HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

ACQUISITIONS

Leveraging Programs' 

Results Could Further 

DHS's Progress to 

Improve Portfolio 

Management

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2018

GAO-18-339SP

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-339SP, a report to 

congressional committees

May 2018

HOMELAND SECURITY ACQUISITIONS

Leveraging Programs’ Results Could Further DHS’s 

Progress to Improve Portfolio Management

What GAO Found

During 2017, 10 of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs GAO 

assessed that had approved schedule and cost goals were on track to meet 

those goals. GAO reviewed 28 programs in total, 4 of which were new programs

that GAO did not assess because they did not establish cost and schedule goals 

before the end of calendar year 2017 as planned. The table shows the status of 

the 24 programs GAO assessed. Reasons for schedule delays or cost increases 

included technical challenges, changes in requirements, and external factors. 

GAO’s Assessment of 24 DHS Major Acquisition Programs during 2017

Programs on track 

to meet schedule 

and cost goals

Programs with 

schedule delays

Programs with cost 

increases

Programs with 

schedule delays and 

cost increases

10 6 2 6

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data. | GAO-18-339SP.

Recent enhancements to DHS’s acquisition management, resource allocation, 

and requirements policies largely reflect key portfolio management practices 

(see table). However, DHS is in the early stages of implementing these policies.

GAO’s Assessment of DHS Policies for Acquisition Management, Resource Allocation, and 

Requirements against Key Portfolio Management Practices 

Key portfolio management practice GAO’s assessment

Clearly define and empower leadership Met

Establish standard assessment criteria and demonstrate comprehensive 

portfolio knowledge Met

Prioritize investments by integrating the requirements, acquisition, and 

budget processes Met

Continually make go/no-go decisions to rebalance the portfolio Partially met

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data. | GAO-18-339SP.

GAO identified two areas where DHS could strengthen its portfolio management

policies and implementation efforts:

• DHS’s policies do not reflect the key practice to reassess a program that 

breaches—or exceeds—its cost, schedule, or performance goals in the 

context of the portfolio to ensure it is still relevant or affordable. Acquisition 

management officials said that, in practice, they do so based on a 

certification of funds memorandum—a tool GAO has found to be effective for 

DHS leadership to assess program affordability—submitted by the 

component when one of its programs re-baselines in response to a breach. 

Documenting this practice in policy would help ensure DHS makes strategic 

investment decisions within its limited budget.

• DHS is not leveraging information gathered from reviews once programs 

complete implementation to manage its portfolio of active acquisition 

programs. DHS’s acquisition policy requires programs to conduct postimplementation reviews after initial capabilities are deployed, which is in line 

with GAO’s key practices. Acquisition management officials said they do not 

consider the results of these reviews in managing DHS’s portfolio because 

the reviews are typically conducted after oversight for a program shifts to the 

components. Leveraging these results across DHS could enable DHS to 

address potential issues that may contribute to poor outcomes, such as 

schedule slips and cost growth, for other programs in its acquisition portfolio.

View GAO-18-339SP. For more information, 

contact Marie A. Mak at (202) 512-4841 or 

makm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, the DHS invests billions of 

dollars in a diverse portfolio of major 

acquisition programs to help execute 

its many critical missions. DHS’s 

acquisition activities are on GAO’s 

High Risk List, in part, because of

management and funding issues.

The Explanatory Statement 

accompanying the DHS Appropriations 

Act, 2015 included a provision for GAO 

to review DHS’s major acquisitions. 

This report, GAO’s fourth annual 

review, assesses the extent to which: 

(1) DHS’s major acquisition programs 

are on track to meet their schedule and 

cost goals, and (2) DHS has taken 

actions to enhance its policies and 

processes to better reflect key 

practices for effectively managing a 

portfolio of investments.

GAO reviewed 28 acquisition 

programs, including DHS’s largest 

programs that were in the process of 

obtaining new capabilities as of April

2017, and programs GAO or DHS 

identified as at risk of poor outcomes. 

GAO assessed cost and schedule 

progress against baselines, assessed 

DHS’s policies and processes against 

GAO’s key portfolio management 

practices, and met with relevant DHS 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DHS update its 

acquisition policy to require certification

of fund memorandums when programs 

re-baseline as a result of a breach and 

assess programs’ post-implementation 

reviews to improve performance 

across the acquisition portfolio. DHS 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Letter 1

Background 5

During 2017, 10 of the 24 Programs with Approved Schedule and 

Cost Goals Were on Track 16

DHS’s Policies Generally Reflect Key Portfolio Management 

Practices, but Opportunities Exist to Leverage Programs’ PostImplementation Results 27

