 

in the south. Another attempt to reach 

an agreement came during the summer of 1946, when Ho and a Viet Minh 

delegation travelled to France for 2 

more months of discussion of the issue. Once again, the talks failed over 

the issue of Vietnamese independence. The Viet Minh delegation returned home and, shortly after, forces 

commanded by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap 

launched a series of attacks on French 

posts and truck convoys, inflicting 

heavy casualties and provoking general hostilities. 

While these events were unfolding 

in Southeast Asia, Washington 's attention was focused on a divided Europe whose eastern half was firmly 

under Soviet control. An additional 

cause for worry was the substantial 

political support the Communist parties of France and Italy began winning 

during the early postwar years. 
American officials felt it was essential 

to restore France so as to enable her 

to reassume her historic role in western Europe. Support of French policy 

in Indochina followed. Thus, the United States accepted the French proposal to give limited autonomy to the 

Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, 

and Cambodia. A number of Vietnamese-such as Emperor Bao Dai-went 

along with the French and he emerged 

as head of the new State of Vietnam 

(which incorporated Cochinchina). 

The United States recognized the Bao 

Dai government on 3 February 1950. 

Meanwhile, the guerrilla war had 

spread and France found it necessary 

to send more military resources to 

Indochina. Exacerbating the French 

situation was the arrival of Mao Tsetung's victorious troops on the northern border of Vietnam in December 

1949. Ho's Viet Minh immediately recognized the new Chinese Communist 

government, and was recognized in 

turn by Peking, Moscow, and the 

satellite regimes of Eastern Europe. On 

16 February 1950 France formally requested American military and 

economic assistance in prosecuting 

the Indochina war. 

At this point the Truman administration undertook an evaluation of the 

situation in Southeast Asia. It concluded that "the threat of Communist aggression in Indochina is only one 

phase of anticipated Communist plans 

to seize all of Southeast Asia." In National Security Council Memorandum 

64, dated 27 February 1950, it further 

stated that " all practicable measures 

[should] be taken to prevent further 

Communist expansion in Southeast 

Asia ... The neighboring countries of 

Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a 

Communist-dominated government. 

The balance of Southeast Asia would 

then b e i n g r a v e h a z a r d . · ' 

Subsequently, on 1 May 1950, President Truman approved an initial allotment of $10 million for French Indochina. 

The U.S. Air Force in Indochina 

Starting in the summer of 1950 and 

during the next two decades, U.S. Air 

Force personnel-military advisors, 

maintenance and supply experts, 

combat crews, etc.-were ordered 

into French Indochina and later to its 

successor states, South Vietnam, 

Laos, and Cambodia in support of national policy. Besides serving as 

members of the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon beginning in July 1950, USAF personnel 

during the early 1950's were sent to 

Indochina on temporary duty (TOY) for 

specific purposes. For example, in 

January 1953 a Philippine-based Air 

Force aircraft maintenance and supply detachment was sent to Nha Trang 

airfield to help the French to maintain 

G-47 transports lent to them for use 

against the Viet Minh. The detachment 

completed its work and withdrew in 

August 1953. 

In February 1954, several months 

prior to the crisis surrounding the battle of Dien Bien Phu, several hundred 

USAF mechanics were again sent to 

Indochina to help keep other U.S.-Ioan 

aircraft in flying condition. In the early 

spring of 1954, at the request of the 

French the Air Force helped fly in 

troop reinforcements from North Africa and France to bolster the deteriorating military situation at Oien Bien 

Phu. Just prior to the climax of the 

battle in May, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his advisers mulled 

over U.S. intervention in the form of a 

possible Air Force and U.S. Navy tactical strike, to include the use of B-29 

bombers, to relieve the enemy's pressure on the French garrison. In this 

regard, Brig. Gen·. Joseph D. Caldara, 

commander of the Far East Air Forces 

Bomber Command in Japan, in April 

1954 reconnoitered the Dien Bien Phu 

5 
2 

(1·21 The US. government loaned France a number of Air Force transports to 

bolster French Air Force airli1l operations against VIet Minh forces. (3, 5) In the 

1960's, Air Force C·123's, converted Into spray aircraft, were employed to defoliate 

jungle vegetation which provided cover for guerrillas who ambushed military 

and c ivolian traffic In South VIetnam. (4) An Air Force Forward Air Controller 

d iscusses a mosslon with his Vietnamese counterpart (6) President Eisenhower 

(1.) and Secretary of State Dulles (r.) confer In the White House with Presodent 

Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of VIetnam, 8 May t957 (7) Viet Minh pri soners 

captured by the French unload military supplies from a USAF C-54 

3 

battlefield in a B-17 and concluded 

that a B-29 strike would be successful. 

However, in Washington key members of the Congress balked at U.S. 

military intervention unless the British 

agreed to participate. When Prime 

Minister Winston Churchill refused to 

go along, the President dropped the 

idea of an air strike. On 7 May 1954 the 

French were overwhelmed by Viet 

Minh troops under General Giap, his 

victory in effect marking the end of 

nearly a century of French rule in Indochina. The very next day, at a previously scheduled international conference in Geneva, Switzerland, representatives of the major powers and of 

the Indochinese people met to discuss 

a cease fire agreement, which was 

subsequently approved on 20-21 July 

1954. 

The conferees recognized the independence of Vietnam, Cambodia, and 

Laos. They agreed that Vietnam would 

be temporarily divided at the 17th parallel pending nationwide elections to 

be held in July 1956 to unify the country. Under terms of separate agreements signed by the French and the 

Viet Minh, France agreed to withdraw 

her forces and presence over a period 

of several years. The Geneva Protocols prohibited the reinforcement of 

local military forces or reequipping 

them with improved armaments beyond what was in the country in mid1954. The Protocols did not require 

the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory 

Group-then at an authorized 

strength of 342 men- to withdraw 

from South Vietnam . The Geneva 

agreement also established an International Control Commission (ICC) to 

supervise the various agreements. 

At the 17th parallel, a demilitarized 

zone (DMZ) was created between the 

two Vietnams with people on both 

sides being allowed to resettle wherever they wished . Some 900,000 Vietnamese in the northern region chose 

to go south, over 300,000 of them 

being evacuate by U.S. Navy vessels. 

8 

More than 100,000 Viet Minh soldiers 

and civilians in the south went _north, 

where some formed the military 

cadres that led the subsequent armed 

struggle in the south. Meanwhile, in 

Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh on 11 October 

1954 once more proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam. In Saigon the State of Vietnam, originally sponsored by the 

French, emerged under a new leader, 

Premier and later President Ngo Dinh 

Diem. He proclaimed his state a Republic and was immediately recognized by President Eisenhower. 

In September 1954 the United States 

also sponsored creation of an eightnation Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which threw a mantle 

of protection over Laos, Cambodia, 

and "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam ... " The 

Senate ratified the SEATO treaty on 1 

February 1955. Meanwhile, the United 

States transferred its economic and 

military assistance from France to the 

new Saigon government and to Laos 

and Cambodia. President Eisenhower, 

who accepted the "domino theory" as 

expressed in NSC 64-i.e., that all of 

Southeast Asia would fall under Communist rule if Ho Chi Minh's government controlled all of Vietnamdecided to assist Saigon to expand its 

armed forces. 

Thus, he approved Diem's plans to 

build an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), consisting of 4 conventional infantry divisions, 6 light divisions, an airborne brigade-size combat team , 13 territorial regiments, support troops, and limited air and naval 

forces . The small Vietnamese Air 

Force (VNAF) was authorized 4,140 

men and was equipped with obsolete, 

non-jet aircraft. It consisted of an F8F 

fighter squadron, two C-47 squadrons, 

two L-19 (liaison) squadrons, and an 

H-19 helicopter unit. The MAAG took 

over training responsibility of most 

South Vietnamese forces after France 

relinquished command authority on 

This Soviet Ilyushin transport 

was photographed dropping 

supplies to leltlst rebels in 

Laos. President Kennedy told 

a Washington press confer· 

ence the Russians had flown 

more than 1.000 sorties on 

behalf of the Pathet Lao 
USAF technicians served on 

temporary duty In Indochina 

to assist the French Air 

Force to ma1ntaln C-47 aircraft transferred to France. 

12 February 1955. The French, however, continued to train the VNAF until 

May 1957. 

In 1956, the year when national elections were to be held to unify the 

country, South Vietnam-which had 

not been a party to the French-VietMinh military agreement or the Geneva 

Accords and had strongly protested 

the election provision-decided to 

ignore the entire matter. Diem argued 

that the northerners would not be able 

to vote freely under Ho's one-party 

rule and that the bloc vote of the North 

would overwhelm those cast in the 

South. The fact was, however, that 

although a Communist, Ho Chi Minh 

was-as President Eisenhower once 

remarked-a legendary hero to the 

Vietnamese people and would probably have won any nationwide election. 

In any event, the election was not held 

and for several years the two Vietnams 

went their separate ways. But in May 

1959 the Central Committee of the 

North Vietnamese Lao Dong (workers, 

i.e., Communist) Party-having firmly 

established control over the countryside by suppressing peasant resistance -called for reunifying the country through armed struggle. 

Shortly thereafter, a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) transportation group 

began work on the Ho Chi Minh trail, 

the infiltration route through Laos to 

the South. The first of an initial 4,500-

man military cadre- most ethnic 

southerners who had received training and indoctrination in the northarrived in South Vietnam . These hardcore VietCong cadres were funnelled 

into Communist jungle base areas in 

Tay Ninh province on the Cambodian 

border (later designated by American 

officials as War Zone C), an area 

northwest of Saigon (War Zone D), 

and in the dense U Minh forest area of 

theCa Mau peninsula. 

Meanwhile, Viet Cong terrorism had 

steadily increased between mid-1957 

and mid-1959, and several MAAG personnel fell victim. Thus, on 8 July 1959 

a U.S. Army major and master sergeant were killed in a Viet Cong attack 

on Bien Hoa. Two months later, several Viet Cong companies ambushed a 

South Vietnamese army force searching for guerrillas in the marshy Plain 

of Reeds southwest of Saigon. 

According to the Viet Cong, this incident marked the official start of the 

armed struggle. Reacting to it, American officials in October 1959 recommended an increase of the strength of 

the MAAG from 342 men to 685 so as 

to provide for U.S. Army Special 

Forces teams to train ARVN rangers 

for border patrols. Despite Communist 

protests to the ICC, Washington on 5 

May approved the recommendation. 

The Special Forces teams arrived in 

South Vietnam by the end of October. 

The Eisenhower administration's 

primary interest at this time was to 

improve South Vietnam's counterinsurgency efforts. Not until several 

months later did it give serious attention to the Vietnamese Air Force, after 

its commander, Col. Nguyen Xuan 

Vinh, grounded all of his old F8F 

fighters because they were unsafe for 

flight. The United States responded in 

September 1960 by shipping the first 

of 25 U.S. Navy AD-6 aircraft to Vietnam to replace the F8F's. Later, 

Washington also agreed to provide 

the VNAF 11 H-34 helicopters. The first 

four arrived in Vietnam in December 

1960, followed by the others over the 

subsequent 3 months. However, logistical actions to support the AD-6's and 

H-34's lagged and many of the aircraft 

soon were out of commission for lack 

of parts. 

Meanwhile, MAAG and Pacific 

Command (PACOM) officials drew up 

a counterinsurgency plan which 

called for providing substantial U.S. 

aid to the South Vietnamese in dealing 

with insurgency. The draft plan, completed by the Commander in Chief, 

Pacific (CINCPAC} in April 1960, was 

approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS}. The latter proposed that South 

9 
Vietnam unify its military command, 

enlarge the army, and augment slightly (by 499 men) the Vietnamese Air 

Force. 

Kennedy Administration 

Policies 

Two weeks before John F. Kennedy 

was inaugurated as President in January 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita 

Khrushchev made a speech in Moscow to the Communist Party Congress 

which had a decisive influence on the 

new chief executive's view of events in 

Southeast Asia. Describing various 

kinds of wars which might occur in the 

future, Khrushchev announced that 

the Soviet Union would " wholeheartedly" support wars of national liberation, examples of which were, he said, 

"the armed struggle waged by the 

peop le of Vietnam and the present war 

of the Algerian people . . . . " Impressed 

by Khrushchev's speech, President 

Kennedy indorsed the counterinsurgency plan in principle and ordered 

his key assistants to undertake a major study of doctrine and force requirements to support it. Almost concurrently, Hanoi announced the establishment within South Vietnam of the 

National Front for the Liberation of 

Vietnam (NLF). 

10 

Kennedy had scarcely settled in 

office when he was faced with a series 

of crises centering on Southeast Asia, 

including a deteriorating situation in 

Laos, where the government was 

threatened by Communist Pathet Lao 

forces. In a press conference statement on 23 March 1961 , the President 

told the American people that : 

Soviet planes, I regret to say, have 

been conspicuous in a large-scale 

airlift into the battle area-over .. . 

1,000 sorties since last December 

13th, plus a whole supporting set of 

combat specialists. mainly from 

Communist North Viet-Nam, and 

heavier weapons have been provided 

from outside, all with the clear object 

of destroying by military action the 

agreed neutrality of Laos . .. We 

strongly and unreservedly support 

the goal of a neutral and independent 

Laos, tied to no outside power or 

group of powers . .. 

Within South Vietnam, similar 

forces continued to threaten the Diem 

government. Whereupon , in May 1961 

Mr. Kennedy dispatched Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to South 

Vietnam to consult with Diem . 

Subsequently, President Kennedy 

agreed to increase U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam. It included, in 

the case of the Air Force, the dispatch 

of a mobile control and reporting post 

(CRP) from the United States to Tan 

Son Nhut Air Base (AB) outside SaiHo Chi Minh visited Moscow 

on the 44th anniversary of 

the birth of the Soviet state, 

7 November 196t . Among 

the COmmunist leaders pres· 

ent were (1. to r.) Bias Roca 

of Cuba; Ho; Soviet Premier 

Nikita Khrushchev ; Janos 

Kadar of Hungary; Soviet 

President leonid Brezhnev; 

Deputy Premier Fret Koslov; 

Presidium member Mikhail 

Suslov; and First Deputy 

Premier Anastas Mikoyan. 
On 3 January 1962 Prestdenl 

Kennedy mel wilh Secretary 

McNamare and !he Join! 

Chiefs of Staff, in Florida 

They are (1. to r.) Gen 

George H. Decker Army 

Chief of Slat!. Gen lyman l 

lemnitzer, Chaorman, JCS. 

Gen. Curtrs E LeMay, Air 

Force Chief of Slat! (back to 

!he camera), Vice President 

Johnson, Presidenl Kennedy, 

McNamara; Adm. George W 

Anderson. Jr., Chit-1 of Naval 

Operations : Gen. David M. 

Shoup, Com mandan!, Marine 

Corps. 

gon. A detachment of the 507th Tactical Control Group departed Shaw 

AFB, S.C., on 26 September 1961 . By 

5 October the control and reporting 

post was operational and began providing radar control and warning in 

the Saigon area while also serving as 

a facility in which to train VNAF radar 

technicians. 

In 1961 , the President also approved 

"in principle" a 30,000-man increase 

in South Vietnam's armed forces. The 

Vietnamese Air Force was authorized 

its second fighter squadron, a third liaison squadron, and a photo reconnaissance unit. Secretary of Defense 

RobertS. McNamara directed that the 

Vietnamese be provided armed T-28 

trainer aircraft for the fighter squadron. The U.S. ambassador in Saigon, 

Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., rejected a 

separate Air Force proposal to equip 

the VNAF reconnaissance unit with 

four RT/T-33 jets, citing the prohibition on jet aircraft in the Geneva Protocols. The third liaison squadron was 

equipped with L-19's, transferred from 

the VNAF training center at Nha 

Trang. 

President Kennedy also approved 

the establishment of a U.S. South Vietnamese combat development and test 

center in Vietnam, under the direction 

of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency, for 

. 

I 

the purpose of learning and improving 

counterinsurgency techniques and 

tactics. Among the ideas listed for 

examination was the use of aerial-delivered defoliants to reduce jungle 

cover along major highways, where 

Viet Cong units frequently ambushed 

government troops. That such a 

project was needed became apparent 

to two U.S. Congressmen who visited 

South Vietnam in late 1961 for a firsthand look at the war. Rep. William E. 

Minshall later reported that 15 miles 

outside of Saigon the situation remained " very tenuous ... very strained. 

The roads are being cut every night. 

There are road blocks set up every 

night and you can hear mortar fire 

every night." 

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force 

Chief of Staff, responded to the President's interest in having the armed 

forces prepared to fight guerrilla wars 

by establishing the 4400th Combat 

Crew Training Squadron (Jungle Jim) 

at Eglin AFB, Fla. on 14 April 1961 . It 

quickly attracted highly motivated 

airmen who were rapidly qualified to 

conduct sub rosa air commando operations. On 11 October the President 

authorized deployment of a Jungle 

Jim detachment to South Vietnam for 

training purposes. After Saigon approved, Detachment 2A, 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron-desig11 
nated Farm Gate-departed the United States for Bien Hoa, South Vietnam. Farm Gate included 151 officers 

and men and 8 T-28's, 4 SC-47's and 4 

RB-26's. The T-28's and SC-47's arrived at Bien Hoa on 4 November 

1961; the RB-26's reached Vietnam 

some time after 18 December 1961 . 

All aircraft carried Vietnamese Air 

Force markings. 

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1961, Communist Pathet Lao forces accelerated 

their operations against the Royal 

Government of Laos. At the same time 

several Viet Cong units of up to 1 ,500 

men began cutting strategic highways 

in the vicinity of Saigon and other 

urban areas. This notable rise of insurgent activities led President Diem to 

proclaim a state of emergency. 

Surprised by this outburst of Communist activities, USAF advisors asked 

for the deployment of a detachment of 

four RF-1 01 's to Tan Son Nhut to conduct reconnaissance missions over 

Vietnam and Laos. An invitation from 

the South Vietnamese for the U.S. Air 

Force to take part in an air show in 

October 1961 provided the occasion 

to send these jets into the area. 

Between 20 October and 21 November, these aircraft flew 67 sorties. 

Early in November, four RF-1 01 's of 

the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance 

Squadron based in Japan were deployed to Don Muang Airport, Thailand, to augment and then replace the 

Tan Son Nhut-based detachment. By 

the end of 1961 , the 45th had flown 

some 130 missions. 

President Kennedy-concerned 

about a lack of confidence in Saigon 

resulting from the recent Viet Cong 

successes- on 13 November 1961 

approved recommendations made by 

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and Dr. Walt W. 

Rostow, a national security advisor, 

both recently returned from a visit to 

South Vietnam . To increase Vietnamese military mobility, the President 

authorized deployment of three U.S. 

Army H-21 helicopter companies (40 

12 

aircraft), a USAF squadron of 16 C-123 

assault transport planes (code name 

Mule Train), and the loan to the VNAF 

of 30 T-28 aircraft. On 30 November 

the President permitted an aerial 

spray flight of six C-123's (Ranch 

Hand)-which had arrived at Clark AB 

in the Philippines- to continue on to 

Vietnam to undertake " carefully controlled " defoliation operations. Most 

of the USAF units were in place in 

South Vietnam in early 1962. They 

came under the command of Brig. 

Gen. Rollen H. Anthis, who landed at 

Tan Son Nhut on 20 November to assume command of four numbered 

detachments, three located in South 

. ,., 

USAF spray missions to de· 

foliate jungle vegetation. to 

eliminate ambush sites, gen. 

erated much controversy 

during I he war. 
(Above) Dr. James W 

Brown (2nd from left), a civolian expen assigned to the 

Pentagon, dorected the ino~al 

defoliation tests on South 

Voetnam 

Vietnam, and one in Thailand . His initial organization was designated as 

2nd ADVON. 

During the waning days of 1961 , the 

first combined U.S.-South Vietnamese 

air mobile operation was launched 

against the Viet Gong's War Zone D 

headquarters northeast of Saigon. Its 

purpose was to locate and capture a 

clandestine Viet Cong radio transmitter. Two newly arrived U.S. Army helicopter companies lifted 360 Vietnamese airborne troops to five landing 

zones in the area on 23 December. 

Additional troops were brought in on 

the 27th. During the critical phases of 

these helicopter lifts, a Vietnamese 

Forward Air Controller (FAC) in a L-19 

and two VNAF AD-6's flew overhead . 

The operation resulted in 2 Viet Cong 

killed , 1 wounded, and 46 suspects 

captured . The Viet Cong radio transmitter went off the air and was not located . 

The U.S. military units dispatched to 

South Vietnam- initially viewed by 

President Kennedy as serving in a 

combat "training" role-were authorized to "fire back if fired upon." A 

major prohibition on their operations 

was to avoid injuring or killing noncombatants. As a consequence, although Air Force reconnaissance 

planes discovered many Viet Cong 

targets and President Diem urged vigorous air action against them , USAF 

pilots did not attack because of concern over possible harm to Vietnamese civilians. In December 1961 Secretary McNamara authorized, and the 

JCS directed Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, 

Commander in Chief, Pacific Air 

Forces (CINCPACAF), to deploy a tactical air control system (TACS) to 

South Vietnam to provide " cooperative" use of VNAF and USAF strike, 

reconnaissance, and transport capabilities. 

On 26 December 1961 Washington 

issued a new directive prohibiting 

Farm Gate aircraft from engaging in 

combat operations over South Vietnam except when a Vietnamese crewman was aboard or when the VNAF 

lacked the ability to perform certain 

missions. In the months and years that 

followed, those simple rules of engagement grew into many pages of 

detailed operating instructions telling 

Air Force pilots what they could or 

could not do in combat. The President 

and his chief advisors through much 

of the war retained tight controls over 

aerial operations in Southeast Asia. 

Their reasons were clear-to avoid the 

military intervention of Communist 

China, as had occurred during the 

Korean War, or that of the Soviet Union. 

13 

Chapter II. 

8 trainer aircraft. 

Air Operations 

In South Vietnam 

1962-1964 

In January 1962 the Farm Gate detachment began training 25 VNAF pilots to fly T-28's of the newly organized 

2d Fighter Squadron. It set up several classes for the Vietnamese and 

taught them methods of day and night 

bombing, rocketry, and gunnery. 

Other USAF personnel taught Vietnamese ground crews T-28 maintenance and supply procedures. By 

March 1962 all 25 pilots had been 

checked out in formation flying, tactics, and instruments, and shortly after, the squadron was declared operational. The Americans found that the 

VNAF airmen were excellent pilots, 

although few had night flying experience. One reason for this was that 

some of the U.S. aircraft provided 

under the Military Assistance Program 

-particularly the 1st VNAF Fighter 

Squadron's obsolete AD -6's- lacked 

landing lights or serviceable artificial 

horizon instruments. 

Because the Viet Cong became active mostly after dark, the Americans 

emphasized the importance of night 

operations. Thus, shortly after their 

arrival in South Vietnam, the Farm 

Gate crews began experimenting with 

aerial flares, dropped from an SC-47, 

to light up a target for night strikes by 

the Vietnamese Air Force. The technique worked well and was quickly 

adopted by VNAF airmen, who began 

flying their own flare missions on 5 

February 1962. The success of the 

flare-and-strike technique- the Viet 

Cong would break off their attacks 

when the flares ignited-led Secretary 

McNamara to direct that Vietnamese 

villages be equipped with radios to facilitate calls for air support. By June 

1962 more than 520 radios had been 

distributed. 

In the early weeks of 1962 USAF 

crews also began test defoliation 

flights along the highway between 

Bien Hoa and Vung Tau in an effort to 

destroy the heavy jungle vegetation, 

perfect cover for enemy troops. These 

operations stirred the Viet Cong into 

denunciations of the United States for 

resorting to " chem ical warfare." As it 

turned out, the initial defoliation spray 

was dispensed too thinly and the vegetation was unaffected. On 2 February, 

during a training mission, a C-123 crashed, killing the crew of three. It was the 

first Air Force plane lost in South 

Vietnam. 

Nine days later a second USAF aircraft-an SC-47- also crashed while 

flying a psychological warfare leaflet 

dispensing mission near Dalat. Six Air 

Force personnel, two U.S. Army men, 

and one Vietnamese airman died. In 

subsequently criticizing the operation, 

Secretary McNamara reemphasized 

that U.S. forces were supposed to be 

training the Vietnamese and not engaging in combat activities. 

Early in 1962 the Air Force also began to assist the Vietnamese in setting 

up a Tactical Air Control System 

(TACS). It initially relied upon USAF 

radars at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang 

and a Vietnamese-operated radar at 

Pleiku. This radar network, which 

provided limited aircraft control and 

warning coverage over all of South 

Vietnam, soon began picking up 

15 
tracks of numerous unidentified aircraft. Some of these later proved to be 

U.S. Army helicopters or light planes, 

which had arrived in South Vietnam 

beginning in late 1961 . Ironically, the 

TACS was first tested operationally on 

27 February when two disaffected 

VNAF pilots strafed and bombed the 

presidential palace in Saigon. One 

plane was shot down and the other 

escaped to Cambodia. 

The system was next exercised during the night of 19 and 20 March 1962 

when unidentified low-flying aircraft 

were detected over the Central Highlands. Concerned about them, Diem 

requested-and Ambassador Nolting 

quickly arranged-the deployment of 

USAF jet interceptors from Clark to 

Tan Son Nhut. On 22 March four 

F-102's began flying missions over 

South Vietnam. After flying 21 sorties, 

they were relieved a week later by U.S. 

Navy interceptors on a rotational basis. USAF and Navy crews failed to 

find any enemy aircraft. 

Subsequently, the Tactical Air Control System was refined and expanded 

to provide the communication network which enabled the Seventh Air 

Force commander to exercise centralized control over his forces and to 

monitor the air/ ground situation. 

Within this system, the Tactical Air 

Control Center (TACC) at Tan Son 

Nhut allowed the air commander to 

plan and coordinate the diverse operations of his tactical forces within the 

four nations of Indochina. A number 

of Control and Reporting Centers 

came directly under the Center and 

supervised activities of subordinate 

radar elements known as Control and 

Reporting Posts. 

While work on the Tactical Air Control System proceeded, USAF advisors 

were encouraging VNAF airmen to 

attack VietCong jungle sanctuaries in 

an effort to keep the insurgents off 

balance. In this regard , in 1962 Adm. 

Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, 

Pacific, proposed that Saigon's 

16 

ground forces undertake offensive 

operations to root out the enemy from 

those areas and pacify the countryside. A pacification program was subsequently drawn up, based on a proposal made by Robert G.K. Thompson, 

head of the British Advisory Mission in 

Saigon (1961-1965). Drawing upon 

Britain's experiences with Chinese 

terrorists in Malaya in 1948-1959, 

Thompson recommended the South 

Vietnamese undertake a strategic 

hamlet program. The idea was to build 

fortified hamlets in relatively safe 

" white" areas. From there ARVN 

troops would move farther and farther 

into Viet Cong "red" areas-"like a 

spreading oil spot"-thus presumably 

driving the insurgents out of the country entirely. 

On 16 March 1962, in a much publicized start of the strategic hamlet program, the ARVN 5th Division launched 

Operation Sunrise. It began with a 

motorized deployment of ARVN troops 

to the southern fringes of the Viet 

Cong's Zone D sanctuary in Sinh 

Duong province. Once there, the soldiers moved out to uproot Vietnamese 

peasants-believed to be supplying 

the insurgents with food- to relocate 

elsewhere in fortified hamlets they 

were compelled to build . Following 

the success of this initial operation, 

President Diem ordered a rapid expansion of the strategic hamlet program. 

Meanwhile, U.S. Army advisors were 

working to develop ARVN airborne 

helicopter assault tactics, using 

equipment of two U.S. Army companies which had arrived in Vietnam in 

late 1961. Almost at once a problem 

arose over fixed-wing/air-ground coordination. According to directives 

issued by the newly organized U.S. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV),* all helicopter operations into areas where enemy opposi-

' Established on 8 February 1962 with Gen. 

Paul D. Harkins, U.S. Army, as commander. 
tion was expected were required to 

have fixed-wing tactical air cover. U.S. 

Army corps advisors who controlled 

helicopter usage, however, tended to 

ignore the requirement. 

In April 1962, during a visit to South 

Vietnam, General LeMay learned that 

Army advisors were not calling for 

fixed-wing air support, that only about 

10 percent of ARVN heliborne operations were accompanied by VNAF aircraft, and that the Air Support Operations Center and Joint Operations 

Center at Tan Son Nhut frequently 

were not informed about such operations. Concerned about this situation, 

LeMay subsequently obtained permission to assign air liaison officers 

(ALO's) to all ARVN corps and division 

headquarters and USAF forward air 

controllers to augment VNAF liaison 

squadrons. Moreover. soon after the 

Viet Cong succeeded in shooting 

down four Army H-21 helicopters, 

Admiral Felt directed General Harkins 

to make maximum use of the fixedwing aircraft during offensive operations. This produced an immediate 

increase in the number of ARVN calls 

for fighter cover. For example, whereas during the first 5 months of 1962 

only 81 fighter flights supported helicopter assault operations, during July 

alone there were 139 sorties. Between 

1 May and 12 August 1962, approximately 40 percent of all ARVN operations employed fixed-wing air support. 

Meanwhile, the VietCong continued 

to exploit the jungle environment with 

great skill to interdict South Vietnamese road and rail traffic. On 16 June 

two enemy battalions ambushed an 

ARVN convoy south of Ben Cat, killing 

23 Vietnamese soldiers and 2 U.S. 

Army advisors. Following this incident 

and a rash of lesser ones, General 

Anthis recommended-and General 

Harkins approved- the mandatory use 

of air cover over all Vietnamese road 

and train convoys. The Vietnamese 

Joint General Staff issued the necessary directive. There fol lowed a complete turnaround in the number of 

enemy ambushes. During the first 8 

months of 1962, the Viet Cong ambushed convoys on 462 occasions; 

thereafter, for more than a year, no airescorted convoy was hit. 

On 23 July Secretary McNamaramindful of President Kennedy's policy 

that the major task of U.S. advisors 

was to prepare Republic of Vietnam 

Armed Forces (RVNAF) for combatordered an increase in the training of 

their troops and delivery of additional 

equipment so as to phase out U.S. 

combat, advisory, and logistic support 

activities. At the same time, he honored General Harkins' request for 

two more U.S. Army helicopter companies to support the ARVN's expanding ground operations. Harkins and 

McNamara initially delayed acting on 

a request from General Anthis to 

augment Farm Gate with 5 T-28's, 10 

B-26's, and 2 C-47's to enable him to 

meet the support requirements. The 

delay resulted from the fact that the 

request had not been presented to the 

JCS and was contrary to the President's policy. It was not until November 1962 that CINCPAC recommended 

the measure to the Joint Chiefs. who 

spent another month studying the 

proposal before recommending it to 

the Defense Secretary. Not until the 

proposal was cleared by the State 

Department 2 weeks later did McNamara recommend the President's 

approval. Another 11 days elapsed 

before the White House gave the " goahead." · 

Aerial reconnaissance was another 

area where the Air Force could not 

keep pace with expanding combat 

operations (see also Chapter XII). In 

1962 the Vietnamese Air Force possessed two camera-equipped C-45's 

to conduct photo reconnaissance 

flights; at the same time, its visual 

reconnaissance activities had been 

reduced following transfer of L-19 pilots to fighter cockpits. The few RF101 's at Don Muang were heavily in17 
volved in meeting intelligence requirements in both Vietnam and Laos. All 

combat film was processed in Saigon 

or at an Air Force laboratory at Don 

Muang. However, the time between 

receipt of a request for aerial photos 

and their delivery proved much too 

lengthy in a situation involving fastmoving, elusive guerrilla troops who 

could hide in jungle growth. 

To correct this situation Harkins 

proposed-and Admiral Felt authorized-equipping the VNAF with a tactical reconnaissance squadron composed of 4 RT 33's, 3 RC-47's, 18 AT28's and several field processing centers. McNamara eliminated the RT-33 

jet aircraft and approved the squadron. In September the VNAF activated 

the 716th Reconnaissance Squad ron 

at Tan Son Nhut with two RC-45's while 

awaiting delivery of the other equipment. Meanwhile, Farm Gate crews 

obtained two RB-26's to meet the 

growing needs for reconnaissance 

photography. 

In early 1962 the Joint Operations 

Center Airlift Branch-manned by Air 

Force personnel-prepared daily 

schedules for the C-123's. Inadequate 

aerial port and mission control facilities caused serious inefficiencies, 

however. To overcome these problems, MACV in September organized a 

theater-level managerial apparatus 

known as the Southeast Asia Airlift 

System (SEAAS). It consisted of C-123 

units, aerial ports, and countrywide 

control detachments, which operated 

in support of MACV J-4 workload allocations. Meanwhile, a second C-123 

squadron arrived in South Vietnam to 

beef up the airlift system . In April1962, 

to stretch the scant aircrew resources 

of the VNAF, 30 USAF pilots (who became known as the Dirty Thirty) were 

detailed to serve with the Vietnamese 

G-47 squadrons, allowing transfer of 

some Vietnamese pilots to T-28 units 

(see also Chapter IX). 

Meanwhile, after several U.S. Army 

light transport aircraft were lost to 

18 

enemy fire in Vietnam, General Harkins recommended deployment of the 

Army's HU-1A (Huey) Helicopter gunships to provide local fire support for 

air mobile operations. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff recommended and 

Secretary McNamara approved the 

additional deployment in order to test 

under field conditions the concept of 

armed helicopters. In September, 

15 Huey gunships arrived in South 

Vietnam. They were joined later by six 

OV-1 Mohawk turboprop observation 

aircraft, equipped with .50 caliber 

machineguns as well as cameras. 

The National Campaign Plan 

During the late summer and fall of 

1962, General Harkins' staff drafted a 

National Campaign Plan (NCP) designed to defeat the VietCong. Under 

this plan the Vietnamese armed forces 

would be reorganized preparatory to 

launching a three-phased military operation. Initially, their mission was to 

drive the enemy back into his base 

sanctuaries inside South Vietnam. 

This done, the Vietnamese would 

launch a general offensive or " explosion" of all their forces in all corners 

of the country to destroy the enemy. 

Finally, it would be followed by a consolidation phase during which Saigon's authority would be extended 

throughout the Republic. Harkins 

proposed the general ARVN offensive 

begin in early 1963, after the Buddhist 

Tet holiday; he thought it could produce a military victory by year's end. 

On 8 October 1962 he briefed Secretary McNamara on the plan and secured his approval to submit it to the 

South Vietnamese. President Diem 

endorsed the concept and on 26 November issued orders to reorganize 

the Vietnamese armed forces. Vietnamese Army, Navy, Air Force and 

Special Forces commands were subsequently activated as major operational components serving under a 
Joint General Staff (JGS). Beyond the 

Capital Military District, the country 

was divided into four corps tactical 

zones (CTZ's). A new Joint Operations 

Center, set up to serve the Vietnamese 

General Staff, impacted upon the existing VNAF-USAF Joint Operations 

Center. The latter, twice redesignated, 

eventually emerged as the Air Operations Center (AOC). 

Meanwhile, Admiral Felt and General Anthis alerted Harkins to the fact 

that there was a serious shortage of 

fixed-wing aircraft to support the nationwide offensive and reminded him 

of long-pending Air Force requests 

to strengthen Farm Gate units. 

Whereupon, on 7 November 1962, Harkins authorized an increase of 5 T28's, 10 B-26's, and 2 C-47's. There 

was a delay in receiving approval from 

Washington, and it was not until 31 

December 1962 that President Kennedy authorized the increase in the 

number of USAF aircraft in South Vietnam. 

Although the additional aircraft arrived at South Vietnam in January 

1963, General Anthis was worried 

about the national campaign plan. He 

thought it would place demands upon 

the Vietnamese Air Force far beyond 

its capability, especially since its 

scheduled expansion and training 

would be taking place during the " explosion" phase of the plan. Citing the 

sizable gap between expected requirements and available air assets, 

he asked for the interim deployment of 

one USAF T-28 squadron, one 8-26 

squadron, two RF-101 reconnaissance 

aircraft (bnnging the total to six), ana 

two RB-26's for local photographic 

services at Da Nang and Pleiku. 

General Harkins' headquarters, then 

completing detailed studies on several 

parts of the three-pronged NCP, did 

not immediately respond. 

A highly relevant aspect of the campaign involved the movement of essential supplies to support it. MACV 

proposed using U.S. Navy ships to deliver supplies to several other major 

port centers in South Vietnam. From 

there USAF C-123's would airlift the 

cargo to airfields in the four corps tactical zones, from which U.S. Army aircraft would deliver the war materiel to 

frontline units. To support this plan, 

Harkins requested deployment of two 

more C-123 squadrons and one CV-2 

Caribou unit to join one recently 

deployed to the theater. 

While the buildup of offensive 

forces got underway, the South Vietnamese launched a series of groundair operations in support of the strategic hamlet program. In October U.S. 

Army Huey gunships began working 

with the ARVN 21st Division in the Ca 

Mau peninsula. Elsewhere, northeast 

of Saigon, C-123's and C-47's on 20 

November dropped 500 ARVN paratroopers into the eastern fringes of the 

Viet Cong's Zone 0 sanctuary. From 

this base of operations, Vietnamese 

rangers on 19 December launched a 

nighttime drive through the jungle 

accompanied by B-26's and T-28's 

overhead. U.S. Army advisors reported 

general-purpose and napalm bombs 

dropped by these aircraft had penetrated the jungle cover with good effects. 

Elsewhere, an ARVN heliborne operation was launched just before 

Christmas Day 1962 near Tuy Hoa in 

the II Corps Tactical Zone. Twentynine U.S. Army H-21 's were committed 

to the operation without fixed-wing air 

support. The first three helicopters 

safely landed the Vietnamese troops, 

but six others were suddenly hit by 

hidden VietCong automatic weapons, 

which inflicted a number of casualties. 

A U.S. Army company commander 

told the famous war correspondent, 

Richard Tregaskis, the casualties were 

caused by the fact that "there had 

been no softening-up" attack at the 

landing zone (LZ) before the helicopters went in. 

No such error was made on the 

morning of 2 January 1963 when the 

19 
JGS committed the entire VNAF-USAF 

force at Bien Hoa to Operation Burning Arrow, a maximum hour-long air 

strike against pinpoint enemy targets 

in the Tay Ninh area. The preliminary 

fixed-wing bombardment apparently 

surprised the enemy and was followed 

by air drops and a landing of helicopters 

carrying paratroopers and rangers 

who seized their objectives against 

very light resistance. Subsequent intelligence received from Communist 

safe havens in Cambodia revealed that 

a number of NLF leaders had been 

killed and wounded. 

Unfortunately, within hours of this 

success the ARVN 7th Division suffered a major defeat in an operation to 

seize a Viet Cong radio transmitter 

near the village of Ap Bac, approximately 15 miles northwest of My Tho . 

The division commander believed a 

VietCong company was encamped at 

Ap Bac. His plan called for heliborne 

troops to land in an arc north and west 

of Ap Bac and then sweep south to 

meet an armored M-113 amphibious 

vehicle company moving to the north. 

Although informed that no tactical 

air support was available (all strike 

aircraft having been committed to the 

Tay Ninh operation), U.S. Army officials agreed to use Huey gunships for 

cover, escort, and fire support. 

Unknown to the division commander 

and his senior U.S. Army advisor, Lt. 

Col. John P. Vann, a well-armed Viet 

Cong battalion-equipped with several heavy machine guns and automatic 

rifles- was dug in under tree lines 

adjacent to the planned helicopter 

landing zones. As the heliborne force 

went in, it came under heavy fire 

which the Huey gunships were unable 

to suppress. Five helicopters were 

destroyed and nine others damaged. 

At mid-morning, the Air Operations 

Center received emergency calls for 

help and diverted two AD-6's to the 

scene. Unfortunately, friendly artillery 

firing through the air space forced the 

AD-6's to hold up their attack against 

20 

plainly visible enemy positions. A B-26 

replacing them arrived after the artillery stopped firing and dropped napalm ; two additional AD-6's and six T28's also provided air support. Later, 

another B-26 and two AD-6's were 

dispatched. The B-26, although striking with accuracy, was finally forced 

away by artillery fire. To add to the 

general confusion, Vietnamese F AC's 

were unable to direct air strikes with 

any accuracy. The enemy's fire continued to range freely over the rice paddies, inflicting telling losses on crews 

of the armored personnel carriers. In 

the late afternoon, six C-123's arrived 

overhead with three companies of 

ARVN paratroop reinforcements but 

the IV Corps commander, Brig. Gen. 

Huyn Van Cao, ordered them dropped 

west of Ap Bac even though the Viet 

Cong were withdrawing to the east. 

During the night the enemy escaped , 

while confused ARVN troops engaged 

each other in firefights. 

Friendly casualties at Ap Bac included 65 Vietnamese troops and 3 U.S. 

advisors killed and 100 Vietnamese 

and 6 U.S. advisors wounded. 

According to the VietCong, this victory was a major turning point in their 

war effort. It rejuvenated their flagging 

morale and taught them tactics which 

were described in a new slogan, 

" wipe- out- enemy- posts- and- annihilate- enemy- reinforcements." Highly 

critical American press coverage of 

the battle for Ap Bac left President 

Diem festering with bitterness. 

During a visit to Saigon several days 

later, Admiral Felt strongly criticized 

MACV for having allowed the Ap Bac 

operation to proceed without fixedwing air support. He asked the Vietnamese JGS to require the mandatory 

employment of tactical air units in 

all future heliborne operations. 

Subsequently, when briefed on the 

extent of air cover required to support 

the National Campaign Plan, Felt 

bluntly labeled the plan infeasible and 

called for its revision. He urged sup-
Bat11• of AP Bac: 

Jan 1963 

port of General Anthis' earlier request 

for two liaison squadrons but only one 

of two C-123 squadrons, and also 

acknowledged the Air Force's need 

for two additional RF-101's and two 

RB-26's. He also recommended to 

Washington that Farm Gate strength 

be increased to permit the Air Force to 

fly more sorties with e·xisting aircraft. 

Shortly afterwards, the Air Force was 

directed to double Farm Gate's 

strength. Admiral Felt also indorsed 

Harkins' request to bring in a second 

Caribou squadron, plus 8 U-1A liaison 

aircraft, and 10 UH-1 B's for use by 

U.S. Army senior corps advisors. 

In Washington, however, senior 

officials still hoped to limit U.S. military involvement. On 25 March 1962 

McNamara decided to send the C-123 

squadron recommended by Felt but 

only one USAF liaison squadron and 

one U.S. Army 0-1A squadron. He directed that they be operated no more 

than 1 year. after which they were to 

be turned over to the Vietnamese. 

Subsequently, the Air Force deployed 

an additional C-123 squadron to Da 

Nang, where it arrived on 17 April. The 

Army Caribou company reached Vung 

Tau in July. 0-1 assets of another 

Army company were divided among 

U.S. Army senior corps advisors. On 8 

July 1963 the Air Force activated the 

19th Tactical Air Support Squadron at 

Bien Hoa; it became fully operational 

in mid-September. 

Meanwhile, General Anthis had 

readied an air strike team of B-26's at 

Pleiku and a similar T-28 strike unit at 

Soc Trang to support the impending 

ARVN ground operations in the II and 

IV Corps areas. The Pleiku airstrip had 

been upgraded but the improved 

3,200-foot Soc Trang runway could 

accommodate only the T-28's. Even 

these planes had difficulty landing at 

Soc Trang at night or when rain 

slicked the short runway. Under these 

conditions, the T-28's could take off 

but were unable to land safely and 

normally would head for Tan Son 

Nhut. In addition to the Farm Gate 

units, the VNAF maintained an A-1 H 

detachment at Pleiku and also operated eight T-28's at Da Nang in support 

of I Corps operations. 

On 22 February 1963 the Vietnamese JGS issued a general offensive 

plan, closely patterned after MACV's 

suggested national campaign plan. It 

called for corps commanders to begin 

initial operations against the Viet 

Cong by mid-March 1963, to be followed by a general offensive on a date 

to be announced by the Joint General 

Staff. The freedom accorded the corps 

commanders, however, resulted mostly in uncoordinated operations. For 

example, air liaison officers in I Corps 

reported that the ARVN 1st and 2d 

Divisions in the north-content to 

control the coastal plains-followed a 

live-and let-live policy with the enemy 

forces in the mountains to the west. 

The corps commander kept tight control on air strikes in his area, requiring 

prior authorization from himself or his 

chief of staff. Unfortunately, there 

were times when the operations center received requests for emergency 

air support but the two officers could 

not be located. 

21 
2 

(1) A1C Norman L. Morgan Inspects I>C·47 mlnlguns. (2)The first AC·47 gunship 

and Its crew. (3) Gunship Interior. (4) F-100 releases Its Ofdnance on a bombing 

mission over South Vietnam (5) An Alr Force bomber unloads a napalm bomb 

on enemy forces dug in along a river bank In South VIetnam. (6) Maj. Robert P. 

Knopf, a gunship commander, relaxes between missions (T) Gunship at Nha 

Trang Air Base, South Vietnam. (8) SSgt Allen D. Niehaus loads ammunition Into 

a mlnlgun. (9) USAF 0 ·1E pilots on a FAC mission. (10) Slde·llrlng mini guns. 

3 

In the II Corps area, the ARVN 22d 

Division-which had deprived the Viet 

Cong of food sources by resettling 

many of the Montagnard tribesmenpoliced the Central Highlands. 

Elsewhere, along the coast the 9th 

Division undertook clear-and-hold 

operations in Sinh Dinh and Phu Yen 

provinces. The 25th, which became 

operational in January 1963, undertook to pacify the guerrilla-ridden 

coastal province of Quang Ngai. Both 

the 9th and 25th asked for deployment 

of air strike teams at Qui Nhon and 

Quang Ngai City, but the limited 

resources made this impossible. Instead, VNAF T-28's and FAC's were sent 

to nearby airfields whenever ground 

· operations were planned. 

Unfortunately, even when given 

advance notice of up to 48 hours, Nha 

Trang-based T-28's were seldom able 

to react on time. During a month-long 

campaign launched by some 10,000 

Vietnamese Army and Marine troops 

on 24 April 1963 against the Do-Xa 

mountain redoubt, the VNAF moved a 

forward echelon of the Air Operations 

Center to Plateau Gi and launched a 

heavy 3-day preliminary bombardment 

of enemy strongpoints. The combined 

ground-air assaults enabled Vietnamese troops to overrun the Do-Xa area. 

Elsewhere, Viet Cong troops, taking 

advantage of the 25th Division's 

preoccupation at Do-Xa, attacked 

Quang Ngai hamlets. However, provincial defense units inflicted heavy 

casualties on them and drove them 

off. 

In II Corps, pacification appeared to 

be a complete success, with the 

Communists clearly thrown on the 

defensive by mid-year. At this point, 

General Harkins recommended-and 

the JGS approved-redeploying the 

ARVN 9th Division southward to the 

Mekong Delta, where the enemy had 

maintained a strong presence for 

many years. However, the Viet Cong's 

decline in II Corps proved transitory. 

During the last half of 1963, South Vi24 

etnamese military effectiveness declined-apparently due to the government's disarray during the Buddhist 

crisis (see discussion below}-the Viet 

Cong returned to their Do-Xa mountain stronghold. 

In the Ill and IV Corps, the Communists continued to dominate large parts 

of the countryside despite ARVN efforts . Factors inhibiting successful air 

operations there included inadequate 

air-ground communications and a 

shortage of VNAF forward air controllers. In Tay Ninh province bordering 

Cambodia, the ARVN 5th Division 

came to rely more and more on U.S. 

Army helicopter gunships to provide 

local air support, primarily because it 

could not get in touch with the air 

operations center. When fixed-wing 

air support was finally provided, ARVN 

forces were able to penetrate into 

Zone D and the enemy's headquarters 

plus several camps along the Ma Da 

river. This success, however, also 

proved to be transitory. The VietCong 

later returned to their burned-out 

ZoneD headquarters, dug deeper into 

the earth, and built stronger log-covered bunkers which enabled them to 

survive all but direct air strikes. 

In the IV Corps area, the ttered 

ARVN 7th Division-still recovering 

from its Ap Bac defeat-showed little 

initiative against the enemy, even 

though it had good intelligence on 

Viet Cong activity. Captured documents disclosed that the enemy was 

moving rice from the Delta through 

the 7th Division's area to feed his 

troops in Zones C and D. To stop these 

shipments, Col. Winston P. Anderson, 

the 2d Air Division's Director of Operations, in March 1963 obtained MACV 

and JGS authorization to undertake 

quick reaction air surveillance and 

strikes in the 7th Division area, using 

ARVN personnel as forward air guides 

to mark targets. However, VNAF officials refused to accept targets marked 

by ARVN troops, rather than by torward air controllers. 
Viet Cong troops cross an 

improvised foot bridge In 

South Vietnam. 

In the lower regions of the Delta, the 

ARVN 21st Division frequently called 

upon five USAF T-28's at Soc Trang to 

provide air cover and support for helicopter operations, often launched on 

the spur of the moment against relatively well armed Viet Cong. However, 

both T-28's and B-26's were too vulnerable to enemy ground fire. In February 1963, after two B-26's were shot 

down, Lt. Col. Miles M. Doyle, the 

Farm Gate detachment commander, 

requested additional aircraft for his 

unit. But General Anthis did not have 

the aircraft to give him. Indeed, in 

March 1963 the Air Force was able to 

honor only about 60 percent of the 

requests from Delta-based units for 

immediate air support. 

Effects of the 1963 

Buddhist Troubles 

During the spring of 1963 there was 

a notable cooling of American-South 

Vietnamese relations against the 

background of growing Buddhist 

opposition to President Diem. The 

problem surfaced in May 1963 when 

the Buddhists-disaffected by Diem's 

policies- organized street demonstrations in the ancient capital of Hue. 

When civil guard troops fired upon 

them, a riot ensued. During the next 2 

months the unrest spread to Saigon, 

which witnessed the self-immolation 

of a Buddhist priest in the heart of the 

capital. This incident shook the government-as well as television audiences around the world-and brought 

down upon Diem 's head a torrent of 

international criticism . As the political 

situation deteriorated, so did the morale of the Vietnamese armed forces 

and their effectiveness in the field. 

While the Buddhist crisis continued 

to dominate the headlines, the Viet 

Cong increased their attacks against 

the strategic hamlets during June and 

July 1963. Their tactics were shrewd 

and effective. If a probing showed 

South Vietnamese defenses were 

" soft"-as in the Ban MeThuot areathe Viet Cong launched sudden night 

attacks which were successful. Where 

hamlets were well-defended, as in I 

Corps in Quang Ngai province, the 

enemy sent in infiltration teams to 

urge the people to join "the struggle 

of the Buddhists." The effects of the 

crisis were soon reflected in the decline of VNAF-USAF tactical sorties 

during the last half of 1963. 

Thus, VNAF flights fell from a high 

of 1,013 sorties flown in May to 736 in 

September and 831 in October. As for 

the Farm Gate detachment-succeeded in the summer of 1963 by the 1st Air 

Commando Squadron- it had planned 

to double its combat sorties. However, 

its intentions were thwarted by aircraft 

losses to enemy fire and declining aircraft serviceability. The latter situation 

was highlighted on 16 August when a 

wing broke off a B-26 and its crew died 

in the crash . By 11 October the squadron was down to 9 T-28's and 12 B26's, with the latter under flight restrictions to avoid undue wing stress. 

After mid-1963, calls by embattled 

Vietnamese outposts for air support 

increased noticeably. In June the Air 

Force flew 70 flare and 40 strike sorties, in July 75/ 52, and in August 79/ 62. 

C-47 pilots were swamped with many 

other unanswered calls for help. In 

September the 2d Air Division placed 

some C-123's on flare duty and managed to provide 172 flare/ 132 strike 

sorties. During this period no outpost 

or hamlet assisted by a flare-andstrike team was ever overrun; others 

went under because of lack of such 

support or because their calls for help 

were never received by the Air Operations Center. 

During the period May through 

August 1963, the VNAF-USAF force 

was unable to fill 534 preplanned air 

support requests from Ill Corps 

alone-167 for lack of aircraft and 

244 for lack of VNAF forward air controllers. It was not suprising that Ill 

25 
Corps ARVN commanders gave up 

and turned to the more readily available U.S. Army gunships. 

The gravest situation was in the 

southernmost regions of the Delta, 

where during the late summer of 1963 

the Viet Cong launched open field 

warfare with well-armed, highly motivated battalion-sized forces. On the 

night of 10 September enemy mortar 

squads laid down a barrage on the 

Soc Trang airstrip while other troops 

attacked two district towns some 70 

miles to the southwest. During the Soc 

Trang attack, four American pilots 

managed to get airborne in two T-28's 

and helped beat off the enemy. These 

USAF airmen later received commendations for their initiative and a 

reprimand for engaging in combat 

without the required VNAF crewmen 

aboard. After 4 days of continuous 

fighting, heliborne Vietnamese marines defeated the enemy around the 

two district towns, helped by paratroopers dropped from C-47 and C123 aircraft. The towns, however, were 

reduced to rubble. During the fight a 

Viet Cong .50-caliber machinegun 

downed an Air Force T-28. 

On 19 October the ARVN 21st Division was ambushed near Loc Ninh in 

Chuong Thien province. Responding 

to this emergency, the Air Operations 

Center committed two A-1 H's, one B26, and five T-28's-the only aircraft 

available-to cover Army helicopters 

sent to the scene. All aircraft expended their munitions by mid-morning in 

a futile attempt to silence enemy guns, 

which downed one helicopter. Other 

aircraft from Bien Hoa and several T28's managed 31 more sorties before 

the day's end. The Viet Cong, however, held their positions, withdrawing 

after dark. Friendly losses were 41 

personnel killed and 84 wounded ((including 12 Americans). In addition to 

the downed helicopter, enemy fire 

damaged two B-26's and six T-28's. 

The Viet Cong hailed Loc Ninh as another victory equal to that at Ap Bac 10 

26 

months before. 

In late September Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, Chairman 

of the JCS, visited South Vietnam. 

McNamara urged Diem to deploy additional troops to the Delta and to slow 

construction of strategic hamlets until 

existing ones could be protected. 

While in Saigon he also reviewed the 

Southeast Asia airlift system whichunder the management of Col. Thomas B. Kennedy, a veteran airlift commander--had met all requirements 

with capacity to spare. Since logistic 

requirements had never reached 

MACV's estimate of 34,000 tons a 

month to support the general offensive, McNamara ordered the return to 

(1) An A-1E Slcyraider al· 

leeks enemy SYpply areas 

(2) An A· 1 E ess•gned lo the 

602nd Air Commando 

Squadron. 
(1) 8 ·57 Canberra tectlcal 

bombers on a mission over 

the Mekong Delta. (2) The last 

VNAF graduating class train· 

ed to fly lhe A·1H by USAF 

crewmen. 

2 

the United States of one Army CV-2 

Caribou company by December as 

part of a planned 1,000-man U.S. force 

reduction. He also called for an accelerated buildup of the South Vietnamese armed forces to allow the early 

withdrawal of the remaining 15,640 

American military men in the country. 

Back in Washington, McNamara 

and Taylor reported to President Kennedy that Diem's repressive measures 

against the Buddhists would likely 

affect the Allied military effort. The 

new U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge-he replaced Nolting 

on 22 August-concluded that Diem 

and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, head 

of the secret police, were hopelessly 

alienated from the people. On 2 September 1963 the President commented publicly that the Saigon government had " gotten out of touch with 

the people" but that there was still 

time for it to regain their support 

through policy and personnel 

changes. By this time, however, dissident Vietnamese officers under the 

leadership of Gen. Duong Van Minh 

had begun to plan a military coup to 

overthrow Diem. 

Departure of the ARVN 9th Division 

to the Delta and the relocation of the 

IV Corps Tactical Zone south of the 

Mekong,effective 1 November, insured 

the success of the coup. These actions upset the delicate balance of military forces maintaining Diem in power. On 1 November 1963 the coup 

leaders launched their revolt. To forestall intervention by the Vietnamese 

Air Force, they seized its commander. 

His deputy sided with the rebels and 

sent four A-1 H's and two T-28's 

against the presidential compound in 

Saigon. A move by loyal Diem troops 

to Saigon was deterred by the threat 

of air attack. On 2 November Diem and 

his brother Nhu surrendered to the 

rebels and were killed. The same day a 

Military Revolutionary Council of 

ARVN generals and colonels led by 

General Minh formally took over the 

government and began the wholesale 

removal of Diemist officials. This action, together with their lack of administrative experience, soon produced 

governmental paralysis. 

Reacting to Diem 's overthrow and 

the governmental disarray, the enemy 

launched numerous attacks throughout South Vietnam. During this emergency USAF and VNAF pilots flew 284 

flare and 298 strike sorties during 

November in defense of threatened 

hamlets and outposts. However, the 

demoralized ARVN ground forces 

were no match for the enemy and , 

before month's end, Viet Cong forces 

had captured enough weapons to arm 

five 300-man battalions. Thus, in I 

Corps, the ARVN 21st Division was 

27 
ambushed in An Xuyen province on 24 

November as it mounted a heliborne 

attack against a Viet Gong battalion at 

Chu Lai. The hidden enemy force, 

equipped with five 7.9-mm machine 

guns and a twin .50 caliber weapon, 

shot down 1 helicopter and 1 T-28 and 

damaged 10 helicopters, 2 VNAF A1 H's, and 1 T-28. 

In Ill Corps, the failure of an ARVN 

5th Division officer to use fixed-wing 

air support apparently contributed to 

another major defeat on 31 December. 

The unit involved, the 32d Ranger Battalion, was surrounded west of Ben 

Cat. The Division's G-3- instead of 

asking a VNAF forward air controller 

and two A-1 H's orbiting overhead with 

full loads of 100-pound bombs to provide assistance-called for and used 

three flights of Huey gunships which 

proved ineffective. The rangers took 

heavy casualties in a battle which 

might have produced an ARVN victory 

but instead ended 1963- the year of 

the general offensive-with another 

disheartening defeat. 

Earlier, President Kennedy-in his 

last public statement on Vietnam before his assassination-on 14 November reiterated America's pledge to 

continue to assist the South Vietnamese to maintain their independence. 

His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, 

reaffirmed that commitment. On 21 

February 1964, in one of his first pu blic comments on the war, President 

Johnson warned Hanoi to end its sup-

. port of the insurgent forces in South 

Vietnam and Laos. Although he appointed a committee of State and Defense Department representatives to 

study ways to increase pressure on 

North Vietnam, he reiterated the past 

policy that the South Vietnamese and 

Laotian people were primarily responsible for their own defense. Thus, on 3 

December 1963 the first 1,000 American military men departed South Vietnam in accordance with McNamara's 

previous announcements. Among 

them were members of the famed Air 

28 

Force "Dirty Thirty" C-47 pilots and 

the U.S. Army's 1st Aviation Com pany. 

Efforts to Revitalize 

Military Operations 

When General Minh's junta assumed 

power in November 1963, it announced plans to improve the effectiveness of the armed forces by placing them directly under the four corps 

commanders. The latter were made 

responsible for carrying the war to the 

enemy. Subsequently, the ARVN on 18 

January 19641aunched the largest helicopter operation ever undertaken in 

South Vietnam up to that time. It involved 115 helicopters which airlifted 

1,100 troops into Zone D. The operation went smoothly but unfortunately 

not a single Viet Gong could be found 

in the area. 

Unsuccessful operations su ch as 

these, combined with continuing political instability, sparked yet another 

coup on 30 January. Maj. Gen Nguyen 

Khanh, commander of I Corps, flew to 

Saigon, ousted General Minh's council, and stated his intention to increase 

operations against the enemy. On 22 

February, he issued his "Chien Thang 

National Pacification Plan," a modification of Thompson's " spreading oil 

stain" proposal. It called for launching 

a series of clear-and-hold operations 

in relatively secure areas. From there 

the Viet Gong would be rolled back 

while simultaneously a " new life development program" would get under 

way to raise the people's standard of 

living. Khanh gave the four corps 

commanders complete responsibility 

for the clear-and-hold operations and 

follow-up actions in their respective 

areas. General Harkins thought the 

plan had a good chance to succeed, 

providing Khanh's fragile government 

stayed in power. 

On 31 January, Maj. Gen. Joseph H. 

Moore arrived in Saigon to assume 

command of the 2d Air Division from 
General Anthis. In reviewing Khanh's 

plan, General Moore was alarmed by a 

provision in it which called for assigning VNAF units to the corps commanders. However, the new VNAF 

commander, Nguyen Gao Ky, quickly 

assured Moore he would not allow his 

air force to be parceled out. Ky interpreted the plan's wording to require 

assignment of VNAF units to corps 

tactical zones, not to individual corps 

commanders. Subsequently, he organized separate VNAF wing headquarters at Da Nang and Pleiku under 

the command of two knowledgeable 

air officers. They became the principal 

VNAF advisors to the I and II Corps 

commanders. He also proposed to set 

up similar wing headquarters for the Ill 

and IV Corps in 1965. 

In keeping with Washington's policy 

of expanding VNAF air capabilities so 

that U.S. units and equipment could 

be withdrawn, MACV and 2nd Air Division in early 1964 undertook major 

reviews of the military situation. 

Although their findings were not encouraging, they prepared plans for the 

withdrawal of the Air Force's 19th 

Tactical Air Support Squadron in June 

1964, followed in 1965 by the 1st Air 

Commando Squadron. To make up for 

this loss, several VNAF squadrons 

were to be equipped with A-1 's, T-28's, 

and C-47's. Meanwhile, the 2d Air Division's aircraft were taking a beating 

from the enemy and age. In February 

two T-28's were lost to machinegun 

fire and, on the 11th, all B-26's were 

grounded after a wing failed during a 

combat flight. 

On 17 February 1964, during a 

MACV meeting, Harkins' new deputy, 

Gen. William C. Westmoreland (he arrived in Saigon on 27 January), urged 

something be done to restore the Air 

Force's "Sunday punch." In Hawaii, 

Gen. Jacob E. Smart, who succeeded 

General O'Donnell on 1 August 1963 

as Commander in Chief, Pacific Air 

Forces, reasoned that the Geneva 

prohibition against introducing jets 

into Vietnam was no longer pertinent. 

He recommended deployment to 

South Vietnam of one of two B-57 light 

jet bomber squadrons. Secretary 

McNamara, however, rejected the 

proposal on the grounds that it not 

only would violate the Geneva agreement but was contrary to Washington's policy of preparing the Vietnamese to fight their own war. He did, 

however, agree to further strengthen 

Saigon's air force and authorized 

equipping a new VNAF squadron with 

A-IH's and to replace the 1st Air Commando Squadron's T-28 and B-26 twoseat aircraft with 25 A-1 E attack 

bombers. 

These decisions, unfortunately, 

came too late for two T-28 Air Force 

pilots and their Vietnamese crewmen. 

On 24 March 1964 one plane--piloted 

by Capt. Edwin G. Shank, Jr.-crashed 

after its wing sheared off during a 

bomb run, killing both men. On 9 April 

a second T-28, piloted by Capt. Robert 

Brumett, went into a dive and failed 

to come out. Other pilots watched with 

horror as the wings fell off and the 

plane plowed into a rice paddy. A few 

days before this second crash, General 

Moore had noted that with the loss 

of B-26 aircraft and suspected 

weakness in the T-28's, "the 2d Air 

Division is practically flat out of 

business:• However, by borrowing nine 

surplus T-28B's from the VNAF, the 1st 

Air Commando Squadron managed to 

stay operational but pilot morale 

sagged. 

Meanwhile, the Viet Gong were expanding their military operations, 

apparently in connection with a diplomatic offensive by Hanoi to neutralize 

all of Indochina. They began on theCa 

Mau peninsula, where the insurgents 

boasted they could take any district 

town at any time. They proved their 

prowess on 12 April 1964 with a dawn 

attack on the district capital of Kien 

Long. VNAF A-1 H's performed valiantly under flare lights, destroying a Viet 

Gong 105-mm howitzer and, after 

29 
(t)USAF strike airetalt of the 3d Tactocal F1ghter Wing provided close air support to the U.S. Army's 11th Armored Cavalry which attacked enemy positions 

northwest of Saigon. (2) Rebellious VNAF p1lots flying AD~ tighter bombers, 

attacked President Diem's palace, May 1962. He was unharmed. (3) Ct23. (4) Capt 

Thomas A. Dwelle, USAF. poses in front ot his A-tE at Bien Hoa AB. South Vietnam. (5) A Vietnamese government observation post, 1963 (6) An A·tH Skyraider 

attacks enemy forces. m Capt Phan Lang Sue, commander, VNAF 516th Fighter 

Squadron lands at Nha Trang alter completing a mission. 

3 

daybreak, providing relays of close air 

support strikes. One fighter took out 

an enemy machinegun set up less 

than 100 meters from ARVN troops. 

Despite the valiant air-ground defense 

of Kien Long, the enemy succeeded in 

overrunning the city, killing more than 

300 ARVN troops. Some 200 civilians 

also were left dead or wounded. This 

defeat was followed by widespread 

terrorist attacks throughout the country. One daring Viet Cong operation 

took place on 2 May 1964, when an 

underwater demolition team sank the 

USS Card, which had been unloading 

helicopters at the Saigon waterfront. 

Secretary McNamara, concluding 

that more aerial firepower was needed, authorized the Air Force to equip a 

second USAF air commando squadron with A-1 E's. Nevertheless, during 

his next visit to Saigon in May 1964, he 

reiterated the administration's policy 

that all U.S. airmen should be out of 

combat within a matter of months. In 

addition, he decided that Air Force 

pilots could no longer fly combat missions, even with Vietnamese observers aboard. They were told to limit 

their activities to providing bona fide 

training only. To balance the loss of 

USAF strike support, he further directed that four VNAF squadrons be outfitted with A-1H's as soon as possible 

and he authorized VNAF expansion by 

another two squadrons, which were to 

take over from the two USAF air units 

scheduled for withdrawal. 

Meanwhile, on 12 March General 

Harkins submitted a plan to the Pentagon to reorganize the command structure in Vietnam to eliminate overlapping responsibilities between the U.S. 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

(established 12 February 1954) and 

the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (established 8 February 1962). His goal was to eliminate 

the advisory group as an intervening 

command so as to be able to respond 

more directly to Saigon's military requirements. The JCS approved Har32 

kins' proposal in April 1964 and it became effective on 15 May. Although 

Air Force officials felt that USAF doctrines and organizational views were 

being ignored, the 2d Air Division did 

gain some strength and stature under 

the reorganization. The Air Force Advisory Group, formerly a part of the 

MAAG, was reassigned to the Division, 

thus bringing all USAF activities in 

Vietnam under one agency. MACV, 

which had "coordinating authority" 

for the Air Force reconnaissance effort 

over Laos, subdelegated it to the 2d 

Air Division. 

Subsequently, changes were made 

in the top level commanders. On 20 

June General Westmoreland succeeded Harkins as Commander, MACV. On 

1 July, Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp 

replaced Admiral Felt as CINCPAC 

and Gen. Hunter Harris succeeded 

General Smart as CINCPACAF. Also, on 

1 July, General Taylor was designated 

the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, succeeding Henry Cabot Lodge. 

Continuing 

Military 

Reversals 

After Hanoi's diplomatic efforts to 

convene an international conference 

to neutralize all of Indochina had 

failed-President Johnson termed it 

" only another name for a Communist 

takeover"-the Viet Cong turned July 

1964 into the bloodiest month to date. 

On the 6th, enemy troops struck the 

Nam Dong Special Forces camp in I 

Corps, killing 55 ARVN troops, 2 U.S. 

rangers, and an Australian advisor. 

Although a flare plane illuminated the 

area, no VNAF strike aircraft were 

available to respond to calls for help. 

Fifteen days later the Viet Cong ambushed 400 ARVN troops in Chuang 

Thien province in the Delta. After the 

battle only 82 able-bodied survivors 

could be found. Nearly an hour 

elapsed before a VNAF forward air 
An A-1 E at Qui Nhon, May 

1965. controller arrived over the battle site. 

Strike aircraft from Bien Hoa did not 

arrive for 1Y2 hours. 

With the Chuang Thien disaster in 

mind, Westmoreland asked General 

Moore and Brig. Gen. Delk M. Oden, 

commander of the U.S. Army Support 

Command, Vietnam, to prepare an 

agreement to govern coordination of 

all aviation activity in South Vietnam . 

They subsequently proposed to colla· 

cate MACV's Army Air Operations Sec· 

tion with the Joint USAF·VNAF Air 

Operations Center at Tan Son Nhut 

and to collocate air support centers 

in the corps areas. Henceforth, senior 

U.S. Army advisors would conduct 

preplanning conferences on at least a 

daily basis with their Air Force coun· 

terparts to insure full utilization of 

fixed·wing strike aircraft. The new ar· 

rangement became effective in August 

1964. 

Moore also was authorized to estab· 

lish a VNAF air request net manned by 

Vietnamese personnel so as to enable 

ARVN commanders to flash calls for 

air assistance directly to an air sup· 

port center. Intermediate ARVN head· 

quarters, monitoring the requests, 

could cancel them only if there were 

more urgent ones. The VNAF net was 

installed in the four corps areas by the 

end of 1964. Although ARVN com· 

manders were unhappy with the arrangement, the Vietnamese high 

command on 1 March 1965 directed 

that the VNAF net would serve as the 

primary system for obtaining emer· 

gency air support. 

The first direct clash between North 

Vietnamese and American forces oc· 

curred on 2 August 1964 when enemy 

torpedo boats attacked the Maddox 

while it was on patrol in the Gulf of 

Tonkin. The attack was apparently in 

retaliation for U.S. sponsored South 

Vietnamese raids along the North Viet· 

namese coast. Two nights later, the 

Maddox and a second destroyer, the 

USS C. Turner Joy, reported addition· 

al enemy attacks against them. 

Whereupon, President Johnson or· 

dered a retaliatory strike against North 

Vietnamese coastal torpedo bases 

and an oil storage depot on 5 August. 

The President then requested and 

Congress on 7 August adopted the 

Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It author· 

ized Mr.Johnsontouse all measuresincluding the commitment of the 

armed forces-to assist South Vietnam 

33 
to defend its independence and territory. During this crisis two B-57 

squadrons were dispatched from 

Clark AB in the Philippines to Bien 

Hoa. In addition, USAF F-100 and F-102 

squadrons were sent to Da Nang and 

still other fighters moved into Thailand. 

A white paper subsequently issued 

by Hanoi admitted the North Vietnamese patrol boats had fired upon the 

Maddox on 2 August because of its 

support of South Vietnamese naval 

incursions. It denied, however, that 

NVA boats were in the area where the 

second attack reportedly occurred . In 

any event, Hanoi signalled its determination to fight by redeploying 30 MIG 

fighters from a South China base to 

Phuc Yen airfield on 7 August. Several 

weeks later, the 325th Division of the 

North Vietnamese Army headed down 

the Ho Chi Minh trail towards South 

Vietnam. During this period, VietCong 

regiments in Zones C and 0--augmented by guerrillas brought up from 

the Delta-were formed into the 9th 

Viet Cong Division. This unit in early 

autumn began to move to the coastal 

regions of Phuoc Tuy province, where 

it was outfitted with Soviet and 

Chinese weapons apparently brought 

in by sea. 

Meanwhile, Ambassador Taylor 

sought new ways to shore up the 

South Vietnamese. On 18 August, he 

recommended to Washington that further military steps be taken "to gain 

time for the Khanh government to 

develop a certain stability." One of his 

proposed actions called for "a carefully orchestrated born bing attack" 

against North Vietnam, aimed primarily at infiltration and other military targets. While these recommendations 

were being reviewed in Washington, 

dissident ARVN troops from IV Corps--

led by Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat-in 
1is USAF aircroft was one 

several destroyed 11 Quo 

oon during a rocket attack. 

September moved against Khanh but 

withdrew from Saigon after General 

Ky sent his VNAF units over the city. 

The political crisis was temporarily 

resolved on 26 October following installation of a provisional civilian government headed by Tran Van Huong, 

Saigon 's former mayor. However, 

Premier Huong found himself unable 

to bring order to the administration. 

Against this background of continuing governmental instability, the Viet 

Cong seized additional portions of the 

South Vietnamese countryside and 

launched a series of attacks aimed 

specifically against the Americans. On 

the night of 1 November 1964, Viet 

Cong squads easily approached within 400 yards of Bien Hoa's perimeter 

and shelled the crowded airfield with 

81 mm mortars. Four Americans were 

killed and 72 others wounded. Losses 

included 5 B-57's destroyed and 15 

damaged as well as 4 VNAF A-1 's destroyed or damaged. At this point, 

Ambassador Taylor concluded that 

while a viable Saigon government 

could not be created through military 

actions alone, a campaign to reduce 

or halt the continuing flow of reinforcements to the Viet Cong from the 

north might resolve some of South 

Vietnam's problems. He suggested 

that air operations beyond the borders 

of the country could contribute to that 

objective. 

In late November, Taylor was recalled to Washington for critical weeklong discussions with the President 

and his key Defense and State Department advisors on future courses of 

action. They agreed the political 

chaos in South Vietnam had to be arrested and further coups avoided. 

They also agreed that a graduated military response against North Vietnamese lines of communication(LOC's) 

would help Saigon's morale and the 

effectiveness of ARVN operations. 

Whereupon. on 2 December 1964 

President Johnson approved a program of controlled air strikes against 

enemy LOC's in Laos to " signal" his 

determination to counter Hanoi's increasing military activities and to 

strengthen the governments of South 

Vietnam and Laos. On his return to 

Saigon, Taylor passed word of these 

decisions and of U.S. reaffirmation of 

support of Premier Huong to the 

South Vietnamese. On 20 December, 

however, General Khanh's Armed 

Forces Council withdrew its support 

of Huong and the governmental crisis 

remained unresolved . 

Meanwhile, good flying weather in 

December 1964 allowed VNAF and 

USAF airmen to score heavily against 

Viet Cong units. On 9-10 December 

VNAF crews helped in the successful 

ARVN defense of Tam Ky in Quang Tin 

province and An Lao in Binh Dinh 

province, both in I Corps. In the IV 

Corps area, VNAF A-1 H and USAF A1 E Skyraiders inflicted more than 400 

casualties and were credited with 

averting destruction of a regional 

force company surrounded near Long 

My after a convoy was ambushed. 

Altogether, the air forces claimed an 

estimated 2,500 Viet Cong troops 

killed during the November-December 

period--more than 60 percent of all 

reported enemy deaths. 

Despite these successes, South 

Vietnam came increasingly under 

enemy attack. On Christmas Eve, the 

VietCong exploded a powerful charge 

in the Brink Hotel bachelor officers 

quarters in downtown Saigon, killing 2 

and wounding 71 Americans. On 27 

December, the Viet Cong's 9th Division attacked Binh Gia village in 

Phuoc Tuy province, southeast of Saigon, setting off a 6-day battle during 

which the 33d Ranger and 4th Marine 

Battalions were virtually destroyed. 

ARVN armored and mechanized 

forces sent to their aid also took heavy 

casualties. The battle of Binh Gia, the 

Viet Cong later boasted, marked the 

end of insurgency phase of its campaign and the start of conventional 

field operations. 

35 

Chapter Ill. The In-Country 

Air War 

OV-10 Bronco. 

1965-1972 

As 1965 opened, there was a desperate feeling among American officials 

in Washington and Saigon that something had to be done to raise South 

Vietnamese morale and reverse the 

depressing political and military situation. In early January, General Khanh 

agreed to continue supporting Premier Huong, but at month's end he 

ousted Huong from office. South Vietnam's governmental turmoil did not 

end for another 6 months. During that 

period the military installed and removed a second civilian premier and, 

finally, ousted Khanh himself, who 

then went into exile. On 21 June, the 

Armed Forces Council installed Maj. 

Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu as the new 

chief of state and Air Marshal Ky as 

prime minister. 

While the South Vietnamese were 

still struggling to organize a viable 

government, the Viet Gong launched a 

series of destructive attacks on allied 

facilities. Thus, in the early morning of 

7 February 1965, enemy mortar and 

demoliiion teams struck with 81-mm 

mortars against the U.S. advisory 

compound and airstrip at the ARVN II 

Corps headquarters in the Pleiku area, 

killing 8 Americans and wounding 

more than 100. Five U.S. helicopters 

were destroyed and other aircraft 

damaged. An hour later the Viet Gong 

attacked and set fire to aviation storage tanks at Tuy Hoa airfield. Fortunately, there were no casualties. 

These events triggered a meeting in 

Washington of the National Security 

Council and President Johnson's decision to order immediate retaliatory 

air raids against barracks and staging 

areas in the southern reaches of North 

Vietnam. That same afternoon, although the target areas were covered 

by clouds, 49 aircraft from naval carriers struck North Vietnamese Army 

barracks at Dong Hoi. The USAFVNAF portion of the retaliatory response was held up because of adverse weather. However, the next afternoon-accompanied by 20 F-100's 

flying flak suppression sorties-28 

VNAF A-1's hit barracks at Chap Le. The 

President, emphasizing that these air 

strikes (Operation Flaming Dart) were 

reprisals for the earlier attacks, 

reiterated that the United States sought 

no wider war. 

The enemy replied on 8 February 

when the Viet Gong struck Soc Trang 

airfield without inflicting casualties or 

damage. Two days later, however, 

they blew up a U.S. Army enlisted 

men's barracks at Qui Nhon, killing 23 

Americans, 7 Vietnamese, and wounding many others. The Allies responded 

immediately, launching Air Force, 

Navy, and VNAF planes against NVA 

barracks at Chanh Hoa and Vit Thu Lu. 

Despite these strikes, the enemy was 

undeterred and announced he would 

continue to attack U.S. military installations throughout South Vietnam. 

The reprisal raids, however, did temporarily lift the sagging morale of the 

South Vietnamese. 

In addition to mounting attacks 

against the Americans, Viet Cong 

troops managed to achieve impressive 

gains in the II Corps area. Whereupon, 

on 19 February General Westmore37 
(1) Secretary McNamara (1.) and Gen Earle G. 

Wheeler, Chairman. of the Joint Chiefs of Statf, 

visit S&~gon on 25 November 1965, where they 

conferred with Lt. Gen Nguyen Huu Co and 

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. (2) Gen Curtla 

E LeMay. Air Force Chief of Staff (I) consults 

with Gen. Paul 0 Harkins. Commander, U.S Mlhtary Assistance Command. Vietnam. In Aprol t962 

(3) Gen. William H. Blanchard. Air Force Vice 

Chief of Staff (1.), Secretary of the Aor Force Eugene M. Zuckert, and Gen. John P McConnell. 

Air Force Chief of Stefl. 
3 4 

(1) Prime Mini ster Nguyen Cao t<y (1.) confers with 

Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, Commander, 2d Air Dlvl· 

slon. (2) Gen. John 0 Ryan, Commander In Chief, 

Pacific Air Forces vlslls with Blnh Thuy AB In VIet· 

nam, September 1967, and greets Maj. Clifford R. 

Crooker, an 0·2A FAC pilot. (3) Gen. George S. 

Brown, Commander, 7th Air Force, accompanies 

Secretary ot the Air Force Robert C. Seamans on 

a tour of USAF activities In South VIetnam. (41 Gen. 

John D. Lavelle, Commander, 

7th Air Force greets 

Gen. Creighton 

w. Abrams, Commander, U.S. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 
land-invoking authority given him 3 

weeks earlier to use jet aircraft under 

emergency conditions-sent 24 Air 

Force B-57's against the Viet Cong 9th 

Division's base camp deep in the jungles of Phuoc Long province along 

the _Cambodian border. Two days later 

an Army special forces team and a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (ClOG) 

company were caught in a Communist 

ambush at the Mang Yang pass on 

Route 19. Supported by F-100 and 

B-57 strikes, which prevented the 

enemy from overrunning Allied forces, 

U.S. helicopters moved in and successfully evacuated 220 men who 

might otherwise have been lost. 

The events of February 1965 marked 

a turning point in the history of the 

war, although the military situation in 

Vietnam remained discouraging. In 

Washington, officials no longer talked 

about withdrawing American military 

advisors. Instead, they now recommended deployment of additional U.S. 

forces to Southeast Asia, proposals 

which the President generally approved. While a campaign of air 

strikes against North Vietnam was 

being readied and launched, Washington also lifted major restrictions on 

air strikes within South Vietnam . On 6 

March, Westmoreland received authorization to use U.S. aircraft whenever the VNAF could not respond on a 

timely basis. The former requirement 

that USAF planes carry Vietnamese 

crew members was dropped. 

On 8 March the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed at Da Nang to 

secure American installations there. 

On 5 May the Army's 173d Airborne 

Brigade arrived at Bien Hoa to defend 

the military complex there. By the end 

of May 50,000 American troops were 

in South Vietnam, 10,000 of them Air 

Force, and more were to come. On 25 

July the President, deciding that an 

even larger force commitment was 

necessary to save South Vietnam, 

authorized an additional troop buildup to 125,000 men. 

40 

As the American ground forces increased, so did U.S. air power. In February 1965, the Strategic Air Command deployed two B-52 squadrons to 

Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, for 

possible use over South Vietnam. In 

April the Air Force activated four 0-1 

squadrons in South Vietnam . The first 

U.S. Marine F-4B's arrived at Da Nang 

on 12 April and immediately began 

flying close air support missions. A 

number of Air Force tactical fighter 

and bomber squadrons also deployed 

to Vietnam on temporary duty assignments, which were later made permanent. In October 1965 the first of five 

F-100 squadrons moved to Bien Hoa 

and Da Nang. They were followed in 

November by F-4C Phantoms of the 

12th Tactical Fighter Wing, which 

were based at Cam Ranh Bay, and 

experimental AC-47 gunships at Tan 

Son Nhut. By year's end, the Air Force 

had more than 500 aircraft and 21 ,000 

men at eight major bases in South 

Vietnam. 

Other SEATO nations also sent military, medical, or civic action units to 

South Vietnam. They included a 1,557-

man Australian ground-air task force, 

a New Zealand howitzer battery, a 

Philippine civic action group, and the 

Queen's Cobra Regiment from Thailand. The largest third-country contribution came from the Republic of 

Korea which was not a SEATO member. It initially dispatched one infantry 

division and a marine brigade totalling 

20,600 men by the end of 1965. Later, 

Korea sent a second infantry division 

to Vietnam . 

Viet Cong/NVA strength also continued to grow and enabled the enemy to 

retain the initiative and ability to interdict almost any line of communications within South Vietnam they 

chose. For example, Communist 

forces during 1965 almost totally isolated the Central Highlands of South 

Vietnam . To help counter enemy activity, President Johnson on 1 April authorized Westmoreland to employ 

Gen. Hunter Harris, Commander in Chief, PACAF, 

stops at Pleiku AB during an 

inspection of USAF units. 
Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, North 

Vietnamese Dele,.. Minoster 

American troops not only to defend 

American bases but also to join with 

the South Vietnamese in taking the 

fight to the enemy. On the 18th, the 

giant Air Force B-52's were brought 

into play for the first time. Flying from 

Andersen AFB, they struck a suspected Communist troop base area in Binh 

Duong province north of Saigon. Although the initial attack was unsuccessful-ground patrols could find little damage before the enemy drove 

them out of the area-the operation 

marked the beginning of extensive B52 operations throughout Southeast 

Asia (see also Chapter VIII). 

Aware of the military weakness of 

South Vietnam , General Westmoreland decided the first phase of Allied 

operations should consist of a holding 

action in areas already under Saigon's 

control. Beyond those areas, he proposed a series of " spoiling attacks" 

against enemy positions to keep the 

Communists off balance while the Allied force buildup continued. That is, 

the emphasis was to be on "search 

and destroy" operations rather than to 

seize and hold new territory. Under 

this strategy, air power was called 

upon to support all major ground unit 

actions while also assisting small special forces reconnaissance teams and 

outposts collecting intelligence of Viet 

Cong/NVA activity along South Vietnam's Cambodian and Laotian borders. 

The deployment of USAF, Navy, and 

Marine units to Southeast Asia during 

the first half of 1965 represented the 

greatest gathering of American airpower in one locality since the Korean 

War. More than 142,000 USAF combat 

sorties of all types were flown and in 

excess of 56,000 tons of munitions 

dropped on enemy targets. The joint 

USAF-VNAF effort alone accounted 

for an estimated 15,000 enemy dead 

and thousands of other casualties during the period. 

The first major combat action involving American troops came in 

August 1965 in I Corps. During Operation Starlight, elements of the 3d Marine Division detected and pinned 

down the 2d Viet Cong Regiment, 

which found itself trapped along the 

coastal lowlands of Quang Ngai province, 15 miles from Chu Lai. With their 

backs to the sea, the enemy fought a 

bitter 2-day battle during which they 

suffered more than 700 casualties. 

Pilots of the 3d Marine Air Wing effectively shut off escape attempts by the 

VietCong. 

In the Central Highlands in II Corps, 

the North Vietnamese launched a 

large-scale attack against the Plei Me 

Special Forces camp in October. An 

enemy regiment of an estimated 2,200 

troops began its assault on 18 October and tried vainly during the next 10 

days to overrun it in the face of intensive USAF air strikes. On several occasions the ferocity of their attack carried enemy troops to within 20 yards 

of the stronghold, only to be beaten 

back. In support of the camp, Air 

Force pilots flew 696 sorties and 

dropped more than 1,500,000 pounds 

of born bs on the attackers. 

An even bloodier operation soon 

followed. Two NVA regiments were 

found in the Plei Me area, which set in 

motion a month-long American and 

ARVN search and destroy sweep 

which killed an estimated 1,800 enemy 

troops. This offensive was supported 

by 384 tactical air strikes, 96 B-52 sorties, and numerous night flare missions. The Communist troops fought 

hard, giving ground only grudgingly. 

However, the pounding from the air 

took a heavy toll, enemy resistance 

finally broke, and the survivors fled 

across the South Vietnamese border 

into Cambodia. But the allied side was 

not always successful. In November 

1965 a South Vietnamese regiment, 

which had defeated the Viet Cong 

281st Regiment, was overrun by the 

272d Viet Cong Regiment, suffered 

heavy casualties and was put out of 

action. Its Vietnamese commander 

41 
(1) 2d Lt. Edward Ridgley, CO, 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry 

Division, calls in an air strike. (2) An allied truck convoy 

heading for Khe San h. (3) Elements of the U.S. Army's 

1st Infantry Division arrive at Vung Tau Bay on 13 July 

1965 as part of the buildup of U.S Forces In Vietnam. 

(41 ARVN troops march to helicopter prior to launching 

an operation against enemy forces In Can Tho, February 

1966. (5) Australian airmen arrive In South VIetnam, 

August 1964. (6) Troops of the Korean Tiger Division 

prepare to board a C·130 at Oul Nhon AB for alrtlfl to 

Ph an Rang AB, May 1966. (71 An airman Inspects aircraft 

ordnance prior to a mission. (81 Resupply drop at Ben 

Het. South Vietnam. 

3 

T 
• 
was killed in the battle. 

During 1966 American troop 

strength continued to grow, reaching 

a total of 385,000. The allies also were 

bolstered by arrival of a second Korean infantry division and additional 

Australian and New Zealand forces. 

Other air equipment arriving in South 

Vietnam included an F-5 fighter 

squadron, two F-4 squadrons, and 

additional AC-47 gunships. 

On 24 January 1966 fierce fighting 

broke out during search and destroy 

operations in I Corps involving some 

20,000 1st Air Cavalry Division troops 

in Binh Dinh province and the U.S. 

Marines in the adjacent Quang Ngai 

province. Their objective was the 19th 

and 98th North Vietnamese Regiments 

and the 1st and 2d Viet Cong Regiments. The operations were highlighted by excellent cooperation among 

Air Force, Navy, Marine, and VNAF air 

crews who provided round-the-clock 

support. AC-47 gunships were especially effective at night in inflicting 

heavy casualties on the enemy. When 

the operations ended 6 weeks later, 

the Air Force had flown more than 

1,100 combat support missions. 

The only significant enemy success 

during the year occurred in March in 

the A Shau Valley when a Special 

Forces camp was overrun. Located 

astride a section of the Ho Chi Minh 

trail, two miles from the Laotian border and 60 miles southwest of Da 

Nang, the camp was defended by 219 

Vietnamese irregu Iars and 149 

Chinese Nung mercenaries, assisted 

by 17 American Special Forces advisors. Before dawn on 9 March an estimated 2,000 North Vietnamese regulars opened an attack on the outpost. 

Poor weather limited the number of 

sorties that could be flown the first 

day to 29. A CH-3C rescue helicopter 

managed to land and evacuate 26 

wounded defenders that day. An AC47 gunship reached the scene but was 

shot down; three of its six-man crew 

were rescued by helicopter, two were 

44 

killed , and one was missing in action. 

On 10 March the NVA launched repeated assaults against the camp 

under cover of a thick overcast which 

hid the tops of the surrounding hills 

and mountains. Almost miraculously 

an A-1 E pilot made his way into the 

valley through an opening in the cloud 

cover. Other aircraft followed him 

down and flew 210 strikes that temporarily slowed the enemy attack. According to one American survivor of 

the battle, tactical aircrews tried to 

hold off the enemy by flying strikes 

under such dangerous conditions that 

they "had no business being there." 

General Westmoreland later called the 

air support there one of the most 

courageous displays of airmanship in 

the history of aviation. The camp 

commander, Capt. Tennis Carter, 

USA, estimated the A-1 E pilots of the 

1st Air Commando Squadron killed 

500 enemy troops outside the camp 

walls. 

During the day's action, Maj. Bernard C. Fisher became the Air Force's 

first Medal of Honor recipient in 

Southeast Asia, when he made a daring rescue of a downed fellow pilot, 

Maj. D. Wayne Myers. Myers' badly 

damaged A-1 E had crash-landed on 

the camp's chewed up airstrip. Major 

Fisher made a quick decision to try to 

rescue Myers. Covered by his two 

wingmen, Fisher managed to land his 

A-1 on the debris-strewn runway, taxied its full length, spotted Myers at the 

edge of the strip, wheeled around , 

picked him up, and then took off 

through a rain of enemy fire. 

On the evening of 10 March, the 

camp was abandoned. Strike aircraft 

forced the enemy back while rescue 

helicopters went in and picked up the 

survivors. Of the 17 Americans, 5 were 

killed and the other 12 wounded. Only 

172 of the camp's 368 Vietnamese and 

Nung defenders survived to be evacuated. The North Vietnamese suffered 

an estimated 800 deaths, most of them 

attributed to air strikes. As the last helNew Zealand artillery unit 

arrives in South Vietnam. 
Royal Australian Air Force 

helicopter gunship goes into 

action against enemy troops. 

icopter departed, the enemy moved in 

and subsequently began developing 

the camp as a major logistic base with 

connecting roads to the Ho Chi Minh 

trail. Two years would elapse before 

any allied troops returned to retake 

the A Shau valley. 

In mid-1966 General Westmoreland 

prepared to begin Phase II operations 

-a series of offensive actions aimed 

at blunting enemy advances into the 

highlands and neutralizing NVA/Viet 

Cong food and manpower resources 

in coastal regions. Planned to run 

through 1967, this phase emphasized 

Special Forces operations and employment of his fast growing USAF 

strength, now directed by his new 

Deputy for Air, Lt. Gen. William W. 

Momyer• (who also wore a second hat 

as commander of the Seventh Air 

Force, which replaced the 2d Air Division on 1 April). Long range ground 

reconnaissance patrols, working out 

of fortified base camps, infiltrated into 

enemy areas seeking weak spots and 

potential targets. In turn these base 

camps became the enemy's priority 

target. 

On 2 June 1966 U.S. Army and ARVN 

elements moved against a North Vietnamese regiment at Tou Monong in 

the highlands of Kontum province. A 

vicious battle ensued which lasted 19 

days and resulted in more than 500 

enemy dead and decimation of the 

NVA regiment. Air units played a major 

role during the battle. At times, the 

opposing forces were so close that 

strike pilots were forced to try pinpoint bombing well inside the usual 

strike limitations. In one instance, a 

company commander called for and 

received air strikes on his own positions, which were being overrun. The 

strikes stopped the attack long 

enough for the Americans to establish 

a new defense perimeter. 

A milestone of significance to General Westmoreland's operations was 

·He succeeded General Moore on 1 July 1966. 

17 June 1966, when the B-52's completed their first year of action over 

Southeast Asia. Westmoreland later 

wrote: "The B-52's were so valuable 

that I personally dealt with requests 

[forB-52 strikes] from field CO!Timanders, reviewed the targets, and normally allocated the available bomber resources on a daily basis." The MACV 

commander also "continued to urge 

that action be taken to substantially 

increase B-52 sorties." 

About this time, two actions were 

taken to enhance B-52 flexibility of 

operation. The first of these involved 

introduction of the Combat Skyspot 

bombing system, whereby ground 

radar control units directed the big 

born bers over an enemy target and 

indicated the exact moment of bomb 

release. The system reduced planning 

time and provided a flexibility of operations which allowed diversion of the 

B-52's to targets of opportunity. The 

second innovation was establishment 

of a six-aircraft force of B-52's which 

was kept on continuous alert on Guam 

and which could be launched quickly 

whenever a battlefield situation required their assistance. 

Another highlight of 1966 operations was the defeat of the Viet Cong 

9th Division, which had an almost 

unbroken string of victories to its 

credit. In June and July, the 1st U.S. 

Infantry Division and the ARVN 5th 

Division- supported by tactical air 

units- launched attacks on the 9th, 

then massing for an attempt to seize 

the provincial capital of An Loc. In a 

series of five engagements, they . 

soundly whipped the enemy division, 

forcing it to withdraw to sanctuaries 

deep in War Zone C, northwest of Saigon. It left behind more than 850 dead. 

Subsequently, the 9th Division was 

outfitted with fresh troops and new 

equipment. In October- bolstered by 

the NVA 101 st North Vietnamese Regiment-the 9th returned to action, this 

time in an operation aimed at a Special Forces camp at Suoi Da. It pur45 
sued a classic strategy- initiate an 

attack with a minimal force, trigger a 

rescue mission by relieving troops 

who would then be decimated by the 

main enemy force through ambushes 

and counterattacks. Initially, the scenario unfolded as planned. Four companies of U.S. mobile strike forces 

were heliborne into landing zones 

south and east of Suoi Oa, where they 

were immediately attacked by the 

enemy. One company was overrun 

and the others had to withdraw or be 

evacuated by helicopter. 

Responding to this pressure, Westmoreland committed some 22,000 

troops from the U.S. 1st, 4th, and 25th 

Divisions, and the 173d Airborne Brigade. This triggered a raging 9-day 

battle with the enemy stubbornly holding his ground. Tactical air strikes 

came in so continuously that aircraft 

frequently were stacked 1,000 feet 

above each other waiting to drop their 

46 

bombs. Their pressure, plus the heavy 

pounding by the B-52's, finally broke 

the enemy's resistance. More than 

2,500 tactical sorties were flown in 

support of the American troops, including 487 immediate requests for 

close air support. The B-52's flew 225 

sorties. In addition to this strike support, 3,300 tactical airlift sorties delivered 8,900 tons of cargo to the ground 

forces and transported more than 

11 ,400 men into and out of the battle 

zone. 

By early November 1966, the battle 

was over. Allied forces had killed more 

than 1,100 enemy troops and wounded hundreds more and seized enormous quantities of weapons, ammunition, and supplies. including 2,000 

tons of rice. The 9th Viet Cong Division was so badly whipped that it was 

unable to return to combat until the 

spring of 1967. 

Taking stock at year's end, U.S. 

A CH-3E helicopter airlifts 

troops on a mission against 

enemy forces, June 1968. 
An Air Force cameraman 

photographs a machine 

gunner s1rafing an enemy 

posi1ion. 

officials estimated that North Vietnam 

- in order to make up for the huge 

VietCong losses- had been forced to 

commit more than 58,000 NVA regulars and take over a greater share of 

the fighting, especially in the two 

northern corps areas. They estimated 

this boosted total enemy forces to 

282 00~11 0,000 being North Vietnamese, 112,000 guerrilla troops, 

40,000 political cadre, and 20,000 

support personnel. That enemy morale was low was testified to by captured soldiers who complained about 

the allied heavy bombardment (especially those by the B-52's} and their 

personal hardships-inadequate food 

and supplies and long separations from 

home and fami ly. 

The increasing effectiveness of air 

power in 1966 was in large measure 

the result of improved tactics and 

weapons. Airborne forward air controllers developed an effective system 

of visual reconnaissance. Assigned to 

specific geographic areas, they were 

able to identify changes in the landscape below which might indicate the 

enemy presence. Night reconnaissance operations were enhanced by 

several research and development 

programs and by refinement of existing instrumentation. A particu larly 

useful device was the starlight scope, 

developed by the Army, which amplified starlight and moonlight so that its 

operator could see movement on the 

ground quite clearly at night. Infrared 

viewers also facilitated night aerial 

reconnaissance operations. Munitions 

introduced into the inventory included 

cluster bombs, each containing sever- · 

al hundred bomblets, and a delayedaction bomb capable of penetrating 

heavy tree cover and then exploding 

on the ground. Another tactic of importance was the routine employment 

of USAF fixed-wing gunships for night 

47 
.------------------------- . 

48 

. ......~ 

DMZ ·.--:.,.-:...,. • .- .... .. . . . . L A 0 S 

Major Battles 

and 

Significant 

Localities 

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LEGEND 

~ MAJOR BATTLES 
hamlet defense. Their ability to remain 

aloft for many hours and to respond 

quickly to calls for close air support 

proved indispensable to hundreds of 

besieged posts, villages, and hamlets. 

The Combined Campaign Plan 

During 1967, as the buildup of U.S. 

forces in Vietnam continued, 

American strength in the war zone 

rose from 385,000 to 486,000 personnel and enabled the allies to continue 

to pursue the enemy. In accordance 

with a joint Vietnamese-American 

"Combined Campaign Plan," ARVN 

troops were given the mission of pacifying the countryside while U.S. and 

allied forces conducted combat operations against NVA and Viet Cong 

units. 

A move to root out Communist 

forces in the Central Highland provinces of Pleiku and Kontum got under 

way on 1 January and continued periodically throughout the year. During 

the first 95-day phase, designated 

Operation Sam Houston, elements of 

the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions 

concentrated on destroying the NVA's 

1st Division operating from bases inside Cambodia. This was followed in 

Apri I with the &-month-long Operation 

Francis Marion. Finally, in November, 

there occurred the Battle of Oak To in 

Kontum province, supported by massive tactical and B-52 strikes-more 

than 2,000 in number. At times, the 

battle was fought so closely that napalm and cluster bomb units fell within 22 and 27 yards of friendly positions 

while larger ?50-pounders were 

dropped within 77 yards. The Communists broke off the fight after losing 

more than 1,600 dead and sustaining 

many more wounded . MACV attributed more than 70 percent of the enemy 

casualties to air strikes. 

In the Ill Corps area, U.S. and Vietnamese troops on 8 January 1967 

launched another sweep into the "Iron 

Triangle." This 60-square-mile jungle 

area contained the suspected location 

of the Viet Gong's 4th Military Region 

headquarters, which directed operations in the Saigon area. A 3-week 

offensive, it involved troops of the 1st 

and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 173d 

Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, plus ARVN 

forces. They succeeded in overrunning a vast " underground city," destroyed the enemy headquarters, and 

seized enough rice to feed 13,000 men 

for a year. They also seized almost a 

half-million pages of enemy documents and captured 213 enemy personnel. According to the U.S. Army 

ground commander on the scene, the 

air strikes-1 ,113 tactical and 102 B52 sorties-were responsible for the 

majority of the 720 enemy dead. 

The Iron Triangle offensive had 

barely ended when General Westmoreland initiated the largest operation of the year in the same corps area. 

It involved 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions which were set into motion on 

22 February against reoccupied enemy bases in War Zone C. It also saw 

the first American parachute ass au It 

of the war aimed at intercepting any 

enemy troops attempting to flee into 

Cambodia. Initially, the enemy sought 

to avoid combat but later began to 

challenge the American forces, paying 

heavily for it. According to their own 

captured casualty lists, the enemy sustained 2,728 deaths and several thousand wounded. The allied troops also 

captured 600 crew-served weapons, 

800 tons of rice, and vast amounts of 

ammunition, medical supplies, and 

field equipment. 

The Air Force flew more than 5,000 

tactical strike sorties and 125 B-52 

sorties during the 83-day operation. In 

all, USAF crews dropped 12,000 tons 

of munitions, much of it in a softeningup zone just ahead of advancing 

troops. USAF crews also airlifted 

11,307 tons of supplies in 2,057 sorties. Both officers and men of the 

49 
Army's 1st Infantry Division praised 

the air support in the following words: 

"We find the enemy, we fix the enemy, 

air destroys the enemy." High-ranking 

VietCong defectors later reported that 

the Allied operation was a major disaster for their side. Loss of the base 

camps in War Zone C led to largescale deterioration of their forces 

throughout the Ill Corps area and a 

revamping of their operational tactics. 

Enemy main force units were forced to 

pull back into Cambodian sanctuaries, 

taking with them hospitals, supply 

depots, and training centers. 

Military experts from China, Cuba, 

and North Korea reportedly visited 

South Vietnam in the spring of 1967 

during Operation Junction City and 

apparently concluded that time was 

no longer on Hanoi's side. Communist 

forces had not won a single major battle in almost 2 years. U.S. firepower, 

especially tactical air, had decimated 

their main force strength. Desertion 

was ram pant and the Viet Cong intrastructure was being destroyed. 

It was against this background that 

General Giap and other North Vietnamese officials flew to Moscow in 

50 

March 1967 seeking additional military and economic aid. The Soviets 

subsequently announced they would 

send Hanoi " even more planes, highaltitude missiles, artillery and infantry 

weapons, together with factories, 

means of transportation, petroleum 

products, iron and steel and nonferrous metal equipment, food, and fertilizer." Indeed, the number of Soviet 

vessels reaching North Vietnamese 

ports rose from 122 in 1966 to 185 in 

1967. In September Giap claimed in 

articles published in his armed forces 

newspaper, Quang Doi Nhan Dan, that 

the allied pacification program had 

failed . He forecast very heavy fighting 

ahead and a Communist victory. He 

did so in the context of a strategy 

which he claimed had drawn allied 

troops to remote areas, thus enabling 

Communist guerrilla forces to achieve 

victory in the heavily populated zones 

of South Vietnam. 

But Giap's statements were an attempt at deception. Instead of relying 

on the badly battered Viet Cong 

forces, beginning in the spring and 

summer of 1967 he deployed 37 NVA 

battalions into the area just north of 

Viet Cong guerrillas fire bolt 

actoon rifles against low· 

flying allied aircrelt 
Fire support in defense of an 

outpost near the Cambodian 

border 

the DMZ preparatory to launching a 

full-scale invasion of South Vietnam . 

The allies detected the threat and hastened completion of a line of fortified 

bases just south of the DMZ. On 6 

April Giap made his first move, 

launching attacks against Quang Tri 

City and the neighboring towns of 

Lang Vei and Hai Lang. The North Vietnamese also opened up intense and 

continuous barrages of mortar and 

artillery fire against the allied bases 

near the DMZ. Shortly after, NVA 

troops began moving into position 

around Khe Sanh. On 16 May MACV 

called in tactical air power to silence 

enemy artillery in the area. Within 2 

days, 30 sites were put out of action. 

General Westmoreland also deployed 

Army troops to the northern province 

of I Corps to support the Marines. 

In a further effort to halt enemy 

shelling ot the Marine border base at 

Con Thien, an air plan was devised 

and refined under the direction of 

General Momyer-its goal was the 

destruction of the Communist positions to the north. Designated Operation Neutralize, it began on 12 September 1967 and employed Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine strike aircraft plus 

off-shore naval guns and Marine heavy 

artillery. During the 49-day operation, 

FAC pilots played a key role, flying 

dangerously close to enemy positions 

north of the DMZ and pinpointing 

them for strike aircraft. B-52's saturated NVA troop sites. Special longrange ground reconnaissance patrols 

were used whenever possible to enter 

target areas to assess bomb damage 

and locate additional targets. By the 

time the operation ended, more than 

3,100 tactical and 820 B-52 sorties had 

been flown. Of these, 916 were under 

Combat Skyspot control because of 

inclement weather. The shelling of 

Con Thien dwindled away after Operation Neutralize succeeded in destroying 146 enemy gun, mortar, and rocket 

positions, and damaging 83 others. 

These American offensive actions 

succeeded in blunting North Vietnamese efforts to prevent the Allied construction of the line of bases south of 

the DMZ and capped the failure of 

General Giap's Phase I strategy. His 

setpiece battles did not drain off 

American strength from populated 

areas, as hoped. Indeed, U.S. air pow51 
er was more than adequate to defeat 

the enemy whenever and wherever he 

massed. The NVA next turned its attention further south to areas closer to 

its Cambodian sanctuaries, where it 

could more easily move out and harass Allied positions in South Vietnam. 

On 27 November the enemy hit at the 

village of Song Be in Phuoc Long 

province and two days later at Loc 

Ninh near the Cambodian border in 

neighboring Sinh Long province. In 

both instances, they were soundly 

beaten. 

During a visit to Washington in 

November 1967, General Westmoreland reported directly to the President 

and the American people. In an address to the National Press Club, he 

expressed confidence that the tide 

was turning and that the allies were 

winning the war. The enemy, he said, 

was staking his hopes on a tactical 

victory to influence American public 

opinion and force the United States to 

throw in the towel. By the end of 1967, 

the enemy had not achieved that goal 

but evidence was piling up of a noticeable buildup of his forces in their 

Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries 

for yet another try. 

The 1968 Tet Offensive 

At the beginning of 1968, more than 

486,000 Americans-56,000 of them 

U.S. Air Force personnel- were in 

South Vietnam . During this climactic 

year, the Air Force flew 840,117 combat sorties in support of allied ground 

forces . A new forward air controller 

aircraft, the OV-1 OA, made its appearance and night operations were enhanced by introduction of lowlight-level television equipment and a 

laser guided bomb. The year also saw 

General Giap order implementation of 

Phases II and Ill of his offensive plan 

within 10 days of each other. One of 

his targets was the Marine base at Khe 

Sanh, selected-according to some ad52 

ministration officials-as the place 

where Gia hoped to emulate his great 

Viet Minh victory over the French 

achieved 14 years earlier at Dien Bien 

Phu. Located on a plateau in the north· 

western corner of I Corps and commanding the approaches to Dong Ha 

and Quang Tri City from the west, Khe 

Sanh was an important strategic post. 

By capturing it, the North Vietnamese 

would have an almost unobstructed 

invasion route in the northernmost 

provinces, from where they could outflank American positions south of the 

DMZ. Anticipating such an attack, 

General Westmoreland decided-and 

the members of the JCS agreed-to 

defend the base. 

On 21 January 1968 the North Vietnamese unleashed a heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket attack on the Marine 

base and began assaulting outlying 

defenses west of it. This attack triggered Operation Niagara, an air campaign in defense of Khe Sanh. That day, 

nearly 600 tactical sorties (including 49 

by the B-52's) were launched against 

enemy positions. Before the campaign 

ended 2V2 months later, control of all 

tactical air units-Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine- had been centralized under 

General Momyer as the Single Manager for Air, effective 8 March. In the 

case of I Corps, Momyer made use of 

the Marines' direct air support center 

at Da Nang, enlarged it, and assigned 

non-Marines there. To coordinate 

tactical air operations, Seventh Air 

force deployed a C-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center 

to the northern corps. 

The extensive use of air power at 

Khe Sanh paid off. More than 24 ,000 

tactical and 2,700 B-52 sorties 

dropped 110,000 tons of ordnance. 

The heavy air attacks- averaging 300 

tactical sorties a day with a three-ship 

B-52 cell arriving overhead every 90 or 

so minutes during the height of the 

battle-destroyed enemy bunkers and 

supplies, exploded his ammunition 

dumps in the area, and caved in his 
) '·. ~ETNA NORTT~ ~IIIIIIii )

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Major Battles 

and 

Significant Localities 

1968 TET Offensive 

lUANG NGAI 

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-tlfNH~< TRANG 

d!f .A RANH BAY 

a 

I 

MAJOR BATTLES 

-

AREAS OF PROLONGED CONFRONTATION 

-

-

53 

(1) An EB-661eads a flight of eight F·4 Phantoms on a bombing mls· 

sian through a low overcast. (2) This painting depicts the daring 

rescue by Maj. Bernard C. Fisher of a downed USAF pilot, Maj. D. 

Wayne MyeNl, at a Special Forces camp In the A Shau valley, 2 miles 

from the Laotian border, In March t966. For his feat, Major Fisher 

became the first Air Force Medal of Honor winner In Vietnam. (3) 

An F·100 Super Sabre fires rockets at enemy troops In South Viet· 

nam. (4) An A·1E Skyralder attacks a Viet Cong target with a 

phosphorus bomb. (5) An A·1E 1ttecks Viet Cong forces with 50().fb 

bombs. 

5 
tunnels near the Khe Sanh perimeter. 

At night, AC-47 gunships kept up a 

constant chatter of fire against enemy 

troops. Because of poor weather, 

about 62 percent of all strikes were 

directed to their targets by Combat 

Skyspot. 

Nine days after the siege of Khe 

Sanh began, NVA and Viet Cong 

troops launched the Tet Offensive of 

1968. In simultaneous attacks 

throughout South Vietnam, they 

struck at 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 

five of six autonomous cities, 23 airfields, and numerous district capitals 

and hamlets. Saigon and the old imperial capital of Hue were among the 

prime targets. This nationwide enemy 

offensive apparently had as its ultimate goal the disintegration of the 

South Vietnamese armed forces, to be 

followed-as Communist dogma had 

it-by the people rallying to the NLF. 

But that did not happen. 

The initial fury of the attack did enable the enemy to seize at least temporary control of 10 provincial capitals, 

and he succeeded in penetrating Saigon, Quang Tri City, Da Nang, Nha 

Trang, and Kontum City. However, 

except for Hue, which took the allies 

several weeks of rugged fighting to 

clear, the enemy was ousted in two or 

three days. Most of 23 airfields attacked by the enemy were soon back 

in full operation. 

Despite the heavy demands placed 

upon it to help defend Khe Sanh, the 

Seventh Air Force was still able to 

provide enough firepower to be a 

major factor in the defeat of the enemy 

offensive. Within Saigon and Hue, the 

Air Force launched carefully controlled strikes against enemy lodgments. Outside the cities USAF crews 

launched heavy attacks against Communist forces. Forward air controllers 

remained aloft around the clock directing strikes at enemy storage areas, 

troop areas, and providing close air 

support for allied units in contact with 

Viet Cong and NVA forces. At Hue, 

56 

only a trickle of essential supplies 

reached the besieged NVA troops. B52's continued saturation raids on 

suspected enemy areas. 

By late February it was evident that 

the Tet offensive had failed, and Hanoi 's dream of a collapse of the South 

Vietnamese government and armed 

forces was chimerical. Instead, Viet 

Cong/NVA troops had suffered heavy 

losses-an estimated 45,000 men 

(8,000 of them in and around Hue 

alone). Unfortunately there also was a 

heavy civilian toll. More than 14,000 

died, some of them (as in Hue) victims 

of NVA execution squads. Another 

24,000 were wounded and 627,000 left 

homeless. 

The extent and nature of the 1968 

Communist Tet offensive proved to be 

a political disaster to the Johnson 

administration. The American people 

-who had only recently been assured 

the allies were winning the war-were 

shocked by the enemy's ability to 

strike throughout South Vietnam, 

even to the gates of the U.S. Embassy 

in Saigon. News accounts and particularly television films showing the devastation wrought by the enemy seriously hurt the administration. While 

additional U.S. troops were dispatched to bolster Westmoreland's 

forces, Washington attempted to 

speed up the previously planned third 

phase of American strategy, that is, to 

turn over most of the responsibility for 

the war to the South Vietnamese. 

As domestic criticism of the administration reached a crescendo against 

the background of an earlier embarrassing incident- North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo on 24 January 

1968 in the Sea of Japan- President 

Johnson on 31 March ordered a halt to 

all bombings north of the 20th parallel. He hoped this action would induce 

Hanoi to begin peace negotiations. At 

the same time the President announced he would not run for a second full term of office. Hanoi's leaders 

agreed to meet in Paris to begin the 
discussions, but they also continued 

to pour troops into South Vietnam at 

the rate of about 22,000 per month. 

By mid-April intelligence revealed 

another enemy buildup in progress 

around Hue. Accordingly, on 19 April 

the allies mounted Operation Delaware/ Lam Son 216, aimed at destroying the NVA logistic base in the A 

Shau Valley and denying the enemy an 

essential source of supply and a line 

of communication for further operations against Hue. A Viet Cong colonel, defecting to the South the same 

day, disclosed plans for a terrorist attack against Saigon beginning 4 May. 

It proved the start of another nationwide wave of assaults against 109 military installations and cities, including 

21 airfields. Once again, U.S. air power played a major role battering the 

weary enemy. 

Although visibly weakened, the 

Communists continued to probe allied defenses. They established a 

stronghold at Cap Mui Lay on the 

coast just south of the Demilitarized 

Zone, and harassed nearby U.S. Marine positions with mortar and artillery 

fire. On 1 July a week-long well-coordinated bombardment by air, Marine 

artillery, and naval guns was begun 

against enemy positions. Almost 1 ,800 

tactical and 210 B-52 missions saturated the area and destroyed some 2,000 

Communist gun positions and structures. Shortly thereafter, alerted that 

11 NVA regiments were massing tor 

another assault on Saigon, Gen. 

Creighton W. Abrams (he succeeded 

Westmoreland on 11 June 1968) 

launched a large number of "spoiling 

operations" and air strikes. Electronic 

sensors, monitored by reconnaissance aircraft, girded the city to alert 

the allies to the expected attack. 

When finally launched in mid-August. 

the enemy assault proved quite ineffective and was easily repelled . 

Three weeks earlier, on 23 July 

1968, Maj. Gen. Robert F. Worley, Vi ce 

Commander of the Seventh Air Force, 

was killed when an RF-4C jet he was 

piloting northwest of Da Nang was hit 

by ground fire and crashed. The second pilot in the plane ejected safely, 

however, and was rescued . General 

Worley became the second Air Force 

general killed while on an operational 

mission. The first, Maj. Gen. William J. 

Crumm , commander of SAC's 3d Air 

Division, died in a mid-air collision of 

two B-52's on 6 July 1967 (see Chapter VIII). 

As part of Hanoi's continuing effort 

to influence American public opinion 

and the peace talks (which began in 

Paris in May but quickly bogged 

down), General Giap on 23 August 

sent 4,000 NVA 1st Army Division regulars against the Due ·Lap Special 

Forces camp, located some 3 miles 

from the Cambodian border and 15 

miles from Ban Me Thuot. The 2,500 

South Vietnamese. Montagnards, and 

Ameri cans defending the camp were 

taken by surprise and the perimeter 

breached. However, 30 minutes after 

the first call for help went out, U.S. 

Army helicopter gunships arrived in 

the area, followed 15 minutes later by 

AC-47 gunships. Placing the attackers 

under heavy fire, the AC-47's remained overhead spotting and " hosing down" enemy units as they appeared. Their effectiveness drew high 

praise from the defenders. In all, more 

than 100 gunship and 392 tactical air 

sorties were flown in support of Due 

Lap. The senior Army advisor on the 

scene, Col Rex R. Sage, later credited 

USAF tactical air and gunships with 

having saved the camp from being 

overrun. 

In October 1968, finally recognizing 

that it could not occupy and control 

the South Vietnamese countryside, 

Hanoi began withdrawing 30,000 to 

40,000 troops. On 31 October, after 

receiving assurances from the North 

Vietnamese that " serious" talks to end 

the war would get under way in Paris, 

President Johnson ordered a halt of 

all bombings north of the DMZ effec57 
2 

(1) U.S. Army 7th Infantry trooper carries an M·60 machine gun past rubble of a residential 

section of Cholon, Saigon, following the 1968 enemy Tat of1ensive, January-February 1968. 

(2) Hue city officials help prepare victims of the Communist Tel Of1ensive tor burial. (3) A 

Skyralder approaches Qui Nhon. (4) Smoke and dust obscure part of the Marine base at Khe 

Sanh, during North VIetnam's unsuccessful attempt to seize It In the 1968 Tet offensive. (5) 

Rocket attack on Due To, 15 November 1967. (6) Weapons and ammunition seized from the 

enemy following the battle of Bong Son. m Vietnamese marines assemble Chinese·made 

240-mm rockets, captured (juring an allied sweep northwest of Saigon, 1969. (8) A South VIet· 

namese outpost constructed In a tree-top served as a vantage point for AAVN rangers near 

Trunglap. 

60 

DMZ 

·•.. 

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GIAP'S 1972 

INVASION 

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SOUTH VIETNAM 

CAMBODIA 

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LEGEND it MAJOR BATTLES 
&-52 Pilot 

tive 0800 Washington time on 1 November. Beforehand, the U.S. delegation in Paris explained to Hanoi's representatives that the United States 

would end " all bombardments and all 

acts involving the use of force" but 

that U.S. air reconnaissance would 

continue. The Americans repeatedly 

used the above phrase in their talks 

with the Communists, arguing that 

reconnaissance was " not an act involving the use of force." The North 

Vietnamese accepted the phrase and 

used it in their statement to the international press after the cessation of 

the bombings. 

Vietnamization and Withdrawal 

A few days later Richard M. Nixon 

defeated Hubert H. Humphrey in the 

1968 presidential elections. During the 

campaign Nixon had pledged to bring 

American troops home while winning 

an honorable peace. An obvious aspect of this policy was to speed "Vietnamization" of the war effort. In March 

1969 Secretary of Defense Melvin R. 

Laird visited South Vietnam to discuss 

an accelerated buildup of the Vietnamese armed forces (see Chapter 

XX). Thereafter, President Nixon met 

with President Thieu and gained his 

approval for the buildup. On 8 June 

Mr. Nixon then announced his plan to 

withdraw U.S. combat troops. The first 

of these Americans departed Vietnam 

in July. By year's end 69,000 had been 

withdrawn. 

Meanwhile, the Air Force not only 

continued to assist allied operations 

in South Vietnam against enemy 

forces in the border regions but soon 

emerged as the primary military arm to 

support the policies of Vietnam ization 

and withdrawal. Thus, a multi-battalion 

helicopter-airborne Marine assault 

during May-June in the A Shau Val ley 

was preceded by 94 preplanned sorties and 28 immediate sorties which 

prepared the landing zone and provided air cover. The Commanding General, Ill Marine Amphibious Force, was 

unstinting in his praise of the USAF 

fighter pilots, air liaison officers, forward air controllers, and other participants. The Air Force also continued to 

support U.S. Army fire support bases, 

many of them situated in exposed positions. On 7 June, the enemy tried to 

overrun one of the bases astride a 

major enemy line of communication 

into Tay Ninh province. Responding to 

a call for help, USAF fighters struck 

the Communist force with bombs and 

napalm while gunships supported the 

action with flares and minigun fire. A 

subsequent sweep of the area revealed 323 enemy troops killed, all attributed to air power. Friendly casualties totaled seven wounded. 

During the same period- between 8 

May and 2 July 1969-the enemy 

launched an intensive attack on the 

Ben Het Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group camp. FAG's flew 571 sorties 

and AC-47's and AC-119's more than 

100. Tactical air swarmed overhead in 

1,828 sorties and SAC bombers, 804 

sorties. Nearly 20,000 tons of bombs 

assailed the enemy day and night, in 

all kinds of weather, and finally forced 

the enemy to retreat. 

In August 1969 the Air Force conducted " spoiling operations" in an 

effort to keep Communist troops off 

balance. Thus, when intelligence disclosed an enemy troop buildup in 

Bing Long province near An Loc and 

Loc Ninh-close to the Cambodian 

border in Ill Corps-B-52's struck 

numerous times and inflicted extensive damage on the enemy force. During the last months of the year, B-52 

Stratoforts helped ARVN troops 

counter a major enemy threat in the 

Bu Prang and Due Lap areas of Quang 

Due province. In November the B-52's 

hit 57 enemy targets and struck 24 

more during the first half of December. During the next 5 weeks the heavy 

bombers unloaded more than 30 mil61 

(1) Damage caused at the U.S Embassy, Saigon, during the t968 Tet Offenstve. i2t Viet· 

namese Sgt Con Nha Tan and USAF Technical Sgt Richard 1-1. Nelson, a weapons 

maintenance advisor, load flares aboard a C-47. (3) Damage caused by a rocket anack 

at Qui Nhon, 18 May 1965. (4) A civilian dashes water on the smoldenng remains of his 

home following a Viet Cong rocket anack, Aug 1968. (5) MaJ. Bernard C Fisher, Juna, 

Idaho (I) and Maj. 0. Wayne Myers, Newport, Wash . followtng the March 1966 rescue 

of the latter at an airstrip in the A Shau valley. (6t U.S. and Vielnamese A·IE pilots dtscuss 

a mtsslon against the enemy, t965. (7) A VNAF A·IH pulls away after unloading his ord· 

nance on an enemy target 

6 
lion pounds of bombs against enemy 

troop concentrations, staging areas, 

and fortifications. Indeed, in 1969 

General Abrams came to depend more 

and more on USAF air power to keep 

the enemy from massing while U.S. 

forces withdrew and the Vietnamese 

armed forces buildup went forward. 

In 1970, when the first USAF elements also began to leave Southeast 

Asia, the VNAF grew to 9 tactical 

wings and some 40,000 personnel and 

greatly expanded its training program. 

Its inventory of nearly 700 aircraft included A-1's, A-37's, F-5's, AC-47's, 

0-1 's, and C-119's. Despite the enemy's reduced activity in South Vietnam, a noticeable buildup was detected in the "Fishhook" area of Cambodia, immediately across the border from 

Tay Ninh province. In response, the 

President authorized a major incursion into the enemy's Cambodian 

sanctuary by allied troops, supported 

by extensive American and Vietnamese tactical air units (see Chapter VII). 

However, both the U.S. and Vietnamese Air Forces also continued flying 

strike missions inside South Vietnam. 

By the end of 1970 the Air Force had 

flown 48,064 attack sorties, while the 

VNAF flew another 28,249-almost 40 

percent of the total sorties over Vietnam. 

Even as the U.S. withdrawal continued into 1971 , the allies laid plans to 

send an ARVN invasion force into the 

southern panhandle of Laos to seize 

Tchepone on the Ho Chi Minh trail, 

destroy enemy forces, and interdict 

NVA traffic into South Vietnam and 

Cambodia. Crossing into Laos on 30 

January 1971 , the South Vietnamese 

were supported by a large tactical air 

fleet. The NVA reacted strongly, sending in large numbers of tanks, artillery, 

and AA weapons to fight the South 

Vietnamese. Elements of ARVN forces 

managed to reach the Tchepone area 

with the help of massive USAF B-52 

and tactical air strikes. Casualties 

were heavy on both sides. The North 

64 

Vietnamese lost about 13,000 men and 

an estimated 20,000 tons of munitions. 

The South Vietnamese, having suffered 5,000 dead, retreated from Laos 

without achieving the initial objectives 

of the incursion. 

By December 1971 the Air Force had 

reduced its inventory of fighter and 

strike aircraft in South Vietnam to 277 

(from a high in June 1968 of 737). The 

number of personnel in-country also 

declined dramatically-from the 1968 

peak of 54,434 to 28,791 at the end of 

1971 . By then the Vietnamese Air 

Force was responsible for about 70 

percent of all air combat operations. 

The enemy- temporarily put on the 

defensive by the moves into Cambodia 

in 1970 and Laos in 1971-began deploying new NVA forces southward in 

preparation for another major offensive. They deposited a huge amount of 

supplies in their old sanctuary areas 

near the Central Highlands. U.S. intelligence detected the enemy buildup 

but NVA plans for the impending operation were unknown. In an effort to 

meet the threat, in mid-February 1972 

hundreds of sorties were flown 

against NVA targets just north of the 

DMZ. 

Some 6 weeks later- on 30 March 

1972-the North Vietnamese launched 

a large, three-pronged invasion of 

South Vietnam, spearheaded by tanks 

and mobile armor units. One NVA 

force swept south across the DMZ, its 

goal apparently the conquest of the 

northern provinces and the seizure of 

Hue. The initial NVA surge led to the 

seizure of Quang Tri City. A second 

NVA force drove from Laos into the 

Central Highlands, and a third effort 

involved a drive from Cambodia into 

Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces, 

northwest of Saigon. 

Fierce fighting ensued on all three 

fronts, with tactical aircraft and B-52's 

launching repeated strikes against the 

advancing NVA armored units. The 

enemy's greatest success was in the 

northern provinces, but perhaps the 

Soviet tanks. 
Demolished VNAF C-47 following an April 1966 enemy 

mortar attack on Tan Son 

Nhut. 

most critical and potentially most disastrous battle occurred at An Loc. 

There, the badly outnumbered and 

outgunned South Vietnamese stood 

their ground within the besieged city 

and survived the heaviest enemy attacks of the entire war. They and the 

city were saved in large measure by air 

power, much of it supplied by the Vietnamese Air Force. More than 10,000 

tactical and 254 B-52 strikes were 

flown in support of ARVN forces. Air 

Force gunships once again proved 

invaluable at night turning back attacking NVA troops. When the battle 

for An Loc was over near the end of 

June, the enemy force there had lost 

all of its tanks and artillery. 

In the Central Highlands, the fight 

started out well for the Communists. 

Employing Soviet-built T-54 tanks and 

heavy armor, the North Vietnamese 

quickly seized control of much of Kontum province. The Air Force responded to this crisis by redeploying additional strike aircraft to South Vietnam 

and by considerably increasing fighter 

strength in Thailand. This bolstered 

force helped decimate enemy units, 

with AC-119 and AC-130 gunships 

being especially effective in the open 

highland country. By 1 June the North 

Vietnamese began withdrawing from 

some of their advance positions. 

By the summer of 1972 the battles of 

An Loc and the highland regions were 

largely over, and attention turned to 

the northern provinces where the NVA 

had seized considerable amounts of 

South Vietnamese territory. Heavy air 

strikes had helped stop the enemy 

advance and destroyed much of his 

armored forces. But when the fighting 

wound down, the North Vietnamese 

were in control of much of the countryside below the DMZ plus a strip of 

South Vietnam's territory running 

along the Laotian and Cambodian 

borders. The major population centers, however, remained under the 

South Vietnamese. Still, North Vietnam retained substantial lodgements 

within the Republic of Vietnam, which 

posed a continuing threat to the Saigon government. 

From the U.S. point of view, perhaps 

the most heartening aspect of the 

enemy offensive-which cost North 

Vietnam an estimated 120,000 casualties and heavy equipment losses-was 

the performance of the Vietnamese Air 

Force. VNAF pilots-many of them 

with 4,000 hours of combat flying 

under their belts-demonstrated great 

skill and initiative in attacking the 

NVA. During 1972, they flew 40,000 

strike sorties in support of ARVN 

ground forces, most of whose troops 

held on and fought valiantly.Some 

units did panic and abandoned Quang 

Tri City during the early phases of the 

Communist offensive, but the ARVN 

subsequently recaptured it. 

Against the background of the massive NVA invasion of South Vietnam in 

the spring of 1972, President Nixon 

ordered renewed bombing of North 

Vietnam by both tactical aircraft and 

B-52's. On 8 May he also authorized 

the mining of the harbors and river 

inlets of North Vietnam to prevent the 

rapid delivery of replacement arms, 

munitions, and other war essentials 

from the Soviet Union and Communist 

China (see Chapter IV). This latest interdiction campaign against North 

Vietnam continued throughout the 

summer and early fall of 1972. 

In October Dr. Henry Kissinger, the 

President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, returned from 

the Paris negotiations to inform the 

nation that "peace is at hand," and the 

bombing of North Vietnam was halted. 

Unfortunately, at the last moment the 

enemy balked over some of the ceasefire provisions, that is, Hanoi insisted 

that the United States install a coalition government in Saigon. A 2 -month 

deadlock ensued, which led the President to order new and more drastic 

measures to end the war. On 18 December 1972, on his orders, the heaviest air attacks of the war were 

65 
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5 

(1 &2) Propaganda leaflet 

operations. (3&4) An enemy 

soldier holds a surrender 

leaflet. (5) A Vietnamese 

officer speaks to villagers of 

Ap Trung, northwest of My 

Tho. (6) South Vietnamese 

psychological warfare team 

hands out leaflets to villagers. (7) A Viet Cong surren· 

ders to government troops 

after picking up a propagan· 

da leaflet. (8) Airmen load· 

ing a leaflet bomb. 

6 

7 

launched against military targets within Hanoi and Haiphong; on 29 December, the North Vietnamese agreed to 

proceed with the negotiations. A ninepoint agreement was finally worked 

out and formally signed on 27 January 

1973. 

Under the agreement, U.S. forces 

would withd raw from South Vietnam 

and all prisoners of war would be returned within 60 days. The United 

States tacitly recognized that the 

North Vietnamese were in strength 

within the territory of South Vietnam. 

Indeed, for the first time, North Vietnam acknowledged that it had 100,000 

troops in the northern and western 

parts of the Republic of Vietnam. Exactly on schedule, on 28 March 1973, 

the last American military personnel 

departed South Vietnam, and MACV 

headquarters was inactivated. Thus, 

after more than a dozen years, an active American military role in South 

Vietnam came to an end. 

67 

Chapter IV. 

Airmen load ammunition on 

a strike aircraft prior to a 

mission 011er North Vietnam. 

The Air War 

Against North Vietnam 

As noted in Chapter II, the United 

States launched its first air strikes 

against North Vietnam in August 1964 

in response to the attack on the Navy 

destroyer, USS Maddox. Navy carrier 

planes hit four North Vietnamese 

coastal torpedo bases and an oil storage facility. On 2 December, the President said he favored a limited air campaign against Communist lines of communication used to support the 

insurgency in South Vietnam. The 

second air strike against North Vietnam, nicknamed "Flaming Dart I;' was 

launched by the Navy on 7 February 

1965 after enemy mortar and demolition 

teams attacked U.S. and South Vietnamese military facilities near Pleiku. 

The following day, as part of this 

riposte, VNAF A-1's-accompanied by 

20 F-100's flying flak suppression sorties and 28 VNAF A-1H's, commanded 

by Lt. Col. Andrew Chapman of the 3d 

Tactical Group 2d Air Divisiondropped general purpose bombs on the 

Chap Le barracks. Several of the 20 accompanying USAF F-100's attacked 

enemy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) sites. 

Three RF-101's provided photographic 

coverage. On 11 February, a third air 

strike ("Flaming Dart II'') was conducted 

by Navy, USAF, and VNAF aircraft 

against NVA barracks at Chanh Hoa 

and Vit Thu Lu. It was in response to 

another enemy attack, this time against 

U.S. facilities at Qui Nhon which killed 

more than 20 Americans. 

A 19-day pause followed the second 

Flaming Dart strikes. When air attacks 

against the North resumed on 2 March 

1965, they carried the appellation 

" Rolling Thunder." On that date, General Moore dispatched 25 F-105's and 

20 B-57's-accompanied by KC-135 

refueling tankers and other supporting aircraft-which hit an NVA ammunition depot at Xom Bong about 35 miles 

above the DMZ, causing heavy damage. 

The Rolling Thunder campaign was 

substantially different from those of 

World War I and II, resembling rather 

the geographically limited air war over 

Korea. That is to say, President Johnson-determined to avoid a larger 

conflict with China and the Soviet 

Union-imposed stringent controls on 

air operations. The strikes had a threefold purpose: to raise the morale of 

the South Vietnamese, impose a penalty on Hanoi for supporting aggression in the South, and reduce infiltration of men and supplies into the 

South. The air campaign also was 

based on the hope that the gradual 

destruction of North Vietnam's military 

bases and constant attacks on its lines 

of communications (LOG's) would bring 

its leaders to the negotiating table. 

The restrictions imposed upon the 

Air Force made execution of Rolling 

Thunder strikes very complex. 

Coordination of USAF and VNAF air 

operations devolved upon General 

Moore and his successors. Besides 

being responsible to Washington authorities and the commanders of the 

two unified commands-Admiral Sharp 

and General Westmoreland-the 2d Air 

Division commander also was required 

to work closely with the U.S. ambassadors in Saigon, Vientiane, and 

Bangkok. In undertaking air strikes, 

political considerations were usually 

paramount. For example, squadrons 

based in Thailand could attack targets 

69 
in North Vietnam and Laos but not in 

South Vietnam. In June 1965 General 

Moore was assigned the additional job 

of serving as MACV Deputy Commander for Air Operations, but it did 

not greatly increase his authority or 

alter his responsibilities for three separate but related areas of operationsSouth Vietnam , North Vietnam, and 

Laos. 

The President retained such firm 

control of the air campaign against 

the North that no important target or 

new target areas could be hit without 

his approval. His decisions were relayed through Secretary McNamara to 

the Joint Chiefs, who then issued 

strike directives to CINCPAC. The latter, in turn, apportioned fixed targets 

and armed reconnaissance routes 

among the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, 

and the Vietnamese Air Force, with 

USAF crews normally providing air 

cover for the VNAF, which later withdrew from northern operations to concentrate on supporting ARVN forces 

within South Vietnam. In conducting 

operations over the North, the American crews were enjoined to minimize 

civilian casualties as much as possible. This policy- and the overall target 

restraints imposed by the White House 

and Pentagon officials-helped avoid 

in North Vietnam the heavy civilian 

losses that characterized bombings 

on both sides in World War II. 

The initial air strikes were limited 

primarily to enemy radar and bridges 

between the 17th and 19th parallels. 

Later, the airmen were allowed to hit a 

number of other military targets below 

the 20th parallel. The first target hit 

above the 20th parallel, the Quang 

Soui barracks, was attacked on 22 

May 1965 by Air Force F-105's and the 

first above Hanoi in late June. After 

mid-1965, the airmen were authorized 

to attack important bridges and segments of the northwest and northeast 

rail lines between Hanoi and the 

Chinese border. For an extended period, Washington exempted from attack 

70 

sanctuary areas around Hanoi and 

Haiphong, a buffer zone near China, 

surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and 

MIG bases located within the HanoiHaiphong areas. After the first few 

sporadic strikes, Rolling Thunder pilots on 19 March began flying strike 

sorties against individual targets and 

target areas on a weekly basis. Beginning on 9 July 1965, targets were programmed on a biweekly basis; after 

1965 new targets were selected periodically. 

The first Air Force tactical strikes 

were by aircraft already in South Vietnam and Thailand. As additional air 

units arrived, those assigned missions 

against targets in North Vietnam and 

Laos-and a portion of the B-52 fleetwere sent to six large airfields, some 

newly built, in Thailand. USAF 

strength in Thailand grew from about 

1 ,000 personnel and 83 aircraft in early 1965 to a peak of 35,000 personnel 

and 600 aircraft in 1968. U.S. Navy aircraft and South Vietnam-based Marine aircraft also flew many missions 

over North Vietnam and Laos. 

The principal Air Force tactical 

strike aircraft during Rolling Thunder 

operations was the F-105 Thunderchief. Mass-produced after the Korean 

War, it served throughout the war in 

Southeast Asia. A newer fighter, the 

twin-seat F-4 Phantom II manned by an 

aircraft commander and a weapons 

system officer,* initially was used in 

a combat air patrol (CAP) role. 

Committed to battle gradually, it flew 

its first strike mission at the end of 

May 1965 and its first armed reconnaissance mission in August. A third 

Air Force fighter, the twin-seat, sweptwing F-111A, reached Thai land in 

March 1968, underwent combat evaluation that year, and was withdrawn. 

Subsequently, in the latter stages of 

the war, this sophisticated night and 

all-weather aircraft returned to South-

•The latter was originally a trained pilot, but 

later USAF employed navigators. 
F-105's in Thailand. 

east Asia and flew regular combat 

missions. 

A number of older, lower-performance and more vulnerable aircraft 

were used briefly or sparingly over the 

North. The F-100 Super Sabre and the 

F-1 04 Starfighter saw action chiefly in 

a support role above the DMZ. Some 

Starfighters flew strike missions and 

the B-57 Canberra light bomber was 

employed largely in night operations. 

Eventually, all were withdrawn from 

northern missions, with the F-100 

being used primarily for close air support in South Vietnam . 

The B-52 Stratofortresses made 

their debut over North Vietnam in April 

1966 with a strike near Mu Gia pass. 

During the next 6 1/ 2 years, these 

heavy bombers were employed 

against enemy targets in North Vietnam's panhandle, staying far away 

from the dangerous SA-2 missile sites 

located mostly in the Hanoi-Haiphong 

area. Based initially on Guam and later 

in Thailand, the B-52's were primarily 

employed to interdict North Vietnamese lines of communication leading to 

the DMZ and the Ho Chi Minh trail in 

Laos. On these missions, they normally 

dropped 25 to 30 tons of ordnance. 

Gen. John P. McConnell, LeMay's 

successor as Air Force Chief of Staff, 

remarked on the irony of the use of 

these strategic bombers to hit tactical 

targets. But it was only one of several 

improvisations introduced by the Air 

Force in waging the unorthodox air 

war. 

The role played by SAC's KG-135 air 

refueling tankers proved vital to the 

execution of Rolling Thunder (see 

Chapter XI). Prior to 1965 they had 

been used primarily to refuel B-52's 

but they also had provided mid-air 

refueling service to tactical aircraft 

deploying from one part of the world 

to another. Gen. William W. Momyer, 

commander of the Seventh Air Force 

(1966-1968), observed that few airmen 

"foresaw that air refueling would become a basic part of the scheme of 

employment of fighter forces over 

North Vietnam ." Since much of the 

USAF tactical air fleet was based some 

350 nautical miles from their targets in 

the North, refueling was essential if 

the F-1 05's and F-4's were to deliver 

substantial ordnance loads on their 

targets. The KG-135's also enabled 

many fuel-short or damaged aircraft to 

return safely to their bases. 

Among the problems facing U.S. 

airmen flying over North Vietnam were 

the heavy forests, the jungle terrain, 

and the annual northeast monsoon 

which was most severe from mid-October to mid-March. All affected 

operations over the North. They also 

placed a premium on the ability of 

reconnaissance aircraft to locate 

enemy targets and assess bomb damage. To obtain this information, the Air 

Force employed a number of manned 

and unmanned aircraft. Perhaps the 

most famous was the U-2, which first 

attracted worldwide attention in May 

1960, when Soviet missilemen shot 

one down over central Russia while it 

was on a high-altitude reconnaissance 

mission. Later, in the fall of 1962, a 

SAC U-2 detected the first Soviet strategic missiles deployed in Cuba. In 

Southeast Asia, the U-2 flew reconnaissance m1ss1ons over North Vietnam beginning in 1965 (see also 

Chapter XII). 

Throughout the war zone, the Air 

Force also operated other reconnaissance aircraft, including the RB-57, the 

workhorse RF-101 , the RF-4C, and 

drones. Some of these aircraft, 

equipped with infrared and side-looking radar, helped advance the technology of reconnaissance during the war. 

In 1965, SAC's Ryan 147D (and other 

model) drones made their initial 

flights over North Vietnam. Dropped 

from DC-130 transports, they were 

able to obtain photo intelligence over 

the Hanoi area. As North Vietnam 

began developing a modern air defense system, the Air Force also began 

using aircraft capable of obtaining 

71 
FRESCO (MIG-17l 
(1) F-105's In Thailand. (2&3) An Air Force reconnaissance photo of Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi shows MIG-17's and 

MIG-21's In revetments. (4) An F-4 Phantom. (5) President Johnson In October 1967 personally approved this first strike 

against enemy MIG's at Phuc Yen. (6) Klen Am airfield with MIG's In revetments. (7) Gla Lam alrfleld near Hanoi. It 

was off limits from attack throughout most of the War. L tor.: AN-2 Colt, MIG-21, and MIG-17. 
target data via various electronic 

methods. 

Rolling Thunder, 1965-1968 

From the first handful of strikes over 

the North in early 1965, Air Force and 

Navy attack sorties rose from 1,500 in 

April to a peak of about 4,000 in September. In October. with the onset of 

the northeast monsoon, they declined 

steeply. While the weather was good , 

U.S. pilots destroyed or damaged a 

variety of military targets: bridges, 

vehicles, rolling stock, barracks areas, 

supply and ammunition depots, ferries, watercraft, and antiaircraft artillery and radar sites. They bombed railroad tracks and roads to prevent the 

movement of men and supplies. The 

results of the air strikes could not be 

accurately assessed and became the 

subject of considerable debate. But 

they reduced or delayed the enemy's 

operations and infiltration into the 

South. They led the North Vietnamese 

to adopt the practice of travelling 

under cover of night and bad weather 

- taking full advantage of forested or 

jungle terrain. They also diverted con-: 

siderable manpower and materiel to 

repair their roads, rail lines, and 

bridges and increased their antiaircraft defenses. 

Because of the limitations imposed 

on air operations, war materiel from 

the Soviet Union, China, and other 

Communist countries flowed in easily 

through Haiphong and other North 

Vietnamese ports and over rail lines 

from Kunming and Nanning, Chinaall of which helped Hanoi to make up 

for its losses and which facilitated a 

rapid air defense buildup. During 

1965, for example, North Vietnam's 

AAA inventory expanded from an estimated 1,000 guns to 2,000 pieces and 

about 400 antiaircraft sites by year's 

end . These consisted primarily of 37-

and 57-mm guns but included a few 

85-mm and 100-mm weapons as well. 

74 

Smaller but deadly automatic weapons-which inflicted much of the losses and damage to U.S. aircraft-also 

proliferated. 

The Soviet surface-to-air missiles 

were first detected by a SAC U-2 aircraft on 5 April 1965. By year's end, 

USAF and Navy reconnaissance had 

pinpointed 56 SAM sites. The North 

Vietnamese, who took great pains to 

conceal them, readily abandoned sites 

to build new ones. By building a large 

number of sites. some of them 

equipped with dummy missiles to 

deceive USAF crews. they were able to 

use a " launch and move" tactic. They 

employed a similar tactic with their 

AAA guns. Another key element of 

Hanoi's air defenses was the North 

Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF), which 

was equipped with 50 to 60 MIG-15's 

and MIG-17's plus a few IL-28 bombers. Although the MIG's began challenging U.S. strike aircraft at an early 

date, they did not become a serious 

threat until1966-1967. The sum of the 

enemy's array of AAA guns, automatic 

weapons, SAM's, and the MIG forcebacked up by an expanding defense 

radar complex-enabled Hanoi to 

build one of the most formidable air 

defense systems ever devised. 

On 23 July 1965, after several 

months of USAF operations against 

North Vietnamese targets. the first F4C was downed by an SA-2 missile. 

Four days later, with Washington's 

approval , Air Force Thunderchiefs 

mounted the first strike of the war 

against the SAM 's. In August. a Navy 

aircraft was downed by a SAM. which 

led to a series of special U.S. "Iron 

Hand" missions aimed at North Vietnam's rapidly expanding SA-2 sites. At 

first, most of them were in the HanoiHaiphong sanctuary area and thus 

could not be attacked, but others were 

emplaced along major rail and road 

junctions. bridges, and cities north 

and south of the North Vietnamese 

capital. In known SAM areas, Air Force 

pilots would drop to lower altitudes to 

Crews flying strike missions over 

North VIetnam were continually 

hampered by heavy flak over the 

target areas. 
Shrike and Standard Arm 

missiles on an F-105. 

avoid the SA-2's but this tactic made 

them more vulnerable to conventional 

AAA and especially to smaller automatic weapons. By mid-1965, the latter were credited with shooting down 

most of the approximately 50 Air 

· Force and Navy aircraft lost over North 

Vietnam. 

An electronic war subsequently 

ensued between U.S. tactical aircraft 

and the enemy's complex of radarcontrolled AAA guns and SAM's and 

other defense radars. The Air Force 

employed specially equipped aircraft 

to counter SAM radars. Initially, fighter pilots relied on the electronically 

equipped EB-66's and "Wild Weasel" 

F-100's and F-105's to neutralize or 

warn them of radar emissions from 

enemy " Fan Song" equipment which 

signalled that they were being tracked 

or that a SAM firing was imminent. 

These countermeasures plus the SA2's generally poor guidance system 

kept losses low. Thus, of the approximately 180 SAM's launched in 1965, 

only 11 succeeded in downing an aircraft, 5 of which were Air Force. 

Nonetheless, the inhibiting and harassing effects of the SAM's had considerable impact on air operations. After 

1966, the fighters carried electronic 

countermeasure pods of their own. A 

number of EB-66's and Wild Weasel 

aircraft continued to be used, however. 

The North Vietnamese Air Force, 

flying from airfields which Washington officials decided should not be hit 

because of their location in the heavily 

populated Hanoi-Haiphong area, was 

not a major threat to USAF pilots during 1965. Although North Vietnamese 

pilots shot down two F-105's in a surprise attack in April, throughout the 

year the American airmen clearly held 

the upper hand in aerial fighting. In 

June Navy pilots downed two enemy 

aircraft. On 10 July the Air Force 

scored its initial kills, when Captains 

Thomas S. Roberts and Ronald C. 

Anderson in one F-4 and Captains 

Kenneth E. Holcombe and Arthur C. 

Clark in another were credited with 

the shoot-down of two MIG-17's. 

Early in the year, several Air Force 

EC-121 's were deployed over the Gulf 

of Tonkin to maintain a " MIG watch" 

over Southeast Asia. Flying missions 

off the coast of North Vietnam, these 

aircraft not only were able to alert U.S. 

fighter and support aircraft of 

approaching MIG's, but also served 

as airborne radar and communication 

platforms. They also warned American 

pilots who flew too near the Chinese 

border and they assisted air-sea 

searches for downed air crews. Later, 

the EC-121's equipment was employed 

in an integrated fashion with the Navy's 

seabased radars, enabling U.S. pi lots to 

obtain a variety of additional timely 

information about the enemy's and 

their own air operations over the 

North. 

The political restraints placed by the 

President on air operations over North 

Vietnam denied U.S. pilots certain 

advantages of surprise. Another problem was the relatively small geographical area overflown by Rolling Thunder crews. It forced pilots to use specific air corridors going into (ingressing) and departing (egressing) a target, a task made all the more difficult 

by the need to avoid civilian casualties 

as much as possible. A third operational factor was the weather cycle in 

North Vietnam, which generally allowed optimum operations in late 

mornings or afternoons when clouds 

and fog were minimal or absent. All of 

these factors contributed to stereotyped American air tactics which the 

enemy quickly became aware of and 

which enabled him to deploy his AAA 

defenses to great advantage. Also, the 

relatively short duty tours created 

much turmoil in air operations. 

Experienced airmen were constantly 

departing and less experienced replacements arriving, which diluted 

both planning and flying expertise in 

the theater. 

75 
2 

(1&2) Maj. Donald J. Ku1yna flew missions over North VIetnam In an F-105 which he named 

the Polish G/lder(3) F-111's and F·4's at Takhll AB, Thailand. (4) F-105 (color painting). (5) 

An F-105 unloads 760·1b bombs on North Vietnam's Hoa Lac airfield. (6) USAF strike air· 

craft destroy a North VIetnamese oil storage facility near Hanoi. (T) Captured enemy 

37-mm AAA gun. (8) F-4E Phantoms arrive at Koral AB, Thailand, November 1968. (9) An 

EB-66 controls a flight of F·t05's on a mission over North VIetnam's panhandle. July 1966. 

(10) Air Force bombers destroyed more than 30 enemy supply trucks In North VIetnam. 
0 
78 

Rolling Thunder Route Packages in North Vietnam 

THAILAND 

5 

NORTH VIETNAM 

CAMBODIA 

6a 

REPUBLIC 

OF 

VIETNAM 

) 
To reduce mrssron interference 

between land-based Air Force and 

Navy carrier aircraft operating over 

North Vietnam, in December 1965--

after consulting with Air Force and 

Navy officials-Admiral Sharp divided 

the bombing area into six major 

"route packages." Generally, the 

long·er-range USAF fighters attacked 

the inland route package targets; 

the shorter-range Navy aircraft concentrated on those near the coast. In 

April 1966, General Westmoreland 

assumed responsibility for armed 

reconnaissance and intelligence 

analysis of the "extended battlefield" 

area of Route Package I above the DMZ 

as it affected allied operations in South 

Vietnam. CINCPAC continued to control air operations in the other route 

packages. 

The Bombing Pauses 

During the first 2 years of operations 

over the North, President Johson periodically ordered bombing pauses in 

an effort to bring Hanoi's leaders 

around to discuss a political settlement of the war. The first bombing 

pause of about 6 day's duration was 

ordered in mid-May. The second one 

began on Christmas Eve 1965 and 

continued until 30 January 1966. In 

both instances, North Vietnam did not 

respond to U.S. action and, indeed, 

used the bombing respites to rebuild 

its strength and speed the infiltration 

of men and supplies southward. USAF 

reconnaissance also disclosed major 

North Vietnamese efforts to repair 

damaged roads and bridges and to 

install more air defense weapons. 

President Johnson also approved 

briefer bombing standdowns, to permit celebration of the annual Vietnamese new year ("Tet"), Buddha's birthday, Christmas, and New Year's Day. 

When U.S. diplomatic efforts to get 

the North Vietnamese to the conference table got nowhere, the President 

in the late spring of 1966 approved a 

series of heavier air strikes against 

North Vietnam. Added to the approved 

target list were POL storage facilities 

at Haiphong, Hanoi, Nguyen Ke, Sac 

Gian, Do Son, and Duong Nham. 

Others included a power plant and 

cement factory in Hanoi, an important 

road-and-rail and road bridge on the 

northwest line, and an early warning 

and ground control intercept radar 

facility at Kep. The first major POL 

strike was conducted on 29 June 1966 

when Air Force F-105's hit a 32-tank 

farm less than 4 miles from Hanoi. 

About 95 percent of the target area 

was destroyed. Navy aircraft struck 

another important POL facility near 

Haiphong. 

Beginning on 9 July 1966, as part of 

an expanded Rolling Thunder program, U.S. aircraft bombed additional 

POL facilities, flew extended armed 

reconnaissance missions throughout 

the North (except for most of the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area), and 

began heavier bombing of the northeast and northwest rail lines in Route 

Packages V and VI. Admiral Sharp assigned interdiction of the railroads to 

the Air Force. Additional pressure 

against the enemy was brought to 

bear on 20 July when the Air Force 

and Marines launched a new campaign (Tally Ho) against infiltration 

routes and targets between the DMZ 

and the area 30 miles northward in 

Route Package I. The U.S. air offensive 

expanded in the ensuing weeks, peaking at about 12,000 sorties in September. 

By that time, Rolling Thunder had 

taken a heavy toll of enemy equipment, destroying or damaging several 

thousand trucks and watercraft, hundreds of railway cars and bridges, 

many ammunition and storage supply · 

areas, and two-thirds of the enemy's 

POL storage capacity. Many sorties 

were flown against AAA, SA-2, and 

other air defense facilities, thousands 

of cuts were made in enemy road and 

rail networks. To counter this air campaign, Hanoi was forced to divert an 

79 
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(1) Sgt Leonard B. Williams (left) works on F·IOO converters at Phan Rang AB, South VIetnam. 

Sgt Philip J Smith adjusts the drag chute cable (2) Col. Robin Olds, Commander, 8th Tac· 

Ileal Fighter Wing, Is carried off by his men after completing his tOOth mission over North 

VIetnam (3) B~2 s drop bombs on a Viet Cong stronghold (4) F-4 Phantoms destroy 8 of 11 

spans of the Lang Gla1 bridge In North Vietnam, 25 May t972. 

-

-

-

-

-

-

3 
estimated 200,000 to 300,000 full and 

part-time workers to repair roads, railway lines, bridges, and other facilities, 

and to man its air defenses. 

Although infiltration southward 

could not be stopped, U.S. commanders in South Vietnam credited the 

bombing with reducing the number of 

enemy battalion-sized attacks. A new 

Rolling Thunder program, dated 12 

November, added more targets including the Van Vien vehicle depot and the 

Yen Vien railroad yards, both within 

the environs of Hanoi. These targets, 

struck by Air Force and Navy pilots in 

December 1966, produced collateral 

damage and civilian deaths which led 

to a political and diplomatic furor. By 

the end of 1966, U.S. tactical aircraft 

had flown about 106,500 attack sorties 

and B-52's another 280 over North 

Vietnam, dropping at least 165,000 

tons of bombs. 

The North Vietnamese accepted the 

tremendous losses and fought back. 

By dispersing and concealing much of 

their POL supply, they were able to 

reduce the full impact of the air attacks. Bad flying weather and extensive use of manpower enabled the 

North Vietnamese to keep open portions of the northern rail lines so that 

some supplies continued to flow in 

from China. More importantly, Haiphong and other ports-still off-limits 

to U.S. aircraft-daily unloaded thousands of tons of war materiel. Despite 

the air attacks, AAA and especially 

small automatic weapons took a rising 

toll of American aircraft, downing a 

total of 455 by the end of 1966 and 

damaging many more. The number of 

SAM sites rose to about 150 during the 

year, but improved flying tactics-plus 

the installation of electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment on U.S. 

aircraft-reduced the effectiveness of 

the missiles. 

Until September 1966 the North Vietnamese Air Force made only sporadic attempts to interfere with Rolling 

Thunder operations. But on 3 Septem82 

ber NVN pilots went on the offensive. 

Equipped with MIG-21's carrying infrared-homing air-to-air missiles, they 

operated freely from five bases-Phuc 

Yen, Kep, Gia Lam, Kien An, and Hoa 

Loc-in the Hanoi area which could 

not be attacked. Confronted by daily 

MIG-21 challenges, General Momyer 

temporarily diverted Air Force F-4C's 

from their primary strike mission to 

exclusive aerial combat against the 

MIG's. 

A favorite MIG tactic was to pop up 

suddenly and try to force the heavily 

laden F-105's to jettison their 

bombs before reaching their targets. 

To offset this, Sidewinder-equipped 

Phantoms flew at lower altitudes to 

enable their pilots to spot the MIG's 

earlier and then used their higher acceleration and speed in hit and run tactics. They avoided turning fights 

because the MIG's had great maneuverability. The EC-121's helped materi· 

ally by alerting the F4's to the presence of the enemy aircraft. During 1966, 

U.S. fighters shot down 23 MIG's, 17 of 

them credited to USAF crews, as 

against a loss of 9 aircraft, 5 of them 

Air Force. 

Early in 1967, Washington officials 

approved new Rolling Thunder targets 

closer to Hanoi. To protect vital industrial and LOC facilities, North Vietnamese pilots-operating with nearly 

100. MIG's-were thrown into the air 

battle. To dampen their ardor, General 

Momyer and his staff devised a ruse 

nicknamed Operation Bolo. The details were worked out and executed by 

Col. Robin Olds, Commander of the 

8th Tactical Fighter Wing. Baited by 

what appeared to be a normal Rolling 

Thunder strike by F-105's, the NVAF 

on 2 January suddenly found itself 

engaging F-4's in the largest aerial 

battle of the war to that time. Colonel 

Olds and his pilots shot down 7 MIG's 

in 12 minutes without losing an aircraft. Olds personally downed two of 

them. On 6 January 1967 the North 

Vietnamese lost two more MIG's. 

Destroyed bridge in Laos. 

1965 
An Air Force reconnaissance 

photograph ol damage at 

Phuc Yen. 

Stunned by the losses, the NVAF 

stood down to regroup and retrain. 

The American air offensive continued into March and April. On 10-11 

March, F-1 05's and F-4C's hit the 

sprawling Thai Nguyen iron and steel 

plant about 30 miles from Hanoi. Air 

Force and Navy follow-up strikes also 

hit portions of the plant. The attacks 

disrupted but did not completely halt 

pig iron or steel production. Also, for 

the first time, Air Force jets struck the 

Canal Des Rapides railway and highway bridge, 4 miles north of Hanoi. 

Enemy pilots did not attempt to challenge American aircraft again until the 

spring of 1967, which saw 50 engagements fought in April and 72 in May, 

the largest 1-month total of the war. 

During the fierce May battles Air Force 

crews destroyed 20 MIG's-7 of them 

on the 13th and 6 on the 20th. 

A revised Rolling Thunder target list 

issued on 20 July permitted air attacks 

on 16 additional fixed targets and 23 

road, rail, and waterway segments inside the restricted Hanoi-Haiphong 

area. Bridges, bypasses, rail yards, 

and military storage areas were 

bombed in an effort to slow or halt 

traffic between the two cities and to 

points north and south. On 2 August 

1967 Hanoi's famous Paul Doumer 

railway and highway bridge was hit for 

the first time. The center span was 

knocked down and two other spans 

were damaged. Struck again on 25 

October, another span went down and 

finally, on 19 December, the rebuilt 

center span was dropped again. 

Despite these successes, the North 

Vietnamese during the year managed 

to inflict a steady toll on the Air Force 

and Navy, and their MIG's were unusually aggressive. The increasing losses led Washington to approve-for the 

first time-the destruction of most of 

the MIG bases. Beginning in April 

1967, Air Force and Navy pilots 

repeatedly bombed Kep, Hoa Lac, and 

Kien An airfields, destroying several 

MIG's on the ground in the process. 

Many of the MIG's flew to nearby 

Chinese bases. On 16 August 1967, 

General Momyer told a Senate committee that " ... we have driven the 

MIG's out of the sky for all practical 

purposes .... " However, the enemy 

aircraft returned with improved tactics, and the Johnson administration 

authorized an attack on Phuc Yen, 

their principal base. 

By early 1968 neither U.S. 

air superiority, Rolling Thunder, nor 

air-ground operations within South 

Vietnam deterred Hanoi's leaders 

from continuing their efforts to destroy the Saigon govern ment. 

Although suffering heavy manpower 

and materiel losses, the North Vietnamese were able to continue the 

conflict with the help of communist 

regimes in Moscow and Peking. 

Washington's military restraints -

aimed at avoiding a wider 

war- permitted foreign military assistance to flow unhampered through the 

seaports of North Vietnam. In addition, the enemy had almost unrestricted use of Cambodian territory adjacent to South Vietnam for stockpiling 

supplies (much of it flowing in from 

Cambodia's major seaport at Kom 

Pong Som) and for resting and regrouping their troops. 

In taking advantage of the opportunities provided by American restraint, the Communists conceived a 

plan for a major offensive against the 

Republic of Vietnam in hopes of 

achieving a dramatic victory-such as 

they had won over the French at Dien 

Bien Phu in 1954- which would persuade Washington and Saigon to acknowledge their defeat. Whereupon, 

in late January 1968 they laid siege to 

the Marine base at Khe Sanh and then, 

at month's end, they launched the 

famous Tet offensive throughout 

South Vietnam . At Khe Sanh, the allies 

threw the enemy back with heavy losses. Elsewhere, after initial but brief 

gains, the enemy's nationwide offensive slowly sputtered out and was 

83 
RAILROAD BRIDGE 

PHU OlEN CHAU 

18-58·20N 105·34-55£ 

BRIDGE INTERDICTION 

NORTH VIETNAM 

. - II. ,. 

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HIGHWAY BRIDGE NORTHWEST 

BAI DUC THDN 

18-04-ll5N 105·4!-30[ 

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• 
4 

5 

(2&3) USAF F·105's destroyed the Doumer Bridge on 18 December t967. After the North Viet· 

namese rebuilt It, US bombers destroyed It agam In 1972. (•) RF-t01 Voodoo pilot photographs 

a railroad bridge 135 moles south of Hanoi, Apro l 1965. (5} An RF-1 01 casts a shadow over a 

missing span of the My Due highway bridge In North Vietnam, 22 April 1965.16} North Viet· 

namese highway bridge, destroyed by F·105's. (7) Destroyed highway and railroad bridge about 

5 miles north-northwest of Dong Hoi. North Vletnam.IBI Destroyed bridge between Yen Bao 

and Bao Ha, North Vietnam, 22 May 1972. 

6 

8 
(1 &2) B-52 bombers destroyed the Klnh No railroad yard, 7 miles 

north of Hanoi, 27 De<:ember 1972 (3) 7~ and 3,000 pound 

bombs ompact on and near a railroad and highway bridge crossong 

1he Canal des Rapkles 5 miles northeast of Hanoi (4) Bomb damage caused by F-105's on the Thel Nguyen rail yard, Aproi-May 

1966. (5) Arl aor stroke on North Voetnam army suP!>IY depot, Thien 

Linh Dong, 16 June 1965. (6) B-52 bombers destroy 1he AJ No 

warehouse t8 December t972 In the Hanoi area. (7) Arl AJr Force 

strike on the Theo Nguyen thermal power plant on North Voelnam, 

29 March 1967. knocked out the boiler plant (lower 1.) and the 

administration building. 
THIEN LINH DONG ARMY SUPPLY DEPOT 

5 
I • 

missile site / 

downed aircraft 

YEN BAI ,1' ~ LANG CH I 

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..... 

.. 

~· .......... LAOS ._~ 

.

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I .·• ' 

./ 

N. VIETNAM 

THANH HOA 

UONG 81 

THERMAL 

POWER PLANT 

GULF OF TONKIN 

SURFACE·TO-AIR MISSILE ENVELOPE 

1966 

slowed, halted, and reversed. But if 

the North Vietnamese military campaign did not succeed, it did lead to a 

change in American war policies. As 

noted in Chapter Ill, President Johnson on 31 March ordered a halt to the 

bombing of North Vietnam north of 

the 20th parallel, then north of the 

19th parallel. As a quid pro quo, the 

Hanoi regime agreed to meet with U.S. 

delegates in Paris to discuss an end to 

the conflict. In the meantime, the Air 

Force and other services virtually 

doubled their air strikes in the area 

88 

below the 19th parallel, interdicting 

enemy troop and supply movements 

across the DMZ into South Vietnam. 

They also stepped up raids against 

enemy positions in southern Laos. 

In Paris, after many meetings and 

months of deadlock between the two 

sides on how to bring the war to an 

end, American and North Vietnamese 

representatives agreed on a certain 

"essential understanding" enabling 

President Johnson on 31 October 

1968 to end all air, naval, and artillery 

bombardment of North Vietnam as of 
A sequence ot frames show· 

ing the destructton ot a 

USAF AF..CC recon aissan~ 

plane by an SA·2 m•sslle, 12 

August 1967 The 2-man 

crew, Lt. Col. Edwin L. Atterberry and Maj. Thomas V. 

Parrott successfully ejected 

and were captured and ina 

terned Colonel Atterberry 

died in captiVIty. 

A North Vietnamese 

SAM missile. 

I 

0800 hours Washington time, 1 November. The understanding, as Mr. 

Johnson expressed it, was that the 

other side intended "to join us in 

deescalating the war and moving seriously towards peace." 

Ninety minutes before the President's order was issued, Maj. Frank C. 

Lenahan of the 8th Tactical Fighter 

Wing made the last target run in an F4D against a target near Dong Hoi. 

Thus, 3 years and 9 months after it 

began, Rolling Thunder operations 

came to an end. The Air Force and the 

other services had flown approximately 304,000 tactical and 2,380 B-52 sorties and dropped 643,000 tons of 

bombs on North Vietnam's war-making industry, transportation net, and 

air defense complex. Notwithstanding 

the variety of constraints imposed on 

air power, the post-1965 aerial assault 

on North Vietnam helped to reduce 

the movement of manpower and supplies going southward and contributed to the 1968 diplomatic efforts to 

lower the tempo of combat. 

Except for Air Force and Navy reconnaissance missions, which were 

permitted in a separate understanding 

between the Americans and North Vietnamese in Paris, all air operations 

over the North ceased . Later- after 

President Nixon assumed office- U.S. 

retaliatory air strikes were launched 

against enemy air defense units which 

began firing at U.S. reconnaissance 

aircraft in violation of the above " understanding." In February 1970, after 

the North Vietnamese again fired 

upon U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, the 

President authorized certain "protective reaction" strikes against NVA antiaircraft and SAM sites and also enemy 

airfields. When U.S. aircraft continued 

to receive ground fire, the Presiden1 

ordered "reinforced protective reaction" strikes on the enemy's air defense system. 

The first of these latter missions 

were flown during the first 4 days in 

May 1970. Nearly 500 Air Force and 

Navy aircraft hit missile and AAA sites 

and NVA logistic facilities near Barthelemy pass, Ban Karai pass, and a sector north of the DMZ. During the next 6 

months interim smaller strikes were 

flown. On 21 November the Air Force 

launched two major operations over 

the North. The first involved a joint Air 

Force and Army commando attempt to 

rescue American prisoners of war 

(POW's) believed confined at the 

Son Tay prison compound, about 20 

miles northwest of Hanoi. Planned by 

Air Force Brig. Gen. Leroy J. Manor 

and Army Col. Arthur D. Simons, the 

volunteer commando force flew 400 

miles from bases in Thailand to Son 

Tay in HH-53 helicopters, with A-1 E 

Skyraiders and specially equipped C· 

130E's providing support. As it landed, 

Air Force and Navy aircraft launched 

heavy diversionary strikes in the area 

to distract the North Vietnamese. 

Members of the commando force 

89 
(1) Enemy mobile AAA units near Haiphong. (2) An alen sends 

Nonh VIetnamese pilots scrambling for their MIG aircraft. (3) A 

dummy SA-2 site in Nonh Vietnam. (4) Soviet ships delivered nol 

only thousands of trucks to the Nonh Vietnamese but also tanks. 

rockets, and other implements of war. (5) North Vietnamese 37-

mm gunners fire at U.S. jets. August 1965. (8) An SA-2 site in the 

Hanoi area. 

2 

quickly discovered, to their dismay, 

that the prison compound contained 

no prisoners. During the 28 minutes 

the rescuers were on the ground, they 

killed about 25 North Vietnamese defenders. The only American casualty 

was an enlisted man who suffered a 

broken ankle. One helicopter was destroyed on landing. 

About 6 hours later, the second operation of the day was launched after 

an RF-4 aircraft was lost. An armada of 

200 Air Force and Navy strike aircraft 

-supported by 50 other planeslaunched a major retaliatory strike in 

the vicinity of the Mu Gia and Ban 

Karai passes and the DMZ. Their targets included SA-2 missile sites, enemy trucks, and supply and transportation facilities. All aircraft returned 

safely to their bases. 

During the 2 years after Rolling 

Thunder operations ended on 1 November 1968, the United States had 

flown more than 60 separate strike 

missions in retaliation to ground fire. 

When the North Vietnamese continued to fire at U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, Washington officials authorized 

stepped up " reinforced protective 

reaction" strikes. In February 1971 , 

the Air Force launched Operation 

Louisville Slugger. Flying 67 sorties, 

USAF crews destroyed 5 SAM sites, 15 

SAM missile transporters, and 15 vehicles in the Ban Karai pass area. On 21 -

22 March, the Air Force teamed up 

with the Navy in Operation Fracture 

Cross Alpha during which they flew 

234 strike and 20 armed reconnaissance sorties against enemy SAM sites. 

In August 1971 , in an effort to curb 

enemy road construction across the 

DMZ into Military Region I* in South 

Vietnam , Air Force jets flew 473 sorties, seeding the road with munitions 

and sensors. On 21 September, flying 

in poor weather, 196 U.S. tactical aircraft hit three POL storage areas 

·rhe four corps tactical zones were redesignated Military Regions in July 1970. 

92 

south of Dong Hoi, destroying about 

350,000 gallons of fuel. It was the first 

all-instrument air strike, employing 

exclusively the long-range electronic 

navigation (LORAN) position fixing 

born b system. 

These intermittent protective reaction strikes-launched mostly in the 

southern panhandle of North Vietnam 

-did not affect Hanoi's efforts to rebuild and reconstitute its air force. By 

late 1971 , it had an inventory of about 

250 MIG's, 90 of them MIG-21 's, and 

once more it prepared to challenge 

American operations over the North 

and, to a limited extent, over Laos. By 

this time the North Vietnamese Air 

Force was operating out of 10 MIGcapable bases, 3 of them located in 

the panhandle area. USAF and Navy 

pilots, who over the years had 

achieved roughly a 2 1/ 2 to 1 victory 

ratio over MIG fighters in aerial battles, saw the odds drop. However, this 

was attributed to the U.S. rules of 

engagement, which again exempted 

MIG air bases and to the geographical 

and electronic advantages possessed 

by the defenders rather than to the 

superiority of enemy pilots. 

To counter the enemy air threat, EC121 aircraft-which had redeployed 

from Southeast Asia after Rolling 

Thunder operations ended in 

1968-were returned to the theater to 

resume their " MIG watch." Once 

again, as in 1967 when the NVAF last 

posed a serious threat to air operations over the North, USAF commanders urged that MIG air bases be attacked. Washington officials agreed , 

and on 7-8 November USAF and Navy 

pilots bombed airfields at Dong Hoi, 

Vinh, and Ouan Lang. After neutralizing these air bases, U.S. pilots on 26-

30 December launched the heaviest 

Capt. Lawrence H. Pettit, 55th 

Tactical Fighter Squadron, 

discusses hi s MIG ki ll with 

his crew c hi ef, Sgt Horace G. 

McGruder. 
USAF Linebacker II Offensive Against North Vietnam 

December 1972 

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

~ ! Port mining .. 

. . 

. • 

THAILAND 

'•• .... • ~ . .. 

• Bombing of supply depots, railroads, etc. 

.. .. .. , ... • 

···•·· .., ... 

....... 

. . . . . . : 

.. .. . 

of Tonkin = 

SEVENTH FLEET 

93 
air strikes since 1968-1

,025 sortiesagainst a variety of military targets 

south of the 20th parallel. 

The Communist Spring 

Offensive, 1972 

Still hoping to end the war through 

negotiations, the Nixon administration 

kept a tight rein on its principal bargaining card-air power. Hanoi, however, was thinking in terms of another 

military offensive. By late 1971 evidence began to accumulate that Hanoi 

was planning a large

-scale invasion of 

South Vietnam. Gen. John D. Lavelle,* 

who in August 1971 succeeded Gen. 

Lucius D. Clay, Jr., as Seventh Air 

Force commander, requested the recall of certain USAF units to the theater. By the spring of 1972, North Vietnam had assembled a force of about 

200,000 men for a push into the South. 

The invasion began on 29-30 March 

1972, with some enemy forces rolling 

directly across the DMZ into Military 

Region I while others penetrated into 

Military Region II from Laos. All were 

supported by considerable numbers 

of tanks and other armored vehicles. 

The South Vietnamese army, although 

greatly improved since 1968, was still 

plagued by poor leadership and morale and was forced to retreat. U.S. air 

power- plus the strengthened Vietnamese Air Force-was thrown into 

the battle. Air Force F-105's, F4's, A7's, AC-130's and B-52's were joined 

by Navy and Marine aircraft in pound

-

ing the enemy daily between the 20th 

parallel in the North and the battle 

lines inside South Vietnam . Bolstered 

by aircraft reinforcements from the 

United States and elsewhere, attack 

sorties over the extended battlefield 

averaged 15,000 per month, almost 

two-thirds of the peak monthly rate in 

1968. 

• General Lavelle was recalled from his post in 

March 1972, charged with having authorized cer· 

lain "protective reaction" strikes beyond those 

permitted by the rules of engagement. He was 

succeeded as Seventh Air Force commander by 

Gen. John W. Vogt. 

94 

A gun camera sequence 

shows the 

destruction ot an 

enemy MIG

-17, 3 June 1967, by 

an 

F·105 crew. 
With Hanoi's forces ensconced inside South Vietnam and determined, 

despite heavy casualties, to maintain 

their positions below the DMZ, President Nixon on 8 May suspended the 

peace talks in Paris and authorized 

the launching of Operation Linebacker. For the first time, the United States 

imposed a naval blockade and mined 

the waters of Haiphong and other 

North Vietnamese ports. Simultaneously, the President authorized a renewal of air strikes throughout North Vietnam above the 20th parallel. Old and new targets were struck, 

including the rebuilt Paul Doumer 

bridge in Hanoi, bridges along the 

northwest and northeast rail lines 

from China, fuel dumps, warehouses, 

marshalling yards, rolling stock, vehicles, power plants, and a POL pipeline 

running from China. All recently emplaced SA-2 missile sites in or near the 

DMZ were destroyed as were many 

SA-2 and AAA sites further north. 

To degrade or neutralize North Vietnam 's rebuilt or new bristling air defenses, the Air Force made full use of 

its electronic technology. It employed 

EB-66's, Wild Weasel F-105's, and EC135's to augment electronic countermeasure equipment used by most 

fighter aircraft. It also employed a profusion of laser and optically-guided 

bombs, which had been developed in 

the late 1960's. Mostly 2,000 pounders, the guided bombs enabled fighter crews to strike targets with great 

accuracy. Thus, the spans of the 

strongly defended Than Hoa bridgewhich had withstood U.S. bombs for 

years and had cost the Air Force and 

Navy a number of downed aircraftwere dropped in one strike by an F-4 

with guided bombs. 

By June 1972 North Vietnam's offensive had stalled outside of Hue and 

elsewhere as South Vietnamese 

ground forces began to fight back. On 

29 June, President Nixon reported that 

with the mining of the harbors and 

bombing of military targets in the 

North-particularly the railroads and 

oil supplies- the situation " has been 

completely turned around .... The 

South Vietnamese are now on the 

offensive." He reiterated his proposal 

of 8 May for an international ceasefire 

and the return of American prisoners 

of war, warning that the United States 

intended to bargain from strength. 

The peace talks resumed in Paris on 

13 July. In the ensuing weeks, Saigon's forces, heavily supported by 

U.S. and VNAF air strikes, continued 

their offensive against the 200,000 

enemy troops who had seized control 

of large portions of the South Vietnamese countryside. 

Meanwhile, North Vietnamese pilots 

were reacting aggressively in the 

Hanoi-Haiphong area in an effort to 

drive American pilots out of the skies 

over their heartland. The renewed 

American-North Vietnamese air battles shortly produced several Air Force 

aces. On 28 August 1972, Capt. Richard S. Ritchie, flying an F-4D 

Phantom II, participated in his fifth 

shootdown and became the nation's 

second ace. (The U.S. Navy produced 

the first.) His weapons system officer, 

Capt. Charles DeBellevue, who had 

flown with Ritchie in three previous 

" kills," became an ace on 9 September when he destroyed his fifth and 

sixth MIG's, becoming the first weapon systems officer to achieve this 

status. Capt. Jeffrey S. Feinstein, also 

an F-4 weapons system officer, became an ace on 13 October when he 

helped bag his fifth MIG. These were 

the only Air Force aces of the war. 

A Navy pilot and a WSO likewise 

became aces. 

The 11-Day Air Campaign 

On 23 October 1972, when it 

seemed that the Paris talks were leading to an agreement to end the war, 

the United States again halted air operations above the 20th parallel. Soon 

after, however, the negotiations 

95 
(11 Six ~C craws pose before their planes In April 1966, following destruc· 

tlon of six MIG aircraft over North Vietnam (2) The first MIG downed during 

the war was credited to Capts. Kenneth E. Holcombe and Arthur C. Clark, 

10 July 1965. Flight commander Maj. Richard Hall gets a ride on the shoulders 

of the other flight members: (1. tor.) capt. Ronald C. Anderson, Kenneth E. 

Holcombe, Capt. Hatold Anderson, Capt. Arthur C. Clark, and Capt. Wilbure 

Anderson. (3) After their 3 June 1967 shootdowns of MIG-17's Capt. Larry 

0. Wiggins and Maj. Arthur L. Kuster review the tactics they used. (4) Col. 

Robin Oids, commMder of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, and other airmen 

pose on the occaslonof the unit's 15th air victory over enemy MIG's. (5) Capt. 

JefferyS. Feinstein, a weapons system officer was credited with live aerial 

victories over enemy MIG's. 

4 

5 
3 

(1) 1st Lt. Clifton P Dunnegan. of the 8th Tactical 

Fighter Wing, shot down 1 

of 7 enemy MIG s destroyed over North Vietnam on 2 January 1967 (2) Capt 

Charles B De Bellevue, credited with sox aerial voctoroes poses with Col Scott G. Smith and Capt Rochard S Rotchie, who became the tlrst USAF ace on 

Southeast Asia. (3) The five general otfocers shown below "P World War II aces 

with frve or more enemy aorcraft "kills" to their credits. tor a total oi41V. vlctorie.directed USAF operatiOns in Southeast Asia durong 1966-1967 Tlwy are 

LL Gen (later General) William W Momyer (center. front), 7th Air Force commander. The others are (1. to r.). Maj. Gen Gordon M Graham vice commander; Brig Gen Franklin A. Nochols chief of staff; Brog Gen. Oonavon F Smolh. 

chief of h~ Air Force Advosory Group in Voetnam; and Brig. Gen Wilham 0 

Dunham, deputy chief of staff lor operations. (4) Maj Robert G Oolger F-4C 

commander (r.) and his pilot, 1st. Lt. Mack Thies (center) report to their CO. Lt 

Col Hoyt S Vandenberg, Jr., how they destroyed a MIG-17 durong a dogtlght 

over North Voetnam. 1 May 1967. 
stalled amid indications that Hanoi 

might renew its offensive in South 

Vietnam . Whereupon, President Nixon 

ordered a resumption of air strikes 

above the 20th parallel. There followed a final 11-day bombing campaign, nicknamed Operation Linebacker II, which resulted in one of the 

heaviest aerial assaults of the war. The 

Air Force dispatched F-105's, F-4's, 

F-111's, and-for the first time, B-52'sover the heavily defended enemy capital and the adjacent Haiphong port. 

The tactical , aircraft flew more than 

1,000 sorties, the B-52's about 740, 

most of them against targets previously on the restricted list. They included 

rail yards, power plants, communication facilities, air defense radars, Haiphong's docks and shipping facilities, POL stores, and ammunition 

supply areas. They repeatedly 

bombed the principal NVAF MIG 

bases and transportation facilities. 

The North Vietnamese responded 

by launching most of their inventory of 

about 1,000 SAM's and opening up a 

heavy barrage of AAA fire against the 

attackers, but USAF electronic countermeasures helped keep losses to a 

minimum. Of 26 aircraft lost, 15 were 

B-52's which were downed by SAM 's. 

Three others were badly damaged. 

However, by 28 December the enemy 

defenses had been all but obliterated and during the last 2 days of the 

campaign, the B-52's flew over Hanoi 

and Haiphong without suffering any 

damage. 

Deprived of most of their air bases, 

North Vietnamese pilots were able to 

launch only 32 aircraft of which 8 were 

shot down, 2 by B-52 tail gunners. 

Hanoi claimed the strikes on HanoiHaiphong produced substantial collateral damage and more than 1,000 fatalities. Considering the size of the air 

assault, the bombing was well controlled and not indiscriminate. 

Impacting fragments from enemy 

SAM's contributed to the destruction. 

98 
(Above) B-52 unloads 11s 

bombs. 

(1) Wealher observer SSgt 

Ronald L. Galy and equip· 

ment repairman Sot George F 

Hammell, Jr , tnflate a 

weather balloon In South 

Vietnam. (2) Maj John A. 

Lasley and Sgt Hammett 

prepare to operate a 

theodohte. (3) SSgt Wttllam E. 

Collins, chief obaerver of the 

weather detachment at Phu 

Cat AB South Vietnam. {4) 

TSgt WilliamS Grady checks 

weather observation charts 

and satellite photographs 

-

-

-

-

-

-

On 30 December 1972, President 

Nixon announced in Washington that 

negotiations between Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and North Vietnam's representative, Le Due Tho, would resume in 

Paris on 8 January. While the diplomats 

talked, American air attacks were 

restricted to areas below the 20th 

parallel. Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

fighters flew about 20 sorties per day 

with B-52's adding 36 to the daily total. 

On 15 January the United States announced an end to all mining, bombing, 

shelling, and other offensive actions 

against North Vietnam . On 23January, 

the Paris negotiators signed a ninepoint cease-fire agreement effective 

28 January, Saigon time. 

Thus, air power had played a significant role in' preventing the complete 

takeover of South Vietnam by the 

northerners and in extracting an 

agreement to end the war. Between 

1968 and 1972, more than 51,000 tactical 

and 9,800 B-52 sorties were flown 

-

-

against the North, most during the two 

Linebacker campaigns. The tactical 

aircraft dropped about 124,000 tons of 

bombs and the B-52's about 109,000 

tons, with their "Sunday punch" missions of late December 1972 being 

perhaps the most noteworthy. An even 

heavier rain of bombs pounded enemy 

forces in South Vietnam 's Military 

Regions I and II. 

In addition to the cease-fire, the 23 

January 1973 agreement provided for 

the return of all American and allied 

POW's within 60 days, establishment 

of a commission to supervise truce 

and territorial disputes, the right of the 

South Vietnamese people to determine 

their own future peacefully, a promise 

of U.S. economic aid for the Indochina 

states, and an affirmation of the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. The 

United States tacitly recognized the 

presence of about 100,000 North Vietnamese troops still entrenched in 

South Vietnam. 

99 

Chapter V 

A flare is readied for drop 

during a night mission 

Interdiction in the 

Laotian Panhandle 

On 3 April1965 an Air Force C-130-

equipped with flares and accompanied by two B-57's-flew a night mission over routes 12, 23, and 121 in the 

southern panhandle of Laos. The 

crews of the three aircraft searched 

for Communist vehicles and other 

enemy targets moving down the Ho 

Chi Minh trail toward South Vietnam 

and Cambodia. The mission marked 

the beginning of Operation Steel Tiger, a limited U.S. air campaign 

against enemy troop and supply 

movements within the panhandle of 

southern Laos. It had been preceded 

by Operation Barrel Roll , another limited interdiction effort aimed principally against Communist Pathet Lao 

and North Vietnamese troops which 

began in December 1964 (see Chapter 

VI). Both were supported by U.S. reconnaissance missions inaugurated in 

May 1964 to obtain target information. 

The Ho Chi Minh trail, consisting of 

numerous winding roads and pathways, had served for many years as an 

infiltration route between the northern 

and southern sectors of Vietnam . During World War II and after, Vietnamese 

insurgents used it to fight the Japanese and later the French. After Hanoi 

launched a guerrilla war against the 

Saigon government, the trail was used 

by South Vietnamese "returnees" and 

indigenous North Vietnamese personnel sent to South Vietnam to aid the 

VietCong effort at unseating President 

Diem and gaining control of the coun· 

try. By 1964, the trail had developed into 

a system of many dry-season truck 

roads and smaller paths for bicycles 

and human portage. By early 1965 the 

trail had become the principal artery 

by which Communist personnel and 

supplies reached the northern sectors 

of South Vietnam. 

The first Steel Tiger strikes-initiated a month after the start of Roll ing 

Thunder attacks against North Vietnam-were directed against enemy 

personnel and supplies moving into 

South Vietnam through the DMZ or 

into the Laotian panhandle. Steel Tiger's mission was one of complementing Rolling Thunder. In both campaigns, political considerations were 

dominant and affected the tempo of 

the air strikes, which were generally 

limited in scope. 

In undertaking these operations, 

Washington's primary concern was to 

avoid involving Communist China and 

the Soviet Union in the war, while maintaining the "neutral" status of Laotian 

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's 

government in Vientiane. This had 

been guaranteed in the 23 July 1962 

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, 

signed by the Peoples Republic of 

China, the Soviet Union, the United 

States, France, Great Britain, and 

other nations. Thus, U.S. officials 

desired to avoid a large-scale air or 

ground campaign in Laos by any of 

the big powers which might undermine Souvanna Phouma's fragile regime. Another constraint on USAF 

operations in Laos was the Vientiane 

government's desire not to subject 

its people or troops to the hazards of 

unrestricted aerial warfare. Accordingly, the number of U.S. strike sorties, the areas where they could be 

flown, and the use of ordnance initially were severely restricted. 

Because of this, command and control arrangements for Steel Tiger (and 

other air operations over Laos) were 

101 
(1) A gunship in action (2) Interior of an AC-119 gunship (3) Aerial 

mines are dropped to interdict an enemy terry and lord near Tch• 

pone, Laos, 1968 t•J AC-119 gunship over Tan Son Nhut, 1969 
3 

28 NOV 68 
highly complex. The JCS relaye'd highlevel Washington target authorizations to USAF and Navy commanders 

through CINCPAC in Honolulu and 

MACV in Saigon. Because USAF 

planes flying over Laos were based in 

South Vietnam and Thailand, the U.S. 

ambassadors in Saigon, Bangkok, and 

Vientiane also played important roles 

in controlling air operations. The position of the American ambassador in 

Vientiane was, however, unique. In the 

absence of a formal U.S. military 

command in Laos (such as MACV in 

South Vietnam), he became the principal American military as well as political authority there. On air operational 

matters, he normally exercised his 

authority through the office of the Air 

Force Attache. 

In Saigon, General Moore's 2d Air 

Division, a MACV component, coordinated Air Force and other U.S. service 

air units employed in Steel Tiger. To 

meet political requirements arising 

from the use of Thai-based Air Force 

aircraft operating over Laos, General 

Moore had a Deputy Air Commander 

located at Udorn RTAFB. In April1966, 

when the division was replaced by the 

Seventh Air Force, he became Deputy 

Commander, 7th AF/13th AF, reporting to the Seventh on operational matters and to the Thirteenth on administration and logistic matters. 

At the start of Steel Tiger operations, the Air Force relied chiefly on 

the RF-101 and RB-57 for target detection and bomb damage assessment. 

For air strikes, it employed the F-100, 

the F-1 05, and the B-57 bomber-the 

last normally in conjunction with a C130 Hercules flareship for night armed 

reconnaissance. As in the case of operations over northern Laos and North 

Vietnam, SAC KC-135 tankers were 

indispensable for refueling aircraft 

heading to or from targets or target 

areas. Air Force and Navy strikes initially concentrated on cutting roads 

and bombing traffic " choke points", 

particularly along routes leading from 

104 

the Mu Gia and Nape passes, two principal entry points from North Vietnam 

into Laos. They also struck trucks, 

bridges, and troop and storage areas. 

The Air Force averaged 9 to 10 sorties 

per day, the Navy a slightly higher 

number. 

Soon after Steel Tiger operations 

were launched in April 1965, the annual May to October southwest monsoon began sweeping over Laos, 

sharply curtailing Air Force and Navy 

operations. Enemy personnel, on the 

other hand, adept at using jungle 

growth to conceal their troop and 

supply movements southward, continued their logistic activities. If the monsoon rains washed out roads and 

trails, they used watercraft on swollen 

streams and rivers to transport their 

men and supplies. 

Introduction of New Tactics 

By mid-1965, despite the poor 

weather, Air Force and Navy pilots 

were flying more than 1 ,000 Steel Tiger sorties per month. To improve 

their operations against targets of 

opportunity, the Air Force placed several F-105's on "strip alert" at a Thai 

air base. The use of the Thunderchiefs 

on strip alert (nicknamed "Whiplash") 

became an enduring Steel Tiger tactic 

against fleeting targets. Another 

measure undertaken was to send 

South Vietnamese ground reconnaissance teams-trained and led by U.S. 

Army personnel - into the border 

areas of the Laotian panhandle to locate and determine the extent of 

enemy traffic along the trail. The first 

team was flown in and removed by 

helicopter in October 1965. Other 

ground reconnaissance teams followed and soon began contributing 

to Steel Tiger operations by directing 

strikes on enemy positions, truck 

parks, and POL, supply, and ammunition stores normally concealed by 

the jungle growth or bad weather. 
As the southwest monsoon subsided in late 1965, the Communists 

stepped up their infiltration, exceeding earlier U.S. estimates that they 

would send 4,500 men and 300 tons of 

supplies monthly into Vietnam . As a 

result, American and Lao authorities 

agreed to concentrate more air power 

on a segment of the Ho Chi Minh trail 

most contiguous to South Vietnam 

and used extensively by the infiltrators. Air Force Col. John F. Groom 

drew up the operational, command, 

communications, and support requirements for the new air program. 

Nicknamed Tiger Hound, it began in 

December 1965. Tiger Hound required 

more resources than the Air Force had 

employed in Laos up to that time. An 

airborne battlefield command and 

control system was established, involving initially C-47's which were later replaced by C-130's, for overall control of air operations within the strike 

area. Air Force 0 -1 'sand A-1 E's, along 

with Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) T28's, served as FAC's. RF-1 01 's and 

the newly-arrived RF-4C aircraft, 

which were equipped with the latest 

infrared and side-looking radars, also 

were employed for target detection. 

UC-123 spray aircraft defoliated jungle 

growth along roads and trails to improve visibility. The principal strike 

aircraft were B-57's, F-100's, F-105's, 

and AC-47 gunships. Substantial Marine, Navy, and Army air joined in the 

operation. The Army provided additional 0 -1 's for FAC missions while its 

OV-1 Mohawks, which were equipped 

with infrared and side-looking radar, 

were used mostly at night and often 

flew with Air Force C-130 flareships. 

To facilitate the search for and destruction of targets, Tiger Hound rules 

of engagement were somewhat less 

stringent than elsewhere in Laos. By 

the end of December, the Air Force 

had logged 384 strike sorties in Tiger 

Hound, 51 of them at night; the other 

services flew an additional425 sorties. 

The chief targets were trucks, storage 

and bivoua·c areas, bridges, buildings, 

and enemy antiaircraft sites. A substantial number concentrated on cutting roads and creating traffic choke 

points. On 11 December, B-52's struck 

the Mu Gia pass area, marking their 

first use in Laos. 

In January 1966, the Air Force 

launched another air program in Laos 

called Cricket. It involved the use of 0-

1 and A-1 E aircraft, based at Nakhon 

Phanom RTAFB near the Laotian border, to fly visual reconnaissance or to 

serve as FAC's in the northern Steel 

Tiger and southern Barrel Roll sectors. In the Barrel Roll area, the mission was primarily to support friendly 

ground units; in Steel Tiger, it was 

armed reconnaissance. Air Force aircraft ranged outward about 300 nautical miles from Nakhon Phanom, concentrating on roads to the south of Mu 

Gia pass- Routes 12, 23, and 911. 

RLAF observers flew with some U.S. 

FAC's to validate targets before allowing the F-100's, F-105's, and AC-47's 

to strike. The FAC pilots worked with 

both ground air liaison officers and 

road reconnaissance teams inside 

Laos who helped pinpoint targets. 

Although Cricket was a relatively minor operation, it proved quite effective 

in destroying or . damaging enemy 

trucks and supplies. 

In early 1966 Tiger Hound operations gathered momentum with each 

passing month. In March, for example, 

tactical air strikes destroyed an estimated 210 trucks and damaged about 

278 more. SAC B-52's flew more than 

400 sorties in the first half of the year, 

conducting saturation strikes on roads 

to block enemy traffic and to hit troop 

encampments, supply dumps, and 

truck parks. By May, Tiger Hound attacks had destroyed or damaged an 

estimated 3,000 structures, 1,400 

trucks, scores of bridges, and more 

than 200 automatic weapon and antiaircraft positions. 

Recognizing the need for aircraft 

with a long loitering capability to help 

105 

6 

7 

8 

(1) View of an AC·119K 20-mm cannon. (2) AC·119K gunship. 

(3) An AC-47 fires its miniguns. (4) Loading 20·mm ammunition 

on a gunship. (5·6) 15,000-lb bomb used to create jungle landing 

zones. (7) An AC-130 gunship at Nha Trang AB. (8) Servicing a 

20-mm cannon. 
locate and attack an enemy concealed 

by jungle or weather, the Air Force 

deployed eight slow, nonjet A-26's (of 

World War II vintage which were reequipped) to Nakhon Phanom in June 

1966. Used in both a hunter and killer 

role against trucks, these aircraft replaced the older-model AC-47 gunships {which were later succeeded by 

improved AC-119 and AC-130 gunships). Also in June, the Air Force installed an MSQ-77 Skyspot radar at 

the base. Its 200-mile range permitted 

more accurate bombing day or night 

and in poor weather. The enemy reacted to the increased tempo of air operations by deploying more AAA weapons which took a steady toll of the attacking aircraft. 

By May 1966 they had downed 22 

U.S. aircraft in the Steel Tiger/Tiger 

Hound areas. With the onset of the 

annual southwest monsoons in the 

spring, air effectiveness again diminished as did the pace of infiltration. To 

maintain their supply flow southward, 

the Communists shifted to roads in 

North Vietnam (route package 1) 

above the DMZ. 

In October 1966, when drier weather 

returned, the enemy resumed largescale supply movements and Steel 

Tiger and Tiger Hound operations intensified once more. From January 

through April1967, the dry months of 

the year in the Laotian panhandle, 

American pilots flew 2,900 to 3,400 

strike sorties per month. In February, 

in undertaking one of the largest sustained air assaults in Laos, they flew 

500 sorties against enemy concentrations opposite Kontum province in 

South Vietnam, thereby aiding considerably Allied operations against the 

Communists in that threatened province. 

Subsequently, air operational rules 

were changed following the division 

of the Steel Tiger/Tiger Hound areas 

into four zones. In zone one, closest to 

South Vietnam, pilots had relative 

freedom to strike targets of opportuni108 

ty. However, there were progressively 

more stringent strike rules governing 

the three zones westward. In those 

areas targets could not be hit unless 

authorized by Laotian officers, lowflying U.S. FAC's, or by the office of 

the American ambassador in Vientiane. In bad weather, all missions had 

to be under Skyspot radar control. 

To maintain an umbrella of air power over the Ho Chi Minh trail, USAF 

commanders tried new tactics and introduced more specially-equipped 

aircraft. They also inaugurated the 

practice of having FAC pilots fly over 

"target boxes" in the same geographical area on a daily basis. This enabled 

them to become familiar with the terrain, aided in the detection of the 

enemy's presence, and simplified the 

command and control of strike aircraft. The use of additional ground 

reconnaissance teams led to the discovery of numerous concealed targets 

or target areas for air strikes. SAC B52 bombers stepped up their operations, flying 1,718 sorties in the Laotian panhandle in 1967, nearly triple 

the 617 sorties flown in 1966. The 

Royal Laotian Air Force flew more T28 FAC and strike missions, although 

its main effort continued to be in the 

Barrel Roll area of northern Laos. 

The Air Force's most effective 

"truck killers" were the AC-119 and 

AC-130 gunships, the B-57, a few C123's equipped with special detection 

devices and BLU bomblet cannisters, 

and the A-26. Carrying flares and detection devices. these aircraft flew 

mostly at night when Communist 

truck travel was heaviest. They also 

could serve as FAC's, calling in "fast 

movers" such as F-4C Phantoms for 

additional strikes. Other aircraft with a 

FAC capability included Air Force A1 E's, Navy P-1's. and RLAF T-28's. In 

1967 0 -2's began replacing 0 -1 's and 

in 1968 the Air Force introduced the 

larger OV-10 Forward Air Control aircraft. The nighttime detection capability of a few tactical aircraft was en-
hanced by equipping them with the 

Starlight Scope, originally developed 

by the Army for its M-16 rifle. During 

the last 2 months of 1967 an important 

advance was made in the Allies' ability 

to detect enemy movements through 

the Laotian panhandle. This was a rudimentary, air-supported electronic 

anti-infiltration system, which consisted of "strings" of seismic and acoustic sensors dropped from aircraft in 

designated jungle areas. These devices, planted along a number of infiltration roads and trails, almost at once 

began picking up the sounds and 

movements of enemy vehicular traffic 

and personnel movements. The information was transmitted to a highflying EC-121 which, in turn, retransmitted it to an Air Force infiltration 

surveillance center at Nakhon Phanom. There data were collated with 

other intelligence information. 

The anti-infiltration detection system had a succession of nicknames, 

with Igloo White being best known and 

used the longest. It was another technological innovation for locating an 

enemy shielded by terrain or bad 

weather. A unit organized under the 

command of Air Force Brig. Gen. William P. McBride, named Task Force 

Alpha, built and operated the infiltration surveillance center. To dispense 

the sensors, the Air Force relied upon a 

small number of A-1 E's, CH-3 helicopters, and also some F-4D's. Navy OP-2E 

aircraft also were employed to dispense the sensors. In January-February 1968, after the Communists laid 

siege to the Marine base at Khe Sanh, 

General Westmoreland diverted Task 

Force Alpha resources to its defense. 

Dropped in the vicinity of the base, the 

sensors in one instance were able to 

detect North Vietnamese troop movements and preparations for a largescale ground assault against the Marine positions. Thus alerted, the threat 

was thwarted and beaten back by 

heavy air strikes and Marine artillery 

fire. 

Commando Hunt Operations 

As was noted in Chapter Ill, the Tet 

offensive and siege of Khe Sanh triggered changes in U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. On 31 March 1968, President Johnson ordered an end to all 

bombing of North Vietnam above the 

19th parallel to facilitate peace negotiations, hopefully paving the way for 

withdrawal of American troops from 

the theater while simultaneously 

strengthening Saigon's military forces. 

While U.S. air power hit hard at enemy 

infiltration through the DMZ, the annual southwest monsoon once again 

reduced Communist traffic in the Laos 

panhandle and air action against it. 

In November 1968, on the basis of 

an " understanding" reached with 

Hanoi, the President ended all attacks 

upon North Vietnam . The enemy 

threat to South Vietnam, however, 

remained undiminished. Abatement of 

the rainy season in Laos, which coincided with the end of all bombing of 

the North, found infiltration down the 

Ho Chi Minh trail heavier than ever. To 

reduce it, the Air Force, Navy, and 

Marines launched a new air campaign 

nicknamed Commando Hunt. Its major objectives were to destroy as many 

supplies as possible being moved 

down the trail, to tie down enemy 

manpower, and to further test the 

effectiveness of the sensor system . 

Initial operations were confined 

roughly to a 1,700 square-mile sector 

of Laos contiguous to South Vietnam. 

The Air Force employed an array of 

FAC, strike, and reconnaissance aircraft, B-52's, C-130 airborne battlefield 

command and control centers, and 

AC-47 and AC-130 gunships. The gunships proved especially valuable in interdicting enemy truck traffic. In 1969, 

AC-119 gunships-some manned by 

Air Force reservists mobilized by President Johnson in May 1968-also flew 

missions against the trail. 