Conclusions 35

Recommendations for Executive Action 35

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 36

Appendix I Program Assessments 38

Appendix II Key Portfolio Management Practices 97

Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 99

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 105

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 107

Related GAO Products 108

Tables

Table 1: DHS Acquisition Levels for Major Acquisition Programs 6

Table 2: Key Documents Requiring Department-level Approval 7

Table 3: Key Documents Requiring Joint Requirements Council 

Validation 11

Table 4: Major DHS Acquisition Programs’ Progress against 

Current Schedule and Cost Goals during 2017 17

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Table 5: Assessment of DHS’s Policies on Acquisition 

Management, Resource Allocation, and Requirements 

against GAO’s Key Portfolio Management Practices 29

Table 6: Rationale for Selecting DHS Major Acquisition Programs 

for Review 100

Figures

Figure 1: DHS Acquisition Life Cycle for Major Acquisition 

Programs 6

Figure 2: DHS’s Acquisition Management Structure 9

Figure 3: Members of DHS’s Joint Requirements Council 10

Figure 4: Requirements Activities Established by DHS Policy 12

Figure 5: Test Activities Established by DHS Policy 14

Figure 6: DHS’s Annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution Process 15

Figure 7: DHS Major Acquisition Programs’ Schedule Slips during 

2017 20

Abbreviations 

APB acquisition program baseline

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FYHSP Future Years Homeland Security Program

JRC Joint Requirements Council

LCCE life-cycle cost estimate

O&M operations and maintenance

PA&E Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 

PARM Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management

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Page 1 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 17, 2018

Congressional Committees

Each year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invests billions of 

dollars in a diverse portfolio of major acquisition programs to help execute 

its many critical missions. In fiscal year 2017 alone, DHS planned to 

spend approximately $6.5 billion on these acquisition programs, and 

ultimately the department will likely invest more than $207.2 billion in 

them. DHS and its underlying components are acquiring systems to help 

secure the border, increase marine safety, screen travelers, enhance 

cybersecurity, improve disaster response, and execute a wide variety of 

other operations. Each of DHS’s major acquisition programs generally 

costs $300 million or more and spans multiple years.1

To help manage these programs, DHS has established an acquisition 

management policy that we have found to be generally sound in that it 

reflects key program management practices we’ve identified in prior 

work.2 However, we have found shortfalls in executing the policy and 

have highlighted DHS acquisition management issues in our high-risk 

updates since 2005.3 Over the past decade, we have found that 

department leadership has dedicated additional resources and 

implemented new policies designed to improve acquisition oversight. But 

our work has also identified shortcomings in the department’s ability to 

manage its portfolio of major acquisitions.4 For example, in April 2017, we 

found that 14 of the 26 programs we reviewed deployed capabilities 

before meeting all key performance parameters—the requirements a 

system must meet to fulfill its fundamental purpose—which increases the 

risk that end users, such as border patrol agents or first responders in a 

 1

DHS defines major acquisition programs as those with life-cycle cost estimates of at least 

$300 million or more. In some cases, DHS may define a program with a life-cycle cost 

estimate less than $300 million a major acquisition if it has significant strategic or policy 

implications for homeland security. 

2

GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to 

Help Meet Mission Needs, GAO-12-833 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2012). 

3

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). For 

our most recent report, see High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While 

Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017).

4

For examples of past GAO work, see a list of related GAO products at the end of this 

report.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

disaster, received technologies that might not work as intended.5 We also 

found that DHS’s acquisition management policy requires programs to 

establish cost, schedule, and performance baselines prior to gaining full 

knowledge about the program’s technical requirements, which serve as 

the engineering basis for development. The order of these events is 

contrary to acquisition best practices and may lead to poor outcomes, 

such as schedule slips, cost increases, or inconsistent performance.

We have made many recommendations over the past decade to help 

address these challenges. For example, we previously recommended that 

DHS leadership ensure all major programs fully comply with the 

acquisition management policy by obtaining department-level approval for 

acquisition documents before the programs are allowed to proceed and 

specifically assess whether adequate funding is available during all 

program reviews.6 In response, DHS has taken several steps to improve 

acquisition management, such as strengthening implementation of its 

acquisition management policy and requiring components to certify that 

programs are affordable before they are approved to move through the 

acquisition life cycle. Nonetheless, DHS has not fully addressed some of 

our other recommendations. For example, we previously recommended 

that DHS leadership prioritize major acquisition programs departmentwide and ensure that the department’s acquisition portfolio is consistent 

with DHS’s anticipated resource constraints, as well as present any 

anticipated annual funding gaps for acquisition programs in the annual 

funding plan submitted to Congress.7 DHS concurred with these 

recommendations and has taken some steps to address them, such as 

updating its policies and revising the format of its funding plan submission 

to Congress to present anticipated acquisition funding gaps.