Initially, about 40 percent of all sorties attempted to block narrow road 

109 
passes, 35 percent hit truck parks and 1 (D;j~~fS~ 

storage areas, 15 percent truck traffic, 

and 10 percent enemy AAA positions. 

By the end of April, after 6 months of 

these operations, U.S. analysts believed that the Commando Hunt operations had destroyed or damaged 

enough vehicles and supplies to force 

the Communists to rely more heavily 

on water routes including the Cambodian port of Kompong Som (apparently with tne acquiescence of Cambodian officials). As the pace of the aerial 

assault quickened, the number of tactical sorties rose from about 4,700 in 

October 1968, to 12,800 in November, 

and 15,100 in December. B-52 sorties 

jumped from 273 in October to more 

than 600 for each of the last 2 months 

of the year. During 1968 SAC bombers 

logged 3,377 sorties over the Laotian 

panhandle, nearly double the total for 

1967. Somewhat greater operational 

flexibility allowed air commanders in 

early 1969 facilitated the upward sortie trend. Notwithstanding their rising 

materiel losses, the Communists doggedly continued to send a substantial 

flow of supplies through Laos into 

South Vietnam. 

Commando Hunt II, begun in May 

1969, coincided with the beginning of 

the annual southwest monsoon 

and the usual reduction of enemy 

movements and U.S. operations over 

southern Laos. American pilots 

nonetheless continued to harass or 

hamper the efforts of the Communists 

to repair roads and trails washed out 

by floods. Within North Vietnam, the 

enemy assembled more manpower, 

trucks, and watercraft and stockpiled 

supplies near the Laos border to prepare for the next infiltration surge 

through Laos after the monsoon abated. They also built a POL pipeline into 

the southern Laotian panhandle and 

augmented considerably their antiaircraft defenses. This activity was facilitated greatly, of course, by the end of 

the bombing of the North and the continued, unrestricted flow of trucks, 

110 

(1) A Chinese built truck, captured in Laos, 

1971 (2) U.S. Army helicopters supported 

Lam Son 719 In early 1971. (4) Captured 

Soviet PT-76 amphiboous tank. (5) A North 

Vietnamese antl&ircraft gun captured in 

Laos by Saigon's troops In 1971. (6) Gun· 

ship fires on enemy truck traffic in Laos. 
6 

guns, equipment, and supplies from 

China or through Haiphong and other 

seaports. Gen. GeorgeS. Brown, Seventh Air Force commander (August 

1968 to September 1970), observed 

that the enemy had a 

"free ride" to the 

borders of Laos and South Vietnam . 

Commando Hunt Ill, launched as the 

dry season began in November 1969, 

again witnessed more intense air operations against an expanded flow of 

enemy troops and supplies southward. The use of many seismic and 

acoustic sensors, unaffected by darkness and weather, provided considerable data on NVA movements and resulted frequently in more timely 

air strikes. The AC-119 and AC-130 

gunships, and C-123's equipped with 

bomblet cannisters continued to be 

the best truck killers. Of the total 

number of trucks claimed destroyed 

or damaged between late 1969 and 

early 1970 (one estimate ranged up

-

wards to 10

,000 trucks), the gunships 

and C-123's were credited with about 

48 percent, although they flew a rela-

tively small number of total Commando Hunt sorties. Some analysts believed that no more than 33 percent 

of the supplies that entered the Ho 

Chi Minh trail reached South Vietnam while the rest were destroyed, 

damaged, or co

nsumed en route. 

During Commando Hunt Ill, the 

tempo of air operations declin

ed grad-

ually. Washington authorities, confident that American objectives in 

Southeast Asia were being achieved, 

imposed budgetary limits on the over

-

all U.S. war effort which led to some 

reduction in Air Force and Navy sortie 

ceilings. Sortie requirements were 

reduced beginning 26 February 1970 

when enemy traffic in southern Laos . 

suddenly dropped to half of the volume observed in the preceding weeks. 

Meanwhile, there were requests to use 

air assets elsewhere. In 

February 1970, 

for example, numerous tactical and B-

52 missions-the latter for the first 

timew

ere diverted to the Barrel Roll 

111 
(1) Reconnaissance photo of camouflaged 

truck In Laos. (21 Truck park on the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail. (3) A military camp located at the Mu Gia 

pass, North VIetnam. (4) Enemy truck traffic 

heading towards the Mu Gia pass. !51 A 

camouflaged enemy truck was spotted and 

destroyed. (61 Aerial Interdiction operations on 

Ho Chi Minh trail. (7) Road interdiction near a 

Mu Gia pass choke point. 

112 

3 
6 

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. 

. . . 

• ·. 

'•., MUONG 

NONG · ...... . 

THAILAND 

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: . . . .. . . .· ... .... ,.·· ........ ,.,, . . :. ·-- . :. , ... . .. ·~ .. .. 

CAMBODIA 

NORTH YII!TNAM 

103 

• PLEIKU 

Ho Chi Minh 

TraU 

Infiltration Routes 

LEGEND 

PERSONNEL ROUTES. -

LOGISTICAL ROUTES. 

BASE AREAS. <==> 
sector of northern Laos to counter 

stepped up Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese activity there. Other diversions 

occurred in April and May 1970, when 

U.S. and South Vietnamese troops 

invaded the " Parrot's Beak" and 

" Fishhook" regions of Cambodia to 

attack Communist base areas and 

supply concentrations. In fact, air requirements in Cambodia, South Vietnam , and northern Laos tor the time 

being took precedence over those in 

southern Laos. 

Lam Son 719 

Late in 1970, attention again was 

directed to an upsurge of Communist 

movements in the Laos panhandle. 

There was evidence of considerable 

stockpiling around Tchepone, a supply hub on the upper end of the Ho Chi 

Minh trail, not far from the DMZ. The 

enemy seemed to be preparing for a 

major ground offensive into South 

Vietnam's two northernmost provinces, Quang Tri and Thau Thien. 

As the enemy buildup grew, U.S. 

and South Vietnamese authorities 

decided to conduct a military thrust 

across a portion of the Ho Chi Minh 

trail toward Tchepone with the objective of thwarting the NVA attack and 

cutting a segment of the infiltration 

route. As in the earlier invasion of 

Cambodia, the incursion into Laos 

promised to "buy time" to insure success of Vietnamization and the withdrawal of U.S. and Allied troops from 

South Vietnam. Because Congress 

had prohibited the use of American 

ground forces in Laos, only South Vietnamese troops were committed to 

the invasion, supported primarily by 

U.S. air power. Nicknamed Lam Son 

719, the operation was conducted 

between January and April 1971 . Air 

assets earmarked earlier for Commando Hunt V (October 1970 to April1971) 

were diverted to Lam Son 719. 

The first phase of the joint South 

Vietnamese-American undertaking 

began on 30 October when U.S. 

114 

ground troops in Quang Tri province 

cleared an area near the Laotian border in order to establish logistical 

bases at Khe Sanh and the Vandegrift 

(Marine) camp. Construction of a new 

assault air strip and stockpiling of fuel 

and supplies followed. Air Force C-123 

and C-130 transports played a major 

preparatory role, flying about 1,900 

sorties to airlift 12,846 personnel, 

mostly South Vietnamese troops, and 

19,900 tons of cargo to the jump-off 

areas. 

The invasion was launched on 8 

February 1971 . South Vietnamese 

troops-drawn from a ranger, airborne, and ARVN infantry division and 

including some mechanized elements 

-fought for the first time without 

accompanying U.S. advisors. Initially, 

a mechanized unit rolled across the 

border to establish and secure land 

lines, while other ARVN troops were 

airlifted by helicopter to the A Luoi 

area, south of Route 9 leading to 

Tchepone. In support of the Vietnamese, the Air Force operated a tactical 

air control system from the forward 

direct air support center (DASC) set 

up and collocated with the U.S. XXIV 

Corps forward command post at 

Quang Tri. It also provided most of the 

0 -2 and OV-10 FAC aircraft. 

English-speaking Vietnamese flew 

with the Air Force FAC pilots and 

aboard C-130 aerial command posts 

to bridge language difficulties between Vietnamese commanders and 

ground personnel. Other participating 

USAF aircraft included F-100's, F4C's, AC-119's, AC-130's, and B52's- all for direct support or interdiction purposes. Also supporting the 

operation were RF-4C's for reconnaissance, A-1 E's tor air cover rescue missions, and KC-135's for air 

refueling. C-130, C-123, and C-7 

transports airlifted more than 30,000 

tons during the invasion. U.S. Marine 

and Navy aircraft provided considerable tactical support and the Army 

employed helicopter gunships and 
hundreds of other helicopters for troop 

and supply airlift. The VNAF also provided ~om bat and airlift support. 

By the end of the first day, 6,200 

South Vietnamese troops were in 

Laos, most of them airlifted to predetermined locations. They built fire bases, 

conducted patrols, and uncovered 

numerous supply and ammunition 

caches. The bodies of many NVA 

troops were found, killed by air 

strikes. By 12 February about 10,000 

South Vietnamese were in Laos and 

shortly after their strength peaked at 

about 17,000. Enemy resistance initially was light to moderate. 

Meanwhile, U.S. aircraft continued to 

strike heavily at NVA positions and 

their LOG's. At night Air Force FAG's, 

flareships, and gunships provided 

cover for friendly troops; on 14 February the B-52's launched their first 

close air support strike. By the 23d, 

the B-52's had flown 399 sorties, 

which helped clear the path for the 

advancing Vietnamese and to prepare helicopter landing zones. Air 

Force C-130's joined in, unloading 

15 0~pound bombs on suspected 

enemy concentrations and using 

them to create instant helicopter 

landing areas. 

On 25 February 1971 , the North Vietnamese launched a counter offensive. 

They first attacked the forward support base at A Luoi and expanded 

their operations in the ensuing 5 days. 

The size and intensity of their response proved greater than anticipated. Some 24,000 NVA combat troops 

-supported by about 11 ,000 support 

personnel-reached the vicinity of the 

forward elements of the South Vietnamese force moving westward. The 

NVA troops were equipped with about 

120 tanks, considerable artillery, and a 

profusion of antiaircraft automatic 

weapons. The AA guns soon began 

taking a heavy toll of low-flying U.S. 

Army helicopters. 

With the help of fixed-wing air power, the South Vietnamese briefly contained the enemy assaults and, on 3 

March, they resumed their westward 

drive. On the 7th three battalions 

reached the area around the logistic 

hub of Tchepone, the principal objective, where they were joined by two 

other battalions. Enemy resistance, at 

first relatively light, grew stiffer between 3-10 March as NVA reinforcements arrived in the Tchepone area. 

Other NVA attacks of growing 

strength began to hit the ARVN troops 

and fire-bases stretching from South 

Vietnam 's border to Tchepone. A 

number of enemy ambushes inflicted 

heavy casualties on the invaders. 

Faced with mounting personnel and 

equipment losses, Lt. Gen. Hoang 

Xuan Lam, the commander of the invasion forces, decided to cut short the 

operation and ordered a withdrawal. 

In the hasty retreat that followed, with 

many personnel being evacuated by 

helicopter, the South Vietnamese 

abandoned large quantities of armor, 

tanks, trucks, and other military hardware. Intense enemy ground fire made 

helicopter missions extremely dangerous and scores were shot down or seriously damaged, leading to panic 

among many ARVN troops. However, 

under massive tactical and B-52 air 

cover, virtually all South Vietnamese 

troops were extricated by 24 March. A 

number of ground reconnaissance 

units fought a rearguard action as 

Lam Son 719 officially ended on 6 

April. 

The cost was high to both sides. The 

North Vietnamese suffered an estimated 14,500 personnel killed, about 4,800 

by air strikes, and unknown numbers 

of wounded. Aircraft were credited 

with destroying the greatest part of 

about 20,000 tons of food and ammunition and 156,000 gallons of fuel. 

About 1,530 trucks were destroyed 

and 480 damaged and a NVA tank regiment- with about 74 tanks destroyed 

and another 24 damaged- was virtually wiped out. The enemy also lost an 

estimated 6,000 weapons. The South 

115 
Vietnamese suffered 1,519 killed , 

5,423 wounded, and 651 missing in action. ARVN equipment destroyed or 

captured included about 75 tanks, 

many armored personnel carriers, 198 

crew-served weapons, and about3,000 

individual weapons. 

American air support had been 

massive. More than 8,000 tactical air 

sorties were flown and some 20,000 

tons of ordnance dropped. The B-52's 

flew 1 ,358 sorties in direct support of 

the South Vietnamese troops. U.S. 

Army helicopters flew thousands of 

sorties in airlifting troops into and out 

of Laos, resupplying units, and evacuating casualties. Considering the magnitude of the air effort and the North 

Vietnamese response to it, aircraft 

losses were relatively small . The Air 

Force lost six aircraft, the Navy one. 

U.S. Army helicopters suffered the 

heaviest attrition. At least 107 were 

destroyed and upwards of 600 damaged , many so badly that they would 

not fly again. American casualties 

totalled 176 killed, 1,042 wounded, 

and 42 missing in action. One lesson 

of Lam Son 719 was that neither the 

invasion nor the withdrawal would 

have been possible without the extensive use of air power. 

Following the operation, both sides 

were forced to reconstitute and re116 
(1) U.S. fighter bomb ers 

destroy enemy truck in Laos. 

(2) Four enemy trucks damaged by U.S. aircraft In vicinity 

of t he Mu Gla pass. (3) 

Air Force fighter-bombers 

attacked enemy petroleum 

drum cache on the Ho Chi 

Minh trail. (4) Three Soviet 

PT·76 tanks damaged by Air 

Force fighter bombers. (5) 

Enemy tanks destroyed in 

Laos. 

5 

equip many of their units. Having suffered by far the largest number of casualties, the North Vietnamese had to 

replace and retrain many personnel. 

They also had to repair roads, trails, 

bridges, and restock stores of food , 

POL, and ammunition in the battle 

area. As a consequence, Hanoi's plans 

for a new major offensive against 

South Vietnam suffered a temporary 

setback and bought additional time 

for Washington and Saigon to advance the on-going Vietnamization 

program. 

Additional Commando 

Hunt Campaigns 

During the annual May to October 

monsoon in 1971 , when Commando 

Hunt operations diminished, the North 

Vietnamese maintained an above 

normal level of activity in southern 

Laos. They added about 140 miles of 

new roads to the Ho Chi Minh trail 

which, by October, brought the total 

to 2,170 miles- including single lanes, 

multiple parallel routes, by-passes, 

and spur roads. They also expanded 

their air defenses. By late 1971, about 

344 antiaircraft guns and thousands of 

smaller automatic weapons defended 

vital points along the trail. A number 

of SA-2 missile sites on the North Vietnamese border and in Laos posed a 

new threat, as did rebuilt air bases in 

southern North Vietnam. The latter 

enabled MIG pilots to challenge or 

harass Commando Hunt aircraft. As 

more North Vietnamese troops arrived, American officials estimated 

enemy strength in Laos-south and 

north-at about 96,000. In Cambodia 

there were about 63,000 North Vietnamese and in South Vietnam about 

200,000. 

Thus, with the onset of the dry season in late 1971 , the Communist threat 

again was formidable. To counter it, 

the Air Force launched Commando 

Hunt VII, extending it beyond the Steel 

Tiger area of southern Laos. However, 

there were fewer U.S. aircraft available 

for Laos because of competing requirements in Cambodia, and North 

Vietnam where "protective reaction" 

strikes were under way, and because 

of U.S. budget cutbacks and the consequent withdrawal of U.S. air and 

ground units. To compensate for fewer U.S. aircraft, USAF officials called 

for greater participation in Commando Hunt VII by the indigenous air 

forces of Laos, Cambodia, and South 

Vietnam , more flexible employment of 

U.S. tactical and B-52 aircraft, and the 

use of the newest technological advances for interdiction . 

By 1971 , U.S. research and develop117 
ment activities had wrought many 

changes in interdiction techniques 

and ordnance. OV-10 FAC aircraft 

were now able to direct laser-guided 

bombs dropped by fighter aircraft 

flying day or night missions, and also 

were more effective in assisting air 

rescue operations. The target-detection and truck-killing capability of the 

B-57G and the AC-119 and AC-130 

gunships had been upgraded. The AC130 was equipped with a variety of 

target acquisition devices, including 

low-light-level television, illuminators, 

beacon-tracking radar, and infrared 

sensors. LORAN-equipped F-4's could 

lead other aircraft not so equipped to 

targets at night or in bad weather. The 

Task Force Alpha infiltration center at 

Nakhon Phanom assumed a more direct operational role while continuing 

to collect, analyze, and disseminate 

sensor-gathered data on enemy movements. And pilots had available more 

deadly types of cluster bombs, more 

accurate laser-guided bombs, and 

improved aircraft guns. 

Commando Hunt VII operations in 

the Steel Tiger area of Laos were conducted in three phases. Beginning 

with Phase I on 1 November 1971 , 

strike aircraft concentrated on hitting 

several entry points from North Vietnam into Laos, principally the Mu Gia, 

Ban Karai, and Ban Raving passes and 

the western end of the DMZ at the 17th 

parallel. During Phase II, as the North 

Vietnamese moved supplies further 

southward along roads and trails in 

the Laotian panhandle, strike aircraft 

shifted attacks to those routes in order 

to create " blocking belts" at key transportation points or areas. These were 

formed first by cutting a road with laser-guided bombs and then seeding 

the road area with air-dropped land 

mines. When ground sensors detected 

the enemy clearing minefields or bypassing the belt area, aircraft were 

quickly dispatched to the scene. 

During Phase Ill operations in early 

1972, U.S. tactical and B-52 aircraft 

118 

HIGHWAY BRIDGE, ROUTE 9 

TCHEPONE AREA, LAOS 

16-4211 115-13£ 

shifted their attacks to seven principal 

exit points from Laos into South Vietnam and Cambodia. 

Commando Hunt VII operations 

were completed at the end of March 

1972. By then, U.S. tactical aircraft had 

flown about 31,500 sorties in the 

Laotian panhandle, with the Air Force 

flying more than half of this total. As 

previously, the B-52's participated, flying 3,176 strikes. About 70 percent of 

the tactical missions were directed 

against interdiction points, trucks, and 

storage areas. Many of the strikes triggered explosions and secondary fires, 

and analysts estimated that the enemy 

lost many of his trucks and a substantial part of about 31,000 tons of supplies moving through southern Laos 

during the 5-month campaign. Despite 

intense enemy AAA fire in some areas, 

the United States lost only 13 aircraft 

in the Steel Tiger sector during Commando Hunt VII. 

Thrs bridge rn I he T chepone 

areas of Laos. deslfoyed in 

early 1964. was reburll by 

enemy torces and later 

downed aga•n-
USAF aircraft interdicted this 

b"dge in Laos •n 1969. Air Power Shifts Again 

While absorbing its losses in Laos, 

the Hanoi regime remained free from 

air attacks north of the DMZ, except 

for occasional protective reaction air 

strikes, to build up its troop strength 

and supplies. In April 1972, as the 

northeast monsoon began to abate, 

the North Vietnamese launched their 

" spring offensive," sending about 100, 

000 men into northern South Vietnam. The United States responded 

forcefully, with President Nixon ordering mining harbors of the North for 

the first time, renewed regular strikes 

above the DMZ, and a buildup of U.S. 

units to provide air support to South 

Vietnamese forces. Augmented by 50 

more B-52's, American air units again 

pounded the enemy. By July, the NVA 

offensive had been contained, but the 

North Vietnamese had succeeded in 

seizing large portions of South Vietnamese territory in the northern and 

western portions of the Republic of 

Vietnam. As a result of Hanoi's spring 

invasion of South Vietnam, air strikes 

in Laos dropped to the lowest level 

since 1965. In September the tempo 

increased with B-52's concentrating 

on the Steel Tiger area and tactical 

aircraft hitting enemy troops in the 

northern part of the country. In October, as the southwest monsoon declined , the North Vietnamese for the 

first time in several years did not step 

up drastically their infiltration activity 

in southern Laos. The Air Force, in 

turn, did not launch another Commando Hunt campaign. It continued, however, to fly air strikes against segments of the Ho Chi Minh trail, employing for the first time the A-7D Corsair II for close air support of friendly 

Lao units and the swept-wing F-111 tor 

armed reconnaissance. Both aircraft 

possessed sophisticated radar equipment for poor weather operations. 

These air missions continued at a 

low but steady pace until 18 December 

1972, when Linebacker II operations 

were launched against the North Vietnamese capital area, including the 

port of Haiphong. The 11-day Linebacker II campaign was followed on 

23 January 1973 by the signing of an 

accord, effective on the 28th, Saigon 

time, between the United States and 

North Vietnam providing for the release of all American and allied prisoners of war in exchange for a U.S. 

withdrawal of all combat forces from 

South Vietnam . However, tactical and 

B-52 sorties continued to be flown in 

the Laotian panhandle until 21 February 1973, when the rival Laotian factions reached a ceasefire agreement. 

The bombing, halted the next day, was 

renewed on 23 February at the request 

of the Vientiane government because 

of ceasefire violations. The B-52's returned to action in April, again in 

connection with a breakdown in the 

ceasefire. With the completion of 

these strikes against targets on the 

Plain of Jars, all American air operations in Laos ceased . 

119 

Chapter VI 

Airman 1st Class Harold P. 

Johnson stands by aa Capt. 

R.P. Roseclans, Jr., prepares 

to taxi hla A·1E at Udorn AB, 

Thailand, 1968. 

Air Operations over 

Northern Laos 

After nearly 9 years of operations 

over northern Laos, the Air Force on 

17 April 1973 flew its last combat sortie in support of the Royal Laotian 

Government (RLG). Unlike the Steel 

Tiger interdiction strikes against 

North Vietnamese traffic on the Ho 

Chi Minh trail in the Laotian panhandle discussed above, the northern 

operations, known as Barrel Roll, primarily supported friendly government 

ground forces-the Royal Laotian 

Army and Neutralist troops but especially the army of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, 

consisting of about 5,000 CIA-trained 

Meo tribesmen, a mountain people living within Laos. Operating mostly as 

irregulars, the Meos did much of the 

fighting, helping to defend an area 

which included the capital at Vientiane and the politically important Plain 

of Jars. Northeast of the plain were 

Sam Neua province, the Pathet Lao 

capital of the same name, and major 

east-west roads leading to and from 

North Vietnam. 

Air Force operations over northern 

Laos had their origins In the failure of 

the Geneva Accords of 23 July 1962. 

Signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, the two Vietnams, and eight 

other countries, the agreement recognized Laos as a neutral, independent 

country to be ruled by a tripartite government divided among Rightists, 

Neutralists, and the Pathet Lao. 

Foreign military personnel- other 

than accredited military attacheswere prohibited from being stationed 

in Laos. Thus, the 75~man U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groupwhich had been in Laos for about 2 

years before the accords were 

signed-had to leave, its departure 

being monitored by the International 

Control Commission. But on the other 

side, North Vietnamese forces lingered on in Pathet Lao territory and 

prevented the ICC from inspections by 

obstructive tactics which were abetted 

by the Communist member of the 

Commission. 

When efforts by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma to form a tripartite 

coalition government proved unsuccessful, he requested American economic and military aid, including supplies, spare parts, and aircraft for the 

Royal Laotian Air Force. T-28 fighterbombers were subsequently delivered 

to the RLAF, replacing worn-out T-6's. 

To manage the increased materiel 

flow, the United States maintained in 

its embassy in Laos a small contingent of civilians (most of them retired military men). In the spring of 

1964, after Pathet Lao and NVA 

forces launched attacks against Neutralist forces on the Plain of Jars, 

government troops evacuated the 

area. This prompted the Neutralist 

general, Kong Le, to warn RLG officials that without immediate air support all would be lost to the Communists. 

Thereafter, with Washington's approval, Leonard Unger, the U.S. ambassador in Vientiane, released the 

fuzes for the bombs previously delivered and allowed the Laotian Air 

Force to attack with live ordnance. He 

also proposed, and Souvanna Phouma 

approved the use of low-level reconnaissance sorties In early June 1964. 

Souvanna authorized the use of tactical 

fighters to accompany the unarmed 

121 
jets after one of the reconnaissance aircraft was lost on 6 June. Following the 

second loss of a Yankee Team aircraft, 

President Johnson ordered a retaliatory strike by eight F-1 OO's on 9 June 

against a Communist AAA installation 

at Xieng Khouang on the Plain of Jars. 

Three months earlier, in response to 

Souvanna Phouma's request for help 

to the RLAF, the Air Force deployed 

Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando 

Wing, to Udorn, Thailand. Two of its 

major jobs were to establish a T-28 

flight checkout system for Laotian pilots and to assist with aircraft maintenance. Forty-one airmen , along with 

four aircraft, opened for business at 

Udorn in April 1964. Subsequently, as 

support of friendly ground operations 

increased, Air Force personnel were 

assigned to work as ground controllers or forward air guides in Laos, 

since few laotians could speak English and none were familiar with procedures for directing air strikes 

against enemy positions. In early 1965, 

Detachment 6 began training Englishspeaking Lao and Meo personnel to 

direct air strikes from the ground. As 

these personnel became proficient, 

USAF airmen withdrew from this role. 

When Barrel Roll operations got 

under way in December 1964, the U.S. 

ambassador in Vientiane as head of 

the " country team "-that is, all Americans officially assigned to the embassy- assumed responsibility for the 

direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. military activities-almost 

entirely air-in support of the government. The Air Force attache and a 

small contingent of military and CIA 

personnel assisted him. 

Although Unger and his successors- Ambassadors William H. Sullivan and G. McMurtrie Godley-did not 

concern themselves with details of 

operations (the number or types of 

planes employed), they validated all 

targets and none could be bombed 

without their permission. Strikes were 

limited to specific areas and conduct122 

ed under strict rules of engagement. 

As the tempo of operations increased, the Air Force in November 

1965 established Headquarters 2d Air 

Division/Thirteenth Air Force at 

Udorn, some 45 miles from Vientiane 

to serve as a focal point for Laotian air 

support requests. The commander, a 

major general, as the senior Air Force 

representative in Thailand, had multiple responsibilities : he reported to the 

American ambassadors in Thailand 

and Laos on military matters in their 

respective areas; to the Commander, 

Thirteenth Air Force for administrative 

and logistic matters involving USAF 

units in Thailand; and to the Commander, Second Air Division in Saigon 

for the combat operations of those 

units. Thus, the Second Air Division 

actually issued the directives (the daily 

" trag" orders) for Barrel Roll missions 

in the Laotian panhandle. The Udorn 

headquarters in April 1966 was redesignated as 7th/13th Air Force following establishment of Seventh Air 

Force at Tan Son Nhut AB, South 

Vietnam. 

The Effects of Weather 

As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the 

seasonal weather was a major factor 

in the ground struggle between government forces and the Pathet Lao/ 

NVA in northern Laos. Enemy troops 

normally became active during the dry 

season between October and April. In 

the 6 months of the wet season that 

followed , the weaker government 

forces became active. Thus, with the 

onset of the dry season in the fall of 

1965, enemy troops launched their 

largest offensive up to that time in an 

attempt to eliminate all government 

outposts on the Plain of Jars and establish secure lines of communication. The expanded fighting brought a 

sizable increase in the embassy workload and led the Secretary of Defense to increase the attache staff to 

117 military and 5 civilian personnel-42 of them from the Air Force. 
The number of Air Force personnel 

continued to increase during the 

next several years until it totaled 125 

in 1969. They helped establish Air 

Operations Centers within the five 

military regions of Laos, which were 

jointly manned by Laotian and USAF 

airmen to manage air support requests. In addition, the Air Force assigned forward air controllers to 

Royal Laotian Army units and Vang 

Pao's Meo forces as a means of overcoming the language barrier between 

them and the strike aircraft crews. 

Operating under the designation of 

Raven, these FAG's flew 0 - 1 's, U17's, and T -28's on 6-month tours of 

duty. And, as necessary, the Air 

Force deployed a C-47 airborne battlefield command and control center 

to the area. 

Despite the American air assistance, 

enemy forces overran a number of 

government posts in Sam Neua province in early 1966, including the key 

airfield at Na Khang-known as Lima 

Site 36 (LS-36)-which fell on 17 February. On 20 March a two-battalion 

enemy force seized a Neutralist stronghold and induced defection of its 

troops. To ease the pressure on friendly forces, USAF pilots flew 32 strike sorties daily, some with aircraft diverted 

from North Vietnam and the Ho Chi 

Minh trail. 

The air strikes gradually took a 

heavy toll of enemy resources, destroying large quantities of supplies 

patiently built up over the previous 

year and slowing down his offensive. 

This success enabled Vang Pao's irregulars to take the offensive with the 

start of the wet season and recover a 

number of government posts, including Lima Site 36. By August 1966, the 

irregulars had reached Nam Bac, only 

45 miles from the North Vietnamese 

border and a major point on the historic invasion corridor from the north. 

In effect, the Communist Pathet Lao 

dry season offensive of 196~ 1966 had 

been a failure. 

North Vietnam reacted to this turn 

of events by dispatching 14,000 firstline troops to northern Laos, bringing 

the total Communist strength to about 

50,000 men for the start of the next dry 

season offensive. As the weather improved during the fall of 1966, enemy 

forces moved against governmentcontrolled Lima Sites in northern 

Laos. By early January 1967 they had 

advanced to Na Khan where the Meo, 

supported by Thai T-28 pilots (trained 

by USAF instructors), drove them back. 

When the enemy tried to overrun LS52, located some 20 miles from the 

Pathet Lao capital at Sam Neua, allied 

air power again saved the day. 

Frustrated by these setbacks, the 

Communists on 2 February mortared 

the Luang Prabang airfield, destroying 

eight aircraft and badly damaging 

three others as well as the air operations center. The attack was unprecedented, since both sides had always 

considered the royal capital immune. 

The airfield attack had a major impact on the opposing forces. The government troops became demoralized 

while the enemy appeared to gain a 

new momentum. On 4 April, he again 

struck at LS-52, attacking from three 

sides. Adverse weather deprived the 

government troops of their air support 

and they quickly fled, only to fall into 

an ambush, and were severely mauled 

by the North Vietnamese. For the next 

2 months, operations were at a low 

level. Then, on 16 July, the enemy 

again struck the airfield at Luang Prabang, destroying 10 or 11 T-28's along 

with a major portion of the government's ammunition supply. The raid 

left the RLAF with only 38 T-28's. 

Pending delivery of additional aircraft, 

Seventh Air Force in July diverted sorties from Rolling Thunder to take up 

the slack. 

After slowly rebuilding his forces, 

Vang Pao on 2 August 1967 attacked 

and captured Muong Ngan, depriving 

the enemy of the year's rice harvest in 

that area. Both sides theR built up 

123 

7 

(1) Munitions storiiQe area at Vietlane, 

Laos. 1970. (2) 20,000 Laotian refugees 

were evacuated from Saravane In 2\"z 

days by three Ameri can C-•e 

transports. (3) A De Havilland transport 

delivered suoolies to remote Laotian 

bases. (4) An Air Force F-111 takes off 

from a US. base. (5-6) Damage caused 

by an enemy rocket attack which 

destroyed six aircraft and damaged 

three others at the Vientiane airport on 

2 February 1967. (7) Royal Laotian 

forces captured this Soviet-built PT-76 

tank on the Plain of Jars. 
their forces in the Nam Sac valley in 

anticipation of the dry season offensive. The government tried to move 

first, but weather and inadequate logistic support produced costly delays. 

Then, in early September, the T-28's 

inadvertently bombed their own 

troops, who promptly fled. Subsequent 

air strikes were poorly coordinated and 

controlled and by mid-October the 

situation at Nam Sac was critical. A 

relief operation proved far too complicated to succeed, although Vang 

Pao's guerrilla force gradually fought its 

Wa{ toward Nam Sac. Finally, during the 

night of 14-15 January-with Vang 

Pao's force only 12 kilometers 

away-the Royal Laotian garrison 

abandoned the town and fled into 

the jungle. Of the 4,000-man garrison, only 1,400 were eventually accounted for. They left behind seven 

105-mm howitzers, thirty-six 60-mm 

mortars, forty-two 57-mm recoilless 

rifles, and more than I million 

pounds of ammunition. 

The Loss of Lima Site 85 

Following this success, the enemy 

turned his attention to Lima Site 85, 

isolated on a 5,200-foot mountain 25 

miles west of Sam Neua and 160 miles 

west of Hanoi, deep within Pathet Lao 

territory. Accessible from only one 

side of the mountain, LS-85 was near a 

700-foot dirt landing strip which had 

been scratched out in a narrow valley 

several hundred feet below. In 1966 

the Air Force installed a tactical air 

navigation system there, primarily for 

the direction of aircraft headed for 

North Vietnam and northern Laos. 

Late in 1967 the Air Force replaced the 

original facility with an all-weather 

navigation system, operated and 

maintained by 19 USAF personnel. 

The increased activity on the mountain's heights aroused North Vietnamese suspicions and, on 12 January 

1968- in one of the bizarre air actions 

of the war-Soviet-manufactured, sin126 

gle engine NVAF Colt aircraft (AN-2's) 

attacked the site, the crews firing 

machineguns out the windows. At this 

point an American helicopter with 

security forces aboard returned fire 

and shot down one Colt. A second 

NVAF plane crashed while attacking 

the site, and a third Colt was chased 

toward North Vietnam by the U.S. helicopter. The third aircraft was forced to 

crash land some 18 miles north of the 

site in Laos. Whereupon, the North 

Vietnamese sent units to seize LS-85. 

By 10 March they had captured the 

landing strip and then advanced up a 

supposedly invulnerable side to the 

top of the mountain, where they defeated in hand-to-hand combat some 

100 Meo guarding the site. Once 

there, they methodically destroyed the 

radar equipment. Of the 19 Air Force 

personnel operating the equipment, 

12 managed to escape and were rescued by helicopters, 4 bodies were 

seen in the ruins of the facility, and 3 

remained unaccounted for. 

Following the loss of Lima Site 85, 

the enemy launched a drive against 

Vang Pao's troops. Friendly outposts 

fell one by one while most Air Force 

and RLAF planes rem ained grounded 

by weather. By early May the Communists had massed five battalions at 

Na Khang, which was defended by 

some 1,500 men. At this point the 

weather improved, enabling Allied 

airmen to fly several hundred sorties 

which blunted the enemy thrust. In 

June Vang Pao went over to the offensive and drove the enemy back towards Sam Neua. Before the summer 

was over, his forces and other friendly troops--supported by some 700 Air 

Force sorties-had recaptured most 

of the posts and territory previously 

lost to the enemy. 

At the beginning of the 1968 dry 

season, when the enemy normally 

launched his offensive, Vang Pao decided to seize the initiative by heading 

straight for Lima Site 85. In December, 

as his troops reached the mountain 
site, they received heavy mortar fire 

from the enemy. Whereupon, Air 

Force FAG's directed numerous 

strikes against the Communist positions. Seventh Air Force allocated 250 

sorties for the operation, 50 being 

flown daily for 5 days. After the enemy 

guns fell silent, the Meo recaptured 

the airstrip. It proved a transitory success ; on Christmas Day three fresh 

Communist battalions from Sam Neua 

counterattacked and drove the Mea 

from the area. Lima Site 85 remained 

in enemy hands. 

NVA troops also moved to regain 

control of Route 7 and the Plain of 

Jars. By late February they were 

threatening Lima Site 36, the scene of 

repeated fighting and the location of 

the only tactical air control system in 

northeast Laos. An all-out air effort 

was launched to save the site. 

However, so many aircraft were diverted to the scene that the FAG's found it 

necessary to return some to their original targets because they could not 

properly handle them. Unfortunately, 

the enemy troops had dispersed in 

small groups and the FAC's-assuming they were hidden in the jungledirected most of the ordnance there. 

An AC-47 gunship also went to the 

support of the badly battered government troops. On 1 March, however, 

after all their officers had been killed , 

the Laotian troops abandoned LS-36 

and withdrew under cover of USAF 

aircraft. 

Following their capture of the site, 

the Communists turned their attention 

to Vang Pao's headquarters at Long 

Tieng (Lima Site 20A). As a countermove, Vang Pao proposed a threepronged preemptive attack with air 

cover to seize the main towns on the 

Plain of Jars (including the provincial 

capital of Xieng Khouang), interdict 

Route 7 east and west of Ban Ban, and 

capture Tha Thorn south of the plain. 

However, his American advisors urged 

a less ambitious offensive, which he 

accepted and which began on 23 

March 1969. It involved a two-pronged 

attack with air support along the 

plain's western rim with separate advances to the enemy's rear. In advance 

of the attack, on 17 March, Seventh Air 

Force and RLAF units launched the 

first of a series of attacks against 

enemy targets. During the first 4 days. 

261 Air Force and 43 RLAF sorties 

struck more than 600 enemy structures, including bunkers and trenches. Of 345 targets in the Xieng 

Khouang area, 192 were knocked out. 

By the time these air operations 

ended on 7 April, the Allied air forces 

had flown 730 sorties. They were 

credited with causing hundreds of 

secondary explosions and fires but, 

more importantly, they enabled Vang 

Pao's troops to walk virtually unopposed into Xieng Khouang in late 

April, a feat thought impossible at 

the start of the campaign. There they 

found large caches of supplies, including trucks, jeeps, 37-mm guns, 

and armored personnel carriers. 

Following the capture of Xieng 

Khouang, the Mea leader launched 

diversionary attacks on Routes 61 and 

7 to force the enemy to withdraw from 

Routes 4 and 5 south and east of 

Muong Soui, the old Neutralist headquarters and gateway from the Plain 

of Jars to the major north-south road 

between the two Laotian capital cities 

of Vientiane and Luang Prabang. The 

Air Attache in Vientiane requested an 

augmentation of 50 sorties a day for 5 

days in addition to the 70 regular Barrel Roll sorties to support the operation. Unfortunately, bad weather interfered with bombing some 150 targets, 

and Vang Pao's troops met stiff resistance from enemy units sent from Sam 

Neua. 

At the same time, NVA troops 

opened their offensive against Muong 

Soui. About 4,000 Neutralist troops 

backed by a 300-man Thai artillery 

unit, defended the town. Both sides 

127 

6 

4 7 

8 

(1) This Soviet-made North VIetnamese AN·2 Colt aircraft was 

downed on 12 January 1968 by an American helicopter crew 

which returned the enemy's fire near lS·85. (2) Meo children, 10 

to 12 years o ld, se.-..ed as Infantry troops In combat against Com· 

mu nisi forces. (3) Jars anc! enemy caves on the Plains of Jars. 

{4) Captured enemy POL storage c!rums on the Plains of Jars. 

{5) An American C-46 on a resupply mission In Laos @N.G.S. 

(6) In October 1961 key Laotian figures met at the Bridge of 

Peace Truce Talks to come to political agreements. The arrows 

lc!entlfy (1. to r.) Gen. Phouml Nosavan, Prince Buon Oum, and 

Prince Souvanna PhOuma {7) Mal Gen. Kong Le ),commander 

of the Lao Neutralist forces In Laos, meets at the Pentagon with 

John T. McNaugton, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter· 

national Security Affairs~ October 1965. (8) An ().1 FAC aircraft 

at VIentiane, Laos, April 1970. 
realized that its capture would be a 

serious blow to Souvanna Phouma's 

government. Although the Neutralist 

force outnumbered the NVA troops by 

three to one, the latter had been ordered to take Muong Soui at all costs. 

At first light on 24 June 1969, as the 

NVA launched a tank-led attack, Raven FAC's directed air strikes which 

destroyed three and damaged a fourth 

tank. But the NVA pressed on and captured three 155-mm and five 105-mm 

guns, plus portions of the nearby dirt 

strip (Lima Site 108). The fighting then 

died down and remained sporadic for 

3 days. By this time the Neutralist 

troops-traditionally poor fighters to 

begin with-were in complete disarray 

and an evacuation was ordered. 

Sixteen American helicopters covered 

by support aircraft managed to extract 

the Thais and Neutralists, including 

200 families of the latter. Air strikes 

destroyed stores and equipment left 

behind, including nineteen 105-mm 

guns, 84 trucks and 1 helicopter previously shot down. 

The loss of Muong Soui was a heavy 

blow to the Royal Government. 

Despite the general gloom, Vang Pao 

decided to go over to the offensive in 

an effort to retake the town. On 1 July 

1969 the Air Force flew 50 strikes 

against Communist forces in Muong 

Soui, destroying 30 bunkers and producing 18 secondary explosions. 

Helped by their "flying artillery," the 

Meo met little resistance until they 

neared the town, when Vang Pao's 

plans went awry. Some 1,000 Neutralist troops committed to the operation 

did not move as planned and adverse 

weather hampered vitally needed air 

operations. On 8 July only six sorties 

could be flown; on the 12th, there 

were none. Without air support, the 

government advance slowed to a virtual standstill. On 12 July the enemy 

launched a counteroffensive which 

overran the government forces, inflicting heavy casualties and ending the 

operation. 

130 

A Major Government Victory 

Vang Pao next proposed an operation which one embassy official called 

the "first major victory in the history of 

the Royal Government." His plan called 

for RLG troops to reestablish the government's presence on the southern 

fringes of the Plain of Jars, while his 

Meo guerrillas-operating from several 

Lima Sites (LS-2, LS-6, LS-32, and LS201) in enemy-held territory-disrupted supply lines to the rear, particularly 

on Route 7. Poor weather again restricted air support. Thus, although 

Seventh Air Force scheduled 200 Barrel Roll sorties a day, less than half 

were executed. The weather improved 

somewhat in mid-August, and both 

the Meo and Royal Army forces were 

able to chalk up some good progress. 

The latter cleared an area along both 

the southeastern and southwestern 

edges of the plain. Vang Pao's guerrillas, supported by heavy air strikes, 

gathered momentum far beyond what 

was originally expected, cleared sizable areas around the Lima sites, and 

cut enemy lines of communication, 

particularly on Route 7. The jubilant 

general pressed his advantage, assisted by some 200 Barrel Roll sorties daily. 

Aerial reconnaissance soon disclosed that Allied air operations had 

deprived the enemy of fuel and ammunition and caused him to abandon his 

tanks and trucks in major portions of 

the Plain of Jars. Government troops 

moved in quickly and on 12 September reoccupied Xieng Khouang, meeting no opposition. They captured 

enormous caches of supplies, including more than 3 million rounds of 

am munition, 150,000 gallons of gasoline, 12 tanks, 30 trucks, and 13 jeeps. 

On 28 September government forces 

retook Muong Soui, again without 

opposition. 

But with the start of the 1969-1970 

dry season, the enemy once again 

became active, particularly along 
Route 7 and the northern portions of 

the Plain of Jars, where battalion and 

company-sized engagements increased. Air sorties in the region declined as the Air Force shifted its attention to the Ho Chi Minh trail. Taking 

advantage of the air lull, fresh NVA 

troops moved back into northern 

Laos, and their construction crews set 

about repairing roads leading southward. By December, a vigorous North 

Vietnamese offensive was well under 

way. On the other hand, the Meauntrained in conventional warfarewere weary. Indeed, after more than 

8 years of fighting, they had suffered 

so many casualties that 10 and 12 

year old boys formed a substantial 

portion of their force. 

The results of the expanding fighting were predictable. On 12 January 

1970, NVA forces captured Phou Nok 

Kok, the northeast entry point to the 

Plain of Jars on Route 7. In February 

Xieng Khouang and its airstrip fell as 

the youthful Meo panicked and fled at 

the sight of the advancing tanks. The 

town 's garrison of 1,500 men also 

walked away. 

At this point, the United States resorted to the B-52, using it for the first 

time to attack enemy positions in 

northern Laos. CINCPAC had earlier 

proposed such an operation when 

Communist forces had threatened the 

royal capital. But it was not until 7 

months later that Washington authorities approved the use of the B-52's to 

support the Laotian government. The 

first raid took place on 17-18 February 

1970. In 36 sorties, the B-52's dropped 

1,078 tons of munitions on NVA and 

Pathet Lao positions on the Plain of 

Jars, causing many secondary explo- · 

sions and inflicting numerous casualties. Thereafter, until 1973, the Stratafortresses flew several thousand sorties against enemy targets in northern 

Laos. 

With the momentum gained from 

the easy capture of Xieng Khouang, 

the NVA moved on Muong Soui. On 24 

February, at the first sign of the approaching enemy, the town 's 120-man 

defending force fled . Thus, almost 

overnight the government position on 

the plain had collapsed and the positions of the two sides were back to 

that of a year earlier. At this point, 

Vang Pao's immediate concern was to 

secure his main headquarters at Long 

Tieng (LS-20A). He deployed his 

troops along a string of hilltop sites, 

forming them into a crescent-shaped 

line around the southwest corner of 

the plain. USAF crews supported him 

with numerous interdiction strikes 

along Route 7 in an attempt to hinder 

enemy supply movements . 

Additionally, after sunset each day, 

other aircraft seeded the road with 

antipersonnel mines to delay repair of 

the bombed roadbed . AC-47, AC119, and AC-130 gunships flew 

nightly, attacking truck traffic. Despite 

these efforts, the enemy managed to 

circle undetected to the rear of Vang 

Pao's troops and, on 17 March 1970 

appeared around Sam Thong and 

Long Tieng. Early on the 18th, the 

Communist troops were spotted only 

2 miles from the camp, and the airstrip 

at Sam Thong came under heavy attack. Despite poor weather, Seventh 

Air Force dispatched strike aircraft but 

thick haze and smoke interfered with 

the pilots' ability to locate communist 

positions. 

Just when things appeared darkest, 

Thai reinforcements arrived and positioned themselves on the south ridge. 

Other government reinforcements 

were airlifted in on the 19th, increasing friendly forces to about 2,000 men. 

The enemy, who had occupied portions of the skyline ridge overlooking 

the airstrip, began firing into the valley. 

RLAF T-28 strikes on their position initially had little effect. USAF A-1 's and 

T-28's during the next 2 days joined in 

the attacks on the NVA troops. 

On 24 March, with the weather 

clearing, USAF and RLAF sorties plus 

ground artillery pounded the enemy 

131 
Plain Of Jars 

S.m 1'hDnl • 

Lona ~e,. * 

LS 20A 

l56 ** LS 32 

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r 

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J 4 I 

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LS 201 

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I 

MUONG NGAN 

.. ,, . .,., .. ,;·: :. 

·:.:~ 
• 

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CHINA 

411 

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NVN 

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(1) Off-loading supplies from Lima Site 32 In 

Laos. (2) A 155-mm howitzer at Lima Site 15 at 

Ban Na, Laos. 

133 
on the ridgeline. During the afternoon 

the Mea moved out to clear the NVA 

from the ridge, succeeded, and then 

beat off an enemy counterattack. The 

next day, as more Royal Army reinforcements arrived , the RLAF flew 43 

sorties even though the weather again 

deteriorated. On 26 March, after Seventh Air Force launched 185 sorties, 

the NVA departed the area, with 

Vang Pao's troops following cautiously behind. Long Tieng had been saved. 

During the next 2 years the struggle 

between government and Communist 

forces continued to swing back and 

forth with the monsoon seasons, but 

the enemy clearly was on the ascendancy. Thus, by March 1971- a 

year after Long Tieng had survived 

the enemy's 1970 offense-Communist troops returned to the skyline 

ridge and seized new positions, although this time they did not try to 

capture Vang Pao's headquarters. 

The Meo leader's subsequent wet 

season offensive, launched in April, 

initially was successful in driving 

NVA forces from the Long Tieng 

134 

area. However, by late August the 

offensive had stalled. 

The government had managed to 

hang on to certain positions on the 

northern portion of the Plain of Jars, 

but by year's end they had been virtually eliminated by five NVA regiments, which were equipped with 130-

mm guns. These units then moved out 

against Long Tieng once more. To try 

to stop the enemy's advance, the Royal Government in January 1972 

brought in reinforcements and 

I au nched some 1,500 strike sorties. 

The Seventh Air Force flew almost as 

many. Despite these attacks, the enemy by mid-March were back in the vicinity of Long Tieng and began employing their 130-mm guns to batter 

government positions. The guns, difficult to spot from the air, were even 

more difficult to hit. Several were finally destroyed by USAF laser-guided 

bombs, but the enemy replaced them 

and continued long distance shelling. 

At the start of the wet season in midApril, the Communists again withdrew 

from the Long Tieng area but this time 

(1) L.S·161 area of Laos. (2) Gen. 

Vang Pao, commander of Meo 

fo rces. (3) An American C-46 

lands at a Laotian base. :© 

N.G.S. (4) The Command Post 

Center at Vientiane, Laos, 

coordinated air operaHons 

against Pathet Lao and North 

Vietnamese forces. (5) T·28 

aircraft at Vientiane, Laos, 

t970. 
3 no further than a day

's march. 

In August, after recovering from this 

latest siege, the government undertook a new offensive, but it was poorly 

coordinated and ran into stiff enemy 

resistance. By November 1972 the 

Communists were a scant 16 miles 

from Long Tieng, the best position 

they had ever had prior to launching 

their annual dry season offensive. To 

ease the threat, the Air Force 

launched a heavy B-52 and F-111 air 

attack against enemy troop and artillery positions, which also came under 

fire from other USAF aircraft. This intensive air campaign completely overwhelmed the North Vietnamese and 

Pathet Lao, who broke off the siege. 

Meanwhile, peace talks between the 

contending Lao factions had gotten 

under way. On 10 November 1972 

Premier Souvanna Phouma received 

the ranking member of the Pathet Lao 

delegation, Phoumi Vongvichit, in 

Vientiane. Anticipating an in-place 

ceasefire in the near future, the Communist forces undertook to eliminate 

the last government enclaves in the 

northern portions of the Plain of Jars, 

rather than try another offensive 

against Long Tieng. By year

's end, 

some of these posts had managed to 

hold out with the help of aerial resupply and tactical strikes. 

On 21 February 1973, less than a 

month after North Vietnam and the 

United States signed a ceasefire agreement, the Laotians followed suit. U.S. 

bombing operations were promptly 

halted, only to be renewed on 23 February at the request of the Vientiane 

government after Communist ceasefire violations. On that date, the B-52's 

launched a heavy attack against enemy positions near Paksong on the 

Bolovens Plateau. A second enemy 

ceasefire infringement brought the 

Stratofortresses back in April with a 

final strike south of the Plain of Jars. 

When the dust settled, some 9 years of 

USAF operations over Laos came to 

an end. 

135 

Chapter VII 

Capt. Laird Johnson. 8th 

Tactical Fighter Wing, 

checks his F-4 ordnance 

prior to flying the unit's last 

combat mission on Southeast 

Asia. 

Air War in Cambodia 

One of the issues that troubled 

American military leaders was the 

Presidential prohibition against allied 

operations into North Vietnamese 

and Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. As early as January 

1964, General Taylor, then Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted to 

Secretary McNamara that the war was 

being fought entirely on Communist 

terms. The enemy, he said 

.. . has determined the locale, the timing and the tactics of the battle while 

our own actions are essentially reactive. One reason for this is the fact 

that we have obliged ourselves to 

labor under self-imposed restrictions 

with respect to impending external 

aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions include keeping the war within 

the boundaries of South Vietnam. 

But in January 1965 President 

Johnson hoped to avoid a major expansion of the war. However, aware 

that a serious problem existed, he 

approved a series of small, covert 

cross-border military operations. 

Initiated on 1 February, they involved 

small-scale American and Vietnamese 

hit-and-run raids against enemy lines 

of communication in southern North 

Vietnam and the Laotian panhandle. 

These initial cross-border operations 

proved so successfu I that Secretary 

McNamara on 16 March recommended their continuance on a larger scale. 

He reiterated, however, that the existing "in-country" war strategy was 

" generally sound and adequate." But 

there were contrary views. For example, the Director of Central Intelligence, John A. McCone, argued that 

the allied program would never be 

completely satisfactory "so long as it 

permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in 

Cambodia and Laos and a continuing 

uninterrupted and unmolested source 

of support and reinforcement from 

North Vietnam through Laos." 

Periodically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

wou ld suggest specific measures to 

take the initiative from the enemy. 

Thus, in August 1964 they proposed 

breaking up Viet Cong sanctuaries in 

the Cambodia-South Vietnam border 

area "through the conduct of 

'hot pursuit' operations ... as required." The President rejected the 

recommendation at that time and 

again in 1965 and 1966. In early 1966 

Premier Ky pressed U.S. officials for 

action against the Cambodian sanctuaries. The administration, however, 

continued to forbid such operations 

except for self-defense in emergency 

situations, such as " shooting across 

the border." In September 1966 General Westmoreland became increasingly concerned about the threat of 

large enemy forces in Laos, Cambodia, 

and North Vietnam. His staff studied 

possible courses of action to counter 

them, but there was no change in the 

President's policy prohibiting border 

crossings. 

In March 1967 South Vietnam's 

leaders met with President Johnson 

on Guam and again expressed their 

frustration over the enemy sanctuaries. The President replied that he 

was just as concerned as they were 

but did not pursue the issue further. 

Five months later, Admiral Sharp 

raised the subject while appearing 

before a Senate Special Investigating 

Subcommittee examining restrictions 

imposed on the air war against North 

Vietnam. Sharp complained that the 

allies were limited to essentially "defense" actions, but the enemy attacked "from sanctuaries across the 

DMZ, from Laos, and from Cambodia, 

and moves his forces at will across 

these borders." Political restraints, 

the admiral noted, had ru led out 

ground operations to deprive the 

enemy of those sanctuaries. 

137 

T H A l A N D 

., 

••• 

. .i 

. .. . ····· ··~ ... . . . .. ,,., .. .. -··········. . . . .:··· ....... , 

... . . 

: 

... ·····., . 

• 

• ···' .. . . :· . 

. • 

• . 

• • • 

•• • 

. 

• • • • 

~Ul.F 

Of 

THAilAND 

Tonie Bassac 

(1) Allied forces seized enemy ri ce supplies. (2) A cache of enemy rifles and 

other weapons In Cambodia. (3) An Alr·Force F·4 of the 366th Tactical Fighter 

Wing, Oa Nang AB, sweeps through smoke of a previous stnke to lay Its ord· 

nance on ao enemy bunker complex In the Fish Hook area of Canobodla. 

l A 0 

0 25 

. .. . ., 

•• . .. •, 

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::::j '-3"' 

::=: '-311.1 

SOUTH 

VIETNAM 

Penetration Up 

To 15 Miles 

25 

I 

50 

I 

NAUTICAL 

MILES 

50 KILOMETERS 

139 
Some 4 months later a prestigious 

voice was heard on the subject. From 

his retirement home at Gettysburg, 

Pa., former President Eisenhower on 

24 November 1967 publicly advocated 

"hot pursuit, even in the air," into 

Cambodia and Laos "to remove a 

thorn in our sides." Apparently as a 

direct result of Eisenhower's remarks 

-endorsed by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, 

a former chairman of the JCS-the 

Department of State on 4 December 

dispatched a diplomatic note to Cambodia complaining about the use of its 

territory by the Communists. "The 

root cause of incidents affecting 

Cambodia territory," the department 

said , "is the VietCong and North Vietnamese presence in the frontier region and their use of Cambodian territory in violation of the neutrality of 

Cambodia." 

Cambodia's leader, Prince Noradam Sihanouk, on 24 December officially denied that "foreign armed 

forces" were implanted on Cambodian soil. However, in an interview 

appearing in the Washington Post on 

29 December, Sihanouk conceded 

that "small units" of Communist 

forces had entered Cambodia "under 

pressure from American forces." He 

went on to suggest that "if limited 

combat breaks out between American and Vietnam [Communist] 

forces" in uninhabited areas of 

Cambodia, " it goes without saying 

that we would not interfere militarily." The Cambodian chief suggested 

that President Johnson send an emissary, preferably Sen. Mike Mansfield, to Phnom Penh to discuss possible U.S. military actions against 

Communist forces inside his country. 

On 1 January 1968, responding to a 

press conference query, President 

Johnson said that he had read the 

account "with a great deal of interest 

-and I might say pleasure," and that 

Sihanouk's remarks were being studied. Three days later the White House 

announced the U.S. ambassador to 

140 

India, Chester A. Bowles, would soon 

meet with Sihanouk. Secretary of 

State Dean Rusk, asked whether Sihanouk's message indicated the door 

was open for " hot pursuit into his territory," responded that it was a " hypothetical question." He said that if 

the Cambodian government could 

assure its own neutrality and territorial integrity with the aid of the International Control Commission, then 

the question would not arise. 

On 8 January the first of several 

meetings between Ambassador 

Bowles and Prince Sihanouk took 

place in Phnom Penh. The envoy also 

met with the Cambodian prime minister and other government officials. 

During subsequent discussions with 

Sihanouk, the ambassador assured 

him that the United States had no desire to conduct military operations inside his country. Sihanouk accepted 

these assurances and later told 

Bowles that "he would not object to 

the United States engaging in 'hot 

pursuit' in unpopulated areas of Cambodia." He added that he could not 

say this publicly or officially. 

What President Johnson thought of 

Bowles' report and what operations 

he planned to authorize is not known. 

Whatever these plans, they were 

aborted at the end of January when 

Communist forces-operating out of 

Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnamlaunched their famous Tet offensive 

throughout South Vietnam . In the 

early weeks of fighting, NVA and Viet 

Cong troops temporarily occupied 

dozens of South Vietnamese cities 

and towns, including portions of the 

ancient capital of Hue. As noted in 

Chapter II, the 1968 Tet offensive killed 

and injured thousands of people and 

wreaked enormous physical damage 

in South Vietnam. Among its victims, 

politically, was President Johnson. On 

31 March he announced that he would 

not seek re-election and invited Hanoi 

to negotiate a settlement of the war. 

As an inducement, he ordered a halt to 
bombing of most of North Vietnam. In 

May 1968 the negotiations got under 

way in Paris, but quickly bogged 

down. On 31 October, in a final effort 

to obtain a settlement before he left 

office, Mr. Johnson ordered a total 

ban on air, naval, and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam . But he 

also warned Hanoi that the end of U.S. 

operations above the DMZ " must not 

risk the lives of our men and that the 

United States would react in such a 

situation." 

President Nixon Orders the 

Bombing of Cambodia 

The North Vietnamese claimed 

credit for the " overthrow" of the Johnson administration by the U.S. electorate. They also apparently decided to 

keep up the pressure on the new President, Richard M. Nixon. Thus, the 

new chief executive had scarcely assumed office in January 1969 when 

the enemy launched another, if smaller, nationwide offensive on 23 February, shelling Saigon, scores of other 

cities and towns, and numerous military bases. Not surprisingly, the President concluded that North Vietnam 

had no intention of going along 

with the understanding which ended 

the bombing of North Vietnam . He had 

before him at this time an 11 February 

1969 request from General Abrams, 

Westmoreland's successor as MACV 

commander, for authority to bomb 

enemy bases in Cambodia using B52's. Whereupon, Mr. Nixon authorized the use of the big bombers 

against the enemy's rear bases in 

Cambodia and directed that the 

bombing be kept secret. 

Thus, on 18 March 1969-operating 

under cover of special security and 

reporting procedures-the B-52 campaign was launched against NVAIViet 

Cong sanctuaries inside Cambodia. 

To insure secrecy- required to protect Prince Sihanouk's position (in 

July 1969 he agreed to restore diplomatic relations with the United States, 

broken off since 1965)-the Defense 

Department announced these B-52 

strikes as being against targets in 

South Vietnam. The sorties, all of 

which were flown at night, were directed by ground control radar units. 

During pre-mission briefings, pilots 

and navigators of the aircraft were 

told to react to all directions for bomb 

release from the ground control personnel. In all, between 18 March 1969 

and 26 May 1970, the B-52's flew 4,308 

sorties and dropped 120,578 tons of 

munitions on e·nemy base camps and 

headquarters in Cambodia. 

Four months after the bombing 

began, the Cambodian parliament in 

August 1969 elected a new government headed by Lt. Gen. Lon Nol, the 

Army Chief of Staff. During the next 

several months, he and Prince Sihanouk tried unsuccessfully to secure international assistance in removing the 

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 

troops from Cambodian soil. In March 

1970, while Prince Sihanouk was visiting Europe, the Cambodian government boldly demanded withdrawal of 

all North Vietnamese. Shortly after, on 

the 18th, Lon Nol announced the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the 

establishment of the Khmer Republic. Sihanouk subsequently formed a 

government-in-exile in Peking. The 

Lon Nol government soon found itself threatened by an estimated 40,-

000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 

troops and appealed for arms assistance. By 20 April 1970 enemy forces 

had taken control of large areas of 

the country and had cut roads within 

15 miles of Phnom Penh. This apparent threat triggered an American/ 

South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia to root out and destroy the 

NV A/Viet Cong forces. From the U.S. 

viewpoint, the operation was long 

overdue and essential to safeguard 

the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces from South Vietnam under President Nixon 's Vietnamization 

policy. 

141 
The operation began on 24 April 

when USAF and VNAF tactical aircraft 

launched strikes against enemy targets in Cambodia. On 29 April and 1 

May, 48,000 South Vietnamese and 

42,000 Ameri can troops drove across 

the border. Initially, the tactical air 

strikes, like the operations of the 

ground troops they were supporting, 

were limited to areas within 18 miles 

of the South Vietnamese-Cambodian 

border. On 14 May, however, a special 

tactical air strike was launched 

against a major truck park and storage 

area in Cambodia beyond the 18-mile 

zone, along the Xe Kong river near the 

Laotian border. In addition to the 

numerous tactical sorties, there were 

hundreds of B-52 strikes against the 

enemy. 

By 29 June all American and most 

South Vietnamese troops had withdrawn from Cambodia. In just 60 days 

the allied ground forces had penetrated up to 20 miles beyond the border 

and overrun an area totally dominated 

by the North Vietnamese Army and the 

Viet Cong. During the operation, the 

allies killed more than 11 ,300 troops 

and captured 2,300 prisoners. They 

also captured 22,892 individual weapons; more than 15 million rounds of 

ammunition; 143,000 rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifle rounds; over 

199,000 antiaircraft rounds; 5,500 

mines, 62,000 grenades, and 83,000 

pounds of explosives. They also 

seized more than 430 vehicles and 

destroyed 11 ,600 bunkers and other 

military structures. 

On 30 June 1970, the day after the 

allied withdrawal, Air Force tactical 

aircraft began flying air strikes against 

enemy forces west of the Mekong River, which were menacing the town of 

Kompong Thorn . When attempts by 

Lon Nol's troops to advance overland 

to the town failed despite air support, 

USAF crews turned their attention to 

roads leading from enemy-occupied 

Laos toward Kompong Thorn. This interdiction attempt failed, however, 

142 

because the flat terrain permitted the 

enemy to bypass cratered segments of 

the highway. Aerial efforts to defend 

Kompong Thorn finally bore fruit 

when 182 fighter-bomber and 37 gunship strikes between 31 July and 9 

August 1970 forced the enemy 

to fall back. Similar aerial support-60 

tactical and 15 gunship sorties-enabled Lon Nol's troops to recapture 

Skoun, an important highway junction 

west of the Mekong. 

To improve communications between air and ground forces in Cambodia, the Air Force initially assigned 

an airborne radio relay station (a modified transport) to the combat zone. 

Later, an elaboratelyequipped airborne 

battlefield command and control center was positioned over Cambodia to 

direct close air support strikes. 

Problems of language, however, interfered with operations. Some Cambodian officers understood English. but 

few Americans could speak the local 

languages. Since the nearest thing to 

a common tongue was French, a carryover from colonial days, the Air Force 

used French-speaking volu.nteers to 

fly with FAC's and serve as interpreters. The Cambodians also made an 

effort to find and assign Englishspeaking officers as forward air 

guides with infantry units, thereby 

permitting direct communication between Cambodian ground commanders and Air Force forward air controllers. 

By early November 1970 Communist 

forces had seized perhaps one-half of 

Cambodia's territory, including several uninhabited regions, despite the 

tremendous air support provided the 

Cambodian Army. When the latter 

proved unable to keep the highway 

open between the capital and Kernpong Som, the nation's major seaport, 

allied attention turned to the use of 

river transport to deliver supplies to 

Phnom Penh. Delivery of supplies via 

the Mekong River from Vietnam to 

Cambodia became essential because 
of costs and the limited capacity of airlift. Whereupon, Communist forces 

began interdicting river traffic along a 

stretch of the Mekong, about 70 

miles in length, where it cuts through 

an area of open flatlands. By January 

1971 the enemy had achieved sufficient control of the region to strike 

almost at will against river traffic, 

firing from ambush with rocket 

launchers and recoilless rifles. To 

ensure the capital's survival, the allies instituted a convoy system, with 

as many as 46 ships and small craft 

of the South Vietnamese Navy escorting 10 or more merchantmen and 

tankers at a time. 

USAF planes and Army helicopters 

assisted Cambodian and South Vietnamese airmen in providing air cover 

for the convoys. Later, U.S. Navy 

planes .and helicopters also escorted 

the convoys. Because so many villages dotted the Mekong's banks, a 

forward air controller had to be present during such air escort operations. 

During an ambush, the FAC solicited 

strike clearance from officers familiar 

with the area so as not to endanger 

noncombatants. Only after the FAC 

received strike authorization could the 

aerial escorts expend their munitions. 

Similarly, when friendly troops were 

involved in clearing operations along 

river banks, tight control over allied 

aircraft strikes was necessary. 

During the summer of 1971 U.S. air 

units supported Cambodian operations to reopen the Phnom Penh-Kompong Som highway and the road to 

Kompong Thorn. The latter drive occurred in September and was judged a 

success. The most important USAF 

action was taken against an enemy 

force deployed in a rubber plantation 

near Chamkar Andong. The aerial attack forced the enemy to abandon his 

entrenchments there. A napalm strike 

upon the village of Kompong Thmar 

routed the defenders and destroyed 

their munitions stockpile. On the other 

hand, the enemy got close enough to 

Phnom Penh to bombard the airport 

with artillery shells and rockets, causing extensive damage to Cambodian 

Air Force planes. Communist rockets 

also hit an oil depot near the capital in 

September, destroying about 40 percent of Cambodia's fuel storage capacity and millions of gallons of petroleum. The United States replaced the 

loss with increased POL shipments. 

During 1971 the Lon Nol government continued to require the military 

assistance of South Vietnam and U.S. 

air power. On several occasions, Saigon forces ventured across the border 

to attack NVA bases and supply 

dumps. During one such operation in 

June, the NVA badly mauled an 

ARVN task force which tell back in 

contusion. Because of poor flying 

weather, the troops initially lacked 

air support. As the skies cleared, 

hundreds of sorties were launched 

against the North Vietnamese. In 

September and October, ARVN 

troops were more successful. After 

stopping an enemy attack upon their 

positions along the Cambodian border, ARVN troops on 20 September 

went over to the offensive and reopened the highway between Tay 

Ninh, South Vietnam, and Krek, 

Cambodia. While the Vietnamese did 

the fighting, 1,500 U.S. troops moved 

behind them in a supporting position 

inside South Vietnam . Enemy targets 

in the Tay Ninh-Krek area took a battering from the air, with B-52's dropping 1,000 tons of bombs on the first 

day of the operation. As the sweep 

was ending, however, an American 

fighter-bomber accidentally attacked 

a South Vietnamese unit, killing 18 

and wounding 7. 

In Peking, where he was living in 

exile, Prince Sihanouk claimed that 

Lon Nol clung to power " only through 

the intervention of the U.S. Air Force." 

While somewhat exaggerated, the fact 

was that air power had influenced 

those battles in whi ch trained and 

motivated Cambodian troops had 

143 

Among the Soviet and Chinese manufactured weapons aelzed during the 

allied incursion into Cambodia were 22,800 individual w.apons, more than 

15 million rounds of ammunition, and 143,000 rockets, mortars and recoilless rifle rounds. 
proved successful. On the other hand, 

allied air power could not save illtrained , poorly led units from defeat. 

As the Cambodians suffered repeated 

setbacks, their reliance on South Vietnamese ground forces increased. Early 

in 1972, ARVN troops were withdrawn 

in anticipation of an enemy attack on 

the South Vietnamese capital. When it 

failed to materialize, the troops were 

sent back to Cambodia where they 

launched several operations into 

enemy-held territory. 

One of these ARVN incursions in 

March 1972 proved especially successful. The South Vietnamese, supported by B-52 strikes, seized enough 

rice from the enemy to feed 10,000 

men for 3 months. Also, one B-52 raid 

caused spectacular damage; the advancing infantry found the bombs had 

made a direct hit, shattering bunkers 

of reinforced concrete, killing the 

occupants, and destroying supplies 

stored inside. Nevertheless, the enemy 

still remained in control of large portions of Cambodia east of the Mekong, 

but still proved incapable of capturing 

the capital and ousting Lon Nol. U.S. 

aircrews continued to fly missions 

against them, even after the ceasefire 

in South Vietnam became effective in 

January 1973. 

By this time a major portion of the 

enemy forces threatening the capital 

were local insurgents of the Khmer 

146 

4 

Rouge. When they launched an assault on Phnom Penh early in 1973, 

Cambodia's government quickly requested American help and a massive 

bombardment got under way. By May 

an armada of USAF aircraft- including B-52's, F-111 's, A-Ts, and AC-130's 

-were launching repeated strikes 

against enemy targets on the outskirts 

of the capital. At times, crowds gathered on the west bank of the Mekong 

to watch them hit Khmer Rouge forces 

on the opposite shore. Eighty percent 

of these strikes were against local insurgents and apparently thwarted 

their plan to capture the capital in the 

summer of 1973. At one point, when it 

appeared the enemy might block river 

traffic again, the Air Force launched 

(1) Cambodian troops were 

trained by the South Viet· 

namese at the Lam Son Train· 

ing Center. (21 U.S. Army 

engineers examine supply 

crates left behind by fleeing 

enemy troops. (3) In March 

1970, the Cambodian Detense 

Mini ster Lt. Gen. Lon Not, 

seized control of the government and an nounced the 

ovenhrow of Prince Sihanouk, 

then visiting in Europe. (4) Lon 

Noi visited Cambodian troops 

In September 1970. 
Ill Cambodian troops trained in 

Vietnam prepare to board U.S. Air 

Force C·123K at Nha Trang for the 

flight back to Cambod ia. (2) 

Slhanouk visited Communist 

China In October t965. Shown (1. 

to r.): Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, 

Peng Chen, Slhanouk, and China's 

Chief of State, Llu Shao-chi. (3) 

Prince Sihanouk met with North 

Vietnamese Premier Pham Van 

Dong in Peking In November 1971. 

an emergency C-130 airlift from UTapao to Phnom Penh's airport. It delivered munitions, rice, military equipment, and occasionally POL This 

C-130 resupply effort was temporarily 

halted, however, when the river convoys succeeded in forcing their way to 

the capital with the help of aerial escort. 

Congressional Criticism 

The continuing bombing of Cambodia in the spring and summer of 

1973 stirred renewed Congressional 

criticism at tlome of the war. Members 

of the House of Representatives 

tacked on amendments to several 

administration bills prohibiting the 

use of appropriated funds for bomb3 

ing Cambodian targets. On 27 June 

the President vetoed one such bill and 

the House sustained the veto. Later, 

President Nixon informed Congress 

that he would not oppose legislation 

calling for a halt in the bombing within 

45 days (on 15 August 1973) instead of 

requiring an immediate bombing halt. 

Congress accepted this compromise 

and on 1 July passed Public Law 93-52 

cutting off all funds "to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by 

United States military forces in or over 

or from off the shores of South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia." Mr. Nixon 

signed the bill into law on 1 July. 

As the deadline drew near, the Air 

Force became involved in two tragic 

accidents. On 6 August a B-52 mistakenly dropped 20 tons of bombs on the 

friendly town of Neak Luong, 38 miles 

southeast of Phnom Penh. The raid 

killed or wounded more than 400 people. Two days later, American bombs 

hit a village on an island in the Mekong, just 3 miles from Neak Luong, 

causing at least 16 casualties. The 

last U.S. air strike in Cambodia occurred on the morning of 15 August 

1973, when an A-7 Corsair, piloted by 

Capt. Lonnie 0. Ratley, returned to its 

home base in Thailand, marking an 

end to the nation's longest war. USAF 

C-130's, however, continued to deliver 

needed supplies to the Cambodians 

after that date. 

147 

Chapter VIII 

A llighl of B-52 bombers as 

seen from the eo<:kpit of 

another Stratofortreu . 

B-52 Arc Light 

Operations 

Of all the Air Force weapons employed during the war in southeast 

Asia, none had a more devastating 

effect on the enemy than the B-52 

Stratofortress. Originally built in the 

1950's as the nation's long range, 

deep penetration nuclear bomber, the 

B-52 demonstrated awesome conventional power against Communist 

forces and military facilities in the two 

Vietnams, Laos, and Cambodia. In the 

early 1960's, as U.S. involvement in 

Southeast Asia grew, the Air Force 

modified some of the big bombers for 

conventional warfare by installing 

external racks capable of carrying 24 

bombs and increasing the internal 

load from 9 to 27 bombs. Thus, in toto, 

the modified B-52 could carry 51 of 

the 500-pound or 750-pound bombs. 

As a final touch, the bomber's white 

and highly visible nuclear blast reflective underside was repainted black to 

make it undetectable by the naked 

eye at high attitude. 

The Air Force flew its first B-52 

strike against the Communists on 18 

June 1965. The aircraft participating in 

this initial Arc Light strike--elements 

of the 2d and 320th Bombardment 

Wings-had deployed to Andersen 

AFB, Guam, from the United States on 

17 February. The target was a suspected Viet Cong base north of Saigon in 

Sinh Duong province containing sizable forces spread out over a large 

area. Earlier strikes at this type of target using tactical aircraft in saturation 

pattern bombing had proved unproductive. Thus the reason for the 

switch to the B-52. 

There were several unfortunate 

aspects to this first B-52 mission. Two 

of the huge bombers collided during 

the course of aerial refueling and both 

plunged in flames into the Pacific. 

Eight of 12 crewmen died. The results 

of this mission proved difficult to 

come by and were fragmentary at 

best. Three Special Forces teams sent 

into the jungle area could find little 

target damage before enemy snipers 

drove them out of the area. Shortly 

after the strike, numerous newspaper 

editorials severely criticized government officials for the operation's insignificant results and the apparent incongruity of " ... swatting flies with 

sledgehammers." General Westmoreland, however, was well-satisfied, 

pointing out that the bombs had been 

on target and the strike "very disruptive" to the VietCong. 

Secretary of Defense McNamara, 

speaking before a Senate subcommittee on the subject, provided the rationale behind the decision to use B52's over area targets: 

We are faced with very, very heavy 

jungle in certain portions of South 

Vietnam. jungle so heavy that it is 

impossible to find an aiming point in 

it. We know some of these jungles 

are used by the Vietcong for base 

camps and for storage areas .... You 

can imagine that without an ability to 

find an aiming point there, there is 

only one way of bombing it and that 

is with a random pattern . .. .With the 

force we had (B-52's) trained as it 

was in pattern bombing .. . the military commanders felt- and I believe 

this was a proper use of the weaponsthat these strikes would destroy certain of the Viet Cong base areas. and, 

as a matter of fact , they did .... There 

is no other feasible way of doing it. 

We propose to continue. 

During the first few months of 

149 
operations, SAC responded to strike 

requests received from MACV, which 

had to be approved by CINCPAC and 

the JCS. Once the MACV staff learned 

how to use the big bomber effectively 

and results of the first few missions 

revealed extremely accurate bombing, 

Westmoreland became convinced of 

the B-52's worth and noted that it was 

" here to stay." Washington authorities 

still had reservations and placed severe controls on B-52 employment. 

One such control called for approval 

in Washington, sometimes at the 

White House level, of all proposed targets. In time, as Arc Light operations 

expanded, approval authority was 

delegated below the Washington level, but the White House, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and the JCS 

continued to receive information copies of all requests. There were other 

Arc Light restrictions which remained 

in effect throughout the war. These 

were primarily measures to safeguard 

noncombatants and religious shrines 

in target areas. 

Supporting the Ground Forces 

In November 1965, the B-52's directly supported American ground 

forces for the first time. The 1st Air 

Cavalry Division-after repelling an attack in the area of the Special Forces 

camp at Pie! Me in the Central Highlands- pursued the retreating Viet 

Gong in a mop-up operation near Pleiku. On the 14th the division drove the 

harried enemy into the Ia Orang Valley. There, near the Cambodian border 

along the foothills of the Chu Phong 

mountains, the American troops uncovered a secret base area containing 

two regular NVA regiments and additional Viet Gong units. The enemy attempted to overwhelm their pursuers 

with repeated counterattacks. As 

fierce ground fighting continued, on 

16 November a hurriedly dispatched 

force of 18 B-52's poured 344 tons of 

bombs on enemy positions along the 

150 

southeast slopes of the mountains. 

Successive Arc Light strikes, together 

with tactical aircraft sorties (almost 

400 sorties combined) and artillery fire 

helped turn the enemy back. In all, the 

B-52's flew 96 sorties and dropped 

1,795tons of bombs in support of the 

1st Cavalry. 

In December, the B-52's were called 

in again, on this occasion in support 

of Third Marine Amphibious Force (Ill 

MAF) operations (Harvest Moon) in 

the northern portion of South Vietnam. The Marines had joined ARVN 

troops about 20 miles south of Da 

Nang to repel an advancing enemy 

force. When Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, Ill 

MAF commander, asked for air support, Westmoreland noted the avai lability of B-52's. Walt then proposed their 

use against a large scale enemy buildup of supplies and reinforcements in a 

rear area. On 12 December the Marine 

general observed the first B-52 strike 

from a helicopter 1,000 feet aloft in the 

vicinity of the target area. Walt subsequently wired SAC's commander: "We 

are more than impressed with the results; we are delighted. The timing 

was precise. the bombing accurate, 

and the overall effort awesome to 

behold." 

On 13 and14 December the B-52's 

delivered additional strikes which 

were just as impressive. General Walt 

subsequently remarked that the big 

bombers had provided " not quite 

close air support but just next to it." 

Marine reconnaissance patrols 

combed the area after the first strike 

and discovered between 50 and 60 

enemy dead. The bombing also uncovered a storage area consisting of a 

series of caves and bunkers. 

In October 1965 the Air Force began 

further modification of the B-52-to 

increase internal loading from 27 to 84 

of the 500- or 750-pound bombs. The 

modified Stratoforts went operational 

in March 1966 and were involved in 

the first Arc Light mission across the 

DMZ into North Vietnam. On 11 April 
and again on the 26th, they struck the 

Mu Gia pass, the mountainous funnel 

through which NVA men and materiel 

passed on the way to the northern 

reaches of the Ho Chi Minh trail. 

During the first strike, the largest single Arc Light attack to date and the 

largest bombing operation since World 

War II, the B-52's dropped some 600 

tons of bombs. 

Concurrently with deployment of 

the mod ified B-52, the Air Force installed Combat Skyspot, a ground-directed bombing system, in South Vietnam. The system employed existing 

SAC mobile ground radar guidance 

units and permitted MACV's targeting 

section considerably more latitude 

because selection of targets would no 

longer depend on a nearby, prominent 

geographical feature ; they had only to 

be within range of Combat Skyspot 

equipment. Using the radar, a controller would direct the bombers along a 

designated route to a bomb drop 

point, providing enroute corrected 

headings and speed as needed. Then, 

at the proper moment, the pilot received a signal to release his bombs. 

Combat Skyspot not only provided 

flexibility in targeting, but its accuracy 

soon surpassed that of the previously 

used radar synchronous bombing. In 

time, practically all combat areas of 

Southeast Asia were within range of 

one or more of the growing number of 

Combat Skyspot facilities in the countryside. Six SAC personnel- members 

of the 1st Combat Evaluation GrouJ>-

Iost their lives during the construction 

phase, when they were ambushed and 

killed near Dong Ha Air Base while 

conducting a site location survey. 

In April 1966, Operation Birmingham , a combined U.S. 1st Infantry and 

25th ARVN Division search and destroy effort into War Zone C in Tay 

Ninh province near the Cambodian 

border, got under way, the first antiCommunist operation there since 1962. 

However, for months before the 

operation, B-52's repeatedly bombed 

the area and were directly responsible 

for increasing numbers of Viet Cong 

troops defecting. In support of Birmingham. the B-52's flew 162 sorties 

and dropped 3,118 tons of ordnance, 

including 220 tons of anti-personnel 

munitions. The first two strikes alone 

destroyed 14 Viet Cong base camps, 

435 buildings and huts, 1 ,267 tons of 

rice, and other materiel. The following 

10 strikes between 30 April and 9 May 

constituted the heaviest B-52 support 

to a ground operation to that time. 

Some 6 months later, War Zone C 

again became the scene of another 

major search and destroy operation 

(Attleboro) which drew B-52 support. 

Beginning 8 November, the B-52's in 

200 sorties dropped more than 4,000 

tons of ordnance during the next 17 

days. Evaluation of the bombing results proved difficult, although MACV 

reported numerous hits on the Communist headquarters and the death of 

at least one top leader. 

Ammunition stores and deeply dug 

enemy trenches and tunnels were 

primary B-52 targets in support of 

Operation Cedar Falls, conducted during 8-26 January 1967. Cedar Falls 

involved a concentrated ground assault upon an enemy stronghold covering 25 square miles of the Iron Triangle, 20 miles northwest of Saigon. 

Fifteen B-52 strikes hit a tunnel system 

that, at places, was 12 to 20 feet beneath the earth's surface. Many of the 

tunnels were destroyed and there 

were numerous secondary explosions 

of enemy ammunition stores. Cedar 

Falls resulted in 720 enemy killed , the 

majority of them by Seventh Air Force 

and B-52 air strikes. In this operation, 

the heavy bombers demonstrated that 

the enemy could no longer regard any 

fortified area as a sanctuary safe from 

attack. 

In February the Army launched Operation Junction City against the 9th 

Viet Cong Division ensconced in a 

War Zone C base area held since the 

war with France. Lasting from 22 Feb151 

6 

(1) A maintenance man checks out a 8-62 tall gun prior to a mission (2) Preparing a 8 -52 for a 

mission. (3) 8·52's dropped various bombs, oncluding 750- and 1,()()().pounders. (~)SAC maintenance 

men worked around the clock to get 8·52's back Into the air during the December 1972 

"Linebacker"strikes of Hanoi. (5) 8·52's In revetments at the U-Tapao Royal Thai Airfield. (6) Three 

8·52's taxi out preparatory to taking off on a mission (7) A 8 -52 lifts off at U·Tapao. (8) Camou· 

It aged 8·52 D. 

7 

8 
2 3 
5 

(1) Loading bombs on a B-52 wing. (2) Loading bombs on B-52 Internal racks. 

(3) Liftoff from a SAC base. (4) Fisheye lens view of a B-52. (5) B-52 target 

area In Vietnam. (6) Refueling enroute to the target. (7) B-52"s destroyed a 

rail yard 7 miles north of Hanoi, December 1972. 

7 
ruary through 14 May 1967, the operation employed together for the first 

time all different types of combat 

forces-some 35,000 men under the 

c'ontrol of the U.S. Army's II Field 

Force. Arc light support totalled 126 

sorties and 4,723 tons of bombs 

dropped. When the operation was 

over, 2,700 enemy dead were found 

and numerous defensive positions 

uncovered. 

In April 1967 the Air Force obtained 

a second B-52 base at U-Tapao, Thailand, from which to conduct operations. There were two important reasons for striking from U-Tapao. The 

Thai base was only 2 to 5 hours distant 

from the targets, whereas the Guambased bombers required 12 hours 

flying time and at least one aerial refueling from KC-135A tankers. The 

other factor was the ever-increasing 

rate of flights, which made concomitant demands on base facilities for 

parking, maintenance, supply, and 

other such requirements. 

That summer, for the second time 

since the start of Arc Light operations, 

a mid-air collision caused fatalities. In 

this instance, on 7 July Maj. Gen. 

William J. Crumm, commander of all 

B-52 forces in the Pacific, was among 

the six crewmen who were lost. 

On 1 September 1967, the enemy 

opened an intensive bombardment of 

Con Thien, a Marine base located just 

south of the DMZ. It appeared at first 

that the steady barrage of rocket, 

mortar, and artillery fire was preparatory to a major ground offensive 

across the DMZ. Later, Westmoreland characterized the attack as an 

enemy effort to repeat its spectacular 

1954 win at Dien Bien Phu. It was 

thwarted, however, by Operation 

Neutralize, which integrated B-52 

and tactical aircraft, field artillery, 

and naval firepower on the North 

Vietnamese positions. Fully 90 percent of B-52 sorties during September were against the enemy in the 

Con Thien area. A prime B-52 target 

156 

was enemy gun positions 6 miles 

north of Con Thien which were 

bombed around the clock for days at 

a time. On 4 October. Westmoreland 

reported that U.S. forces had inflicted " a Dien Bien Phu in reverse." The 

enemy lost an estimated 3,000 men 

killed or wounded, about 10 percent 

of NVA forces in the DMZ, before 

breaking off the battle. 

During November 1967 a major fight 

occurred in and around the Special 

Forces camp at Oak To, when elements of the 4th U.S. Infantry Division 

clashed with the 1st NVA Division. The 

Air Force directed 228 B-52 sorties 

against 32 targets in the area. During 

the same month, 36 sorties were flown 

in close support of U.S. Army and 

ARVN troops engaged in repelling a 

Viet Cong attack near Loc Ninh in Ill 

Corps. 

The first quarter of 1968 saw Arc 

Light missions directed primarily on 

targets around the Marine base of Khe 

Sanh in the northwest corner of South 

Vietnam. Here for nearly 3 months 

three Marine regiments and their Vietnamese Ranger allies were surrounded by two or more NVA divisions with 

some 20,000 to 30,000 men and became the focal point of worldwide interest. When it became clear that the 

enemy was about to move in force 

against the Marine base, General 

Westmoreland on 14 January put Operation Niagara into effect-a joint air 

campaign dedicated to maintaining 

the American position at Khe San h. As 

part of Niagara, B-52's flew 461 missions. 2,707 sorties, and dropped 75,-

631 tons of ordnance between 14 

January and 31 March. 

The B-52 targets initially consisted 

of enemy staging, assembly, and storage areas and gun positions around 

the outpost. Bombs were released to 

fall no closer than 3,300 yards of 

friendly positions. When air observers 

detected extensive enemy bunker 

complexes within the buffer zone, 

however, B-52's were ordered to 
bomb within one-sixth of a mile of the 

base perimeter. The first such strike 

occurred on 26 February under the 

anxious eyes of the Marine commander at Khe Sanh, concerned about the 

effects of close-in bombing on his own 

bunkers and trenches. The accuracy 

of the first ground radar-directed 

strikes dispelled those anxieties. Only 

enemy fortifications and positions 

were destroyed. 

Succeeding close-in strikes devastated enemy positions along the camp 

perimeter, resulted in numerous secondary explosions, and lifted the spirits of the Marines. Altogether, over a 

period of a little more than a month, B52's flew 101 close-in missions totalling 589 sorties. Accurate and complete bomb damage assessment was 

difficult-initially because of adverse 

weather including low-lying fog, but 

later because the ground became so 

thoroughly pockmarked with overlapping B-52 bomb craters that it was 

impossible to determine which strikes 

were responsible for a specific crater. 

A major contribution to Arc Light's 

success at Khe Sanh was adoption of 

the Bugle Note scheduling technique 

devised by SAC's 3d Air Division, 

director of B-52 operations in Southeast Asia. By fully utilizing the ground 

radar bombing system and obtaining 

maximum performance from aircrews, 

bomb loaders, and maintenance 

crews, the division was able to keep 

aloft an unbroken stream of six aircraft that struck Khe Sanh targets every 3 hours. Bugle Note also allowed 

MACV to change targets as late as 2 

hours prior to target time. The system 

proved so successful that it was soon 

used on a regular daily basis. 

The additional sorties that General 

Westmoreland required not only for 

Khe Sanh but elsewhere during the 

simultaneous Tet offensive were provided by B-52's newly deployed to the 

western Pacific in response to North 

Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo in 

January. That B-52 force, stationed at 

Kadena AB, Okinawa, subsequently 

joined in the combat operations over 

Vietnam . 

From a rate of approximately 300 

sorties each month late in 1965, the 

B-52 effort had gradually increased to a 

rate of 800 sorties during 1967, and for 

the first 2 weeks in February 1968 had 

risen to the 1 ,200-sortie level. On 15 

February, at Westmoreland's request, 

Washington officials authorized an 

increase to 1 ,800 sorties monthly and 

the use of the Kaden a-based 8-52 force 

Although viewed at first as temporary, 

this new sortie rate remained in effect 

until 1969 when Defense Department 

economies forced a cutback to 1 ,600. 

In early April1968, during Operation 

Pegasus, the 1st Cavalry Division 

(Mobile) spearheaded a breakthrough 

of enemy positions on Route 9 and relieved the Marine base. The siege of 

Khe Sanh was over. Several months 

after the battle, General Westmoreland observed : 

The thing that broke their back basically was the fire of the B-52's. Now 

yes, we did have additional fire power. We were putting in around 100 

TAC air sorties a day. We had sixteen 

175-mm guns of the U.S. Army that 

were moved within range of Khe 

Sanh base and they fired a number of 

rounds each day and they did an excellent job but the big gun, the heavyweight of fire power, was the tremendous tonnage of bombs dropped by 

our B-52's. Without question the 

amount of fire power put on that 

piece of real estate exceeded anything that had ever been seen before 

in history by any foe and the enemy 

was hurt, his back was broken by air 

power. 

MACV's analysis of the battle credited the 8-52 with preventing any large 

massing of enemy troops required to 

overrun the base. In one instance, a 

prisoner of war reported, 75 percent of 

an 1,800-man regiment had been 

killed by a single Arc Light strike. The 

bombers also succeeded in tearing up 

the enemy's logistic lines to the battlefield and causing immense materiel 

losses. 

157 


Later in April the U.S. Army 

launched an offensive-Operation 

Delaware-against enemy bases in the 

A Shau valley near the Laotian border, 

directly west of Da Nang. Arc Light 

aircraft struck 123 targets with 726 

sorties. During the remainder of 1968, 

B-52's supported a variety of troop 

operations and interdiction efforts. 

Highlights of the summer bombing 

period were strikes against NVA 

troop and supply targets 15 miles 

north of the DMZ on 14 July (the 

deepest B-52 penetration north to 

date) and, 4 days later, the first B-52 

strike against North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile sites. 

In March 1969, as Operation Menu, 

B-52's were directed against Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia (see 

Chapter VII). Between 18 March, when 

the first B-52 strike was launched 

against the sanctuaries, and 15 August 

1973, when all bombing was halted, 

B-52 crews flew 16,527 sorties and 

dropped 383,851 tons of munitions on 

Viet Cong/NVA and Khmer Rouge targets. Similarly unannounced bombings 

(Operation Good Look) against enemy 

targets occurred in northern Laos in 

1970, after NVA forces massed for a 

major attack against government outposts in and around the Plain of Jars. 

Between February and May, 149 sorties were flown against enemy troops, 

preventing a major defeat of 

Laotian government forces. During 

1970-1973 more than 2,500 sorties 

struck enemy targets in northern 

Laos. The Strategic Air Command flew 

its last Good Look sortie on 17 April 

1973. 

In South Vietnam, the remote Special Forces camp at Ben Het in the 

western sector of II Corps, came under 

enemy siege in May 1969 and was the 

scene of heavy fighting for the next 2 

months. Before the siege was lifted, B52's had flown 804 sorties against 140 

targets in that area. The bombers 

struck almost daily, with many of the 

targets being changed at the last 

160 

moment because of the enemy's frequent moves. A SAC officer with the 

advanced echelon reported :"From 21 

to 27 June, we had 98 sorties around 

Ben Het. Every target box, except one, 

was changed . Some were changed , 

two, three, and four times. . . Most 

were in close support." By 2 July Ben 

Het defenders felt certain the enemy 

had departed. Air power, with its big 

gun, the B-52, was credited with keeping the enemy force at bay and preventing a major assault. 

On 1 May 1970, shortly before American and ARVN forces invaded the 

Parrot's Beak and Fishhook areas of 

Cambodia, B-52's flew six " softeningup" missions in front of the advancing 

troops. During the 2-month period 

that the ground forces remained in 

Cambodia, Arc Light sorties totalled 

763, of which 653 supported six 

ground operations. Authorities had 

not restricted the B-52's to the 18-mile 

penetration limit set for U.S. ground 

forces, and the bombers often ranged 

beyond the line, hitting target areas 

suspected of containing the long 

sought Communist headquarters of 

the Central Office of South Vietnam 

(COSVN). 

The Laotian Incursion 

The Cambodian incursion was followed in early 1971 by a second crossborder operation into the Laotian 

panhandle. Initiated in February, it 

was undertaken by South Vietnamese 

forces only (see Chapter V). 

Designated Lam Son 719, the operation was aimed at disrupting the 

southward movement of troops and 

materiel on the Ho Chi Minh trail. 

From 8 February, when ARVN forces 

crossed into Laos, until 24 March, the 

final day of the operation, B-52's flew 

1,358 sorties and dropped more than 

32,000 tons of bombs. Many of the 

strikes were used to carve out landing 

zones for helicopters supporting the 

ground advance toward Tchepone. 

The Laotian incursion also marked a 
return to close-in bombing, sometimes less than 1,000 feet from friendly 

positions. On 21 February, in one of 

the most productive strikes of the war, 

Arc Light crews were credited with 

killing 698 enemy troops. The North 

Vietnamese that day had unwisely 

massed for an assault on an ARVNheld hill, presenting a perfect target 

for the B-52's. 

Earlier, on 12 February, the ARVN 

command reported B-52 strikes had 

hit the headquarters of the NVA 308th 

Division, killing 35. Arc Light damage 

reports throughout the operation were 

meager, but two strike areas searched 

on 25 February uncovered 142 dead, 

plus 4 tons of mortars and ammunition destroyed. At times, units of the 

ARVN 1st Infantry Division employed a 

daring tactic calculated to keep enemy troops in a designated B-52 target 

area. After locating the enemy and 

forwarding the target coordinates, 

ARVN units would engage the enemy 

in a firefight, then break off and withdraw just before the planned Arc Light 

strike. On 27 February, for example, 

the 1st Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment 

counted 29 enemy soldiers killed during such an action. Speaking of the 

B-52's, Brig. Gen. Phan Van Phu, 

commander of the 1st Infantry Division, said: 

The enemy tries to get very close to 

us, hoping we will get hit by one of 

our own bombs. We let them come 

close, then pull back just before the 

air strikes, closing again when the 

bombers are finished. If you want to 

kill people you must use maximum 

air. During the heavy fighting around 

Fire Support Base Lo Lo early in the 

week, I called for B-52 strikes within 

300 yards of my unit. Many of the 

nearly 1,700 enemy soldiers reported 

killed in that fighting died in those 

strikes. 

Early in 1972, MACV intelligence 

sources obtained strong indications 

of a forthcoming NVA offensive. 

Unusually large southbound troop and 

logistic movements were detected 

along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Part of 

MACV's strategy to counter the buildup was to hit the new targets with B52's "as hard as possible" before the 

enemy initiated the assault phase of 

operations. The Secretary of Defense 

authorized the Air Force to increase 

the monthly sortie rate, set at 1,000 

since July 1971, to 1,200 as of 8 February. On the same day, 29 B-52's deployed from the United States to 

Guam to permit sortie expansion to 

1,500 per month. In April and May, 

three other deployments brought the 

number of B-52's available for SEA 

duty to 200 and some 3,150 sorties 

each month (as compared to the pre1972 force of 42 bombers and 1,000 

sorties). The last augmentation marked 

the first entry of the B-52G into Arc 

Light operations. The newer G's were 

not modified to carry the larger payload, 

but their longer flying range reduced 

aerial refueling requirements. 

When Hanoi finally unleashed its 

1972 offensive late in March, it consisted of a three-prong NVA thrust toward Quang Tri City, Kontum, and An 

Loc (see Chapter Ill). On 30 March, 

three enemy divisions moved across 

the DMZ and in the first week scored a 

series of stunning victories, dislodging ARVN troops from 14 positions 

before they regrouped on the outskirts 

of Quang Tri City. 

During that hectic week, the B-52's 

flew 132 sorties in an attempt to stem 

the onslaught. B-52 support strikes 

against enemy units and materiel moving through the DMZ continued 

through all of April. One B-52 was hit 

by a SAM on 9 April but managed to 

land at Da Nang. A counteroffensive 

launched by the ARVN in mid-April 

was unsuccessful and Quang Tri City 

fell on 1 May. In bombing enemy positions east of the city, three Arc Light 

strikes were credited with 300 enemy 

killed. After capturing the city, the 

NVA regrouped and moved southward 

toward Hue where ARVN forces had 

hastily erected a defense line. An 

ARVN operation, launched on the 

161 

8 

(1·2) Preparing to load bombs prior to a mission. (3) Carpet bombing In 

support of Operation Junction City, March 1967. (4·5) Before end after. 

The photo on the left shows an area of the DMZ prior to intense air 

strikes. The second photo shows extensive cratering caused from 8·52 

bomber and tactical alrstrlkes. (6) Bombs away. (7) Highlands surround· 

lng the A Shau Valley of South Vietnam show craters produced by B·S2 

strikes Truck parks on either side of the road were destroyed. (8) Carpet 

bombing In support of Operation Junction City in March 1967. 

8 

..... ' .,_ 7 - ...... ~ 

..... 

..... .._ ~ 

..... ...... 

--

.__ 

~ 

..... .._ ....._. 

...._ 
heels of a B-52 strike, led to a continuing engagement with the 29th NVA 

Regiment and the recapture of Fire 

Support Base Bastogne on 15 May. In 

later action around the fire support 

base, a B-52 was credited with 60 

enemy fatalities and permitted the 

capture of large quantities of weapons 

and ammunition. By 28 June, the 

enemy in Quang Tri province had 

been forced onto the defensive and B52's continued to batter the retreating 

enemy. 

Elsewhere, at Kontum, the NVA 

achieved an early success. The invaders overran Rocket Ridge, a strategic 

high point south of Oak To, and 

cut 

Route 14, Kontum's lifeline to the 

south. Throughout this period , B-52

's 

hit suspected enemy troop positions 

and logistic lines. By 16 May the NVA 

had gathered in force before Kontum 

and begun assaults on the ARVN de

-

fensive positions. Close-in B-52 strikes 

were used to counter the advance. 

One Arc Light strike on 18 May decimated the 48th Regiment, 320th NVA 

Division, killing 180 (their bodies were 

later found in a single mass grave). The 

heaviest fighting, on 23-24 May, had 

full Arc Light support. On 25 May the 

enemy was thrown back from Kontum, 

and by 6 June he was in full retreat. 

Between 30 March and 30 June, there 

were 2,262 sorties against 795 targets 

in Military Region II, virtual

ly all of 

them in direct support of the ARVN's 

successful defense of Kontum. 