The Explanatory Statement accompanying a bill to the DHS 

Appropriations Act, 2015 contained a provision for GAO to develop a plan 

for ongoing reviews of major DHS acquisition programs, as directed in the 

 5

GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear 

Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress, GAO-17-346SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2017). 

6

GAO-12-833; GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage Its 

Portfolio to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with Congress, 

GAO-14-332 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2014).

7

GAO-12-833, GAO-14-332.
Page 3 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Senate report.8 This is our fourth annual review of major DHS acquisition 

programs. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS’s major 

acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals 

and (2) DHS has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes to 

better reflect key portfolio management practices.

To answer these questions, we reviewed 28 of DHS’s 79 major 

acquisition programs. This included all 16 of DHS’s Level 1 acquisition 

programs—those with life-cycle cost estimates (LCCE) of $1 billion or 

more—that were in the process of obtaining new capabilities at the 

initiation of our audit. We also included 12 other major acquisition 

programs that we or DHS management identified were at risk of not 

meeting their schedules, cost estimates, or capability requirements. Eight 

of these 12 programs were Level 1 acquisitions that either had not yet 

begun obtaining capabilities or had entered the deployment phase of the 

acquisition life cycle, while the other four programs were Level 2 

acquisitions with LCCEs between $300 million and less than $1 billion. 

Appendix I presents individual assessments of each of the 28 programs 

we reviewed. These assessments include key information, such as the 

status of programs’ schedules, costs, projected funding levels, testing, 

and staffing. Our objective for the 2-page assessments is to provide 

decision makers a means to quickly gauge the programs’ progress and 

their potential cost, schedule, performance, or funding risks.

To determine the extent to which the programs we reviewed are on track 

to meet their schedule and cost goals, we analyzed available acquisition 

documentation, such as acquisition program baselines (APB), which 

contain information on programs’ schedules and cost estimates. Since the 

November 2008 update to DHS’s overarching acquisition management 

directive, these documents have required DHS-level approval; therefore, 

we used November 2008 as the starting point for our analysis. We used 

these documents to construct a data collection instrument for each 

program, identifying any schedule slips and cost growth. We 

subsequently shared this information with each of the program offices and 

met with program officials to identify causes and effects associated with 

any schedule slips and cost growth since (1) their initial baselines and (2) 

January 2017—the data cut-off date of the report we issued in April 

 8

Explanatory Statement submitted by Mr. Rogers of Kentucky, Chairman of the House 

Committee on Appropriations, regarding H.R. 240, Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2015 (published in Cong. Record, Jan. 13, 2015, at p. H276). 
Page 4 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

2017.9 As of December 31, 2017—the data cut-off date of this report—24 

of the 28 programs we reviewed had one or more department-approved 

APBs; therefore, we excluded the remaining 4 programs from our 

assessment of whether programs are on track to meet their schedule and 

cost goals. We also reviewed the Future Years Homeland Security 

Program (FYHSP) report to Congress for fiscal years 2018–2022—which 

presents 5-year funding plans for each of DHS’s major acquisition 

programs—to assess the affordability of DHS’s acquisition portfolio.

To determine the extent to which DHS has taken actions to enhance its 

policies and processes to better reflect key portfolio management 

practices, we compared the current policies for the department’s 

requirements, acquisition management, and resource allocation 

processes that were issued in 2016 to key portfolio management 

practices we established in September 2012 and identified any significant 

gaps.10 We also reviewed documentation that resulted from these 

processes since January 2016 to get a sense of how the department has 

implemented its current policies. Lastly, we interviewed relevant 

headquarters officials responsible for implementing these policies and 

processes to obtain their perspectives on our analysis of DHS’s current 

policies and processes and to identify any current and planned initiatives 

to improve management of the department’s portfolio of major acquisition 

programs. Appendix III provides detailed information on our scope and 

methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2017 to May 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 9

GAO-17-346SP. 

10We established GAO’s key portfolio management practices, which are listed in appendix 

II, in GAO-12-833. The DHS policies we assessed apply to all major acquisition programs, 

including information technology programs. DHS has also established and implemented a 

separate portfolio management process specifically for information technology programs, 

which we have assessed through our high-risk updates. For the most recent report, see 

GAO-17-317.
Page 5 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

To help manage its multi-billion dollar acquisition investments, DHS has 

established policies and processes for acquisition management, 

requirements development, test and evaluation, and resource allocation. 

The department uses these policies and processes to deliver systems 

that are intended to close critical capability gaps, helping enable DHS to 

execute its missions and achieve its goals.

DHS policies and processes for managing its major acquisition programs 

are primarily set forth in its Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and 

Acquisition Management Instruction 102-01-001. DHS issued the initial 

version of this directive in November 2008 in an effort to establish an 

acquisition management system that effectively provides required 

capability to operators in support of the department’s missions.11 DHS’s 

Under Secretary for Management is currently designated as the 

department’s Chief Acquisition Officer and, as such, is responsible for 

managing the implementation of the department’s acquisition policies.

DHS’s Under Secretary for Management serves as the acquisition 

decision authority for the department’s largest acquisition programs, 

those with LCCEs of $1 billion or greater. Component Acquisition 

Executives—the most senior acquisition management officials within each 

of DHS’s components—may be delegated acquisition decision authority 

for programs with cost estimates between $300 million and less than $1 

billion. Table 1 identifies how DHS has categorized the 28 major 

acquisition programs we review in this report, and table 7 in appendix III 

specifically identifies the programs within each level.

 11DHS has issued multiple updates to its acquisition management directive and 

instruction. DHS issued the current version of the directive on July 28, 2015, and the 

current version of the instruction on March 9, 2016. DHS also issued a separate Systems 

Engineering Life Cycle Guidebook (DHS Guidebook 102-01-103-01) on April 18, 2016 that 

outlines the technical framework underlying DHS’s acquisition management system. 

Background

Acquisition Management 

Policy
Page 6 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Table 1: DHS Acquisition Levels for Major Acquisition Programs

Level Life-cycle cost estimates Acquisition decision authority Number of programs 

reviewed in this report

1 Greater than or equal to $1 billion Under Secretary for Management/Chief 

Acquisition Officer

24

2 $300 million or more, but less than $1 

billion

Under Secretary for Management/Chief 

Acquisition Officer, or the Component Acquisition 

Executive

4

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data. | GAO-18-339SP

DHS acquisition management policy establishes that a major acquisition 

program’s decision authority shall review the program at a series of

predetermined acquisition decision events to assess whether the major 

program is ready to proceed through the acquisition life-cycle phases. 

Depending on the program, these events can occur within months of each 

other, or be spread over several years. Figure 1 depicts the acquisition 

life cycle established in DHS acquisition management policy.

Figure 1: DHS Acquisition Life Cycle for Major Acquisition Programs

Note: Programs may develop capabilities through individual projects, segments, or increments, which 

are approved at ADE 2B. Programs without individual projects, segments, or increments may conduct 

a combined ADE 2A/2B since ADE 2B is the first milestone at which programs are required to submit 

certain acquisition documents.

An important aspect of an acquisition decision event is the decision 

authority’s review and approval of key acquisition documents. See table 2 

for a description of the type of key acquisition documents requiring 

department-level approval before a program moves to the next acquisition 

phase.
Page 7 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Table 2: Key Documents Requiring Department-level Approval

Document Description

Capability Development Plan Serves as the agreement between the component head, program manager, and the 

acquisition decision authority on the activities, cost, and schedule for the analysis and 

selection of potential solutions to fill a mission need. 

Acquisition Plan Provides a top-level plan for the overall acquisition approach. Describes why the solution is in 

the government’s best interest and why it is the most likely to succeed in delivering 

capabilities to operators. 

Integrated Logistics Support Plan Defines the strategy for ensuring the supportability and sustainment of a future capability. 

Provides critical insight into the approach, schedule, and funding requirements for integrating 

supportability requirements into the systems engineering process. 

Life-Cycle Cost Estimate Provides an exhaustive and structured accounting of all resources and associated cost 

elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program. 

Acquisition Program Baseline Establishes a program’s critical baseline cost, schedule, and performance parameters. 

Expresses the parameters in measurable, quantitative terms, which must be met in order to 

accomplish the program’s goals. 

Test and Evaluation Master Plan Documents the overarching test and evaluation approach for the acquisition program. 

Describes the developmental and operational test and evaluation needed to determine a 

system’s technical performance, operational effectiveness/suitability, and limitations. 

Source: Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | GAO-18-339SP

DHS acquisition management policy establishes that the APB is the 

agreement between program, component, and department-level officials 

establishing how systems will perform, when they will be delivered, and 

what they will cost. Specifically, the APB establishes a program’s 

schedule, costs, and key performance parameters. DHS defines key 

performance parameters as a program’s most important and nonnegotiable requirements that a system must meet to fulfill its fundamental 

purpose. For example, a key performance parameter for an aircraft may 

be airspeed and a key performance parameter for a surveillance system 

may be detection range.