The third prong of the enemy offen

-

sive, in Military Region Ill, first concentrated on Loc Ninh. Troops 

crossed over from Cambodia on 5 

April and took the city the next day. 

The enemy then moved toward An 

Loc, the provincial capital, some 12 

miles to the south and succeeded in 

cutting its main supply route. Arc 

Light struck repeatedly at enemy positions near Loc Ninh and along the 

road to An Loc. Between 6-28 April, 

117 targets- most near the fighting at 

An Lee-received B-52 treatment. 

164 

2 3 
-

-

-

-

-

5 

Thirty percent of the sorties were of 

the close-in type. On one occasion, 

the B-52's hit an enemy force moving 

through the target area, destroying 3 

or 4 tanks and killing approximately 

100 soldiers. 

Between 29 Apr

il and 16 May, the 

period of the heaviest fighting, a stalemate ensued with intense artillery exchanges. On the night of 12-13 May, 

the enemy took advantage of bad 

flying weather to launch a major tanksupported attack. It soon stalled , 

however, after B-52's destroyed the 

tanks and blew up an ammunition 

dump. The bombers also aided ARVN 

relief units making their way toward 

the beleaguered troops in An Loc, but 

their progress was slow. Heavy fighting continued until 23 June, when the 

relief column finally broke through. 

The B-52 again played a major role, as 

two raids spaced 15 minutes apart 

caught the NVA blocking force by surprise, destroyed it, and opened the 

way into the city. By 26 June, major 

enemy forces had withdrawn from An 

Loc and only small pockets of resistance remained. 

8-52's Over Hanoi 

While the fighting raged in South 

Vietnam, the B-52's also struck deep 

into North Vietnam. In the first strike 

on 9 April 1972, 12 B-52

's bombed 

underground POL sto

rage tanks and a 

railroad yard at Vinh. Although many 

buildings in the POL area were de6 strayed, none of the underground 

tanks were visib

ly damaged. The railroad yard, however, was cut in 4 

places, and 1 locomotive and 10 cars 

destroyed. Three days later, 18 B-52

's 

hit the Bai Thuong airfield, pepperi

ng 

the runway and taxiways with craters 

and destroying one MIG-17 along with 

one occupied and three unoccupied 

AAAsites. On 15April

,17 B-52'sstruck 

Haiphong's POL storage area; the 

North Vietnamese fired 35 SAM's but 

all missed the bombers. Strike results 

were good, with 15 surfa

ce and two 

(1) 750-pound bombs awaiting loading on a 8·52. (2) 8·52 on a 

hard stand. (3) A port

ion of the Klhn No rail yards damaged by 

B-52 strike. (4) Each B-52 carried a v..-lety of bombs Including 

750 pounders. 

(5) Enemy rail siding was put out of service. (6) 

Rail cars carrying petroleum supplies destroyed by 8.S2's. 
underground tanks destroyed-or 

about one-third of the facility's capacity. The B-52's also cut rail lines in the 

area and smashed 30 pieces of rolling 

stock and 66 structures. 

Two strikes, each involving 18 B52's, were made against targets in the 

Thanh Hoa area on 21 and 23 April. 

About 25 SAM 's were fired at the attackers on each day and one missile 

hit its mark. The striken bomber reached Da Nang safely with no crew losses. 

Cumulative damage included 16 buildings destroyed at the Hamm Rong 

transshipment point, and 3 large structures completely or partially destroyed 

in a warehouse area. Rail lines on the 

western approach to the Thanh Hoa 

railroad-highway bridge were cut and 

the thermal power plant damaged. 

In October 1972 peace negotiations 

resumed in Paris, but optimism for an 

agreement proved short-lived. On 13 

December, the North Vietnamese 

broke off the discussions. In the hope 

of forcing a settlement, President Nixon ordered heavy air strikes against 

military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area which had not been previously attacked. These Linebacker II 

operations spanned an 11 -day period 

between 18 and 29 December (with a 

24-hour pause in bombing on Christmas day) and included more than 700 

B-52 sorties against rail and ship 

yards, command and control facilities, 

warehouses and transshipment points, 

power plants, railway bridges, rolling 

stock, MIG bases, and air defense 

sites. The B-52's bombed relentlessly 

around the clock in the rainy monsoon 

weather. 

The damage inflicted by the Strataforts was awesome. At the Gia Lam 

railroad yard and repair facility, four 

buildings were destroyed and two 

damaged, railroad tracks received 

numerous cuts, and direct hits were 

made on military supplies. Bombing 

the barracks at Bac Mai airfield resulted in 31 being destroyed, as were 

large portions of an adjoining military 

166 

storage complex. Nine warehouses at 

the Yen Vien warehouse center were 

destroyed and 10 damaged. A B-52 

strike against the Yen Vien railroad 

yard uprooted tracks, switches, and 

rolling stock, destroyed 2 locomotives 

and 9 warehouses, and damaged 10 

buildings of an adjoining warehouse 

center. At the Van Dien Army supply 

depot, 12 warehouses were destroyed 

and 11 damaged. 

The B-52's, along with F-4's and F111 's also hit hard at electrical power 

production and POL supplies during 

the " Eleven Day War." Subsequent 

assessment revealed that 80 percent 

of North Vietnam's electrical power 

production and 25 percent of its POL 

were destroyed. The bombing of a 

major petroleum storage area in Hanoi 

caused 30 large secondary explosions 

and destruction of two buildings. The 

Haiphong petroleum storage area was 

hit repeatedly. Secondary fires and 

explosions destroyed or damaged 

twenty 50,000-gallon POL tanks and 

countless 55-gallon drums. Other facilities destroyed and damaged included buildings at the Than Am and 

Bac Giang petroleum storage areas 

and four support buildings at the Thai 

Nguyen thermal power plant. 

The results of the short but intense 

Start of the Pans peace talks 

between the Unoted States 

and the Oemocratoc Republoc 

of Vietnam. Secretary Kissor>-

ger Is 2d from the right DIrectly across the table is the 

senoor North Vietnamese 

negotiator. Le Due Tho (2d 

from lett) 
In 1h41 spring of 1969 President Nixon conferred wtth 

South Vtetnamese President 

Nguyen Van Thieu at Midway 

Island Durtng this meeting 

Mr Nixon announced plans 

to begin the wtthdrawal of 

U S forces on Southeast 

Asia 

B-52 campaign were impressive, but 

not without substantial cost. The air 

defenses of Hanoi and Haiphong were 

extensive, highly sophisticated, and 

were years in the making. The cities 

were two of the most heavily defended 

areas in the world. Because all portions of Linebacker II got under way 

more or less concurrently, the Air 

Force had no opportunity to send tactical aircraft to wipe out the enemy's 

air defenses, particularly the greatest 

threat to the high-flying B-52- the 

numerous SAM-2 missile sites that 

encircled both cities. There were 

about 1,000 SAM 's fired during the 

first few days of the bombing campaign, but their number slackened off 

noticeably after B-52 and tactical aircraft eliminated many launching sites 

and the supply of missiles was depleted. 

In all, the North Vietnamese shot 

down 15 B-52's. Of the 92 air crewmen 

aboard, 33 bailed out and were taken 

prisoner. Air Force rescue teams recovered another 26. Four crewmen 

died in a crash landing and 29 were 

reported missing. In exacting that toll 

in men and machinery, the North Vietnamese had mounted a defense unparalleled in its ferocity. Finding their 

normal tracking procedures inadequate, they had resorted to salvoing 

large numbers of missiles in a shotgun 

pattern into the calculated path of the 

on-coming aircraft. 

By 28 December, Ameri can airmen 

had swept away virtually all of the 

enemy's defenses, and the B-52's 

were free to roam the skies of North 

Vietnam. Most of the SAM sites and 

their tracking radars had been neutralized and most MIG-21 interceptors 

were immobilized on their battered 

airfields. B-52D tail gunners marked 

up a kill against a MIG-21 on 18 December and again on 24 December. 

These were the first recorded by B52's during the 7-1 / 2 years of Arc Light 

operations. On 3o' December Hanoi 

agreed to resume the peace talks, 

which culminated in the 27 January 

agreement. 

It was not until 15 January that the 

Air Force stopped B-52 missions over 

North Vietnam, although restricting 

them to below the 20th parallel. 

During those 15 days, in 532 sorties, 

they bombed such logistic targets as 

truck parks, storage areas, and transshipment points. The final B-52 sorties 

in South Vietnam occurred on 27 January, the day of the peace agreement. 

B-52's continued to fly missions over 

Laos until17 April and over Cambodia 

until15 August 1973, when more than 

8 years of Arc Light operations came 

to an end. 

Between June 1965 and August 

1973, the Strategic Air Command 

scheduled 126,663 Stratofortress 

combat sorties, of which 126,615 were 

actually launched. The number of aircraft reaching the target area was 

125,479 with 124,532 successfully releasing their bombs on the targets. 

Geographically, 55 percent of the sorties were flown against targets in 

South Vietnam, 27 percent in Laos, 12 

percent in Cambodia, and 6 percent in 

North Vietnam. Altogether, the Air 

Force lost 31 B-52's-18 from hostile 

fire (all over North Vietnam) and 13 

from other operational causes. 

167 

:. · 

Chapter IX 

Supplies dropped from Air 

Force G-130's drift toward 

troops in the drop zone in 

the A Shau valley, April t968 

Tactical Airlift 

Major roles of air transport in support 

of U.S. ground operations were 

demonstrated during the Second World 

War. In western Europe and in Burma 

thousands of twin-engine C-47'soriginally procured to parachute assault 

troops into combat-were far more 

often used as conventional carriers of 

men and supplies theaterwide. During 

the Korean War, the 315th Air Division 

operated more than 200 Far East Air 

Forces transports under a centralized 

theater system. After the Korean armistice, USAF airlift concepts were 

broadened to encompass another 

primary role-supporting short-notice 

transoceanic deployments of U.S.-based 

tactical air forces. Later, the Kennedy 

administration's interest in limited war 

gave impetus to concepts of airmobile 

tactics in ground warfare. This led the 

Air Force again to focus its tactical 

airlift fleet toward the ground battle, 

meshing its capabilities with the airlift 

forces of the U.S. Army. 

Forces and Organization 

The first USAF transports sent to 

Vietnam were four C-47's, which arrived at Bien Hoa AB on 16 November 

1961 as part of the Farm Gate detachment. The C-47 airlifters performed 

diverse missions-support flights for 

Farm Gate, airdrops of Vietnamese 

paratroops, and night flareship operations. Their most demanding task, 

however, was to resupply U.S. Army 

Special Forces detachments at remote 

locations throughout South Vietnam. 

Such deliveries were often by airdrop, 

either by parachute or free-fall , the C47's escorted by fire-suppressing 

Farm Gate or VNAF strike aircraft. In 

1963 the number of C-47's increased 

to six, but airlift tasks gradually yielded to gunship roles. 

The Vietnamese Air Force also used 

C-47's, organized in a two-squadron 

group commanded in 1962 by Lt. Col. 

Nguyen Cao Ky, future VNAF commander who later served as Prime Minister and Vice President of his country. 

A shortage of VNAF pilots in early 

1962 led the Air Force to assign USAF 

pilots to the two squadrons. Thus, 

in April, 30 American officers arrived 

in Saigon to serve as co-pilots with 

otherwise all-Vietnamese C-47 crews. 

The " Dirty Thirty" Americans soon 

appreciated the flying skills of their 

VNAF counterparts and acquiesced to 

their own co-pilot roles. Some at first 

criticized the informality of Vietnamese flying methods, but all came to 

agree that these were often the surest, 

given the difficult flying environment. 

Ky's tactful leadership preserved good 

relations between the two groups. A 

second contingent replaced the original Dirty Thirty officers in the spring of 

1963. The project ended in December 

1963, although the idea was temporarily revived in modified form in 1965. 

The VNAF airlift squadrons remained 

healthy, frequently transporting the 

Vietnamese airborne battalions in 

their nationwide reserve role. 

The larger, twin-engine C-123 Providers gradually took over the role of 

USAF C-47's in South Vietnam. The 

Provider had been tagged as " obsolescent" as early as 1956 and in 1961 

was scheduled for retirement from the 

active inventory. Instead, in December 

1961 a squadron of 16 C-123's began 

deploying to Vietnam (Project Mule 

Train) to provide "tactical airlift support of South Vietnamese armed 

forces." The first four ships reached 

Tan Son Nhut on 2 January 1962. A 

second C-123 squad ron entered Vietnam in the spring of 1962, a third in 

1963, and a fourth in 1964. All eventually were assiQned to the 315th Air 

169 
Commando Wing. The C-123's thus 

became until 1965 the principal airlift 

element in South Vietnam. Their ability to land on short and rough fields 

proved most valuable, and the four 

squadrons remained in South Vietnam 

until 1970. During 1967-1968 the aircraft underwent major modifications 

-a supplementary jet engine was installed under each nacelle, and improved brakes. flaps, and landing gear 

were provided-all of which enhanced 

C-123 payload, climb, and short-field 

performance. 

Dominating airlift operations in Vietnam after early 1965 was the C-130 

Hercules. Equipped with four turboprop engines and first flown in 1954, 

the C-130 was far superior in performance to earlier tactical transports. Its 

15-ton payload, for example, was three 

times that of the C-123. In 1961 three 

squdrons of C-130A's were stationed In 

the western Pacific under the 315th Air 

Division in Japan; a fourth squadron 

deployed in the spring of 1962. These 

units assisted in deploying a U.S. 

ground and air task force to Thailand 

in May 1962 and regularly airlifted 

personnel and cargo into South Vietnam from offshore locations before 

1965. They occasionally made deliveries between points in South Vietnam, 

making extra stops while transiting 

from offshore or deploying to an incountry base for short periods. When 

President Johnson ordered U.S. 

ground units into South Vietnam, the 

C-130's during 8-12 March 1965 deployed a Marine battalion landing 

team from Okinawa to Da Nang. On 4-

7 May 1965 the C-130 fleet carried the 

Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade from 

Okinawa to South Vietnam in 140 

flights. 

C-130 in-country missions from 

South Vietnamese bases became routine in April 1965. Thereafter, aircraft 

and crews rotated into South Vietnam 

on 1- or 2-week cycles from home bases in the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Japan. By the end of 1965 the 

170 

in-country force had grown to 32 

ships, positioned at four bases. Airlift 

requirements expanded with the 

scope of ground combat, the C-130 

force in South Vietnam reaching 96 

ships in February 1968. The rotational 

scheme was retained-offshore basing exploited existing maintenance 

facilities, reduced in-country construction and manpower requirements, and reduced exposure to enemy shelling. In an emergency, the incountry force could be quickly augmented. 

In the spring of 1965 the offshore C130 force increased to eight squadrons, including four on temporary 

duty from TAC. The force grew to 12 

permanently assigned squadrons by 

m id-1966 and reached a peak of 15 

(including 3 temporarily deployed TAC) 

in early 1968. The 315th Air Division also 

controlled a C-124 squadron based at 

Tachikawa, employing these fourengine craft for overwater transport and 

occasional hauls of outsized items 

within Southeast Asia. 

Within Vietnam, the C-123's and C130's were centrally controlled 

through the Common Service Airlift 

System (CSAS) and its Airlift Control 

Center (ALCC) at Tan Son Nhut. In the 

spring of 1966 MACV established the 

Joint Movements Transportation 

Board and the Traffic Management 

Agency for theater-level management. 

The Board reviewed monthly forecasts 

of airlift requirements and capabilities 

and made allocations as necessary, 

while the Agency gave daily attention 

to priorities and controlled the flow of 

cargo to aerial ports. For emergency 

moves, the MACV Command Operations Center could levy special flights, 

bypassing the transportation agencies. The ALCC scheduled the aircraft 

flights and controlled the daily missions. 

The ALCC functioned countrywide 

through local airlift control elements, 

liaison officers, field mission commanders, and mobile combat control 
teams-all linked by often troublesome radio and land-line communications. The whole apparatus was 

placed under the 834th Air Division 

upon its activation on 15 October 

1966. Also assigned to the 834th 

were the 315th Wing and its C-123 

squadrons, along with three incountry aerial port squadrons and 

numerous subordinate aerial port 

detachments. Expansion of the aerial 

port system tended to lag behind 

workload requirements, a condition 

intensified by shortages and breakdowns in cargo handling equipment. 

Also assigned to the 834th Air Division-but employed outside the centralized scheduling system-were six 

squadrons of C-7A Caribou transports. These twin-engine reciprocating aircraft had been purchased by the 

U.S. Army in the early 1960's to support its airmobile forces. An Army Caribou company deployed to South Vietnam in the spring of 1962. By 1966 the 

force had expanded to six companies 

and operated under the scheduling 

and mission control of specified Army 

corps and divisions. In April 1966 the 

Army and Air Force chiefs of staff 

agreed to transfer the Caribous to the 

Air Force. Later that year, USAF air 

and ground crewmen entered the 

Army companies as trainees and replacements. On 1 January 1967 the six 

companies officially became Air Force 

squadrons, based at three locations 

and assigned to the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing at Cam Ranh Bay. For the 

most part, the squadrons continued to 

operate under Army scheduling. The 

Air Force acquiesced in this " dedicated user" procedure, although it was a 

departure from its doctrine of centralized control. 

Airlift in the Ground War 

Basic to Allied strategy were searchand-destroy operations, penetrating 

remote regions used by the enemy. 

Pivotal in these ventures were the 

fixed-wing transports, which lifted 

multi-battalion task forces to forward 

airheads and resupplied them with POL 

and ammunition. The Army helicopters, 

which performed local assaults and 

short-haul distribution of supplies, often refueled and rearmed at the C-130 

airhead. Highway lines of communication supplemented air delivery when 

feasible, but airlift avoided the problem of enemy road ambushes, enabling the Allies to operate-like Communist forces-in a " war without 

fronts." 

Before 1965, during the period of 

Mule Train C-123 operations, such 

combat applications of tactical airlift 

were only glimpsed . Each day several 

C-123's and VNAF C-47's formed an 

alert element ready to move Vietnamese paratroops on instant notice. 

Although the airlift force was rarely 

exercised in this fashion, it did conduct a series of paratroop assaults, 

some preplanned and others in response to enemy ground attacks. 

These operations were uniformly disappointing, due to poor coordination, 

inaccurate drops, or the troopers' inability to close with the enemy. 

By contrast, the C-123's won praise 

in airlanded troop deployments, hauling multi-battalion Vietnamese forces 

for reinforcement or offensive purposes. Efforts to mesh the best of C-123 

and helicopter assau It qualities had 

gratifying results, as exemplified during Allied operations in the Mekong 

delta in March 1964, when the Providers delivered fuel and ordnance for 

Army helicopters at forward dirt strips. 

More significant than the assault roles, 

however, was the C-123's vital service in 

assisting Farm Gate C-47's in resupplying Special Forces camps. 

Demands for airlift increased substantially in 1965, after the arrival in 

South Vietnam of large U.S. Army contingents. Among the first were two 

paratroop brigades, seen by General 

Westmoreland as a central reserve 

force quickly available for offensive or 

reaction operations. In August 1965 

171 
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1968 

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(1) 105 Howitzer being loaded on a USAF C-123. (2) Unloading 

jeep and cargo. (3) Unloading a howitzer. (4) Troops airborne on 

a mission over South Vietnam. (5) Air Force C·1231ands at the 

Khe Sanh air strlp. (6) USAF Tactical Airfields In South Vietnam 

(7) Delivering supplies to an airstrip In South VIetnam. (8·9) 

Paratroops jump from Air Force C-123 Providers. (10) Unloading 

Army ordnance . 

10 
the 173rd Airborne Brigade was airlifted from Bien Hoa to Pleiku in 150 C130 flights for just this purpose. Then, 

after returning to its home base, the 

173d began a series of sweeps over 

the Saigon plain, relying on a mix of 

truck, helicopter, and air transport 

support. During Operation New Life65, which began on 21 November 

1965, the 173d made a helicopter assault into a dirt airstrip 40 miles east of 

Bien Hoa. The first C-130 landed within 1 hour, and another 70 C-130 sorties 

followed during the next 36 hours to 

deliver both troops and cargo. Overland communications established by 

the third day enabled the C-130's to 

reduce their effort to 10 sorties daily. 

The key role played by air transport 

also was seen in the operations of the 

1st Brigade, 101 st Airborne Division, 

during the spring and summer of 

1966. The brigade made five successive moves, each requiring some 200 

C-130 lifts and each operation largely 

sustained by air resupply. The C-130's 

first airlifted the brigade from Tuy Hoa 

to Phan Thiet early in April, next to the 

highlands airstrip at Nhon Co later 

that month, then north to Cheo Reo in 

May, then to Dak To soon after, and 

finally back to Tuy Hoa in July. 

In the fall of 1965, soon after its arrival at An Khe, the 1st Cavalry Division undertook operations requiring a 

major airlift effort by the Air Force. 

When strong NVA forces attacked Plei 

Me camp south of Pleiku, General 

Westmoreland committed the division. Its assault helicopters consumed 

large amounts of fuel in the battle area 

and almost depleted available stocks, 

despite the efforts of the Army's Caribous and Chinook helicopters to sustain an air line of communications. 

Faced with this emergency, MACV 

called for USAF airlift forces. On the 

morning of 29 October, the C-130's 

began an extended stream from Saigon, hauling POL and munitions to 

the main Pleiku field for redistribution 

by helicopter to the battle area. After 

174 

several days, the C-130's landed closer to the battleground on a dirt strip at 

Catecka Tea Plantation, where the division's helicopters refueled . Over a 

period of 29 days, the Air Force delivered to the 1st Cavalry Division an average of 186 tons per day, most of it 

POL. These operations indicated that 

in the future airmobile forces would 

require substantial logistical airlift 

support from the Air Force, probably 

greater than that required by conventional ground forces. 

Airlift support for the conventional 

units in search-and-destroy operations was exemplified during Operation Birmingham, a 4-week air deployment into Tay Ninh province beginning 24 April1966. The C-130's flew 56 

D-Day sorties into the 4,600-foot dirt 

strip at Tay Ninh. C-123's lifted other 

forces to smaller, nearby strips. An 

around-the-clock resupply airlift into 

Tay Ninh followed to sustain the twobrigade force. The Air Force averaged 

424 tons daily the first week, close to 

the forecast requirements. A land line 

of communications, opened on 1 May, 

reduced the burden on the C-130'~ 

which were also supporting the airborne brigade at Nhon Co. Army helicopters carried supplies from Tay 

Ninh to field units, while Caribous 

provided courier service between Saigon base camps and the battle scene. 

During the second week of Birmingham, the runway at Tay Ninh deteriorated from heavy rains, which also 

halted ground movement. By the time 

the operation ended on 17 May, the C130's and C-123's had flown nearly 

1 ,000 sorties and delivered nearly 

10,000 tons of cargo for the division. 

C-130 parachute capabilities were 

exercised during Operation Junction 

City early in 1967. The operation 

got under way on 22 February with 

airmobile assults using all 

available helicopters. Executed 

simultaneously was the war's only 

battalion-sized parachute assult by 

American troops. Thirteen C-1 30's 
departed from Bien Hoa on schedule; 

the troopers of the 173rd Brigade 

jumped as planned at 0900. All landed 

in the drop zone at Katum near the 

Cambodian border. There was negligible opposition, although one C-130 received a single hit. At 0927, 10 C-130's 

dropped the brigade's equipment, 

returning at 1300 to make additional 

cargo drops. Some of these loads 

landed in swamp areas, complicating 

retrieval. Five cargo-carrying Hercules 

sustained hits, none seriously. 

On the second day, the Air Force 

launched 38 C-130 resupply sorties, 

but bad weather reduced drop accuracy. During the next 5 days, coordination and accuracy improved with daily 

drops averaging 100 tons. During the 

final stages of the operation in late 

March, the C-130's made airdrops to a 

"floating brigade," using drop zone 

locations which the ground unit provided by radio. The drops in support of 

Junction City totalled 1,700 tons. The 

sustained effort strained the Army's 

parachute rigging capability, but also 

eased the workload of the Army's 

resupply helicopters and provided 

USAF crews with invaluable experience. 

Airlanded operations in support of 

subsequent Army offensives followed 

the pattern of the earlier ones. In November 1967, C-130's in some 250 sorties flew the 173d to Oak To. In the 3 

weeks of heavy fighting that followed , 

daily streams of C-130's delivered 

more than 5,000 tons, landing on a 

much-patched and busy 4,200-foot 

asphalt strip. Enemy shelling on the 

15th destroyed a 1 ,300-ton ammunition dump and two parked C-130's. 

Crewmen courageously taxied a third 

Hercules from the inferno and received Silver Stars for their deed. 

Although land deliveries supplemented the air resupply, General Westmoreland later remarked that " along 

with the gallantry and tenacity of our 

forces , our tremendously successful 

air logistic operations was the key to 

the victory." 

Combat operations in the northern 

portion of South Vietnam created 

special transportation problems for 

Allied forces. In 1966 highway communications north of Da Nang were in 

disrepair and highly insecure, while 

port facilities and airfields near the 

DMZ were primitive. In July the Marines deployed their forces immediately below the DMZ, using more than 

250 trips by Marine KC-130's-with 

some aid from USAF aircraft-into the 

red dirt airstrip at Dong Ha. The allies 

later surfaced the strip and also 

opened a second all-weather field at 

Quang Tri. These projects required 

large quantities of scarce airstrip matting, as did the Khe Sanh strip improvement to the west. A prolonged C130 airdrop supported operations and 

airstrip construction at Khe Sanh during the fall of 1967. The effort required 

cooperation among Navy suppliers at 

Da Nang, Army parachute riggers, Air 

Force crews, and the Marines at Khe 

San h. 

The air supply of Khe Sanh during 

the first 4 months of 1968 represented 

a remarkable achievement, enabling 

6,000 Allied defenders to survive under heavy NVA pressure until reopening of land communications in April. 

Favored by absolute air supremacy 

and the proximity of Khe Sanh to Da 

Nang (30 minutes), the Khe Sanh airlift 

nevertheless faced major problems 

stemming from difficult weather and 

the enemy's imaginative use of firepower. For much of the period , Communist fire forced a halt to C-130 landings and limited severely those by c123's, thus necessitating reliance on 

airdrops. The Air Force overcame its 

hitherto chronic weakness in dropping supplies during poor visibility, by 

using ground radar to guide the 

C-130's to precise points over the Khe 

Sanh runway. The foul weather helped 

screen the transports from enemy 

gunners, although it also hindered fire 

suppression efforts by allied fighters. 

On most days the ability of Marine re175 
trieval parties to clear loads from the 

rough drop zone limited the volume of 

supplies. Late in the siege C-130's 

began bulk deliveries within the Khe 

Sanh main perimeter using low-level 

extraction techniques. 

Between 21 January and 8 April, the 

Air Force delivered 12,400 tons to Khe 

Sanh. The C-130's accounted for more . 

than 90 percent of the total in 496 

drops, 67 extractions, and 273 landings. C-123's made 105 drops and 179 

landings; C-7 Caribous made 8 landings. During the early weeks, Marine 

KC-130's also delivered cargo. 

Throughout the siege, Marine helicopters resupplied hill positions outside 

the perimeter. During February alone, 

they hauled well over 1,000 tons. 

Supply levels never became dangerously low. Three C-123's and one Marine C-130 were destroyed during the 

battle. 

The 1968 Communist Tet offensive severely challenged the airlift 

crews. The early attacks at Tan Son 

Nhut and many of the up -

country airstrips temporarily dislocated the airlift system . However, transport crews managed to fly numerous 

emergency troop and supply missions 

on behalf of hard-pressed garrisons. 

By 3 February, the fourth day of the 

offensive, countrywide airlift sorties 

regained former levels. Sortie totals 

increased thereafter as crews flew to 

the limit of their capacity and as additional planes and crews arrived from 

offshore. With surface lines of communication disrupted throughout the 

month, demands for airlift remained 

high. The most critical area was the 

northern provinces, where winter 

monsoon weather and airspace 

congestion hampered resupply of 

expanded allied forces. But in all regions, the recovery from the enemy 

offensive depended upon the air 

transport system. Missions into Khe 

Sanh were unaffected by the Tet attacks. 

Efforts of airlift crews were extraor176 

dinary in two other 1968 operations. 

The first was Operation Delaware, the 

air invasion of the A Shau valley in 

April. Once more the C-130's faced a 

gauntlet of enemy fire and bad weather, this time without the assistance of 

ground radar. In daily supply drops to 

the 1st Cavalry Division at A Luoi, the 

C-130 crews used their radar and 

doppler equipment to navigate up the 

cloud-filled valley, breaking out just 

before visual release of cargo. During 

the 9-day period starting 26 April, the 

C-130's in 165 flights d rapped 2,300 

tons, nearly all of it ammunition. 

Drops continued even during one period when the weather was so bad that 

helicopters could not operate. One C130 and its crew was lost to enemy 

fire; four others received major battle 

damage. The cavalry division commander termed the C-130 effort "one 

of the most magnificent displays of 

courage and airmanship that I have 

ever seen." A rebuilt A Luoi airstrip 

received its first Caribou on 2 May and 

its first C-123 and C-130 2 days later. 

Before rain closed the airstrip on the 

11th, USAF transports made 113 landings, more than half by C-130's. 

The air evacuation of the allied garrison at the Kham Due mountain post 

on 12 May 1968 was equally spectacular. Intermittently through much of the 

day, Army and Marine helicopters lifted out survivors, while allied air 

strikes held off the enemy on all sides. 

During the morning a C-130 landed but 

received heavy damage, then departed 

with only three passengers, fuel steaming from shrapnel holes and tires stripped away. A C-123 made a successful 

morning pickup. In early afternoon, 

three C-130's attempted pickups. 

Enemy fire destroyed one after it took 

off with more than 100 civilian passengers; another, crippled in landing, was 

abandoned. Only the third made a 

successful landing and evacuation. 

Then, late in the afternoon, three C130's succeeded in bringing out the 

last of the garrison. Of 1 ,500 survivors 

A C-7 aircraft oflloads cargo 

at isolated camp 
,.,.,. 

.. ,.,,,. ~. 

· .... 

Supplies delo,.red by parachute 

of Kham Due, the Air Force flew out 

more than 500, nearly all in the final 

crucial minutes before the outpost 

fell. 

One final act of valor ensued. 

Under orders to bring in a three-man 

USAF control team and unaware that 

the evacuation was already completed, a final C-130 landed at the nowhostile Kham Due strip. Radio conversations soon after the Hercules took 

off made known the blunder. A C-123 

made a touch-and-go landing and 

spotted the three men. A second C123, piloted by Lt. Col. Joe M. Jackson 

and Maj. Jesse W. Campbell, landed 

under heavy fire and successfully 

removed the team . For his role in the 

rescue effort Jackson received the 

Medal of Honor, the only airlifter of the 

war so honored. Jackson wore the 

award with dignity in the years that followed, representing the thousands of 

USAF airlifters who shared pride in his 

recognition. 

The small payload capacity of the C7 Caribou normally discouraged its 

use in major tactical operations. On 

the other hand, excellent maneuverability at low altitude and slow airspeed 

enabled the Caribou to make accurate 

drops into small places. Furthermore, 

its small payloads were appropriate for 

garrisons lacking heavy recovery 

equipment ; finally, simplicity of construction minimized the C-7's vulnerability to ground fire. Thus, the Caribou 

was used frequently for emergency 

drops, of which three were particularly 

noteworthy-the resupply of Due Lap 

in August 1968, Ben Het in the spring 

of 1969, and Oak Seang a year later. 

The garrisons at all three survived 

heavy enemy pressure with the help of 

air-delivered supplies; hostile fire was 

severe in each instance, necessitating 

special tactics. At Due Lap, the Caribous flew in at tree-top level, popping 

up to 300 feet at the last moment for 

the release. At Ben Het, the C-7's 

made run-ins at intervals of about 20 

seconds, in coord ination with preplanned fire suppression from covering fighter aircraft. Similar tactics 

were tess successful at Oak Seang, 

where three aircraft were lost in the 

first week of operations. The force 

then went over to night drops, the 

drop zone marked by signal fires and 

airborne flareships. During the battle, 

the C-7's made 125 drops over Oak 

Seang, releasing 250 tons; the garrison recovered 94 percent of these 

supplies. 

Airlift efforts during 1969-1971 included massive support of the allied 

incursions into Cambodia and southern Laos. During 9 weeks commencing on 28 April 1970, aircraft of the 

834th Air Division delivered 60,000 

tons to more than 20 airfields in South 

Vietnam immediately adjacent to 

Cambodia. Ammunition lifts from Bien 

Hoa for a short period approached 

1,000 tons daily. Missions into Cambodia were less extensive, but included 

more than 150 C-7 flights into the border strip at 0 Rang and several C130 ammunition drops to U.S. 

forces near 0 Rang. Lam Son 719 

was preceded by 250 C-130 flights, 

hauling a Vietnamese airborne division and other ARVN forces from 

Saigon to Dong Ha and Quang Tri. 

Over a 7-week period during the Laotian 

operation, the C-130's delivered more 

than 14,000 tons to a reconstructed 

logistics base at Khe Sanh. During 

the same period, C-141 's of the Military Airlift Command flew some incountry movements to reduce aerial 

port backlogs. 

The major North Vietnamese spring 

offensive in 1972 led to frequent Air 

Force supply flights in support of the 

defenders of Kontum and An Lee, two 

primary objectives of the enemy. 

Sustained air resupply into isolated 

Kontum began in April, with day landings halting on 17 May after enemy 

shells damaged several C-130's, 

burned two VNAF C-123's, and destroyed a C-130E. C-130 landings resumed exclusively at night on 18-19 

177 
(1) AAVN paratroopers board a C-130 prior to dropping Into a VietCong area. 

(2) Parachute touchdown. (3) An Air Force combat control team watches Vietnamese paratroopers drop Into a VietCong area. (4) A toad master noti fies 

pilot of compl etion of d rop as ammunition pallet l oads go out a C-123 rear 

door. (5) General McConnell (1.) congratulates Sgt Joseph F. Mack after 

presenting him and Capt. Joseph K. Glenn (center) lhe Sliver Star and 

Di stinguished Flying Cross. The two airmen were cited fo r heroic action in 

saving their damaged C-130 in 1967 during the battle of Oa~ To. (6) A C-123 

ta~is at an Army Special Forces camp. (7) Parachute d rop from a C-123 

transport to Marines at Khe San h. (8) A C-7 lands at Khe San h. (9) An Air 

Force combat controller team d irects C-130 aerial delivery of equipment to 

troops in lay Nlnh province. 

----------------~----------~ 

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3 

2 

(1) A C-130 airdrops 105mm Mwl1zers, prepared for the drop by AAVN troops, 

1967. (2) C-123's airlifted U.S. Marines Into Calu, South Vietnam, along with 

61ons of equipment. (3) C-130's delivered troops and supplies to a Tay Nlnh 

airstrip during Operation Birmingham, April 1966. (~)A C-130 drops supplies 

to Marines at Khe Sanh, April 1968. 

• 
May, with n aircraft overcoming extreme hazards to make successful 

deliveries. Resupply continued nightly under cover of allied gunships, 

although in one instance a C-130 

delayed its departure past dawn and 

was destroyed by ground tire. On 25 

May the enemy seized a part of the 

runway, closing the field to landings. 

The supply burden momentarily fell 

upon VNAF and U.S. Army helicopters, but on the 28th C-130's began 

drops into one corner of the airfield. 

Although bundle recovery was difficult and slow, more than 2,000 tons 

were dropped in 130 sorties before -=- ~~~~;~ 

C-130 night landings could be resumed on 8 June. 

Aerial resupply to the 20,000 defenders and refugees at An Loc began 

in April, with deliveries by VNAF and 

U.S. helicopters and VNAF C-1 23's 

approximating 20 tons daily. Loss of a 

VNAF helicopter and a C-123 to enemy 

fire caused successive suspensions of 

these efforts. Air Force C-130's began 

daylight drops on 18 April. The first 

four aircraft successfully parachuted 

supplies but each received battle 

damage; a fifth ship went down west 

of the city. To reduce exposure, altitudes were raised above 6,000 feet, 

dropping with ground radar guidance. 

" High-altitude, low-opening" parachute techniques proved unsuccessful, however, as numerous chutes 

failed, in part because of inexperienced Vietnamese packers. The 

C-130's resumed low-level conventional drops even though all ships 

continued to receive hits. 

On 26 April, after another C-130 was 

lost, the Air Force switched to night 

drops. Conducted visually with light 

signals, these too proved unsatisfactory, as many bundles missed the mark 

and some fell into enemy hands. The 

low point occurred the night of 2-3 

May, when the C-130's failed to make 

a single successful delivery. Loss of a 

third C-130 on the following evening 

caused the cancellation of further 

182 (1·3) C-130"s delivering supplies to allied troops by airdrop and arresting cable. 

2 

., . . r 

.. -

t 
• 

• 

• 

• 

' • • ... 

3 

• 

• 

• 

• 

night missions. High altitude, daylight 

drops were resumed on 5 May but now 

with the assistance of American para- chute riggers brought in from Okinawa. Half of the parachutes opened 

properly and only one of the 24 bundles dropped that date fell into enemy 

hands. On 8 May the An Loc defenders 

recovered 68 of the 88 tons dropped. 

The drops became increasingly successfu I thereafter, the airlifters exclusively resupplying the defenders until 

the end of the siege on 18 June. In all, 

C-130's dropped 

7,600 tons into the 

beleaguered city in more than 600 sorties, a dramatic and fitting climax to 

the 10-year history of the USAF tactical airlift arm in Vietnam . 

Other Applications 

of Tactical Airlift 

Air Force transports performed 

numerous noncombat transportation roles during the war. Passengers, 

mail, perishable foods, and high value 

equipment were moved between aerial ports throughout South Vietnam . 

Such toads frequently originated at 

airfields served by Military Airlift 

Command and the principal seaports - Saigon, Da Nang, and the Qui NhonNha Trang-Cam Ranh Bay complex. 

For routine bulk hauling within Viet-

nam, air transport remained se

cond-

ary to the surface modes. An excep

-

tion was the Army Special Forces 

logistic system, whi ch depended primarily on airlift for the routine supply 

of its camps. The C-130 force also 

made overwater hauls between offshore points and fields in Vietnam, 

averaging 

7,000 tons monthly in the 

peak year, 1966. 

The war in Laos required substantial 

air transport, of which USAF helicopters based in north Thailand provided 

a part. Civilian contract firms were 

primarily responsible for fixed-wing 

transport in Laos. The 315th Air Divi- sion operated a passenger and air 

logistic service within Thailand, linking the principal Air Force bases 

183 
there. In September 1965, a rotational C-130 detachment at Bangkok 

took on this role, replacing C-123's 

previously rotated from South Vietnam. 

Casualty evacuations in South Vietnam were almost entirely by air. Army 

helicopters performed most battlefield 

evacuations, while USAF transports 

hauled between the 18 in-country 

hospitals, mostly located at C-130 airfields. Transports carried unrigged litters at all times for emergency evacuations. The 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, organized in 1966, 

provided flight medical personnel and 

operated a control center at Tan Son 

Nhut to monitor patient movements. 

Mobile casualty staging teams entered 

South Vietnam in early 1967, thereafter performing patient care at certain 

forward airheads. 315th Air Division C130's and C-118's performed patient 

evacuations from Vietnam to offshore 

points. Specifically configured for patient evacuations, the C-118's were 

assigned to the 6485th Operations 

Squadron, based originally in Japan 

and later at Clark in the Philippines. In 

1968 a C-118 detachment began operating at Cam Ranh Bay to support incountry patient movements. All-jet C9's finally replaced the C-118's in 1972 

as the PACAF specialized aeromedical 

evacuation force. 

Late in 1965, the Air Force deployed 

a squadron of CH-3 helicopters to 

South Vietnam, each able to carry a 3-

ton payload about 200 miles. The 

squadron performed a variety of tasks, 

including delivery of supplies to USAF 

radar and communication sites in 

South Vietnam, and occasionally 

joined Army and Marine units in air 

supply operations. Both the CH-3's 

and the Air Force UH-1 's later deployed played major roles in special 

warfare operations in Laos, Cambodia, and remote areas of South Vietnam. Management remained outside 

the Common Service Airlift System 

(CSAS). Because of interservice 

agreements, Air Force operation of 

184 

transport helicopters was quite limited. 

Techniques of air delivery were advanced. Introduced in 1966 was the 

container delivery system, which permitted supply drops from 600 rather 

than 1,000 feet. Thereafter, C-130's 

employed the system in all drops except for the heaviest items. Low-level 

extraction systems developed in the 

early 1960's proved useful for pinpoint 

aerial deliveries. One of these, the 

ground proximity extraction system 

(GPES), used a hook-and-cable arrangement which required prepositioning of an arrestor gear. The other, 

the low altitude parachute extraction 

system (LAPES), required a large extraction parachute and a long cleared 

space on the ground (often an old airstrip). The Air Force used both systems at Khe Sanh with mixed success. 

For most airlifters, flight operations 

in Southeast Asia were an abrupt 

change from the methods taught and 

(1·2) A U.S. Air Force HH-43 

helicopter delivens supplies 

to allred troops in Vietnam. 

July 1970. 
2 

practiced in the United States. In 

peacetime flying, crews adhered to 

written regulations, regularly attended 

flying safety meetings, and practiced 

endlessly the mechanical techniques 

of instrument flight. In Southeast Asia, 

however, crewmen quickly learned to 

rely on their own wits and judgment. 

Prescribed criteria of ceiling and visibility were generally overlooked. 

Crews flew visually whenever possible, looked for breaks in overcasts, 

and stayed underneath low ceilings 

except when over hostile areas. 

Squadron commanders frequently had to 

curb the enthusiasm of their crews 

and caution them against unnecessary risks-a difficult message in 

view of the heady sense of mission 

accomplishment generally felt. 

Special hazards existed at the forward airheads, where the fixed-wing 

transports shared crowded ground 

and air space with seemingly uncon-

trolled helicopters, trucks, pedestrians, and assorted hazards. Landings required the concentration of the 

entire crew to avoid other traffic, 

friendly artillery, and high terrain-all 

while maneuvering clear of clouds 

and setting up precision final approaches. Joint working groups set up 

in late 1968 belatedly addressed the 

hazardous conditions. 

Beginning in 1970 the Air Force 

substantially reduced its airlift forces 

in the Pacific. Remaining by the end of 

1971 were only five C-130, three C-7, 

and one C-123 squadrons; the 834th 

was inactivated in November. In 1972 

the Caribou and C-123 wings went out 

of existence, leaving only four squadrons of G-130E's based in Taiwan and 

Thailand. On the other hand, the VNAF 

airlift force expanded from two squadrons in 1970 to eight in late 1972, including three C-7 and three G-123 

squadrons. Two squadrons were equipped with C-130A's just before the 1973 

ceasefire, making available the c123's for the air forces of Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. 

Over the years between 1962 and 

1973, the Air Force delivered more 

than 7 million tons of passengers and 

cargo within South Vietnam. By comparison, U.S. and British transports 

carried slightly more than 2 million 

tons during the Berlin airlift and about 

750,000 tons during the Korean War. 

The Air Force lost 53 C-130's in the 

Southeast Asia war, more than half of 

them in 1967 and 1968. C-123 losses (including 1 spray aircraft) also totaled 

53 and G-7 losses numbered 20. Of 

these 126 aircraft, enemy action accounted for 61 , including 17 destroyed 

by sapper or shelling attacks. The other 65 were lost from " operational" 

causes, mainly associated with the 

difficult conditions at forward airstrips. All but 10 of the losses occurred in South Vietnam . Those airlift 

crewmen killed or missing numbered 

269. In Vietnam, the USAF tactical airlift arm lived up to its proud history, 

adding a new, illustrious chapter. 

185 

Chapter X 

C-14t transports at 8 western Pacif•c base They 

played 8 key role In dehver-

.ng men and supplies to 

Southeast Asia. 

Strategic Airlift 

When the large-scale deployment of 

military forces to South Vietnam got 

under way in 1965, the Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC) found 

itself assigned the task of providing 

urgent transportation of personnel 

and certain supplies from the United 

States to Southeast Asia. U.S. reliance 

on strategic airlift stemmed from the 

fact that ship movements nearly half 

way around the world were slow and 

that the Republic of Vietnam at the 

time lacked suitable ports, roads, and 

railways to remove and distribute efficiently the materiel once it had arrived. It was not uncommon during the 

1965-1966 force buildup for ships to 

wait in harbors for days or weeks to be 

unloaded. The airlift into Southeast 

Asia was not entirely new to the Military Airlift Command. As early as 1954, 

under its former designation as Military Air Transport Service, it carried 

some 500 wounded foreign legionnaires back to France and Algeria after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. However, 

the airlift to Southeast Asia that began 

in 1965 grew to proportions unequaled in the history of strategic airlift. 

In 1965, to fulfill the demands 

placed upon it, the command had 34 

squadrons: 21 C-124 Globemasters, 3 

C-133 Cargomasters, 7 C-130 Hercules, and 3 C-135 Stratolifters. Only 

the C-124 and C-133 had been originally designed as cargo aircraft, and 

both were nearing obsolescence. The 

aging Globemaster served admirably 

as an intratheater cargo transport, but 

its speed and range were inadequate 

for intertheater operations. Thus, the 

C-124 normally required about 95 

hours of flying time to go from Travis 

AFB, Calif., to Saigon and return-or, 

at the then-current utilization rates, 

slightly more than 13 days. The C-133 

made fewer stops and carried more, 

but its speed was marginal for strategic airlifts. Moreover, flight safety modifications to the C-133 during early 

19651imited its utilization. 

MAC had acquired both the C-130 

and C-135 as interim aircraft, pending_ 

development and production of advanced jet transports such as the C-141 

Starlifter- then on the assembly line 

but not yet operational-and the controversial C-5 Galaxy, which was still 

under development. The C-130's and 

C-135's helped take on the expanding 

strategic airlift work, although neither 

was entirely suited for the Southeast 

Asia job. The C-130 lacked true strategic airlift speeds and ranges; on the 

other hand, these features were quite 

adequate on the C-135 but its load 

capacity was insufficient, particularly 

for outsized cargo. 

Unable to meet the mushrooming 

airlift demands with its own aircraft, 

MAC solicited the help of the Air Force 

Reserve and Air National Guard. They 

were equipped with C-97, C-119, C121, and C-124 aircraft which were 12 

to 15 years old, difficult to maintain, 

and capable of transporting no more 

than 10 tons at a time over the Pacific. 

Nevertheless, through their ongoing 

training program, the reserves provided an available airlift resource and, 

between 1 August 1965 and 30 June 

1966, they carried 30,000 tons of cargo 

and 5,790 passengers to the Pacific 

area. Indeed, by October 1972 Air 

Force Reserve crews alone had made 

1,294 trips into the war zone, during 

which they delivered 30,434 tons of 

cargo and 3,600 passengers. Perhaps 

even more important, by employing 

these reservists on some MAC stateside missions, the command was able 

to release more of its own aircraft for 

operations into Southeast Asia. The 

Air Force Reserve and Air National 

Guard took over some internal and 

near-offshore transport aeromedical 

187 
evacuation and air airlift missions 

starting on 1 August 1965. 

But as demand for airlift to support 

the war outstripped capacity, the Air 

Force turned to the commercial airlines. The President chose not to declare a national emergency and take 

control of the more than 180 commercial airliners that made up the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Instead, 

MAC relied on contract leasing of 

188 

these aircraft. The arrangement 

worked well as there was little to fear 

from enemy air activity. 

A milestone in the modernization of 

the strategic airlift fleet occurred in 

April 1965 when the C-141 Starlifter 

became operational and then began 

flying to SEA in August. By 1967, the 

C-141 fleet had grown to morethan100, 

and in 1968 the 284th and last C-141 

was produced. The Starlifter could 

A C-5 Galaxy, the world's 

largest aircraft, made 11& first 

deliveries to South Vietnam 

in August t971 . 
carry 67,620 pounds of cargo 4,000 

miles or 20,000 pounds non-stop from 

California to Japan at speeds of 440 

knots. By comparison, the C-124 

could carry 50,000 pounds over a 

range of 1 ,000 miles or 25,000 pounds 

for about 2,300 miles at speeds of only 

200 knots. 

Fleet modernization received another boost in 1969 when the world's largest aircraft, the C-5 Galaxy, entered 

service. The.Air Force received its first 

C-5 on 17 December 1969. Possessing 

unique cargo capabilities, the aircraft 

added much to MAC's airlift posture. 

The C-5 could carry 164,383 pounds 

over 3,000 miles at a speed of 450 

knots. Perhaps its best feature was the 

giant cargo compartment, which 

accommodates equipment 120 feet 

long, 19 feet wide, and 13Y2 feet high. 

The C-5 could transport about 98 percent of the Army's equipment, including self-propelled howitzers, personnel carriers, and tanks. Had they been 

available, only 17 C-5's could have 

done the work of the 300 or more aircraft used each day in the 1948-1949 

Berlin airlift. The C-5 made its first deliveries to South Vietnam in August 

1971. In the months that followed, particularly in the spring of 1972, it played 

a major role in SEA strategic airlift. By 

mid-1973, MAC had 77 Galaxies ready 

for duty. 

Bases and Routes 

In responding to the urgent SEA 

requirements, the Air Force quickly 

found the base and route structure 

inadequate for the unusually heavy 

airlift traffic. Congestion quickly developed over routes into the theater. 

This was particularly true in South 

Vietnam, where all commercial inbound cargo and passenger flights 

processed through Tan Son Nhut. At 

this major South Vietnamese airfield, 

a huge cargo transshipment workload 

resulted and grew worse as the American military buildup increased. Soon 

the base had the highest air traffic 

density in the world. 

Similar difficulties were encountered at en route stations throughout 

the Pacific area because of the tremendous flight surge. Pacific operations of MAC's 21st Air Force alone: 

rose from 2,000 flying hours during 

January 1965 to more than 11 ,000 the 

following June. Overall, traffic to the 

Pacific grew from a monthly average 

of 33,779 passengers and 9,123 tons 

of cargo in fiscal year 1965 to 65,350 

passengers and 42,296 tons of cargo 

in fiscal year 1967. Clark Air Base, 

the major Philippines terminal en 

route to South Vietnam , was particularly saturated. 

To relieve congestion and speed 

cargo handling in South Vietnam , the 

United States initiated a vast construction program in that country. Dual 

runways were built at several existing 

bases and new air facilities added. 

This included new passenger terminals at Kontum, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, 

Phu Cat, Da Nang, and Cam Ranh Bay. 

At Yokota Air Base, Japan, a passenger terminal capable of processing 

35,000 personnel monthly opened in 

March 1969. 

Aerial port backlogs also developed 

in the United States. In 1965 MAC's 

worldwide operations centered on 

several coastal aerial ports of embarkation {APOE's). Each served only 

specific destinations in the adjacent 

oceanic area. All passengers and cargo destined for SEA processed initially through Travis AFB, Calif., and it 

soon was congested. 

As improved facilities became available, MAC increased its cargo routes 

between the United States and South 

Vietnam from 1 to more than 12, and 

passenger routes from 1 to more than 

6. Many interconnecting routes were 

also established between the United 

States and numerous Pacific stations 

to and from the bases in Vietnam . The 

expansion of airlift services to these 

points reduced the transshipment 

189 
workload that had contributed to the 

Tan Son Nhut congestion difficulties. 

The Air Force removed or reduced 

bottlenecks at many of the en route 

bases by dispatching large numbers 

of MAC personnel to help out at the 

saturated or expanding stations. Other measures to ease traffic problems 

included securing approval to use 

Mactan Air Base in the Philippines, 

staging aircrews throughout the Pacific more efficiently, adjusting route patterns, bypassing saturated bases, and 

scheduling maintenance only at home 

bases. As examples of adjusting routes 

to the performance of the latest aircraft, the C-141 and C-5 did not need to 

land at Wake Island on their way from 

Hawaii to Southeast Asia, since flights 

on the " great circle" route between the 

United States and Southeast Asia operated via Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, and 

Japan. 

On 1 April 1965, after a year of testing a concept of originating Pacific 

flights from the middle or eastern 

190 

United States, the Air Force opened 

Kelly AFB, Tex., as a port of commonuser service to western Pacific installations. Shortly thereafter, on 1 July, 

the APOE at McChord AFB, near the 

Army troop processing center at Fort 

Lewis, expanded to include passenger 

service to Japan and Korea. On 1 October Norton AFB, Calif., became an 

aerial port to provide cargo service to 

Okinawa and Vietnam. 

The use of eastern U.S. bases as 

aerial ports for Southeast Asia began 

in April 1966, with cargo routes between Dover AFB, Del., and Clark and 

Tan Son Nhut Air Bases and between 

Charleston AFB, S.C., and Don Muang 

AS, Thailand. In May, passenger service from McGuire AFB, N.J., to South 

Vietnam also was initiated. These 

flights used the North Pacific route. 

On 1 January 1968 another aerial port 

in the interior, at Tinker AFB, Okla., 

began serving Guam and Thai bases 

directly, reducing cargo transshipments. 
Lt. Gen. Tran Van Minh, commander in chief, Vietnamese Air Force, salutes Vietnamese student pilots on amval at Keesler AFB in 

January 1972. Maj. Gen. Frank M. Madsen, Jr., USAF escorts him. 

Improving the aerial ports through 

mechanization also helped relieve 

congestion and reduce transit times. 

The Air Force installed automated 

terminals at Travis in February 1965 

and at McChord in early 1966. The 

automated system- 463L Materials 

Handling Support System- included 

special vehicles to facilitate ai rcratt 

loading and unloading. Another effective measure to reduce in-transit 

down time of aircraft called for prepositioning crews at en route bases, 

thereby eliminating aircraft standdowns tor crew rests. With standby 

crews at Hickam and Wake Island, 

tor example, aircraft ground time 

decreased from 15 to 4 hours. 

Coincident with the tremendous 

military expansion in Southeast Asia, 

the Secretary of Defense authorized 

the Air Force to increase the utilization rate of its aircraft incrementally. 

By 30 June 1966, this accelerationappropriately named Fast Fly- saw 

aircraft utilization climb from a daily 

peacetime rate of 2.5 hours for troop 

carriers and 5 hours tor air transports 

to approximately 4 and 8 hours, respectively. This had an important im191 
(1) 

At Qui Nhon atrf1eld the Air Force's 15th 

Aenal Port Squadron processed an average 

of 25.000 passengers per month. (2·3) 

Unloadmg 

U.S Army hel icooters from a C·5 

Galaxy at Ca'l'l Ranh Bay. (4) Memorial ser· 

v•ce at Tan Son Nhut AB for US sold1ers 

kl·led In aclion (5) The cavernous C·SA 

Galaxy cargo area a'ter military supplies 

have been oepos1ted at Cam Ranh Bay 

2 3 
5 
11) An Aor Force C-1•1 S1arllfle• a1 Bien Hoa AB South 5 

Vietnam. (2-8) The strateg'c aorhft In support of the war 

effort oncluded the C-5 Gataxie, the largest transport 

In the world, lhe C-141 Slarhfter, and lhe C-133 

Cargomasterl 

2 

3 
8 
pact on personnel, particularly on 

flight service and maintenance crews. 

Additional personnel were acquired 

from SAC units being discontinued 

and were put through a special training program . 

To expedite the flow of critically 

required cargo from the aerial ports, 

the Air Force employed a series of 

priority designations : " 999" identified 

the highest priority cargo ; " Green 

Sheet" covered cargo to be moved 

ahead of older cargo of the same 

priority; and " Red Ball" (an airlift reference to the famous World War II 

truck express in Europe) tagged priority Army spare parts for inoperative 

combat equipment. The Military Airlift 

Command began its Red Ball Express 

on 8 December 1965, guaranteeing 

shipment within 24 hours of receipt at 

the APOE. The 1,000th Red Ball mission departed Travis on 1 May 1967. 

MAC's primary responsibility involved the intertheater delivery of personnel and cargo, but it also performed numerous intratheater tasks. 

Before the Vietnam conflict, the Pacific Air Forces relied on its own tactical 

transports to move personnel and 

cargo to and from Japan, Okinawa, 

Taiwan, and the Philippines. The war 

in Southeast Asia, however, put a severe strain on PACAF's ability to operate the intratheater airlift system while 

also meeting tactical airlift requirements in South Vietnam. Whereupon, 

the Air Force decided that MAC 

should assume a major portion of the 

intratheater airlift load over routes 

previously supported by tactical airlift. Accordingly, Military Airlift Command established several new routes, 

extended others, and diverted aircraft 

in the theater for special assignments. 

Intra theater cargo flights varied 

from the delivery of ammunition to Da 

Nang from Kaden a to the movement of 

troops and equipment within South 

Vietnam. Altogether, MAC intratheater 

activity increased dramatically-from 

53,198 tons of cargo and 175,539 pas196 

- " - • ., ~ 

-l\· 

sengers in 1965 to 117,465 tons and 

254,000 passengers in 1966, and to 

141,113 tons and 347,027 passengers 

in 1967. The largest increases occurred on the routes from Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines to Southeast Asia. 

Airlifting Troops 

The task of getting essential supplies, personnel, and units to Vietnam 

was a staggering one. In flying about 

210,000,000 miles during 1967, MAC 

flew the equivalent of 8,750 aircraft 

around the world and carried sufficient troops to fill every manpower 

space in 85 Army infantry divisions. 

Military aircraft carried most of the 

cargo while chartered commercial airliners carried most of the passengers. 

(1) Aerial view of C·S Galaxy, 

with vlser raised at Cam Ranh 

Bay. 

) 

~ 

-
(2) Bulky cargo is removed 

from the C-5 by forklift, 

1972. 

2 

Not to be overlooked were the thousands of combat personnel flown by 

these aircraft to Honolulu and nine 

other cities in the Pacific area for rest 

and recuperation (R&R) leaves. The 

R&R flights began in fiscal year 1966 

with 14,970 passengers. The numbers 

increased to 521,496 in 1967 and to 

774,386 in fiscal year 1968. 

On several occasions during the 

war, the Air Force was called on to 

undertake the deployment of major 

Army units under special conditions. 

The first of these, designated Operation Blue Light, came in response to 

the need to rush the 3d Brigade, 25th 

Infantry Division from Hawaii to Pleiku, Vietnam , to offset a buildup of 

Communist forces late in 1965 that 

threatened the area. The Military Airlift 

Command reacted quickly, flying 231 

sorties over a 26-day period and moving 3,000 troops and 4,700 tons of 

equipment some 6,000 miles to Pleiku 

by 23 January 1966. For a time, a C141 or C-133 took off from Hickam 

every 3 hours. At the other end, aircraft unloaded with their engines running, enabling them to depart in an 

average time of 17 minutes instead of 

the planned 1 to 2 hours. Blue Light 

was completed 8 days ahead of schedule. 

The Army required special airlift assistance again in late 1967 to move the 

remainder of the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell , Ky., to Bien 

Hoa, Vietnam . Under the designation 

of Operation Eagle Thrust, MAC flew 

10,355 paratroopers and 5,118 tons of 

equipment, including 37 helicopters, 

via 413 C-141 and C-133 flights between 17 November and 29 December 

-the largest single airlift of combat 

troops undertaken from the United 

States to a war zone to that time. Engine-running offloading procedures 

and the performance of support personnel enabled the aircraft to unload 

on the average of less than 7.5 minutes. 

In February 1968, while still supporting a buildup of ground and air forces 

in Korea following the seizure of the 

USS Pueblo, MAC undertook the 

emergency movement of ground 

troops to South Vietnam to help stem 

the Communist Tet offensive. Involved 

were a brigade of the 82d Airborne 

Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., and a regiment of the 5th Marine Division at 

Camp Pendleton, Calif. Between 14 

and 26 February, MAC successfully 

deployed more than 6,000 troops and 

almost 3,500 tons of equipment in 258 

C-141 and C-133 flights. Fourteen reserve C-124 groups , which had not 

been recalled in January, also flew 158 

support missions into Saigon. 

In mid-1969 emphasis shifted to the 

return of units to the United States in 

accordance with the President's policy of gradual American withdrawal 

from Vietnam, beginning with 25,000 

197 
troops before 31 August. The Military 

Airlift Command carried out the redeployments through a series of operations called Keystone. In the first of 

these, MAC airlifted 15,446 of the 

25,000 troops plus 47.5 tons of materiel. As the President directed other incremental withdrawals over the next 

several years, MAC responded accordingly. 

In April 1972, after North Vietnam 

launched its spring offensive into 

South Vietnam, the Air Force dispatched the 49th Tactical Fighter 

Wing from Holloman AFB, N.M., to 

Takhli , Thailand (Operation Constant 

Guard). In support, MAC teamed up 

the C-5 Galaxy with the C-141 and 

commercial carriers and, starting on 6 

May 1972, moved the wing's 3,195 

personnel and 1,600 tons of cargo in 

only 9 days. 

When the Communist offensive 

swept through the provincial capital of 

Quang Tri and moved southward, the 

U.S. Army turned to the Air Force to 

deliver more tanks and armored vehicles to the South Vietnamese. In response, the C-5 fleet airlifted 26 tanks 

- weighing about 1.6 million pounds 

-in 10 flights directly to Da Nang, including 6 which were delivered from a 

repair depot in the Pacific within 24 

hours. Offloading averaged 32 minutes, and the tanks were in battle in a 

matter of hours. 

Return of the POW's 

2 

As American participation in the war 

phased out, MAC devoted considerable airlift capacity to equipment 

being delivered to South Vietnamese 3 

forces. Following the peace agreements in January 1973, MAC turned 

its attention to the withdrawal of the 

remaining American military personnel and equipment from Vietnam. 

This task involved several thousand 

tons of equipment and more than 

20,000 personnel. 

One of the most dramatic airlift operations of the war-which captured 

the attention of millions of people 

198 

(1) An army truck Ia unloaded from a C124 at a SEA base. (2) Unloading cargo from a C 5. (3) US. Army 

troops prepare to bo ard a C141 for the flight back to the United States. (4) A C 5 Galaxy takas ofl 

from Cam Aanh Bay. 
A C-5 

Galaxy takes off from Cam Ranh Bay. 

around the world and brought to an 

end more than a decade of direct U.S. 

involvement in the conflict-was the 

return of American prisoners of war. 

Designated Operation Homecoming 

(see Chapter XXI), it consisted of three 

major phases: repatriating the prisoners and airlifting them to a processing 

center at Clark AB, continuing their 

homecoming journey to the United 

States, and then getting them to a 

hospital for a thorough medical examination. 

Given the responsibility for airlifting 

the POW's from North Vietnam, the 

Military Airlift Command prepositioned several C-141's at Clark. Sparkling from the polishing given them 

and displaying red crosses on their tall 

tai Is, the Starlifters waited for the signal to take off for North Vietnam. Arrangements called for the release of 

the first 116 prisoners on 12 February, 

and three C-141

's landed at Hanoi's 

Gia Lam airport one at a time, picked 

up the POW

's, and returned them to 

Clark. North Vietnam released the 

remainder of the prisoners in 9 groups 

ranging in size from 10 to 108. In ac

-

cordance with the schedules. C-141

's 

picked up the prisoners during a 7-

week period, with the last 67 leaving 

Hanoi on 29 March 1972. 

At Clark, the repatriates underwent 

a medical examination and received 

individually tailored uniforms complete with appropriate insignia and 

ribbons. Boarding C-141 

's once again, 

they were whisked across the Pacific 

on the next and longest leg of their 

return to home and family. Upon their 

arrival in the continental United 

States, the returnees boarded C-9 

Nightingale aeromedical aircraft and 

flew to 1 of 23 airfields serving 31 military hospitals nearest their homes. 

Completed with precision, the airlift 

portion of Homecoming drew praise 

for a flawless performance. This included a citation from the National 

Defense Transportation Association 

for undoubtedly the most popular air-

lift in the nation's history. 

199 

Chapter XI 

... 

An onfloght refueling ol the 

F-4 Phantom 

Air Refueling 

On 9 June 1964, four KC-135 jet 

tankers operating out of Clark AB in 

the Philippines under the nickname 

Yankee Team Tanker Task Force (TTF) 

provided inflight refueling over Da 

Nang to eight F-1 00 fighters on their 

way to strike Pathet Lao antiaircraft 

emplacements on the Plain of Jars. 

The KC-135's then loitered over southern Laos, ready to provide post-strike 

refueling as needed. After refueling 

two of the fighters, the KC-135's returned to Clark. They remained there 

until15 June, then returned to Andersen AFB, Guam, where they rejoined 

the main body of the tanker task force 

supporting routine Tactical Air Command (TAC) deployments across the 

Pacific. 

The Yankee Team refueling of 9 

June was significant because it 

marked the first time that SAC tankers 

had directly supported combat operations in Southeast Asia. Also of interest was the fact that the receiving aircraft were fighters rather than B-52 

bombers, the aircraft usually paired 

with the giant Stratotanker. The routine manner of performing the intricate aerial refueling in their unusual 9 

June assignment also provided testimony to the proficiency that KC-135 

crews and fighter pilots had attained 

in this technique. 

Introduction of the KC-135 into the 

USAF inventory in 1957 provided significantly improved means of aerial 

refueling for SAC's bomber force. 

With it, refueling could be done at altitudes and speeds approaching or 

equalling those of the receiver aircraft. While refueling bombers was its 

primary mission, in 1959 the KC-135 

was successfully tested with jet fighters and assigned to refuel TAC aircraft 

during some exercises and movements to and from overseas bases. In 

1961 , the Air Force designated SAC as 

single manager for the aerial refueling 

of its own and T AC forces. 

Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, the Air Force 

ordered a deployment of 84 fighters 

from the United States to the western 

Pacific. They were supported by 48 

tankers, some of which were quickly 

deployed to augment those already 

based at Andersen AFB, Guam, and 

Hickam AFB, Hawaii. By 15 August, 

after flying 172 refueling sorties, all 

deployed tankers returned to their 

home bases. At this time, ,the JCS directed reestablishment of the Yankee 

Team TIF in the Philippines to provide 

refueling support for SEA combat 

missions. Renamed Foreign Legion, 

the task force of eight KC-135's undertook its first operational refueling on 

28 September. 

In October 1964, when PACAF's 

obsolete KB-50 tankers were permanently grounded, SAC assumed responsibility for the PACAF air refueling requirements, with the Foreign 

Legion task force given the job. By the 

end of 1964, its KC-135's had flown 

235 sorties, made 948 refuelings, and 

offloaded 11 ,900,000 pounds of fuel in 

western Pacific operations. To carry 

on this expanding task, the Air Force 

instituted a system wherein the aircraft and crews rotated with those at 

home on a regular basis. 

The Foreign Legion force operated 

only until the end of the year, when the 

Air Force worked out a more permanent arrangement. Effective 12 January 1965, SAC organized the 4252d 

Strategic Wing at Kadena AB, Okinawa. It was assigned responsibility for 

operating and maintaining a tanker 

task force of about 15 KC-135's in 

support of tacticai aircraft operations 

in Southeast Asia (nicknamed Young 

Tiger). As before, the task force consisted of aircraft and crews on tempo201 

(1-3) lnfllght refueling of B·52's. (4) An F-105 trails another In a refuel· 

tng operation. (5) Refueling F·105's. (6) Refueling an F-4 Phantom. 

(7) Refueling an Air Force HH-3E helicopter over the Gulf of Tonkin 

by an HC-130 

7 6 
rary duty, replaced periodically by 

others from the United States. The 

first Young Tiger inflight refueling 

occurred on 25 January 1965. 

The 4252d soon developed a forward operating task force, designated 

Tiger Cub, at Don Muang Airport, 

Thailand. Early in March, this detachment, with four tankers acquired from 

the discontinued Foreign Legion force 

at Clark, began refueling combat 

fighters. The remaining Foreign Legion tankers were sent to Kadena. 

In early 1965 a B-52 force also was 

deployed to Andersen for possible 

combat in Southeast Asia. Departing 

stateside bases on 17 February, the 30 

bombers were refueled enroute by a 

tanker force of 38 KC-135's gathered 

in from 9 different air refueling squadrons and operating out of Castle AFB, 

Calif. Simultaneously with the bomber 

flight, an Arc Light tanker force, composed of the 904th and 913th Air Refueling Squadrons, was on its way to 

Kadena. These tankers performed no 

inflight refueling. Instead they carried 

about 30,000 pounds of cargo and 

passengers. This logistical role for the 

KC-135 would be repeated often within the Strategic Air Command as it airlifted personnel and supplies from one 

Pacific base to another or between 

them and the United States. 

In mid-May, the 913th tankers returned to Barksdale AFB, La., along 

with the 2d Bomb Wing's B-52's. They 

were replaced at Kadena by KC-135's 

of the 7th Air Refueling Squadron, a 

subordinate unit of the 7th Bomb 

Wing which had joined the 320th at 

Andersen to form the Arc Light contingent. Thus, the pattern of maintaining 

Arc Light forces-bombers at Andersen and tankers at Kadena-was firmly established well before the bombing 

commenced. This mode of deployment would undergo several changes 

during the next few years. As the 

bomber and tanker forces grew, their 

basic elements consisted of " cadre 

units" to which were added aircraft 

called "augmentees." Both Young 

204 

Tiger and Arc Light tankers, although 

sent for different purposes, were organizationally placed under the 4252d 

Strategic Wing. And until the first B-52 

bombing mission in June 1965, both 

sets of tankers were used to refuel 

tactical combat aircraft. 

On 18 June, when 30 bombers took 

off from Andersen on their first bombing mission, 30 tankers left Kadena. 

arrived on schedule at the designated 

rendezvous northwest of Luzon, and 

refueled 27 bombers (two were lost in 

a mid-air collision and one did not 

take on fuel) on their way to South 

Vietnam. Refueling 30 bombers was 

accomplished without incident on 5 

and 7 July, setting a pattern that continued for the next several months. 

Only the rendezvous point shifted 

occasionally to accommodate changes 

in weather. During October, the number of B-52's dispatched on missions 

began to vary, sometimes numbering 

as few as 15, and the refueling force 

was, of course, adjusted accordingly. 

Bomber destinations also influenced 

the number of tankers dispatched; 

obviously the closer the targets to 

Guam, the less fuel was required. 

To transfer fuels from the tankers 

required two different techniques, 

depending on the type of aircraft 

being serviced. All bombers and some 

fighters, particularly those employed 

late in the war, had receptacles for the 

tankers' flying boom. To effect a hookup, the pilot of the receiver aircraft 

simply positioned himself behind and 

slightly under the tanker. The boom 

operator on the tanker then directed a 

46-foot boom into the receiver's refuel· 

ing receptacle, and the fuel transfer 

began. Several fighters used in the early 

years of the war, notably the F-100, were 

not equipped with boom receptacles 

and relied instead on the probe and 

drogue system. In this instance, the 

KC-135 used a drogue (a funnel-like 

device at the end of a flexible hose) 

which could be installed quickly on 

the boom. The latter was extended 

and maintained in a stable flight posi-
tion, and the fighter aircraft then flew 

its probe into the drogue. 

In addition to its boom operator, who 

was the only enlisted man on 

board, the KC-135 crew consisted of 

a pilot, co-pilot, and navigator. With 

such a small crew, the members performed some duties (flight engineer 

and loadmaster functions, for example} normally done by others on cargo aircraft. The pilot and co-pilot 

were responsible for fuel management-the distribution, balance, and 

offloading of the fuel. The navigator 

operated the electronic rendezvous 

equipment, and the boom operator 

assisted the navigator by making 

celestial observations with a periscope sextant. 

Increasing Demands for Fuel 

As bomber and fighter operations 

expanded, demand for inflight refueling grew. This, in turn, led to the idea 

of moving more KC-135's closer to the 

combat areas, particularly in view of 

the satisfactory Don Muang arrangement. Thereafter, and during the next 

8 years, the Air Force stationed tankers at three additional Thai bases 

(Takhli, U-Tapao, and Karat) and at 

Ching Chuan Kang AB, Taiwan (commonly called CCK). The first of these 

expansions occurred in September 

1965, when tankers moved to Takhli 

under the designation of King Cobra 

and supplemented those at Don 

Muang in refueling the Thai-based 

fighters. This had the beneficial effect 

of eliminating the long flights from 

Okinawa to the refueling areas over 

Thailand. By the end of 1965, there 

were about 55 tankers in the western 

Pacific: 40 at Kadena, 10 at Takhli , and 

5 at Don Muang. During the year the 

tankers flew more than 9,200 sorties, 

conducted 31 ,250 refuelings, and 

transferred approximately 315,000,000 

pounds of fuel. 

On 2 June 1966, SAC organized the 

4258th Strategic Wing at the U-Tapao 

AB, then under construction in Thailand, to take over the Young Tiger job 

-refueling tactical combat aircraftfrom the Kadena-based tankers of the 

4252d. On 11 August, with the runway 

just completed , the first KC-135 landed at U-Tapao, then flew its first mission the same day. Throughout the 

remainder of the year-pending arrival of permanent ground personnel 

(flight crews normally were on temporary duty)-the U-Tapao tankers operated as a forward operating element of 

the 4252d. In late October, the Don 

Muang force ceased operations and 

its aircraft relocated to U-Tapao. 

By the close of 1966, there were 75 

KC-135's in the western Pacific. About 

45 were at Kadena, primarily supporting Arc Light flights, although a few 

still flew tactical missions; another 20 

were at U-Tapao, and the remainder 

were at Takhli, During the year, the 

tankers flew about 18,203 sorties, 

almost 11,000 of them in support of the 

fighters. More than 78,000 refuelings 

were effected in offloading more than 

850,000,000 pounds of fuel. 

On 1 January 1967, the 4258th Strategic Wing assumed full responsibility 

for the U-Tapao operations; a month 

later it assumed control of the Takhli 

tankers- formerly belonging to the 

4252d. The separation of refueling 

responsibilities was now complete. 

The 4252d at Kadena supported Arc 

Light bombers and the 4258th at UTapao and Takhli refueled the fighters. On occasion, however, the Kadena tankers furnished fighter support as required. Early in April, part of 

the B-52 Arc Light force began operating out of U-Tapao. These B-52's 

could normally complete their missions without inflight refueling. 

At year's end, the tanker force numbered approximately 80-45 of them 

at Kadena, 30 at U-Tapao, and 5 at 

Takhli. Southeast Asia aerial refueling 

statistics during 1967 were again impressive, with approximately 22,891 

sorties and more than 103,415 inflight 

transfers involving more than 1 billion 

205 
pounds of fuel. Arc Light and other 

SAC support activities accounted for 9,180 sorties and 7,469 refuelings. The 

importance of the KC-135 to tactical 

operations was evident from the 

13,711 sorties and 95

,946 refuelings. 

In providing this support, one tanker 

ordinarily satisfied the needs of several fighter aircraft. 

On 23 January 1968, North Korea 

seized the USS Pueblo in the Sea of 

Japan, and on 30 January the enemy 

launched the Tet offensive in South 

Vietnam. The United States responded 

to these crises by sending more B-52's 

to Andersen, others to Kadena, and 

increasing the number of fighters in 

the western Pacific, particularly in 

Korea. By mid-year, with demand for 

inflight refueling having reached an all 

time high, the tankers engaged in 

supporting operations had grown to 

more than 90, including 35 at Kadena, 

40 at U-Tapao, and 15 at Ching Chuan 

Kang. 

Although their primary job continued to be the refueling of the B-52's 

from Andersen. the Kadena tankers 

also supported PACAF flights in the 

northern Pacific areas and, after midFebruary 1968, refueled B-52's 

launched from Kadena. Located closer to the target areas, these B-52's 

required fewer refuelings than those 

from Andersen. Normally, one tanker 

could service three Kadena bombers. 

As before, refue

ling for fighter combat 

operations came from U-Tapao, with 

Ching Chuan Kang now the second 

base. CCK entered the scene in February when the 4200th Air Refueling 

Squadron was activated with tankers 

formerly based at Takhli. 

Concurrently with the tanker move 

to CCK, KC

-135 radio-relay aircraft, 

operating since 1966 from U-Tapao, 

relocated there. Although these tankers had an emergency refueling capability and occasionally performed for 

that purpose, they were primarily re-

sponsible for operating a continuous 

radio link in the area of the Gulf 

of 

Tonkin. Through their rad

io contact 

206 

2 
(1) An F·105 takes on fuel from 

a KC·t35 tanker against the 

backdrop of rugged moun· 

talns at VIetnam (2) F·105's 

approach an Air Force 

tanker's boom for refueling. 

with tactical air control centers in Vietnam, these tankers served as airborne 

information and communication posts 

for American aircraft operating over 

much of Southeast Asia. In addition, 

as had been the case since the beginning of Arc Light, several KC-135's 

maintained an emergency strip alert 

on Andersen. 

Southeast Asia refueling operations 

in 1968 broke all records, even though 

bombing of North Vietnam was halted 

during the year. During approximately 

32,000 KC-135 sorties, more than 1.6 

billion pounds of fuel was offloaded in 

more than 129,000 refuelings. As in 

previous years, tactical aircraft received most of the inflight support18,667 sorties and 114,744 refuelings. 

In 1969, KC-135 sorties dropped by 

more than 10 percent, to below 28,000, 

and fuel offloaded decreased to 

about 1.4 billion pounds while refuelings actually increased to 138,164, 

approximately 9,000 more than a year 

earlier. This apparent contradiction in 

increased fighter and decreased B-52 

requirements stemmed from the gradual shift of bomber operations from 

Andersen to Kadena and U-Tapao. In 

fact, about 65 percent of the B-52 sorties originated at U-Tapao and normally required no aerial refueling. 

During the next 2 years, as the 

American air campaign in Southeast 

Asia declined, air refueling activity 

dropped correspondingly. By midSeptember 1970, all Arc Light operations were concentrated on U-Tapao, 

eliminating the requirement for air 

refueling support from Kadena. Late 

in 1970, fewer than 50 tankers were 

operating in the western Pacific: 30 at 

U-Tapao which refueled fighters and 

flew radio-relay missions, 15 at Kadena supported other requirements, 

and several continued on emergency 

strip alert at Andersen. Refueling operations dropped precipitously in 1970 

to the lowest level in 5 years. Of approximately 19,540 sorties flown, 

more than 13,500 were devoted to 

fighter support and associated activities, while less than 6,000 assisted 

several types of strategic and related 

operations. The fighters accounted for 

about 82,000 individual refuelings, 

another 2,800 were specifically for 8-

52 bombing operations, and the remainder supported other strategic activities. Offloaded fuel in 1970 totalled 

888,200,000 pounds. 

In 1971 , aerial refueling operations 

dropped again. In approximately 

14,400 sorties, the KC-135's conducted 62,600 refuelings to offload 

618,500,000 pounds. As usual, the 

preponderance of refueling activityapproximately 10,500 sorties and 

61 ,000 refuelings-supported fighters. 

In November and December there was 

a noticeable increase in refueling as 

the Seventh Air Force conducted Operation Commando Hunt VII against 

growing personnel and materiel traffic 

on the Ho Chi Minh trail. 

The 1972 Surge 

The North Vietnamese invasion of 

South Vietnam during the spring and 

summer months of 1972 prompted 

expanded 8-52 and tactical air operations and a concomitant surge in air 

refueling. The revival of Andersen as a 

8-52 base for these operations imposed greater demands on Kadena 

tankers. By the end of June, approximately 60 KC-135's, including the radio-relay aircraft which had relocated 

from U-Tapao, were based at Kadena. 

Closer to home, tactical requirements 

grew as additional fighter squadrons 

deployed into the western Pacific to 

support the South Vietnamese. During 

a 5-week period in April and May, TAC 

deployed nine squadrons to the area. 

Approximately 150 tankers supported 

these deployments on schedule with 

no fighter being delayed for lack of 

fuel. 

Once in place, these fighters began 

combat operations requiring inflight 

refueling. U-Tapao soon had 45 tankers, but these proved insufficient to 

keep up with demand. Accordingly, in 

May and June, 70 additional KC-135's 

207 
deployed to Clark and to three Thai 

bases-Don Muang, Takhli, and Korat 

-bringing to 115 the number of tankers supporting tactical operations. 

The KC-135 force remained at this level until October and November when 

several tankers were withdrawn from 

Don Muang, Korat, and Ching Chuan 

Kang AB (which replaced Clark in 

August). 

In December 1972, when the United 

States resumed the large-scale bombing of North Vietnam , the tanker force 

increased again, to approximately 

195. Major increases at Kadena supported the growing B-52 flights from 

Andersen. Other tankers were sent to 

Takhli and to a new detachment activated at Clark. In the 11-day bombing 

of Hanoi and Haiphong between 17-28 

December, the tankers flew 1,390 sorties and made 4,625 inflight refuelings. 

During 1972, the KC-135's flew 

about 34,700 sorties in Southeast 

Asia, some 2,700 more than in 1968, 

the previous high year. Approximately 

two-thirds supported tactical aircraft 

operations. The other third were devoted to SAC activities: B-52 bombing 

missions, reconnaissance flights, radio-relay sorties, and deployment 

flights to and from operational bases. 

The 115,272 refuelings (1 06,91 3 to 

fighters) were significantly below the 

levels of 1968 and 1969 but the fuel 

offloaded (more than 1.4 billion 

pounds) was second only to the record-breaking year of 1968. 

With the suspension of bombing in 

North Vietnam and the resumption of 

peace negotiations, inflight refueling 

requirements decreased markedly. As 

a result, in late January 1973 many of 

the augmentee tankers including 

those at Clark returned to their home 

bases. In February, others returned 

home after being withdrawn from 

Takhli, Kadena, and Andersen. 

The Air Force continued to retain 

more than 100 KC-135's in the western 

Pacific until U.S. participation in the 

war formally ended on 15 August 

208 

1973. Approximately 50 were at Kadena, assigned temporarily to the 

376th Strategic Wing, which had 

replaced the 4252d Strategic Wing in 

early 1970. A similar-sized force was 

on temporary duty with the 310th Strategic Wing Provisional, organized in 

June 1972 to handle the increased 

tactical air refueling mission at U-Tapao and the radio-relay aircraft that 

had returned in February 1973 after 10 

months at Kadena. Several KC-135's 

remained on alert at Andersen . 

. During the last months of the war, 

between 1 January and 15 August 

1973, the KC-135's flew 15,603 sorties. 

Approximately 6,900 supported SAC 

flights and the remainder tactical aircraft missions. In more than 67,000 

refuelings, more than 726,000,000 

pounds of fuel were dispensed. 

In slightly more than 9 years in and 

around Southeast Asia, SAC tankers 

(1) Using model aircraft, these 

fo ur o fficers demonstrate 

what may be the first tri-l evel 

air refueling in history, during 

which they saved six NO!V)' airc raft and two Air Forc e 

F·104's. They are: (1. to r.) Maj. 

John H. Casteel, aircraft commander; Capt. Richard L. Trail, 

co-pilot; Capt. Dean L. Hoar, 

navigator; and MSgt Nathan 

C. Campbell, boom operator. 

(2) A fuel specialist with the 

15th Air Base Wing checks a 

fuel sample for impurities. 
An Air Force tanker refuels a 

flight of four F-105's heading 

for targets in North Vietnam. 

provided almost 9 billion pounds of 

fuel, flew 194,687 sorties, and made 

813,878 refuelings. Impressive as 

these statistics were, they fail to reflect the KC-135's real contributions to 

the overall USAF effort in Southeast 

Asia. Before the war, the KC-135 had 

demonstrated repeatedly that its avai lability could reduce by several days 

the movement of combat aircraft to 

forward operating locations. Its use 

for this purpose and in support of 

fighter and B-52 combat operations 

was vital to the conduct of the air war. 

Not the least of its contributions was 

in saving fighter aircraft and the lives 

of their crews. Without the tankers, 

many fuel-starved fighters would have 

never returned to their bases. The refueling of these aircraft brought into 

being a new term , " aircraft save," 

which soon became common parlance among fighter and tanker crews. 

Many fighter pilots departed successful hook-ups with a grateful "Thanks, 

tank, you can count this a save." 

While most emergency refuelings 

involved USAF fighters, there were 

some with U.S. Navy aircraft. One 

such occasion on 31 May 1967 over 

the Gu lf of Tonkin turned into perhaps 

the most complex and spectacular 

refueling ever accomplished. It started 

during the routine refueling of two 

F-104's when the tanker received word 

to intercept two Navy aircraft almost 

out of fuel. Periodically refueling the 

two F-104's that went along to provide 

MIG cover, the tanker successfully 

rendezvoused with the two Navy A-3 

tankers, one with only 3 minutes of 

fuel (both had fuel aboard which they 

could transfer but could not use themselves). After taking on a small amount 

of fuel from the KC-135 the first Navy 

tanker pulled away and allowed the 

second A-3 to hook up. As this tanker 

took on fuel, two Navy F-8's came into 

the area for emergency refueling. One 

was so low on fuel that it could not 

wait for the A-3 tanker to complete its 

own refueling from the KC-135. It 

hooked up to the A-3 and began taking on fuel while the Navy tanker continued to draw from the KC-135. Concurrently with this unprecedented trilevel refueling, the first A-3 serviced 

the second F-8 and then returned to 

the KC-135 for additional fuel. 

In the midst of this emergency, the 

KC-135 was informed of two Navy 

F-4's with insufficient fuel to return to 

their carrier. After refueling the two 

F-104's again, the KC-135 rendezvoused with the two F-4's and successfully refueled them. By this time, 

the KC-135's own fuel supply was so 

low that it could not return to its home 

base and had to land at an alternate 

base in South Vietnam , but not before 

again refueling the two F-1 04's. For 

this amazing series of life-saving refuelings, Maj. John H. Casteel and his 

crew received the 1967 Mackay Trophy, presented annually for the most 

meritorious USAF flight of the year. 

209 

Chapter XII 

Airmen technicians unloaded 

cameras and film from an 

RF-101 following a recon· 

naissance mission. 

Tactical 

Reconnaissance 

Throughout the war the Air Force 

relied heavily on its tactical reconnaissance force to provide vital target 

information. Initially, it had two squadrons of RF-1 01 reconnaissance aircraft in the western Pacific, one based 

at Misawa AB, Japan, another at Kadena AB, Okinawa. The twin-engine 

RF-101 Voodoo, which could carry a 

wide selection of aerial cameras for 

reconnaissance at all altitudes up to 

about 50,000 feet, was a proven, dependable aircraft. The Air Force also 

had available a few bomber, transport, 

and training aircraft which had been 

modified to fly reconnaissance missions. It was the RF-101 , however, 

which served as the reconnaissance 

workhorse in the early years of the 

war. 

The Air Force reacted to a Royal 

Laotian government request in early 

1961 by sending an Air Force SG-47 

aircraft with special cameras to photograph Pathet Lao and NVA installations. For almost 3 months it provided 

the only hard intelligence concerning 

these hostile forces. On 23 March 

1961 , however, this first Air Force " reconnaissance" aircraft in Southeast 

Asia was shot down over the Plain of 

Jars. 

In April another Air Force plane-an 

RT-33 based at Udorn- resumed the 

reconnaissance sorties over Laos. 

Pi lots of this aircraft flew over poorly 

mapped areas devoid of navigational 

aids or cultural features, often in poor 

weather, without weapons or fighter 

escort. Between 24 April and 10 May, 

when a negotiated ceasefire between 

the Laotian combatants halted the RT33 flights, the aircraft brought back 

tangible evidence of Communist activity in northern Laos. The RT-33 sorties 

resumed from Don Muang Airport on 4 

October, but again were halted on 7 

November after the more modern 

RF-101 's arrived in Thailand. 

A South Vietnamese invitation to the 

United States to take part in an October 1961 Saigon air show provided the 

Air Force its first opportunity to deploy 

the Voodoo reconnaissance aircraft 

into Southeast Asia. Four RF-101 's 

and a photo processing unit landed at 

Tan Son Nhut on 18 October, only to 

learn the air show had been cancelled . 

However, disastrous floods in the 

Mekong River delta provided a reason 

for the aircraft to remain in South Vietnam for some time. On 23 October the 

RF-101's flew over the Plain of Jars 

and photographed Soviet aircraft parachuting supplies to Pathet Lao and 

North Vietnamese forces at the Tchepone airfield. Other flights brought 

back additional photographs of Soviet 

involvement, as well as pilot reports of 

intensifying enemy AAA fire. On 21 

November 1961 , after 31 days of recording enemy activities with their 

cameras, the RF-1 01 's departed Vietnam. They left behind the photo unit 

to complete processing of the accumulated film. 

That same month the first elements 

of the Farm Gate detachment reaching Bien Hoa AB included among its 

aircraft four RB-26's. These modified, 

obsolete light bombers proved to be 

good reconnaissance platforms. Also, 

in November 1961, four RF-101 'sand a 

photo processing unit were deployed 

to Don Muang Airport, Thailand , to fly 

reconnaissance sorties over Laos and 

South Vietnam. When President Kennedy sent a task force into Thailand on 

211 
12 May 1962 to counter growing North 

Vietnamese aggressiveness, the 

RF-101 's were placed under its control. USAF reconnaissance sorties 

over Laos, however, were intermittently halted because of indecision on the 

part of RLG officials. On 6 November 

1962, after a year of RF-101 operations 

and more than 1,000 sorties, all reconnaissance over Laos was terminated. 

Although the RF-1 01 's and RB-26's 

were not allowed to fly over Laos, they 

continued photo missions over South 

Vietnam. Detouring southward around 

Cambodia, they photographed the 

southern portions of South Vietnam 

on nonstop sorties. To cover the 

northern provinces of South Vietnam, 

they had to stage through Tan Son 

Nhut where exposed film was turned 

over to the photo processing unit 

there, cameras were reloaded, and the 

aircraft refueled for a final sortie enroute back to Don Muang. These 

lengthy flights were largely eliminated 

when the reconnaissance task force 

moved to Tan Son Nhut in mid-December 1962. 

As the number of U.S. advisers assigned to the South Vietnamese 

armed forces increased throughout 

1962, the demand for aerial reconnaissance increased. Most were for 

photos of large areas, which required 

production of thousands of prints and 

created a tremendous workload for 

the small Tan Son Nhut photo unit. · 

Pending construction of a larger fac ility, six semi-trailer photo vans were airlifted from Europe to South Vietnam 

to handle the film processing. To man 

the production unit, the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron was 

organized at Tan Son Nhut on 18 April 

1963. 

On 15April1963, two RB-57E 'swere 

attached to the RF-101 force, bringing 

into the theater an infrared sensor 

capability and the first of the new 

panoramic cameras. Two additional 

Farm Gate RB-26's were modified at 

Clark AB for night photography, and 

two Cessna U-3B's were added in May 

212 

to serve as couriers for film, prints and 

intelligence reports to units throughout South Vietnam . The crash of two 

B-26's early in 1964, caused by structural fatigue, led to the withdrawal of 

all B-26's and RB-26's from the theater. This loss, however, was somewhat 

offset by the addition of two RF-1 01 's 

to the task force. 

Yankee Team 

After a lapse of 18 months without 

tactical reconnaissance over Laos, 

U.S. and Laotian officials could only 

surmise the strength and disposition 

of much of the hostile forces in that 

country. When on 19 May 1964, Premier Souvanna Phouma approved a 

resumption of reconnaissance sorties 

over Laos, four RF-1 01 's streaked low 

across the border to photograph segments of the Ho Chi Minh trail and key 

military installations on the Plain of 

Jars. Follow-up low-altitude Air Force 

and Navy reconnaissance sorties were 

ordered for the operation, nicknamed 

Yankee Team. On 21 May the United 

States announced that the Laotian 

government had asked for help in collecting information of the disposition 

of the Pathet Lao and other hostile 

forces, information that would be 

presented to the International Control 

Commission. In justifying the flights, 

U.S. officials cited repeated Pathet 

Lao and North Vietnamese violations 

of the Geneva agreements and Pathet 

Lao refusal to allow ICC access to its 

territory. 

At the request of Vientiane officials, 

the northern portion of Laos had been 

avoided but in November 1964 certain 

targets were approved for strikes. 

Pathfinder RF-101 's led F-100's to the 

targets and orbited until the strikes 

ended and then proceeded to photograph the bomb damage before returning to base. 

Because the distance between Saigon and the Laotian target areas limited the photo time of the RF-101 's, the 
Air Force on 2 April 1965 deployed an 

RF-101 task force to Udorn. Initially 

intended for Yankee Team sorties, the 

force subsequently was authorized to 

fly over North Vietnam. Intensified 

enemy antiaircraft defenses and the 

threat of MIG interceptions for a time 

required a fighter escort for the RF1 01 's, a procedure that was dropped 

in favor of two-ship formations of 

Voodoos. 

When the eastern portion of the Laotian panhandle was designated a separate operational area (Steel Tiger) in 

April1965, the reconnaissance aircraft 

set about photographing roads, trails, 

and waterways in search of enemy 

targets. The area was further divided 

in December when General Westmoreland designated the southern 

half Tiger Hound and asked for frequent, detailed photography of infiltration targets and the use of infrared 

sensors to locate enemy bases. Army 

OV-1 Mohawk reconnaissance aircraft 

flew at night while Air Force units operated mostly during the day. 

In March 1966 the Udorn task force 

was enlarged by the arrival of the 20th 

Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 

and its 16 RF-101 's from Tan Son 

Nhut. A detachment of 11 RF-4C's arrived in July and was absorbed into 

the 11th Tactical Reconnaissance 

Squadron, which deployed to Thailand in November with 10 more RF4C's. All of the Thai-based reconnaissance units, including a new Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, were 

assigned to the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, organized on 18 September 1966. 

When the Igloo White electronic 

sensor system was activated in Laos in 

1967, the area where the acoustic and 

seismic sensors were to be implanted 

had to be photographed in detail so 

they could be put into the best locations. Sensor drops were likewise 

photographed so the exact position of 

each could be accurately plotted . 

Each significant signal return required 

visual or photographic evidence to 

prove the existence of a valid target 

before strikes were approved. RC-121 

aircraft of the 533d Reconnaissance 

Wing flew orbits over Laos to relay 

signals from the sensors to the Thaibased infiltration surveillance center 

and to collect and analyze the signals 

as necessary. 

North Vietnam 

RF-1 01 's were pathfinders for the 

F-100's taking part in the first Air 

Force strike against North Vietnam on 

8 February 1965, leading the F-100's to 

the target and then orbiting until the 

last strike aircraft departed so they 

could photograph the damage. When 

the Rolling Thunder operations got 

under way, reconnaissance aircraft 

flew with or behind the strike force to 

photograph bomb damage. Subsequently, a separate reconnaissance 

program was set up to acquire photos 

for planning, targeting, and intelligence purposes. The RF-101 's, which 

original ly operated out of Tan Son 

Nhut, later flew almost all of their missions over North Vietnam from Thailand. 

Shortly after the first Gulf of Tonkin 

incident in August 1964, SAC sent its 

drones to Southeast Asia and flew the 

first reconnaissance drone sortie in 

August. Launched from DC-130 aircraft, the strategic reconnaissance 

drones were intended to satisfy national intelligence requirements but 

also became a prime source of photos 

of portions of North Vietnam that were 

off limits to manned reconnaissance 

aircraft. SAC U-2 aircraft also began 

reconnaissance sorties over North 

Vietnam early in 1965, flying at altitudes well above antiaircraft fire and 

beyond the reach of enemy MIG's. In 

April 1965, a U-2 photographed the 

first SAM site in North Vietnam. Subsequently U-2 sorties monitored the 

development of additional sites. Because of its ability to fly largely undetected and beyond interceptor reach, 

213 
(1) Capt. Edward 

M. Greer checks the window glass over one 

of his aerial cameras before a mission. (2) Airmen load an 

aerial reconnaissance camera into the nose of an AF·101 

at a base In South Vietnam. (3) A sentry guards a DC·130 

launch aircraft carrying a remotely piloted vehicle which 

was employed as a reconnaissance vehicle over enemy ter· 

rltory. (4) These remotely piloted aircraft are launched from 

the mother ship in the background. (5) Fosheye lens view of Capt. LaNrence L Champion. Oet. 1, 460th Tactical 

Aeconnaossance Wing, In the cockpit of an Air Force AB·57 

prior to a mission (6) An Air Force RB-57 reconnaissance 

aircraft. (7) Reconnai ssance photo showong destructoon of 

a North Vtetnamese oil storage area. (8) On mi ssion over 

North Vietnam, an Air Force pilot from the 432d Tactical 

Reconnaissance Wing, photographed a surface-to-a

ir 

missile e•p

loding In front of his AF-101 aircraft. (9) An RF·101 

reconnaissance aircraft surprised North Vietnamese gun· 

ners out In the open as they sped to man their anti-aircraft 

positions the DMZ. 

3 
8 

6 
the U-2 could cross borders and surmount defenses almost with impunity, 

although the arrival of the Soviet 

SAM's portended a serious challenge. 

During the 5-week halt of bombings 

north of the DMZ in early 1966, USAF 

reconnaissance over North Vietnam 

was intensified in an effort to determine what the enemy was doing. The 

photos obtai ned showed frantic enemy activity to repair roads, construction of new bridges, and a massive 

effort to move tons of supplies and 

equipment into Laos and the DMZ. 

During the bombing pause, North Vietnamese bumper-to-bumper convoys 

showed total disdain for the reconnaissance aircraft overhead. 

Because of the areas over which 

they flew, reconnaissance aircraft 

generally suffered loss rates far higher 

than the strike aircraft. Thus, an RF-101 

photographing an F-105 strike on 

the Thanh Hoa Bridge on 3 April1965 

was lost to enemy fire, one of the first 

such losses over the North. An RF-1 01 

on a 26 January 1966 sortie over the 

Xuan Son Barracks was downed by 

ground fire, while two RF-101 's on a 7 

March 1966 mission northwest of Vinh 

disappeared without a trace. Losses in 

June 1966 included seven RF-101 's, 

one RF-4C, and one RB-66, all to hostile antiaircraft fire. 

In November 1965, two MIG-17's 

jumped two RF-101 's east of Yen Bay, 

the first encounter with enemy fighters. While one RF-101 accelerated and 

completed its photo run, the other 

drew the attackers off before increasing his speed and leaving them behind. Four MIG's attempting another 

intercept later that month also found 

themselves outclassed by the speedy 

reconnaissance planes. It was not until the later models of the MIG showed 

up that the supersonic RF-1 01 's lost 

their advantage. 

For some time Air Force reconnaissance had revealed the North Vietnamese were dispersing and hiding their 

petroleum, oils and lubricants, even 

burying storage tanks in their river 

216 

dikes. It was not until 29 June 1966, 

however, that the Air Force was authorized to launch its first strikes 

against the enemy's vital POL storage 

system. Once the bombing campaign 

began, additional RF-101 sorties were 

needed to photograph the bomb damage and keep abreast of the destruction of the storage facilities. 

During 1965-1966 the North Vietnamese began unloading ships at 

Haiphong harbor at night to avoid 

Navy surveillance, whereupon the Air 

Force was assigned the mission of 

flyir.g a photographic sortie over that 

busy port. Thus, on 28 February 1966 

two Air Force RF-4C's used photoflash 

cartridges during a low-altitude dash 

across the busy harbor. This night 

photography revealed the North Vietnamese engaged in the intensive unloading of anchored ships and streets 

piled high with cargo that couldn't be 

moved because of bombed roads and 

rail lines. 