The APB schedule, costs, and key performance parameters are defined 

in terms of an objective and minimum threshold value. According to DHS 

policy, if a program fails to meet any schedule, cost, or performance 

threshold approved in the APB, it is considered to be in breach. Programs 

in breach are required to notify their acquisition decision authority and 

develop a remediation plan that outlines a time frame for the program to 

return to its APB parameters, re-baseline—that is, establish new 

schedule, cost, or performance goals—or have a DHS-led program 

review that results in recommendations for a revised baseline.

In addition to the acquisition decision authority, other bodies and senior 

officials support DHS’s acquisition management function:
Page 8 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

• The Acquisition Review Board reviews major acquisition programs 

for proper management, oversight, accountability, and alignment with 

the department’s strategic functions at acquisition decision events and 

other meetings as needed. The board is chaired by the acquisition 

decision authority or a designee and consists of individuals who 

manage DHS’s mission objectives, resources, and contracts.

• The Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management 

(PARM) is responsible for DHS’s overall acquisition governance 

process, supports the Acquisition Review Board, and reports directly 

to the Under Secretary for Management. PARM develops and 

updates program management policies and practices, reviews major 

programs, provides guidance for workforce planning activities, 

provides support to program managers, and collects program 

performance data.

• Components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the 

Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard 

sponsor specific acquisition programs.12 The head of each component 

is responsible for oversight of major acquisition programs once the 

programs complete delivery of all planned capabilities to end users.

• Component Acquisition Executives within the components are 

responsible for overseeing the execution of their respective 

portfolios.

• Program management offices, also within the components, are 

responsible for planning and executing DHS’s individual 

programs. They are expected to do so within the cost, schedule, 

and performance parameters established in their APBs. If they 

cannot do so, programs are considered to be in breach and must 

take specific steps, as noted above.

Figure 2 depicts the relationship between acquisition managers at the 

department, component, and program level.

 12DHS’s components consist of operational components—those that have responsibility 

for directly achieving one or more of the department’s missions or activities—and support 

components—those that generally provide assistance or guidance to other DHS 

components or external organizations.
Page 9 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Figure 2: DHS’s Acquisition Management Structure
Page 10 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

DHS established a Joint Requirements Council (JRC) to develop and lead 

a component-driven joint requirements process for the department.13 The 

JRC has issued policies outlining a process for analyzing and validating 

capability gaps, needs, and requirements.14

The JRC consists of a chair and 14 members who are senior executives 

or officers that represent key DHS headquarters offices and seven of the 

department’s operational components. The JRC chair rotates annually 

among the seven operational components. JRC members represent the 

views of their components or office leadership, endorse and prioritize 

validated capability needs and operational requirements (user-defined 

performance parameters outlining what a system must do), and make 

recommendations that are supported by analytical rigor. Figure 3 depicts 

the current headquarters and component members of the JRC.

Figure 3: Members of DHS’s Joint Requirements Council

 13DHS re-established the JRC in June 2014. For more information, see GAO, Homeland 

Security Acquisitions: Joint Requirements Council’s Initial Approach Is Generally Sound 

and It Is Developing a Process to Inform Investment Priorities, GAO-17-171 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 24, 2016).

14Department of Homeland Security, Directive 71-02, The Joint Requirements Council, 

February 1, 2016; Directive 107-01, Joint Requirements Integration and Management 

System, March 8, 2016; and Instruction Manual 107-01-001-01, DHS Manual for the 

Operation of the Joint Requirements Integration and Management System, April 21, 2016. 

Requirements 

Development Process
Page 11 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

The JRC provides input to two senior-level entities:

• The Acquisition Review Board—as a member, the JRC chair 

advises the board on capability gaps, needs, and requirements at key 

milestones in the acquisition life cycle.

• The Deputy’s Management Action Group, which the Secretary 

established in April 2014, is a decision-making body that is chaired by 

the Deputy Secretary. Its membership consists of the DHS Chief of 

Staff, DHS Under Secretaries, senior operational component deputies 

and select support component deputies, and the Chief Financial 

Officer. The group provides recommendations to the Deputy 

Secretary for consideration in the annual resource allocation process 

that reflects DHS’s investment priorities. The group reviews JRCvalidated capability needs and recommendations, provides direction 

and guidance to the JRC, and endorses or directs related follow-on 

JRC activities.

The JRC is responsible for validating proposed capability needs and 

requirements for all major acquisitions, as well as for programs that are 

joint or of interest to the Deputy’s Management Action Group, regardless 

of level. See table 3 for a description of the key requirements documents 

requiring JRC validation. 

Table 3: Key Documents Requiring Joint Requirements Council Validation

Document Description

Capability Analysis Report Provides an assessment of the department’s ability to fulfill a mission, objective, or function. 

Identifies capability gaps, redundancies, fragmentation, and overlaps; and provides 

recommendations for either a materiel or non-materiel approach to mitigate those gaps or 

overlaps. 