When a U.S. bombing campaign 

against the rail lines in the North was 

launched early in 1967, the enemy 

concentrated antiaircraft weapons at 

rail yards and along key sidings to try 

to keep down the damage from American strike planes. The Air Force sent 

out daytime reconnaissance sorties 

which were flown at a low enough altitude to identify rolling stock by type 

and size, while night infrared missions 

were launched to discover and identify operating locomotives and active 

yards. 

On 10-11 March the Air Force 

launched its first strike against the 

Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex, a 

symbol of North Vietnam's industrial 

growth. Post-strike reconnaissance 

photography showed damage to key 

buildings but analysts could not determine whether the plant was still operational. A low-altitude infrared reconnaissance sortie the following night 

proved that the coke oven, blast furnace, and power plant were in operation and there was hot slag in the 

dump area. 
In 1967 Air Force RF-101 's undertook photo surveillance of all North 

Vietnamese jet-capable airfields, monitoring the presence of MIG fighters , 

helicopters, and support aircraft. In 

September 1967, after a M IG-21 shot 

down one of the RF-1 01 's, a decision 

was made to ban the Voodoo from all 

further missions over North Vietnam. 

The RF-101 squadron in Thailand was 

inactivated and replaced by a squadron of RF-4G's. The latter was a multisensor aircraft capable of speeds in 

excess of Mach 2. It carried a wide 

assortment of the most modern aerial 

cameras, side-looking radar, an infrared sensor, sophisticated allweather navigation equipment, and a 

2-man crew. All RF-101 's remaining in 

the theater were redeployed to Tan 

Son Nhut for use over Laos and South 

Vietnam. By the end of 196 7, only 

the RF-4C was flying tactical reconnaissance sorties over North Vietnam, 

augmented by low-altitude drones and 

U-2's over certain safe areas. 

In late November 1967 air strikes 

against targets near Hanoi led to allegations by Hanoi that the bombing 

had damaged the Soviet embassy and 

other buildings in downtown Hanoi, 

which produced considerable worldwide publicity. In an effort to determine the extent and cause of the damage, special low-level reconnaissance 

missions were flown over the embassy 

area. resulting in the loss of two RF4C's in 2 days. 

South Vietnam 

Reconnaissance over South Vietnam lacked the significant objectives 

characteristic of North Vietnam, but in 

many ways was more diversified. The 

intense antiaircraft defenses were 

missing but Viet Cong and NVA conventional weapons could be just as 

deadly. 

In South Vietnam infrared imagery 

particularly gained popularity with 

Army units, who used it to find Viet 

Cong base camps and installations. 

Photo interpreters gave priority to infrared film , passing significant intelligence to appropriate ground units by 

telephone or radio, greatly increasing 

the timeliness of the intelligence and 

permitting immediate reaction. For 

example, in April 1965 an RB-57 sortie 

south of Saigon discovered a well-defended Viet Gong base camp with arms 

factories, training areas, barracks, and 

a sampan base. Shortly thereafter, 

another infrared mission recorded the 

location of a Viet Cong regiment west 

of Da Nang. Infrared film also was used 

to set up an ambush for Viet Gong convoys. 

When General Westmoreland was 

authorized to use B-52's over South 

Vietnam, tactical reconnaissance 

crews were given additional responsibilities. It became necessary to photograph each 8-52 target box to make 

certain there were no temples, cultural 

monuments, and friendly personnel in 

the area beforehand. After each 

bombing, the target area had to be 

photographed again to assess the 

bomb damage. As the 8-52 raids increased, this became a monumental 

task. In February 1966 the Air Force 

activated the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Tan Son Nhut to 

manage the growing tactical reconnaissance workload in Southeast Asia. 

Its initial complement of three flying 

squadrons, a reconnaissance task 

force, and several support squadrons 

made it the largest wing in the war 

zone. Its seven types of aircraft also 

made it the most diversified. 

One of these was the ageless G-4 7, 

which had been loaded with special 

equipment for radio direction finding 

to increase its versatility. Thus, on 21 

November 1966 an RC-47 of the 360th 

Reconnaissance Squadron detected 

the position of a Viet Cong transmitter 

and passed the information to the 

appropriate Army unit. A F AC was diverted to the area, spotted an ambush 

being set up, called for strike aircraft, 

and had Army helicopters fire into the 

ambush position to alert an approach217 
ing Army convoy. The troops in the 

convoy ambushed the ambushers. The 

360th, manned mostly by field grade 

veterans of World War II whose average age was well above 40, dubbed 

themselves "Antique Airlines" in honor of the dependable old RC-47 and 

the equally aged crews. 

To relieve the tactical reconnaissance aircraft from covering larger 

areas and from the tedium of backand-forth flight lines, USAF officials 

submitted several requests for mapping aircraft. There also was a need 

for cartographic quality photography 

throughout Southeast Asia, photography which was beyond the capability 

of the tactical reconnaissance aircraft. 

In July 1967 three specially equipped 

RC-130A mapping aircraft arrived in 

South Vietnam for a short stay that 

extended into many months as new 

mapping requirements continued to 

arise. 

In 1967 Marine Corps positions 

south of the DMZ came under attack 

by North Vietnamese artillery hidden 

in the DMZ. Marine counterbattery fire 

proved ineffective because the enemy 

gun positions were well concealed. To 

pinpoint those positions, the Air Force 

began flying low-altitude reconnaissance missions over the area in September 1967. New high-acuity cameras and special infrared sensors were 

employed in an RB-57 aircraft to assist 

in the search, and artillery fire and air 

strikes were directed against those 

which were found. Although hostile 

fire diminished, the exact results of 

the counterbattery fire and air strikes 

were difficult to assess. 

The year-end truce period in 1967 

was followed by intensified reconnaissance activity throughout the war 

zone, including infiltration routes into 

South Vietnam and key Viet Cong 

base areas. Despite the large quantity 

of photography accumulated, the Allies had few indicators that the North 

Vietnamese and VietCong were about 

to launch a major offensive throughout South Vietnam. Most attention 

218 

was focused on an impending threat 

to the Marine Corps base at Khe Sanh, 

where General Westmoreland 

launched Operation Niagara. It involved a concerted intelligence effort 

to find, identify, and monitor NVA 

forces gathering in the vicinity of the 

Marine base. Aerial reconnaissance 

photos provided much of the required 

intelligence. 

Despite poor weather conditions in 

the area, the RB-57's special high-acuity cameras quickly photographed all 

of the ground for 12 miles around Khe 

Sanh, revealing camouflaged positions, enemy supply dumps, bunkers, 

and similar intelligence information. 

Air Force RF-4C's and RF-101 's also 

flew dozens of daily sorties to obtain 

more detailed photos from which the 

Marines could plot enemy trenches, 

gun emplacements, and other positions. Hundreds of sensors implanted 

around the base were monitored by 

Air Force EC-121 aircraft, which relayed the signals to the infiltration 

surveillance center in Thailand for 

computer processing and evaluation. 

The results were passed to the Marine 

defenders at Khe Sanh within minutes. 

While much attention was being 

focused on the siege of Khe Sanh, the 

enemy launched a massive attack 

throughout South Vietnam . They assaulted Saigon, five other major cities, 

and dozens of provincial capitals, 

towns, villages, and military installations. The 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing was soon inundated by a 

flood of requests for aerial reconnaissance photos to help find enemy 

units, evaluate the damage to friendly 

cities and military installations, and 

determine the status of Allied lines of 

communication. Two Communist attacks on Tan Son Nhut on 31 January 

and 18 February, which destroyed 

eight reconnaissance aircraft and 

damaged many others, adversely affected the Wing's capability. 

The combined demands of Khe 

Sanh and the enemy's nationwide Tet 

offensive placed an enormous burden 
on the already overextended reconnaissance support units. Seventh Air 

Force officials sought out every available photo interpreter from subordinate units and put out a call for more. 

From Air Force units around the 

world, photo interpreters were soon 

converging on Tan Son Nhut; the Army 

also sent every interpreter it could 

spare. A Niagara Task Force was 

quickly formed to insure the immediate exploitation of sensor products 

from the Khe Sanh sorties, provide 

rapid targeting of enemy positions, 

and assist in planning effective reconnaissance sorties. When Operation 

Niagara terminated successfully on 31 

March, almost 1,400 reconnaissance 

sorties had been flown in less than 90 

days. During that period Air Force 

cameras had exposed slightly less 

than 1 million feet of film, all of which 

was screened for target information. 

The Post-Tet Era 

When President Johnson announced that all bombing of North 

Vietnam " except in the area of the 

demilitarized zone" would end at 0800 

on 1 April 1968, Saigon time, no mention was made of reconnaissance. 

After an initial period of indecision, 

U.S. officials also decided to restrict 

reconnaissance flights to the North 

Vietnamese panhandle south of Vinh. 

Photos taken of that area, however, 

showed that the North Vietnamese 

were redeploying missiles and antiaircraft guns into the panhandle, where 

they threatened the large number of 

reconnaissance and strike aircraft 

operating in a rather small air space. 

Although tactical reconnaissance 

aircraft no longer flew over the northern portion of North Vietnam, other 

aircraft-including SA-71 's, U-2's, and 

drones-brought back evidence of 

enemy efforts to repair and expand 

vital facilities, including damaged 

roads and rail lines. At Viet Tri, for 

example, the North Vietnamese were 

repairing the thermal power plant and 

the nearby factories were being readied for production. Within 3 months 

after the partial bombing halt, 75 percent of North Vietnam's industrial installations were again in operation, its 

transportation network was carrying 

more freight than ever before, and all 

major airfields had been repaired and 

were being expanded to handle a 

growing MIG force. 

The number of reconnaissance sorties over North Vietnam decreased 

after 1 April 1968, but there was no 

comparable decrease elsewhere. 

Within South Vietnam , enemy forces 

continued to harass allied lines of 

communication and military installations as American and South Vietnamese Army units slowly regained control of areas lost during Tet. Because 

fewer reconnaissance sorties were 

flown over North Vietnam, however, 

additional sorties became available 

for use in South Vietnam. Thus, when 

the enemy turned his attention once 

more to the A Shau Valley, frequent 

Air Force reconnaissance missions 

helped identify new targets for Army 

units engaged in Operation Grand 

Canyon and Buffalo. The week-long 

siege of the Kham Due Special Forces 

camp in early May required a large 

number of reconnaissance sorties, 

many of them diverted from other assignments. In the Saigon area, reconnaissance crews continued to monitor 

enemy efforts to launch a new assault 

on the city. 

In Laos, weather continued to be 

one of the controlling factors affecting 

reconnaissance operations. When the 

good weather returned to Laos in 

1968, the Air Force initiated a new interdiction campaign. Selected targets, 

such as mountain passes, were photographed several times daily so that 

strike aircraft could keep them closed; 

roads leading into them were scanned 

for truck parks and storage areas. 

President Johnson on 31 October 

1968 ordered an end to all bombing of 

North Vietnam in order to speed a set219 
tlement of the war. American envoys 

in Paris, however, during their discussions with Hanoi's delegation, declared that the United States intended 

to continue reconnaissance flights. At 

first, the North Vietnamese insisted 

that reconnaissance was an act of 

war, but they later relented and accepted cessation of " all other activities that involve the use of force." 

SAC's reconnaissance vehicles continued to photograph North Vietnam 

as before, but a new tactical reconnaissance program was begun in the 

lower panhandle to " determine as 

soon as possible the reaction or intentions of the enemy with regard to a 

manned tactical reconnaissance program." When the North Vietnamese 

fired on the test missions, subsequent 

flights were accompanied by armed 

escort airc raft; however, two reconnaissance planes and one escort were 

lost to enemy fire within the first 

month. By the end of 1969 reconnaissance operations fell into a pattern: 

SAC's SA-71 's covered the heavily 

defended areas of Hanoi and Haiphong and their environs, drones 

were used wherever they could be 

most effective, and the RF-4C's were 

restricted to the southern portion of 

the panhandle. 

Reconnaissance 

Winds Down 

Even as reconnaissance operations 

over North Vietnam continued following the complete bombing halt, the 

number of sorties decreased significantly towards the end of 1969. The 

allied ground incursions into Cambodia in 1970, however, led to a surge 

of reconnaissance activity, particularly infrared missions. The Air Force had 

sufficient resources on hand to satisfy 

all requirements. In July the number of 

sorties decreased after U.S. ground 

units withdrew. 

The first reconnaissance force cut220 
(1) An AF·4C reconnaissance 

c rew debarks after returning 

from a mission, while airmen 

1echnicians remvoe the film. 

(2) A Viet namese Air Force office r, examining recon· 

naissance pho1os at Tan Son 

Nhut, is assisted by an Air 

Force officer. (3) Photo inter· 

preters check reconnais· 

san ce film for target s 

selection. 

back came in March 1970 when an 

RF-4C squadron redeployed from 

Tan Son Nhut to Japan. In November 

the RF-101 squadron at Tan Son Nhut 

was inactivated, and one of the two 

RF-4C squadrons at Udorn redeployed 

to the United States. The departure of 

the RF-1 01 's brought to an end 9 years 

of continuous combat operations in 

Southeast Asia by that aircraft. In 

August 1971 , after flying reconnaissance missions in the theater for more 

than 8 years, the RB-57's also redeployed to the United States. One of 

them had accumulated more than 

8,000 flying hours. Within a few days, 

the last RF-4C squadron in South 

Vietnam also returned to the United 

States, leaving only one tactical reconnaissance squadron with 24 RF4C's at Udorn. Stripped of its squadrons, the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing was inactivated on 31 

March 1971 

In September 1971 tactical reconnaissance flights over areas just north 

of the DMZ revealed a sharp increase 

in the number of North Vietnamese 

AAA weapons and missile sites. When 

the enemy began firing missiles at the 

reconnaissance aircraft, Seventh Air 

Force on 8 November launched protective reaction strikes on the gun positions and SAM sites near the Vinh and 

Ouan Long airfields. A rash of ground 

attacks against U.S. bases in South 

Vietnam inspired renewed air strikes 

against targets in North Vietnam, beginning on 26 December 1971 . 

Reconnaissance sorties were flown to 

assess bomb damage after each attack. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird 

charged that Hanoi had violated the 

understandings associated with the 

1968 born bing halt, including the one 

concerning the U.S.-North Vietnamese agreement that unarmed reconnaissance aircraft did not involve the 

use of force. 

In February 1972 NVA tanks and 

heavy artillery were photographed just 

north of the DMZ, and American officials received intelligence that Hanoi 

was planning another major invasion 

of South Vietnam. On 30 March the 

North Vietnamese launched a threefront attack on South Vietnam . The 

single RF-4C squadron was hard 

pressed to meet all of its commitments, but the South Vietnamese Air 

Force helped out wherever possible 

with its RF-5's. 

When a U.S. air strike was directed 

against the famous Thanh Hoa Bridge 

on 27 April 1972, two RF-4C's and two 

F-4 escorts covered the target at high 

altitude and brought back word that 

the bridge had finally been dropped 

into the river after 7 years and hundreds of bombing sorties. Several 

enemy missiles were launched at the 

flight during the strike. North Vietnamese intransigence at the Paris 

peace conference triggered Linebacker II on 19 December 1972, an air 

offensive against targets in the 

Hanoi-Haiphong area, which also 

brought reconnaissance aircraft back 

to assess bomb damage. Two RF-4C's 

followed every strike element to photograph the resulting destruction. The 

film was processed at Udorn and 

rushed to Tan Son Nhut for exploitation for follow-up bombings. The sorties continued until the signing of the 

Paris agreements on 27 January 1973, 

which brought all combat operations 

over North Vietnam to an end. 

Fighting in Laos officially ended on 

16 February 1973, but the Air Force 

continued to fly reconnaissance sorties along lines of communication to 

maintain current data on enemy AAA 

positions, truck traffic, and storage 

areas. The RF-4C's also flew sorties 

over Cambodia to assess damage 

from B-52 and tactical aircraft bomb~ 

ing, and a few sorties were flown 

along the South Vietnamese border 

where Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces were concentrated. All 

USAF operations ended on 15 August 

1973. Between early 1961 and the halt 

of America's longest war, USAF reconnaissance crews had flown almost 

650,000 tactical sorties. 

221 

Chapter XIII 

The flight line and control 

tower at Tan Son Nhut, 1964. 

(1. to r.) two R F·101's, six 

F·102's, and a 8-66. @N.G.S. 

Control of Strike and 

Defense Forces 

As noted earlier, in the fall of 1961 

the Air Force deployed a detachment 

from the 507th Tactical Air Control 

Group, Shaw AFB, S.C., to Tan Son 

Nhut, where it established a combat 

reporting center. Declared operational 

in October, the center took over responsibility for maintaining the primary control radars and directing air 

defense operations, i.e., scrambling 

and directing interceptor aircraft. It 

also performed routine air traffic control functions. In November 1961 additional elements of the 507th and the 

5th Tactical Control Group also arrived in Vietnam. Early in 1962 they 

assisted in activating the joint USAFVNAF Air Operations Center at Tan 

Son Nhut, adjacent to the combat 

reporting center. Rounding out the 

initial radar net were two combat reporting posts at Da Nang and Pleiku, 

each equipped with mobile search 

and height radars. Air Force personnel 

ran the Da Nang facility whi le the 

VNAF operated the Pleiku unit. The Air 

Operations Center became the heart 

of the tactical air control system, enabling air commanders to control and 

direct their strike forces. 

t:xpanding the Radar Net 

To provide coverage of the western 

air approaches to South Vietnamfrom northeastern Cambodia and 

southern Laos-the Air Force in April 

1962 moved a radar emplaced a year 

earlier at Don Muang to Ubon AB, 

where it provided a more favorable 

Thai location for detecting aerial activity in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. This installation not only greatly 

improved radar surveillance but also 

tied the air defense systems of Thailand and South Vietnam into a single 

coordinated whole. The installations 

at Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, Pleiku, and 

Ubon provided high-altitude (above 

5,000 feet) surveillance over South 

Vietnam. They also possessed a command and control capability and secure teletype circuits to radar and 

control units throughout South Vietnam and Thailand. 

Except for a VNAF reporting post 

established at Ban Me Thuot in February 1963, the network remained essentially unchanged until April1964 when 

more powerful radars were set up on 

Monkey Mountain near Da Nang and 

at Can Tho, which strengthened early 

warning and tactical air control operations. A few months later, the Air 

Force upgraded its Thai facilities, adding a combat reporting post at Udorn , 

thereby extending coverage over 

northeast Thailand and central Laos. 

The commissioning of several communication and navigation facilities in 

1964 also benefited the air defense 

and tactical control systems. 

One of the critical needs that grew 

out of the expanded forces was to 

enhance the tactical air control system. Although the network as of mid1964 performed reasonably well, it 

became obvious that the ever-increasing military and commercial air 

traffic would soon overtax the system. 

In turn, this expansion made it imperative to build a single comprehensive 

system that could handle all U.S. and 

allied air operations, including air defense, tactical strikes, and air traffic 

control. 

223 
Coincident with the 1965 deployment of additional American forces to 

the area, the Air Force began to build 

the Southeast Asia Integrated Tactical 

Air Control System (SEAITACS). 

Established over a 2-year period, it 

consisted of four tactical air control 

centers (T ACC's), two in South Vietnam and two in Thailand. Within 

South Vietnam, the focal point for all 

air operations was the TACC-South 

Sector (SS), whi ch replaced the Air 

Operations Center at Tan Son Nhut 

in the summer of 1965. Like the AOC, 

the TACC-South Sector was manned 

by U.S. and VNAF personnel. Their 

job was to direct the air defense effort 

for South Vietnam , allocate air defense resources, and monitor all air 

movements within the air defense 

subsectors of a Mainland SEA Air Defense Region. 

Acting for the Seventh Air Force 

commander in his capacity as Deputy 

Commander, MACV for Air Operations, TACC-South Sector had virtually complete responsibility for prosecuting the air war in South Vietnam. 

224 

Air Force officials in the Tan Son Nhut 

center planned , directed, and coordinated all allied tactical air operations 

in South Vietnam and achieved a remarkable ability to provide close air 

support to allied forces. American 

Army and Marine commanders repeatedly praised the air assistance provided them. For example, following Operation Paul Revere II, a 1st Cavalry Division (Mobile)/ARVN ground operation 

in the summer of 1966, Maj. Gen. John 

Norton, USA, wrote to General 

Momyer to praise "the outstanding 

combat support received." He noted 

that tactical air support requests, 

"both immediate and preplanned, 

were answered promptly and effectively; in every instance accuracy was 

excellent and target coverage complete." This letter was only one of 

many received by Seventh Air Force 

which acknowledged the contributions 

not only of USAF strike units but, indirectly, of the tactical air control system. 

The TACC-North Sector became 

operational at Da Nang in November 

(1) An Air Force mobile air traffic control team directed a 

C-123 to a safe landing on a 

small al~trl p at Oau Tleng, 

South VI et nam. (2) A 

Troposcatter antenna, operat· 

ed by the 1974th Communication Gro up, dominates a 

peaceful swampland scene 

near Don Muang Royal Thai 

AB, Thailand. (3) The Air Force 

Command Post Communications Center, operated by 

the 1876th Communication 

Squadron, Tan Son Nhut. 
2 

1966. Collocated with the combat reporting center at Monkey Mountain, it 

was responsible for the air defense of 

northern South Vietnam and for providing surveillance, warning, and limited control of air operations over 

North Vietnam and Gulf of Tonkin. 

The Thai-based tact

ical air control 

center was at Udorn. It served as an 

extension of the Seventh Air Force 

control center, controlling and coordinating USAF strike units in Thailand. 

The Udorn facility was designated 

Alternate T ACC-North Sector and-as 

its name implies-served as the back-

up to the main center at Da Nang for 

control of air operations over North 

Vietnam and Laos. In an emergency, 

Marine Corps air control radars could 

take over from the primary centers at 

Da Nang and Udorn in directing ope

r-

ations over North Vietnam or the Laotian panhandle. 

The buildup of tactical air 

control 

centers in the mid-1960's was accompanied by a substantial expansion of 

radar facilities. To strengthen the control system, the Air Force added 9 radars to 12 already in its early warning 

net. South Vietnam received four, 

bringing its total to an even dozen. 

The other five were installed in Thailand, raising the total there to nine. 

Additional coverage was achieved by 

tying in the radars of the Marine Corps 

and the Navy's Carrier Task Force 77. 

The Air Force also employed airborne combat command posts as 

command centers to control interdiction strikes in the Laotian panhandle 

and Route Package 1 in North Vietnam. These were C-130 aircraft 

equipped with a removable command 

communications module. The airborne command team consisted of 

approximately 12 personnel. Their 

ability to control air operations was 

amply demonst

rated during the defense of the Marines at Khe Sanh in 

1968. During the peak of the strike 

operations, G-130 command teams 

controlled approximately 850 aircraft 

per day. 

225 
The EC-121 Task Force 

Another major USAF asset which 

enhanced Air Force operations in 

Southeast Asia was the ultra-sophisticated , electronic-laden EC-1210 aircraft (code name College Eye). In effect a flying radar station and airborne 

control platform, the EC-121D possessed the AN/APS-95 search radar, 

IFF/SIF (Identification Friend or Foe/ 

Selective Identification Feature), interrogation equipment, and a battery of 

communication gear. It became a key 

element in enabling successive Seventh Air Force commanders to exercise airborne control over tactical air 

operations. The range of its radar 

coverage and tactical air control extended over all of North Vietnam and 

the Gulf of Tonkin. 

EC-121 operations began in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1965, after 

two F-105's were stlot down by enemy 

MIG's while on strike missions over 

the North. From this incident- the first 

in which F-105's were lost in air combat-it became clear that early detection and warning of MIG flight activity 

were prerequisites to reducing aircraft 

losses. With the existing surfacebased radar net unable to do the job, 

the Air Force brought in the EC-121 's. 

The EC-121 task force deployed to 

Southeast Asia early in 1965. It consisted of 5 aircraft, flight crews, and 

about 100 support personnel from the 

Aerospace Defense Command's 552d 

Airborne Early Warning and Control 

Wing at McClellan AFB, Calif. Its main 

support base was in Taiwan, but operations were generally flown from forward bases in South Vietnam or Thailand, originally Tan Son Nhut, later 

from Ubon, Udorn, and eventually 

Korat, where the task force finally 

found an in-theater home in October 

1967. It was officially designated Detachment 1 (Rotational), 552d Aircraft 

Early Warning and Control Wing on 30 

October 1968. 

In performing what became their 

primary mission, College Eye airmen 

226 

stationed themselves over the Gulf of 

Tonkin about 50 miles from Haiphong 

Harbor, flew elliptical orbits, and passed on information about North Vietnamese air activity. After Communist 

China charged in October 1965 and 

May 1966 that U.S. aircraft had violated its borders, the EC-121 's took on 

the additional task of tracking and 

warning all American aircraft when 

they were approaching or appeared to 

be too close to the Chinese border. 

For this purpose, task force aircraft 

flew orbital patterns over Laos near 

the Plain of Jars. 

The EC-121 crews undertook a 

number of other control duties. For 

example, from April1965 to early 1966 

and beginning again in late 1967, they 

controlled four fighters flying protective cover for unarmed support aircraft operating in the Gulf of Tonkin 

area. The EC-121 's also (1) served as 

an airborne communications relay 

center through which aircraft returning from their targets could transmit 

strike results and position reports to 

the control center at Da Nang; (2) directed operations of fighter escorts, 

MIG combat patrols, C-130 flareships, 

and A-26 strike aircraft along the 

North Vietnamese-Laotian border; (3) 

provided rescue and navigational assistance in searches for downed pilots; and (4) frequently assisted fighters in finding tankers for emergency 

refuelings. In 1967 College Eye controllers also began actively directing 

USAF F-4 fighters to North Vietnamese MIG's. 

Paradoxically, the EC-121 's were 

called upon only three times to provide one of its basic services-early 

warning of enemy air attacks against 

South Vietnamese ground targets. 

The first occurred in October 1965 

when intelligence reports indicated a 

possible IL-28 bomber attack on Da 

Nang. The second- and possibly most 

serious threat of the entire war- took 

place early in February 1968 when 41L 

-28's and 13 MIG's penetrated the 

DMZ. Upon entering the zone, the 
fighter escort broke off, some turning 

toward the Laotian border, the remainder flying out to sea. The four 

Beagles loitered in the DMZ area for 

almost an hour, then dropped below 

radar detection altitudes and departed . The third incident came in midJune 1968 when an enemy helicopter 

threat appeared to be building up 

along the DMZ. In these three instances, night-flying College Eye crews 

were able to detect them and alert 

friendly ground forces. 

Air Defense 

Long before the EC-121 's began 

providing early warning of potential 

enemy air operations against South 

Vietnam, the Air Force deployed interceptors to Thailand in 1961 to demonstrate America's resolve to support its 

SEATO allies and the beleaguered 

Kingdom of Laos. From that point on 

during the next several years, the Air 

Force kept a minimum of four aircraft 

on alert in Thailand. 

In March 1962 USAF interceptors 

also were sent to South Vietnam after 

radars detected low-flying, unidentified aircraft along the Cambodian 

border. At the request of Saigon officials, the Air Force dispatched four 

F-102's to Vietnam from Clark AB. This 

deployment inaugurated a year-long 

series of rotations, with Navy EA-1 F 

all-weather fighters alternating with 

the F-1 02's. Because the EA-1 F was 

the slower aircraft, it proved better 

suited than the F-1 02 for low-speed, 

low-level interceptions. The two rotated every 6 weeks to Tan Son Nhut until 

May 1963, when base overcrowding 

and the low probability of an enemy 

air attack ended the deployments. 

Subsequently, a number of . aircraft 

were kept at their home stations in an 

on-call status so as to permit a speedy 

flight to Vietnam if necessary. 

During the summer of 1963, Thirteenth Air Force conducted a series of 

no-notice exercises to test the ability 

of the F-1 02's to deploy to Vietnam. 

They involved brief flights to Tan Son 

Nhut and Da Nang, which were continued through mid-1964 for training 

purposes. Occasionally during the 

early 1960's, allied radars detected 

unidentified, low-speed, low-altitude 

tracks in South Vietnam's airspace. 

They were presumed to be those of 

Communist aircraft engaged in the 

resupply of Viet Gong troops during 

hours of darkness, but some of the 

unidentified radar tracks also might 

have been caused by U.S. Army helicopters or even flocks of migratory 

birds. 

Apart from sporadic radar returns 

and infrequent violations of South Vietnamese air space by Cambodian 

MIG's, no significant enemy air activity 

occurred through the 1960's, although 

the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August 

1964 had significant air defense ramifications. Not knowing whether the 

North Vietnamese attack signalled the 

start of a major military campaign, the 

Air Force quickly reinforced its alert 

forces. Within a week, 6 F-102's were 

on alert at Da Nang, 8 F-105's at Karat, 

and 18 F-100's were available at Da 

Nang and Takhli to fly escort. Air defense units stayed in a heightened 

alert status throughout the remainder 

of 1964. 

Estimates of the air threat changed 

sharply in 1965, particularly in the 

spring when the North Vietnamese Air 

Force acquired the Soviet-built light 

bomber, IL-28 Beagle. For the first 

time, Hanoi possessed the potential to 

strike as far south as Saigon and into 

northeast Thailand. The deployment 

of larger numbers of American aircraft 

to a handful of South Vietnamese bases made such fields attractive targets. 

When the United States initiated air 

strikes against North Vietnamese military facilities in 1965, the possibility of 

enemy retaliation in the South obviously increased. 

In this regard , the lack of low-altitude radar coverage was a problem. If 

the enemy chose an attack route 

227 

6 

11) A2C Douglas C Christensen. seen through the plotting board on 

the EC-121C aircrafl. The boards played a vital role in allowing crewmen to keep track of other alrcraN In lhe area. (2) Control lower and 

helicopter area at Bien Hoa AB. 1 November 1964. (3) SSgt Eroc M 

Routkedge, a precision final controller, guides an aircraft to a safe 

landing during inclement weather at Dan Nang AB. (~) An Air Force 

F-100 Supersabre turns in making a strafing pass against an enemy 

force in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam. (5) Aerial view of the 

Monkey Mountain radar site overlooking Da Nang AB and the city's 

harbor. (6) Tactical rur nav1gation (TACAN) and power un1ts were 

deployed to B1nh Thuy AB, V1etnam 1n 1965 by the 1st Mobile Communications Group at Clark AB, the Philippines (7) 1st Lt Lance D. 

Scalf. a weapons controller aboard an EG-121 rurcratt. plots the 1<>-

catiOns of U.S. airstrikes over North V1etnam In November 1968. (B) 

TSgt James E. Johnson, a crewman aboard the EG-t21D radar surveillance atrcraft, checks hiS manuals as he prepares for a frequency 

'peak-up'" of delicate equ1pmant 
which exploited this weakness, the allies would receive little or no warning. 

It was estimated that Saigon might get 

an advance notice of 4 minutes: Da 

Nang, however, would have no more 

than 1 to 2 minutes to react. Given the 

closely parked, unreveted aircraft and 

their proximity to ordnance and POL 

storage, even one or two enemy aircraft could wreak havoc. One burning 

aircraft alone could trigger a holocaust under prevailing airfield conditions. Since command and control , 

radar, and communication systems 

were equally vulnerable, the creation 

of an adequate air defense system 

became a matter of urgency in 1965 

and thereafter. 

The number of aircraft committed to 

SEA air defense climbed gradually but 

steadily. Though still small, the air 

defense contingent tripled in size over 

the pre-1965 force. A round-the-clock 

230 

alert was maintained by 12 F-102's-8 

at Tan Son Nhut and 4 at Don Muang. 

For a period of nearly 6 months between October 1965 and the spring of 

1966, F-102's and F-4C's performed 

alert duty at Da Nang on a 24-hour 

basis. The assignment of the F-4's 

marked the first operational use of 

these aircraft in an air defense role. As 

the war over North Vietnam intensified, the F-4's strike role took precedence and they were relieved .of air 

defense duty, except during periods of 

tension when all fighters were alerted 

on a back-up basis. Beginning in late 

1964, the U.S. Army also deployed surface-to-air Hawk missiles to Tan Son 

Nhut, Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, and 

Da Nang to help counter any enemy 

air attack on allied bases. 

By the end of 1966 air defense 

forces had grown significantly both in 

South Vietnam and Thailand. At that 

A view of Air Force troposcatler communication 

antennae at Monkey Moun· 

taln, South VIetnam. 
In De<:ember 1967 a newly 

modified ground controlled 

approach radar unil went Into 

operation. The new unit provided controllers with the 

capability of precision radar 

approaches on parallel run· 

ways at Tuy Hoa AB. 

time, 22 F-102's were exclusively deployed for air defense: 12 on alert in 

South Vietnam (6 at Bien Hoa and 6 at 

Da Nang) and the other 10 in Thailand 

(6 at Udorn and 4 at Don Muang). Approximately 14 F-104's based at Udorn 

also had air defense duties as a secondary mission. 

USAF air defense forces in Southeast Asia underwent little change in 

composition and location during 

1967-1968. During those 2 years, the 

Air Force normally kept a minimum of 

14 aircraft on 5-minute alert-4 each 

at Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Udorn, and 

2 at Don Muang. The remainder of the 

F-102 force was on 1-hour call. In addition, eight F-4C's stood alert at Cam 

Ranh Bay- one on a 15-minute basis 

and four others on 30-minute notice. 

Another two were on 15-minute alert 

at Da Nang. The U.S. Navy and Marine 

Corps augmented these forces by 

maintaining alert aircraft at all times. 

Altogether, as many as 200 U.S. aircraft were available for air defense at 

the peak of the U.S. force buildup. 

Air Traffic Control 

One of the important functions performed by the allied air control system 

was that of traffic control. The first 

USAF team deployed to Southeast 

Asia for this purpose was an element 

of the 1st Mobile Communications 

Group, which arrived in Thailand on 

15 February 1961 to assist in providing 

air route traffic control for the Thai Air 

Force. Subsequently, other teams 

deployed to the area to support the 2d 

Air Division, the Vietnamese Air Force, 

and other allied forces. In many instances in the early days, 1st Mobile 

Communications Group teams occupied control towers alongside Thai or 

Vietnamese personnel to facilitate 

local traffic handling of joint-usage 

airfields. 

As the air forces in Southeast Asia 

grew, the problems of air traffic control mounted. During the early 1960's 

navigation throughout the area was 

based primarily upon nondirectional 

radio beacons. Existing fields lacked 

modern equipment to handle the upsurge in traffic. To help resolve the 

problem, the Air Force installed mobile radar approach control (RAPCON) 

units, mobile towers. and navigational 

aids at key locations. The nondirectional radio beacons were replaced or 

augmented as rapidly as possible with 

very high frequency omni-directional 

radio range equipment, tactical air 

navigation equipment, or a combination of both. Nondirectional beams at 

Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Binh Long, and 

Tan Son Nhut provided reporting and 

navigational reference points for enroute traffic. An additional beacon was 

placed on Phu Quoc Island, off South 

Vietnam's west coast, as a navigational aid for traffic routed around Cambodia-due to Phnom Penh restric231 
tions of overflight of its territory. 

The Republic of Vietnam, like all 

nations, exercised sovereign control 

of its airspace. Its Directorate of Civil 

Aviation delegated all South Vietnamese airspace control to its Saigon area 

control center, which in turn delegated authority to ground radar operators, who controlled landing approaches. Operations in subdelegated 

airspace were governed by letters of 

agreement between officials of operating facilities and the Saigon area control center. In July 1965 the Directorate formed an air coordinating committee in an effort to achieve closer 

coordination between civil and military agencies. Represented on this 

committee were U.S. Air Force, Army, 

and Marine Corps members and others 

from the VNAF, MACV, and the U.S. 

Civil Aviation Assistance Group. The 

U.S. Air Force and the Directorate of 

Civil Aviation jointly chaired the committee. 

It resolved many problems, but rising air traffic, inexperienced personnel, cumbersome lines of authority, 

and the need to build an adequate air 

traffic control structure in the middle 

of a war complicated its job. A series 

of meetings was held in 1966 to discuss a variety of current problems, 

including terminal and enroute traffic 

control, equipment for navigation 

aids, point-to-point communications, 

and personnel training. 

One important issue was the blocking or preemption of airspace as a 

result of impending artillery firing, 

special air operations, and naval gun 

fire. For example, when the B-52's 

began operations in the spring and 

summer of 1965, the need to block 

vast amounts of airspace had an unfavorable effect on enroute air traffic 

control. Navy amphibious operations 

and U.S. Army artillery fire also required airspace blocks. Naval operations were usually coordinated with 

the air component commander. In the 

Central Military District surrounding 

Saigon, 15 minutes prior to the firing 

232 
(1) Ar1 Air Force EC-121 aorcraft over South Vietnam. (2) 

Air Force aor traffic oontrollers, 1877th Communications 

Squadron, and Vietnamese 

Air Force traonees, dorect aor 

traffic at Boen Hoa AB, South 

Vietnam They are· (1. to r.) 

SSgt William A. Beeton, Jr., 

A1C Oo Dang Thanh, Sgt 

Robert M. Lennon, and Sgt 

Phan Cong Tao. (3) 1st Ll 

Sa Nguyen. of Saogon, senior 

VNAF weapons dorector, r&-

ceives training on running 

air defense ontercepts of 

unidentified aorcraft. His instructor, 1st Lt. Larry G. 

Laurendine, served as a 

weapon Instructor. 

of artillery or mortar shells, the radar 

approach control facility at Tan Son 

Nhut advised all aircraft in the vicinity 

of the impending operations. 

Because of artillery firings and 

blocked airspace, there were only 

three altitudes provided for aircraft 

departures at Tan Son Nhut: 7,000 

feet, 9,000 feet, and 11 ,000 feet. At the 

same time, traffic was rapidly escalating. The arrival of the summer monsoons also caused difficulties, since 

precipitation cluttered the radar 

scopes, often rendering them useless 

when most needed. With nearly simultaneous operations being carried out 

by the Air Force, Army, Navy, VNAF, 

and civilian airlines, air traffi c controllers at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and 

Da Nang found themselves each handling more aircraft movements monthly than Chicago's O'Hare International 

Airport. During 1968 there were 

4,779,647 aircraft movements (principally takeoffs and landings) controlled 

by towers manned partially by USAF 

personnel assigned to units of the 

1964thCommunicationsGroup. 

A number of steps were taken to 

maintain air safety. Since controllers 

of the South Vietnamese Directorate 

of Civil Aviation needed assistance, a 

U.S.-Vietnamese letter of agreement 

raised the status of USAF controllers 

to advisors with authority to take necessary steps to insure the safety of military flights. Previously, USAF controllers had only manned traffic control 

positions under the Vietnamese agency. In May 1966 the mobile radar approach facility at Tan Son Nhut became the first in Southeast Asia to 

receive a modification unit which 

provided additional surveillance radar 

scopes. With this equipment, operations at that facility were divided into 

sectors. During June-July 1966 the 

radar approach control units at Da 

Nang and Cam Ranh Bay also were 

modified. Similar actions were taken 

at other bases, increasing from three 

to five the number of control positions 

at each facility. 

In February 1968 PACAF initiated a 

special project (Commando Indian) to 

create an air traffic regulatory system 

to handle heavy traffic between air 

bases. Under an agreement among 

the Directorate of Civil Aviation, 

MACV, and the VNAF, the Air Force 

created six air traffic regulation centers (ATRC's) as elements of the aircraft control and warning subsystem 

of the tactical air control system. The 

centers were located at existing control and reporting centers and posts, 

with which they were linked internally 

to enable coordination of data on aircraft movements. The last of these 

sites became operational in February 

1969. 

By mid-1969, the air traffic control 

centers were handling an average 

of more than 70,000 aircraft operations monthly, accounting for approximately 75 percent of the total traffic at 

the control and reporting centers and 

posts, thus permitting the weapon 

controllers there to concentrate on 

their primary duty of directing strike 

aircraft. Because of reduced flying 

starting in 1971 , the weapon controllers were initially trained and then given responsibility for the traffic previously controlled by the ATRC's 

throughout Vietnam. 

Control tower aircraft movements 

handled by USAF controllers decreased substantially after 1969. As 

American participation in the war 

ground down, the Air Force began 

transferring control towers, direct air 

support centers, and other communications facilities to the South Vietnamese. A final, orderly phaseout of 

remaining Air Force communications 

was carried out in January-March 

1973. The 1964th Communications 

Group, whose mission had been to 

provide USAF telecommunications 

and air traffic control in Vietnam, terminated its operations on 23 March 

1973. The 1974th Communications 

Group at Udorn continued to provide 

these services for USAF units remaining in Thailand. 

233 

Chapter XIV 

Col. Devol Bran, Vice Commander. 12th TFW, was rescued by an HH-3E helicopter 

from the Gulf of Tonkin in 

December 1967. His F-4C 

Phantom wu hit by enemy 

fire while on a strike mlssoon 

north of the DMZ. 

Air Rescue 

During the course of the war the Air 

Force's Air Rescue Service recovered 

several thousand U.S. and Allied fighting men who went down in jungles, 

mountains, and waters of Southeast 

Asia. The first USAF rescue teamthree officers and three airmen-arrived in South Vietnam on temporary 

duty on 10 January 1962. Based at Tan 

Son Nhut, its mission was to organize 

a search and rescue (SAR) control 

center and network throughout the 

country. In April 1962 the 6-man cadre 

was designated Detachment 3, Pacific 

Air Rescue Center. Its first commander arrived on 2 July. The detachment 

initially had no aircraft and had to rely 

on U.S. Army advisors to provide their 

helicopters to assist in air rescue missions. Army personnel subsequently 

were assigned to the Tan Son Nhut 

control center and provided liaison 

between the Air Force and the Army. 

In addition to not having its own aircraft, the detachment lacked most of 

the basic equipment needed for an 

effective SAR system . For example, in 

the early days of its operations the 

SAR center sent requests for help to 

operational units by bicycle-a method faster and more reliable than trying 

to use the existing Vietnamese telephone network. Its reliance on the 

Army and later the U.S. Marines for 

helicopter support also created problems because they were not configured for rescue missions. For example, in March 1963 an Army OV-1 aircraft went down near the top of a 6,000 

foot mountain in II Corps. To reach 

the site, two Marine UH-340 helicopters 

attempted to insert a 4-man AmericanVietnamese rescue team at the crash 

site. However, the Marine helicopters 

did not have a cable long enough to 

reach the ground through the high 

jungle canopy. When one descended 

to the jungle canopy, it suddenly lost 

power and crashed , killing an ARVN 

ranger who was on the hoist at the 

time. The aircrew managed to climb 

out of the wreckage moments before it 

erupted into flames. The copilot, however, was severely burned and died 

during the night. Subsequently, a second Marine helicopter attempting to 

land a Marine rescue team also lost 

power and crashed but the only injury 

was a sprained ankle. Eventually, the 

bodies of the Army OV-1 pilot, ARVN 

ranger, and Marine copilot, plus members of the American and Vietnamese 

rescue teams were extracted by helicopter. 

It was clear that specialized aircraft 

and devices were needed to effectively 

operate over the jungle and mountainous terrain of Southeast Asia. In the 

early 1960's the only crash/rescue helicopters in the USAF inventory were the 

short-range (220 miles) HH-43 Huskies, operated by local base rescue 

(LBR) units in the United States and 

overseas. However, the HH-43 was 

considered inadequate for conditions 

in Southeast Asia. In June 1963 a more 

advanced helicopter, the CH-3 singlerotor cargo amphibian, made its first 

flight. It had a forward speed of about 

150 miles per hour, an endurance of 4-

1/2 hours, and range of approximately 

500 miles. Impressed by its performance in November 1963, the Commander, Air Rescue Service, recommended to Headquarters USAF the 

purchase of the CH-3 in quantities. He 

reported that the Service was not 

equipped to do the job in Southeast 

Asia and that, by "utter default," Air 

Force combat crews were " made dependent upon ill-equipped and illtrained . .. U.S. Army and Marine 

Corps helicopter resources diverted to 

accomplish our mission .. .Their no235 
ble efforts have wrought confusion 

and even disaster when engaged in 

some attempts to prosecute Air Rescue Service missions." 

In response, Headquarters USAF 

ordered a number of combat-modified 

CH-3's. But, pending their manufacture, the Air Force was forced to use 

the HH-43's. In March 1964 three 

USAF HH-43 units were transferred 

from the Philippines and Okinawa to 

Southeast Asia. In June 1964 the 

first temporary-duty contingent-two 

HH-43's and 36 personnel- was sent 

to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. That 

same month the 31st Air Rescue 

Squadron at Clark deployed two 

HU-16 amphibian aircraft to Da Nang, 

South Vietnam, to provide rescue 

service for U.S. airmen downed in 

the Gulf of Tonkin. Two HU-16's from 

the 33d Air Rescue Squadron also 

were deployed to Korat Air Base, 

Thailand, to support USAF operations over that country and Laos. 

On 20 October 1964 Detachment 4, 

Pacific Air Rescue Center, which was 

equipped with three HH-43F helicopters specifically modified for use in the 

theater, arrived at Bien Hoa, replacing 

a temporary duty unit deployed there 

236 

several months before. The modified 

HH-43's possessed heavy armor plating to protect the crews from hostile 

ground fire and 250-foot cables to facilitate rescues in high rain forest 

areas. The unit also had on hand 

HU-16 amphibian aircraft for use in 

sea rescue of downed pilots. 

By 1 January 1965 five helicopter 

detachments were operating in the 

theater-at Bien Hoa and Da Nang, 

South Vietnam ; and at Udorn, Nakhon Phanom, Takhli, and Korat in 

Thailand. However, only the Udorn 

and Nakhon Phanom detachments in 

Thailand operated solely in support 

~ downed ~rmen . The ~he~ pe~ 

formed their normal local base rescue missions. The two detachments 

in South Vietnam flew aircrew recovery missions, although their " combat-modified" helicopters were extremely limited in range and loitering 

capability. 

In January 1966, the Air Force activated the 3d Aerospace Rescue and 

Recovery Group at Tan Son Nhut to 

serve as the primary rescue agency in 

Southeast Asia. It took over the job of 

planning, organizing, coordinating, 

and controlling rescue operations 

Capt. Leo F. Dusard. downed 

at sea after suffering an 

engine failure. climbs Into the 

rescue sting of an HH·43 

rescue helicopter after being 

forced to eject from his F·100 

In the Gulf of Tonkin. 

December 1967. 
In February 1968 Capt Bernard E. Flanagan, an F-100 

pilot of the 355th Tactical 

Fighter Squadron. was shot 

down while on a mission over 

South V•etnam. He was 

picked up within an hour by 

an HH-3E helicopter of lhe 

3rd Aerospace Rescue and 

Recovery Group. 

from the Joint Search and Rescue 

Center at Seventh Air Force headquarters, Tan Son Nhut, and coordinating 

centers at selected operating locations. The group directed the activities 

of three rescue squadrons, the 37th at 

Da Nang, the 38th at Tan Son Nhut, and 

the 39th at Tuy Hoa. Later, the group 

operated a fourth squadron, the 40th at 

Udorn. Ten rescue detachments also 

were based throughout South Vietnam 

and four in Thailand. 

While this dispersion of rescue units 

facilitated recovery of downed pilots 

over a wide area, there were many instances when helicopter crews found 

they were unable to reach grounded 

airmen due to the limited range of 

their aircraft. Looking for ways to extend their operations, rescue crews 

sought out clearings in the jungle for 

use as forward locations, where they 

could stockpile fuel and await calls for 

help many miles and minutes closer to 

a downed pilot. They also installed 

extra fuel tanks- initially a 150-gallon 

container, later as many as four 55-

gallon drums-to gain additional operating time. To Improve their ability 

to rescue crews shot down over North 

Vietnam , ordinarily far beyond their 

reach, they also stored drums of fuel 

on mountain tops along the route 

north, enabling them to leapfrog from 

one to another. 

The SAR Task Force 

Other improvisations included employment of a SAR Task Force, or 

SARTAF. The basic rescue element for 

aircrew recovery missions after the 

1965 force buildup, this task force 

subsequently developed a rescue 

formation involving a pair of helicopters, one flying high, the other low. 

The low aircraft would " go in" to 

make the recovery, while the high aircraft stood by to lend aid if required. 

Also, in 1965 rescue crews were provided high-flying USAF fightercoverto 

ward off MIG attacks. This fighter cover was known both as M IGCAP and 

Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP). 

In August 1965 Air Force A-1 E Skyraiders also began escorting the rescue 

units. Coordination and control of all 

air elements involved was exercised 

by a fixed-wing rescue aircraft, itself a 

part of the SAR Task Force. 

Typically, during a recovery operation, two A-1 E's flew directly to the 

general search area and began a hunt 

237 
for the downed crew. Two other 

A-1 E's escorted the helicopters to the 

area, flying above small-arms range. 

Reaching the target area, they circled 

until the first two A-1 E's contacted the 

survivor by radio, located him, and 

determined whether he was in a hostile area. If he was, the fighters and 

escorting A-1 E's attacked with bombs, 

rockets, and 20-mm cannon fire until 

the area was " neutralized" sufficiently 

for a helicopter to go in low for the 

recovery. The A-1 E's orbited nearby 

but not directly over the downed pilot 

so as to avoid giving away his position. Although the HH-43's were poorly equipped for this rescue role, USAF 

crews performed it repeatedly. However, after accelerated tactical strike 

operations began over both North and 

South Vietnam, the number of 

downed airmen rose dramatically. 

Rescue detachments found they could 

not keep up with the number of calls 

for help, and it also became apparent 

that a more powerful, better-equipped 

helicopter was essential, especially if 

they were to operate deep in enemy 

territory. 

In July 1965, the Tactical Air Command-many of whose crews were 

being shot down in enemy territoryloaned the Air Rescue Service two CH-3 

cargo helicopters. However, it was 

not until November 1965 that there 

was a major improvement in air rescue 

capabilities, with the arrival in Southeast Asia of the first six HH-3E's. An 

updated version of the CH-3, the 

HH-3E was specifically modified for 

rescue operations. Its speed, endurance, and ceiling of approximately 

10,000 feet were about the same as 

the CH-3, but auxiliary fuel tanks increased its range to about 640 nautical miles. Operating out of Udorn, 

Thailand, or Da Nang, South Vietnam, 

it could reach any point in North Vietnam and return to its home bases. 

When deployed to a forward location, 

its extended range enabled rescue 

crews to deploy near an area of aerial 

combat, where it could orbit ready for 

238 

an emergency deep within North Vietnam. 

The HH-3E's communication equipment was compatible with all other 

allied aircraft operating in Southeast 

Asia, and it possessed an external 

variable-speed hoist with 240 feet of 

cable, stressed for 600-pound loads, 

and able to penetrate the jungle 

canopy. The new helicopter, along 

with its less powerful companion, the 

HH-3C, quickly became known as the 

Jolly Green Giant. 

With these advanced helicopters, 

rescue crews were able to keep pace 

with the stepped-up tempo of the air 

war. Control of operations became 

more direct and responsive. Communications further improved when 

Udorn-based C-54's began flying as 

airborne command posts along the 

Thai frontier. HU-16 amphibians performed the same communications 

task over the Gulf of Tonkin. Old, slow, 

and limited like the CH-54 to low-alti· 

tude operations, the HU-16 had been 

in the inventory since 1949. However, 

it was able to make water landings in 

daylight and mild sea conditions and, 

by the end of 1965, had saved 70 people, 60 of them combat crewmembers. 

Beginning in 1966, the amphibious 

HU-16's and other Air Rescue Services 

fixed-wing aircraft were replaced by 

the Lockheed HC-130 Hercules, an 

all-metal, high-wing, land-based amphibian tailored specifically for the 

global search and rescue mission. The 

Air Force contracted for the plane in 

1963. With a top speed of approximately 340 knots and a range of more 

than 4,500 nautical miles, it could land 

easily on short runways or landing 

strips such as those usually found in 

advance-base operations. It obviously 

could not make vertical recoveries on 

land or water like the HU-16's, and 

could not commit its pararescue 

teams to jungle areas where parachutes would be caught in 150-foot 

trees or mountain slopes where jagged outcrops could spear a man. But 

the HC-130 could fly great distances 
over the oceans, find its objective with 

its electronic gear, and linger for a 

long, long time. 

Over land, the HH-3E's began flying 

an increasing number of recovery 

missions as more of them entered the 

inventory. Despite its superiority over 

the HH-43, however, it still lacked the 

full capacity to loiter for lengthy periods over hostile territory. This was a 

serious problem since on deep penetration missions it was often necessary to loiter for a considerable time 

while escort and strike planes neutralized enemy areas. Also, when carrying 

a full load of fuel, the helicopter was 

unable to hover over mountain areas 

where many downed pilots deliberately guided their parachutes to avoid 

capture. 

Recognizing this dilemma, the Air 

Rescue Service in 1964 proposed 

converting the HC-130 into an aerial 

tanker to provide an air-to-air refueling capability for the HH-3E. On longrange missions, this would enable the 

HH-3E to provide a complete land or 

water vertical recovery capability 

throughout the theater. With refueling, it could perform missions far beyond its normal range, enabling it to 

participate in extended SAR/recovery 

operations, to loiter indefinitely, and 

to return home. 

The proposal was approved, and Air 

Force Systems Command experts 

immediately began working with the 

Rescue Service and industry to develop a workable mid-air helicopter refueling capability. A working system 

was devised and tried experimentally 

in 1965, was fully tested in 1966, and 

finally adopted in 1967 as the mainstay 

of air rescue operations. The first operational use of the aerial refueling 

technique involved an HH-3E helicopter which was assigned a Gulf of Tonkin orbit mission previously flown by 

an HU-16. With the help of two mid-air 

refuelings by an HC-130P, the HH-3E 

flew the 8-hour mission to successfully demonstrate its improved range and 

loiter capability. Thereafter, the HC130/ HH-3E team began flying daily 

operational missions. 

Even as this important improvement 

was made in air rescue capabilities, 

the Air Force took steps to acquire a 

more powerful rescue helicopter. The 

result was the production and deployment in 1967 of the Super Jolly Green 

Giant-the HH-538 and its more capable sister, the HH-53C. Adapted from 

a Marine Corps helicopter, these new 

aircraft began flying rescue missions 

in late 1967. The HH-53 could carry 38 

passengers, or 24 litter patients with 4 

attendants, as well as its normal crew 

of 5. It could carry more than 7 short 

tons of dead weight, transport the 

cargo some 258 miles without auxiliary tanks, protect itself with three 

7.62-mm miniguns, and fly at a top 

speed of 195 miles per hour. Besides 

having a complete air refueling system 

like the HH-3E, it had automatic flight 

control and engine anti-icing systems 

for all-weather flying. Altogether, the 

HH-53 was the largest, fastest, most 

powerful heavy-lift helicopter in the 

Air Force inventory. This team-along 

with a variety of other support aircraft 

-played a key role in the dramatic but 

unsuccessful effort to rescue American prisoners of war in the Son Tay 

prison camp near Hanoi the night of 

2Q-21 November 1970 (discussed in 

Chapter IV). 

Together with the older HH-3E, they 

were used extensively in Southeast 

Asia, while the Air Force continued 

working to improve their components. 

Advances were made in communications, navigation equipment, signaling devices used on and from the 

ground, fuel tanks to prevent explosions, and a fuel-dumping mechanism. In addition, the Air Force 

worked to develop a ground-fire warning device, a multichannel survival 

radio, better signals and flares, an 

improved jungle penetrator, a superior Doppler navigation system, more 

resistant armor plating, bullet-resistant windshields and sideview panels, 

239 

7 

(1) An Air Force HH·43 helicopter approaches a jungle clearing In South Viet· 8 

nam's "D" zone to pick up wounded Amerlca.n paratroopers. (2) An HC-130 refuels 

an HH-3E helicopter heading out on a rescue mission, accompanied by four A·1 

Skyralders to fly cover for the operation. (3) This Air Force painting depicts the 

rescue of Lt. Ken Thomas, whose plane went down in North VIetnam. (4) A U.S. 

Air Force gunner In an HH-43 helicopter prepares to give fire support during a 

1966 rescue mission over Vietnam. (5) This air rescue crew plucked two Army 

flyers whose plane went down In South Vietnam. Shown checking map coor· 

dlnates of the rescue site are (1. tor.): A1C Charles R. lngulil, Jr., pararescueman; 

SSgt James Baldwin, flight engineer; and 1st Lt. John F. Kolar, rescue crew com· 

mender (6) Maj. Carl B. Light (3d from 1.) thanks an F-4 helicopter team which 

rescued him from the southern panhandle of North Vietnam in June 1968. The 

F·4's flew air strikes which enabled the helicopters to make the pickup. Shown 

(1. to r.): Maj. Don P. Olsen, rescue helicopter pilot; Sgt James A. Bowers, 

helicopter flight engineer; Lt. Col. Donald R. D'Amico, F-4 pilOt and commander 

of the 480th Tactical Fighter Squadron; and Lt. Col. Charles R. Klinkert, an air 

rescue pilot. (7) Two A·1H's escort an Air Force HH·3 rescue helicopter during 

a mission In Southea.st AsiL (8) Lt. Col. Robert F. Wilke, and A·t pilot, 602d Fighter 

Squadron (CommiWldo), surveys his damaged aircraft which was hit during a 

rescue mission owr North Vietnam. 
and electronic countermeasures to 

confuse enemy radars. 

The Problem of Night Rescue 

Normally, a survivor's chances of 

rescue from hostile territory were best 

within 15 minutes after landing; after 

30 minutes, his chances declined 

sharply. The onset of darkness or bad 

weather forced suspension of all recovery activity until conditions again 

permitted a rescue attempt. The lull 

gave the enemy time to move into an 

area and capture the downed airman, 

or worse, to set a trap to blast the rescue helicopter from the skies when it 

returned in the morning or when the 

weather cleared. 

In 1967, with night rescue growing 

in importance, the Air Force initiated a 

3-year development program to acquire a system which would enable a 

rescue force to fly after sunset to any 

geographical point in any kind of 

weather, avoiding all obstacles. The 

Air Force also sought a system which 

would enable rescue crews to " see" 

with instruments on a moonless, starlit night, locate a downed airman approximately 5 miles away, establish 

and maintain a safe hover over him, 

and lift him out without giving away 

his location or that of the helicopter. 

These were extraordinarily difficult 

requirements, which American industry could only partially fill within the 

time and funds available. 

Nevertheless, by March 1971 a limited night recovery system was produced and installed on five HH-53C's 

which became operational in Southeast Asia. These aircraft contained a 

low-light-level TV device which enabled the pilot to see on a cabin screen 

much more than he could out his window with the naked eye. In addition, 

infrared lights installed externally enabled crewmen equipped with night-vision goggles also to see outside. The 

aircraft also contained a semi-automatic approach-and-hover system to 

242 

This air rescue crew during an 11-day period saved 11 men 

wounded In combat. Shown In front (1. tor.): Maj. Harold Picker· 

lng, detachment commander; Sgt James A. Crawford, flight 

engineer; SSgt William L.Crawford, flight engineer; and Capt. 

Laurence W. Conover, rescue crew commander. In back row (1. 

tor.): AfC Ronald E. Sholes, pararescueman: AtC James L Park, 

pararescueman; capt. William J. Haugen, rescue pilot; Capt. 

Albert E. Tollefesen, rescue pilot; and Sgt Garry G. Harold, 

pararescueman. 

help the pilot during a pickup. Night 

rescues with this interim system became possible, but only from lightly' 

defended territory, comparatively flat 

terrain, and in relatively good weather. 

Under these conditions it also was 

necessary for the survivor to have an 

infrared strobe light and be in an open 

area where he could be readily seen by 

a crewman with night-vision goggles. 

Components under development 
A fisheye lens view of A2C Roy E. Kelsey, 38th Aerospace 

Rescue and Recovery Squadron, who sits on a jungle penetrator as he prepares to be lifted to a hovero11g HH-43 helicopter 

during a. practice mission in Vietnam. 

which could transform this limited 

system into a full night recovery capability included an improved, virtually 

automatic Doppler navigation system 

which would take an aircraft to any 

point selected by the pilot. Another 

component was a radar system enabling the pilot to hug the ground at 

some 200 feet, safe from radar detection, automatically adjusting to the 

terrain and dodging obstructions. A 

third device, an electronic location 

finder (ELF), would enable the crew to 

pinpoint a survivor's exact position, 

even when under a jungle canopy, and 

come to a stable hover directly over it. 

In 1973, the first two devices were 

still in the prototype test stage but the 

ELF had already been installed on 

HH-53's. In 1972 the latter device led 

to at least one rescue during a remarkable armed incursion into North Vietnam , which saved an F-4 crewmember, Capt Roger C. Locher. His aircraft 

was shot down in May 1972 by a MIG21 heat-seeking missile over North 

Vietnam while he was on his 407th 

combat mission. After parachuting 

safely into a valley, he tried without 

success to contact friendly aircraft by 

radio. During the next 23 days he hid 

some 8 miles from the MIG base at 

Yen Bai, living on fruits, nuts, and 

berries. He finally made contact with 

two USAF flights, which triggered a 

rescue attempt by a task force including HH-53 helicopters, A-1 fighters, an HC-130 command aircraft 

(which also refueled the helicopters), 

and F-4 and F-105 air cover. The initial rescue attempt on 1 June was 

driven off by enemy MIG's. However, 

the next day, with the help of the 

ELF, an HH-53 was able to locate 

him and pull him out with a jungle 

penetrator. Brought back to his base, 

Captain Locher declared: "There's 

no way to express my feelings. It's 

unbelievable. It's just a miracle." 

It was one of many miracles brought 

about by the determination, endurance, and ingenuity of Air Force rescue crews, development agencies, 

and American industry. Together, they 

helped save 3,883 lives between 1964 

and mid-August 1973. Of these, 2,807 

were U.S. military: 926 Army, 680 

Navy, and 1 ,201 Air Force. The rescuemen also saved 555 allied military 

men, 476 civilians, and 45 other unidentified persons. They also paid a 

high price. During the course of the 

war 71 U.S. rescuemen were killed and 

45 aircraft destroyed. 

243 

Chapter XV 

A1C William G. Si mpson (1 .) 

and A 1 C James H. Chester 

(r.) line up a C-47 engine on 

its mount as TSgt William C. 

Kearnes tightens a belt at 

Pleiku AB, South Vietnam. 

Logistics 

Long before the first combat aircraft 

deployed to Southeast Asia, personnel 

of the Air Force Logistics Command 

(AFLC) and other airmen were hard at 

work readying planes tor training and 

combat. For example, beginning in 

1961 maintenance crews began removing from "mothballs" many of the 

aircraft initially sent to South Vietnam. 

In many instances, the aircraft required modifications before being 

flown to the war zone. They included 

T-28's, SC-47's, and B-26's of the Farm 

Gate detachment which deployed to 

South Vietnam beginning in November 1961 and the c-123 Ranch Hand 

aircraft that followed early in 1962. 

Upon reaching South Vietnam. the 

first USAF personnel to arrive found 

little in the way of adequate maintenance facilities. At several bases, leanto or other temporary structures constituted the only roofed work areas. At 

other bases, buildings which had been 

built through the Military Assistance 

Program or those used by the French 

Air Force were available. One of the 

first challenges facing the Farm Gate 

crews was to set up a flightline supply 

and maintenance capability. To support them in this area, AFLC successfully developed, equipped, and 

shipped to Vietnam 24 mobile maintenance vans. 

Aircraft deploying to Southeast Asia 

in the early 1960's carried within them 

30-day mission support kits, which the 

Air Force periodically replenished 

from the United States. Initially, all 

other support came from USAF re-

·sources at Clark AB in the Philippines. 

This was not completely satisfactory 

because of the time required to fly in 

spare parts from Clark to the bases 

in South Vietnam and Thailand. 

Whereupon, in December 1962 the Air 

Force established Tan Son Nhut as a 

main logistic base. A few months 

thereafter the Air Force ordered a return to normal supply procedures for 

its SEA units in lieu of the special aerial resupply system being used. Supply 

shortages. however, soon appeared 

with the result that NORS (Not Operationally Ready, Supply) rates climbed . 

On 13 August 1963 the Air Force reinstated a modified aerial resupply system and aircraft NORS rates improved. 

Base Materiel 

The beginning of air operations 

against North Vietnam in 1965 was followed by the deployment of thousands of additional men and planes to 

Southeast Asia. To house and support 

them. the Air Force established four 

new major air bases and expanded 

four others. To provide essential materiel for these bases, a major logistical 

effort- designated Project Bitterwine 

-got under way in mid-July 1965 

under the aegis of a Logistics Activation Task Force established by AFLC. 

A few weeks later, however, the Secretary of Defense authorized still another sizable force buildup in the theater 

along with a further expansion of air 

facilities to include, overall, construction of 11 main bases and enlargement of 8 others. As a consequence, 

Project Bitterwine became the focus 

of one of the largest single Air Force 

logistic efforts undertaken since the 

Korean conflict. 

Under Project Bitterwine, AFLC was 

responsible for determining, procuring, packing, and shipping all required 

materials for various bases in special 

packages-to be accomplished without resorting to the normal practice of 

245 

(1) The assembling of an Air Force 

OV-10 alrcraf1 at Bien Hoa AB, 

August 1968. (2) Gen. John 0. 

Ryan, PACAF commander-in-chief, 

discusses engine maintenance 

with Chief Master Sgt William F. 

Hair, noncommissioned oftlcer in 

charge of the Tuy Hoa AB propul· 

slon branch (3) High priority 

cargo being loaded for dispatch to 

Southeast Asia. (4) Air Force Sgt 

Donald F. Clements (1.) and A1C 

Greg E. Sniegowski load a 

SUU-23/A gun pod at Phu Cat AB, 

Vietnam. (5) F·105 mechanics posi· 

tlon a mobile console and power 

unit while munitions men watch. 

3 5 

(1) A C-123 transport downed by enemy ground 

fire in April 1969 Is lofted by an Army Cl+54 Nilcopter at Ben Tre, Vietnam. (2) A C-123 unloa<ls 

avlatoon fuel at the An Khe airfield In South Vietnam. (3) Alr.men prepare a missile lor loading on 

an F-4 Phantom. They are (1. to r.): A1C Garry P. 

Mincer: Sgt Vernon E. Klsinger: A1C Lonnie J. 

Hartfield, and Sgt Phineas T. Berry. (4) Army 

armored vehicle exiting a kneeled C-5. It was 

among a number ol tanks and armored cars sent 

to South Vietnam during the enemy's 1972 spring 

oflenslve. (5) An Air Force flight mechanic Is silhouetted in the rear cargo doorway of e C-7A tollowong an aerial resupply mlssoon. (6) An airman 

loads napalm bombs pnor to a combat mosslon. 

249 
preparing and processing the usual 

supply requisition forms. Each functional package was to contain equipment and supplies to support a particular base operation. A food service 

package, for example, contained all 

equipment needed to outfit and operate a base mess hall. The Bitterwine 

concept called for the base buildup to 

proceed in three distinct phases. First, 

so-called "Gray Eagle" kits containing 

housekeeping equipment to support 

4,400 people in tent facilities were delivered to a new base. Next, temporary 

structures such as inflatable shelters 

and prefab buildings replaced the 

Gray Eagle installation. Finally, in the 

third phase, civilian contractors completed runway construction and built 

operational and support facilities and 

housing for a permanent base. 

During the course of Project Bitterwine -which ran from mid-July 1965 

to early 1967 -the Air Force put together and shipped more than 1,500 functional packages. In toto, they contained 346,000 different items. 

Purchased and shipped at a cost of 

about $82 million, they permitted early 

air operations from four new bases in 

Vietnam-Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang, 

Tuy Hoa, and Phu Cat-and two in 

Thailand, Nakhon Phanom and U Tapao. They also were used to upgrade 

13 others in those countries, Taiwan, 

and the Philippines. 

The amount of supplies required in 

Southeast Asia increased tremendously as combat operations expanded . During the first 6 months of 1965, 

more than 56,000 tons of materiel was 

delivered by ship to South Vietnam 

and Thailand. Deliveries amounted to 

592,554 tons in fiscal year 1966, to 

1,155,719 tons in fiscal year 1967, and 

reached a high of 1,697,315 tons in 

fiscal year 1969. Air cargo deliveries 

grew commensurately-from 5,929 

tons during the first 6 months in 1965 

to more than four times that amount in 

fiscal year 1966. In fiscal year 1969 

more than 48,000 tons of cargo were 

flown into the war zone. 

250 

The sheer volume of supply shipments to Southeast Asia-plus the total lack or general inadequacy of port, 

storage and handling facilities and 

accounting or sorting procedures, 

particularly at the forward bases-created immense problems and seriously 

complicated the operations of base 

and combat units. Many logistic organizations in the war zone simply 

were unable to cope with the vast 

amount of incoming materiel. 

Substantial portions of it were often 

unaccounted for, lost, or misplaced. In 

an attempt to overcome these problems, the Air Force recruited Rapid 

Area Supply Support (RASS) teams 

from among its military and civilian 

supply experts. These teams deployed 

to SEA for periods of 60 to 120 days 

and helped establish viable accounting, inventory, storage, and issue procedures and practices. 

The first RASS team-consisting of 

22 military personnel--departed for 

Clark AB on 23 June 1965 and returned to the United States 90 days 

later. Between January 1965 and the 

end of 1969, 138 teams (a total of 3,207 

people, 2,271 of them civilians) visited 

20 bases in the Fifth, Seventh, and 

Thirteenth Air Force areas and provided 293,063 man-days of expert assistance. Fifteen of the 20 bases were in 

South Vietnam·and Thailand. The other five were in the Philippines, Taiwan, 

Okinawa, Guam, and Korea. 

The Air Force also deployed special 

maintenance units-Rapid Area Maintenance (RAM) teams-to the theater 

to repair crash- and battle-damaged 

aircraft. A team normally consisted of 

18 military or civilian personnel highly 

skilled in repairing aircraft. The first 

RAM team deployed in April 1965 to 

repair two crash-damaged F-105 aircraft. The teams subsequently repaired 

885 aircraft which were returned to 

operational units, prepared another 88 

for one-time flights to repair shops, 

disassembled and crated 126 for shipment to repair centers, and declared 29 

irreparable and salvaged them for parts. 
The value of these aircraft totalled 

more than 1.7 billion dollars. During 

the course of these activities, four 

RAM civilians were killed in South 

Vietnam and one seriously wounded 

as a result of enemy action. 

Still another specialized logistic 

force dispatched to Southeast Asia by 

the Air Force was known as Rapid 

Area Transportation (RATS) teams. 

They helped to process backlogged 

priority cargo and trained Vietnamese 

civilians to do the work. Without their 

help, vital materials for isolated bases, 

outposts, and units would have been 

delayed or perhaps never received . 

A fourth specialized unit, the Installation and Checkout (I&C) team, assisted with the installation and checkout of equipment in base maintenance 

shops, precision measurement laboratories (PMEL's), and computer facilities. Between 1966 and 1969, for example, the Air Force installed UNIVAC 

1050-11 computers at 17 bases. They 

enabled base supply and maintenance 

personnel to process requisitions in 

hours instead of days, and to control 

assets and forecast future requirements. The availability of these computers also allowed USAF personnel 

to employ normal Air Force supply or 

"pull" system practices. 

Prime Beef and Red Horse 

The Air Force resorted to other 

kinds of special organizations-one 

temporary and one permanent- to 

undertake minor construction, improvement, and repair of base facilities. Prime Beef (Base Engineering 

Emergency Force), the first of these, 

consisted of teams of about 25 men 

sent on TOY to Southeast Asia. In 

August 1965 the first three Prime Beef 

teams left for South Vietnam , where 

they erected dirt-filled steel-ribbed 

revetments to protect aircraft from 

enemy mortar and automatic weapons 

fire. By 15 February 1968, more than 40 

teams-totalling more than 1,900engineers-had put in 120 days TOY in the 

combat area, performing urgent and 

emergency tasks of a base civil engineering nature. The Air Force eventually formalized the Prime Beef concept, forming teams and placing them 

on a stand-by basis for rapid deployment where they might be needed 

around the world . 

The more permanent units were 

known as Red Horse (Rapid Engineer 

Deployable, Heavy Operations Repair 

Squadrons, Engineer) squadrons or, 

more precisely, civil engineering 

squadrons. The first two 400-man 

squadrons, activated late in 1965, deployed to Southeast Asia early in 1966 

and initially engaged in construction 

of interim facilities such as combat 

centers, wing headquarters, and shops. 

Within a ear, the Air Force had established, trained, and deployed a total of 

six Red Horse units to the war zonefive to South Vietnam and one to Thailand. At the peak of their activity, their 

total strength included 2,400 military 

men and more than 6,000 local nationals. Their work included digging wells 

to obtain potable water, quarrying and 

crushing stones for roads and runways, repairing damage caused by 

enemy standoff mortar attacks, constructing and upgrading operational 

facilities and housing, and doing a 

host of other jobs for which contract 

assistance was not readily available. 

The rapid surge in requirements 

beginning in late 1964 and early 1965 

led the Air Force to improve the flow 

of munitions to Southeast Asia. At the 

time, the supply line stretched from 

California through the Philippines to 

Southeast Asian depots. Commercial 

transport vessels under contract to 

the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) carried the munitions destined for South Vietnam and Thailand 

to Subic Bay in the Philippines, where 

they were unloaded and hauled by 

truck to storage sites at Clark. The 

munitions were then hauled back to 

Subic Bay and loaded onto ships as 

requisitions came in from South Viet251 
2 

(1) Transport ships carrying construction materials and equipment 

to South Vietnam lay at anchor offshore while awaiting oflloading 

at Tuy Hoa AS. (2) A bomb storage area at Oa Nang AB. January 

1966. (3) An A-1E Skyraider detachment operated out ot Qui Nhon, 

South Vietnam in 1964-1965. (•) Saogon harbor served as a major 

port tor the receipt ol U.S. military equipment. (5) Oltloading an 

QV-10 FAC aircraft at Saigon. (6) Bombs unloaded from a ship at 

Guam lor use by 8-52 bombers. (7) uaing a Iori< lilt, a loading 

crew places a cargo pallet aboard a C.t30 transport at Tan Son 

Nhut. (8) 750-lb bombs are loaded on a s-52 at Andersen AFB. 

Guam. 

nam and Thailand. Thus, the system 

consumed about 150 days in getting 

munitions from California to the forward bases in Southeast Asia. 

To shorten the delivery cycle, Air 

Force logisticians again turned to 

special procedures, setting up Project 

Special Express. As originally established the project called for full-time 

assignment of MSTS vessels. These 

were loaded on the West Coast at 

scheduled intervals, moved to the 

Philippines to take on fresh water and 

provision, and then sailed to the coast 

of South Vietnam where they served 

as "floating warehouses." Then, as 

needed, munitions were unloaded 

onto U.S. Navy LCM (landing craft, 

medium) transports-manned by Air 

Force personnel- and taken to shore. 

Special Express reduced transit time 

by some 80 percent, from 150 to 30 

days. The first Special Express vessel 

departed Concord Naval Weapons 

Station, Calif., on 25 April 1965 and 

arrived at Nha Be, South Vietnam, in 

mid-May. The number of ships involved in Special Express grew to 15 

by May 1966. 

Improved munitions, including 250-

and 500-pound bombs, also were procured by the Air Force Logistics 

Command for the fighting units. It 

purchased in quantity a new fuze and 

warhead for the 2.75-inch rocket, an 

air-to-air weapon that was redesigned 

for air-to-ground strikes. Another item 

purchased was an aerial gun which 

fired at a rate of 6,000 rounds per minute, carried more ammunition than the 

gun it replaced, and was one-fourth the 

weight. 

In 1967-1968 two new fuzes were 

added to the USAF munitions inventory, the FMU-26 for general purpose 

bombs, and the FMU-54-used with 

the Mau-91 retarding fi~which improved the low-level delivery of ?50-

pound bombs. In 1969 the 10,000-

pound M-121 bomb, a veteran piece of 

ordnance developed during World 

War II, made its debut in Southeast 

Asia. Employed primarily to create in254 

stant helicopter landing zones in 

dense jungle areas of Southeast Asia, 

it was dropped by C-130 transports or 

helicopters. Also, in the last year of the 

war, the Air Force began using newly 

developed " guided bombs" with great 

effect. They enabled strike aircraft to 

destroy a number of key North Vietnamese bridges which had withstood 

repeated attacks by conventional 

gravity bombs. 

Modification of aircraft either at Air 

Force depots or contractor plants was 

another support function of importance to Air Force logisticians. 

Throughout the war, as operating 

shortcomings were found or appealThe Air Force Logistics 

Command initiated a ··spe- cial Express·· system of 

ocean go•ng vessels to carry 

numerous types of munitions 

to Southeast Asia. 

1 
(1) War munitions and supplies delivered to Andersen 

AFB, Guam. (2) Handling 

ordnance at Guam. 

months later, faced with a long-term 

requirement to employ its huge bomber in a conventional bombing mode, 

the Air Force directed modification of 

other B-52's to permit them to carry 

108 bombs at one time. 

Modification and conversion of the 

aged C-47 into a gunship with three 

7.62-mm miniguns on the port side of 

its fuselage provided added substance 

to the belief that this pre-World War It 

airplane was destined never to leave 

the skies. The first SEA missions in its 

new operational role were flown on 15 

December 1964. Its successes thereafter led to the conversion of C-119 

and G-130 aircraft into even more 2 sophisticated gunships. They proved 

indispensable in defending isolated 

outposts and camps under enemy 

siege, in escorting truck convoys, and 

providing close air support to friendly 

forces. 

ing technical innovations appeared, 

the Air Force would undertake modification of its aircraft. 

For example, in 1963 the Air Force 

initiated an evaluation of the B-52 as a 

conventional bomb carrier. During the 

following year, the Air Force and the 

Boeing Aircraft Company conducted a 

series of tests to determine the feasibility and desirability of so modifying 

the B-52. Test results were encouraging 

and modification of the first 30 

B-52F's began early in October 1964. 

These aircraft subsequently deployed 

to Andersen AFB, Guam, in February 

1965 and, as noted earlier, flew the 

first B-52 strikes on 18 June. Two 

How welt the Air Force fared in fulfilling the materiel requirements of its 

operational units in a pipeline more 

than 10,000 miles in length can be illustrated in part by examining a statistical criterion used by the logisticians to 

evaluate performance. For example, 

there was the Not Operational Ready, 

Supply, or NORS rate data, maintained for each kind of operational 

aircraft. In the case of Arc Light 

B-52's, aircraft out of commission for 

lack of parts exceeded the Department of Defense standard of 5 percent 

during less than one-fifth of the period 

between October 1965 and the end of 

1969. Of even greater significance, 

perhaps, was the fact that the Arc 

Light NORS rates were below the 

worldwide rates for more than half of 

the same period-some 29 months out 

of 51 . The Air Force achieved a similar 

NORS rate success with the F-1 00. 

The USAF logistical effort which got 

under way in 1961 and grew so tremendously after 1965 enabled the Air 

Force not only to support its combat 

forces at the end of a 1 0,000-mile pipeline but also America's allies in Southeast Asia. 

255 

Chapter XVI 

A1C David B Shark and his 

sentry dog stand · guard at 

Cam Ranh AS, South Vietnam, 1970. 

Base Defense 

In the Republic of Vietnam , the Air 

Force for the first time found itself 

flying combat missions from air bases 

which were repeatedly attacked by 

enemy ground forces. During previous 

conflicts, the Air Force had operated 

from relatively secure bases and had 

been free to concentrate exclusively 

on waging aerial warfare. But in the 

war without fronts that was fought in 

South Vietnam, U.S. and Vietnamese 

airmen found their bases and cantonments subjected to sudden enemy attacks, requ iring a vigilant defense at 

all times. 

When the first USAF crews arrived 

in South Vietnam in 1961 , the VNAF 

installations where they became tenants did not appear to be in any danger. Indeed, during the first 3 years of 

Air Force operations, the Viet Cong 

ignored the bases. In the early 1960's, 

USAF officials also operated on the 

premise that any threat to men and 

planes would be of a clandestine nature. Thus, they gave their attention to 

traditional internal base security, 

e.g., requiring all personnel entering 

the facility to have identifi cation 

badges and limiting them to their own 

work areas. 

Lack of a clear understanding of th& 

base defense responsibilities of ARVN 

and U.S. forces in Vietnam eventually 

became a problem. The job was tacitly 

acknowledged to be the Vietnamese 

Army's responsibility. ARVN troops 

were expected to provide area and 

local defense, while the Vietnamese 

Air Force handled internal airfield 

security. These arrangements were 

satisfactory up to the sum mer of 1964, 

when the first U.S. retaliatory air 

strikes were launched against North 

Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin 

incident. The latter apparently triggered the first enemy attack on Vietnamese bases where large American 

units were located. 

Thus at 0025 hours on 1 November 

1964, the VietCong launched a standoff mortar attack against Bien Hoa, a 

major USAF operating location northeast of Saigon. Using six 81-mm mortars emplaced less than 440 yards outside the northern perimeter of the 

base, Communist gunners fired between 60 and 80 rounds into the base 

and swiftly departed, undetected and 

unmolested. The damage inflicted was 

out of all proportion to the effort expended. Four Ameri can personnel 

were killed and 72 wounded. Five B-57 

jet bombers were totally destroyed. 

eight sustained major damage, and 

seven others minor damage. Four 

USAF H-43 helicopters and three 

VNAF A-1 H fighter bombers also were 

damaged. Only departure of one B-57 

squadron from Bien Hoa the week 

before prevented even more extensive 

losses. This attack proved to be but 

the first of many launched against 

USAF facilities during the next 8 years. 

The Enemy Threat 

For the most part, the enemy 

planned, organized, rehearsed, and 

executed air base attacks in a highly 

professional manner. Initially, the Viet 

Cong conducted the raids. However, 

after suffering heavy casualties during 

the 1968 Tet offensive, they were increasingly supplanted by NVA personnel, who were better traine~ . equipped, 

and motivated. Both forces, however, 

responded to a single control, employed the same tactics, and used the 

same type of weapons and equipment. 

In planning an attack, the enemy's 

first task was to collect maximum in257 
telligence about a base. Special attention was given to allied defense 

forces, their organization, operation, 

equipment and morale, safeguards, 

fortifications, the attitude of the local 

population, and routes to and from the 

facility. Much of this intelligence was 

obtained from local sympathizers or 

agents living near or employed on the 

base. One of the more sensational 

examples of this type of espionage 

occurred at Tan Son Nhut where the 

enemy successfully recruited a lieutenant of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces, who worked in the 

Joint Operations Center at Tan Son 

Nhut and had access to the entire allied order of battle. 

Specially trained military reconnaissance teams also were used to 

obtain additional information about a 

target. Under exceptional circumstances, personnel from such units were 

infiltrated into the base to gather vital 

information not otherwise obtainable. 

Several such incursions were thwarted at Bien Hoa and Phu Cat when security police detected and captured 

the infiltrators. Occasionally, the 

enemy would try to intercept radio and 

telephone communications seeking 

base defense intelligence. To locate 

and identify the type of allied weapons 

available and reaction time of artillery, 

the Communists would engage base 

defenders with sniper or harassing 

fires or small unit probes to provoke a 

response. Intelligence gathered in this 

fashion, combined with information on 

enemy manpower and materiel resources, became the basis for the 

plan of operation and organization of 

the attack force. Normally the proposed attack was extensively rehearsed beforehand. To preserve secrecy, participating troops were rarely 

told the identity of the target until the 

final approach march was under way. 

The Communists conducted four 

types of operations against allied air 

bases: standoff attacks, sapper raids, 

mass attacks, and sabotage. The standoff attack, lasting from 1 to 20 min258 

utes, was the most common, cost 

effective, and simple of the four operations, and allowed the attack force to 

evade defensive fire from the base. 

Through 1966 enemy standoff weapons consisted of 60-mm, 82-mm and 

120-mm mortars plus 57-mm, 75-mm 

and 82-rnm recoilless rifles. In February 1967 an attack on Da Nang AB 

marked introduction of 107-mm, 122-

mm, and 140-mm rockets as the principal Communist standoff weapons, 

which gave the enemy additional flexibility and greater firepower. 

Sapper raids against allied bases 

were initiated on 1 July 1965, also at 

Da Nang. The intent of these operations was to use small numbers of 

men to produce extensive materiel 

damage rather than casualties. 

Stealth, not firepower or numbers, was 

relied upon to penetrate perimeter 

defenses, reach the objectives, and 

place the explosive charges that were 

the basic sapper weapon. If all went 

well, the operation lasted no longer 

than 30 minutes. The mission was to 

hit and run, not to engage the enemy. 

The enemy sapper was not a guerrilla 

but a carefully selected, well trained, 

and highly disciplined combat engineer. The sapper standard of performance was illustrated by a February 

1969 incident at Phu Cat. A wounded 

sapper captured by security police 

related that during the rehearsal for 

the attack, his company commander 

warned that anyone who jeopardized 

the success of the mission would be 

shot. Accordingly, when the prisoner 

detonated a trip flare, the commander 

shot him. 

Mass attacks by multi-battalion 

forces with the goal of seizing and 

holding allied air bases were mounted 

on only one occasion against Tan Son 

Nhut and Bien Hoa as part of the 

Communist 1968 Tet offensive. It was 

one of the enemy's rare failures to 

achieve tactical surprise (see discussion below, pp. 265-269). 

Sabotage, the technique most 

commonly associated with insurgent 
activity and originally considered the 

principal threat by American officials, 

was seldom employed against air bases. Indeed, the only truly noteworthy 

case of sabotage occurred on 8 February 1967 when the napalm bomb 

stockpile at Bien Hoa was exploded by 

devices of Soviet manufacture. How 

they were brought into the munitions 

storage area was never established. 

The previous day, however, when the 

devices were most likely emplaced , 

only 9 of 27 Vietnamese workers reported for duty, a circumstance which 

suggests that most had prior knowledge of the plan to destroy the stockpile. However, enemy activity of this 

nature was a minimal threat to base 

security. For example, during 1968-a 

year of intensive Communist operations-not a single incidence of actual 

or attempted sabotage was reported 

by a USAF installation. 

Allied Defenses 

Almost all USAF resources in 

South Vietnam were located on 10 

major air bases. Six of them-Da Nang, 

Pleiku, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Tan Son 

Nhut, and Binh Thuy-were joint-use 

installations with the Air Force a tenant of the Vietnamese Air Force. The 

other four- Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, Cam 

Ranh Bay, and Phan Rang-were constructed between 1965 and 1967 for 

use by the U.S. Air Force alone. The 

older bases were situated in urban 

areas where dense population provided ideal cover for enemy operations 

and prohibited or severely restricted 

defensive fire. These same bases 

usually were saturated with personnel 

and aircraft and thus presented attractive targets. 

New bases, though less congested, 

were sited without much regard for 

defense considerations. Phu Cat, for 

example, overlapped three districts, 

thereby necessitating triple coordination of security operations with local 

officials. A universal and unending 

problem was the control of the dense 

vegetation which concealed enemy 

movements and obscured fields of 

fire. Physical safeguards were either 

lacking or inadequate. A POL pipeline 

laid from the coast to Phu Cat couldn't 

be used because of sabotage and 

theft. Only at Da Nang, where the 

U.S. Marines installed perimeter barriers and lighting systems, was a satisfactory defense posture established. One feature of the Da Nang 

defense complex was unique. To 

detect and intercept enemy sapper 

and standoff forces, the Marines 

joined with ARVN troops to construct 

and man a 28-mile anti-infiltration 

barrier which enclosed the air base 

on the landward side. 

The Air Force interpreted its base 

defense responsibilities in accordance with guidelines laid down by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. These provided 

that local air base defense was the 

responsibility of the local Air Force 

commander. On this basis, the Air 

Force took the position that its responsibility ended at the base boundary and that outside that line, the area 

ground commander was responsible 

for defense operations. But in the 

absence of a combined command 

structure, genuine coordination of 

area and local defense always was 

problematical. Again the notable exception was at Da Nang, where the 

dual responsibility of the Marine 

commander for both area and local 

defense resulted in the only truly unified base defense operation within 

South Vietnam. Thus, when the JCS 

rejected a proposal that U.S. ground 

forces be assigned to defend USAF 

bases in Vietnam, the Air Force in late 

1965 began creating an organic base 

defense force, which ultimately grew 

to a strength of 5,000 personnel. 

As this defense force accumulated 

combat experience and knowledge of 

enemy tactics, USAF officials came up 

with a three-zone base defense concept tailored to counter the Communist threat. Under this concept, static 

and mobile elements were deployed in 

259 
6 
10 

11 

(1) Sgt David T. Hanson sets a trip flare along the perimeter of 

Hill 151 overlooking Phu Cat AB, South Vietnam, 1970. (2) A2C 

Bruce L. Hoffman examines the body of a VietCong Infiltrator 

he had killed during an attempted attack at Tan Son Nhut AB, 

1966 (3) Capt. 0. Wise, chief of an explosive ordnance disposal 

team, disarms a VIet Cong Claymore land mine found during 

a perimeter sweep of the Tan Son Nhut Aa (4) U.S. and VIet· 

namese security troops stand on alert at Tan Son Nhut behind 

a sandbag bunker on the base perimeter. The Americans are 

(I or.~ A1C Major Wingfield and A1C Douglas M. Terry, both 

members of the 6250th Air Pollee Squadron, 1966. (5) In July 1967 

the VIetCong attacked Da Nang AB with rockets. This aerial 

view of the parking ramp shows damage done to aircraft located 

there. (6) Members of the 3nth Security Police Squadron at Tan 

Son Nhut take up posotions to repulse VietCong Infiltration of 

the base. (7) Despite dorect hits by enemy rockets launched dur· 

lng the enemy 1968 Tet offensive, this Bi en Hoa AB bunkercompletely surrounded during a 7-hour attack- remained In 

allied hands. (8) Air Force Lt. Col. Eugene J. Kelly (1.) and Army 

Sgt Lorenzo Beckwith Inspect a captured Soviet rocket launcher, 

part of a Communist cache found near Bien Hoa AB. (9) An 

enemy mortar attack on Tan Son Nhut In April t966 demolished 

this Vietnamese Air Force C-47, (10) This USAF sentry dog, 

Nemo, returned to the United States from VIetnam in Jul y 1967 

to a hero's welcome. The previous December, while on patrol 

at Tan Son Nhut, he detected four Viet Cong Infiltrators, who 

opened fire and hit both the dog and his handler, A1C Robert 

A. Throneburg. Throne burg commanded Nemo to charge. The 

powerful German shepherd, despite a head wound, killed two 

of the Intruders. (11) An enemy mortar and rocket attack in 

February 1966 destroyed a C-47 transport at Tan Son Nhut. 
a sectorized defense in depth, which 

was designed to contain and destroy 

any enemy forces that penetrated the 

base. The outermost zone consisted 

of a complex of barriers, mines, lights, 

flares, and observation points. The 

intermediate zone contained bunkers 

manned by armed USAF security police 

and was patrolled by mobile security 

alert teams and sentry dogs. A final protective line-Including barriers, lights, 

bunkers. and foot and mobile patrolswas maintained at the boundaries of 

areas containing essential combat 

resources, e.g., aircraft. munitions, 

fuel. Heavily armed and mobile quick 

reaction teams were kept on standby 

alert to reinforce any part of the system. 

The key to USAF base defenses was 

the individual security policeman. uniformly young, inexperienced and untrained in the weapons and skills of 

ground combat, but also alert. enthusiastic, and completely reliable. The 

valor with which he responded to the 

enemy challenge and the stoicism 

with which he endured the mindnumbing daily routine of his unglamorous calling quite properly evoked 

commendations from the highest 

quarters. His efforts more than any 

others accounted for success of the 

USAF base defense missio_n. 

The organization of the 10 security 

police squadrons deployed to South 

Vietnam differed little from that of 

their counterparts at home. It consisted of three flights, each permanently 

assigned to one of the three 8-hour 

shifts. By January 1966 it was customary to employ 50 percent or more of 

the security force on the 2000-0400 

hour shift, the high threat period. To 

offset the loss of continuity resulting 

from the 1-year tour and to promote 

detection of indicators that might precede an enemy attack, most security 

policemen were retained in stabilized 

duty assignments in a single sector. 

The closest approximation to a tactical element to emerge from this nontactical organization was the 13-man 

262 

quick reaction team, an ad hoc reserve formation analogous to an infantry squad. Available as auxiliary 

U.S. defense forces were select personnel drawn from other combat support group units and from tenant U.S. 

Army organizations. At Oa Nang this 

arrangement was essentially reversed : 

USAF security policemen augmented 

U.S. Marine base defense forces. 

Beginning in 1966 these ground 

elements were increasingly supplemented by aerial components of all 

U.S. forces and VNAF which flew reconnaissance, illumination, and fire 

support missions in a base defense 

role. Among the most successful applications of air power to base defense 

was the Rocket Watch which between 

1968-1970 was largely responsible for 

deterring, detecting, or suppressing 

standoff attacks in the Saigon-Tan 

Son Nhut-Bien Hoa area. 

Even as the Air Force began building up its air base security police 

squadrons, the enemy continued their 

successful standoff attacks. Thus, on 

13 April1966 Tan Son Nhut was hit by 

one of the most intensive and destructive assaults of the war. Late the preceding day, a Communist attack force 

numbering about 90 men moved undetected to preselected firing positions located about half a mile outside 

the base perimeter. There they 

placed at least three 75-mm recoilless rifles and ten 81 / 82-mm mortars 

at three sites. Then, within a span of 

13 minutes beginning at 0027 hours 

they fired no less than 245 rounds 

into the base. Its mission accomplished, the force withdrew without 

sustaining a single casualty. 

Seven Americans and two South 

Vietnamese died that night and 184 

U.S. personnel were wounded. One 

USAF C-123 and 2 VNAF C-47 aircraft 

were destroyed; 29 USAF aircraft of 

various types were damaged; a fuel 

storage tank containing 420,000 gallons of gasoline was set ablaze and 

destroyed; and 34 USAF vehicles were 

destroyed or damaged. 
There was no reliable tactical warning. Vietnamese and U.S. forces alike 

showed their incapacity to cope with 

enemy standoff attacks even on the 

doorstep of the capital. Fragmented 

ARVN external defense elements never made contact with the enemy. U.S. 

reaction forces failed to place ordnance on the enemy mortar positions, 

hence the battery of ARVN 105-mm 

howitzers it supported never went into 

action. Also, the need to obtain prior 

South Vietnamese clearance for 

ground and air units to engage enemy 

forces actively assaulting allied installations contributed to the failure to 

engage the attackers. 

Remedial actions subsequently focused on Tan Son Nhut. Prodded by 

USMACV, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff reorganized its external defense forces to centralize control in 

the VNAF wing commander, who was 

designated the commander of Tan 

Son Nhut " sensitive area." In this latter capacity, he also was vested with 

authority to approve fire missions. The 

sensitive area concept became a 

standard pattern for air base defense. 

But only at Tan Son Nhut was the 

commander authorized to clear fires 

on his own authority. Elsewhere, detailed coordination with frequently 

unresponsive district and province 

chiefs remained the rule. 

After the 13 April attack, a USAF AC47 gunship began flying nightly airborne alerts in the Bien Hoa-Tan Son 

Nhut area. Also, U.S. Army gunships 

on ground alert were assigned revetted parking space away from the heliport. All American and Vietnamese 

defense forces were directed to integrate their activities by the publication 

of a single combined plan. However, 

the guiding principle was not allied 

unity of command but coordination 

and cooperation. 

These actions did not prevent Tan 

Son Nhut from being hit again during 

the early morning hours of 4 December 1966 by the largest sapper raid to 

date and the first since the 1 July 1965 

sapper attack on Da Nang described 

above. The first indication the base 

was under attack came at 0110 hours 

when a USAF sentry dog handler reported unidentified personnel on his 

post in the interior of the base. Subsequent investigation and prisoner interrogation disclosed that the sapper 

raiding party consisted of 2 support 

platoons totalling 58 men and 1 assault platoon with a strength of 34. All 

belonged to parent main force battalions operating from a Communist 

stronghold about 11 miles southwest 

of Tan Son Nhut. Two days earlier 

members of this force had been told of 

the attack and briefed on the target 

with the aid of " sandtable studies." 

Their objective was the destruction of 

Allied aircraft "to prove the Viet Gong 

were winning and to heighten the 

morale of VC soldiers and cadres." 

Departing their base in the early 

evening of 2 December 1966, the platoons arrived at a friendly village some 

6 miles west of the base early the next 

morning. There they remained unreported for 15 hours, then departed for 

Tan Son Nhut which they reached at 

midnight. The assault platoon cut 

through three barbed wire fences 

undetected by a nearby Vietnamese 

guard post and entered the base followed by an unknown number of men 

from the support platoons. While advancing southward toward the aircraft 

parking ramp on the far side of the 

main runway, they were fired on by the 

USAF security police who had responded to the alarm of the sentry dog 

handler. At this point the assault platoon split into two groups which continued toward the ramp by different 

routes. Thirteen sappers were killed 

when they came within range of a 

security police machinegun position 

at the close-in boundary of the parking area. 

The other group of sappers was not 

detected until it had reached the 

ramp. Supported by mortar fire they 

inflicted minor damage before they 

were driven off by security police, 

263 
close-in sentries, and patrols. Leaving 

behind one dead, the sappers withdrew along their entry route. Thirty 

minutes had elapsed since they were 

first detected. By 0210 reaction forces 

of security police and tenant U.S. 

Army troops had been deployed in 

accordance with contingency plans. 

A security blocking force was across 

the enemy withdrawal route near the 

opening cut in the perimeter fence. To 

reopen the escape route for their comrades, elements of the support platoons engaged the security police 

with automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades, and hand grenades. 

With support from Army gunships, the 

security police maintained their position and returned intensive fire. 

Failing in their effort, the enemy support elements withdrew, abandoning 

the remnants of the sappers trapped 

inside the base. 

The U.S. Army countermortar radar 

located the oft-base mortar sites and 

directed counterfire by ARVN artillery 

and USA gunships. Illumination was 

furnished by USAF AC-47 gunships 

which expended 490 flares between 

0120 and 0650 hours. At no time did 

South Vietnamese internal security 

forces engage the enemy. At daybreak 

four more enemy troops were sighted 

and taken prisoner; no other survivors 

were found. Thereafter, the base returned to normal operation until 2021 

hours 4 December 1966 when security 

police killed nine more enemy sappers 

who had concealed themselves in the 

dense vegetation. 

In this action 3 USAF security police 

were killed and 15 wounded. ARVN 

forces lost three killed and four 

wounded. Twenty U.S. aircraft sustained minor damage estimated to 

total $64,230. Five security police vehicles were destroyed. Communist casualties were 28 killed. Four prisoners 

and a sizable quantity of enemy weapons and munitions were taken. In the 

words of the USMACV Combat Operations Log, the 4-5 December 1966 

engagement was one in which "the 

264 

brunt of a highly successful ground 

operation [was) borne by the U.S. Air 

Force with close air support furnished 

by the U.S. Army." 