Mission Need Statement Provides a high-level description of the mission need, whether from a current or impending 

gap. Outlines only the concept of the solution to fill the gap and does not provide information 

on specific types of acquisitions that could provide that capability. 

Concept of Operations Provides a description of how an asset, system, or capability will be employed and 

supported. Identifies the capabilities needed to perform the missions and fill the gaps 

expressed in the Mission Need Statement.

Operational Requirements Document Provides a number of performance parameters that must be met by a program to provide 

useful capabilities to the operator by closing capability gaps identified in the Mission Need 

Statement. 

Source: Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | GAO-18-339SP

In general, the DHS requirements development process moves from 

broad mission needs and capability gaps to operational requirements. 

See figure 4.
Page 12 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Figure 4: Requirements Activities Established by DHS Policy

In May 2009, DHS established policies that describe processes for testing 

the capabilities delivered by the department’s major acquisition 

programs.15 The primary purpose of test and evaluation is to provide 

timely, accurate information to managers, decision makers, and other 

stakeholders to reduce programmatic, financial, schedule, and 

performance risks. We provide an overview of each of the 28 programs’

test activities in the individual program assessments presented in 

appendix I.

DHS testing policy assigns specific responsibilities to particular 

individuals and entities throughout the department:

• Program managers have overall responsibility for planning and 

executing their programs’ testing strategies, including scheduling and 

funding test activities and delivering systems for testing. They are also 

 15DHS issued a revised version of its Test and Evaluation Directive 026-06 on May 5, 

2017, and a revised instruction for implementing this directive on July 5, 2017. 

Test and Evaluation Policy
Page 13 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

responsible for controlling developmental testing, which is used to 

assist in the development and maturation of products, manufacturing, 

or support processes. Developmental testing includes engineeringtype tests used to verify that design risks are minimized, substantiate 

achievement of contract technical performance, and certify readiness 

for operational testing.

• Operational test agents are responsible for planning, conducting, 

and reporting on operational test and evaluation, which is intended to 

identify whether a system can meet its key performance parameters 

and provide an evaluation of the operational effectiveness, suitability, 

and cybersecurity of a system in a realistic environment. Operational 

effectiveness refers to the overall ability of a system to provide a 

desired capability when used by representative personnel. 

Operational suitability refers to the degree to which a system can be 

placed into field use and sustained satisfactorily. The operational test 

agents may be organic to the component, another government 

agency, or a contractor, but must be independent of the developer in 

order to present credible, objective, and unbiased conclusions.

• The Director, Office of Test and Evaluation is responsible for 

approving major acquisition programs’ operational test agent and test 

and evaluation master plans, among other things. A program’s test 

and evaluation master plan must describe the developmental and 

operational testing needed to determine technical performance and 

operational effectiveness, suitability, and cybersecurity. As 

appropriate, the Director is also responsible for observing operational 

tests, reviewing operational test agents’ reports, and assessing the 

reports. Prior to a program’s acquisition decision event 3, the Director 

provides the program’s acquisition decision authority a letter of 

assessment that includes an appraisal of the program’s operational 

test, a concurrence or non-concurrence with the operational test 

agent’s evaluation, and any further independent analysis.

As an acquisition program proceeds through its life cycle, the testing 

emphasis moves gradually from developmental testing to operational 

testing. See figure 5.
Page 14 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Figure 5: Test Activities Established by DHS Policy

DHS has established a planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 

process to allocate resources to acquisition programs and other entities 

throughout the department.16 DHS uses this process to produce the 

department’s annual budget request and multi-year funding plans 

presented in the FYHSP, a database that contains, among other things, 

5-year funding plans for DHS’s major acquisition programs. According to 

DHS guidance, the 5-year plans should allow the department to achieve 

its goals more efficiently than an incremental approach based on 1-year 

plans. DHS guidance also states that the FYHSP articulates how the 

department will achieve its strategic goals within fiscal constraints.

At the outset of the annual resource allocation process, the department’s 

Offices of Policy and Chief Financial Officer provide planning and fiscal 

 16Department of Homeland Security, Directive 101-01, Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Execution, July 14, 2016; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution Instruction 101-01-001, July 15, 2016; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution System Operating Handbook, revised July 2016. 

Resource Allocation 

Process
Page 15 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

guidance, respectively, to the department’s components. In accordance 

with this guidance, the components should submit 5-year funding plans to 

the Chief Financial Officer. These plans are subsequently reviewed by 

DHS’s senior leaders, including the DHS Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary. DHS’s senior leaders are expected to modify the plans in 

accordance with their priorities and assessments, and they document 

their decisions in formal resource allocation decision memorandums. 

DHS submits the revised funding plans to the Office of Management and 

Budget, which uses them to inform the President’s annual budget 

request—a document sent to Congress requesting new budget authority 

for federal programs, among other things. In some cases, the funding 

appropriated to certain accounts in a given fiscal year can be carried over 

to subsequent fiscal years. Figure 6 depicts DHS’s annual resource 

allocation process.

Figure 6: DHS’s Annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process

Federal law requires DHS to submit an annual FYHSP report to Congress 

at or about the same time as the President’s budget request.17 This report 

presents the 5-year funding plans in the FYHSP database at that time.

 17DHS is required to include the same type of information, organizational structure, and 

level of detail in the FYHSP as the Department of Defense is required to include in its 

Future Years Defense Program. 6 U.S.C. § 454. 
Page 16 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Two offices within DHS’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer support the 

annual resource allocation process:

• The Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) is 

responsible for establishing policies for the annual resource allocation 

process and overseeing the development of the FYHSP. In this role, 

PA&E develops the Chief Financial Officer’s planning and fiscal 

guidance, reviews the components’ 5-year funding plans, advises 

DHS’s senior leaders on resource allocation issues, maintains the 

FYHSP database, and submits the annual FYHSP report to Congress.

• The Cost Analysis Division is responsible for reviewing, analyzing, 

and evaluating acquisition programs’ LCCEs to ensure the cost of 

DHS programs are presented accurately and completely, in support of 

resource requests. This division also supports affordability 

assessments of the department’s budget, in coordination with PA&E, 

and develops independent cost estimates for major acquisition 

programs upon request by DHS’s Under Secretary for Management or 

Chief Financial Officer.

Of the 24 programs we assessed with approved schedule and cost goals, 

10 were on track to meet those goals during 2017. The other 14 programs 

were not on track because they changed or breached their schedule 

goals, cost goals, or both. We found that most programs updated their 

cost estimates in response to requirements DHS established in January 

2016 that are intended to provide decision makers with more timely 

information. These actions are in accordance with GAO’s best practice to 

regularly update cost estimates and we plan to use these updated 

estimates to measure programs’ cost changes going forward.18 Based on 

our April 2014 recommendation, DHS revised the format of its fiscal year 

2018–2022 FYHSP report to Congress to include acquisition affordability 

tables for select major acquisition programs.19 However, the report 

shows—and our analysis of programs’ current cost estimates confirms—

that some programs face acquisition funding gaps in fiscal year 2018.

We also reviewed 4 programs that were early in the acquisition process 

and planned to establish department-approved schedule and cost goals

 18GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: 

March 2009).

19GAO-14-332. 

During 2017, 10 of 

the 24 Programs with 

Approved Schedule 

and Cost Goals Were 

on Track
Page 17 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

in calendar year 2017. However, these programs were delayed in getting 

department approval for their initial APBs for various reasons and, 

therefore, we excluded them from our assessment of whether programs 

were on track to meet their schedule and cost goals during 2017. DHS 

leadership subsequently approved initial APBs for 2 particularly complex 

and costly programs—a border wall system along the southwest U.S. 

border and the Coast Guard’s Heavy Polar Icebreaker—in January 2018. 

We plan to assess these programs in next year’s review, but provide 

more details on all 4 additional programs we reviewed in the individual 

assessments in appendix I.

Table 4 summarizes our findings and we present more detailed 

information after the table.

Table 4: Major DHS Acquisition Programs’ Progress against Current Schedule and Cost Goals during 2017

Component Program On track 

during 2017

Changes to 

schedule 

goals

Changes to 

cost goals

New 

programs 

GAO did not 

assessb

Customs and 

Border Protection 

Automated Commercial Environment — X X —

Biometric Entry-Exit Program n/a n/a n/a X

Border Wall System Program n/a n/a n/a X

Integrated Fixed Towers — X — —

Medium Lift Helicopter (UH-60) — X X —

Multi-role Enforcement Aircrafta X — — —

Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems Programa X — — —

Remote Video Surveillance System n/a n/a n/a X

Tactical Communications Modernization — X X —

TECS (not an acronym) Modernization — X — —

Federal Emergency 

Management 

Agency 

Logistics Supply Chain Management System — X — —

Immigration and 

Customs 

Enforcement 

TECS (not an acronym) Modernization — — X —

National Protection 

and Programs 

Directorate 

Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation — X X —

Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology — X — —

National Cybersecurity Protection System X — — —

Next Generation Networks Priority Services X — — —
Page 18 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Component Program On track 

during 2017

Changes to 

schedule 

goals

Changes to 

cost goals

New 

programs 

GAO did not 

assessb

Science and 

Technology 

Directorate 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facilitya X — — —