In the early spring of 1967 the 

Communists began using a new weapon which substantially increased the 

problems of air base defense. It was 

unveiled at 0310 hours 27 February 

when Da Nang was subjected to another standoff strike. In this attack fifty-six 140-m m rockets hit the base 

proper while eight others fell in an 

adjacent village. The operation, lasting less than 60 seconds, killed 11 U.S. 

personnel and wounded 125. Thirteen 

aircraft and various facilities were 

damaged. In the Da Nang village 35 

people were killed and 50 wounded. 

This was the first Communist use of 

rockets in South Vietnam. A detailed 

account of the organization and execution of the attack was obtained 

from captured prisoners. The firing 

positions, located nearly 9,000 yards 

southwest of the base, were selected 

by a skilled and well-trained team on 

the afternoon of 26 February. 

Concurrently, the rockets were 

brought in by porters and rivercraft to 

the launch site, arriving at 2300 hours. 

Some 4 hours later, upon completion 

of final site preparation and weapon 

assembly, the rockets were fired. The 

rounds were fuzed at the super-quick 

setting which provided maximum 

shrapnel effect and the greatest damage to aircraft. Although more than 

500 enemy troops were involved in 

this attack, the operation was not 

compromised. 

This use of rockets, which during 

1967 came to include 107-mm and 

122-mm varieties, gave the Communists more firepower and flexibility 

since these weapons had a greater 

range and could be fired remotely and 

simultaneously in large numbers from 

crude improvised launchers. In response to this threat, the Air Force 

increased its AC-47 gunship fleet by 

50 percent- from 22 to 33 aircraftand expanded and accelerated con-
struction of aircraft revetments and 

personnel shelters. 

The 1968 Tet Offensive 

The most sensational of all enemy 

operations mounted against U.S. bases during the war were the multi-battalion attacks on Tan Son Nhut and 

Bien Hoa during the 1968 Tet offensive. By launching this major offensive 

during the festivities celebrating the 

Vietnamese lunar new year, the enemy 

clearly hoped to achieve maximum 

tactical surprise. In this he was disappointed. A variety of sources-captured documents, prisoners, and defectors-all indicated the Communist 

intention to attack population centers 

and military installations. Accordingly, 

the Americans and Vietnamese concentrated maneuver battalions around 

Saigon in expectation of a Tet attack. 

In a message released the morning of 

30 January 1968, USMACV cancelled 

the Tet truce, ordered resumption of 

full-scale military operations, and directed all installations and air bases 

to assume a maximum security posture. However, the allies did not anticipate the true magnitude of the impending offensive. At Bien Hoa the 

enemy committed two infantry battalions and one reinforced infantry company; at Tan Son Nhut, one sapper 

and four infantry battalions. In each 

case, North Vietnamese troops were a 

sizable percentage of the attacking 

force. 

The enemy infiltration into the area 

surrounding Saigon and the two air 

bases was facilitated by the increased 

number of holiday travelers and by 

the jungle terrain. Except for the few 

radial roads emanating from Saigon, 

the city is bounded on the north, west, 

and east by a combination of paddies, 

jungles and swamps interlaced by 

waterways. These waterways provided excellent avenues for clandestine 

approach to the capital and its environs. In crossing this terrain, Communist units that engaged Bien Hoa, 

Tan Son Nhut, and other targets in 

the Saigon area made normal tactical 

marches over established routes, 

through established base camps and 

known base areas. These troops 

were held in assembly areas 9 to 12 

hours marching distance from their 

targets for the coordinated assault. 

Apart from avoiding detection on 

approach, enemy units attacked their 

targets overtly, preceded or accompanied by supporting fires and supplementary attacks. 

Thus, at approximately 0300 hours 

31 January 1968 Bien Hoa was hit by 

35 rounds of 122-mm rocket and 10 

rounds of 82-mm mortar fire. Almost 

simultaneously a sentry dog handler 

near the southeast perimeter reported 

the base was being penetrated. 

Approaching from the southeast an 

enemy force estimated at eight companies breached the perimeter at four 

points but was thwarted in a fifth attempt by fire from U.S. Army gunships. 

A concrete pillbox located directly in 

the path of the main penetration force 

became a center of resistance. Unable 

to capture this bunker, which remained in security police hands 

throughout, the attackers were caught 

in a crossfire when they bypassed it in 

an effort to reach the flight line without delay. By 0400 hours the enemy 

penetration was halted just east of the 

flight line complex by security police 

and augmentee blocking forces vigorously supported by Army gunships. 

Consequently, the enemy force never 

reached the aircraft parking area, its 

prime objective. 

At dawn on 31 January 1968 there 

were only three centers of enemy resistance: a revetted engine test stand, 

the dearming pad, both east of the 

flight line complex, and an estimated 

reinforced squad located near a penetration point on the eastern perimeter. 

A counterattack by security police and 

other security personnel cleared the 

test stand and, supported by 57-mm 

recoilless rifle fire, subsequently regained control of the dearming pad. 

265 
(1) An Air Force sentry and his German shepherd watch 

an Air Force ~C Phantom jet land at Cam Ranh Bay. 

(2) An Air Force security alert team checks a sentry dog 

post for possible enemy activity. ShOwn (t. to r.): Airmen 

First Class Freeman Tilden, Francis A. Jasinski, Joseph 

A. LeBlanc. On far right Is A1C Leon E. Senecal, with 

his sentry dog, Rex. (3) An enemy attack on Qui Nhon 

AB destroyed a number of U.S. aircraft Including this 

A·1E Skyraider. (4) Remains of tne hulk of what was an 

Air Force C·130A aircraft destroyed by enemy rockets 

at Da Nang, 1967. (5) An Air Force sentry, silhouetted 

In the light from a search beacon, mans a perimeter 

post on the outskirts of Da Nang Aa (6) An Air Force 

security policeman and his sentry dog silhouetted 

against the setting sun at Phan Rang AB. 

Supported by Army gunships, a final 

sweep of the field to the eastern perimeter terminated all enemy resistance on base at 1640 hours. Damage 

from enemy standoff weapons included 2 USAF aircraft destroyed and 

20 damaged. Air Force casualties 

totalled 4 killed, 26 wounded. Enemy 

losses inside the air base were 139 

killed and 25 taken prisoner. In the 

Bien Hoa area enemy losses were 

1,164 killed and 98 captured. 

That same day, one of the most significant air base battles of the war was 

fought at Tan Son Nhut. The strength 

of the enemy force, his tactics, and 

post-battle investigations indicated 

the Communists intended to overrun 

and occupy the base. The capture of 

Tan Son Nhut along with Headquarters MACV, Seventh Air Force, VNAF, 

and the adjoining South Vietnamese 

Joint General Staff compound could 

well have been the key to Communist 

seizure of Saigon. 

The attack on Tan Son Nhut, coordinated with other strikes into Saigon 

and its environs, commenced at 0320 

hours 31 January 1968 when enemy 

forces initiated probes at various 

points around the entire perimeter. 

The main assault was concentrated 

against the southwest perimeter midway between Gate No. 051 and a concrete pillbox, Bunker 051 , the latter 

manned by USAF security police. 

Following a barrage of grenades and 

mortar rounds, sappers who had approached the perimeter along National Highway No. 1 in a Mabretta taxi, 

detonated a Bangalore torpedo to 

breach the fence line. This opening 

became the entry port for Communist 

troops into Tan Son Nhut. A last transmission was received from Bunker 051 

at 0344 hours. Shortly thereafter, all 

defenders having been killed, the position was overrun and converted to 

an enemy strongpoint. 

At approximately 0600 hours the 

attack reached its high water mark, 

enemy forces having penetrated eastward 650 yards into the base where 

268 

they established a north-south line 

about 330 yards in length. At that point 

the attackers were halted and contained by a blocking force of USAF 

security police and personnel from 

tenant Army units supported by fire 

from helicopter gunships. After some 

delay due to unsatisfactory radio 

communications, friendly artillery and 

mortars were cleared to engage the 

enemy on the western perimeter. 

When three VNAF-controlled light 

tanks were committed in an effort to 

dislodge the enemy from Bunker 051 , 

two were immediately destroyed by 

rocket-propelled grenades and the 

third forced to retire. In time the U.S. 

blocking force was augmented by two 

ARVN airborne companies. 

Between 0630 and 0800 hours two 

troops of U.S. cavalry and one battery 

of U.S. 1 05-mm artillery arrived on the 

scene after fighting their way along 

Highway No. 1 from their base camp at 

Cu Chi, 18 miles northwest of Tan Son 

Nhut. All friendly forces launched a 

coordinated counterattack forcing the 

enemy to fall back from the base. 

Much of the fire cover for this withdrawal came from Bunker 051 which 

remained in enemy hands until it was 

successfully assaulted and taken by 

USAF security police elements at 1210 

hours. At 1217 hours the breach in the 

western perimeter was closed and 

secured. Fighting on the east and 

southeast perimeter continued until 

1300 hours when those areas also 

were declared secure, bringing the 

engagement to a successful conclusion. The performance of ARVN air 

base defense forces showed little improvement. A Combat After Action 

Report noted that a number of the 

South Vietnamese personnel assigned 

to static perimeter defense positions 

in the vicinity of the enemy penetration deserted their posts. 

Friendly casualties included 4 USAF 

security police, 19 U.S. Army, and 32 

South Vietnamese troops killed. 

Eleven Air Force security police, 75 

U.S. Army troops, and 79 Vietnamese 
An Aor Force sentry and his 

dog. 

were wounded . Thirteen U.S. aircraft 

received minor damage from standoff 

weapons. Enemy forces lost 962 personnel killed and 9 taken prisoner. 

The successful defense of Bien Hoa 

and Tan Son Nhut was attributed 

chiefly to the advanced tactical warning which triggered the mobilization 

and deployment of U.S. air base defense forces. Even so, the allied failure 

to estimate accurately the true scale of 

the Communist effort meant that these 

anticipatory countermeasures did not 

provide any margin for safety. To avert 

a repetition of this predicament, security police units were directed by 

PACAF to monitor all information on 

enemy activities within an 18-mile radius of each air base. This procedure 

reduced but did not eliminate the 

problem of timely and well defined 

tactical warning. 

The USAF concept of close-in internal security was sufficiently discredited to be replaced in South Vietnam by 

a PACAF concept of local base defense applicable to the type of threat 

encountered in an insurgent environment. Since air base defense training 

conducted in the United States and 

South Vietnam appeared to be inadequate, Seventh Air Force undertook to 

provide its own instruction at a Heavy 

Weapons and Small Unit Tactics 

School. In the materiel area, armored 

cars, armored personnel carriers, 

heavier weapons (81-mm mortars, 90-

mm recoilless rifles, .50-cal. machineguns), and a four-channel, non-tactical radio net were added to the security police equipment inventory. 

The 1968 Tet offensive also pointed 

to the need for a mobile, in-country 

base defense contingency force that 

could be deployed quickly to any facility where the threat was particularly 

grave or where security force effectiveness was critically reduced by prolonged duty in advanced alert status. 

At the urgent request of Seventh Air 

Force, Headquarters USAF accelerated activation of security forces to provide the desired defenses. Three combat security police squadrons were 

formed and rotated this duty in South 

Vietnam between April 1968 and 

March 1971 when, due to force withdrawals and related defense budget 

reduction, the program was 

scrapped. During the 2 years that followed, the bulk of USAF units departed the area. As for Air Force base defense forces, they had reached peak 

strength and effectiveness in 1969. 

Repeatedly proven in combat, the 10 

security police squadrons that were 

the core of the defense effort had 

earned a memorable and distinguished place in USAF annals. 

269 

Chapter XVII 

Wounded servoceman Is car· 

ried down a ramp at an Air 

Force base where he will be 

hospotallzed until he recovers 

from his wounds 

Medical Support 

The first Air Force medical officer 

sent to South Vietnam arrived on 4 

December 1961 , several weeks after 

the first Farm Gate aircraft reached 

that country. He was Maj. George 

Haworth, brought in from the Air 

Force Academy and initially detailed 

to the American Dispensary in Saigon. 

This facility was operated by the U.S. 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

and manned by doctors from the U.S. 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department. Early in 1962 Major Haworth 

was reassigned to the MAAG's Air 

Force Section and later to 2d ADVON 

and its successor, 2d Air Division. 

In May 1962 Haworth became commander of the first USAF medical facility in South Vietnam. Located at Tan 

Son Nhut, it consisted of a tactical 

hospital of 14 tents and 36 beds flown 

in from Thailand. An interim facility, it 

was subsequently replaced by a 10-

bed Class A dispensary and, in October 1962, designated the 6220th USAF 

Dispensary. Its staff consisted of five 

doctors, one dentist, and one veterinarian under the command of Haworth. A sixth USAF doctor was assigned to the Saigon dispensary. The 

Air Force also had deployed to Bien 

Hoa and Da Nang medical teams consisting of one USAF officer and three 

enlisted men to provide medical support to Air Force personnel there. 

Soon after the first USAF C-123's 

arrived at Tan Son Nhut, the Air Force 

opened an aeromedical evacuation 

control center on the base manned 

by two technicians from the Japanbased 9th Aeromedical Evacuation 

Squadron. One C-123 was kept on 24-

hour alert to respond to emergency 

requests for evacuation, while others 

stowed two unrigged litters aboard for 

emergency use. Beginning in November 1962, the center scheduled weekly 

C-123 aeromedical evacuation missions between the U.S. Army's 8th 

Field Hospital at Nha Trang and Tan 

Son Nhut. Other C-123's flying resupply missions to South Vietnamese 

outposts frequently evacuated the 

sick and wounded to Saigon. In March 

1962 C-130's began evacuating patients from South Vietnam to Clark AB 

in the Phi lippines, and in May they 

began weekly flights between Clark 

and Tan Son Nhut. Subsequently, the 

Air Force also established a C-130 

route into Thailand, using an aeromedical evacuation control center at Don 

Muang. During the next 2 years, as 

U.S. units became more deeply involved in combat, the number of 

American casualties and evacuation 

flights from the theater rose. 

Following the August 1964 Gulf of 

Tonkin incident, PACAF's 1st Medical 

Service Wing at Clark AB ordered several squadron medical elements from 

Japan and Okinawa to Southeast Asia. 

Element 1, Detachment 1-consisting 

of a captain, sergeant, and two airmen 

-departed Yokota AB, Japan, on 7 

August for Bien Hoa to support B-57 

squadrons which had arrived there the 

previous day. Medical Element 1 remained at Bien Hoa 15 months and 

won commendation for its conduct 

and care of casualties suffered during 

the devastating 1 November 1964 Viet 

Cong standoff mortar attack on the 

base. It was replaced in November 

1965 by another element of Detachment 4, 1st Medical Service Wing, 

based at Kadena AB, Okinawa. 

On 7 August 1964 Squadron Element 2 also departed Yokota for Korat, 

Thailand, to support an F-1 05 squadron deployed there. The same day, the 

1st Medical Service Wing dispatched a third element from Naha 

AB, Okinawa, to Bien Hoa. Because of 

271 
the lack of office space, this element 

was forced to operate out of a South 

Vietnamese dispensary. During its 

brief tour ending on 27 October 1964, 

the unit treated 226 patients. It also 

instituted a program of malaria prophylaxis whereby all USAF personnel 

were required to take 0.5 grams of 

chloroquine each week. Medical personnel dispensed the tablets in dining 

halls and crew briefing rooms. 

In 1965 malaria was the major medical problem facing American forces in 

Vietnam, its incidence rising to the 

point where it was a significant military problem as well. Prior to 1965, 

malaria attack rates among Americans 

were negligible. But as large numbers 

of newly-arrived U.S. Army and Marine 

troops began moving into the countryside for combat, the rates rose to 8 

and 16 per 1000 a year-with a sharp 

increase to 73 per 1000 in September, 98 in October, and a further increase to more than 100 in November. 

On the other hand, the Air Force did 

not have a serious malaria problem. In 

1963 there were no cases among Air 

Force personnel in Vietnam ; in 1965 

there were less than 15. The likeliest 

explanations, aside from the fact that 

there were fewer USAF personnel in 

South Vietnam compared to Army and 

Marine troops, were that the former 

were on duty at fixed bases in relatively secure areas where mosquito and 

other malaria control measures were 

easier to implement than in the field 

and jungle areas. Also, most airfields 

were located in the flat lowlands or 

coastal areas of South Vietnam where 

there was much less malaria than in 

the foothills and plateau areas where 

ground troops operated. 

But Air Force personnel did begin to 

suffer from an upsurge of chronic sinusitis and other common respiratory 

diseases, attributable in part to the 

extremely wet and extremely dry seasons. During the monsoon season, 

humidity was very high; personnel 

could be drenched several times daily 

272 

from the frequent showers and/or 

through excessive perspiration. In the 

dry season, heavy wind-blown dust 

resulted in irritation of mucous membranes. The nature of military operations also required personnel to be in 

almost constant motion-by air and, 

increasingly, by surface travel. Thus, 

changes from wet to dry seasons 

could be experienced in a single day 

by personnel travelling from north to 

south or vice versa. In air travel, there 

was the added factor of rapid cooling 

as the perspiring individual took off 

from a super-heated runway and rose 

to altitude. Dysentery and parasitic 

infections also were fairly common in 

the early years of USAF operations. 

In the post-1965 period of rapid 

growth of U.S. forces in Southeast 

Asia, the Air Force opened up two 

Class "A" dispensaries and three 

Class " B" dispensaries, bringing the 

latter total to eight. Where more substantial inpatient care was required, 

Air Force physicians transferred their 

patients to U.S. Army hospitals at 

Saigon, Nha Trang, and Korat; the 

U.S. Navy station hospital in Saigon; 

the naval hospital supporting U.S. 

Marine Corps operations near Da 

Nang; the USAF hospital at Clark; 

and to others as needed. Specialist 

consultation in internal medicine was 

available at the 33d USAF Dispensary 

at Tan Son Nhut. The U.S. Navy hospital in Saigon provided surgical and 

neuro-psychiatric consultation. A 

U.S. Army neurosurgeon served at 

the Cong Hoa military hospital, Saigon. An additional neuropsychiatrist, 

an orthopedic surgeon, a pathologist, and a radiologist were available 

at the U.S. Army 8th Field Hospital, 

Nha Trang. 

Recognizing the importance of preventive medicine, the 2d Air Division 

Surgeon's Office inspected base water 

supplies to insure adequate chlorination. Initially, insect and rodent control was inadequate because of shortages of equipment and supplies. 

During the 1965 force buildup nearly 
all installations in Vietnam and Thailand found it difficult to obtain insecticides and rodenticides through supply 

channels. The surge in new personnel 

overtaxed troop quarters, while construction of additional facilities lagged 

behind requirements. At one point the 

2d Air Division Veterinary Service 

warned that the inflow of troops was 

overtaxing existing dining halls. The 

quality of food served, although not 

comparable to that prevailing in the 

United States, was satisfactory. 

Because of lack of refrigeration, one 

of the Air Force's biggest food problems in 1965 was the delivery of perishable items to remote sites fast 

enough to keep them from spoiling. 

In both Vietnam and Thailand the 

Dental Service provided routine examination, emergency treatment, including fillings and limited prosthetic maintenance and repair, and established 

an oral health program. At Tan Son 

Nhut, the Air Force dental facility initially consisted of two small dental 

operating rooms. One contained a 

wall-mounted X-ray, and the other a 

small bench for prosthetic work and 

repair. At Da Nang, where Air Force 

personnel numbered more than 2,000 

by the end of June 1965, one dental 

officer and two technicians provided 

care in a dental van. 

Facilities and Supplies 

In 1965-as the combat casualties 

increased-USAF medical personnel 

realized they needed additional dispensaries, casualty staging units, and 

hospitals in the theater. Because there 

was a shortage of construction materials in South Vietnam and existing 

building methods were too slow, the 

Air Force in April 1966 decided to procure prefabricated, modular type 

buildings for use as medical facilities 

at Da Nang (1 O~bed casualty staging 

facility) and Takhli, Thailand (10-bed 

dispensary). The destination of the latter was subsequently changed to UTapao, Thailand. A contract for the 

manufacture of these two modular 

medical facilities was awarded to an 

Idaho firm. They were designed and 

engineered at the Mobile Air Materiel 

Area, Brockley AFB, Ala., based upon 

concepts provided by the Surgeon 

General, Headquarters USAF. Both 

facilities were completed in 59 days. 

The first facility package arrived at 

the port of Da Nang in mid-August 

1966, the U-Tapao package at Sattahip, Thailand, in early September. 

Both were in operation by late November 1966. This represented 8 and 10 

months, respectively, from the start of 

the initial design effort. By mid-1969, 

the Air Force had assembled and put 

into use 19 prefabricated module 

medical facilities. 

The standard prefab unit was 10 feet 

wide by 40 feet long, with several 

modules joined together side-to-side 

to form the medical facility. These 

buildings contained electrical systems, water supplies, waste plumbing, 

air conditioning, heat, finished interiors, vinyl tile floors, conductive floors 

where necessary, and adequate lighting. Casework, sinks, lavatories, toilets, tubs, and showers were installed. 

Full utility support, such as steam and 

electric generators, hot water heaters, 

fuel storage tanks, and electrical 

switching gear came with the package, plus a utility building to put them 

in. The completed facility included 

waiting rooms, nurses' stations, diet 

kitchens, dining areas in larger facilities, treatment rooms, laboratories, 

pharmacy, administration and supply 

area, operating rooms, X-ray rooms, 

wards, ancillary service areas, and 

corridors. 

The modular-erected facility enabled the Medical Service to expand 

fast enough to handle the growing 

patient load. Starting with its eight 

Class "B" dispensaries for outpatient 

care only and two Class "A" dispensaries with 16 beds, the Air Force by 

June 1969 added one 200-bed hospital 

at Cam Ranh Bay and five more Class 

"A" dispensaries with 62 beds. 

273 
... 

\ 6;.-
r 3 

(1) t.led1cal evacuation. Interior of a C-141 transport. (2) SSgt Billy 

E. Nealey prepares an Intravenous bottl e for a U.S. serviceman 

aboard a C·141 carrying wounded personnel to the United States 

(3) Army Sgt Charles Blck.enheuser checks medical supplies In 

the operating room at the Due Lap camp's underground dlspen· 

sary. His supplies were delivered by an Air Force C-7 transport 

from the 43:ld Tactical Airlift Wing. (4) A wounded trooper Is 

unloaded from a HH-43 Huskle after landing on the helo pad 

of the 121h USAF Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay. (5) Air Force 

medical personnel from Da Nang move a Marine casualty from 

the Khe Sanh aid station to a waiting C-130 for a flight to medical 

facilities at Da Nang. (6) 1st Lt. Frances P. Jones, 57th 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, gives medicine to a wound· 

ed serviceman aboard a C-14t evacuating patients from Vietnam 

to Japan, 1968. 

4 

2 

6 
Offshore medical facilities at Clark 

and Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, also 

were expanded by 100 beds. During 

1967-1968 the number of inpatient facilities in the war zone rose substantially. And by 30 June 1969 the Air 

Force was operating a medical complex in Southeast Asia which consisted of 3 hospitals, 12 Class "A" dispensaries, 2 Class "B" dispensaries, and 

5 aeromedical staging facilities. At the 

time of the 1965 buildup, the medical 

supply account at Clark had the responsibility for medical materiel support for all USAF medical units in the 

Philippines, Taiwan, and Southeast 

Asia. As the war escalated and the 

medical establishment began expanding rapidly, the demands placed upon 

the Clark medical supply account 

exceeded the manning, inventory and 

facility capabilities available. Consequently, shortages of medical supplies somewhat hampered medical 

operations in the war zone. 

Under the impact of the additional 

workload, warehousemen, key punch 

operators, and officers handling the 

Clark Air Base medical supply account 

soon found themselves working overtime to get supplies in and out as fast 

as possible. But there were significant 

delays in obtaining supplies from the 

continental United States. It was not 

unusual for a shipment of medical 

supplies destined for Clark to remain 

in the hold of a cargo ship lying for 

weeks at anchor off each of several 

Vietnamese ports before war materiel 

was partially unloaded so the vessel 

could proceed to Manila. This logistical problem increased pipeline time 

for medical materiel to get to Clark by 

an additional 60 days in October 1965 

and as much as 75 days in November. 

Due to stringent limitations on air 

shipments, only the most essential 

items were airlifted to Clark. Anything 

less than an emergency shipment was 

usually sent by sea. 

Distribution of medical supplies 

from Clark to South Vietnam and Thailand, on the other hand, was not a 

276 

major problem. It was accomplished 

by a large fleet of USAF transports, 

whose routes and frequency of flights 

normally insured that supplies arrived 

at intended destinations within several 

days to 2 weeks. To speed sea deliveries of medical supplies to South Vietnam, a priority effort was made to install improved port-handling equipment to help reduce pipeline time. The 

initiation of port-to-port cargo hauls 

also helped. For example, a ship destined for Cam Ranh Bay was loaded in 

the United States with cargo solely 

destined for that port. 

In 1966, the Air Force relieved the 

Clark medical supply account of responsibility for the entire area and set 

up separate medical supply accounts 

in South Vietnam , Thailand, and Taiwan for support of medical units in 

those countries. In July 1966, the medical supply account at Cam Ranh Bay 

took over the job of resupplying all 

USAF medical units in South Vietnam. 

In January 1967 two other accounts 

were established at U-Tapao airfield, 

Thailand, and Ching Chuan Kang AB, 

Two nurses. one of them 

from the American Red 

Cross. attend wounded servicemen enroute to the Unit· 

ed States. 
Patients awaot loading 

aboard a C-130 Hercules 

transport at Qui Nhon. 

Taiwan. The addition of these accounts essentially eliminated most of 

the medical support problems encountered in 1965. 

The significance and tempo of the 

medical supply operation in Southeast 

Asia and vicinity is best illustrated by 

the chart on page 279. 

The volume of medical supplies issued during 1968 by the account at 

Cam Ranh Bay alone exceeded the 

total issued by bases in most major 

commands. In addition to medical 

supplies, the accounts at Cam Ranh 

Bay and U-Tapao issued very large 

amounts of equipment in 1967 and 

1968. They also were involved in handling of approximately $1 .2 million of 

supplies and equipment shipped direct from the United States to Vietnam 

and Thailand. 

Aeromedical Evacuation 

During the war only 1 percent of all 

U.S. personnel wounded in Southeast 

Asia died after reaching a medical facility. This was a substantial improvement over the survival rate during the 

Korean War and World War II, and was 

primarily attributed to speedy 

aeromedical evacuation. In Korea, 

where fewer than i 5 percent of the 

wounded were evacuated by helicopter, the death rate was 2.5 percent. 

During World War II, when no tactical 

aircraft were made available to fly 

casualties from the battlefield, the rate 

was 4.5 percent. 

The key to saving lives was to get 

the patient to an adequate medical 

facility as quickly as possible. Once 

there, other medical innovationssuch as the use of frozen whole blood , 

artificial kidney and blood volume 

machines, and an ultrasonic device 

that locates shell fragments deep 

within the body by sonar-helpBd 

lower the death rate. For example, 

almost immediately after the early 

morning Viet Gong attack on Pleiku 

airfield on 7 February 1965, local aircraft began evacuating the wounded 

to the Army's field hospital at Nha 

Trang. Some 4 hours later, Detachment 4, 9th Aeromedical Evacuation 

Squadron at Clark, received a request 

for service. At 0800 hours a C-130 

departed the Philippines for Nha 

Trang, where it was met by a medical 

flight crew of one nurse and one 

aeromedical evacuation technician 

from Detachment 6, 9th Aeromedical 

Evacuation Squadron, Saigon. At 1300 

hours this medical flight crew left Nha 

Trang for Clark with 21 patients, all 

casualties. 

The next day another C-130 flew 

from Clark to Vietnam to evacuate 

another 31 litter patients from Saigon 

and Nha Trang. All but 4 of the 31 were 

victims of the enemy attack of the previous morning. The medical flight 

crew-one nurse and two aeromedical 

evacuation technicians-provided 

extensive inflight care to 12 who were 

in serious condition . The crew administered chest and abdominal suction 

and intravenous fluids. With the medical personnel checking each patient 

277 
(1) 1st Lt Bolly G. Proddy, a male flight nurse with the 91h Aeromedical 

Evacuation Squadron, keeps a watchful eye on the condition ol 

wounded Marines durong a flight from a Vietnam battlefield to Da 

Nang, 1966. (2) A wounded trooper is queroed aboard an AJr Force 

evacuation aircraft at Do Nang. (3) The large container rolling into the 

open taol and ramp doors of a C-130 provides a complete operating 

room and X-ray facolity This uno!, a doctor. and a staff of corpsmen 

were moved to Quang Tri ufield from Its previous location at Lai Khe. 

(4) Air Force Sergeants Daniel Beste and Garry Bolyard handle medical stock at a Thai base 

2 
1ST MEDICAL SERVICE WING 

CLARK AIR BASE. PHILIPPINES 

279 
throughout the flight, all arrived at 

Clark without serious deterioration of 

their condition. By 14 February the 

squadron had completed the evacuation of all casualties of the Pleiku attack. 

The demand for aeromedical evacuations rose steadily with the increase 

of combat casualties. To handle the 

increased patient load, the Air Force 

deployed TOY personnel to the theater to augment the 9th Aeromedical 

Evacuation Squadron and authorized 

an increase in Clark's bed capacity 

from 40 to 250 beds. Patient movements within Southeast Asia and 

from there to offshore hospitals rose 

from 3,719 in December 1965 to 21 ,-

474 in May 1968. Evacuation of patients from the theater to the United 

States by the Military Airlift Command increased from 1,085 in December 1965 to 5,401 in May 1968. 

280 

•• 

In South Vietnam nearly all battlefield casualties were evacuated to rear 

areas by U.S. Army UH-1 helicopter 

ambulances, each able to carry six litter patients. At the peak of combat 

operations in 1968, the Army operated 

116 of the air ambulances. Air Force 

helicopters occasionally assisted in 

battlefield evacuations, the H-43 air 

rescue helicopter being particularly 

useful in bringing out casualties from 

deep jungle areas. Otherwise, thousands of casualties were moved incountry by a variety of USAF transports-including C-130's, C-123's, and 

C-7's. In January 1968, C-118's of the 

6485th Operations Squadron were 

assigned to fly in-country aeromedical 

evacuation missions, freeing the 

C-130's to carry combat cargo missions 

during the Communist Tet offensive. 

Based at Cam Ranh Bay, the C-118's 

flew scheduled aeromedical evacuaMembers of an Air Force 

C·123 alrcrew and a medic 

rush a wounded airman to a 

hospotalln Saigon He Is SSgt 

Richard G. Benton, shot 

through the arm during a 

paradrop mission north of 

Saigon. Others shown (1. to r.): 

AIC Carl w. Larson, Capt. 

Donald J. Haney, unidentified 

Vietnamese soldier, and AIC 

Donald E. Delahunt, February 

1966. 
Gen. John P. McConnell. 

USAF Chief of Staff, visits 

with Army Private First Class 

Gary L. Kaesser. during a 

tour of the 12th USAF hospi· 

tal at Cam Ranh Bay. 

tion missions four times a week, serving Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Tuy 

Hoa, Phu Cat, and Phan Rang. One C118 at Clark flew four missions a week 

to Chu Lai, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and 

Nha Trang and terminating at Cam 

Ranh Bay. 

Committing aircraft specifically for 

aeromedical evacuation became one 

of the main features of medical support in South Vietnam. Working with 

medical agencies and the 834th Air 

Division, the 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron provided scheduled 

service throughout the country. From 

July 1967 through January 1968, patient movements averaged 5,813 per 

month; from February through June 

the average was 9,098 per month. 

Almost 11 times each day requirements were called in, missions set up, 

medical crews picked up, cargo offloaded, planes reconfigured , and patients evacuated- almost always on a 

short notice or no notice basis. 

Equally important, about 11 times 

each day aeromedical evacuation 

requirements disrupted the programmed cargo and passenger commitments of the airlift agencies. 

The 1968 Communist Tet offensive 

produced large numbers of military 

and civilian casualties and required 

four to five unscheduled aeromedical 

evacuation flights each day and occasionally eight. To keep up with the 

demand, a C-1 30 assault aircraft operated a daily round-robin shuttle from 

0900 to 1700 hours. This aircraft averaged from 125 to 158 patients per day, 

most of them recent Marine and Army 

battle casualties. To handle patients 

during late afternoons and evenings, 

another C-130 operated a regular 

nightly round-robin. This aircraft averaged 40 to 60 patients per flight Both 

281 
MJOR AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION ROUTES 

UDORN 

' KHLI e NKP 

•. . .. . ·. 

r 

282 

.... 

.... ... ... 

"' .· TAIPEI A··· "'"'' 

{/

·············::CI KAOENA 

CCK •• ••• 

.·· TAl AN / 

-e MACTAN 

.. 

.. · 
President Johnson (1.) and 

Generll Westmoreland greet 

a wounded Vietnamese sol· 

dler hospitalized at Cam 

Aanh Bay. 

aircraft operated into forward sites 

such as Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Hue/ 

Phu Bai, and evacuated patients to Da 

Nang. Occasionally, after its second 

round-robin the aircraft further evacuated the patients to Qui Nhon, Phu 

Hiep, Nha Trang, or Cam Ranh Bay 

when Da Nang was saturated. An average of 2.4 aircraft per day were used in 

I Corps to support aeromedical evacuation requirements. In February 1968 

more than 10,770 patients were evacuated on 330 flights. 

The heavy and continuous fighting 

in the provinces around Saigon during 

the early months of 1968 also produced many casualties requiring evacuation. To handle these patients, an 

aircraft began flying 7 days a week 

from Tan Son Nhut servicing Cu Chi, 

Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, Binh Thuy, and 

terminating at Cam Ranh Bay. 

Following the 1968 surge of casualties, the Air Force increased the number of flight nurses in the Far East 

from 314 to 409. In February the Air 

Force transferred 20 nurses from a 

MAC C-141 evacuation unit at McGuire AFB, N.J., to Yokota, Japan, increasing the number there to 62. 

Twenty MAC nurses also were sent to 

Yokota on 90 days TOY. When their 

time expired , they were replaced by 

another 30 stateside nurses. Twenty of 

the latter were members of an Air 

Force Reserve Unit, the 34th 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 

Kelly AFB, Tex., activated in May 1968. 

The other 10 were transferred from 

other USAF hospitals. After its recall 

to active duty, the 34th deployed to 

Yokota and flew more than 1,200 

aeromedical evacuations from Southeast Asia to the United States plus 

about 1,000 others from Japan to 

stateside hospitals. 

Throughout the war the Military Airlift Command played a vital role in 

evacuating thousands of casualties 

from the theater to the United States. 

From a small force of one squadron 

and a detachment which it operated 

in mid-1964, MAC expanded the system by 1968 to one aeromedical evacuation group, three squadrons, and 

five detachments. The monthly average of evacuated patients rose from 

342 in August 1964 to 8,956 in 1968. As 

indicated, the principal evacuation 

redistribution centers in the Pacific 

were Clark and Yokota. Mid-Pacific 

flights transited Guam, Wake, or Hawaii or went directly from Yokota to 

Travis AFB, Calif. In August 1966 MAC 

also inaugurated evacuation flights 

from Vietnam to the eastern part of the 

United States via Yokota and Elmendorf. 

The introduction of C-135, C-141 , 

and C-9 aircraft made MAC's 

aeromedical airlift more responsive 

than in previous wars. In 1965 the 

C-141 replaced the C-135 as the principal intertheater evacuation aircraft. 

On 15 July it flew its first long distance 

air evacuation mission in the Pacific 

area. The C-141 's advantages included high speed, long range, and a larger cabin capacity able to handle 60 litter patients, 100 ambulatory patients, 

or a combination of both. Approximately 6,000 C-141 air evacuation 

missions were flown within the Pacific 

and from the Pacific area to the United 

States between July 1965 and December 1972. The C-9, the Air Force's 

newest theater aeromedical evacuation aircraft, flew its first operational 

mission in Southeast Asia on 15 

March 1972. Overall, the Military Airlift 

Command evacuated a total of 406,022 

patients, including 168,832 battle casualties between 1965 and 1973. The 

airlift was accomplished with a perfect 

flying safety record . 

283 

Chapter XVIII 

Assisted by a Vietnamese 

woman, Air Force Sgt. Craig 

E Wenzel Inspects a drinkong well at a VIllage near 

Phan Rang AS, South Vietnam, 1971 

M i I itary Civic Action 

The Air Force not only fought a tenacious enemy in Southeast Asia but 

also participated in a program of civic 

action to assist friendly governments 

in the theater to gain the support of 

their rural populations. This civic mission had its origins in a Defense Department task force report to President Kennedy, dated 27 April 1961 , 

which proposed a number of military 

and economic steps the United States 

might take to help counter North Vietnam's drive to overthrow the government of South Vietnam . Two days later 

the President approved the task force 

recommendations, one of which 

called for setting up civilian and military civic action teams to help the 

peoples of Southeast Asia to raise 

their standards of living. 

Although the Air Force did not form 

civic action teams in South Vietnam in 

the early 1960's as had the U.S. Army, 

its Farm Gate crews began providing 

direct aid to the Vietnamese within 

days of their arrival in the country. 

Beginning in January 1962, Air Force 

C-123's began delivering relief supplies and other necessities to Vietnamese communities cut off by monsoon floods or Communist insurgents. 

The role of the C-123's was graphically 

described by Col. Benjamin S. Preston, the Air Force commander at Da 

Nang. In his 1964 end-of-tour report, 

he wrote: 

.. .I came to realize how much these 

little people looked forward to the 

stops by our C-123 aircraft. Our airlift 

system has revolutionized the way of 

life of these people; partic ularly the 

outpost people who depended upon 

us for resupply .. The daily shuttle run 

between Da Nang and Tan Son 

Nhut. . .has become famous to Vietnamese and us alike as the only way 

most of them can travel north or 

south. Sometimes it breaks down 

enroute to Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, 

Quang Ngai, or Hue Fue Bai, and it 

becomes a community project to 

load, unload, handle block and tackle, etc., and try to get it going again. 

I guess it comes closer to the old 

Western Overland Stage than anything else I can think of .. . . 

I watched ou r crews at work, and 

the way they handled themselves in 

helping people, reassuring children 

and ancient old peasant couples, 

laughing and joking, sweating and 

cursing, but acknowledging the 

human dignity of the individual all the 

while made me realize that they were 

some of Mr. Lodge's best possible 

ambassadorial representatives. 

The use of Air Force transports contributed greatly to Saigon's administrative control of its territory. Flying in 

and out of some 100 airfields throughout Vietnam, the C-123's provided a 

vital line of communication which 

helped maintain the nation's viability 

in times of extreme distress. 

Beginning in the early 1960's, Air 

Force officers and enlisted men also 

became personally involved in a variety of assistance projects. For example, 

since there was an acute shortage of 

trained physicians in Vietnam (in 1970 

there were only 1,300 doctors for more 

than 17 million people), Air Force 

medical officers and dentists volunteered their talents and days off to 

orphanages and leprosariums in the 

vicinity of their bases. USAF veterinarians also assisted nearby villagers to 

set up disease-prevention programs 

including purification of their water 

supplies. Many enlisted men contributed their time and personal funds to 

help the many orphans in Vietnam , 

and during New Years holidays, joined 

with the Vietnamese Air Force personnel to distribute toys to the children. 

At Bien Hoa AB, USAF crews contributed $1 ,500.00 in personal funds for 

distribution to needy Vietnamese. 

285 

5 

(1) Capt. Drew D. Whiteside ) looks for cavities 

In a young Vietnamese patient's mouth. A1C 

Ivory Herbert, Jr., a dental technician urges the 

boy to open wide. (2) A medical corpsman of 

the 466th USAF Dispensary, Da Nang, attends 

to the needs of a local VIetnamese child. (3) 2d 

Lt . Kathleen M. Sullivan treats a Vietnamese 

child during Operations Med Cap, a U.S. Air 

Force civic action program. (4) Capt. Robert 

Robinson, general dental officer, 388th Tactical 

Dispensary, Koral Royal Thai Air Base, ex· 

amlnes the teeth of a young boy from a nearby 

village. (5) The leg of this Vletnames& child 

became infected alter he had be scalded by hot 

water. AtC Arthur D. Krull (1.) and a fellow Air 

Force Reserve medic remove bandage In 

preparation for more extensive treatment. (6) 

Capt. Thomas K. Cart ton, Jr., a general medical 

doctor with the 388th Tactical Dispensary, 

Korat, examines a child from a nealby village. 

IT) Maj. Jack D. Bashaw, an Air Force doctor at 

the Cam Ranh Bay Air Base hospital, examines 

a patient from a nearby village, June 1966. 

6 
Funding the Program 

Most of these humanitarian activities were undertaken on an ad hoc 

basis, and it was not until President 

Johnson put the full weight of the U.S. 

government behind civic action in 

1966 that the program picked up substantial momentum. In a message to 

Congress, he said he would " give new 

stress to civic actions programs 

through which local troops would 

build schools and roads and provide 

literacy training and health service." 

Substantially, a special fund was set up 

for the use of U.S. civilian and military 

agencies in Southeast Asia to support 

such projects. 

In the last half of 1966 planning for 

the program went into high gear. after 

MACV issued a directive establishing 

procedures for U.S. and free world 

military units in Vietnam to obtain 

working funds. Initially Seventh Air 

Force was allotted 200,000$VN to 

finance projects by bases or units 

too small to qualify for their own 

funds. The first such project for 

which funds were allotted helped 

repair and rebuild a road between 

the hamlet of Trang Sup and the 

provincial capital of Tay Ninh. It was 

begun as a joint venture of the United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and the U.S. 

Army Special Forces, which contributed 50,000$VN out of a total 

75,000$VN cost. USAID asked the Air 

Force unit in Tay Ninh province-the 

617th Tactical Control Squadron-to 

finance the remaining 25,000$VN. 

Seventh Air Force headquarters authorized the expenditure and transferred the money to the squadron. 

Bases allotting their own civic action 

funds (100,000$VN each) were Bien 

Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and 

Nha Trang. Tan Son Nhut was allotted 200,000$VN. 

In July 1966 General McConnell 

emphasized the importance of the Vietnamese pacification program and the 

"tremendous potential for civic action 

288 

and assistance" that could be provided by "indigenous air forces." He 

suggested establishment of a civic action assistance council in Southeast 

Asia to advise Air Force commanders 

and to coordinate and expand their 

civic action activities. Second to combat operations, he said, " our efforts in 

this area are the most valuable contributions we can make to the defeat of 

the Communist insurgency .. .. " 

Responding to McConnell's guidance, Seventh Air Force during the 

summer of 1966 organized a civic action coordinating group within its 

headquarters. On 6 October it published a regulation requiring the establishment of "Civic Action Councils" within both Headquarters Seventh Air Force and all USAF bases in 

Vietnam. On 8 October it issued a second regulation defining the responsibility of each base commander and 

outlining objectives and reporting 

procedures which would govern civic 

action projects. The same day, all base 

commanders were directed to use the 

capabilities and energies of USAF 

units to implement " a positive civic 

action program" geared to the ongoing Vietnamese revolutionary development program. 

Immediately, personnel requisitions 

were made to obtain full-time civic action officers and noncommissioned 

officers at each base in Vietnam. 

Funds to finance their various projects 

were allotted to base commanders. In 

October information about the program was provided in a civic action 

" Notebook." Subsequently, Seventh 

Air Force published a Civic Action 

Newsletter which provided information on projects under way at various 

bases, their successes, and problem 

areas. On 10 November 1966 the Seventh Air Force Civic Action Council 

was convened for its first meeting by 

the Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Franklin 

A. Nichols. Council members discussed funding problems, ways to further encourage VNAF participation in 

the programs, and the use of the 
command's "civic action airlift." 

On at least one occasion, the civic 

action program enabled USAF and 

VNAF officials to thwart a planned Viet 

Cong mortar attack on Binh Thuy AB 

in the fall of 1966. Some months before, USAFIVNAF civic action personnel had gone into several hamlets on 

the southern perimeter of the base to 

offer their help in various ways. 

Among the projects they supported 

were construction of community 

washhouses, schools, and latrines. 

One USAF and two VNAF doctors and 

four VNAF and two USAF medical assistants also made weekly visits to the 

villages to treat the sick and distribute 

food supplements and clothing to 

poor inhabitants. These civic actions 

won over several hamlet residents, as 

the following Seventh Air Force report 

to PACAF makes clear: 

In early October the VC moved into 

one of the perimeter hamlets in preparation for a mortar attac k against 

the air base planned for 12 October. 

At great risk to their own lives, several residents of the hamlet involved 

reported the attac k plans to the VNAF 

and USAF security police at the base. 

With sufficient warning the security 

police moved into the hamlet a couple of days prior to the planned attack capturing mortars and ammunition, thus preventing the ... attack. 

The security police attributed this 

" save" to the excellent rapport established with the local populace 

and the newly won support of the 

local people to the GVN and to the 

continuous fine efforts of the military 

civic action program at Binh Thuy. 

This incident, however, apparently 

energized the Viet Cong, who began 

to shell Binh Thuy on a regular basis. 

Thus, the Viet Cong did manage to hit 

the base with several mortar rounds, 

but the damage was minor due to the 

fact they had been forced to set up 

their positions 7 kilometers away, well 

beyond the perimeter hamlets. Although intelligence reports about Viet 

Cong activities in the base environs 

also progressively improved, the enemy managed to hit Binh Thuv at least 

once a month during the first half of 

1965. 

On the other hand, relations with 

South Vietnamese villagers were occasionally exacerbated by accidents 

of war. For example, on 1 July 1966 a 

3d Tactical Fighter Wing aircraft accidentally bombed the village of Tan 

Uyen, about 10 miles north of Bien 

Hoa AB, killing 8 Vietnamese and injuring 40 and substantially destroying 

the village marketplace. Base medical 

personnel immediately sped to the 

scene along with U.S. Army advisers 

and Vietnamese province officials to 

help evacuate the wounded. However, 

the villagers were openly hostile to the 

first Americans who appeared, even 

shouting at one officer. In the weeks 

that followed, Viet Cong agents used 

the incident to stir up the peasants 

against the government and the United States. 

However, the early and continuing 

massive effort to ease the villagers' 

plight by volunteers from the 3d Tactical Fighter Wing was able to partly 

offset the Communist effort. Within 24 

hours they began to repair the damaged village structures. Emergency 

supplies were distributed through Vietnamese province officials and, with 

the help of U.S. Army advisers and Vietnamese officials, the Wing legal 

officer compiled a list of the injured 

and dead for solatium payments. Within 2 weeks market stalls and several 

houses were rebuilt, roofs were repaired, and other assistance provided. 

As a climax to the successful rehabilitation of the village and its inhabitants, a "Country Fair" was staged 

there in August. 

Medical Services 

One of the most effective of all 

American civic action projects during 

the war was the medical and dental 

care provided to the people. For example, in November 1966 local South 

Vietnamese militia requested the aid 

of USAF medical and dental personnel 

to accompany them in a " clear and 

289 

6 

5 

(1) Students are taught English at the 20th Street School and Protestant Orphanage 

at Can Tho City. This class was instructed by Col. Delbert J. Light, Chief of the Air 

Force Advisory Team Seven based at Blnh Thuy AB. (2) Maj. Thurman Dabbs, a 

National Guard flight surgeon, examines a Vietnamese youngster brought from a 

refugee camp to the Tuy Hoa AB hospital, 1968 (3) Youngsters from the Tan 

Mal Or· 

phanage in the village of Tan Hlep exercise their lungs as they receive their weekly 

baths from three Air Force sergeants of the t8nth Communications Squadron, Bien 

Hoa, AB They are (1. tor.): SSgts Anthony R. Scarlett. WalterS. Hornat and Sgt Ben 

E Shipwash. (4) The 

Air Force airlifted two anaesthetized elephants from Ban Dou 

to Chu Lal, Vietnam. where they were put to wort< assisting South V1etnamese workers 

in the logging Industry (5) An Air Force plane orops rice and medical supplies to 

residents of a small Thai village 

Isolated by rtsing flOOd waters on the Nam Bae Wang 

river. Some 300 bags 

of rice were delivered to the village (6) Medics of the 366th 

USAF Dispensary prepare to depart for a village, accessible only by boat, to provide 

medical care and treatment to the 

Vietnamese. (7) USAF Chaplain (Capt.) Donald J. 

Sheeband, and Father Joseph Hien, leader of the village complex of Oal An·Thai Hung, 

look on as a villager uses a 

tractor donated by Americans to the farmers, 1966. 

7 
hold" operation in the Nhon Trach 

area of Bien Hoa province, which had 

been under enemy control for many 

years. After the local military moved in 

and cleared out the Viet Gong, they 

secured the hamlets, and then escorted the USAF medical teams into the 

area where they set up a clinic in a 

local home. Many of the people had 

not seen a doctor in several years and 

some had not seen a dentist in their 

entire lifetimes, so that the impact of 

the visit was great. The hamlet chiefs 

made the doctors promise to return 

again to treat their people. When news 

of the "painless" dentist spread 

through the sector being cleared, 

people from distant hamlets infiltrated 

through Viet Gong-held areas for 

treatment. 

Between 1966-1968 the medical civic action program expanded steadily 

into all hamlets, villages, and autonomous city areas contiguous to Seventh Air Force bases. From an occasional trip into the countryside in 

1966, Seventh Air Force medical and 

dental personnel expanded their volunteer assistance to the Vietnamese 

to the extent that more than 60,000 

medical, dental, and immunization 

treatments had been provided by the 

fall of 1968. Whenever possible, they 

were accompanied by VNAF medical 

personnel. On these visits, dental personnel distributed soap, toothbrushes, and toothpaste. 

In Thailand, the Air Force also fielded mobile medical teams in seven politically sensitive areas in the northeast part of that country, which faced 

the potential subversive threat from 

Communist terrorists. In 1966, with 

the deployment to Thailand of the 606th 

Air Commando Squadron, the unit 

organized a Civic Action Branch to 

serve as part of the country team 

headed by the U.S. ambassador. This 

branch later was redesignated a Civic 

Actions Section and finally a Civic Actions Center. In 1967 it was manned by 

84 officers and enlisted personnelmost of them physicians, medical 

292 

technicians and dentists-who were 

assisted by 12 Thai interpreters. They 

worked closely with Thai officials at all 

levels of government, from the Ministry of Health down to remote village 

medical centers, treating some 10,000 

patients each month. 

In 1967 they initiated a unique Floating Mekong Medical Clinic in an effort 

to reach tens of thousands of people 

in remote villages who were completely isolated from the outside world during the rainy season. Conceived by 

civic action personnel, the waterborne clinic was coordinated and approved by the Royal Thai government. 

A commercial river boat was leased by 

the government and renovated into a 

medical facility. The boat was staffed 

by one physician (on a rotational 

American-Thai basis), one dental technician, one U.S. medical technician, 

and three Thai " sanitarians." Areas 

and specific villages to be visited were 

selected by Thai provincial health 

officers. The floating clinic proved a 

great success, was the pride and joy of 

Air Force personnel and Thai government officials, and greatly benefited 

the rural people along its route. 

USAF physicians and dentists also 

lived and worked in a number of medical centers where they held daily sick 

call in the mornings and went out in 

the afternoons-with the help of Thai 

military and public health officials-to 

visit surrounding villages on a scheduled basis. Approximately 350 villagers were treated during these visits. 

On some visits to remote villages, the 

Americans were acompanied by a Thai 

sanitarian and midwife, a Royal Thai 

Army doctor, and occasionally a small 

armed escort. In the countryside USAF 

dental technicians also undertook to 

promote a preventive dental program. 

For example, during the first 3 months 

of 1968 they distributed 18,000 toothbrushes and toothpaste to school children in northeast Thailand and instructed them in the proper use. The 

only problem was how to provide a 

continuing supply of toothpaste. 
When the latter ran out, the brushes 

were discarded. 

Air Force veterinarians gave a great 

deal of attention to rabies, a prevalent 

disease among thousands of stray 

dogs in Thailand, which caused 300 

reported human deaths each year and 

an estimated unreported death toll 

ranging as high as 1,200. Although 

rabid dogs were greatly feared by the 

Thais, proposals to destroy them were 

opposed by the government because 

of Buddhist sensitivity to killing man 

or beast. An abbot at one of the monasteries offered an alternative solution, which was adopted. He advised 

the Americans to set out both poisoned and unpoisoned meat for the 

dogs. Thus, according to the abbot, 

the decision of life or death would not 

be the responsibility of the government. If Buddha decided a dog should 

die, he would lead it to the poisoned 

meat. If he determined the animal 

should live, he would direct it to the 

unpoisoned bait. By the end of 1968 

this approach eliminated some 3,000 

strays. More than 30,000 other dogs 

were immunized against rabies. 

Tet Recovery Activities 

The Communist Tet offensive of 

January-February 1968 was the crucible for the civic action program in 

South Vietnam. The widespread damage and destruction and large refugee 

problem it caused galvanized both 

Vietnamese and Americans to combine their efforts to promote a rapid 

recovery. Seventh Air Force civic action units constituted an available 

resource to coordinate the USAf effort, which was marked by a further 

outpouring of voluntary contributions 

of money, goods, and thousands of 

man-hours of precious free time. The 

Vietnamese Air Force played an important role during these recovery 

operations. 

Before the emergency recovery 

program ended, Seventh Air Force civic action personnel had provided assistance to about 60,000 refugees, 

3,400 of whom were airlifted to new 

locations. They also delivered 132 

tons of commodities and other supplies to needy people, rebuilt or repaired more than 6,000 homes, provided medical care to 23,741 Vietnamese, 

immunized 23,021 , provided dental 

care to 4,287, and contributed $24,-

798.00 to local relief projects. In addition, they expended $85,481.00 in appropriated funds for the recovery program. 

By late summer and the early fall of 

1968 the Air Force was able to resume 

its normal civic action projects, including agricultural development and 

improved education and social welfare. In the agricultural area, Da Nang 

AB civic action personnel in September 1968 provided the farmers of Con 

Dau hamlet a mechanical rice threshing machine. The device consisted of 

a drum with attached wire spokes. 

Driven by a large foot pedal, it was 

both simple to operate and maintain. 

This machine threshed rice twice as 

fast as the traditional hand flailing 

method, was approximately 99 percent effective in removing all rice 

grains from the stalks without damage 

(as opposed to 80 percent by the flailing method), and partially separated 

the rice grains from the chaff, reducing this portion of the operation considerably. The rice thresher was owned 

and maintained by the hamlet. Individual farmers were authorized to use it 

one-half day during the harvesting 

period. 

The thresher arrived just in time for 

the harvest season and a semi-emergency condition resulting from a recent monsoon, which knocked the 

tops of the stalks into the flooded 

paddies. The only way to save the rice 

was to cut it quickly (and slightly prematurely), dry it and thresh it. The 

hamlet did this on a cooperative basis. 

The rice thresher enabled the farmers 

to thresh their crops in approximately 

293 
one-half the normal time. USAF civic 

action personnel later arranged to 

purchase additional threshers for other hamlets in the Da Nang area. 

In Bien Hoa province, in the summer 

of 1968, base personnel enlisted the 

aid of the Air Force chaplain and his 

congregation to assist a recently 

formed " Farmers Cooperative" in the 

hamlets of Dai An and Xa Thai Hung. A 

9-horsepower Kobota garden plow, 

with four interchangeable attachments, was purchased from the 

church collections and formally presented to the cooperative. Father Joseph Hien accepted the tractor on 

behalf of all the residents. Selected 

farmers of the two hamlets were provided basic instruction in the operation 

of the plow. 

Air Force personnel at Pleiku AB, 

working with local Montagnard village 

officials, initiated several farm instruction programs. Using surplus lumber 

obtained from the base dump, they 

taught the Montagnards how to build 

animal shelters, chicken coops, and 

grain storage bins. After obtaining 

vegetable seeds from the United 

States, they helped in the planting of 

more than eight acres of vegetables by 

Montagnard villagers. They also assisted the people to build dams, spillways, irrigation systems, wells, and 

rice-drying platforms. 

Throughout the war Air Force personnel contributed funds, labor and 

materials to Vietnamese schools and 

orphanages. For example, in the 

summer of 1966 the need for school 

furniture in Bien Hoa elementary 

schools came to the attention of the 

local AID officials and members of the 

3rd Tactical Fighter Wing. Since lumber for furniture was in short supply, 

the Wing donated used bomb fin 

crates from its dump, delivering them 

to the schools with the help of the Vietnamese Air Force. USAF technicians 

showed AID representatives and 

school carpenters how to disassemble 

the crates and reassemble them to 

make suitable and attractive (when 

294 

painted) desks and benches. News of 

the Bien Hoa school furniture program quickly spread to outlying districts, which requested " bomb fin 

crate" furniture to equip 14 classrooms. Again, VNAF and USAF personnel delivered the crates and local 

school carpenters were taught how to 

make the furniture. 

In the fall of 1968 USAF personnel 

furnished wire, electrical fixtures, and 

other materials to build Do Vinh elementary school in Phong Dinh province, a library at Cong Thanh high 

school in Bien Hoa province and three 

blackboards for the Tay Do School in 

Phong Dinh. They also furnished lumber, nails, paint, and wire screen to 

build five dormitories at the II Corps 

National Police Academy and a library 

and visitors lounge at the Highland 

Junior Military Academy in Pleiku 

province. In addition, they contributed 

60,000$VN to the Phu Yen public administration library to purchase 

books. 

One of the interesting civic action 

projects supported by the Air Force 

was known as " Dollars for Scholars." 

Financed by funds donated by organizations and individuals in the United States as well as USAF personnel 

in Southeast Asia, it provided needy 

and deserving youth, money for 

school tuition. Local school principals and teachers, assisted by area 

officials, determined student eligibility and made the selections. By the end 

of 1967 more than 700 students were 

being helped by the " Dollars for 

Scholars" project. In the view of one 

Vietnamese school principal, these 

scholarships had hampered Viet 

Cong efforts to recruit teenagers. 

Throughout the war and against the 

background of natural disasters and 

the ravage of war, Americans at home 

generously donated food, clothing, 

money, toys, and other materials to 

orphanages, religious institutions, 

schools, and villages. For example, 

between April and September 1967, 

Seventh Air Force civic action person-
An Air Force dentist on a 

med ocal visit to To Cau village examones the teeth or a 

Vietnamese woman. 

nel distributed 32,650 pounds of food, 

21,000 pounds of clothing, 83 cartons 

of toys and playground equipment for 

orphanages, more than 3,000 cots, 

2,365 pounds of soap, and cash totalling $34,000.00 and 1.4 million Vietnamese piasters. 

In October 1968 President Thieu 

announced the start of an accelerated 

military pacification campaign to extend his government's control 

throughout South Vietnam. As part of 

this campaign, he emphasized civic 

action " as a means to win the people." 

In gearing its activities to this new 

pacification program, Seventh Air 

Force doubled the civic action funds 

provided to air base commanders who 

were authorized to approve projects 

costing up to $1,000 to respond faster 

to Vietnamese needs. Planning and 

managing the various civic action 

projects was done by Vietnamese 

officials, with Air Force personnel and 

equipment being used only when 

there was no alternative available. 

Thus, during 1969 the Vietnamese 

supplied 72 percent of the labor on 

USAF-supported civic action projects. 

That figure increased to 80 percent in 

1970 and 96 percent in 1971 . Similarly, 

the percentage of Vietnamese-supplied material rose from 20 percent in 

1969 to 48 percent in 1971 . Vietnamese man-days and expenditures on 

agricultural, public works, and refugee rehabilitation projects also rose 

accordingly. This situation in part reflected the steady withdrawal of U.S. 

forces from South Vietnam which was 

initiated by President Nixon in the 

summer of 1969. 

During these latter years, however. 

USAF personnel continued to play a 

significant civic action role. One project they became involved in was the 

resettlement of Truong Long village in 

Phong Dinh province in 1970. Four 

years earlier, all residents of the village fled to more secure areas when 

the Viet Cong moved in. As enemyoccupied territory, the Truong Long 

area became a free fire zone. In 1970, 

Saigon decided to restore Truong 

Long and station a military post there 

for security. Former residents were 

located in refugee centers and agreed 

to return with the help of the government. USAF civic action personnel 

provided the construction materials 

that enabled the villagers to rebuild 

their houses and to reestablish a market place, two hamlet offices, a school, 

and other buildings. 

In 1970 Seventh Air Force civic action medical teams also expanded 

their services into 22 districts and 3 

provinces which had not previously 

been supported , despite the danger of 

possible enemy ambushes. The effectiveness of the Air Force medical 

teams was noted in a captured Viet 

Cong document: 

The enemy [Americans] behaved 

kindly to the people to win their 

heart. They carried the people's children in their arms, washed and 

changed their clothes .. . those who 

were wounded were given thorough 

medical treatment .. . although the 

people knew the enemy was dishonest, they seemed to appreciate the 

treatment and compared them with 

those performed by our civil health 

teams. 

295 

Chapter XIX 

An Air Reserve technician, 

705th Tactlcel Air Training 

School, instructs a student 

in a simulated C-130 cockpit. 

Training and Manning 

the Combat Force 

During the first few years of combat 

support operations in South Vietnam , 

the Air Force manned its small contingent of fighting units in that country 

without difficulty. Following the Gulf 

of Tonkin incident of August 1964 and 

the start of Rolling Thunder operations in March 1965, however, the Air 

Force found itself facing a demand for 

substantially larger combat forces in 

the theater. Until units could be deployed on a permanent basis, the Air 

Force turned to extensive use of temporary duty personnel, drawn mostly 

from Pacific Air Forces resources, 

who served up to 179 days (most averaged 120). By July 1965, approximately 42 percent of the 17,900 USAF personnel in South Vietnam were there 

on TOY. Between November 1965 and 

February 1966, the Tactical Air Command, one of the primary sources for 

expansion, sent 14,000 men and 23 

fighter, 4 reconnaissance, and 8 C-130 

squadrons to Southeast Asia or the 

western Pacific. During that same period the Air Force also reassigned 

another 18,000 officers and airmen 

from other commands to the war 

zone. 

The Pilot Deficit 

Even as the 1965-1966 force buildup 

got under way, the Air Force found itself short of flying personnel. The 

problem surfaced at an awkward time, 

as large numbers of World War 11-

trained pilots were nearing the end of 

their military careers (more than 13,000 

left the service between July 1964 

and July 1967) and new pilot production was at a low ebb as a result of actions taken in 1957 to reduce the 

number of pilots trained. Under a 

Congressional mandate to cut back its 

pilot force in light of the changing 

USAF force structure- that is, the introduction of intercontinental ballistic 

missile squadrons-the Air Force reduced undergraduate pilot training 

from a post-Korean War high of 5,726 

graduates in fiscal year 1957 to 1,300 

in fiscal year 1962. Ironically, in that 

year the first combat units were dispatched to South Vietnam. 

The shortage quickly became apparent. Headquarters USAF initially 

required all deploying squadrons to 

have a minimum of 1112 aircrews per 

tactical aircraft, but lack of enough 

rated personnel soon caused the 

Chief of Staff to cut the requirement to 

1.25 aircrews. The lack of pilots was 

further compounded by two other decisions made by the Chief of Staff in 

November 1965 and February 1966. He 

directed that combat tours in Southeast Asia be limited to 1 year or a specified number of mission sorties, and 

that USAF members not be required to 

serve an involuntary second SEA tour 

until other similarly qualified members 

had served a tour. These decisions in 

the long term enabled many more 

officer and enlisted personnel to acquire combat experience. They also 

produced extensive manpower turbulence and turnover within combat units 

throughout the war. 

As one of its first steps to increase 

the number of rated officers, Headquarters USAF late in 1965 directed 

TAC and the Air Training Command to 

expand pilot and crew training. At the 

time, TAC conducted combat crew 

fighter and reconnaissance replace297 
ment training at five bases. To meet 

the new requirements, TAC converted 

combat-ready wings into replacement 

training units (RTU's) and combat 

crew training wings (CCTW's). Within 

a short time, all operational wings 

were deeply involved in a massive 

training effort conducted at nine bases. By 31 December 1966, this TAC 

training program had produced 1,842 

fighter and reconnaissance aircrewmen, 1,017 troop carrier flying personnel, and 1,486 airmen assigned to 

special air warfare units. 

During the same period Air Training 

Command also felt the heavy burden 

of the war. Responsible for undergraduate pilot training, ATC had a 

special problem in that it took a great 

deal of time to obtain trainee candidates for the flight course, which itself 

lasted 53 weeks. In 1965 ATC's pilot 

production capability also was limited 

by the capacity of eight training bases. 

On the other hand, ATC got a significant boost in July 1965 when it acquired the first of 171 T -41 's (Cessna 

172F) for primary pilot training. Civilian contractors provided 30 hours of 

T-41 flight training at civilian airfields 

near ATC bases, which eased runway 

and airspace problems and increased 

pilot production at each base. 

After completing primary training, 

each student received 90 hours of 

flight training in the T-37 (instead of 

the usual 132 hours) and 120 hours in 

the supersonic T-38 (reduced from 

130 hours). Despite the reduced flight 

training time, it was soon ~pparent 

that ATC's eight bases were insufficient to handle the growing pilot training load. Consequently, Headquarters 

USAF authorized ATC to institute 

USAF pilot training at two other bases 

-Randolph AFB, Tex., and Columbus 

A.FB, Miss. Meanwhile, during the fall 

of 1967 ATC introduced a new method 

for controlling T-37 and T-38 takeoffs, 

thereby relieving runway and air traffic 

congestion at some bases. At those 

equipped with Category VI radar, ATC 

permitted simultaneous ·use .of three 

298 

parallel runways, with aircraft spaced 3 

minutes between launches, one from 

the T-37 runway and one from the 

overflow runway. Even at bases with 

only two runways, the 3-minute launch 

was used. 

Meanwhile, however, the accelerated American air offensive against 

North Vietnam caused F-1 OS and F-4 

pilots to complete their tours earlier 

than expected, thus exacerbating the 

shortage. A study group headed by 

Maj. Gen. Jack J. Catton in the fall of 

1966 looked into this problem and 

recommended a number of short- and 

long-term measures to provide 9,400 

flight personnel for Southeast Asia 

over a 21-month period beginning 1 

January 1967. After reviewing these 

proposals, General McConnell on 18 

October directed action be taken on 

many of them. One of his more significant decisions was to turn to the major air commands for pilots serving in 

"behind the line" administrative or 

other non-flying positions. Some 3,000 

pilots subsequently were identified 

by name and withdrawn from these 

organizations. Many were older pilots 

who required retraining and found 

themselves going through TAC's 

combat crew or replacement training 

schools. General McConnell also ordered a 30 percent reduction in the 

number of officers attending professional military schools; advanced the 

phaseout dates of certain SAC and 

ADC squadrons, freeing their personnel for retraining and reassignment; 

retained Reserve officers scheduled 

for retirement for another year; withdrew, effective 1 January 1967, all 

USAF advisers below the grade of 

colonel with Air National Guard and 

Air Force Reserve units; substituted 

navigators for pilots in the F-4 rear 

seat*: and expanded ATC's undergraduate pilot training program. 

In 1971 , based on experience obtained from several years of com bat 

*Although the substitution of navigators for pilots helped alleviate the pilot shortage. it had the 

reverse effect on navigator manning. 
and on the need to reduce expenditures, the Air Force decreased the 

length of undergraduate pilot training 

from 53 to 48 weeks and cut the 

amount of actual flying time from 240 

to 208.5 hours. ATC accomplished this 

in part by providing 16 instead of 30 

flying hours in the T -41 , a period 

deemed sufficient to identify students 

lacking the aptitude to go on to jet 

training. The command obtained the 

remainder of the savings by eliminating five flights from the T-37 and seven 

flights from the T-38 portions of the 

course. 

These actions helped to alleviate the 

shortage of fixed-wing pilots, but other measures were necessary to fulfill 

rising helicopter pilot requirements in 

Southeast Asia. In 1965 there were 

about 700 helicopter pilots in the Air 

Force engaged primarily in flying rescue, recovery, mapping, and charting 

missions, in supporting SAC missile 

sites, and in assisting humanitarian relief operations. To maintain the helicopter force, ATC graduated about 60 

pi lots a year through a special undergraduate course that included instruction in both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. They underwent 120 hours of 

training in the T-28, another 70 hours 

of rotary wing transition in the H-19, 

and 35 hours of specialized flying in 

the H-21, H-43, or CH-3 helicopters- altogether a total of 43 weeks. 

Presuming a sizeable growth in its 

helicopter inventory, the Air Force 

determined that it would need to almost double the number of pilots. To 

expand the undergraduate helicopter 

training program, ATC dropped the T28 phase and transferred it from Randolph to Sheppard AFB where it could 

use the jet undergraduate pilot training pipeline. However, the training still 

consumed 43 weeks. 

In an effort to shorten training time, 

the Air Force in December 1965 requested, and the Secretary of Defense 

approved, taking experienced fixedwing pilots and converting them to 

helicopter pilots. ATC set up a 12-

week conversion course during which 

students received 70 hours of rotarywing training in the H-19 and either 

the H-43 or CH-3. The first students 

entered the new course in April 1966 

and graduated 3 months later. In September 1966, as the pilot shortage 

continued, Headquarters USAF directed ATC to concentrate all helicopter 

training efforts on the 12-week course. 

Since undergraduate helicopter trainees received 105 hours of rotary-wing 

flight time and conversion students 

only 70 hours, it was possible to increase production significantly by 

relying on experienced fixed-wing pilots as the source of supply for helicopter training. 

Thus, where ATC previously trained 

60 helicopter pilots in 43 weeks, it 

could now produce 90 in 12 weeks 

with no increase in training resources. 

There was another dividend. By eliminating undergraduate helicopter students from the fixed-wing undergraduate course, ATC could train 60 additional jet pilots annually with the same 

training facilities. 

Overall, during the 6 years between 

fiscal 1965 and 1971 , the period of 

expanding combat activity, ATC 

trained 22,948 pilots of all types. In the 

last years of the war, even as combat 

gradually wound down, the training 

bases produced another 10,250 pilots. 

Airlift and Special Operations 

Crews 

Another important training effort in 

1965-producing replacement crews 

for Southeast Asia airlift units-was a 

TAC responsibility. Before 1965, TAC 

had annually trained about 400 C-130 

crews (pilot, copilot, navigator, flight 

engineer, and loadmaster as a unit}. 

In the late summer of 1965, as combat 

requirements rose, Headquarters 

USAF directed TAC to expand the rate 

of training to 480 crews for 1966. 

To handle this larger training load, 

299 
6 

(1) A photography student learns how to maintain and operate 

a reconnaissance camera at a Department of Aerospace 5 

Photography course at Lowry AFB, Colo. (2) T-28 Nomad aircraft 

were employed to train Air Commandos during the early 1960's. 

(3) Ordnance loading training at Lowry AFB. (4) A lieutenant 

learns the latest photo Interpretation techniques at the Armed 

Forces Air Intelligence Training Center, Lowry AFB. (5) The final 

phase of undergraduate pilot training at Randolph AFB, Tex., 

Involved flying the twin engine T-38 jet. Prior to a flight, lnstruc· 

tor Pilot Capt. Clyde S. Betts (r.) discusses a training flight mls· 

slon with his student, 2d Lt. Fred Young. (6) At Lowry AFB 

students entered the weapons mechanics course to tearn how 

to maintain the air Intercept missile (AIM). 
2 

CAIIIOO UEORICAL SYSTEM 

PANEL No 3 ur ''' '" 

3 

(1) A C.7A Caribou transport 

Electrical System Tralnlng 

Aid (2) Caribou crewmen 

study the C-7's electrical 

systems train ing aids at 

Sewart AFB, Tenn. (3) 

Students learn to adJUSt the 

controlling radar system In 

the Bomber Branch of Lowry's 

Department of Avionics 

Training. 
TAC transferred 42 pilots and flight 

engineer instructors and 24 aircraft 

from its operational force to the 4442d 

Combat Training Group (later Wing) at 

Sewart AFB, Tenn. The number of instructors soon grew to 146 pilots, 63 

navigators, 84 flight engineers, and 84 

loadmasters, who manned five TAC 

replacement training units established 

in November 1965 within five airlift 

wings. These RTU's were based at 

Forbes AFB, Kan.; Lockbourne AFB, 

Ohio ; Pope AFB, N.C.; Dyess AFB, 

Tex., and Sewart. 

Phase I of C-130 crew training began in December 1965 and included 

navigators and loadmasters only; the 

rest of the crew joined in the training 

during Phase II. At the time, few TAC 

pilots had qualified to operate C-130's 

into short, unimproved fields, a basic 

necessity in Southeast Asia. Consequently, TAC emphasized instruction 

and practice in landings and takeoffs 

from such types of fields. Within a 

year, TAC had trained 500 C-130 replacement crews. After completing 

this initial task, the command inactivated the Forbes and Dyess units and 

kept the other three for on-going replacement training. 

TAC also trained replacements to 

man C-123 squadrons, the first elements of which had arrived in South 

Vietnam as early as January 1962. As 

the inventory of aircraft and the scope 

of operations increased, the command in late 1965 established the 

4410th Combat Crew Training Wing at 

Hurlburt AFB, Fla., to provide replacements. By 30 June 1966, it had graduated and made available for SEA duty 

almost 600 aircrewmen (252 of them 

pilots). 

Training crews for the Air Force's 

third tactical transport, the C-7 A Caribou, got under way in 1966, after the 

Army Chief of Staff agreed in April to 

turn the airplane over to the Air Force. 

In preparation for the actual transfer, 

TAC organhed the 4449th Combat 

Crew Training Squadron at Fort Benning, Ga., as a component o1 its 

302 

4449th Wing. Beginning in May, Army 

instructors provided a 3-week course 

to squadron personnel slated to train 

USAF pilots and flight engineers in the 

operation of the C-7. The first class of 

USAF students began training at Fort 

Benning in June 1966, but later classes met at Sewart. By 30 June 1967, 

TAC had trained sufficient crews-479 

Caribou pilots, copilots, and flight 

engineers-to enable them to operate 

the six Caribou squadrons in Southeast Asia. 

The task of training replacement 

crews for a host of other tactical aircraft- such as the 0-1, 0-2, OV-1 0, U-1 0, 

A-1 E, A-26, C-47, and A-37-also fell 

to T AC. As the war continued , the 

command's capabilities grew to encompass two wings which operated 

training facilities at Hurlburt AFB, Fla.; 

England AFB, La.; Holly Field Navy 

Auxiliary Air Station, Fla.; and Forbes 

AFB, Kan. Replacement crewmen to 

operate this myriad of airplanes gradually increased over the mid- and late 

1960's. For example, 1,620 crewmen 

were trained in fiscal year 1966; 3 

years later, the figure had grown to 

more than 2,880. 

Technical Training 

During the · early years of the war, 

the shortage of maintenance personnel became a manpower problem 

second only to the aircrew deficit. 

With the tours of aircraft mechanics 

and other maintenance men also limited to 1-year tours, the Air Force found 

it necessary to provide for a continuous flow of airmen technicians to 

Southeast Asia. Consequently, the 

training of aircraft, engine, radar, and 

other specialists became a priority 

matter and, on 28 October 1965, Headquarters USAF directed TAC and ATC 

to undertake an expanded program 

for this purpose. 

Representatives of the two commands and the Air Staff held two conferences on the subject during Nov-
ember and December 1965 at Randolph AFB, Tex., and Langley AFB, Va. 

They concluded that TAG should provide most of the aircraft maintenance 

replacements through expanded onthe-job training (OJT) on its own bases. The conferees rejected an alternate proposal to transfer aircraft to 

ATC technical training centers for the 

same purpose. ATC supported TAG by 

expanding field training detacl:lments 

at 16 T AC bases. 

T AC was expected to provide half of 

the maintenance replacements for 

Southeast Asia with other commands 

supplying the remainder. But since 

many airmen in the latter group would 

lack current qualification or would 

have no actual experience on TAC aircraft. TAC and ATC jointly undertook 

another improvisation. Such personnel would be sent to TAC bases in a 

temporary " enroute to SEA" duty 

status and receive job-oriented flight 

line proficiency training as well as 

specialized instruction. The airmen 

would get 4 hours of classroom instruction from the ATG detachment 

and 4 hours of proficiency training 

from TAC personnel daily during the 

TOY period, expected to average 

about 30 days. 

Initially, highest priority was given 

to training approximately 1,800 maintenance personnel to augment TAC 

units deployed to Southeast Asia in 

November 1965. Soon after the deployment, it became evident that 25 to 

35 percent more maintenance men 

per squadron were needed to support 

the high level of combat. This special 

training effort got under way in January 1966 on an emergency basis. By 

May, more than 1,800 had completed 

the course and could serve with maintenance crews of the F-100, F-105, 

F-4G, RF-4G, RB-66, or G-130 aircraft. 

In April 1966, the urgency of the 

second phase of replacement training 

was underlined by PACAF's request 

for 4,813 maintenance personnel between July 1966 and May 1967. Concurrently, Headquarters USAF noted 

that additional units would deploy to 

Southeast Asia between May 1966 and 

April 1967. This expanded combat 

force meant that ATG and TAG would 

have to train 3,237 technicians to support the additional units. The requirement was subsequently modified because most of the deploying units 

obtained "filler" personnel several 

months before they left. 

As demand tor replacements increased during 1966, TAC suffered a 

steady decline of skilled personnel 

and had to depend more and more on 

semi-skilled maintenance men. To 

ease this pressure on TAC, Headquarters USAF raised to 55 percent the 

number of replacement trainees withdrawn from other commands and sent 

through the " enroute" course. TAC 

on-the-job training doubled in 1966-

from 16,711 airmen in January to 

32,355 by December. The airmen soon 

overloaded housing and messing facilities and, at one point, some enroute personnel undergoing TOY 

training lived off base and were transported daily to and from the maintenance shops and flight lines. Replacement training eased somewhat after 

PACAF agreed to accept semi-skilled 

personnel to meet one third of its requirements. 

Maintenance training was but one 

aspect of a vast technical training 

effort which began in the summer of 

1965. In July Headquarters USAF decided to recruit 88,000 new airmen, 

most of whom would require specialized technical training in such areas 

as communications, electronics, supply, munitions, and avionics. By the 

spring of 1966 the Air Force had raised 

its fiscal year 1966 recruitment target 

to 107,000 personnel. To handle these 

large numbers, ATC placed the five 

technical training centers-Chanute 

AFB, Ill.; Keesler AFB, Miss.; Lackland 

and Sheppard AFB's in Texas; and 

Lowry AFB, Colo.-on 6-day, roundthe-clock operations. 

A problem that ATC faced in taking 

on this large training burden was a 

303 
(1) TSgl N.D. Newson discusses simulator 

lessons and trelnlng progress, procedures, 

techniQues, and study assignments In updallng Royel Australian Air Force crewmen 

who ser.ed under I he Australian Task Force In 

Vietnam. (2) Students In the Undergraduate 

Pilot Trelnlng Course at Randolph AFB, Colo. 

receive classroom lnslrucllon prior to starting 

flight training. 13) Conventional Weaoons 

Branch Instructors. Department of Aerospace 

Munlllons precllce loading ordnance on an 

F-105 al Lowry AFB, Colo. (4) This realistic C-130 

simulator Interior was used lo train ll lghl personnel. (5) All he Armed Forces Air Intelligence 

Training Center. Lowry AFB, an Instructor 

discusses briefing lecnnlques lo a class of 

Intelligence operallons students. (6) TSgl 

Scholen, 3045 Field Training Detachment, explains the construction and function of the 

C-7A propellers WJd components at Sewart 

AFB. Tenn. 

2 

shortage of about 7,000 instructors. 

As a partial solution, ATC identified 

former instructors and had them reassigned to the training centers. Headquarters USAF gave priority to manning the ATC instructor force, but 

combat demands for experienced 

personnel in Southeast Asia soon 

forced ATC to use recent school graduates. As a result, at the height of the 

1965-1967 Southeast Asia buildup, 25 

percent of the instructors were recent 

graduates of their training centers. 

By the end of June 1966, ATC technical centers had graduated 145,000 

students and, with the major bottleneck broken, ATC soon returned the 

centers to a 5-day week. Thereafter, 

ATC maintained normal operations 

with minor exceptions. In 1968, for 

example, Lowry went to a 6-day-aweek schedule to training 4,000 munition specialists, more than double the 

number trained before January 1968. 

Officer Recruitment 

Recruitment of adequate numbers 

of officers for the expanding Air Force 

brought with it several difficulties 

which the Air Training Command 

undertook to resolve. One stemmed 

from the location of the Officer Training School (OTS) on Lackland AFB, 

which was soon overcrowded and 

without enough classroom and housing facilities due to the tremendous 

surge in airman basic military training 

which also was conducted there. During 1965, OTS commissioned 2,596 

college graduates, of which 33.2 were 

former enlisted men who had passed 

through the Airman Education and 

Commissioning Program. Under this 

program , the Air Force sent airmen 

306 

with high scholastic aptitude, particularly in science and engineering, to 

college for up to 24 months. After obtaining a degree, they received military training at the Lackland school to 

earn their commissions as second 

lieutenants. 

As the pace of combat quickened, 

the Air Force raised its requirement 

for OTS officers to 7,781 in fiscal year 

1967. To meet this goal in the face of 

existing facility shortages, ATC added 

a half-day to the school week, reduced 

the course time from 60 to 54 days, 

and increased the number of classes 

each year from 8 to 10. OTS production was at a high the next year, when 

7,383 officers were commissioned. 

Thereafter, as requirements were satisfied, the course reverted to the normal 60-day, 5-day-a-week schedule. 

Between 1 July 1966 and 1 July 1970, 

the Officer Training School commissioned 26,582 new officers. 

Another important source of officers 

during the war was the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps (AFROTC) which commissioned 26,853 

college graduates between July 1966 

and July 1970. In 1966 AFROTC training was offered at 177 colleges and 

universities. As the conflict proceeded 

in Southeast Asia, the growth of antiwar sentiment throughout the nation 

caused a number of colleges and universities to first challenge the academic rank, credit, and departmental 

status of the AFROTC units on their 

campuses and then, in some cases, to 

eliminate them entirely. On the other 

hand, some non-participating educational institutions invited the Air Force 

to establish units on their campuses. 

In 1970, AFROTC operated at H4 colleges and universities. 

Survival Training 

In late 1961 the Air Force required 

all flying personnel at wing level and 

below who were involved in counterinsurgency operations to complete a 
basic survival, escape, and evasion 

course. The first class of 134 students 

to undergo instruction in the 21-day 

course met at Stead AFB, Nev., on 23 

November. During the next 3 years 

additional hundreds received survival 

training at Stead preparatory to their 

departure for South Vietnam and Thailand. 

As the pace of air operations in 

Southeast Asia quickened, Headquarters USAF in January 1965 directed 

PACAF to establish a jungle survival 

school to train aircrew members enroute to the war zone. At the time the 

only course for such training was at 

the Tropic Survival School, Albrook 

AFB, C.Z. The Jungle Survival School 

began operation at Clark on 12 April 

with a 4-man instruction team detailed 

from Stead for 120 days. Initially set 

for 6 days, the course was soon reduced to 5 days. By late June, a permanent instructor cadre was in place. 

The school's original goal was to 

train 720 per year. The surge in combat operations after mid-1965 caused 

the training goal to be increased. In 

1967 the school graduated 6,734 students at Clark, while its mobile training teams instructed another 1 ,582 in 

South Vietnam and Thailand. Even 

these measures proved inadequate, 

and in 1968 more than 11 ,000 personnel completed the jungle course. 

Meanwhile, with Stead AFB scheduled to close in 1966, the Air Force 

shifted the survival training course to 

Fairchild AFB, Wash., where a class 

commenced training on 27 June. In 

January 1966, prior to the move, the 

course was reduced from 21 to 18 

training days. It included academic 

and operational training in basic survival, escape, and evasion. On 1 November 1966 the Air Force made another important change by shifting TAC's 

Sea Survival School from Langley 

AFB, Va., to Homestead AFB, Fla. The 

new school location enabled TAC to 

train aircrews year round, whereas 

training at Langley was limited to 7 

months. Some cooler temperatures 

during the 5 coldest months were 

unendurable. Tactical fighter and reconnaissance crews destined for the 

war zone received priority for this training. 

In July 1967 the Air Force reduced 

the Fairchild survival course to 13 

days for SEA-destined personnel by 

eliminating the field training phase. 

This was done because the PACAF 

Jungle Survival School provided field 

training in the Philippines. Two additional days were saved in 1968 by eliminating unarmed combat training. The 

number of graduates of the Fairchild 

school grew steadily, with 10,164 

completing the course during fiscal 

year 1970. Budgetary and manpower 

limitations subsequently led to smaller 

training classes, but they obviously 

reflected the reduced levels of combat 

in the war zone. 

During the course of its strenuous 

efforts to increase and maintain the 

strength of its combat forces, the Air 

Force built up to a peak in March 1969 

of 97,551 officers and airmen in the 

war zone-60,785 in South Vietnam 

and 36,766 in Thailand. After peaking 

in 1969, personnel strength in South 

Vietnam declined fairly steadily, almost in a direct line until only 7,608 

officers and airmen were there on 31 

December 1972. By March 1973, 

there were none. The Thailand-based 

force also began a decline from its 

1969 peak strength, slipping downward at a steady rate except for a 5-

month period begining in March 

1972, when Hanoi launched its massive invasion of South Vietnam. The 

North Vietnamese attack led to the 

return of additional USAF units (about 13,800 men) to Thailand, from 

where they resumed air attacks 

against the Hanoi-Haiphong area. 

After this latest enemy offensive, a 

substantial USAF force stayed on in 

Thailand after the formal cease-fire 

agreement was signed in Paris in January 1973, ending U.S. combat operations in both South and North Vietnam. 

307 

Chapter XX 

Maj George T. Bennett. 

dviser to the 524th Squadron (VNAF), checks a target 

map With a VN,.F pilot at 

ian Hoa ... e. 

Vietnamization 

From the beginning of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, Washington 

officials undertook to strengthen 

South Vietnam's armed forces so they 

could deal with their Communist opposition themselves. Thus, shortly after his inauguration President Kennedy approved a buildup of the Vietnamese armed forces along with an increase in the size of the U.S. Military 

Assistance Advisory Group. In the 

case of the Vietnamese Air Force, the 

Defense Department was authorized 

to replace its obsolete American-supplied aircraft with better aircraftA-1 's, T-28's and H-34's. 

When the Farm Gate detachment 

arrived at Bien Hoa in November 1961 , 

Vietnamese airmen were in the process of activating their first T-28 squadron. In January 1962, as noted earlier, 

Farm Gate instructors began training 

25 Vietnamese pilots to fly the T-28 

in methods of day and night operations. The training effort went well 

and, in the spring of 1962, the first T28 squadron was declared operational. When a second squadron was activated , Farm Gate pilot instructors 

again helped with its training. The Vietnamese proved to be apt pupils and 

soon were flying combat strikes in 

their new aircraft. By mid-1962, the 

Vietnamese Air Force had grown to 

a force of about 5,700 officers and airmen with an operational inventory of 

140 aircraft. 

As the VNAF buildup continued, the 

Air Force found itself carrying a heavy 

training burden both in Vietnam and 

the United States. Thus, Air Training 

Command dispatched several mobile 

detachments to South Vietnam to instruct VNAF personnel how to maintain and operate the new aircraft. For 

example, in May 1962 it sent a 45-man 

team to Vietnam for 6 months TOY to 

teach Vietnamese maintenance personnel the intricacies of the T-28. 

Other mobile training teams taught 

VNAF personnel RT-28 reconnaissance procedures and others how to fly 

the U-17A, an off-the-shelf Cessna aircraft provided South Vietnam under 

the military assistance program. In the 

spring of 1963 TAC dispatched 20 

USAF L-19 pilots to Vietnam to augment VNAF liaison squadrons so that 

Vietnamese pilots could begin upgrade training in the A-1 E. 

By mid-1963 approximately 1,800 

Vietnamese airmen out of a total VNAF 

strength of 7,736 personnel were students, most of them pilots. Of that 

number, 459 were being trained in the 

United States. One hundred fourteen 

attended U.S. Army and Navy training 

courses since several of the new aircraft in their inventory came from 

those services. 

The Language Problem 

Throughout the war the language 

barrier was a factor that inhibited all 

U.S. training programs. In early 1962 

the Farm Gate detachment-to partly 

resolve the problem-produced an 

English-Vietnamese list of basic 

words for voice communications. 

Vietnamese airmen studied this as 

part of their curriculum at the VNAF 

FAC school at Tan Son Nhut. Also, in 

October 1962, the Air Force instituted 

an 8-week language school for Vietnamese airmen in training at Hurlburt 

Field, Fla. 

In July 1963, in a further effort to 

overcome the language barrier, the Air 

Force dispatched a 5-man English 

language training detachment to Vietnam, which it later augmented with 

five more instructors. These men 

helped organize three English lan309 
guage schools in South Vietnam, two 

of them operating on two 6-hour shifts 

per day. One school was located in 

Saigon, the others at Tan Son Nhut 

and Nha Trang. By 31 January 1964, a 

total of 994 Vietnamese students had 

begun language training and 514 had 

completed the course. 

Subsequently, VNAF personnel sent 

to the United States for pilot training 

were required to complete a 15-week 

English language course at Lackland 

Air Force Base, Tex. The Lackland 

school-later assigned to the Defense 

Language Institute-became the first 

stop for thousands of Vietnamese 

airmen trained in the United States. To 

facilitate the training effort both in 

Vietnam and the United States, the Air 

Force also began translating a number of its on-the-job training publications into the Vietnamese language. In 

South Vietnam, the Air Force used 

both uniformed and civilian contractor personnel in the OJT program until 

such time as Vietnamese noncommissioned officers were qualified as instructors. However, the language barrier was never entirely overcome and 

remained a problem which handicapped all USAF training efforts 

throughout the war. 

As the buildup of the Vietnamese Air 

Force continued, it reached a Decem

-

ber 1964 strength of 10,592 personnel. 

They manned four tactical fighter 

squadrons, four helicopter and four 

liaison squadrons, two troop carrier 

squadrons, plus other miscellaneous 

units. In 1965 modernization was accelerated when the single-seat A-1 H 

attack planes and the two-seat A-1G 

began replacing the VNAF's T-28's. The 

A-1's were faster and carried a larger 

bomb load. The transition to the A-1's 

was completed by April 1965. During 

the year the VNAF 0-1 liaison fleet more 

than doubled in size, going from 37 in 

January to 84 in December. Its 

U-17 

inventory rose from 25 to 46 aircraft. In 

all, during the year, the VNAF acquired 

108 additional aircraft, a 38 percent 

increase over the previous year. 

310 

2 
(1) An Air Force language Instructor works with a Viet· 

namese o1flcer at Nha Trang. 

(2) Col. Nguyen Huy Anh (1.) 

commander of the 74th Wing, 

checks the control s o f a new 

UH-1H helicopter. Col. Robert 

C. Mathis. Chief. Air Force Ad· 

visory Team at Blnh Thuy AB, 

looks on. (3) An Air Force C8!>· 

taon and hos Vietnamese 

c re wman return to base 

following a strike mission 

over South Vietnam. 

Throughout 1965 Air Force training 

efforts were aimed at increasing the 

number of VNAF fighter, helicopter, 

and liaison pilots, while also producing mechanics, communication specialists, and other support personnel. 

A substantial portion of this growing 

training took place in Vietnam , with 

1,232 VNAF personnel completing 

OJT and 320 language training in 

1965. The Air Force continued to make 

extensive use of ATC field training 

detachments and mobile teams (including one from the U.S. Navy), and 

civilian contract technical service personnel. The last-mentioned group, 

assigned to the Air Force Advisory 

Group in Vietnam , taught a variety of 

technical subjects to the Vietnamese, 

e.g., engines, communications, and 

radio navigation aids. At Bien Hoa, the 

6251st Combat Support Wing, USAF, 

provided VNAF pilots A-1 transition 

training, while the 19th Tactical Air 

Support Squadron taught Vietnamese 

airmen to fly the 0-1 F. A U.S. Marine 

element provided H-34 helicopter 

upgrade training tor Da Nang-based 

VNAF helicopter pilots. 

As the air war escalated , South Vietnamese officials-particularly the new 

Premier, Nguyen Cao Ky (he continued to head the VNAF)-pressed the 

United States to provide Vietnam with 

jet aircraft. They argued that the North 

Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Thais 

already possessed jet aircraft. 

American officials subsequently approved their request, and on 9 August 

1965 the first of four B-57's were 

turned over to the Vietnamese Air 

Force. Transition training was begun 

in the Philippines and initially involved 

6 pilots, 4 navigators, 4 maintenance 

officers, and 16 aircraft mechanics. By 

year's end, four combat-ready VNAF 

crews began flying training missions 

with the Air Force B-57 unit at Da 

Nang. 

Meanwhile, the Air Force Advisory 

311 

5 

(1) VNAF students In a classroom a1 Sheppard AFB, Tex. (2) 

Vle1nameseofflcerswere trained on oscilloscope sets, Its 

chief use being to serve as an Indicator In a radar set. (3) 

VNAF pilot, Lt. Van Llch Hlen, prepares for a mission In his 

A· I Skyralder at Bien Hoa AB. (~)An f!o..37A light ground at· 

t ack aircraft (In foreground) was turned over to the VNAF 

In October 1970. (5) MaJ. Dang·Duy Lac, commander of the 

VNAF 524th Squadron makes a final adjustment In his 

equipment, while Lt. Col. Walter V. Woods, IIO<Ith SOS com· 

mander, starts up the A·37 engine. (6) Air Force TSgt Bruce 

A. Miller, a 60~th Special Operations Squadron aircraft 

maintenance technician, shOws a VNAF mechanic how to 

Install a c anopy safety clamp. 
Group studied other options to provide the VNAF an additional jet capability. It focused on the F-5, a new jet 

aircraft which the Air Force had sent 

to South Vietnam in October 1965 to 

begin combat field tests. The Advisory 

Group recommended, and Secretary 

McNamara approved, conversion of 

one A-1 squadron to F-5's. Thirty-two 

VNAF pilots departed in August to 

begin F-5 conversion training at the 

Combat Crew Training Center, Williams AFB, Ariz. Ten of these men, 

however, were first required to take 9 

weeks of language training before 

entering flight training. 

In December 1966, after the first F-5 

crews returned from combat crew 

training in Arizona, an F-5 training 

detachment arrived at Bien Hoa to 

continue VNAF pilot training in the jet. 

The following month 10 USAF non

-

commissioned officers and a civilian 

contract engineer were dispatched to 

Vietnam to provide further training to 

F-5 officers and airmen. By the spring 

of 1967 the Vietnamese had flown 

hundreds of training sorties in their 

new jet aircraft. On 1 June, at a formal 

VNAF-USAF ceremony held at Bien 

Hoa, the planes were officially turned 

over to the 522d VNAF Fighter Squadron, which immediately began flying 

combat sorties. 

In 1967 USAF personnel also assisted the Vietnamese to modernize their 

transport fleet. VNAF C-47 officers and 

airmen were sent to the United States 

to begin transition training in the C119. After completing ground courses 

at Lackland and Sheppard Air Force 

Bases, they were sent to Clinton 

County AFB, Ohio, the Air Force's C-

119 training center. There they were 

taught engine and airframe maintenance by ATC's 614th Field Training 

Detachment and C-119 crewmen of 

the Air Force Reserve. The first seven 

VNAF C-119 crews-six pilots, eight 

copilots, and seven flight engineers-

returned home in September 1967. 

They were followed to Vietnam 

in October by an Air Force C-119G detach- 314 

2 
3 4 

(1) An Air Force c aptain briefs a Vietnamese airman prior to flying a gunship mission. 

(2) A VNAF gunner performs maintenance on a UH·1's mlnlguns at Blnh Thuy AB, South 

Vietnam (3) A Vietnamese student checks out a night observations scope at Phan Rang 

AB as his Instructor Capt. Wilham H. Kmg, looks on. (4) With Capt. Jim Downs looking 

on, a Voetnamese navigator In a flare plane radios defenders belo w to learn the location 

ot enemy troops 

ment, which continued their training 

there. By mid-March 1968, more than 

200 Vietnamese airmen had completed all C-119 training. 

Air Force modernization plans also 

called for converting three VNAF A-1 

fighter squadrons to A-37 jets and one 

C-47 squadron into an AC-47 gunship 

unit. During 1967 the Vietnamese Air 

Force assigned 103 pilots to three 

squadrons scheduled to receive the A37's. On 1 January 1968 the first 

squadron to receive the A-37's stood 

down to prepare for the conversion, 

and the following month the first ~8 

pilots departed for the United States 

to begin transition training. In May, an 

A-37 mobile training detachment arrived at Nha Trang to begin maintenance training. 

Actual squadron conversion began 

in November 1968 with delivery of the 

first A-37 jets from the United States. 

By May 1969 the full complement of 54 

A-37B jets was on hand and assigned 

to the 524th, 520th, and 51 6th Fighter 

Squadrons. The first A-37 jet squadron 

was declared operationally ready in 

March 1969, the last one in July. 

During 1969 VNAF personnel strength 

grew to about 29,000 officers and airmen, an increase of more than 5,000 

over the previous year. 

Shortly after becoming President in 

January 1969, Mr. Nixon announced 

that one of the primary goals of his 

administration would be to end U.S. 

combat in Southeast Asia while simultaneously strengthening South Vietnam's ability to defend itself. In March 

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 

after visiting officials in Saigon, ordered an accelerated "Vietnamization" program aimed at turning over 

combat operations to the South Vietnamese. In May Mr. Laird informed the 

Joint Chiefs that Vietnamizing the war 

was the Defense Department's highest 

priority. In June 1969, after conferring 

with South Vietnamese officials on 

Midway Island, the President announced plans to withdraw the first 

U.S. troops from South Vietnam. In 

315 

(1) VNAF students In a classroom at Sheppard AFB, Tex. 

(2) VIetnamese Air Force Captains stand at attent•on 

before the first of <10 A-37 Jets were tumed over to the 

VNAF In October 1970. (3) Aboard a VNAF UH·1 

helicopter gunship, a Vietnamese gunner fires a 

mlnlgun during a training mission In South Vietnam. 

An Air Force adviser, Sgt Isidro ArrCI(O, Jr., looks on. (4) 

Two VNAF crewmen check out the Forward·Looklng In· 

frared (FUR) sensor system. Their Instructors were 

members of the 11th Special Operations Squadron at 

Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam. (5) An Air Force staff 

sergeant, member of an air weather unit, Instructs a 

VNAF airman In plotting weather maps. 
support of this action, the South Vietnamese requested further assistance 

for Vietnamization. Among other 

things, they asked for F-4 Phantoms, 

C-130 transports, and air defense missiles. 

In August 1969 Secretary Laird directed the JCS and the services to 

prepare plans and programs to develop a South Vietnamese capability to 

cope successfully with a combined 

Viet Cong/NVA attack. In response, 

the Air Force began intensive planning on ways to speed the Vietnamization program. A joint Seventh Air 

Force-USAF Advisory Group Ad Hoc 

Committee was established in South 

Vietnam for that purpose. In Washington, an office for the Special Assistant 

for Vietnam ization was organized 

within Headquarters USAF on 3 November 1969 to monitor all actions 

concerning transfer of Air Force combat responsibilities to the Vietnamese 

Air Force. 

Integrated VNAF Training 

An important innovation in the Vietnamization program took place in 

1970 with the start of on-the-job integrated training conducted by USAF C123 operational crews for their South 

Vietnamese counterparts. The project 

was undertaken when it became clear 

to the Air Force that the VNAF airmen 

would be completing C-123 combat 

crew training in the United States 

about 9 months before activation of 

the first VNAF C-123 squadron. To 

maintain VNAF pilot proficiency in the 

interim, the Air Force decided to integrate the Vietnamese airmen into 

USAF C-123 units in Vietnam, pending 

transfer of those aircraft to the VNAF. 

This was a reversal of the 1962 assignment of 30 U.S. Air Force pilots (the 

"Dirty Thirty") as crewmen flying with 

VNAF C-47 transport units. The ensuing on-the-job training by USAF C-123 

crews gave Vietnamese pilots current 

operational experience, reduced the 

318 

need to train them in the United 

States. and also lessened Air Force C123 pilot requirements in South Vietnam. 

The idea of both integrated and OJT 

training for VNAF officers and airmen 

subsequently was adopted at all bases 

where Vietnamese and American air 

units were collocated. Conventional 

OJT methods were used with courses 

tailored to fit VNAF requirements. 

Special emphasis was given to training the Vietnamese in base support 

operations, a subject not previously 

given high priority. Individual skill 

upgrading resulted from this integrated program but it was designed primarily to achieve VNAF self-sufficiency as soon as possible. By 31 January 

1970, more than 900 trainees were 

enrolled in this integrated training 

program. By mid-year, more than 1,-

240 officers and airmen were being 

taught more than 30 different specialties at Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, Sinh 

Thuy, Pleiku, Da Nang, and Tan Son 

Nhut. Many of the VNAF airmen were 

trained in security, fire protection, 

weather, communications/electronics, air traffic control, and civil engineering. 

Meanwhile, Secretary Laird approved further increases in VNAF 

strength-to 35,786 officers and airmen in 1970 and 44,712 in 1972 to 

support a VNAF force of 34 squadrons. To support this major expansion, the Vietnamese Air Force was 

completely restructured . It emerged in 

1970 with 5 air divisions, 10 tactical 

wings, 5 maintenance and supply 

wings, and 7 air base wings. The VNAF 

Air Logistics Wing was transformed 

into an Air Logistics Command, 

equipped with a modern computer 

and given control of all VNAF inventory assets. Also with the help of ATC, 

the Vietnamese began expanding 

their Nha Trang Training Center, 

which was the location of six military 

schools and the English Language 

School. In the military schools, all 

instructors were Vietnamese. 
To further speed VNAF self-sufficiency, 243 Vietnamese technicians 

were sent to the United States in 1970 

to be trained as instructors to serve in 

the Nha Trang schools. This training 

consisted of a basic mechanics 

course tailored to their specific needs, 

instructor training, and follow-on 

training in ATC classrooms or with 

ATC field training detachments. The 

first instructor course began in March 

1970. By mid-1971 more than 5,500 

Vietnamese instructors had graduated 

and returned to Vietnam , while another 1,330 remained in training in the 

United States. In addition to this program, the Air Force sent ATC mobile 

training teams to Nha Trang to teach 

37 specialized skills. The Air Force 

Advisory Group also provided teams 

at each VNAF base to assist the Vietnamese wherever possible. 

During 1971 the VNAF flew more 

combat sorties in Vietnam than the 

U.S. air arms combined-63 percent 

of all such missions. This constituted a 

69.8 percent increase over the VNAF's 

1970 operations. In September 1971 

the Air Force transferred a second AC119G gunship squadron to the VNAF. 

During the year the VNAF transport 

fleet was increased to five squadrons 

following turnover of three USAF 

squadrons of C-123's. In addition, 3 C119's were added to the 16 already 

being flown by the Vietnamese. In 

November, the VNAF took control of 

the direct air support centers at Pleiku, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang. By year's 

end, the Vietnamese also were solely 

responsible for operating air navigation facilities at eight bases-Sinh 

Thuy, Ban Me Thuot, Bien Hoa, Nha 

Trang, Da Nang, Chu Lai , and Phu Cat. 

Meanwhile, a plan was adopted to 

phase out most Vietnamese training in 

the United States. As part of this plan, 

the Air Force turned its attention to 

translating technical orders into Vietnamese and building training aids so 

that all instruction could be performed 

in South Vietnam . Additional mobile 

training teams were sent to Southeast 

Asia equipped with specially built 

training aids to expedite the teaching 

of VNAF maintenance personnel. 

The partial success of Vietnamization of the air war was demonstrated 

during North Vietnam's 1972 spring 

invasion of the south. Responding to 

the enemy attack, the VNAF began 

flying the first of more than 20,000 

strike sorties, which helped blunt the 

North Vietnamese advance. VNAF 

transports carried more cargo and 

troops than ever before, while fighters, gunships, and helicopters provided close air support to ARVN ground 

forces. In March and July, the VNAF 

activated its first C-7A Caribou squadrons and subsequently also acquired 

its first C-130 Hercules transports. The 

first VNAF C-130 instructor aircrew 

took its final check in December 1972. 

The turnover of all training programs to the Vietnamese continued 

throughout 1972. English language 

training went from an almost entirely 

USAF effort to an almost entirely VNAF 

responsibility. In May 1972 the VNAF 

established a communications and 

electronics school at Bien Hoa. Also, 

with the aid of USAF mobile training 

teams, the VNAF took over maintenance training for the C-130, T-28B, 

and other aircraft systems. An AC119K mobile training team started 

cross-training VNAF AC-119G and c119G aircrews and maintenance 

crews into the AC-119K. 

By December 1972 the Vietnamese 

Air Force had almost doubled in size 

over its June 1969 strength. From an 

organization of about 29,000 men, 20 

squadrons, and an inventory of 428 

aircraft in 1969, it had grown to 42,000 

officers and airmen (with another 

10,000 in training), organized into 49 

squadrons equipped with about 2,000 

aircraft (22 different types). In terms of 

numbers of aircraft, it had emerged as 

the fourth largest Air Force in the 

world- behind Communist China, the 

United States, and the Soviet Union. 

319 

Chapter XXI. American POW's 

and Operation 

Homecoming 

On 23 January 1973 Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs, and Special 

Adviser Le Due Tho of North Vietnam 

reached agreement in Paris to end the 

war in Vietnam and restore the peace. 

Four days later the four major combatan"ts-the United States and South 

Vietnam on the one side and North 

Vietnam and VietCong (the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the 

Republic of South Vietnam) on the 

other-signed the cease-fire agreement. It required the release of all 

American prisoners of war held by the 

Communists simultaneously with 

withdrawal of all U.S. forces from 

South Vietnam , these actions to be 

completed within 60 days. 

For the nearly 600 POW's the 27 

January agreement meant freedom 

after many years of captivity in North 

Vietnamese, Viet Cong, Laotian, and 

Chinese prison camps. Three hundred 

and twenty-five were USAF personnel, 

mostly combat pilots. Two were Korean war aces-Lt. Col. James L. Kasler 

and Col. Robinson Risner- who had 

spent 61f2 and 7 years in captivity, 

respectively. A third Air Force pilot, 

Col. John P. Flynn, who was shot 

down in October 1967, was the senior 

American POW in North Vietnam . 

Promoted to brigadier general while in 

captivity (to protect him against harassment, no announcement was 

made), Colonel Flynn helped to organize and command the " 4th Allied 

POW Wing" in the last years of the 

war. 

USAF officials did not have much 

information about the prisoners' living 

conditions or their treatment during 

the early years of their captivity. What 

was known was not encouraging. As 

early as 25 June 1965, Hanoi radio 

reported that the Viet Cong had executed Sgt. Harold G. Bennett, an adviser to an ARVN unit, who was captured on 29 December 1964, in retaliation for the execution of Communist 

terrorists by the Saigon government. In 

August 1965--after Hanoi radio broadcast the tape-recorded statements of 

two recently captured Air Force pilots 

praising their captors for their "humane" treatment-fears were expressed that they had been tortured . 

These fears eventually were confirmed. 

Beginning in late 1965 and during 

the next 7 years, the U. S. government 

worked to bring international pressure 

to bear on Hanoi to insure that the 

rights of the prisoners under terms of 

the 1949 Geneva Convention were 

being observed . Although North Vietnam had signed the convention in 

1957, it announced that captured 

American pilots were not entitled to 

POW status. According to Hanoi, there 

had been no formal declaration of war 

between the United States and North 

Vietnam (the Geneva convention 

made no such distinction) and the pilots were "criminals" who could be 

convicted " under the principles established by the Nuremburg war crime 

trials." 

In its efforts to ease the plight of the 

POW's, the Johnson administration 

solicited the assistance of the lnterna321 
1 hOt 6..1\r f ltr" 

jK<rd I~ HO'"'' 
(1) Newsmen swarm around Ambassador Averell Harriman (see arrow), wllo headed the U.S. 

delegation to the prelimmary peace talks. after emerging from a meeting with French Foreign 

M1nister Couve de Murville at the Quai d'Orsay, In May 1968. (2) Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (1.) and 

Hano1's senior representative Le Due Tho (r.) are shown during a break In the Paris talks on a 

ceas~>-flre, November 1972. In the center is Tho's interpreter. (3) A group of wives and relatives 

of U.S. pnsoners of war held in North Vietnam conferred w1th Secretary of Defense Melvin A. 

Laird m his office in April 1970. (4) Secretary of State William Rogers signed the Vietnamese 

Peace Agreement in Pans, 27 January 1973. Shown oo his nght Is Under Secretary Designate of 

Political Affairs, Ambassador William J. Porter. 

3 
3 

(1} President Nixon at a White House ceremony presented awards 

for gallantry to four men who panlclpated In the US. raid on the Son 

Tay POW camp near Hanoi In November 1970. Shown (1. to r.}: Air 

Force Brig. Gen. LeRoy J Manor, overall commander of the raiding 

party; Air Force TSgt LeRoy M. Wright, Army SFC Tyrone Adderly; 

and Col. Arthur D. Simons, the Army Ranger leader of the unsuc· 

cessful rescue effort. (2) An aerial view of the Hoa Lo prison In Hanoi 

where many U.S. prisoners were held (3} Navy Lt. Cmdr. R. A. Stratton 

In his prison cell. (4) lsi Lis. J. R. Shivley (I } and tst Lt. R. A. Abbott, 

USAF (r.}. (5} Capt. Murphy N. Jones, USAF. (6) Seanan D. B. Hegdahl, 

USN. (7} Lt. Cmdr. H. A. Stafford, USN. 6 

5 

tional Red Cross and friendly nations 

to use their influence in obtaining 

proper treatment. On 29 April 1966, at 

the request of the White House, the 

State Department established a Committee on Prisoner Matters which included representatives from several 

Department of Defense agencies. On 

10 May the President designated W. 

Averell Harriman as his Special Representative and Ambassador to negoti-

~e an exchange of prisone~ . The 

United States also asked the Soviet 

Union to intervene with North Vietnam 

to allow Red Cross representatives to 

visit the POW's, but Moscow referred 

the Americans to Hanoi. 

Hanoi Threatens " War Crimes " 

Trials 

During the early summer of 1966, 

following increased U.S. air strikes 

against oil facilities in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, North Vietnam initiated a 

propaganda campaign leading to the 

scheduling of "war crime" trials for 

the captured airmen. As part of this 

campaign, 52 American POW's handcuffed in pairs were paraded through 

the streets of Hanoi while agitated 

crowds stoned , beat, and reviled 

them. On 7 July 1966 Hanoi radio read 

depositions from several pilots (they 

had been tortured) denouncing American war operations and asking for Vietnamese "forgiveness." On 12 July 

two East European Communist press 

agencies reported that 60 American 

military men would be brought to trial 

later in the month or in early August. 

The United States took North Vietnam 's plans for war crime trials seriously. President Johnson made no 

public threats but warnings about his 

reaction should the trials actually take 

place were soon dispatched around 

the world. In Washington, 19 senators 

who strongly opposed Johnson's Vietnam policies on 15 July issued " a plea 

for sanity" to Hanoi. v·iolence against 

the captured Americans, they warned, 

326 

would " incite the public demand for 

retaliation swift and sure." The next 

day Sen. Richard B. Russell, chairman 

of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warned that North Vietnam 

would be made " a desert" if the trials 

were held. Sen. George D. Aiken predicted " complete destruction of North 

Vietnam" if the POW's were killed. The 

New York Times reported that there 

was little doubt that " Lyndon Johnson's reaction would be severe." 

These warnings had a salutary effect 

on Hanoi, which abruptly ceased its 

propaganda campaigns about the 

trials. Its treatment of the captured 

airmen, however, remained severe. 

Their lot included torture-ranging 

from being trussed up by ropes and 

hung on rafters to being beaten severely by prison guards or having their 

fingernails pulled out. Some POW's 

were tortured to persuade them to 

meet with American antiwar and other 

visiting delegations and recite dictated statements about their " humane" 

treatment. Many prisoners-especially 

senior officers- were placed in solitary confinement for years and fed a 

bare subsistence diet. Except in certain serious cases, medical care was 

minimal. Mail privileges were nonexistent for most prisoners. During the 

Christmas season of 1966, 457 of 467 

packages sent to them by their families were returned with the stamp: 

"Refused by the Postal Authorities of 

Vietnam." 

During 1967 the U. S. government 

continued its search for ways to persuade Hanoi to allow Red Cross representatives to visit the prison camps in 

the North. The South Vietnamese government cooperated by opening its 

camps for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners to inspection by the 

International Committee of the Red 

Cross and allowing mail privileges. 

Still Hanoi refused to budge. On 26 

July 1967 the Department of Defense 

established a Prisoner of War Policy 

Committee. Chaired by Paul C. 

Warnke, Assistant Secretary of De-
tense (International Security Affairs), it 

had the job of coordinating all POW 

matters and planning the eventual 

recovery and repatriation of the prisoners. 

Information about the living conditions and treatment of POW's held by 

the Viet Cong in jungle camps in 

South Vietnam or Cambodia came to 

light from the infrequent successful 

escapee or from the American captive 

occasionally released by the enemy 

for political purposes. Living conditions were extremely primitive, with 

many POW's succumbing to disease 

and starvation. 

In the case of North Vietnamese 

camps, the first authoritative information became available in February 

1968, when Hanoi released three 

American pilots shot down 4 to 6 

months earlier. They were Lt. Col. Norris M. Overly, USAF; Capt. John D. 

Black, USAF; and Lt. Og.) David P. 

Matheny, USN. The North Vietnamese 

announced their impending release 

on 27 January, noting that they would 

be handed over to the U. S. National 

Mobilization Committee to End the 

War. Two of its members-the Rev. 

Daniel Berrigan and Dr. Howard Zinn 

-flew to Hanoi, where the release 

took place on 16 February. 

The entire affair may have been a 

North Vietnamese ploy related to the 

1968 Tet offensive, launched on 31 January. If, as seems likely, the enemy 

thought that the 3-man release might 

ward off U. S. retaliatory strikes in the 

Hanoi-Haiphong area, they were correct. In Washington, Assistant Secretary Warnke-serving as a member of 

a working group created by the newly 

designated Secretary of Defense, 

Clark Clifford, to prepare new military 

recommendations for the Presidentargued against JCS proposals for 

such bombings. He recommended 

that the existing bombing ban " should 

be continued pending the return of 

the 3 American PWs." 

When the three released captives 

reached the United States several 

weeks later, U. S. officials learned for 

the first time that many of the American POW's were in prison camps in 

the Hanoi area. The airmen also identified 40 men as prisoners who had 

been listed as missing in action. Citing 

their testimony, Warnke argued that 

heavy and "indiscriminate" attacks in 

the Hanoi area " would jeopardize the 

lives of these prisoners and alarm 

their wives and parents." 

Subsequently, the President on 31 

March 1968 announced a halt to all 

bombing of North Vietnam (except for 

the area immediately north of the 

DMZ) and invited Hanoi to begin 

peace talks in Paris. The North Vietnamese accepted and, in May 1968, 

the first meetings got under way in 

Paris. Apparently, in an effort to further encourage an end to all bombings of North Vietnam, in August 1968 

Hanoi released three more captured 

pilots, all members of the Air Force 

and recent captives. They were Maj. 

James F. Low, a Korean War ace shot 

down in December 1967; Maj. Fred N. 

Thompson, captured in March 1968; 

and Capt. Joe V. Carpenter, captured 

in February 1968. Turned over to 

members of the U. S. antiwar movement in Hanoi on 18 July, they were 

escorted back to the United States. 

During the waning months of the 

Johnson ad ministration in late 1968, 

little progress was made in the Paris 

talks. The next major event affecting 

the POW's involved the efforts of the 

new administration of President Richard M. Nixon, who took office in 

January 1969. Within days of his inauguration, the President sent Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to Paris 

to head the U.S. delegation to the peace 

talks. Mr. Lodge very early proposed to 

the North Vietnamese the release of 

POW's held by both sides as part of 

any peace agreement. Hanoi, however, demanded that the United States 

end its support of Saigon. As the talks 

deadlocked over this issue, the administration in early 1969 abandoned 

quiet diplomacy in dealing with the 

327 
4 

6 

(1-2) POW's were dnven to the Gia Lam Airport preparatory to their turnover to American officials. (3) Col Emil J. Wenger. USAF greets Maj Hubert K Flesher (I.), who was 

shot down on 2 December 1966. (4) Happy former POW's after boarding a C-141 transport taking them back to the Umted States. (5) The end of a long journey for Army Sgt 

Edward W Williams. greeted by close relatives at Scot1 AFB. Ill (IH) Welcome sogns 

greet returned POW's. 

-· 
2 3 -~----, ,------- 6 

(1-8) Scenes of homecommg. 

5 





AND 
POW issue and proposed discussing it 

" openly, candidly, forcefully, and repeatedly." In the dozens of meetings 

with the North Vietnamese during 

1969, the Americans repeatedly 

brought up the subject. They cited 

" disturbing evidence" that the prisoners were being held "in solitary confinement and being subjected to physical and mental duress." They repeatedly proposed a prisoner exchange, 

repatriation of the sick and wounded, 

and inspection of the camps by impartial outsiders. They pressed the North 

Vietnamese for lists of all POW's so 

that their families could know " who is 

dead and who is alive." 

Although it rejected all these proposals, Hanoi on 3 July 1969 announced that "in recognition of the 

American Independence Day," it 

would release a third group of prisoners. They were: Capt. Wesley L. Rumble, USAF, a captive 15 months; Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, imprisoned 

more than 2 years; and Lt. Robert F. 

Frishman, USN, a prisoner for about 

20 months. Prior to their turn-over to 

another U. S. antiwar group in Hanoi 

on 18 July, the North Vietnamese 

warned Lieutenant Frishman not to 

cause them any "embarrassment" 

since they would retaliate against 

those left behind. The other POW's, 

however, had urged him to speak out 

about their ill-treatment when he got 

home. 

He did several weeks later, with the 

encouragement of the administration. 

On 3 September 1969, Frishman and 

Hegdahl held a press conference at 

the Bethesda Naval Hospital, during 

which the lieutenant reported that 

POW's had been beaten, tortured, 

placed in solitary confinement, provided minimal medical care, and otherwise mistreated. Frishman, for example, almost lost his injured right arm, 

which became shorter than his left arm 

for lack of adequate medical aid. 

Based upon these statements and 

other available information, the U. S. 

government on 13 September report336 

ed to the International Conference of 

the Red Cross meeting in Istanbul, 

Turkey, on Hanoi's gross violations 

of the Geneva Convention. 

The publicity about the harsh treatment had a galvanizing effect on the 

families of the prisoners. Starting in 

September-October 1969, delegations 

of wives and relatives of POW's descended on the North Vietnamese 

delegation in Paris to plead for information about their men. The spectacle 

produced widespread headlines and 

television coverage and adversely 

affected North Vietnam's position in 

the eyes of the world. On 12 November 

the United States also took its case to 

the United Nations General Assembly, 

where it denounced Hanoi's torture 

and treatment of the prisoners and its 

refusal to allow mail privileges to the 

POW's. 
These events finally produced a 

North Vietnamese reaction. Re-

\ 

sponding to the unfavorable publicity, Hanoi requested members of the 

American peace movement to form a 

" Committee of Liaison With Families 

of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam" to transmit letters from the 

POW's to their families in the United 

States. Subsequently, on 14 December 1969, North Vietnamese prison 

officials suddenly directed the POW's: 

"Everyone will write home for Christmas." There followed a dramatic 

change in the number of letters sent 

and received. For example, in the 4Y2 

years ending in January 1969, American families had received only 620 letters from 103 prisoners. During the 

next 11 months, the number climbed 

to 940 from 294 writers, most of the 

additional 320 letters being written in 

November and December. Of those, 

191 came from new writers, whose 

fate for the most part had remained 

unknown to their families. This was an 

important break-through for the prisoners and was followed by noticeable 

improvement in their living conditions. 

The administration continued to 

hammer away at the POW issue in various forums. In early 1970 both houses 

of Congress adopted a resolution expressing concern about the prisoners' 

fates. During the summer, President 

Nixon appointed Col. Frank Borman 

(he and two companions orbited the 

moon in December 1968) as his Special Representative on Prisoners of 

War. Borman traveled to 14 countries 

(including the Soviet Union) seeking 

assistance in persuading Hanoi to 

exchange American prisoners for the 

thousands of captured North Vietnamese troops. Although the trip was unsuccessful, it helped to focus the spotlight on the plight of the POW's. After 

his return to the United States in September 1970, Colonel Borman reported to a joint session of Congress on 

his efforts. 

In October the National League of 

Families of American Prisoners and 

Missing in Southeast Asia held its first 

annual convention in Washington, 

D.C., attended by more than 450 family 

members. The League grew out of the 

activities of a group of wives on the 

West Coast in 1966. In November the 

U.S. government received-via the 

antiwar Committee of Liaison- the 

first news from Hanoi about the death 

in captivity of six POW's. The committee also turned over a North Vietnamese list of 339 American captives, 

which included 4 new names. 

In late November 197~as a direct 

result of the daring U.S. raid on the 

Son Tay prison camp west of Hanoithe North Vietnamese evacuated all 

outlying prisons and brought the 

POW's- 352 of them-to the Hoa Lo 

prison (Vietnamese for "hell hole" but 

usually called the " Hanoi Hilton" 

by the POW's). This consolidation 

337 
opened a new era for the prisoners. 

For the first time they were placed in 

large open-bay rooms housing 20 to 

50 men, enabling them to organize to 

a greater extent than ever before. 

Their senior officers, although still 

kept in isolation by the North Vietnamese, were able to issue policy guidance and directives to the younger 

men via a variety of clandestine communication methods and maintained 

effective command of the "4th Allied 

POW Wing" despite efforts to halt 

this activity. 

During 1971-1972 perhaps the most 

important influence on Hanoi-and the 

final peace settlement-was President 

Nixon 's state visits to North Vietnam's 

major military suppliers-Communist 

China in February 1972 and the Soviet 

Union in May. Within months after Dr. 

Kissinger's secret trip to Peking in 

July 1971 which led to arrangements 

for the President's trip to China, a 

North Vietnamese delegate at Paris 

offered to release all POW's if the United States promised to withdraw all its 

forces from Vietnam by a fixed date. 

The proposal became the foundation 

for reaching a final agreement between Kissinger and Tho in 1972. 

There were several setbacks and interruptions in their negotiations, including Hanoi's major offensive in the 

spring of 1972 to seize territory in 

South Vietnam and defeat the Saigon 

government. The heavy bombardment 

of Hanoi and Haiphong in December 

1972- following Hanoi's procrastination over the settlement-apparently 

was a factor leading to the 27 January 

1973 agreement and set the stage for 

Operation Homecoming, the return of 

all American prisoners. 

Planning the POW Recovery 

Operation Homecoming plans. 

refined over a period of several years, 

called for each returning POW to remain in medical channels from the 

time he returned to American control 

338 

until he had completed all post-captivity processing in a hospital in the 

United States. Representatives of the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

military services, and the State Department attended the final planning conference, held in Honolulu, Hawaii, during August 1972. Among the attendees 

were physicians. surgeons, lawyers, 

escorts. consular officials, chaplains, 

public affairs officers, and others. The 

Commander, 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group (PACAF). was appointed 

overall aeromedical evacuation coordinator for the recovery operation. 

The operation was divided into 

three phases. First. there was to be the 

initial reception of prisoners at three 

release sites: prisoners held by the 

Viet Cong were to be flown to Saigon 

by helicopter; those in North Vietnam, 

the majority of the prisoners, would be 

released at Hanoi; and finally, three 

American POW's held in China- two 

U.S. pilots and a CIA agent imprisoned 

during the Korean War-would be set 

free at Hong Kong. All would be flown 

to Clark AB in the Philippines for the 

second phase of the operation-processing through the Joint Homecoming 

Reception Center. Then the POW's 

would fly to 1 of 31 military hospitals 
in the United States for detailed medical assistance and processing, the 

third phase of the operation. 

In late September 1972 a realistic 

rehearsal for Operation Homecoming 

took place after North Vietnam released three more American POW's: 

Maj. Edward K. Elias, USAF: Lt. Norris 

A. Charles, USN; and Lt. Markham L. 

Gartley, USN. Their release gave 

Homecoming personnel the opportunity to exercise and refine their procedures. The 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group, for example, responded 

five times, sending a C-9A aeromedical aircraft to potential release sites, 

including Vientiane, Laos. 

On 27 January 1973, as specified in 

the cease-fire agreement, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong provided the 

United States with a list of 578 American POW's of whom 556 were military 

personnel and 22 civilians. On 1 February the "Lao Patriotic Front" provided the names of nine other American 

prisoners-seven military and two civilians. Finally, an additional POW in Viet 

Cong hands also was reported, bringing the total of American personnel to be released to 588. The 

Communist side also listed nine nonU.S. personnel: two West Germans, 

two Canadians, two Filipinos, two 

Thais, and one South Vietnamese. The 

total number of Americans returning 

home-including the three released by 

China-was 591 . 

Under provisions of the cease-fire 

agreement, POW's were to be released simultaneously with the withdrawal of American troops, at approximately 15-day phased intervals. The 

first release took place almost on 

schedule and was followed by another 

North Vietnamese " good will" release a few days later. When the North 

Vietnamese fell behind the release 

schedule, the President ordered a halt 

in American force withdrawals from 

the South to make clear the importance the United States attached to 

prompt and full compliance with the 

agreement. North Vietnam responded 

by releasing additional prisoners, the 

last of them on 29 March. In the South, 

Saigon officials released 26,508 North 

Vietnamese and Viet Cong prisoners 

while the Communist side released 

about 5,000 South Vietnamese POW's. 

For the American people the return 

of the nation's captured military men 

was a moment of tears and joyous celebration as they watched the arrival of 

their servicemen at Clark and then at 

air bases throughout the United 

States. A State Department official, 

Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to 

the Deputy Secretary of State for Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Matters, told a congressional committee 

in May 1973 of being at Hanoi's Gia 

Lam airport on 12 February and his joy 

when the first group of POW's arrived 

there for their flight to freedom. He 

said: 

The guards ordered the men off the 

bus. Suddenly, the senior American 

officer of the group took command 

away from the guards and gave the 

orders for the men to march in formation to the release point. The guards 

tried to intervene but fell back. It was 

clear then that, despite the grim experience of their captivity, our men 

had endured and prevailed. They 

deserve our thanks and commendation. 

339 

Appendix I Key Air Force Leaders 

During the War 

in Southeast Asia 

Secretaries of the Air Force 

Eugene M. Zuckert .......... 24 Jan 1961-

30 Sep 1965 

Harold Brown .................... 1 Oct 1965-

14 Feb 1969 

Robert C .......................... 15 Feb 1965-

Seam ans, Jr. 14 May 1973 

John L. ............................ 15 May 1973-

Mclucas (Act) 18 Jul1973 

John L. Mclucas .............. 19 Jul1973-

Under Secretaries 

oftheAirForce 

Joseph V. Charyk ............. 28 Jan 1960-

1 Mar 1963 

Brockway McMillan ........ 12 Jun 1963-

30 Sep 1965 

NormanS. Paul .................. 1 Oct 1965-

30 Sep 1967 

Townsend Hoopes ............ 2 Oct 1967-

3 Feb 1969 

John L. Mclucas" ............ 17 Mar 1969-

18 Jul 1973 

James W. Plummer ......... 20 Dec 1973-

*Mc lucas served in this post through 19 December 1973 in addition to serving as Secretary of the 

Air Force. 

Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force 

Gen. Curtis E ................... 30 Jun 1961-

LeMay 31 Jan 1965 

Gen. John P ...................... 1 Feb 1965-

McConnell 31 Jul1969 

Gen. John D. Ryan ............ 1 Aug 1969-

31 Jul1973 

Gen. George S .................. 1 Aug 1973-

Brown 30Jun 1974 

Gen. David C. Jones ........... 1 Jul1974-

Commanders in Chief, 

Pacific Air Forces 

Lt. Gen. Emmett ................ 1 Aug 1959-

0 'Donnell, Jr. 31 Jul1963 

Gen. Jacob E ..................... 1 Aug 1963-

Smart 31 Jul1964 

Gen. Hunter ...................... 1 Aug 1964-

Harris, Jr. 31 Jan 1967 

Gen. John D. Ryan ............ 1 Feb 1967-

31 Ju11968 

Gen. Joseph J ................... 1 Aug 1968-

Nazzaro 31 July 1971 

Gen. Lucius D ................... 1 Aug 1971 -

Ciay 30 Sep 1973 

Gen. John W . ..................... 1 Oct 1973-

Vogt, Jr. 30 Jun 197 4 

Gen. Louis L. ....................... 1 Jui1974-

Wilson, Jr. 

341 
Commanders, 

Seventh Air Force 

Organized at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, 1 

April 1966. Replaced 2d Air Division. 

Lt. Gen. Joseph H ............. 1 Apr 1966-

Moore 30 Jun 1966 

Gen. William W . .................. 1 Jui1966-

Momyer 31 Jul1968 

Gen. George S . ................. 1 Aug 1968-

Brown 31 Aug 1970 

Gen. Lucius D . .................. 1 Sep 1970-

Ciay, Jr. 31 Jul1971 

Gen. John D . ..................... 1 Aug 1971-

Lavelle 6 Apr 1972 

Gen. John W . ..................... 7 Apr 1972-

Vogt, Jr. 30Sep1973 

Lt. Gen. Timothy F ............. 1 Oct 1973-

0 'Keefe 

Commanders, 

Seventh/ Thirteenth Air Force 

Organized 6 January 1966 at Udorn AB, 

Thailand as 2/13 Air Force. 

Redesignated 7/13 Air Force April1966. 

Redesignated 13 Air Force ADVON in 

late March 1973. 

Maj. Gen. Charles R ........... 6 Jan 1966-

Bond, Jr. (Dep Cmdr) 31 Mar 1967 

Maj. Gen. William C . ......... 1 Jun 1967-

Lindley, Jr. 31 May 1968 

Maj. Gen. Louis T . ............. 1 Jun 1968-

Seith 31 May 1969 

Maj. Gen. Robert L. .......... 1 Jun 1969-

Petit 5 Mar 1970 

Maj. Gen. James F . .......... 15 Apr 1970-

Kirkendall 11 Oct 1970 

Maj. Gen. Andrew J ......... 12 Oct 1970-

Evans, Jr. 30 Jun 1971 

Maj. Gen. DeWitt R. ............ 1 Jui1971 -

Sea rles 8 Sep 1972 

Maj. Gen. James D . ........... 9 Sep 1972-

Hughes 19Apr1973 

342 

Commanders, 

Eighth Air Force 

Moved, without personnel or equipment, from Westover AFB, MA to 

Andersen AFB, Guam on 1 April 1970. 

Replaced 3d Air Division. Moved 

without personnel or equipment, to 

Barksdale AFB,-lA on 1 January 1975. 

Lt. Gen. Alvan C ... . . . ... 1 Apr 1970-

Gillem, II 12 Jul 1970 

Brig. Gen. Leo C. . . . ... . 13 Jut 1970-

lewis 31 Jut 1970 

Lt. Gen. Sam J .... . ..... 1 Aug 1970-

Byerley 13 Sep 1971 

Lt. Gen. Gerald W. . .. . . 14 Sep 1971-

Johnson 30 Sep 1973 

Lt. Gen. George H . ... . . . 1 Oct 1973-

McKee 29 Aug 1974 

Maj. Gen. Charles F. . . . . 30 Oct 1974-

Minter, Sr. 31 Dec 1974 

Division, Wing, and Group 

Commanders 

2d ADVON 

Established by Thirteenth Air Force on 

15 November 1961 with four numbered 

detachments, three located in South 

Vietnam, and one in Thailand. Inact ivated October 1962; replaced by 2d Air 

Division. 

Commanders, 2d Air Division 

Organized 8 October 1962. Discontinued 1 Apri/1966; replaced by Se\tenth 

Air Force. 

Brig. Gen. (Later, Maj .. .. . 8 Oct 1962-

Gen.) Rollen H. Anthis 19 Dec 1963 

Brig. Gen. Milton B . . . . 20 Dec 1963-

Adams C. 20 Jan 1964 

Maj. Gen. (Later, Lt . . . C. 21 Jan 1964-

Gen. Joseph H. Moore 2 Apr 1966 

•Anthis also wore a second hat as Chief, Air 

Force Section, MAAG, Vietnam. 
Commanders, 3d Air Division 

Activated at Andersen AFB, Guam on 

18 June 1954. Inactivated 31 March 

1970. Replaced by 8 AF. Activated at 

Andersen AFB, Guam on 1 January 

1975. 

Brig. Gen. Harold W. ..... 2 Jul 1963-

0hlke 16 Jul 1965 

Maj. Gen. William J .. . . . . 16 Jul 1965-

Crumm 7 Jul 1967 

Maj. Gen. Selmon W. . . . . . 8 Jul 1967-

Wells 5 Jun 1968 

Lt. Gen. Alvan C .... . . .. . 6 Jun 1968-

Gillem, II 31 Mar 1970 

Maj. Gen. Charles F ... .. . 1 Jan 1975-

Minter, Sr. 10 Aug 1975 

Maj. Gen. Thomas F. . . . 20 Aug 1975-

Rew 17 Aug 1976 

17th Air Division (Prov) 

Activated 1 Jun 1972 at U-Tapao Afld, 

Thailand, attached to 8 AF (SAC). Inactivated 1 January 1975. 

Brig. Gen. Frank W. . .. .. 1 Jun 1972-

EIIiott, Jr. 5 Jun 1972 

Brig. Gen. Glen A . . .. ... 6 Jun 1972-

Sullivan 1 Feb 1973 

Brig. Gen. Billy J .... .... 2 Feb 1973-

EIIis 12 Oct 1973 

Brig. Gen. James S .. ... 13 Oct 1973-

Murphy 4 Aug 1974 

Brig. Gen. George D .... . 5 Aug 197 4-

Miller 31 Dec 1974 

57th Air Division (Prov) 

Activated 1 June 1972 at Andersen AFB, 

Guam, attached to 8 AF (SAC). Inactivated 15 November 1973. 

Brig. Gen. Andrew B. . . .. 1 Jun 1972-

Anderson, Jr. 14 Jan 1973 

Brig. Gen. John W. . . . . . 15 Jan 1973-

Burkhart Oct 1973 

Brig. Gen. Edgar S .. . . ... . Oct 1973-

Harris, Jr. 15 Nov 1973 

315th Air Division 

Activated 25 January 1951, Tachikawa 

AB, Japan. Inactivated 15 April 1969. 

Brig. Gen. Theodore . . . . 31 Aug 1963 

G. Kershaw 

Brig. Gen. Richard H .. ... 1 Sep 1963-

EIIis 15 Jun 1965 

Col. Lester A ... . ... .. 16 June 1965-

Ferris, Jr. (Interim) 12 Jul 1965 

Col. Charles W. .. .. .. .. 13 Jul 1965-

Howe 25 Jul 1968 

Col. Robert D ... . ....... 26 Jul 1968-

Brown 15 Apr 1969 

834th Air Division 

Organized 25 October 1966 at Tan Son 

Nhut AB, RVN. 

Brig. Gen. William G. 

Moore. Jr ..................... 11 Nov 1967 

Brig. Gen. Hugh E . .......... 12 Nov 1967-

Wild 28 Nov 1967 

Brig. Gen. Burl W . ........... 29 Nov 1967-

Mclaughlin 22 Jun 1969 

Brig. Gen. John H . .......... 23 Jun 1969-

Herring, Jr. 1 Dec 1971 

Brig. Gen. Eugene W ....... 24 Jan 1972-

Gauch, Jr. 

343 
3d Tactical Fighter Wing 

Arrived at Bien Hoa AB, RVN, 8 

November 1965. Inactivated 15 March 

1970. Activated 15 March 1971. 

Col. Robert A . ................... 8 Nov 1965-

Ackerly 31 Oct 1966 

Col. Richard C . ................. 1 Nov 1966-

Catledge 29 Sep 1967 

Col. George W . ............... 30 Sep 1967-

McLaughlin 4 May 1968 

Col. Homer K . .................... 5 May 1968-

Hansen 31 Mar 1969 

Col. Howard M . .................. 1 Apr 1969-

Lane 10 Apr 1970 

Col. William E . ................. 11 Apr 1970-

Charlson Unkn 

Coi.AbnerM ................... 11 Mar1971 -

Aust, Jr. 20 May 1971 

Col. Clement D ................ 20 May 1971-

Billingslea (Temp) 6 Jun 1971 

Col. Abner M ..................... 7 Jun 1971-

Aust, Jr. 16 Nov 1971 

Col. Charles A . ................ 17 Nov 1971-

Watry 4 Oct 1972 

Col. Paul A .... . . . . . . .. . 5 Oct 1972-

Kattu 18 Nov 1973 

Col. Harry W .................... 19 Nov 1973-

Schurr 

8th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Organized at Ubon AB, Thailand, 8 

December 1965. 

Col. Joseph G .................. 8 Dec 1965-

Wilson 29 Sep 1966 

Col. Robin Olds ............. 30 Sep 1966-

22 Sep 1967 

Col. Robert V ................. 23 Sep 1967-

Spencer 4 Jul 1968 

Col. Charles C ..................... 5 Jui1968-

Pattillo 7 May 1969 

Col. Donald N . ................... 8 May 1969-

Stantield 5 May 1970 

Col. David J . ...................... 6 May 1970-

Schmerbeck 1 Oct 1970 

Col. Lloyd A. . ..................... 2 Oct 1970-

Leavit1, Jr. {Temp) 3 Oct 1970 

Col. Larry M. . ..................... 4 Oct 1970-

Killpack 18 May 1971 

344 

Col. James A ................... 19 May 1971 -

Young 27 Feb 1972 

Col. CarlS. Miller ............ 28 Feb 1972-

24 Nov 1972 

Col. Francis A ................. 25 Nov 1972-

Humphreys, Jr. 24 Jan 1974 

Col. Tom M ...................... 25 Jan 1974-

Arnold, Jr. 

12th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Arrived Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN, on 8 

November 1965. 

Moved to Phu Cat AB, RVN, 31 March 

1970. Inactivated at Phu Cat AB, RVN, 

17 November 1971. 

Col. Levi A. Chase ............ 8 Nov 1965-

170ct1966 

Col. Jones E. Bolt ............ 18 Oct 1966-

19 Mar 1967 

Col. Joel D ....................... 20 Mar 1967-

Thorvaldson 8 Apr 1967 

Col. Woodard E . ................ 9 Apr 1967-

Davis, Jr. 4 Apr 1968 

Col. Floyd White ................ 5 Apr 1968-

6 Apr 1969 

Col. Ramon A . .................... 7 Apr 1969-

Melton 30 Mar 1970 

Col. Harry B . .................... 31 Mar 1970-

Trimble 12 Apr 1970 

Col. Larry M . .................... 13 Apr 1970-

Killpack 3 Oct 1970 

Col. RalphS. Parr .............. 4 Oct 1970-

18 Feb 1971 

Col. Richard H ................ 19 Feb 1971-

Schoeneman 3 Oct 1971 

Col. Albert L. ...................... 4 Oct 1971-

Melton 17 Nov 1971 
14th Air Commando Wing 

Organized at Nha Trang AB, RVN, 8 

March 1966. Redesignated 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 August 1968. 

Moved to Phan Rang, 15 October 

1969. Inactivated 30 September 1971 . 

Redesignated 14th Flying Trng Wg 22 

March 1972. Activated 1 June 1972 at 

Columbus AFB, Miss. 

Col. Gordon F. 

Bradburn ........................ 9 Apr 1967 

Col. Forrest L. .................. 10 Apr 1967-

Rauscher 16 Nov 1967 

Col. John M. Patton ........ 17 Nov 1967-

2 Jun 1968 

Col. Conrad S ................... 3 Jun 1968-

AIIman 4 Mar 1969 

Col. William K ................... 5 Mar 1969-

Bush 1 Sep 1969 

Col. Clyde S ...................... 2 Sep 1969-

Cherry 2 Apr 1970 

Col. William H . ................... 3Apr 1970-

Fairbrother 12 Sep 1970 

Col. Alfred F .................... 13 Sep 1970-

Eaton 13 Mar 1971 

Col. Mark W . ................... 14 Mar 1971-

Magnan 12 Sep 1971 

Col. Malcolm L. ............... 13 Sep 1971-

Nurnberg 30 Sep 1971 

31st Tactical Fighter Wing 

Arrived Tuy Hoa AB, RVN, 25 December 1966. Redeployed back to the 

United States. 15 October 1970. 

Col. Warren R . ................ 28 Nov 1966-

Lewis 6 Dec 1967 

Col. William J .................... 7 Dec 1967-

Evans 2 May 1968 

Col. Abner M . .................... 3 May 1968-

Aust, Jr. 7 Feb 1969 

Col. Cuthbert A. ................ 8 Feb 1969-

Pattillo 7 Aug 1969 

Col. William B . .................. 8Aug 1969-

Yancey, Jr. 14 Jun 1970 

Col. Gilbert D . ................. 15 Jun 1970-

Hereth 15 Oct 1970 

35th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Organized Da Nang AB, RVN, 8 April 

1966. Moved to Phan Rang AB, RVN, 10 

October 1966. Inactivated 30 June 

1971 at Phan Rang. 

Col. Franklin H . .................. 8 Apr 1966-

Scott 9 May 1966 

Col. Allan P . .................... 10 May 1966-

Rankin 9 Oct 1966 

Col. GeorgeS . ................. 10 Oct 1966-

Weart 27 Feb 1967 

Col. James A . .................... 1 Mar 1967-

Wilson 31 Jan 1968 

Col. Herndon F ................. 1 Feb 1968-

Williams 22 Sep 1968 

Col. FrankL. ................... 23 Sep 1968-

Gailer, Jr. 8 Aug 1969 

Col. Walter T . .................... 9 Aug 1969-

Galligan 9 Jun 1970 

Col. Walter C . .................. 10 Jun 1970-

Turnier 31 Dec 1970 

Col. Cregg P ....................... 1 Jan 1971-

Nolen, Jr. 30 Jun 1971 

37th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Organized at Phu Cat AB, RVN, 

March 1967. Inactivated 31 March 

1970. 

Unkn .................................. 1 Mar 1967-

. 5 May 1967 

Col. Raymond C ................ 6 May 1967-

Lee, Jr. 14 May 1967 

Col. Edwin A . .................. 15 May 1967-

Schneider 14 May 1968 

Col. Leroy J. Manor ........ 15 May 1968-

31 Mar1969 

Col. Harry B ........................ 1 Apr 1969-

Trimble 31 Mar 1970 

345 
43d Strategic Wing 

Activated 1 April 1970 at Andersen AFB, 

Guam, assigned to 8 AF (SAC) and later 

attached to Air Division Provisional, 57 

during existence of latter. Replaced 

3960th Strategic Wing. 

Col. Lawrence E .. . ...... 1 Apr 1970-

Stephens 30 Jun 1970 

Col. Glenn R. .. ... ... . . . 1 Jul 1970-

Dunlap 28 Apr 1972 

Col. William P. .. ......• 28 Apr 1972-

Armstrong 14 Jun 1972 

Col. James H ..... . . .. . 16 Jun 1972-

McGrath 30 Nov 1972 

Col. James R. . ... . ..... 1 Dec 1972-

McCarthy 1 Jun 1973 

Col. Morris E. .. . .. .... . 1 Jun 1973-

Shiver Aug 1973 

Col. Lawton W. .. .. ....... Aug 1973-

Magee 15 Nov 1973 

Col. James R . .. .. .. . . . 15 Nov 1973-

McCarthy 15 Jun 1974 

Col. Andrew . . . ..... . . .. .. Jun 1974 

Pringle, Jr. Jun 1975 

Col. Donald C ... . . .... ... Jun 1975-

Bass Mar 1976 

56th Air Commando Wing 

Organized at Nakhon Phanom AB, 

Thailand, 8 April 1967. Redesignated 1 

August 1968 as Special Operation 

Wing. 

Col. Harry C . ....................... 8 Apr 1967-

Aderholt 18 Nov 1967 

Col. Roland K .................. 19 Nov 1967-

McCoskrie 6 Nov 1968 

Col. Edwin J ...................... 7 Nov 1968-

White, Jr. 30 May 1969 

Col. Patrick M . ................ 31 May 1969-

Fallon (Temp) 4 Jul1969 

Col. EdwinJ ........................ 5Jui1969-

White, Jr. . 4 Oct 1969 

Col. Samuel E . ................... 5 Oct 1969-

Crosby, Jr. 7 Aug 1970 

Col. Edward J .................... 8 Aug 1970-

Walsh, Jr. 14 Jul1971 

346 

Col. Jack A ........................ 15 Jui1971-

Rob i nson 16 Jun 1972 

Col. Norbert L. ................ 17 Jun 1972-

Simon 30 Nov 1972 

Col. Robert E . ................... 1 Dec 1972-

Wayne 29Jun 1973 

Col. William B . ................ 30Jun 1973-

0wens 14 Sep 1973 

Col. Ralph H . ....................... 15 Sep 73-

Bowers, (Temp) 25 Sep 1973 

Col. Charles E ................. 26 Sep 1973-

Woods 22 Jun 1974 

72d Strategic Wing (Prov) 

Activated 1 June 1972 at Andersen AFB, 

Guam, attached to Air Division Provisional, 57. Inactivated 15 November 

1973. 

Col. Kenneth M .. . ...... 1 Jun 1972-

Holloway 8 Oct 1972 

Col. Thomas F .. ; . .. . . .. 8 Oct 1972-

Rew 16 Mar 1973 

Col. Thomas W. ..... ... 16 Mar 1973-

Sherman, Jr. 16 Apr 1973 

Col. Nathaniel A. . . ... .. 16 Apr 1973-

Gallagher 15 Nov 1973 

307th Strategic Wing 

Activated 1 April 1970 at U-Tapao AB, 

Thailand, assigned to 8 AF (SAC) and 

attached to Air Division Provisional, 17 

while the latter was in existence. 

Replaced 4258th Strategic Wing. lnac· 

tivated 30 September 1975. 

Brig. Gen. Woodrow A. .. . 1 Apr 1970-

Abbott 4 Jul 1970 

Brig. Gen. John R ... . .... 5 Jul 1970-

Hinton, Jr. 4 Jul 1971 

Brig. Gen. Frank W. .. . ... 5 Jul 1971-

EIIiott, Jr. 31 May 1972 

Col. Donald M . .. . .... . . 1 Jun 1972-

Davis 10 Feb 1973 

Col. Bill V ... . . .. ...... 11 Feb 1973-

Brown 20 Aug 1973 

Col. Frank J ....... .. . . 21 Aug 1973-

Apel, Jr. 9 Apr 1974 
Col. Ernest J .. ...... . . . 10 Apr 1974· 

Stirman 31 Dec 1974 

Brig. Gen. George D ..... 1 Jan 1975· 

Miller 21 Jan 1975 

Col. Ernest J ........... 22 Jan 1975· 

Stlrman 5 Mar 1975 

Col. Caryl W. . .. .... . ... 6 Mar 1975· 

Calhoun 30 Sep 1975 

310th Strategic Wing (Prov) 

Activated 1 June 1972 at U-Tapao AB, 

Thailand, attached to Air Division Pro· 

visional, 17. Inactivated 1 July 1974. 

Col. James R. . . ..... ... . 1 Jun 1972 

McCarthy 13 Jun 1972 

Col. William L. .. ... .... 14 Jun 1972· 

Nicholson, Ill 5 Dec 1972 

Col. Stanley C .... . .. ... 6 Dec 1972· 

Beck 12 Jun 1973 

Col. Robert T .. . .... . .. 13 Jun 1973· 

Herres 7 Sep 1973 

Col. Vernon R. . .. ...... 15 Sep 1973· 

Huber 20 Nov 1973 

Col. Richard J ........ . 21 Nov 1973· 

Smith 1 Jan 1974 

Col. Earl T ... ........ .. . 2 Jan 1974· 

O'Laughlin 21 Mar 1974 

Col. Donald N ....... .. 22 Mar 1974· 

Webster 1 May 1974 

Col. Lavern E. .. ...... .. 2 May 1974· 

Williams 1 Jul 1974 

315th Tactical Airlift Wing 

Organized as 315th Air Commando 

Wing, Troop Carrier, on 8 March 1966 

at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN. Moved to 

Phan Rang AB, RVN, on 15 June 1967. 

Redesignated 315th Air Commando 

Wing on 1 August 1967. Redesignated 

315th Tactical Airlift Wing on 1 January 

1970. 

Col. George L. .. ................. 8 Mar 1966-

Hannah, Jr. 22 Jun 1966 

Col. Robert T ................... 23 Jun 1966-

Simpson 18 Nov 1966 

Col. Vernon W ................. 19 Nov 1966-

Froehlich 8 Aug 1967 

Col. Bill M ......................... 9 Aug 1967-

Richardson 19 Nov 1967 

Col. Robert D .................. 20 Nov 1967-

Brown 7 Jun 1968 

Col. Noble F . ..................... 8 Jun 1968-

Greenhill, Jr. 18 Ju11968 

Coi.JohnW. Pauly ........... 19Jul1968-

9 Jun 1969 

Col. LeslieJ ..................... 10Jun 1969-

Campbell, Jr. 26 May 1970 

Col. Charles S. Reed ...... 27 May 1970-

30Jan 1971 

Col. Kenneth T ................. 31 Jan 1971-

Biood, Jr. 18 Nov 1971 

Col. Ray C. Staley ........... 19 Nov 1971-

31 Mar 1972 

355th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Based at Takhli AB, Thailand, 8 November 1965 to 10 December 1970. 

Replaced 6235th Tactical Fighter 

Wing. Inactivated 10 December 1970. 

Col. William H. Holt .......... 8 Nov 1965-

3 Aug 1966 

Col. Robert R. Scott ......... 4 Aug 1966-

1 Aug 1967 

Col. John C. Giraudo ........ 2 Aug 1967-

29Jun 1968 

Col. Michael C ................ 30 Jun 1968-

Horgan 26 Jun 1969 

Col. Heath Bottomly ....... 27 Jun 1969-

14 Jun 1970 

Col. Clarence E . .............. 15Jun 1970-

Anderson, Jr. 10 Dec 1970 

347 
366th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Arrived at Phan Rang AB, RVN 20 

March 1966; moved to Da Nang 10 

October 1966. On 27 June 1972 transferred to Takhli AB, Thailand. On 1 

November 1972 transferred to Mt. 

Home AFB, ID. 

Col. George S. 

Weart .............................. 9 Oct 1966 

Col. Allan P. Rankin ......... 10 Oct 1966-

19 Mar 1967 

Col. Jones E. Bolt. . ... 20 Mar 1967 · 

26 May 1967 

Col. Robert W . ................ 27 May 1967-

Maloy 18 Dec 1967 

Col. Clifford H . ................ 19 Dec 1967-

Meier 16 Jan 1968 

Col. Paul C. Watson ......... 17 Jan 1968-

2 Jan 1969 

Col. (Later BG) John ........ 3 Jan 1969-

W. Roberts 30 Sep 1969 

Col. Joseph C ..................... 1 Oct 1969-

Secino 18 Sep 1970 

Col. Daniel C ................... 19 Sep 1970-

Perry 17 Feb 1971 

Col. John R ..................... 18 Feb 1971-

Spalding, Jr. 6 Jul1971 

Col. Julian D . ....................... 7 Jui1971-

Sawyer 21 Mar 1972 

Col. George W . ............... 22 Mar 1972-

Rutter 

374th Troop Carrier Wing 

Organized 8 August 1966. Redesignated 374th Tactical Airlift Wing 1 August 

1967. Based at Ching Chuan Kang AB, 

Taiwan. 

Col. John R. Neal .............. 8 Aug 1966-

15Jun 1967 

Col. Russell D ................. 16Jun 1967-

Crane 24 Jan 1969 

Col. (Later BG) Kelton ..... 25 Jan 1969-

M. Farris 10Jul1970 

Col. Noble F ...................... 11 Jui1970-

Greenhill, Jr. 31 May 1971 

Col. Andrew P ................... 1 Jun 1971-

losue 17 May 1973 

Col. James I. .................... 18 May 1973-

Baginski 

348 

376th Strategic Wing 

Activated 1 April 1970 at Kadena AB, 

Okinawa. Replaced 4252d Strategic 

Wing. 

Brig. Gen. Alan C . .. .... 1 Apr 1970-

Edmunds 1 Sep 1970 

Col. Jack A ..... . . .... .. 2 Sep 1970-

Weyant 30 Aug 1972 

Col. Dudley G .. . .... .. 30 Aug 1972-

Kavanaugh 9 Sep 1974 

Col. Raymond L ... .. . . . 10 Sep 1974-

Horvath 30 Sep 1977 

388th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Organized at Karat AB, Thailand, 8 

April 1966; replaced 6234th Tactical 

Fighter Wing. 

Col. Monroe S . ................... 8Apr 1966-

Sams Aug1966 

Brig. Gen William S . ............ Aug 1966-

Chairsell 31 Jul1967 

Col. Edward B ................... 1 Aug 1967-

Burdett 17 Nov 1967 

Col. Jack C ...................... 18 Nov 1967-

Berger 21 Nov 1967 

Col. Neil J ........................ 22 Nov 1967-

Graham 18 Jan 1968 

Col. Norman P ................. 19Jan 1968-

Phillips 23 Jun 1968 

Col. Paul P ....................... 24 Jun 1968-

Douglas, Jr. 14 Dec 1968 

Col. Allen K ..................... 15 Dec 1968-

McDonald 10 Jun 1969 

Col. John A. Nelson ........ 11 Jun 1969-

. 4 Dec 1969 

Col. James M .................... 5 Dec 1969-

Breedlove 29 Jun 1970 

Col. Ivan H ....................... 30 Jun 1970-

Dethman 31 Jul1970 

Col. I rby B. .. ...................... 1 Aug 1970-

Jarvis, Jr. 25 Jul 1971 

Col. Webb ......................... 26 Jui1971 -

Thompson 14 Dec 1971 

Col. Stanley M ................. 15 Dec 1971-

Umstead, Jr. 4 Aug 1972 

Col. Richard E ................... 5 Aug 1972-

Merkling 24Jan 1973 
Col. Mele .......................... 25 Jan 1973-

Vojvodich, Jr. 30 Jun 1973 

Col. Robert K . ...................... 1 Jul1973 

Crouch 

405th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Activated 9 April 1959 at Clark AB, 

Philippines. 

Col. Edward P ................... 5 Feb 1968-

McNeff 9 Jan 1970 

Col. Walter J ...................... 10Jan 1970 

Brown 31 May 1971 

Col. James E . .................... 1 Jun 1971-

Tilton 31 Dec 1971 

Col. John R. Geyer ............. 1 Jan 1972-

5Jun 1972 

Col. Henry C ...................... 6 Jun 1972-

Gordon Mar 1973 

432d Tactical Reconnaissance 

Wing 

Organized at Udorn AB, Thailand, 

18 September 1966. 

Col. Robert W ................. 18 Sep 1966-

Shick 17 Sep 1967 

Col. Victor N . ................... 18 Sep 1967-

Cabas 3 Sep 1968 

Col. Wendell L . ................. 4 Sep 1968-

Bevan, Jr. 6 Jun 1969 

Col. Darrell S ..................... 7 Jun 1969-

Cramer 27 Jul1970 

Col. DavidS ...................... 28 Jui1970-

Mellish 25 Nov 1970 

Col. Lloyd R .................... 26 Nov 1970-

Leavitt, Jr. 2 Apr 1971 

Col. Lyle E. Mann ............... 3 Apr 1971-

28 Oct 1971 

Col. Charles A .................. 29 Oct 1971-

Gabriel 14Jun1972 

Col. Scott G. Smith ......... 15 Jun 1972-

18 Mar 1973 

Col. Robert W . ................ 19 Mar 1973-

Ciement 

-=-- ~ 

460th Tactical Reconnaissance 

Wing 

Organized at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, 18 

February 1966. Inactivated 31 August 

1971. 

Col. Edward H ................. 18 Feb 1966-

Taylor Jan 1967 

Col. Robert G . ...................... Jan 1967-

Williams 20 Dec 1967 

Brig. Gen. Robert J ......... 21 Dec 1967-

Holbury 7 Ju11968 

Col. Leslie J ......................... 8 Jui1968-

Westberg 27 May 1969 

Col. HalL. ........................ 28 May 1969-

Fitzpatrick 20 Jun 1969 

Col. Harry M .................... 21 Jun 1969-

Chapman 30 Apr 1970 

Col. James E ..................... 1 May 1970-

Tilton 14Apr1971 

Col. Dale L. ....................... 15 Apr 1971-

Fiowers 31 Jul1971 

Col. Jerome F .................... 1 Aug 1971 -

0'Malley 31 Aug 1971 

463d Troop Carrier Wing 

Constituted 463d Troop Carrier Wing 

(M}, 1 December 1952. Redesignated 

Troop Carrier Wing (Assault}, 1 October 1962; Troop Carrier Wing (M}, 15 

May 1965; Troop Carrier Wing, 8 December 1965; 463d Tactical Airlift 

Wing. 1 August 1967. Inactivated at 

Clark AB, Philippines, 31 December 

1971. 

Col. Arthur E . ................... 17 Oct 1964-

Aenchbacher 6 Nov 1966 

Col. Lopez J ...................... 7 Nov 1966-

Mantoux 6 Dec 1967 

Col. Thomas A .................. 7 Dec 1967-

Twomey 11 Apr1968 

Col. Marion F . .................. 12 Apr 1968-

Caruthers 8 May 1969 

Col. Charles S ................... 9 May 1969· 

Wolfe 1 Jul1970 

Col. John A. Geyer .............. 2 Jul1970-

1 Sep 1971 

Col. Stewart Young .......... 2 Sep 1971-

31 Dec 1971 

349 
483d Tactical Airlift Wing 

Organized at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN, 

15 October 1966, as 483d Troop Carrier 

Wing. Inactivated May 1972. 

Col. Paul J. Mascot ........... 4 Nov 1966-

7 Oct 1967 

Col. William H .................... 80ct 1967-

Mason 29 Sep 1968 

Col. Wilbert Turk ............ 30 Sep 1968-

3Sep1969 

Col. Keith L ....................... 4 Sep 1969-

Christensen 22 Mar 1970 

Col. Abbott C. .. ............... 23 Mar 1970-

Green leaf 10 Apr 1971 

Col. Rodney H .................. 11 Apr 1971-

Newbold 24 Feb 1972 

Col. Duane H ................... 25 Feb 1972-

Erickson 15 May 1972 

553d Reconnaissance Wing 

Based at Korat AB, Thailand, 31 

October 1967. Inactivated 15 December 

1970. 

Col. Gus Weiser .............. 31 Oct 1967-

30Jun 1968 

Col. John W. Emis .............. 1 Jul1968-

7 Jul1968 

Col. Henry L ........................ 8 Jul 1968-

Timmermans 31 Jun 1969 

Col. Ted H . .......................... 1 Jui1969-

0stendorf 6 Dec 1969 

Col. John W ....................... 7 Dec 1969-

M itchell 1 0 Dec 1970 

Col. Robert A . ................. 11 Dec 1970-

Sioan 

633d Special Operations Wing 

Organized at Nakhon Phanom AB, 

Thailand, 15 July 1968. Inactivated 15 

March 1970. 

Col. George P . .................. 15 Jui1968-

Birdsong, Jr. 24 Apr 1969 

Col. Samuel D . ................. 25Apr 1969-

Berman 15 Mar 1970 

350 

3960th Strategic Wing 

Activated at Andersen AFB, Guam 1 

April 1955, assigned to 3d Air Division. 

Underwent short-lived changes of 

designation to Air Base Wing and Combat Support Group. Inactivated 31 

March 1970, replaced by 43d Strategic 

Wing. 

Col. Edward C .. .... . .. .. . Apr 1964· 

Unger 21 Jul 1964 

Col. Edward D .. . . ...... 22 Jul 1964· 

Gaitley, Jr. 9 Jul 1965 

Col. Joseph J .. . ..... .. . 10 Jul 1965 

Semanek 11 Jul 1967 

Col. James M .......... 12 Jul 1967· 

Smith 6 Jul 1969 

Col. Lawrence E .. . . .. . . . 7 Jul 1969· 

Stephens . . ........ .. 31 Mar 1970 

4133d Bombardment Wing (Prov) 

Activated at Andersen AFB, Guam 1 

February 1966. Turned over its combat 

mission to 43d Strategic Wing and inactivated on 1 July 1970. 

Col. William T .. . ...... .. 1 Feb 1966· 

Cumiskey 31 Mar 1966 

Col. Harold J ... . ... . ... 1 Apr 1966-

Whiteman 12 Jun 1966 

Col. Albert H ...... . ... 13 Jun 1966· 

Schneider 20 Sep 1966 

Col. Willard A ... .. .... . 21 Sep 1966-

Beauchamp 27 Sep 1966 

Col. Earl L. . ........ . . 28 Sep 1966-

Johnson 28 Feb 1967 

Col. Mitchell A ... ..... .. 1 Mar 1967-

Cobeaga 30 Oct 1967 

Col. Robert E ..... ..... 31 Oct 1967-

Brofft 28 Mar 1968 

Col. Madison M .. ...... 29 Mar 1968· 

McBrayer 31 Aug 1968 

Col. Robert E .. . .. . . .. .. 1 Sep 1968· 

Blauw 25 Sep 1968 

Col. Robert E ... .. . . ... 26 Sep 1968-

Brofft 20 Mar 1969 
Col. Robert E .......... 21 Mar 1969 

Blauw 19 Sep 1969 

Col. Raymond P. . ....• . 20 Sep 1969 

lowman 29 Sep 1969 

Col. Howard P. ......... 30 Sep 1969 

McClain 24 Mar 1970 

Col. Harold E. . . . ..... . 25 Mar 1970 

Ottoway Jun 1970 

Col. William P .. . ......... Jun 1970-

Armstrong 1 Jul 1970 

4252d Strategic Wing 

Organized and activated, 12 January 

1965, at Kadena AB, Okinawa. Inactivated, 1 April 1970. Replaced by 376th 

Strategic Wing. 

Col. Holly W. ..................... 12 Jan 1965-

Anderson (Acting) 17 Feb 1965 

Col. (later, Brig. Gen.) ... 18 Feb 1965-

Morgan S. Tyler, Jr. 18 Jul 1967 

Col. (later, Brig. Gen.) .... 19 Jul 1967-

Eugene A. Stalzer 3 Aug 1969 

Brig. Gen. Alan C ............. 4 Aug 1969-

Edmunds 31 Mar 1970 

425Bth Strategic Wing 

Activated at u.:rapao AB, Thailand, 2 

June 1966 to 1 April1970. Replaced by 

307th Strategic Wing. 

Capt. Ralph W ................... 2Jun 1966-

lngram 20Jul1966 

Col. John W. Farrar .......... 21 Jul1966-

30 Jun 1967 

Col. Alex W . ......................... 1 Jui1967-

Talmant 4 Aug 1968 

Brig. Gen. Richard ............ 5 Aug 1968-

M. Hoban 10Jul1969 

Brig. Gen. Woodrow ......... 11 Jui1969-

A. Abbott 31 Mar 1970 

6234th Tactical Fighter Wing 

Organized at Korat AB, Thailand, 5 April 

1965. Discontinued 8 April 1966. Replaced by 388th Tactical Fighter Wing. 

Col. William D .................... 5 Apr 1965-

Ritchie 13 Dec 1965 

Col. Monroe S. Sams ...... 14 Dec 1965-

8 Apr 1966 

6251 st Tactical Fighter Wing 

Organized at Bien Hoa AB, RVN, 8 July 

1965. Discontinued 18 February 1966. 

Col. Philip Brooks .............. 8 Jul1965-

20 Nov 1965 

6252d Tactical Fighter Wing 

Organized at Da Nang AB, RVN, 8 July 

1965. Discontinued 8 April 1966. 

Col. Franklin H . ................... 8 Jui1965-

Scott 8 Apr 1966 

3d Aero Rescue & Recovery 

Group 

Organized 8 January 1966 at Tan Son 

Nhut AB, RVN. 

Col. Arthur W . .................... 8 Jan 1966-

Beall 31 Oct 1966 

Col. Albert P ...................... 1 Nov 1966-

Lovelady 5 Oct 1967 

Col. Paul E. Leske .............. 6 Oct 1967-

19 Sep 1968 

Col. Hollon H ................... 20 Sep 1968-

Bridges 16Jun 1969 

Col. Rayvon ..................... 17 Jun 1969-

Burleson 16 Aug 1969 

Col. Malcolm C . .............. 17 Aug 1969-

Frazee H1 Jul1970 

Col. Frederick V . ............... 17 Jui1970-

Sohle, Jr. 17 Oct 1970 

Col. George C .................. 18 Oct 1970-

Pinyerd Unk 

Col. Warner A ............................... UnkBritton 12 Jan 1972 

Col. Cecil N . ..................... 13 Jan 1972-

Muirhead, Jr. Unk 

Col. Herbert R . ............................. UnkZehnder 16 Dec 1973 

Col. Richard F ................. 17 Dec 1973-

Burdett Unk 
315th Troop Carrier Group 

Organized at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, 8 

December 1962. Redesignated 315th Air 

Commando Group, 8 March 1965. Inactivated 8 March 1966. 

Col. Thomas B .......... Mid-June 1964-

Kennedy 14Jun1965 

Col. David T . ...................... 15 Jui1965-

Fieming 22 Jun 1966 

Col. George L. ................. 23 Jun 1966-

Hannah, Jr. 8 Mar 1966 

Col. James L. Price .............. Jan 1967-

15 May 1967 

Col. Delbert R . ................ 16 May 1967-

Smyth 17 Apr 1968 

Col. Emanuel A ................ 18 Apr 1968-

Pelaez 6 Apr 1969 

Col. Lewis R. Smith ........... 7 Apr 1969-

27 Mar 1970 

Col. William P . ................ 28 Mar 1970-

Lehman 23 Jul1971 

Col. Paul L. Park ............... 24 Jui1971-

Unk 

Col. Robert A ............................... UnkCoffin 28 Feb 1973 

504th Tactical Air 

Group Support- 552d Airborne Early Warning 

Task Force 

Organized at Bien Hoa AB, RVN, 8 

December 1966. Inactivated at Tan Son 

Nhut, 15 March 1972. 

Col. Carl E. Taylor ............. 8 Dec 1966-

5 Mar 1967 

Col. Clyde W. Strain ......... 6 Mar 1967-

22 Nov 1967 

Col. James M . ................. 23 Nov 1967-

Fogle 7 Mar 1968 

Col. Robert L. .................... 8 Mar 1968-

Herman 3 May 1968 

Col. William I. .................... 4 May 1968-

Williams 26 Mar 1969 

Col. Andrew J .................. 27 Mar 1969-

Chapman 11 Feb 1970 

Col. Guy E. ...................... 12 Feb 1970-

Hairston, Jr. 14 Oct 1970 

Col. Andrew P .................. 15 Oct 1970-

losue 23 Feb 1971 

Col. Fleetwood ............... 24 Feb 1971-

Pride, Jr. 10 Jun 1971 

Col. Patrick G .................. 11 Jun 1971-

Long 15 Mar 1972 

505th Tactical Control Group 

Activated, 8 November 1965 at Tan 

Son Nhut AB, RVN. Inactivated 26 

February 1973. 

552d Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing (Air Defense Command), 

designated Big Eye Task Force, 4 

April 1965. Redesignated College Eye 

Task Force, 1 March 1967. 

Col. Gus Weiser ................. 4 Apr 1965-

30Jun 1965 

Col. James Q ....................... 1 Jui1965-

McCall 27 Jul1966 

Lt. Col. WaldoW . .............. 28 Jui1966-

Peck 14 Aug 1967 

Lt. Col. Harold T . ............. 15Aug 1967-

Knutty 25 Sep 1967 

Col. Ross Davidson ........ 26 Sep 1967-

12 Sep 1968 

Col. James L ................... 13 Sep 1968-

McCall 8 Sep 1969 

Col. Floyd M . ..................... 9 Sep 1969-

McAIIister 22 Sep 1970 

Col. Milton E . .................. 23 Sep 1970-

McEwen (1972) 

Lt. Col. Elliott .................... (1972-1973) 

Powers 

Col. Harold P . ............................. (1973) 

Knutty (Interim) 

Col. Richard E ............................ (1973) 

Williams 

1964th Communications Group 

Col. Charles L. .................. 8 Nov 1965- Organized at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, 1 

Daniel Unk May 1962, as 1964th Communications 

352 
Squadron. Redesignated 1964th 

Communications Group on 1 October 

1962. Moved to Ramstein AB, FRG, on 

27 March 1973. 

Lt. Col. Kenneth ................ 1 May 1962-

Keyte 19 Apr 1963 

Lt. Col. John M ................. 20 Apr 1963-

0 'Reilly 27 Oct 1963 

Col. Gilbert H ................... 28 Oct 1963-

Bertie 1 Dec 1964 

Col. Erwin F . ..................... 2 Dec 1964-

Matelski · 6 Jan 1965 

Col. Lewis L. ...................... 7 Jan 1965-

Bradley, Jr. 19 Jan 1966 

Col. Charles Y . ................. 20 Jan 1966-

Shultz. Jr. 9 Dec 1966 

Col. Lou is A . .................... 10 Dec 1966-

Raeke, Jr . ...................... 31 Aug 1967 

Col. James M. Neff ............ 1 Sep 1967-

1 Aug 1968 

Col. Howard R ................... 2 Aug 1968-

McKendrick 8 Jul1969 

Col. lvey J. Lewis ................ 9 Jul1969-

14 Mar 1970 

Col. Joseph H. Weeks ..... 15 Mar 1970-

5Jul1970 

Col. Robert E . ..................... 6 Jui1970-

Sadler Apr 1971 

Col. Forrest K. ..................... Apr 1971-

Looney 1972 

1974th Communications Group 

Organized at Korat AB, Thailand, 1 

November 1965. Moved to Udorn AB, 

Thailand, on 1 April 1968. 

Lt. Col. Charles R .............. 1 Nov 1965-

McMahan 20 Dec 1965 

Lt. Col. Dirk Duys ............ 21 Dec 1965-

28 Jan 1966 

Col. George C .................. 29 Jan 1966-

Kougias 6 Jan 1967 

Lt. Col. Joseph A . ............... 7 Jan 1967-

Bailey 13 Jan 1967 

Col. AlbertJ. Brown ........ 14 Jan 1967-

11 Dec 1967 

Col. Robert P .................. 12 Dec 1967-

Baumann, Jr. 14 Nov 1968 

Col. Joseph H. Weeks ..... 15 Nov 1968-

21 Aug 1969 

Col. Robert A .................. 22 Aug 1969-

Bourcy 24 Ju11970 

Col. John M. Bolger .......... 25 Ju11970-

6Jul1971 

Col. William R. Yost ............ 7 Ju11971-

2Jul1972 

Col. Theodore F .................. 3 Jui1972-

DeMuro 19 Jun 1973 

Col. Richard A . ................ 20 Jun 1973-

Goldfogle 6Jun 1974 

Col. Ben P. Lee ................. 7 Jun 1974-

353 

Appendix II Air Force Recipients of 

the Medal of Honor 

On 10 March 1966, Major Bernard F. 

Fisher took off in an A-1 E Skyraider 

from Pleiku, South Vietnam, to fly a 

routine bombing and strafing mission. 

Soon after taking off, he was diverted 

to Ashau where a Special Forces camp 

was under heavy attack by 2,000 North 

Vietnamese troops. 

Arriving over the area, Major Fisher 

found four Skyraiders, which had also 

been diverted, circling over a dense 

cloud cover. He led his wing man and 

two of the other A-1 E's down through 

a hole in the overcast. As they flew 

down a valley leading to the camp, the 

pilots were informed that it was being 

overrun by the enemy. 

The A-1E's were making strafing 

runs against the attacking troops 

when one of the aircraft was hit by Major Bernard F. Fisher 

ground fire. The pilot crashlanded on 

the airstrip at the camp, and ran from 

his burning plane to seek refuge down 

an embankment. With enemy troops 

all around him, it appeared certain 

that he would be captured before a 

rescue helicopter could reach him. 

Major Fisher, quickly realizing his 

fellow pilot's predicament, made a 

perilous landing on the airstrip. The 

steel planking runway was torn up and 

littered with debris. As he taxied under 

fire, Major Fisher saw the downed pilot dashing from his hiding place. 

The A-1 E stopped and he clambered 

aboard. Dodging shell holes and debris, Major Fisher took off safely despite many hits on his aircraft by small 

arms fire. 

The Medal of Honor awarded to 

Major Fisher for this daring rescue 

was presented to him by President 

Lyndon B. Johnson at the White 

House on 19 March 1967. 

355 
Captain Hilliard A. Wilbanks 

356 

On 24 February 1967, Captain Hilliard A.Wilbanks, a forward air controller, was dispatched in an unarmed ()..1 

Bird Dog aircraft to assist in an operation against enemy forces attacking 

near Dalat, South Vietnam . 

While flying reconnaissance for a 

South Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, 

Captain Wilbanks discovered hostile 

units concealed on two hilltops. He 

promptly called in helicopter gunships 

by radio and alerted the Rangers advancing into the area. 

Realizing that their ambush was 

being compromised, the enemy reacted with a barrage from mortars, machine guns, and automatic weapons. 

Captain Wilbanks received much of 

this fire as he marked the enemy positions with white phosphorus rockets 

for the gunships. He himself opened 

fire with an M-16 rifle that he carried in 

his plane when he spotted forward 

Ranger squads that were pinned down 

and about to be overrun. Firing out of 

the side window of his 0-1 , Captain 

Wilbanks distracted the enemy troops 

and momentarily slowed their advance. 

The outnumbered Rangers were 

afforded a chance to withdraw as the 

attackers diverted their fire against the 

low-flying aircraft. Despite the hits 

being scored on his plane, Captain 

Wilbanks persisted in covering the 

withdrawal. On his third pass, he was 

severely wounded and crashed in the 

battle area. The Rangers managed to 

rescue Captain Wilbanks from the 

wreckage of his plane, but he died 

while being evacuated to a hospital. 

For his heroic support of the Rangers, Captain Wilbanks was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. 

The presentation was made to his 

widow by Secretary of the Air Force 

Harold Brown at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. on 24 January 1968. 
On 10 March 1967, Captain Dethlefsen flew on a mission against the steel 

works at Thai Nguyen some fifty miles 

north of Hanoi, North Vietnam, with 

three other F-105 Thunderchief pilots. 

Their task was to go in ahead of a 

strike force of fighter-bombers and 

attack the surface-to-air missile (SAM) 

complex, antiaircraft guns, and automatic weapons ringing the target. 

On the first pass against these defenses the F-1 05 flight leader was shot 

down and his wing man was forced to 

withdraw with severe battle damage. 

Captain Dethlefsen decided to continue the attack on his own. As he maneuvered, he evaded an intercepting 

MIG-21 by flying into heavy enemy antiaircraft fire but his F-105 was seriously damaged. Captain Merlyn H. Dethlefsen 

Captain Dethlefsen nonetheless 

made repeated strikes with his wing 

man against the defense positions, 

even after they became obscured by 

the smoke and dust of the exploding 

bombs being dropped by the fighterbombers. The bombing completed, 

the strike force withdrew but the two 

F-105's remained over the target. 

Evading a second MIG, Captain 

Dethlefsen was diving through the 

obscuring haze to locate the missile 

complex when he was again hit by 

flak. Making a final dive bombing attack and a strafing run with 20-mm 

cannon fire, Captain Dethlefsen effectively destroyed two missile sites before leaving for home in his battered 

F-105 

For this action, Captain Dethlefsen 

was awarded the Medal of Honor. The 

presentation was made at the White 

House by President Lyndon B. Johnson on 1 February 1968. 

357 
Major Leo K. Thorsness 

On 19 April 1967, Major Leo K. 

Thorsness piloted an F-1 05 Thunderchief on a combat mission over North 

Vietnam. He was flying with a strike 

force sent out to suppress surface-toair missile (SAM) sites. 

Acting with his electronic warfare 

officer, Major Thorsness first detected 

one site as it was about to launch an 

attack and destroyed it with a Shrike 

missile. Almost immediately, another 

site was discovered. Major Thorsness 

flew through heavy antiaircraft fire to 

score direct hits on the site with cluster bombs. 

On this second strike Major Thorsness' wingman was hit and the two 

358 

crew members bailed out. As he circled the descending parachutes, a 

MIG-17 appeared in the area. Major 

Thorsness promptly dived but his 

shots missed the enemy fighter. 

Attacking again, he closed rapidly to 

pour 20-mm cannon fire into the MIG. 

Just as he pulled up sharply to avoid a 

collision, he saw the fighter go into a 

tight spin and crash . 

Major Thorsness then had to leave 

because he was low on fuel. While 

searching for a KC-135 Stratotanker, 

he learned from the Search and Rescue Center that two helicopters were 

waiting for an escort before attempting a rescue of the downed crew. Major Thorsness flew back alone, spotting four MIG-17's as he neared the 

bailout area. He immediately attacked 

and damaged one of the enemy aircraft with a long burst of cannon fire. 

He drew the others away by diving and 

flying close to the ground until they 

gave up pursuit. 

Although now critically short of fuel, 

Major Thorsness advised another 

F-105 to fly to the nearest tanker when 

the crew reported that it would have to 

bail out unless their aircraft could be 

quickly refueled. He then diverted to a 

forward base where he landed with 

only a 10-minute supply of fuel remaining. 

Major Thorsness was awarded the 

Medal of Honor for his deeds of extraordinary heroism on this mission. 

Only 11 days later he was shot down 

over North Vietnam and held prisoner 

for nearly 6 years. Following his release, Major Thorsness received this 

highest decoration for valor from 

President Richard M. Nixon at the 

White House on 15 October 1973. 
Shortly before midnight on November 8, 1967, Captain Gerald 0. Young, 

the commander of a HH-3E rescue helicopter, was dispatched to evacuate 

the survivors of a U.S. Army reconnaissance team . The soldiers were 

surrounded and about to be captured 

in enemy-held territory in the Laotian 

Panhandle. Two helicopters had already been lost trying to rescue them. 

Captain Young and his crew were 

flying as backup for another helicopter on this night operation. The first 

aircraft managed to pick up three 

members of the team before extensive 

battle damage forced it to withdraw. 

The commander of the craft advised 

Captain Young that intense enemy fire 

made the rescue of two soldiers left 

behind all but impossible. Accompanying gunships were also running 

low on fuel and ammunition. 

Intent on completing the evacuation, Captain Young guided his helicopter down into the flare-lit darkness, touching down on a slope not 

far from the two soliders. Both 

wounded, they were loaded aboard 

under heavy attack with enemy 

troops closing in. As it moved forward tor takeoff, the helicopter was 

fired on at point blank range. It 

plunged downward and crashed in 

flames in an upside down position. 

Captain Young dropped out of a 

cockpit window and rolled down the 

slope, his parachute afire. Although 

badly burned, he beat out the flames 

and gave aid to another crew member, 

a sergeant, who had also escaped. He 

then tried to reach the burning helicopter but was driven back by the intense heat. When enemy troops approached the crash scene, he led 

them away from the wounded sergeant hidden in the underbrush. 

At dawn, Captain Young reached a 

clearing and helped to pinpoint his 

Captain Gerald 0. Young 

position for searching aircraft with 

flares and radio signals, but he broke 

contact when he realized that he was 

being used as bait by enemy gunners 

in the area. He again concealed himself in the dense foliage and continued to evade throughout the day despite the mounting pain of his burns. 

After 17 hours, Captain Young was 

finally rescued by a helicopter that he 

attracted with his radio and by firing 

tracers with his revolver. He then 

immediately informed his rescuers of 

the position of his fellow crew member. 

For his heroism in this action, Captain Young was awarded the Medal of 

Honor. It was presented to him by 

President Lyndon B. Johnson on 14 

May 1968 at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

359 
Lieutenant Colonel Joe M. Jackson 

360 

On 12 May 1968, Lieutenant Colonel 

Joe M. Jackson, commander of an 

unarmed C-123 transport aircraft, flew 

from Da Nang to Kham Due, South 

Vietnam, on an emergency mission. A 

Special Forces camp at Kham Due was 

being overrun by enemy forces. They 

had taken the forward outpost and 

were in complete control of the airstrip. Located in a valley, the airstrip 

was surrounded on all sides by mountainous terrain. 

While orbiting over the battle area 

Colonel Jackson learned by radio 

that in the evacuation of the camp by 

air a three-man Combat Control 

Team had inadvertently been left behind. Another C-123 transport was 

ahead of Colonel Jackson in the 

traffic pattern. The aircraft landed 

successfully on the airstrip littered 

with debris, including a wrecked helicopter, but failed to evacuate the 

team. 

Colonel Jackson then descended 

rapidly from 9,000 feet and made an 

assault landing on the strip under 

heavy enemy fire. After he stopped, a 

rocket fell in front of the transport. A 

dud, it bounced harmlessly toward the 

nose of the plane without exploding. 

Colonel Jackson had landed near the 

spot where the three men had been 

reported to be hiding. With the team 

safely on board, he quickly took off 

under a mortar barrage and intense 

automatic weapons fire from the surrounding hills. After landing at Da 

Nang the crew found that not a single 

bullet had touched their aircraft during the enire flight. 

Colonel Jackson was awarded the 

Medal of Honor for rescuing the threeman team. The presentation was made 

by President Lyndon B. Johnson at the 

White House on 16 January 1969. 
On 1 September 1968 Lieutenant 

Colonel William A. Jones, Ill, led a 

flight of four A-1 H Skyraider aircraft 

on an escort mission. The flight was 

accompanying two helicopters sent 

out to rescue the pilot of an F-4 Phantom downed about twenty miles northwest of Dong Hoi, North Vietnam . 

Arriving over the area, Colonel 

Jones made several low passes across 

a valley to find the pilot and pinpoint 

enemy gun positions. On one pass he 

felt an explosion beneath his aircraft 

and his cockpit was filled with smoke. 

After the smoke cleared, he continued 

his search and finally spotted the 

downed pilot near a towering rock 

formation. Enemy gunners occupying 

a position near the top of the formation opened fire on the propeller-driven Skyraider. 

Colonel Jones realized that the gun 

position had to be destroyed before a 

rescue could be made and that strikes 

against it would endanger the survivor 

unless his location was known. He 

himself attacked with cannon and 

rocket fire while relaying the pilot's 

location by radio. While making his 

second pass, Colonel Jones' aircraft 

was hit and his cockpit was set ablaze. 

He sought to eject but the damaged 

extraction system only jettisoned the 

canopy without pulling him from the 

cockpit. At the same time his transmissions to the rescue force were being 

blocked by repeated calls from other 

aircraft that he bail out. 

Before the fire died out Colonel 

Jones was badly burned and his radio 

transmitters were disabled. He chose 

to return to base to report the downed 

pilot's exact location. Despite his seLieutenant Colonel Wi IIi am A. Jones, Ill 

vere burns he landed his damaged 

aircraft safely, and insisted on passing 

on the vital information before receiving medical treatment. The downed 

pilot was rescued later that day. 

The Medal of Honor was awarded to 

Colonel Jones for his selfless heroism, 

but he died in an aircraft accident in 

the United States before it could be 

presented to him. His widow received 

the decoration from President Richard M. Nixon at the White House 

on 6 August 1970. 

361 
First Lieutenant James P. Fleming 

On 26 November 1968, First Lieutenant James P. Fleming and four other 

UH-1 F helicopter pilots were returning 

to their base at Due Co, South Vietnam, for refueling and rearming when 

an emergency call for help was received from a Special Forces reconnaissance team. 

The home bound force- two gunships and three transport helicopters 

- immediately changed course and 

sped to the area without refueling. The 

362 

six-man Special Forces team was 

pinned down by a large, hostile force 

not far from a river bank. As the gunships descended to attack the enemy 

positions, one was hit and downed. 

The remaining gunship made several 

passes, firing away with its miniguns, 

but the intense return fire from enemy 

machine guns continued . Low on fuel, 

the helicopters were being forced to 

leave and return to base. 

Lieutenant Fleming, piloting the 

only remaining transport helicopter, 

descended over the river to evacuate 

the team . Unable to land because of 

the dense foliage, he hovered just 

above the river with his landing skids 

braced against the bank. The lone 

gunship continued its strafing runs, 

but heavy enemy fire prevented the 

team from reaching the helicopter. 

The leader advised Lieutenant Fleming by radio to withdraw. 

After pulling away, Lieutenant Fleming decided to make another rescue 

attempt before completely exhausting 

his fuel. He dropped down to the same 

spot and found that the team had 

managed to move closer to the river 

bank. The men dashed out and clambered aboard as bullets pierced the 

air, some smashing into the helicopter. The rescue craft and the gunship 

then returned safely to Due 

Co, arriving with their fuel tanks nearly 

empty. 

For this miraculous rescue, in which 

not a single life was lost, Lieutenant 

Fleming was awarded the Medal of 

Honor. He received this highest decoration for valor at the White House 

from President Richard M. Nixon on 

14 May 1970. 
On 24 February 1969, Airman First 

Class John L. Levitow flew on a combat air patrol over South Vietnam as 

the loadmaster of an AC-47 Dragonship. The gunship was patrolling in 

the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut, when the 

Army Post at nearby Long Sinh came 

under mortar attack. The aircraft was 

diverted to aid in the defense of the 

post. 

Firing its miniguns at the enemy, the 

gunship knocked out two mortar positions, but further firings were observed a few kilometers away. As the 

AC-47 flew in that direction, a mortar 

shell fell on the top of its right wing. 

A brilliant explosion shook the aircraft violently and the fuselage was 

riddled by thousands of shell fragments. Airman First Class John L. Levitow 

Airman Levitow and another crew 

member were standing near the open 

cargo door at that moment, dropping 

parachute illumination flares. The explosion knocked both of them to the 

floor, and a flare that they were handling was tossed inside the cargo 

compartment. Spewing toxic smoke, 

the activated magnesium flare was 

due to separate explosively from its 

canister and ignite within seconds. 

Although stunned and wounded by 

shrapnel, Airman Levitow moved forward in the compartment and flung 

himself on the flare to keep it from 

rolling. He then dragged himself and 

the flare back toward the cargo door 

and tossed it out. The flare ignited just 

as it cleared the aircraft. 

Airman Levitow was awarded the 

Medal of Honor for his selfless heroism that saved his fellow crew members and the gunship. The presentation was made by President Richard 

M. Nixon at the White House on 14 

May 1970. 

363 
Captain Steven L. Bennett 

On 29 June 1972, Captain Steven L. 

Bennett, a forward air controller, was 

flying an OV-10 Bronco on an artillery 

adjustment mission near Quang Tri 

City, South Vietnam . A Marine gunfire 

spotter occupied the rear seat of the 

lightly armed reconnaissance aircraft. 

After controlling gunfire from U.S. 

naval vessels off shore and directing 

air strikes against enemy positions for 

approximately 3 hours, Captain Bennett received an urgent call for assistance. A small South Vietnamese unit 

was about to be attacked by a much 

larger enemy force. Without immediate help, the unit was certain to be 

overrun. Unfortunately, there were no 

friendly fighters left in the area, and 

supporting naval gunfire would have 

endangered the South Vietnamese. 

364 

They were between the coast and the 

enemy. 

Captain Bennett decided to strafe 

the advancing soldiers. Since they 

were North Vietnamese regulars, 

equipped with heat-seeking SAM 7 

missiles, the risks in making a low-level attack were great. Captain Bennett 

nonetheless zoomed down and 

opened fire with his four small machine guns. The troops scattered and 

began to fall back under repeated 

strafing. 

As the twin-boomed Bronco pulled 

up from its fifth attack, a missile rose 

up from behind and struck the plane's 

left engine. The explosion set the engine on fire and knocked the left landing gear from its stowed position, 

leaving it hanging down. The canopies 

over the two airmen were pierced by 

fragments. 

Captain Bennett veered southward 

to find a field for an emergency landing. As the fire in the engine continued 

to spread, he was urged by the pilot of 

an escorting OV-1 0 to eject. The wing 

was in danger of exploding. He then 

learned that his observer's parachute 

had been shredded by fragments in 

the explosion. 

Captain Bennett elected to ditch in 

the Gulf of Tonkin, although he knew 

that his cockpit area would very likely break up on impact. No pilot had 

ever survived an OV-10 ditching. As 

he touched down, the extended landing gear dug into the water. The 

Bronco spun to the left and flipped 

over nose down into the sea. His 

Marine companion managed to escape, but Captain Bennett, trapped 

in his smashed cockpit, sank with 

the plane. His body was recovered 

the next day. 

For sacrificing his life, Captain Bennett was posthumously awarded the 

Medal of Honor. The decoration was 

presented to his widow by Vice President Gerald R. Ford on 8 August 1974. 
On 26 August 1967, Major Day was 

forced to eject from his aircraft over 

North Vietnam when it was hit by 

ground fire. His right arm was broken 

in three places, and his left knee was 

badly sprained. He was immediately 

captured by hostile forces and taken 

to a prison camp where he was interrogated and severely tortured. After 

causing the guards to relax their vigilance, Major Day escaped into the 

jungle and began the trek toward 

South Vietnam . Despite injuries inflicted by fragments of a bomb or rocket, 

he continued southward surviving on 

only a few berries and uncooked · 

frogs. He successfully evaded enemy 

patrols and reached the Ben Hai River 

where he encountered United States 

artillery barrages. With the aid of a Major George E. Day 

bamboo log float, Major Day swam 

across the river and entered the demilitarized zone. 

Due to delirium, he lost his sense 

of direction and wandered aimlessly 

for several days. After a number of 

unsuccessful attempts to signal United States aircraft, he was ambushed 

and recaptured by the Viet Gong, 

sustaining gunshot wounds to his 

left hand and thigh. He was returned 

to the prison from which he had escaped and later was moved to Hanoi 

after giving his captors false information to questions put before him. 

Physically, Major Day was totally 

debilitated and unable to perform 

even the simplest task for himself. 

Despite his many injuries, he continued to offer maximum resistance. His 

personal bravery in the face of deadly enemy pressure was significant in 

saving the lives of fellow aviators 

who were still flying against the 

enemy. 

Major Day continued in internment by the North Vietnamese until 

his release on 14 March 1973. He 

was awarded the Medal of Honor for 

his personal bravery by President 

Gerald A. Ford on 4 March 1976. 

365 
Captain Lance P. Sijan 

366 

On 9 November 1967, while on a 

flight over North Vietnam, Captain 

Sijan ejected from his disabled air· 

craft and successfully evaded cap· 

ture for more than 6 weeks. During 

this time, he was seriously injured 

and suffered from shock and extreme 

weight loss due to lack of food. After 

being captured by North Vietnamese 

soldiers, Captain Sijan was taken to 

a holding point for subsequent trans· 

fer to a Prisoner of War camp. In his 

emaciated and crippled condition, he 

overpowered one of his guards and 

crawled into the jungle, only to be 

recaptured after several hours. He 

was then transferred to another pris· 

on camp where he was kept in solitary confinement and interrogated at 

length. 

During his interrogation, he was 

severely tortured; however, he did 

not divulge any information to his 

captors. Captain Sijan lapsed into 

delirium and was placed in the care 

of another prisoner, Lieutenant Colo· 

nel Robert Craner, to care for him. 

During Captain Sijan's intermittent 

periods of consciousness until his 

death, he never complained of his 

physical condition and, on several 

occasions, spoke of future escape 

attempts. Due to his extreme weak· 

ness, adverse living conditions, insuf· 

ficient clothing, and an inadequate 

diet, Captain Sijan contracted pneu· 

monia on 18 January 1968. Removed 

from his cell on 21 January 1968, he 

died at the Hoa Lo prison camp, as 

reported by his Vietnamese captors. 

The Medal of Honor was presented 

to his parents on 4 March 1976 by 

President Gerald R. Ford. 
Appendix Ill Vietnam War Aces 

Lt. Randy Cunningham , 

USN 

5 

b.-:J 

Capt. Charles D. DeBellevue, 

USAF 

6 

Lt. William Driscoll, 

USN 

5 

Capt. JeffreyS. Feinstein, 

USAF 

5 

Capt. Richard S. Ritchie, 

USAF 

5 

367 
Appendix USAF Air Munitions Consumption 

IV 

WW II, Korea, and Southeast Asia 

(Cumulative through period shown) 

Million Tons 

7.0 

6.0 

5.0 

4 .0 

3.0 

2.0 

1.0 

0 

2.150 

1.613 

EUROPE 

WW II 

Source: USAF Southeast Asia Summary, 28 Sep. 73, p. 18 

KOREA 

6.162 

31 Aug 73 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Appendix V 

U.S. Air Force Losses - Cumulative 

AIRCRAFT ' (Combat and Operational Causes) 

2,257 

CASUAL TIES 2 

Deaths 

2,118 

Missing 

599 

• LOIMS Fram February 1962 'Thnlulh 31 Aulult 1973 

• From January 1962 Throulh 25 Aulust 1173 

COST (Millions) 

3,129.9 $ 

Woun

3,460 

ded 

~ 

to 

POW's 

Military 

Returned 

Control 

t 

368 

Sources: USAF Southeast Asia Summary, 28 Sep 73, p. 18 

Southeast Asia Review, Final Issue, 31 May 74, pp. 12, 25 

369 
Glossary of Terms 

and Abbreviations 

AAA 

AB 

AD 

AD VON 

AFB 

AFLC 

AFROTC 

AFSC 

AID 

ALCC 

ALO 

ANG 

AOC 

APOE 

ARVN 

ATRC 

BLU 

CAP 

CBU 

CCC 

CCK 

CCTW 

CIA 

ClOG 

CINCPAC 

CINCPACAF 

COSVN 

CRAF 

CAP 

CSAS 

CTZ 

DASC 

DMZ 

ECM 

ELF 

EW 

370 

antiaircraft artillery 

air base 

air division 

advanced echelon 

Air Force Base 

Air Force Logistics Command 

Air Force Reserve Officer 

Training Corps 

Air Force Systems Command 

Agency for International Development 

Airlift Control Center 

air liaison officer 

Air National Guard 

Air Operations Center 

Aerial Port of Embarkation 

Army of Republic of South 

Vietnam 

air traffic regulation center 

bomb, live unit 

combat air patrol 

cluster bomb unit (anti-personnel weapon) 

Combat Control Center 

Ching Chuan Kang (AB, Taiwan) 

combat crew training wing 

Central Intelligence Agency 

(U.S.) 

Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group 

Commander in Chief, Pacific 

Commander in Chief, Pacific 

Air Forces 

Central Office for South Vietnam (Vietnamese Communist headquarters) 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

control and reporting post 

Common Service Airlift System 

Corps Tactical Zone 

Direct Air Support Center 

demilitarized zone 

electronic countermeasure 

electronic location finder 

electronic warfare 

FAC 

GPES 

I&C 

ICC 

IFF/SIF 

JCS 

JGS 

LA PES 

LBR 

LCM 

LOC 

LORAN 

LS 

LZ 

MAAG 

MACV 

MAF 

MAC 

MSTS 

NCP 

NLF 

NORS 

NSC 

NVA 

NVAF 

OJT 

oso 

OTS 

forward air controller 

Ground Proximity Extraction 

System 

installation and checkout 

International Control Commission 

Identification Friend or Foe/ 

Selective Identification Feature 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) 

Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese) 

Low-Altitude Parachute Extraction System 

local base rescue 

landing craft, medium 

line of communication 

long-range electronic navigation 

Lima Site - Temporary aircraft 

landing sites in Laos 

landing zone 

Military Assistance Advisory 

Group (U.S.) 

Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam (U.S.) 

Marine Amphibious Force 

Military Airlift Command 

Military Sea Transportation 

Service 

National Campaign Plan 

(South Vietnamese) 

National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam 

not operationally ready, supply 

National Security Council 

(U.S.) 

North Vietnamese Army 

North Vietnamese Air Force 

on-the-job training 

Office of Secretary of Defense 

Officer Training School 
PACAF 

PACOM 

PMEL 

POW 

Prime Beef 

R&R 

RAM 

RAP CON 

RASS 

RATS 

Reece (Recon) 

Red Horse 

RES CAP 

RLAF 

RLG 

RTU 

RVNAF 

SAC 

SAM 

SAR 

SARTAF 

SAW 

SEA 

SEAAS 

SEAITACS 

SEATO 

TAC 

tac 

TACC 

TACC(NS) 

TACC(SS) 

TACS 

TOY 

TFW 

TTF 

USA 

Pacific Air Force 

Pacific Command 

Precision Measurement 

Equipment Laboratory 

prisoner of war 

base engineering emergency 

force 

rest and recuperation 

rapid area maintenance 

radar approach control 

rapid area supply support 

rapid area transportation support 

reconnaissance 

rapid engineering deployment 

and heavy operational repair squadron, engineering 

rescue combat air patrol 

Royal Laotian Air Force 

Royal Laotian Government 

replacement training unit 

Republic of Vietnam Armed 

Forces 

Strategic Air Command 

surface-to-air missile 

search and rescue 

SAR Task Force 

special air warfare 

Southeast Asia 

Southeast Asia Airlift System 

Southeast Asia Integrated 

Tactical Air Control System 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

Tactical Air Command 

tactical 

Tactical Air Control Center 

Tactical Air Control Center, 

North Sector 

Tactical Air Control Center, 

South Sector 

Tactical Air Control System 

temporary duty 

tactical fighter wing 

Tanker Task Force 

United States Army 

USAF 

US AID 

USMACV 

VNAF 

United States Air Force 

United States Agency for International Development 

U.S. Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam 

Vietnamese Air Force (South 

Vietnam) 

371 
Photo Credits 

The Office of Air Force History is indebted to 

various government agencies, private organizations, and individuals who kindly provided 

photographs to illustrate this book. They include: the USAF Still Photo Depository. 1361st 

Audiovisual Squadron, Aerospace Audio-Visual 

Service, Military Airlift Command; the White 

House, U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Army, 

Navy, and Marine Corps; Maj. Thomas A. 

Dwelle, Capt. Keith Grimes. Donald W. Randle, 

Brig. Gen. A.R. Brownfield (USA, ret.), Maj. 

Donald J. Kutyna. and others. The Office is 

particularly indebted to the National Geographic Society for permission to use several 

color and black and white photos dealing with 

the war. The bold face numbers listed below 

refer to pages, numbers within parenthesis 

indicate photo numbers, with the source identified, such as AF (Air Force), USA (U.S. Army), 

U.S. Marines, etc. 

S (1-2). Mtnistere des Armees ''AIR ·. (3). AF; 7 (4·5. 7), AF (6), 

DO Etsenhower L•brary; a, source unk, 9, AF; 10, UPI, 11, JFK 

Library 12-13, AF; 14, AF; 22-23, AF 25, source unk, 26 (1), 

AF, (2), Dwelle; 27, AF; 30, (1). AI-, (2), U.S Army, (3) AF 

Al1 Collection; 31, (41 Dwelle; (5-7}, AF; 33, Dwelle ; 36, AF; 38, 

(1), US Army, (2), AF; (3) N.G.S ; 39 (1-3). AF; 40, AF; 41 , 

source unk; 42 (1-3), U.S. Army, (2). AF: 43, (4). US. 

Army, (5). USIA; (&-8), AF; 44, source unk; 51, AF; 54, (1 ), AF, 

(2). AF Art Collection; S5, (3-5). AF: 58, (1 ). U.S. Army, (2) 

source unk; (3), Dwelle; 59, (4) U.S. Marines. (5) source unk. 

(6), U.S. Army; (7-8). U.S. Army; 60, AF; 62, (1). U.S. Army. (21. 

AF. (3), Dwelle: 63, (4), source unk; (5-7), AF: 64, source unk: 

65, AF; 66 (1), AF Al1 Collection, (2), U.S. Army; (3), AF; 67, (5-

6). U.S. Army; (7·6). AF; 66, AF; 71, Kutyna; 72, (1-3), AF; 73, 

(4-7), AF; 74, AF; 75; 76, (1-2). Kutyna; (3). AF, (4), AF Art 

Collection; 77, (5-10), AF; 80, (1-2), AF; 81, (3-4), AF; 82, AF; 

83, AF, 84, (1-3), AF; 85, (4-6). AF: 86, (1-4). AI- ; 87, (5-7), AF , 

88-89, AF; 90, (1-2) source unk; (3-5), AF: 91, (&-8), AF: 92, 

AF; 94, AF; 96, (1·5). AF; 'fl, (1-4). AF; 98, (1-4), AF; 9!1, 100, 

AF 102, (1), AF Art Collection; (2). AF,. 100 (3-4), AF: 106, AF, 

107, AF: 110, (1), source unk, (2). U.S. Army, (3). AF; 111, (4). 

source unk, (5), source unk: (6), AF: 112, AI-: 116, (HI), AF, 

117, (3-4), AF, 118 , AF 119, AF; 120, AF; 124, (10, Capt Ray 

De Amgunaga (2) Ll Col Billy Keeler; (3). Keeler: 125, (4). AF, 

(5-8), Capt Donald W Randle: (7), Keeler: 128, (1-2). 'Apt 

Ketth Gmnes . 1~, (3-4), Keeler: (5). N G S : (6) Col. John S 

Wood Jr , (7). DOD (8) Arrigunaga, 132, Keeler (1-2). 133, 

Keeler. 134, Grtmes 135, N G.S : (41. Keeler: (5). Arrigunaga; 

136, AF. 138 (1·21. US. Army, (31 AF: 144-145, U.S. Army, 146, 

(1). ARVN: (2), U.S. Army; (3) source unk; (4) source unk, 147, 

(1) AF; (2-3). source unk; 148, AF; 152-153, AF; 154-155, AF , 

158-159, AF; 163-164 (1-7). AF; (8) U.S. Army: 164-165, AF; 

168, AF; 172, (1·4, 7), AF; (5). N.G.S.: 173 (6-10 ), ~F ; 176, AF, 

177, AF; 178 (1-3) AF; 179 (4-8), AF;180, AF; 181 (2-3), AF ; (4), 

U.S. Army; 182-183 (1-3), AF: 184, AF; 186, AF ; 188, AF; 191, 

AF; 193-194, AF; 195, AF; 196, AF; 1~7, AF; 198-199, AF· 200, 

AF: 202-200, AF; 206, AF: 208, AF: 209, AF; 210, AF; 214 (1·2), 

AF; (3)Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical: 215, (41, Teledyne: (4-9), AF: 

220, AF, 222, N.G.S ; 224,/>.F; 225, AF; 229,AF: 230-231, AF; 232, 

AF. 234, AF; 236. AF ; 237, AF; 240, (1-2), AF. (31 AF Al1 Collection; 241, AF, 242-243, AF; 244, AF· 246, AF; 247, AI-; 248, 

AF; 249, AF; 252, (1-2), AF; (3) Dwelle: 253, AF: 254, AF 2S5 

(1·2), AF; 256, AF; 260, AI- ; 261 , AF; 266-267, AF; 269, AF; 270, 

AF; 274, AF. 276, AF: 277, AF: 278, AF: 279, (1-2). AF; 280 (3j, 

AF: (4). Sgl Arlin J French: 281, AF; 282, AF· 286-287, AF 

290-291, AF, 295, AF: 296, AF: 297, AF 300-301 , AF; 304-305, 

372 
The Scenes shown on 

these pa~es were taken in Southeast 

Asia by 

U.S Air Force photographers serving w1th the 1365th 

Photo SQua

dron. SOOth Photo Squadron. end 601st Photo 

Squadron, all assigned to the ~. r Force's Aerospace AudioVisual Service. Military Airlift Cor1mand. 

AF: 308, AF: 310, AF: 311, N.G.S.; 312·313, AF: 314, AF; 315 

(3), AF: (4). N.G.S.: 320, AF: 322, AF Art Collection: 323, (1·2), 

(4), White House, (3). DOD: 324, (1) White House. (2) AF: (3) 

lile Magazme: (4) NBC Huntley Brinkley Reports: (5) source 

unk, (6). NBC: Huntley Brinkley Reports: (7) NVN propaganda 

photo: 325, AF; l28 (1·7). AF: 

329, (1-B). AF; 330, AF. 331, AF 

l l2, AF. 334, AF; 33e, AF: 337, /lF: 338, AF; 339, AF, 352, AF: 

353, AF. 354, AF; 35S, AF: 356, /lF: 357, AF; 358, AF, 35S, AF. 

360, AF, 361, AF: 362, AF; 363, !oF; 364, AF, 365, AF; 370, AF, 

371, AF 

373 
Index 

A 

A Luol: 114·115, 176 

A Shau valley: +4-<45, 55. 57, 61 , 63, 160, 163. 169. 

176, 183, 219 

Abbott, R. A.. 324 

Abrams, Creighton W., USA: 39, 57, 64, 141. See 

a/so Unl1ed States Military Assistance Command, VIetnam 

Accidents, aerial: 57, 147, 149, 156, 204. 212, 269 

Accounting systems and procedures: 250, 27&-

'07 

Aces: 95, 365 

Adderley, Tyrone, USA: 324 

Advanced Echelon (AOVON), 2d: 13, 271 , 342 

Advanced Research Projects Agency: 11 

Advisers, U.S.: 5, 12, 1&-t7, 19, 21 , 32-33,44. 1t4, 

t27 , 212, 235, 289. See a/so United States 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand ; 

United States Military Assistance Advisory 

Group, Vietnam 

Aerial Port Squadron, 15th: 192 

Aerial porta of embarkation: 8~196 

Aeromedical Evacuation Group, 9th: 336-339 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadrons 

9th: 211. m 34th. 283 

903d: 184, 281 

Aerospace Defense Command. 226 

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, 3d: 236-

237, 350 

Agents 

enemy: 258. 289 

u.s . 4 

Agriculture, development of: 293-294 

AI No: 86 

Aiken, George D.: 326 

Air Base Wing, 15th: 206 

Aor cargo. See Airlifts. strategic and tactical 

Air Command Wing, 14th: 344 

Air Commando Squadrons 

1st· 25, 29, 44 

602d· 26 

606th 292 

Air commando training: 300 

Air Commando Wings 

1st· 122 

14th: 345 

56th: 346 

3t5th: 169-t70 

Air Defense Command: 296 

Air defenses: ~233 

Air defenS8t, Memy 

lnatallatlona and inventory: 74, 79, 90, 98, 108, 

110, 115, 117, 213. 216. 219, 221 

strikes against: 69. 71-75, 79, 89, 95, 105, 110, 

122. 165-166, 201 

Air Divisions 

2d: 24-25, 26-29, 32. 45. 69, 104, 122. 231, 271-

'03, 342 

3d: 57, 157, 343 

17th: 343 

57th: 343 

315th: 169-171, 183·184, 343 

834th: 171, 177, 185, 281, 343 

Air drops. See Airlifts: Parachute operations 

Air Force Advisory Groups. See United States MilItary Assistance Command, Thailand; United 

States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Air Force R-rve. See Reserve components 

Air Forces 

Far East. 5. 169 

374 

Pacific. 164, 196, 201, 206, 233, 269, 271 , 269, 

297, 303, 307-341. See a/so Harris, Hunter; 

O'Donnell, Emmett, Ryan, John 0.; Smart, 

Jacob E. 

Fifth: 250 

Seventh: 16, 45, 52, 56, 122·123, 127, 131, 135. 

151 , 207, 219, 221, 224-226, 237, 250, 268-

269, 288·289, 292-295, 316, 342. See a/so 

Brown. George S.; Clay, lucius D., Jr.; 

Lavelle, John D.; Momyer, William W.; Vogt, 

John w. 

Eighth: 342 

Thirteenth: 104, 122. 227, 250, 342 

Twenty-first: 169 

Air-ground operations: 18-25, 41, 14~167, 169 

Air liaison officers: 17, 21 , 61, 105 

Air logistics Command, RVNAF: 318 

Air National Guard. See Reserve components 

Air operations (see also Airmobile operations: 

Helicopters) 

accidents In: 57, 147, 149, 156, 204 212, 289 

advantages and drawbecka: 75 

advantages and drawbacks, enemy: 92 

air-ground operations: 18-25, 41 , 44, 14~187, 

169 

airlifts. See airlifts, strategic end tactical 

airspace, control of: 232-233 

bombing operations. See Bombing operations 

Bugle Note scheduling system: 157 

carrier planes, strikes by: 69, ~3. 69, 94, 99, 

104-105, 114, 143 

characteristics: 69, 71 

combat air patrols: 70 

command, control and coordination: 1&-17, 21, 

32-33, 52. 6~70. 79, 102-108. 114, 122, 126. 

134, 16~170, 178, 211-212, ~233. 236. 

263 

defoliation missions: 6, 11-13, 15, 105 

drone reconnaissance sorties: 213, 217, 2t~220 

escort and patrol missions. See Escort and patrol missions 

l ighter operations. See Fighter operations 

first all-Instrument stnke 92 

first enemy l ighter encounter: 216 

first kills: 75 

first m1ssions: 3. 255 

first tr~level refueling: 208-209 

fixed-wing/air-ground coordination controversy 1&-17 

flare-and-stnke miss1ons: 15, 25, 27. 41, 61, 101. 

108, 115, t69, 262. 264. See a/so Night missions 

floods, effect on: 211 

instrument and visual techniques: 92, 165 

kills ratios: 92 

limitations, suspensions and resumptions: 13, 

25, 29, 32, 40, 5&61 , 65-67, ~70, 73, 75, 

7~99. 101. 108-109, 111, 117, 122, 130, 137. 

141-142, 147, 1-'9. t50, 157. 161, 166, 207-

206, 21&-217, 219-220, 231-232, 326-327 

maintenance, supply and support torces: 5, 9. 

15, 122, 153, 245-255, 302·306 

mission: 69, t69 

movements and operations, number of: 233 

night mlasions: 15, 44, 47-49, . 71 , 101, 104-

105, 108. t15, 1n·t83, 213, 216, 227. 242· 

243, 262-264. See a/so Flare-and-strika missions 

patrol m1sslons. See Escort and patrol missions 

photo reconnaissance missions: 17-18, 47, 69. 

71 , 73, 85, 112. 211-218. See also Reconnalssance missions 

psywar missions: 15. 67 

reconnaissance m1SS1ons: 12-13, 17-18, 24, 32, 

47, 57, 81, 7G-71, 79, 83. 69, 92, 101, 104-

105, 109, 114, 119, 130, 135, 206, 211-221, 

262. See also Photo reconnaissance mi&-

sions 

refueling operations and techniques: 7t, 104, 

114, 149, 158, 16t. 201-209, 226, 239, 241 

r,esults assessed: 74, 89, 143-146 

rocket assaults: 55 

route packages system: 79, 108, 225 

ruses In: 82 

safety measures: 233 

search-and-rescue missions: 44, 55, 83, 75, 89, 

118, 167, 177, 226, 235-243 

sorties, number flown 12, 18-17. 25. 27, 41 , 44, 

46, 49, 52. 61 ' 64, 74, 79, 82, 69, 92-94, 98-

99. 104-108, 110, 115-116, 118, 123, 127, 

130-t35. 141, 15G-151, 15&-161, 164, 167, 

174-175. 182-163, 197, 201 , 205-209. 212. 

219, 221 

tactical support missions. See Tactical air su~ 

port 

tactics; 47-49, 75, 82, 104-109, 238 

target acquiSition systems: 51, 71, 104-105, 1t8, 

151 

television equipment ln. 52, 118. 242 

terrain features, effect on: 71 , 142, 149, 157 

time-end-distance factors in: 156 

traffic control: 231 -233 

transport missions, noncombat: 183-184 

weather, effect on: 35. 37, 44, 51, 56, 71, 74-75, 

82, 92, 104-105. t08-109. 119, 122-127, 130-

131, 135. 143, 157, 165. 175-176, 21 1, 216-

219. 233. 242 

Air Operations Center. ~20. 24-26, 33. 123, 223-

224 

Air Refueling Squadrons 

7th, 904 and 913: 204 

4200th: 206 

Air Rescue Service 235. 238-239. See a/so 

Searchaand-rescue missfons 

Air Rescue Squadrons 

31st and 33<1· 236 

37th, 36th. 39th and 40th: 237 

Air security police 262-266, 268-269. 289 

Air Staff: 302 

Air Support Operat10ns Center: 17 

Air traffic control: 231-233 

Air Traffic regulation centers. 233 

Air Training Command. 297-299, 302-303, 306, 

309, 311, 314, 318-319 

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center: 52. 123, 142 

Airborne Bngade, 173d. 40. 46, 49, 170. 174-175 

Airborne Divisions 

82d: 197 

101St (Airmobile): 197 

Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing, 552d: 

226, 352 

Aircraft 

armament: 22, 47, 107, 118, 254. See a/so 

Bombs 

Atmy • Air Force agreements on: 302 

characteristics, capabilities and modifications: 

170, 1n. 187-189, 209, 236, 254-255. 263 

control. See Command, control and coordination ; Tactical Air Control Center; Tactical 

Air Control System 

deadline rates 255 
first lon 15 

losses 15. 1a. ~26. 28·29, 35. 44. 74-75, 82-83, 

92, 98, 108, 116, 118, 122-123, 125, 149, 

167, 175-tn. 182, 185, 211. 211>-218 220, 

226, 243, 257. 261-262. 264. 261>-269 

types See Aircraft types 

"A11craft save"· 209 

Aircraft lypes ($IN also Helicopter types) 

A.t Skyraoder: 21 , 21>-33. 35, 37, 44 SS. 58, ~ 

64, 69, 89, 105, 106-109, 114, 121, 131, 237· 

238, 241 , 243. 252. 257. 266, 302, 309·315 

A-3 Skywarrior. 209 

A·7 Corsair: 94. 119, 141>-147 

A-26 Invader 108, 226, 302 

""37 Dragonfly: 64, 302, 313, 315, 317 

A~7 22. 40. 44, 51>-57, 61 , 64, 105, 106-109, 

127, 130, 263-264, 315 

AC-119: 61, 65, 102, 107·109. 111,114, 118, 13G131 

AC-121 : 218 

AC-130. 65, 94, 107-109, 111 . 114, 118, 131, 146 

AC).6 9, 13, 15, 20, 30 

AN-2 Con. 126 

B-17 fortress. a 

B-26 Marauder: 17. 1~21. 25, 29, 212, 245 

B·29 Superfor1ress: 3, 5. a 

B-52 Stra1ofor1ress: 4(}41, 45-47, 49, 51-62, 64-

65, 7G-71 . 8H!2, 86, 89, 94. 98-99, 105, 106-

111, 114-119, 130-131, 134, 141-143, ·~ 

147, 14~167 201, 20G-209, 217 221, 232, 

252, 255 

B-57 Canberra 27, 29, 35, 40. 69, 71 , 101, 104-

105, t08, 1t8, 257, 271 , 311 

B-66 Destroyer: 76 

C-5 Galaxy 187·190, 192, 194, 198-198, 249 

C-7 Carobou (formerly CV-2). 19, 21 , 114, 125, 

171, 174, 171>-178, 185, 247. 275. 280. 301-

302, 304, 319 

C-9 Noghtongale: 184, 199, 283, 339 

~5 Expediter 17 

~Commando: 125 

C-47 Skytraln: 5-6. S-9. 12. 1&-19, 25-26, 28-29, 

65, 105, 123, 169. 217, 247, 255, 261·262, 

302, 314-315, 318 

C-54 Skymasler: 6, 238 

C-97 Stratolreighter t87 

C-118 Llftmaster 184, 280 

C-119 Flying Boxcar· 64, 187, 255, 314-315. 319 

C-121 Super Constellation: 187 

C.t 23 Provider: 6, 12, 15, 1S-t9, 21. ~28. 30, 

108, 111, 114, 169-171, 173-17a, 181-182, 

184-185, 224, 245, 249, 262, 266. 271 , 280. 

285, 302, 316-319 

C-124 Globemasler 170, ta7. 189. 197·198 

C-130 Hercules· 42, 52, 89. 101, 104-105, 109, 

1t4-115, 147, 16~171. 174-17a. t81·185, 

187. 225-226. 252. 254-255, 271, 275-281, 

297, 299, 302-304, 31S-3t9 

C-133 Cargomas1er ta7, 197 

C-t35 Sl'etohlter 187, 283 

C.t41 Starlifter: 1n, 1a1-t88, 190, 194, 197-199, 

271 , 275. 283 

C-142: 197 

CV·2 Caribou (later C-7): 13, 27 

DC·1:lO: 71 , 213-214 

EA-1: 227 

EB·66 75.95 

EC.t2t : 75, a2. 92, 109, 221>-227, 229, 233 

EC-135: 95 

F~ Phenlom: 40. 44, 55. 7G-71, 74, 76, 81-83, 

89, 94-96. 98. 108-109, 114, 118, 139, 166, 

203, 209, 221 , 226. 23G-231, 235, 241, 243, 

249, 261 . 266, 298, 303, 3t8 

F-5 T ge•: 44. 64. 314 

F-a Crusader: 209 

F8F Bearcat: a-9 

F-100 Super Sabre: 22, 34, 37, 40, 55, 71, 75, 

8t, 104-105, 114, t 22, 201 , 204, 212-213. 

227, 229, 238, 255, 303 

F'-102 Della Dagger: 16, 34. 227, 23G-231 

F-104 S1arfighter 71 . 20&-209. 23t 

F-105 Thunderchief· 69·71 , 73-76, 79, 82-86, 94-

95. 98, t04-105, 203, 207, 209, 216, 221>-227, 

243, 247, 250, 271, 298, 303-304 

F-111 : 70, 76, 98, 119, 125, 131, 146, 166 

HC-130: 203, 236-239, 241 , 243 

IL-28 Beagle. 74, 221>-227 

KB·SO. 201 

KC-t30 Hercules: 175-t76 

KC-135 Slralolanker 69. 71 . 104, 114, 156. 201-

209 

L·19 (later G-t Bird Dog): 8, t1 , 13, 17, 309 

MIG· IS Fagot 74 

MIG-17 Fresco 73-75, 94, 96-97, 216 

MIG-21 Fishbed 73, 82, 92, 167, 217, 243 

0-1 Bird Dog (formerly L-19)· 21-22, 40, 64. 105, 

106, t 23, 129, 302, 31G-311 

0-2: 108, 302 

OP-2: 109 

OV-t Mohawk . 18, 105, 213, 235 

OV-tO Bronco· 52, t06. 118, 247, 252, 302 

P-1 : 108 

RB-28 12, 18, 21, 211·2t2 

RB-57: 71, 104, 212, 214, 217·218, 221 

RB~ 55, 2t6, 303 

R~ 18 

RC~7 18, 2t7·218 

RC-121 · 213 

AC-130 218 

AF~ 57. 71, 89, 92, 105, 114, 2t3, 2t&-218, 220-

221 , 303 

RF-5: 221 

RF-100: 85 

RF-tOt · 12, 17 19, 21, 619 , 71 , 85, 104-105, 211· 

218, 221 

RT-28 18. 309 

AT-33: 11, t8, 2t 1 

Ryan 147D drone· 71 

SC-47: 12, 15,211, 245 

SR-71 : 219-220 

T-26. 134 

T-27: 3t9 

T-28 Nomad 11·12, 15, 17-21 , 24-29, 108, 121· 

123, 126, 131,245, 299-300. 309-310 

T-37: 296-299 

T-38 Talon : 298·300 

T-41 Mescalero· 298·299 

lJ-1 Otter: 21 

lJ-2 Otter: 7t . 74, 213. 211>-217, 2t9 

lJ-3: 212 

U-10 Hello 310 

U-17 123. 309 

UC-123: 105 

Airfields 

constructoon and repair: 21, 114, 175-176, 189. 

251 

enemy assaults against· 51>-57, t26, 131. 143. 

176, 182 

enemy construction and repaor 117. 219 

strikes against. 92, 98, 165-166 

Airlifts, straleglc and lactical (see also Helicopters: Parachute operations: Passenger deliv· 

eries 

bases and routes: 189-196 

cargo tonnages delivered 174·1n , 182·183, 

185, 187, 189, 191>-1 98, 204-209, 250 

casualties. 8\lecuahon. 184, 187, 199, 271, 277-

283 

command, control and coordination: t70-171 

commercial airlines In: 188, 196, 198 

container delivery system: 184 

crews, !raining: 299-302 

enemy operallons: 21 t 

ground proxomoty extraction system 184 

largest 197 

low·allotude parechute extraction system: 185 

organization: 18 

passenger deliveries 183. 185. 187. 189, 198-

199, 204 

priority designations. t96 

tralloc problems and soluhons. See bases and 

routes 

of troops and supploes. 5-6. 13, 1~20. 28, 40. 

42, 44, 46, 49, 104, 114-1t6, 125, 130-13t 

147, t69-185. 187-t89, 212, 285, 29t, 293 

Airlines. commercoal: 188, t96, t98 

Airman Education and Commlssionong Program 

306 

Airmobile operations· 13 See also Airtolts stra· 

leglc and taclical: Helicopters. assaults by. 

Parachute operations 

Airspace. conlrol of 232·233 

Alaska. bases in: 190 

Albrook Air Force Base: 307 

Alert exercises· 227, 23G-231 , 263 

Allied par1icopation: 4(}41 

Allied POW Wing, 4th. 321 , 338 

Ambush operations 217 

Ambush operations, enemy: 9, 11, 17, 26, 28, 32. 

35, 40, 115, 123, 143, 151, 2t7-218 

American Red Cross: 276. See also lnternahonal 

Red Cross 

Ammunition depots. See Supply depots 

Ammunition losses. enemy See Materoel losses. 

enemy 

An Khe 174, 249 

An Lao: 35 

An Loc 45, 61, 65, 161, 164-t65, 1n 182·183 

Andersen Air Force Base 4(}41, 149, 201 204, 

201>-208, 252, 255 

Anderson, George W .. Jr .. 11 

Anderson. Ronald C .. 75 

Anderson, Winston P · 24 

Anh, Nguyen Huy: 3t1 

Annam: 4 

Anthis, Aollen H.: 12, 17, 19, 21. 25, 29 

Antiaircraft defenses. See Air defenses 

"Antique Airlines": 2t8 

Ap Bac : 20. 24, 26 

Ap Trung: 67 

Arc Light operations: 149-167, 204-205, 207, 25S 

Armament 

alrcrell: 22. 47, t07, 118, 254. See also Bombs 

helicopters: 18 

Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center: 

300, 304 

Armed Forces Council, RVN : 35, 37 

Armor operations: 20, 35. 114, 268 

Armor operations, -my 64-65, 94, 115, 130, 

165, 268 

Armored Cavalry Aegoment, 11th: 30, 49 

Arroyo, Isidro: 317 

Artillery assauHs and auppor1 . 20, 57, 131. 150, 

. 156, 232·233, 26-4. 266 

Artillery assaults and suppor1. enemy: 51·52, 57, 

115, 131 , 141 , 143, 156, 218 

Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodoa: 5 

Atomic bomb strikes: 3 

Atrocities, enemy: 32f>.335 See a/so Executions. by enemy; Terrorism campaigns, enemy 

Atterberry, Edwin L.: 89 

Attleboro operation 151 

Australia forces: 40, 42, 44, 304 

Aviation Company, tst · 28 

Awards. See Decorations and awards 

B 

Bac Glen: 79. 166 

Bac Mal: 166 

Bai Thoung: 165 

Baldwin, James: 241 

Ban Ban : 127 

375 
Ban Karai pass: 92, 118 

Ban Na: 133 

Ban Raving pass: 118 

Bangkok : 3, 69. 104, 184 

Beo Ha: 85 

Bao Dai: 5 

Barksdale Air Force Base: 204 

Barrel Roll operation: 1(1!;.108, 111-114, 121-135 

Barthelemy pass: 89 

Base Engineering Emergency Force (Prime 

Beef): 251-255 

Ban Oou: 291 

Ban Me Thou1: 25, 223, 319 

Bases 

construction, development and repair: 245-255 

defense and safeguarding: 257, 259-269, 318 

enemy assaults against: 221, 257-258, 262-264 

strikes against: 151 

Bashaw, Jack D.: 287 

Bastogne fire support base: 164 

Beckwith, Lorenzo, USA: 261 

Beeton, William A., Jr.: 233 

Ben Cat: 17, 28 

Ben Het: 42, 61. 160, 1n 

Ben Karel pass: 89 

Ben Tre: 249 

Bennett, George T.: 309 

Bennett. Harold G.: 321 

Bennett, Steven L.: 362 

Benton, Richard G.: 280 

Berlin Airlift, comparison with: 185, 189 

Berrigan, Daniel: 327 

Berry, Phineas T.: 249 

Beste, Daniel: 278 

Bickenheuser, Charles: 275 

Bethesda Nevel Hospital: 336 

Betts, Clyde S.: 300 

Bicycle, communication by: 235 

Bien HOa: 9, 12, 15, 20-21, 26, 30, 34-35, 40, 169, 

174-175. 1n. 194, 197, 21t . ~231, 233, 236, 

247, 257-263, 265-269, 271, 263, 285, 288, 294, 

309, 311, 313-314, 31&-3t9 

Bien Hoa province: 292, 294 

Binh Oinh province: 24, 44 

Binh Duong province: 16, 41 , 149 

Binh Gla: 35 

Binh Long province: 61 , 64, 231 

Binh Thuy: 39, 229, 259, 283, 289, 315, 31&-319 

Birmingham operation: 151, 174, t81 

Bitterwine project: 245, 250 

Blanch9rd, William H.: 38 

Black, John D.: 327 

Blockade, naval: 95, t19 

Blue Light operation: 197 

Boeing Aircraft Company: 255 

Bolo operation: 82 

Boloven plateau: 135 

Bolyard, Garry: 278 

Bombardment Wings 

2d: t49, 204 

7th: 204 

320th: 149, 204 

4133d (Provisional): 350 

Bombing operations: 3, 5, 8, 19-20, 24-25, 27-28, 

34, 37-41, 44-46, 49, St-57, 61, ~. 69-99, t01-

1t9, 12t-t35, t41 -147, 149-t67, 208 

Bombing operations, enemy: 227 

Bombs 

capacitii!B and loading systems: 149-t50, 155, 

163, 165 

clustars: 47, 106, 111, 118 

damage 8988ssment: 51, 71, 74, 104-105, t1~ 

1t1 , 146, 149-t50. t57, t66, 216-2t8, 221 

delayed-ac1ion: 47 

fuzes and warhellds: 254 

guided types: 254 

improved types: 47-49, 254 

laeer-guided: 52, 95. 118, 134 

376 

napalm: t9-20, 49, 6t, 143, 249 

optically guided: 95 

phosphorus: 22. 55 

tonnages expended: 41, 49, 52, 61-64, 71 , 82, 

89, 99, 116, t30, t4t, t43, 150-tSt, t56, 160 

Bong Son: 58 

Borman, Frank: 337 

Bowers, James A.: 24 t 

Bowles, Chester A. : 140 

Boy soldiers: 129, 13t 

Bradley, Orner N., USA: 140 

Brett, Devol: 235 

Brezhnev, Leonid: tO 

Bridges 

enemy construction and repair: 79, 82. 85. 1t7, 

216 

strikes against: 70, 74, 79-86. 95, 104-tOS, 119, 

166. 221, 254 

Brigades 

tst, 101st Division: 174 

3d, 25th Division: 197 

Brink Hotel: 35 

British Advisory Mis•ion: 16 

British Commonweath forces: 4 

Brookley Air Force Base: 273 

Brown, George S.: 39, 111·. See also Air Forces. 

Seventh · 

Brown, James W.: 13 

Brumett, Robart: 29 

Bu Prang: 61 

Buddhist beliefs: 293 

Buddhist disorders: 25-28 

Buffalo operation: 219 

Bugle Note scheduling system: 157 

Bullpup missile: 75 

Bunker systems. enemy: 24, 52. 127, 130, t39. 

143, 218 

Burma: 3, 5. 169 

Burning Arrow operation: 20 

c 

Ca Mau peninsula: 9, 19, 29 

Caldera, Joseph D.: 5 

Calu: 181 

Cam Rang Bay: 3, 40, 171, 183-164, 189, 192, 196. 

198, ~231 , 233, 250, 257, 259, 266, 273, 

21s.2n. 28(}-283, 288 

Cambodia: 3. 5, 6-9, t6 

air operations by: 143, 227 

air strikes in: 141-147, 160, 167, 177, 221 

aircraft deployment to: 185 

enemy infiltration into: 141-147 

as enemy sanctuary: 20, 24, 40-41 , 4~50. 52. 

. 83, 99, 101 , 1t0, 114. 1t7-t18. 137-

140, 150, t60 

ground operations in: 144-147, 1n. 184, 220 

Khmer republic proclaimed: 141 

leadership and morale status: 146 

training programs: 146-147 

Camouflage techniques: 153 

Camouflage techniques, enemy: 112. 218 

CarrTho: 223, 291 

Cam Tho province: 42 

Camp Pendleton, Calif.: 197 

Campbell, Jesse W.: 177 

Campbell, Nathan C.: 208 

Canal des Rapides bridge: 83, 86 

Cao. Huyn Van: 20 

Cap Mui Lay: 57 

Cap St. Jacques (Vung Tau): 3 

Capital Military District: t9 

Card, USS: 32 

Cargo drops. See Airlifts, strategic and tactical 

Cargo tonnagi!S delivered: 174-177, 182-163, 185, 

187. 189. 196-198, 204-209, 250 

Carlton, Thomas K., Jr.: 287 

Carpenter, Joe V.: 327 

Carrier planes. strikes by: 69, 79-83, 89. 94, 99. 

t04-105, 114, 143 

Carrier Task Force 77, USN: 225 

Carter, Tennis, USA: 44 

Casteel, John H.: 20&-209 

Castle Air Force Base: 204 

Casualties 

air evacuation: See Airlifts. strategic and tactical 

ARVN: 15, 17, 20, 26, 32, 37, 44, 64, 1t6, 243, 

262, 264, 468 

civilian : 32. 56, 70. 75. 82. 98, t47, 251 , 289 

death rates: 277 

enemy: t3. 35. 41 , 44-46, 49, 56. 61 , 65, 92, t15. 

142, tSG-151 . 156-157, 161 , 164-t65. 263-

269 

evacuation and treatment: 273-2n. See also 

Airlifts, strategic and tactical 

U.S.: 9, 15, 17, 20, 26. 32, 35, 37. 44, 61 . 69, 92, 

116. 126, 151, 167. 185. 243. 257, 262, 264-

268 

Catecka Tea Plantation : 174 

Catton, Jack J.: 298 

Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st: 44, t50. 157, 

t 74, t 76. 224 

Cease-fire agreements. See Peace negotiations 

Cedar Falls operation: t 51 

Cement plants, strikes against: 79 

Central Highlands region. 16, 24, 40-41, 49, 64-65, 

150 

Central Intelligence Agency: 121-122, 338 

Central Military District: 232 

Central Offoce of South Vietnam. = 160 

Chamkar Andong: 143 

Champion, Lawrence L : 214 

Chanh Hoa: 37. 69 

Chanute Air Force Base: 303 

Chap Le: 37, 69 

Chapman, Andrew H.: 69 

Charles. Norris A .. USN: 339 

Charleston Air Force Base: 190 

Chemical warfare, charges of: 15 

Cheo Reo: 174 

Chester. James H.: 245 

Chief of StaH, USAF: 341. See also LeMay. Curtis 

E.; McConnell, John P. ; Ryan. John D. 

Chief Thang National Pacific Plan: 28 

Children soldiers: 129, 131 

Children's welfare, contributions to: 285 

China, Communist. See People's Republic of 

China 

China, Nationalist. See Republic of China 

Ching Chuen Kang Air Base: 205-206, 208, 276 

Cholon area: 58 

Christensen, Douglas C.: 229 

Chu Lai: 28, 281 , 291 . 319 

Chu Phong mountain: 150 

Chuong Thien province: 32-33 

Churchill, Winston: 8 

Civic action programs: 285-295 

Civic Action N-sle!fer: 288 

Civil Aviation Assistance Group: 232-233 

Civil disorders: 25-28 

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, RVN: 40. 61 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet: 188 

Clark, Arthur C. : 76, 96 

Clark Air Base· 12. 16, 34, 184. 189-190, 20t , 204. 

208, 2t 2. 227, 229, 236, 245. ~251, 271-272. 

278-277, 280, 263, 307, 338-339 

Clay, Lucius D., Jr.: 94. See also Air Forces, Seventh 

Clear-and-hold operations: 24. 28, 289-292 

Clements. Donald F.: 247 

Clifford, Clark M.: 327. See also Defense, Depart· 

ment of 

Clinic. floating: 292 

Clinton County Air Force Base: 3t4 

Cluster bombs: 47, 108. 111. 118 
Co, Nguyen Huu: 38 

Cochinchina. See Republic of Vietnam 

College gr•duates commissioned: 306 

Collins, W111iam E .. 99 

Collisions aerial. See Accidents. aenal 

Columbus Air Force Base 298 

Combat Crew Tra1n.ng Center 314 

Combat Crew T ram1ng Squadrons 

4400th (Jungle Jim}: t 1 

4449th. 302 

Combat Crew Tra1ning Wing, 4410th 302 

Combat development and test center· t 1 

Combat Evaluetlon Group, 1st· 1St 

Combat reporting canters: 223, 225 

Combat Skyspot bombing system: 45, 51 , 56, 108, 

15t , t57 

Combal Support Wing. 6251st· 311 

Combat T1ainlng Group (Wing). 4442d: 302 

Combined Campaign Plan 49-52 

CommRnd. control and coordination: 16-t7. 21 , 

32·33. 52. 69-70, 79, 102·108, 114, t22, 126, 

134, 169-t70, t78, 21t·213. 22~233. 238, 263 

Command posts. airborne: 225, 238 

Commando Hunt operations: 109-114, t17-1 t9, 

207 

Commando lndoan pro1ect: 233 

Committee on Prisoner Matters: 326 

Common Service Airlift Syatem: 170, 184 

Communications equipment and systems: 16, 24. 

142, 17t, 226. 230, 232, 238-239 

Communications Groups, 1~th and t974th: 233. 

352.,'!53 

Communicatoons Squadrons 

t876th: 224 

1877th 233, 291 

Communocatoons systems, enemy· 13 

Computer facilities· 251 

Con Dau 293 

Con Thien: St . 156 

Concord Naval Weapons Station: 254 

Cong Hoa: 272 

Cong Thanh: 294 

Congress: 3. 8, 11 , 33, 83. 114. 137. t47. 149, 288, 

297' 326, 337' 339 

Conover, Laurance w.: 242 

Constant Guard operations· 198 

Construction programs: 245-255, 273. 289, ~ 

295 

Container deliveries: 184 

Contrectora, civilian: 183,250. 298, 31().311 , 314 

Control and Reporting Centers: t 6 

Control and Reporting Poats: 16 

Convoys 

air cover tor t 7 

enemy: 2t 6-217 

u.s 143, 147 

Corps, XXIV 1 14 

Corps Tactical Zones (later Military Regions) 

1: 2t 25. 26-29, 32. 35, 4t , 44, 5t..S2. 283 

II t9, 21 , 24, t9, 27. 41, t60, 235, 294 

Ill: 24-25, :26-39, 49-50, 6t ' t56 

rv: 20-2t. 24. 21. 29, 34-35 

Counterinsurgency operations: 9-t1 

Couve de M urvllle: 326 

Crawford. Jamea A.: 242 

Crawford, William L : 242 

Crews training program: 297·302, 307 

Cricket operation: t05 

Crook01r, CliMord A. : 39 

Crumm, William J.: 57, 156 

Chu Chi: 268, 283 

Cuba: 50, 7t 

D 

De Nang (Tourane). 3 t5 t9. 21 , 29, 34, 40, 52, 

56-57, 150, t6t ' t66, 170, 175. t83, t89. t96, 

198, 20t, 217, 223-23t. 233. 236-237, 252. 25&-

262, 264, 266, 27t-273, 275. 278, 28t·283. 285-

266. 29~294, 3t1, 3t&-319 

Dabbs, Thurman· 29t 

Dai An: 29t, 294 

Oak Seang: t77 

Oak To: 49. t56, 184, t74-175, 178 

Dalal 4, 15 

D'Amico, Donald A .. 24t 

Dau Tieng. 224 

:>ay. George E .. 363 

Jeadline percentages: 255 

Jeath rates, casualties· 277 

)e Bellevue. Charles B. 95, 97 

:>ecker, George H , USA. t1 

)eclaratlon on Neutrality of Laos: 10t 

Jecora1ions and awards 

Distinguished Flying Cross: 178 

Mackay Trophy: 209 

Medal of Honor: 44, 55, 177, ~364 

Silver Star: t75, 178 

Defectors, enemy: 50, t51 

Defense. Dapartman1 of: t1 , 28, 35, t4t, 150, 157. 

255, 285, 309, 326, 338. See also CliHord. 

Clark M.; Laird, Melvin A.; McNamara, Robert 

s. DefenM Language lnatltu1e: 310 

Defoliation missions: 6, 1t·13, 15. 105 

Delahunt. Donald E.: 280 

Delaware operations: 57, t60, 176 

Delayed-actoon bombs· 47 

Demilitarozed Zone (DMZ} 8, 51·52, 57-Gt , ~. 

89. 71 , 79, 8&-ll9. 92, 94-95. 101, 1Q8.t09. t14, 

t18-1t9, 137, t4t, t5t , t56, 16t·t63, 175, 214-

216, 218 221 , 226-227 235, 327 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. See North Viet· 

nam 

Demolition assaults, enemy: 32, 37. 89. 258-259, 

~264. 288 

Dental aervloas: 273, 267, 292. 295 

Desertions, enemy: 50, t51 

Detection systems: See Warning and detection 

systems 

Dethlefsen, Merlyn H.: 355 

Diem. Ngo Dinh: 6, 8-10, 12·13, t6, 18, 20, 25-27, 

30, 10t 

Dian Bien Phu: 5, 52, 83, 156. t87 

Dilger, Robert G.: 97 

Dorect Air Support Center· t14 

Directorate of Civil Aviation, AVN: 232·233 

Dirty Thirty detachment: t8, 28, t69, 318 

Dispensaries, medical: 271·272 

33d: 272 

366th 29t 

466th: 267 

6220th 27t 

Distinguished Aying Cross awards: t78 

Do Son 79 

Do Vinh: 294 

Do Xa· 24 

Documents, capture and exploitation : 24. 49, 295 

Dogs, sentry: 257, 26t·283. 265-266, 269 

Dollars for SCholars program: 294 

Domino theory: 5, 8 

Don Muang Air Base: t2, 17-t8, 190, 204-205, 208, 

211·2t2, 223-224, 23().23t, 271 

Dong, Pham Van: t47 

Dong Ha: 52. 151 , t 75. t 77, 28t 

Dong Hoi airfield: 37, 85, 89, 92 

Doumer (Paul) bridge: ~85. 95 

Dover Air Force Base: 190 

Doyle, Miles M.: 25 

Drone reconnaissance sorties: 213, 2t7, 2t9-220 

Due Lap : 57, 61 , 177, 275 

Due To: 58 

Dulles, John Foster· 6. See also State. Depart· 

ment o1 

Dunham, William D .. 97 

Dunnegan, Clifton P.: 97 

Duo~g Nham: 79 

Dusard, Leo F.: 236 

Dwelle, Thomas A . 30 

Dyess Air Force Base: 302 

Dysentery, incodence of 272 

E 

Eagle Thrust operation: t97 

Early warning. See Watning and detection ~ 

terns 

Economic assistance programs: 8, 99, 12t, 294-

295 

Education programs: 291, ~294 

Eglin Air Force Base: 11 

Eisenhower, Dwight D .. 5-6, 8-9, t40 

Electronic countermeasures: 75, 82, 92, 95, 98, 

109. ~233. 242.See a/so Warning and detection systems 

Electronic location finder: 243 

Elephants. transporting 29t 

Elias, Edward K.: 339 

Elmendorf Air Foree Base: 190, 283 

Engl.-ring operations: 25t·255 

Engineers, U.S. Army: t46 

England. See British Commonwealth forces; Unit· 

ed Kingdom 

England Air Force Bue: 302 

Entnsnc:IWnanta, enemy: 127 

Equipment to.es. See Materiel losses 

Escape and evasion training: 306-307 

Escort and petrol mosalona: 238, 255 

Espionage operations, enemy. Sea Agents, -my 

Exacutions. by anemy: 56, 321 

F 

Fairchild Air Force Base: 307 

Fan Song equipment: 75 

Farm Gate detachment: 12· t3, 17·19, 2t . 25, 37, 

69,189, 17t, 211·212, 245,271 , 285, 309 

Farm machinery, donetlon of: ~294 

Fermers Cooperative: 294 

Fast Fly program: 191 

Feinstein, JeMrey S.: 95-96 

Felt, Harry D. , USN: 9, t&-20, 32. See also Pacific 

Command 

Ferries, strik"" against: 74, 102 

Field Force. II: t56 

Field Hospital, 8th: 27t·272 

Field Training Detachment, 6t4th. 3t4 

Fighter operations: 3, 75, ~99 

Fighter operations, -my: 82·99 

Fire support bases: 6t , 1t5 

S.Stogne: 184 

Lo Lo: 161 

Fish Hook area: 84, t14, t39, 160 

Fisher, Bernard F.: 44, 55, 83, 353 

Flaming Dart operations: 37, 119 

Flanagan, Bernard E .. 237 

Flar•and-strike mlsalons: t5, 25, 27, 4t, 6t, 10t, 

108, 1t5,189, 262, 264. See also Night operations 

Fleming, Jemes P.: 360 

Flasher, Hubert K.: 328 

Flight engineers, training: 302 

Floating Mekong Medical Clinic: 292 

Floods, eMect on operations: 2t1 

Flynn. John P.: 321 

Food 

deliveries by air: t83 

enemy losses: 46, 49, 1t5, 123, 139, t46, 1St 

Food service: 273 

Forbes Air Force Base: 302 

Foreign Legion: t87 

Fort Benning, Ga.: 302 

Fort Bragg. N.C.: 197 

Fort Cempbell, Ky.: t97 

Fort Lewis. Wash .. t90 

377 
Forward air controllers: 6. 13. 17, 20, 22. 24, 28, 

32-33. 47, 51 . 56. 61 , 105, 108-109, 114-115, 

123, 127, 129. 142-143, 217 

Forward air controller school , RVNAF: 309 

Forward air guides: 122 

Fracture Cross Alpha operahon. 92 

France: 3-8, 101 . 245 

Francis Marton operation: 49 

Fnshman. Robert F .• USNc 336 

Fuzes, bomb. 254 

G 

Galy, Ronald L .. 99 

Gartley, Marl<ham L .. USN. 339 

General officers killed: 57 

Geneva Accords: &9, 11 , 29, 121 , 212 

Geneva Conventions: 321, 336 

Gl plateau: 24 

Gla Lam airfield · 3, 73. 82-83, 199. 328, 339 

Glap. Vo Nguyen: 4, B. 41 , S0-52. 57 

Glenn. Joseph K.: 178 

Godley. G. McMurtrie: 122 

Good Look operation: 160 

Grady, WilliamS.: 99 

Graham, Gordon M.: 97 

Grand Canyon operation: 219 

Gray Eagle kits: 250 

Great Bntaln See British Commonwealth Forces· 

United Kmgdom ' 

Greer Edward M.: 214 

Grenade assaults enemy: 264, 268 

Groom John F .. tOS 

Ground-a" assaults. See Air-ground assaults 

Ground control approach radars: 231 

Ground control intercept systems, enemy: 79 

Ground controllers: 122, 141 

Ground proximity extraction system: 184 

Guam 

bases on: 71 , 156, 161 , 190. 250. 2B3 

conference at · 137 

Guerrilla operations 

enemy: 3-5, 12, 50, 101 

Laotian forces: 126, 134-135 

Guided bombs: 254 

Gulf of Tonkin: 3, 33. 75, 201 . 203, 206. 209, 213, 

22!>-227, 235-236. 238-239, 257, 271, 297 

Gunners k1lls by: 96, 167 

H 

HaLo 324 

Hal Lang 51 

Haiphong. 3-4. 67 7~71 , 74-75. 79-83. 90, 95, 98 

111, 119, 16!>-167 208 216 220-221 , 'JIJ7, 32~ 

327, 338 

Hair, Wilham F .. 247 

Hamm Rong 166 

Hammett, George F .. Jr .. 99 

Haney, Donald J.: 280 

Hanoi: 3-4, 8, 67. 7~71 . 74-76, 79-83, 90. 95, 98, 

153, 155, 165-167, 199, 206, 217. 22().221, . 

32~327 . 338 

" Hanoi Hilton": 337 

Hanson, David T.: 261 

Harkins, Paul 0 ., USA: 1&-19, 21, 24, 28, 32, 38. 

See also United States Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam 

Harold, Gerry G : 242 

Harriman, W Averell· 323, 326 

Harris Hunter· 32, 40 See also Air Forces. Pacific 

Hartf~e , Lonnie J.: 249 

Harvest Moon operation: 150 

Haugen, Wilham J .: 242 

Hawa1i, bases 1n. 197 

Hawk m1ssi le: 230 

378 

Haworth, George: 271 

Hegdahl, Douglas B .. USN. 324, 336 

Helicopter types 

CH-3 Sea King. 44, 46, 109, 23!>-236, 238. 299 

CH-47 Chinook: 174-175 

CH-54 Terhe 249 

H-19 Chickasaw: 8, 299 

H-21 Worl<horse 12, 19. 299 

H-34 Seahorse 9. 241, 309. 3t 1 

H-43 Husk~e 257, 280. 299 

HH-3 Jolly Green Goant: 203, 235. 237-239, 241 

HH-32: 236 

HH-43 Husk~e · 184, 23!>-236. 238. 241, 243, 275 

HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant. 99. 239. 242-

243 

HU-1 Huey: 18 

HU-16: 236, 23&239 

UH-1 Iroquois: 21. 184, 280. 311 , 315, 317 

UH-3 Hello-Courier: 235 

Helicopters 

airl ifts by. See Airlifts. strategic and tactical 

armament: 18 

assaults by. 16-17, 19-20. 25-26, 28. 57, 61 , 114-

115, 143. 174, 217. See also Airmobile operations 

casualties evacuation See Airlifts, strategic 

and tactical 

characteristics. capabilihes and modilicahons· 

235-239 

deployment of units 11·18 

enemy assaults by 227 

losses. t 7. 20. 26 28. 37, 92, 115-116. t30. 182. 

257 

polot tra1ning 299 

search-and-rescue m1sslons· 23!>-243 

supply by See AirliftS. strategic and tactical 

support missions· 24 

troop landings by. See Airlifts, strategic and 

tactical 

Herbert, Ivory, Jr .. 287 

Hickam Air Force Base: 191, 197, 201 

Hlen. Joseph 294 

Hien . Van Lich: 313 

Hien An aorfleld· 83 

Highland Junior Military Academy, RVNc 294 

Highways national. See Routes 

Hill t 51: 261 

Hirosh1ma· 3 

Ho Cho Minh: 4-5, &10 

Ho Chi Minh trail 3. 9. 34, 44-45, 64. 71. 101. 105-

1t9, 121, 123, 135. 151. 160-161 . 207 

Ho a Lo 337 

Hoa Lac airfield 76. 82-83 

Hoar. Dean L.. 208 

Hoffman, Bruce L 261 

Holcombe, Kenneth E.: 75. 96 

Holloman Air Force Base: 198 

Holly Field Navy Auxiliary Air Station: 'JIJ2 

Homecom1ng operation: 199, 321-339 

Homestead Air Force Base: 'JIJ7 

Hong Kong. 338 

Honolulu conference· 338 

Hornat, Walter S .. 291 

Hospital. 12th: 275, 281 

Hospital facilities: 272·277. See also Medical servIces 

House of Representatives. See Congress 

Hue: 25. 52-58, 64. 95. 140. 161, 281 

Hue Fue Sal: 285 

Humphrey, Hubert H: 61 

Huon, Joseph. 29t 

Huong, Tran Van. 35, 37 

Hurlburt Air Force Base: 'JIJ2. 309 

Ia Orang valley 150 

Identification. fnend or foe: 226 

Igloo White sensor· 109, 213 

India. bases ln. 3 

Indochina. See North Vietnam; Republic of Vietnam; Southeast Asia 

Infantry Divisions 

1st 42, 45-46, 49-50. 151 

4th. 46. 49, 156 

25th. 46. 49 

Infantry Fleg""ent. 7th 58 

Informers. See Agents. enemy 

Infrared devicu: 47. 71 , 105, 118, 212-213, 216, 

218. 220. 242, 317 

Infrared devices. enemy· 82 

lngullli, Charles A . Jr.: 241 

Installation and Checkout teams: 251 

Instructors 

number employed : 302. 306 

training program: 316-319 

Instrument techniques: 92, 185 

Intelligence operations and reports· 20. 24, 41 , 57, 

61 . 64. 79, 161. 217·218, 226, 289 

l ntellogence operations. enemy: 257-258 

lnternetlonal Control Mission: &9, 121. 140, 212 

Inventory systems and procedures: 250 

International Red Cross· 321-326, 336. See also 

American Red Cross 

Iron Hand missions 74 

Iron Tn angle area: 49, 151 

lnslllnbul· 336 

Italy. 4 

J 

Jackson. Jcl8 M.c 177 358 

Japan 

bases in : 170, 184, 189-190, 198. 21 1. 271 

occupies Indochina 3 

strikes against 3 

Jasinski, Francis A.: 266 

Johnson. Harold P.: 121 

Johnson. James E.: 229 

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 3, 1 ~ 11. 28, 32-33, 35. 37. 

40. 52. *61, 69-70, 75. 79, 88-89 109, 122. 

137. 14~141. 170, 188. 219, 283. 288, 321 , 

32~327 

Jo int Ch~efs of Stall: 9. 11. 13. 17-18, 32. 52, 70. 

104. 137. 150. 201 , 259, 315. 318. 327. See 

al so Lemnltzer. Lyman L ; Taylor. Maxwell 0 .; 

Wheeler. Earle G 

Joint General Staff. RVN. 17 19-21. 24. 263. 268 

Joint Homecomong Recaptoon Center. 338 

Joont Movements Transportation Board: 170 

Joi nt Operations Center· 17·18. 258 

Jotnt Operations Center. RVN: 19 

Joont Search end Rescue Center 237 

Jolly Green Giant 203, 235, 237-239. 241 

Jones, Franc1s P 275 

Jones, Murphy N.: 324 

Jones. William A. . 359 

Junction City operation: 50. 151 . 163. 174-175 

Jungle Jim. See Combat Crew Trai ning Squadron. 

4400th 

Jungle surv1val training. 307 

K 

Kadar. Janos 10 

Kadena Aor Base: 157. 196. 201 . 204-206. 211. 211 

Kaesser, Gary L .. USA: 281 

Kasler. James L.: 321 

Katum 175 

Kearnes William C . 245 

Keesler Air Force Base t 91 . 303 

Kelly. Eugene J . 261 

Kelly A~r Force Base 190, 283 

Kelsey, Roy E 243 
Kennedy, John F.: 3, B, 1~13, 17, 19. 27-28. 169, 

211 , 285, 309 

Kennedy, Thomas B : 26 

Kep alrlie1d . 79. 82-83 

Kham Due: 176-177, 219 

Khanh Hguyen. 28-29, 35, 37 

Khe Sanh 42, 51-56. 58. 83-88, 109, 114. 156-157. 

173, 175-178, 181 , 185,218, 225, 275 

Khmer Rouge: 146, 160 

Khfuschev, N1k1ta S .. tO 

Klen An. 73, 82 

Klen Long: 29-32 

Kills, I rst 75 

King, Wilham H .. 315 

K~nh r-.o 86. 165 

Kisinger Vernon E.: 249 

Kissinger, Henry A.. 65, 99, 166, 321 , 323, 338 

Klinkert. Charles A.: 241 

Knopf, Robert P.: 22 

Kolar, John F.: 241 

Kompong Som: 83, 110, 142-143 

Kompong Thmar: 143 

Kompong Thorn · 142-143 

Kontum: 56, 161, 164. tn. t89 

Kontum province: 45, 49. 65, 108 

Korat Aor Base· 76, 205, 208, 226-227, 236, 271-

272 

Korean War comparosons with: 69. 169 185, 2n Koslov, Fret 10 

Krek. 143 

Krull, Atthur D.: 287 

Kunmlng 74 

Kuster Ralph L . 94, 96 

Kutyna, Donald J .. 76 

Ky. Nguyen Cao: 29, 35, 37-38, 137, 169, 311 

L 

Lac, Dang Duy: 313 

Lackland Air Foree Base: 303, 306, 310, 314 

Lai Khe· 278 

Laird, Melvin A.: 61, 221, 315, 318, 323. Se<l also 

Defense. Department of 

Lam, Hoang Xuan: 115 

Lam Son 216 operation: 57 

Lam Song 719 operation: 110, 114-117, 160, 177 

Lam Son Training Canter· 146 

Landing craft, medium· 254 

Lang Giai 81 

Lang ve, 51 

Langley Air Force Base: 303, 307 

Language b<urier, overcoming 114, 122-123, 142, 

309-311, 314, 31&-319 

Lao Dong 9 

Laos 3,5,8-10, 12, 18 

AJr Force personnel strength 1n. 122-123 

air operations by: 105-108, 121-135 

air operations. USAF: 101-119, 121-135, 160-

164, 167, 183,211-213, 219, 221 . 225 

aircraft deployment to: 121-122, 185. 211 

combat effectiveness of forces: 126, 131 

enemy infiltration into: 18, 28, 32, 35, 41 , 52. 64-

65, 7~71 , 82. 88. 92, 94, 99. 101. 104-119, 

121 -135, 160-164 

as onemy sanctuary: 137. 140 

ground operations in: 114-119. 121-135, 137. 

177, 184, 221 

independence proclaimed: 121 

leadership and morale status: 123. 130 

radar systems and nets: 223 

training programs: 122 

Larson. Carl W . 2BO 

Laser-guided bombs: 52. 95, 118, 134 

Lasley. John A : 99 

Laurendine, Larry G.: 233 

Lave! e, John D 39. 94. See a/so Air Forces, Seventh 

La, Kong: 121 , 129 

Leadership status, AVN. 24, 2>27, 37, 94, 115 

La Blanc, Joseph A.: 266 

Leclerc, Jacques: 4 

Le May Curt1s E.: 11, 17, 38, 71 . See a/so Chief of 

StaN, USAF 

Lemnltzer, Lyman L.: 11 See also Joint Chiefs of 

Staff 

Lenahan, Frank C. : 89 

Lennon, Robert M.: 233 

levitow, John L : 361 

lib<aries. contributions to: 294 

light, Carl B : 241 

Light, Delbert J • 291 

Lima Sites: 123, 128-135 

Linebacker operations 95, 98-99, 119, 153, 166-

167, 221 

Lines of communication 

enemy strikes against: 40, 219 

Strikes against· 35, 57, 69, 71 . 115, 130, 135, 137 

US forces: 171. 174, 176, 218 

Llu Shao-chi. 147 

Lo Lo lire support base: 161 

Loadmasters, training: 302 

Loc Nlnh: 26 52, 61 . 156, 164 

Locher, Roger C.: 243 

lockbourne Aor Force Base: 302 

Lodge, Henry Cabot. 27. 32, 38. 285, 327 

Logistical operations and systems. Se<l Supply 

operations and systems 

logistics Command: 245, 254 

Long My. 35 

long Tleng (L1ma Site 20A) 127, 130-131, 134-135 

LORAN systems· 92, 118 

Louisville Slugger operation: 92 

Low. James F.: 327 

Low-altitUde parachute extrac!ion system· 185 

Lowry Air Force Base: ~301, J<n-306 

Luang Prabang: 123, 127 

M 

Ma Da river: 24 

Mack, Joseph F.: 178 

Mackay Trophy award: 209 

Mactan Air Base: 190 

Maddox, USS: 33-34, 69 

Madsen, Frank M., Jr.: 191 

Mall deliveries· 183 

Mainland Southeast Alsa AJr Defense Region: 224 

Maintenance, supply and support forces: 5. 9, 15, 

122, 153, 245-255. 302-306 

Malaria, Incidence of· 272 

Malaya experience 16 

Mang Yang pass 40 

Manor, leroy J 89. 324 

Mansfield, Mike: 140 

Mao Ts~Hung : S, 147 

Maps, compiling· 173, 218 

Materiel losses 

AAVN 27, 64, 116 

enemy; 46, 49, 51 , 58, 66, 76, 115. 127, 129-130, 

135, 139, 142-143, 145, 161, 164-165, 264 

Laotian 126, 130 

US forces· 262, 264 

Materials Handling Support System (463L): 191 

Matheny, David P , USN: 327 

Mathis, Robert C.: 311 

McBride, William P.: 109 

McChord Air Force Base: 19~191 

McClelland Air Force Base: 226 

McCone, John A .. 137 

McConnell, John P.: 38. 71, 178, 281 , 268, 297-

298 See a/so Chief of Staff, USAF 

McGruder, Horace G : 92 

McGuire Air Force Base: 190, 283 

McNamara, RobartS.: 11, 13, 15. 17-18, 21,26-27. 

29 32, 38, 70, 122, 137, 149, 161, 191, 245, 

299, 314. Sea also Defense, Department of 

McNaughton, John T.: 129 

Mechanics, training 302, 311, 313, 319 See also 

Maintenance, supply and support forces 

Medal of Honor awards 44, 55. tn, ~ 

Medical Service Wing, tst. 271 

Medical services: 271-283. 285-293 

MEOCAP program See Civic action program 

Medical officer, first 271 

Mekong river and della 24-27, 32, 34, 142-143. 

146-147, 171 , 211 , 229 

Menu operation 160 

Mao forces· 121-135 

Meteorologists 99, 317 

Midway conference 167, 315 

MIG Combat Air Patrol 237 

Mikoyan. Anastas· 10 

Mllllary Airlift Command: 177, 183, 187-t99. 280. 

283 

Military assistance programs· . S.9, 15, 121 , 

245, 309 

Military Regions (formerly Corps Tactical Zones. J 

1: 92. 94, 99 

II: 94. 99, 164 

Ill: 184 

IV: 49 

'l<lihtary Revolutionary Council 27 

Military Sea Transportation Service 251 , 254 

Millar, Bruce A .. 313 

Mincer, Garry P · 249 

Mmh, Duong Van. 27-28 

M1nh. Tran Van: 191 

Mining operations; 3, 65, 95. 99, 102, 118. 130 

Mining operations. enemy: 261 

M1nshall, William E .. 11 

Mlsawa Air Base: 211 

M1ssile systems, elf-to-air 

Bullpup and Shnke 75 

enemy 82. 243 

Sidewinder AIM - 9 82 

Missile systems. surfactHo-air 

Hawk· 230 

enemy: ~71, 74-75, 79, 82. 89-90. 92. 95, 117, 

160-161, t6S.167, 219, 221 

Mobile Commun•catlons Group, 1st: 229. 231 

Momyer, William W .. 45. 51-52, 71. 82-83, 97. 244 

See also Air Forces, Seventh 

Monkey Mountain: 223, 225, 229-230 

Monsoons. See Weather. effect on operations 

Montag nards: 24, 57, 294 

Moore. Joseph H 2S.29 33, 39, 6&-70, 104. See 

also Air Divisions, 2d 

Morale status 

enemy: 20. 47, 263 

AVN : 24-25, 27 37, 94, 115 

Morgan, Norman L. 22 

Mortar assaults 268 

Mortar assaults enemy. 35. 37, 51-52. 57, 65, 69. 

123. 127, 156, 257, 261-263, 265. 268, 271 , 289 

Motor vehicles, strokes 8Q8inst 74, 76, 79, 82, 92. 

95, 104-111 , 115. t17-118, 142,163, 167 

Mu Gla pass· 71. 82, 104-105. 112. 117-118, 151 

Mule Train detachment. 12, 169, 171 

Munitions specialists training. 306 

Muong Ngan: 123 

Muong Soui: 127, 130-131 

My Due: 85 

My Tho· 20 

Myers, o. Wayne: 44, 55, 63 

N 

Na Khang airf1eld (Lima Site 36): 123, 126 

Nagasaki: 3 

Naha Air Base: 271 

Nakhom Phanom Air Base: 105-109 118, 236, 250 

379 
Nam Bae Wang river· 291 

Nam Bac: 123, 126 

Nam Dong: 32 

Nanning: 74 

Napalm bombs: 19-20, 49, 61 , 143, 249 

Nape pass: 1 04 

National Campaign Plan. 18-23 

National Defense Transportation Assocoation: 199 

National league of Families of American Prisoners and Missi ng on Sou1heast Asia: 337 

Na1ionaJ liberation Front· 10. 20. 56 

NatoonaJ Mobilizatoon Committee to End the War: 

327 

National Police Academy, RVN: 294 

National Press Club: 52 

National Security Council: 5, 8, 37 

Naval facilities, strikes against : 3 

Naval gunfire support: 51 , 57, 156, 232 

Navigation systems and equipment: 126. 231-232. 

239, 243 

Navigators, training: 302, 311, 315 

Neak loung: 147 

Nealey. Billy E.: 275 

Nelson, Richard H.: 63 

Nemo (sentry dog)· 261 

Neutralize operation. 51 , t56 

New life - 65 operation: 174 

New York Times: 326 

New Zealand forces: 40. 44 

Newson, N.D.: 304 

Nguyen, Sa· 233 

Nguyen Ke: 79 

Nha Be: 254 

Nha Trang 3-5, 11, 22, 24, 30, 56, 107, 147 183. 

259. 211-212. 2n 28G-283. 288. 31().311 . 315. 

318-319 

Nhon Co: 174 

Nhon Trach: 292 

Nhu, Ngo Dinh: 27 

Niagara operation. 52, 156, 218-219 

Nichols. Franklin A. : 97, 288 

Niehaus. Allen D.: 22 

Night missions: 15. 44, 47-49, 52. 71, 101, 104-

105, 108. 115, 177-183, 213. 216, 227. 242-243, 

262-264. See also Flare-and-strike missions 

Night operations, ground: 19 

Night-vision devices: 47, 109, 118, 242-243 

Nixon, Richard M · 3. 61-65, 89, 94-99 119, 141, 

147, 166-167, 198, 295, 315, 324, 327-339 

Nol, Lon : 141-146 

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr .. 11 . 16, 27 

North Alrica: 5 

North Korea · 50, 56, 157, 197, 206 

North Vietnam : 9 

aggression by 3, s-1 0 

air operatoons over: 3, 32, 37, 40, &s-99, 119, 

16&-167, 213-217, 21s-221, 227, 257, 326-

327 

air reinforcements: 34. 22.7 

aorcraf1 inventory: 74, 92 

aircraft losses: 16, 75, 82-83. 94-98, 126 

bombing operations against. See Bombing operations 

emigration lrom South : 8 

fighter operations by. See Fighter operations, 

enemy 

first strikes against : &s-70, 213 

first target in: 70 

first U.S. clash with 33-34 

independence proclaomed: 4, 8 

labor force· 82 

noght air missoons by. 25 

polo! training: 83 

resourcefulness· 104 

tactics· 20, 2&-26, 46, 50, 74, 82. 257-258, 263 

troop infiltration, reinforcements and strength 

380 

34. 47, 50-51, 57. 64. 67, 79, 82, 94, 99. 101, 

105. 117, 119, 198, 257, 265 

North Voetnam Army 

1st Dovisoon 49, 57. 156 

308th Divosion. 161 

320th Dovisoon 164 

325th Division: 34 

19th Regiment: 44 

29th Regiment: 164 

98th Regoment: 44 

10 1st Regiment: 45 

Nort on, John, USA: 224 

Norton Aor Force Base· 190 

Nosayan, Phoumi. 129 

Not Operationally Ready, Supply (NORS): 245 

255 

Nung mercenaries: 44 

Nurses 276, 278. 283 

0 

0 Rang : 177 

Oden. Delk M .. USA: 33 

0 Donnell, Emmett: 13. 29. See also Air Forces, 

Pacific 

Offo cer Trainong School : 306 

Ofhcers recrui1ing. 306 

O'Hare lnlernational Airport· 233 

Okinawa, bases on: 157, 170, 183, 196, 205, 236. 

250, 271 

Olds, Robin: 81-62, 96 

Olsen, Don P.: 241 

On-the-job training. 303. 31().311. 318-319 

Operahons Squadron, 6465th· 164, 260 

Optically guided bombs: 95 

Oum, Buon: 129 

Overly, Norris M .. 327 

p 

Pacoflc Air Rescue Center: 23&-236 

Pacoficatlon programs: 16, 18-25. 4~50. 288, 295 

Paksong: 135 

Pao. Vang: 121-135 

Parachule operations: 19-20, 26, 49, 169, 171. 

173-175. 178 

Parasitic onfections. incidence of: 272-273 

Park. James L.: 242 

Parrot's Beak area: 114, 160 

Parrot!. Thomas V.: 89 

Passenger deliveries· 183, 185, 187, 189, 196-199, 

204 

Pathet Lao 8. 10. 12, 101. 114, 121-135, 201 , 211-

212. 338 

Patrols. ground: 41 

Paul Revere operations· 224 

Peace negotiations: 5&-61 . 6&-67, 79, 88-89, 95, 

109, 119, 129, 135, 14().141, 166. 198 208, 

211 , 21s-220. 307, 321-323, 327-336. 338 

Pegasus operation 157 

Peking 141 , 143 

Peng Chen 147 

People's Republic of Chona: 5, 13, 34. 50, 65, &s70, 74. 62-83. 95. 101 , 111 , 145, 226, 338 

Pest control: 272 

Petroleum. oil, lubricants 

enemy assaults against: 37. 359 

enemy l acilities: 110,1 17.216 

strlkos against : 3. 33. 69. 76. 7s-&2. 92, 95, 98, 

104, I 15. 117, 135, 16f>.166, 214. 216 

U.S taciilhes and supply. 114, 171, 174. See 

also Refueling oper ations 

Petti!, Lawrence H.: 92 

Phan Rang: 3. 42, 81, 250. 259, 266. 280. 285. 315, 

317 

Phan Tlet : 174 

Phat, Lam Van: 34 

Philippines 

bases in: 3, 170, 184, 190, 196, 236. 250. 276. 

307,311 

lorces in RVN: 40 

Phnom Penh. 3, 140, 142-143. 146-147 

Phong Dinh province 294 

Phosphorus bombs 22. 55 

Photo interpreters 217, 219, 221 . 300 

Photo reconnaissance missions 17-18, 47, 69, 71 . 

73, Bf>.112, 211-213. See also Reconnaissance 

m issions 

Photography, trainong program: 300 

Phou Nok Kok 131 

Phouma, Souvanna 101, 121-122, 127 129, 135 

Phu, Phan Van: 161 

Phu Bao 281 

Phu Cat· 99, 189 247 250. 258-259, 261, 280. 319 

Phu Hlep 283 

Phu Ouoc osland: 231 

Phu Van province: 24. 294 

Phuc Yen : 34, 73, 82- 83 

Phoc Long province: 40 

Phouc Tuy province: 34 

Pickering. Harold: 242 

Pilot training 

helicopters. 299 

North Vietnam : 83 

replacement system 75 

RVNAF 15, 27. 169, 191, 309 - 319 

U.S. Air Force: 297 - 299 

Pipeline anemy· 110 

Plain of Jars 119. 121 - 135. t 60. 20t , 21 1, 226 

Plain of Reeds· 9 

Pial Me: 41, 150, 174 

Pleiku: 15, 19, 21 , 29, 37, 69, 150, 174, 197, 223, 

245, 259 

Pleil<u province: 294, 318- 319 

Pope Air Force Base· 302 

Port lacolitoes 

eMmy 216 

strokes against: 96 

U.S.: 175. 183, 187, 250, 276 

Porter, William J .. 323 

Power plants 

enemy construction and repair: 219 

strikes against: 79, es. 95. 96, 166 - 167 

Press repor1s: 20. 56. 149 

Preston, Benjamin S.: 285 

Preventove medocine p<ograms: 285, 292 

Priddy, Billy G. 278 

Prime Beef (Base Englroeerong Emergency Force): 

251 - 255 

Priority desognatoons· 196 

Prisoner of War Polley Committee: 326 

Prisoners of war 

enemy· 6, 13. 49, 142, 264. 266- 269, 326, 339 

RVN; 339 

u.s.· 89 - 92, 99. 119. 167. 198. 239. 321- 339 

Propaganda campaigns. See Psychological warfare operations 

Psychological warfare 15, 67 

Psychological warfare, enemy 321 , 326 

Pueblo, USS: 56, 157, 197, 206 

Q 

Quang Long airlield: 92, 221 

Quant Dol Nhan Dan : 50 

Quang Due province: 61 

Quang Ngei : 24. 285 

Quang Ngal province: 24- 25, 41 , 44 

Qui Nhon 24, 33. 37. 42, 58, 63, 69, 183, 189, 192, 

231 . 252. 266. 2n, 280-283, 285 

Quang Soul · 70 

Quang Trl: 51 -52, 56, 64 - 65, 114, 161, 175, 177, 

198, 278. 261 

Quant Tro Province 114, 164 

R 

Rabies. detection and treatment: 293 

Radar approach control: 231, 233 
Radar systems and nets 

AAVN 15. 225 

enemy stlkes against. t 26 

str~kes agamst 70. 74 • 75, 79. 96 

in Th .. land· 223, 225 

u.s 11, 15, 71 , 75, 105, 108, 118 • 119, 151, 

157, 175, 182, 223 . 233, 298 

Radoo toOts 15, 239 

RailWays 

enemy construction and repair: 82, 219 

strikes against: 3, 70, 74, 79 • 83, 86, 95, 96, 

155, 165 . 166, 216 

Ranch Hand detachment 12. 245 

Randolph Air Force Base: 296 . 300, 303. 304 

Ranger units, ARVN: 19 . 20, 58, 166 

Rangoon: 3 

Rapid Area Maintenance (RAM) teams: 250 

Rapid Area Supply Support (RASS)· 250 

Rapid Area Transportation (RATS) teams: 251 

Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operations 

Repair Squadrons, Engineer (Red Horse): 251 

• 255 

Ratley, Lonnie 0 .: 147 

Raven detachment 123, t30 

Racoolless rifle fire assaults: 265 

Reooolless rifle fire IISSIIUits, enemy: 143, 262 

Reoonnalssance, ground 

enemy· 258 

us 45, 51 ' 104 ° t08, 115, t50 

Aeoonnaissance mosslons, aerial: 12 • 13, 17 • 18, 

24 32, 47, 57, 61 , 70 . 71 , 79, 83, 89, 92, 101, 

104 . 105, 109, 114, 119, 130, 135, 208, 211 • 

221 , 262 

Reconnaossance Technical Squadron. 13th: 212 

Reconnaissance Wing, 553d: 350 

Recruotong programs: 303, 306 

Red Ball Express: 196 

Red Horae (Rapid Engoneer Deployable, Heavy 

Operations Repair Squadrons, Engineer): 251 

0 255 

Refrlgttratlon facilities: 27:1 

Refueling operations and techniques: 71, 104, 

114, 149, 158, 161, 20t . 209, 226. 239, 241 

Refugees, evacuation and care of: 125, 133, 176, 

293, 295. See also Aeaettlement programs 

Regional Forces. RVN: 258 

Repaor systems and forces. See Maintenance. 

supply and support forces 

Replaoements 

polots: 75 

training 296, 302 -306 

Republic of China: 3 • 4, 44 

Aepubhc of Korea: 40, 42, 44, 197, 206, 250 

Republic of Vietnam 

aJr operations over: 217. 221 

a"space oontroi· 232 

armed forces buildup: 309 

emigration from North: 8, 101 

enemy inf~tration and assaults: 34, 51 • 67, 69, 

83 . 88, 91 • 99, 109, 207, 221 

first major U.S. combat action: 41 

Independence proclaimed: 8 

manpower deployments and strength in, USAF: 

5, 13, 18 . 19, 21, 40 . 41, 52, 64, 169, 235, 

251 

physicians, ratio of: 285 

political crlaes: 25 • 28, 34 . 35 

troop rotation program, U.S.: 170, 297 

troop units In, deployments and withdrawals: 

28, 40, 58, 61 ° 67, 109, 197 • 198, 297, 309, 

315 . 318, 339 

troop units In, periodic strength: 40, 44, 49, 52, 

307 

worK force. 295 

Republic of Voetnam Air Force 

Air Force details to: 18 

air operations by. 69 • 70, 1U . 119, 142. 147, 

169, 221 , 309, 314, 319 

aircraft deployments to, Inventories and wit~ 

drawais· 9, I I • 13, 16 • 17, 25, 27 • 29, 32, 

34, 40, 44, 64 . 65. 94, 119, 161 , 169 . 171, 

185, 187 . 188, 201,207 . 208, 211 , 217, 221 , 

223, 226 . 227, 236, 245, 309, 311 , 314.315, 

317, 319 

in air-ground operations: 44, 114 . 119 

In ciVIc actions: 293-294 

oombat etfocoency 65 

oommand, control and coordination · 263 

expansion and organization: 1 t. 18 • 19, 29, 32, 

64. 169, 185, 310, 318. 319 

personnel strength. paroodic 309 • 310, 315, 

318.319 

pilot training IS, 27, 169, 191 , 3()9.319 

sorties, number flown: 25, 64-65 

security measures: 257 

training programs: 4. 8 . 9, 11, 16. 17, 64, 309 . 

319 

tst Fighter Squadron: 15 

2d Fighter Squadron: 15 

51 6th Fighter Squadron: 30, 315 

520th Fighter Squadron: 315 

522d Fighter Squadron: 314 

52 4th Fighter Squadron: 315 

71 6th Reconnaissance Squadron· 18 

Republic of Vietnam Army 

airborne units: 268 

combat efficiency· 24, 41, 268 

combat operations· 18 . 25, 114 . 119, 150 

establishment 8 

e)(pansion, organization and strength: 8, 11, 18, 

27 

leadership and morale status: 24 • 25, 27. 37, 

94, 115 

materiel losses: 27, 64, 116 

1st Division: 21 , 161 

2d Division: 21 

5th Division: 16, 24, 28. 45 

7th Division· 20, 24 

9th Division: 24, 27, 35 

21st Division: 19, 25 . 27 

22d Division: 24 

25th Division: 24, 151 

32d Ranger Battalion: 28 

33d Ranger Battalion: 35 

Republic of Vietnam Mariroe Corps: 24 , 26, 35, 

58 

Republic of Vietnam Navy: 18, 143 

Ftescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP)· 237 

Rescue missions. See Search-and-rescue ml• 

sions 

Reserve components: 109, 187. 283, 296, 314 

Raserve Officers Training Corpe: 306 

Aeaettlement programs· 295. See also Refugees, evac uation and care of 

Respiratory ailments: 272 

Rest and recuperation leaves: 197 

Ridgely, Edward, USA: 42 

Risner, Robinson· 321 

Ritchie, Richard S.: 95, 97 

Road system• · 

construction and repair: 251, 288 

enemy construction and repair: 79, 82, 92, 117, 

131 ' 216, 219 

strikes against: 74, 83, 104 . 105, 109 • 112. 142, 

216 

Roberts, Thomas S.: 75 

Robinson, Robart : 287 

Roca, Bias: 10 

Rocket assaults: 55 

Rocket assaults, enemy: 52, 58, 63, 125, 143, 156, 

258, 261 , 264 . 265 

Rocket launchers, enemy: 261 

Aocl<et ridge: 164 

Rocl<et Watch· 262 

Rockets: 254 

Rogers, William: 323 

Rolling Thunder operation: 69-71 , 74-89, 92, 

101, 123, 213, 297 

Rosecrans, R.P .. Jr.: 121 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 3 

Rostow, Walt W.: 12 

Rotation program: 170, 297 

Route 1: 268 

Route 4: 127 

Route 5 127 

Route 7: 127, 130 • 131 

Route 9: 114, 157 

Route 12: 101, 105 

Route 14: 164 

Route 19: 40 

Route 23: 101 , 105 

Route 61 : 127 

Route 121: 101 

Route 911 : 105 

Route packages: 79, 108, 225 

Routledge, Eric M.: 229 

Rumble, Wesley L.: 336 

Ruaes: 82 

Rusk, Dean: 140. See also State, Department of 

Russell, Richard B.: 326 

Russia. See Soviet Union 

Ryan, John D.: 39, 247. See also Chief of Staff, 

USAF 

s 

Sabotage, enemy: 258 • 259 

Safety measures: 233 

Sage, Rex R , USA: 57 

Saigon· 3 • 4, 8 • 13, 16, 18 • 19, 25, 27 • 28, 30, 

35. 45, 49, 58. 58. 63. 104, t4t, 174, 1n. 183, 

197, 212. 218 • 219, 227, 230, 232, 252, 262, 

265. 269, 271 • 'Z12. 277, 283, 310, 338 

Saigon air show: 21 I 

Sam Houston operation: 49 

Sam Neua province: 121, 123, 127 

Sam Thong: 131 

Sapper raids, enemy. See Demolition operations, 

enemy 

Saravane: 125 

Sattahip: 273 

Scalf, Lance D.: 229 

Scarlett, Anthony R.: 291 

Scholen, Tf Sgt: 304 

Schools, assistance to: 294 

Schools. AVNAF: 309 • 319 

Soott Air Force Base: 328 

Saa of Japan: 56, 206 

Seamans, Robart C.: 39 

Saarc~an<klestroy operations: 41 , 44, 151 , 171, 

174 

Sear0and-rescue missions: 44, 55, 83. 75, 89, 

118, t67, 1n. 226, 235 . 243 

Secretary of the Air Force. See Seamans. Robert 

C.: luckert, Eugeroe M. 

Security measures and systems: 141, 257 • 259, 

262, 269 

Security Pollee Squadron, 377th 261 

Senate, U.S. See Congress 

Senecal, Leon E.: 266 

Sensor devices: 57, 92, 109, 111, 118, 212 • 213, 

218 . 219, 317 

Sewart Air Force Base: 301·302, 304 

Shank, Edwin G., Jr.: 29 

Shark, Devid B.: 257 

Sharp, U. S. Grant, USN: 32, 69, 79, 137. See also 

Pacific Command 

Shaw Air Force Base: 11, 223 

Sheeband, Donald J.: 291 

Sheppard Air Force Base: 299, 303. 313. 314, 317 

Shipping 

cargo tonnages delivered: 250 

supply flow and transit time: 251 • 254, 'Z16 

381 
Shipwash, S.n E.: 291 

Shipyards. atrlkes against. t66 

Shl.n.y, J. A.: 324 

Sholes, Ronald E : 242 

Shoup, David M., USMC II 

Shrike missile; 76 

Sieverts, Frank A.: 339 

Sihanouk, Norodom· 140 - 147 

Sljan, Lance P : 364 

Silver Star awards: 175, 178 

Simons, Arthur D., USA: 89, 324 

Simpson, William G.: 245 

Singapore, strikes against: 3 

Skoun: 142 

Skyline ridge: 134 

Skyapot. See Com bet Skyapot bombing system 

Smart, Jacob E. : 29. See also Air Forces, Pacific 

Smith, Dona-.on F.: 97 

Smith, Philip J : 81 

Smith, Scott G .. 97 

Sniegowski, Greg E.· 247 

Snipers, enemy: 149, 258 

Soc Trang: 21 , 25- 26, 37 

Social welfare programs: 293 

Son Tay: 89 - 92, 239, 324, 337 

SongS.: S2 

Sorties, nomber llown: 12, 16- 17, 25, 27, 41 , 44, 

46, o49, 52. 81, 64 - 65, 74, 79, 82, 89, 92- 94. 

98 - 99, 104 • 108, 110, 115 - 116, 118, 123, 

127, 130- 135, 141, 150 - 151, 156. 161, 164, 

167, 174 - 175, 182- 183, 197, 201, 205- 209, 

212, 219, 221 

South Vietnam. See Republic of Vietnam 

Southeast Asia, first 811 mlulons· 3 

Southeast Asia Airlift System (SEA.AS): 18 

Southeast Asia T actlcal Air Control System (SEATAGS): 13, 15 • 16, 18, 224 • 233 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: 8, 40 

S011let Union: 4, 8, 10, 13, 34, 50, 65, 69. 71, 74, 

83, SIO, 101, 121, 145, 211 , 217, 259, 261, 326, 

338 

Special Aaalstant for Vletnamlzation, USAF: 318 

Special Express projec1: 254 

Special Forces 

ARVN: 19. 32 

U.S.: 9, 40 • 41, 44 • 45, 57, 149 • 150, 156, 160, 

169, 171, 178, 183. 219, 236 

Special Operations Squadron, 17th· 317 

Specoal operations units, crew training· 298 - 302 

Special Operations Wing, 633d: 350 

Specialiats. See Technicians 

Stafford, H. A., USN: 324 

Starlight operation 41 

Starlight scope: 47, 109 

State of Vietnam: 5 

Stead Air Force Base· 307 

State, Department of: 17, 28, 35, 140, 271, 326, 

338. See also Dulles, John Foster; Rusk. 

Dean 

SIMI plants, strikes against: 83, 216 

SIMI Toger area: 101 • 108, 117 ·119, 121, 213 

Storage facilities. See Supply depots 

Strategic Air Command: 40, 61 , 71, 74, 104 - 108, 

110, 150 . 160. 187, 196, 201. 204 . 206, 208, 

213. 220, 298 - 299 

Strategic hamlets program: 16, 19, 25 - 26 

Strategic Wings 

43<1: 3-46 

72d (Provisional): 346 

307th: 346 

310th (Provisional): 208, 347 

376th: 208, 348 

3960th: 350 

4252d; 201·205, 208, 349 

4258th: 205, 349 

Stratton, A. A., USN: 324 

Students, al&lstance to: 294 

Sublo•Bay: 251 

382 

Sue, Phan Lang: 30 

Sullivan, Kathleen M .. 267 

Sullivan, William H.· 122 

Sunrose operation 16 

Suol Da: 45 - 46 

Super Jolly Green Giant: 89, 239, 242- 243 

Supply depots 

enemy essaults against: 115, 123, 175, 262 

strikes against 3. 26. 52, 56 • S7, 89, 74, 79, 83, 

86, 89, 92, 95, 96. 104 • 105, 114. 115, 118, 

123, 135, 142 - 143, 150 - 151, 157, 160, 164 

· 167 

U.S. facilities: 250 

Supply drops. See Airlifts, strategic and tactical 

Supply forces. See Maintenance, supply and support forces 

Supply operations and systems 

ARVN: 295 

enemy: 34, 74, 79 - 83, 90, 101 • 119, 135, 151, 

216. 227 

U.S.: 19, 26. 129, 142 • 143, 171, 173, 245 • 255, 

216 - 277, 285. See also Alrlifls, strategic 

and tactical 

Support forces. See Maintenance. supply and 

support forces 

Surprise. application ol: 20, 57, 75, 165, 214 

SUigeon General, US-'F: 273 

Survival training. 306 - 307 

Suslov. Mikhail: 10 

Systems Command· 239 

T 

Tachlkawa Air Base: 170, 216 

Tactical Alr Command: 110, 201, 207, 236, 297 • 

303, 307, 309 

Tactical air control centers: 16, 207. 224 

Tactical Alr Control Group. 5th: 223 

Tactical Air Control System. See Southeast Asia 

Integrated Tactical Air Control System 

Tactical air aupport: 17, 20, 24- 26, 30- 32. 40, 44 

-45. 49 -57. 61.64.65, 10 . 11 , 75, 105, 114-

119, 121 - 135, 142 - 147, 150. 167, 213, 223-

233. 262, 264 - 268 

Tactical Air Support Group, 504th: 352 

Tactical Air Support Squadron. 19th: 21 , 29, 311 

Tactical Airlift W ings 

315th: 347 

433<1: 275 

483d: 171, 350 

Tactical Control Groups 

505th: 352 

507th: 11, 223 

Tactical Control Squadron, 617th: 288 

Tactical Fighter Wings 

3d: 30, 289, 294, 344 

8th: 344 

12th: 30, 344 

31st: 345 

35th' 345 

37th: 345 

49th: t 98 

3551h: 347 

366th: 139, 348 

388th: 348 

405th: 349 

6234th: 349 

6251at: 340 

6252d: 350 

Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons 

11th: 213 

20th: 213 

45th: 12 

360th: 217 • 218 

Tactical Aeconnalssanoe Wings 

432d: 213, 349 

460th: 217 . 218, 221 , 349 

503d: 213 

Tactics 

ARVN: 161 

North Vietnam: 20, 25 - 26, 46. 50. 74, 82, 257 -

258, 263 

U.S.: 41 , 47 • 49, 75, 82, 104 • 109, 236 

Taiwan. besas on: 170, 185, 196, 205, 226, 250, 

276 

Takhli All Base: 76, 198, 205 • 206, 208, 227, 236, 

213 

TallyHo operation: 79 

Tam Ky: 35 

Tan. Con Nha: 63 

Tan Hiep: 291 

Tan Son Nhut Air Base: 4, 10, 12, 15 - 18, 21, 33, 

40, 65, 102. 122, 169. 178, 184. 189 - 190, 192, 

211.213, 211- 219, 221, 223 . 224, 226- 227, 

230- 231, 233, 235 - 237, 245, 252, 258. 283, 

265 - 269, 271 - 273, 283. 285, 288, 309 - 310, 

318 

Tan Uyen: 289 

Target acquisition techniques: 51, 71, 104 • 105 

118. 151 

Tay Do: 294 

Tay Ninh: 20, 143, 174, 181. 288 

Tay Ninh province: 9, 24. 61, 64, 151, 174, 178, 

288 

Tank types, enemy 

PT • 76: 110, 117, 125 

T · 54: 65 

Tao. Phan Cong. 233 

Task Forces 

Alpha: 109, 118 

Carrier 1, USN: 225 

ec - 121 College Eye: 226 - 227 

Foreign Legion: 201 , 204 

Kino Cobra: 205 

Logistics Aviation: 245 

Niagara: 219 

search and rescue (SARTAF): 237 

Tiger Club: 204 

Yankee Team Tanker: 122. 201 

Young Tiger: 201 - 205 

Taylor, Maxwell 0 .: 12, 26 • 27, 32. 34 • 35, 137. 

See also Joint Chiefs ol Stall 

Tchepone: 64, 102. 114 - 115, 160, 211 

Technicians, traonlng: 302 • 306, 319. See also 

Maintenance, supply and support torces 

Television 

n-s cowrage by: 56 

use in operations: 52, 118, 2o42 

Terrain features. eflect on operations: 71, 142, 

149, 157 

Terrorism campaigns. enemy: 9, 32, 35. 56 - 57 

Terry. Douglas M.: 281 

Tel o«ensrve: 18, 52· 61. 63, 109, 140, 157, 176, 

197. 206, 218- 219, 257 . 258, 261. 265. 269, 

280 - 281 • 293, 327 

Tha Thom: 127 

Thai Hung: 291 

Thai Nguyan: 83, 86, 167, 216 

Thailand 

air defenses In: 227-231 

aircraft and personnel development to: 70, 170, 

185, 212- 213. 217, 221 , 227, 231 , 236 . 237, 

251 , 307 

beses in: 3, 5, 34. 65, 69- 71, 78. 89, 104. 147, 

153. 156, 183, 185, 190, 205, 250, 271, 273, 

276 

civic action programs: 292 • 293 

forces in RVN: 40 

radar systems In nets: 223. 225 

troop uno\ 8\rangth, periodic: 307 

Than Nrl: 166 

Than Hoa: 95, 166, 216, 221 

Thanh, Do Dang: 233 

Thau Thien province; 114 

Thien Linh Dong· 86 

Thies, Mack: 97 
Thieu, Nguyen Van: 37, 61 , 167, 295 

Thomas. Ken 241 

Tho, L8 Due: 99, 166, 321 , 323, 338 

Thompson, Fred N .. 327 

Thompson, Robert G. K .. 16, 28 

Thorsneu, Leo K.: 356 

Throneburg, Robert A. 281 

T~ger Hound operation· 105 . 106, 213 

Tllden, Freeman 266 

Tlme·anckllstance factors· 156 

Tinker Aor Force Base. 190 

To Cau: 295 

ToHeiMn, Albert E. 242 

Torpedo bases, strikes against 60 

Tou Monong 45 

Tourane (Oa Nang): 3 

Traffic Management Agency. 170 

Trail, Richard L. : 208 

Training aids: 319 

Training programs 

air commando: 300 

Cambodia: 146 • 147 

crews: 297 • 299, 302, 307 

instructo rs: 318 • 319 

L8os: 122 

loadmasters: 302 

mun lions specialists: 306 

navigators· 302, 311, 315 

on.th&-job : 303, 310 • 311, 318. 319 

photography 300 

RVNAF; 4, 8 • 9. 11, 16 • 17. 64, 009 • 319 

$UMval methods: 306 • 307 

technicoane 302 • 306 319 

U.S. general. 196, 227, 232 • 233. 289, 297 • 307 

weapons mechanics· 300, 314 

Trang Sup. 288 

Tranelato,.., 310, 319 

Transport missions, noncombat: 183 • 18-4 

Travis Air Force Base: 187, 189. 191, 196, 283 

Tregaskls, Richerd: 19 

Troop Carrier Group, 315th: 352 

Troop Carrier Wings 

374th: 348 

463d: 349 

Tropic Survival School: 307 

Trucks. See Motor vehicles 

Truman, Harry S 4 • 5 

Trung Lap: 58 

Truong Long: 295 

Tunnel systems, enemy 151 

TurrHir Joy, USS: 33 

Tuy Hoa 3, 19, 37, 174, 189. 231 , 237, 247, 250, 

252, 259, 260, 291 

u 

U Monh forest 9 

U Tapao Aor Base 147, 153, 156, 205 . 2011, 250, 

273, 276 • 277 

Ubon Air Base: 223, 228 

Udorn I>Jr Base· 104, 121 • 122, 211 . 213, 221 , 223, 

225 • 228, 231 ' 233, 236 • 238 

Ungar Leonard: 121 • 122 

United Kingdom: 4, 8, 16, 101. See a/so British 

Commonwealth forces 

United Nations General Assembly: 338 

Unltea States Agency tor International Develop--

ment: 268, 294 

United Slates Army: 12 . 13, 16 . 17, 19, 21 , 24, 

27, 57 . 58, 89, 104 . 105, 150 . 167, 171 , 176, 

18-4, 197 • 198, 217, 219, 224, 230. 232 - 233, 

235. 241 , 243. 249, 262 • 288, 271 • 272, 277. 

280 . 281 , 289, 309 

United States Army Support Command. Vtetnam: 

33 

United States Embsasy 56, 63. 69, 104. See also 

Lodge, Henry Cabot: Nolting, Frederick E.; 

Taylor. MaJtwell D. 

United States Marine Corps: 40 • 41 , 44, 51 • 52, 

57 . 58, 61 , 70. 79, 94, 99, 105. 109, 114, 156. 

157. 170, 175 . 176, 178, 181, 184. 218. 224. 

225, 231 • 233, 235. 239, 259, 262. 272. 278, 

281 , 311 

Ill Amphibious Force· 61 , 150 

3d I>Jr Wing· 41 

3d Division 41 

5th DiVISIOn 197 

9th Expeditionary Brigade: 40 

United States Molitary Assistance Advisory Group. 

Laos: 121 

United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, 

Vietnam: 5, 8 • 9, 32, 271 , 309, 311 • 314, 318 

• 319 

United States Military Assistance Command, Viet· 

nam: 18 • 21 . 24, 29, 32 • 33, 51 , 67, 104, 150 • 

151 , 157, 181. 170, 174, 176, 232 . 233. 263 . 

265, 288, 288. See also Abrams, Creighton 

W.: Harkins, Paul D.; Westmoreland, William 

c. United States Navy: 5, 8, 16, 19, 37, 41 , 44. 51 , 74 

• 75, 94 • 95, 104, 108 . 109, 111, 175, 2011 . 

209, 216, 225, 227, 231 , 233, 243. 254, 271 • 

272, 009, 311. See also Carrier planes, strikes 

by 

Unity ot command: 263 

UNIVAC computers· 251 

v 

Van Dien: 186 

Van Vren 82 

Vandegrrlt camp· 11• 

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., Jr.: 97 

Vann, John P., USA: 20 

Veterinary services: 293 

Vientiane: 69, 101, 104, 106, 121 • 122, 125, 129, 

133, 135, 339 . 

VietCong: 3, 9, 11 - 13, 15, 17, 19 · 21 . 24 • 26,29 

• 32, 35. 40, 50 . 67, 137 . 147, 149 . 167, 217 

• 218, 221 , 227, 257 . 269, 271 , 277, 289, 292, 

295, 318, 321' 328 . 327, 338 . 339 

9th Division: 34 , 40, 45 . 46. 151 

1st Regiment : 44 

2d Regrment: 41 , 44 

272d Regiment: •1 

281st Regiment •1 

Viet Minh ~ • 8, 52 

Viet Trl 219 

Vietnam war 

intensification, evoodong e!l, 137. 228 

origins· 3 • 5 

public criticism of: 58 • 57, 306. 327 

publoc support· 3 

Vletnamiution program 56, 61 • 67, 114. 117, 

141 . 009 . 319 

Vinh, Nguyen Xuan 9 

Vinh airfield· 92. 165. 216. 221 

Vii Thu Lu: 37 

Vogt, John W. · 94. See also Air Forces. Seventh 

Vongvichit, Phouml: 135 

Vung Tau (Cap St. Jacques): 3, 15. 21, 42, 283 

w 

Wake Island bateS on: 190 • 191, 283 

Walt, Lewis W., USMC: 150 

War crimes trials, threats ot: 326 

War Zones. vc C: 9, 24, 34, 45, 49 • SO, 151 

0 : 9, 13, 16. 19, 24. 28, 34. 241 

Werheads. bomb 254 

t:: U . S • GOVERNMENT PRI NTI NG OFFICE 1984 0 - 459- 488 QL 2 

Warning and detection systems: 11, 15 • 16, 75, 

108. 109, 111 , 117. 118, 217, 223. 233, 239, 

263 • 264, 269. See also Electronic countermeasures 

Warning and detection systems. -my: 79 

Warnke, Paul C.: 326 • 327 

Washington Post. 140 

Water craft, strikes agarnet 74. 79 

Water supply and purifocalion 251 , 272 • 273, 285 

Waterways 

enemy interdiction: 143. 146 • 147 

strikes against· 83 

Weapon systems oHicers: 70 

Weapons, enemy: 258 

Weapons, controllers: 233 

Weapons losses. See Material losses 

Weapons mechanics, training: 300, 314 

weather, effect on operations: 35, 37. 44. 51, 56, 

71 ' 74 • 75. 82. 92. 104 • 105. 108 • 109. 119, 

122 . 127, 130 . 131 , 135, 143, 157, 165. 175'· 

176, 211 ' 218 . 219, 233. 242 

Weathermen. See Meteorologists 

Wengel, Emil J.: 328 

Wenzel, Craig E: 285 

Westmoreland, William C .• USA: 29, 32 • 33, 37 • 

41, 44 • 46, 49, 51 • 52. 57. 69, 79, 109, 137, 

141, 149 . 150, 156 . 157, 171, 174 . 175, 213, 

217. 218, 283. See also United States Military 

Assistance Commend, Vietnam 

Wheeler. Earle G .. USA: 38. See also Joint Chiefs 

of Stall 

Whiteside, Drew D : 287 

Wiggins, Larry 0 . 94. 96 

Wilbanks, Hilliard A. : 354 

Wild Weasel aircraft: 75 

Wilke, Robert F.: 241 

Williams. Edward W , USA: 328 

Williams, Leonard B.: 81 

Williams Air Force Base: 314 

Wingfield, Major: 261 

Wise. o., 281 

Woods. Walter V.: 313 

World War II 

air operations: 3 

comparisons with· 169, 188. 277 

Insurgency in: 101 

Worley, Robert F.: 57 

Wright, L8roy M.: 324 

X 

Xa Thai Hung 294 

Xe Kong river: 142 

Xieng Khouang· 122, 127, 130 • 131 

Xom Bong· 69 

Xuan Son. 216 

Xuyen province: 28 

y 

Yankee Team: 122. 201 , 212 • 213 

Yen Bal: 85. 216, 243 

Yen Vien: 82, 186 

Yokota Air Base: 189, 271, 283 

Young, Fred: 300 

Young Gerald 0 .: 357 

z 

Zinn, Howard: 327 

Zud<ert, Eugene M 38 

383