Transportation 

Security 

Administration 

Electronic Baggage Screening Program — — X —

Passenger Screening Program — X X —

Technology Infrastructure Modernization X — — —

U.S. Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter X — — —

H-65 Conversion/Sustainment Program — X — —

Heavy Polar Icebreaker n/a n/a n/a X

Long Range Surveillance Aircraft (HC-130H/J) X — — —

Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft (HC-144A & 

C-27J)

X — — —

National Security Cutter — X X —

Offshore Patrol Cutter X — — —

U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration 

Services 

Transformation — X — —

Legend: X = yes; — = no; n/a = not applicable; shaded rows = program was in breach of its baseline goals as of December 31, 2017

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data. | GAO-18-339SP

a

Program is on track against its initial cost and schedule goals (e.g. has not revised the acquisition 

program baseline DHS leadership initially approved after the department’s acquisition management 

policy went into effect in November 2008).

b

Not assessed because DHS leadership had not approved an acquisition program baseline 

establishing schedule and cost goals for these programs by December 31, 2017. DHS leadership 

subsequently approved initial baselines for the Border Wall System Program and Heavy Polar 

Icebreaker in January 2018.

From January 2017 to January 2018, 10 of the 24 programs we assessed 

with department-approved APBs were on track to meet their schedule 

and cost goals. This is fewer than our last annual review in which we 

found that 17 of the 26 programs we assessed were on track during 

2016.20

Three of the 10 programs on track during 2017 were on track against 

initial schedule and cost goals; that is, the schedule and cost estimates in 

the baseline DHS leadership initially approved after the department’s 

acquisition management policy went into effect in November 2008. The 

 20GAO-17-346SP. 

Ten Programs Were on 

Track during 2017
Page 19 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

other 7 programs had re-baselined prior to January 2017 and were on 

track against revised schedules and cost estimates that reflected past 

schedule slips, cost growth, or both.

However, some of the programs on track in 2017 identified risks that may 

lead to schedule slips or cost growth in the future. For example, officials 

from the Technology Infrastructure Modernization program told us that 

staffing challenges may impede their ability to execute the program in 

accordance with its current APB. We also identified 2 programs that are in 

the process of re-baselining or plan to re-baseline in the near future to 

account for significant program changes or to add capabilities. For 

example, the Next Generation Networks Priority Services program plans 

to update its APB to establish schedule, cost, and performance goals for 

the next increment, which is intended to address landline capabilities for 

providing government officials emergency telecommunication services.

During 2017, 14 of the 24 programs we assessed with departmentapproved APBs were not on track. Twelve of these programs had at least 

one major acquisition milestone that slipped, including 6 of these 

programs that also changed or breached their cost goals. Two additional 

programs changed or breached only their cost goals.

As of January 2018, 6 of the 12 programs that experienced a schedule 

slip were in breach and had not yet revised their goals. Therefore, the 

magnitude of the schedule slips is unknown. For the remaining 6 

programs, the change in schedule during 2017 ranged from a delay of 6 

months to 66 months. Figure 7 identifies the programs that experienced 

schedule slips and the extent to which their major milestones slipped in 

2017, as well as—for additional context—in prior years.

Fourteen Programs Were 

Not on Track during 2017

Programs with Schedule Slips 

during 2017
Page 20 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Figure 7: DHS Major Acquisition Programs’ Schedule Slips during 2017
Page 21 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

While there are various reasons for schedule delays, the result is that end 

users may not get needed capabilities when they originally anticipated. 

Examples of the reasons why these key milestones slipped in 2017 

include the following:

• New requirements: For example, the Passenger Screening Program 

re-baselined in May 2017 for the fifth time since its initial APB was 

approved in January 2012. This latest re-baseline was to remediate a 

17-month breach caused by delays in incorporating new cybersecurity 

requirements in one of the program’s transportation security 

equipment technologies, known as the Credential Authentication 

Technology. The program now plans to achieve full operational 

capability for this system by December 2023—more than 9 years later 

than it initially planned. In another example, the Tactical 

Communications Modernization program re-baselined in November 

2017—4 months after the program notified DHS leadership that it 

would not achieve full operational capability as planned. The reason 

for this re-baseline was to resolve issues related to federal information 

security requirements. The program now plans to achieve this 

milestone by March 2019, which is more than a year later than its 

initial APB threshold.

• Technical challenges: For example, the Continuous Diagnostics and 

Mitigation program re-baselined in June 2017 to account for 

significant coverage gaps identified during the deployment of phase 1 

sensors and to establish cost, schedule, and performance goals for 

phase 3 tools. The program’s full operational capability date slipped 

almost 4 years after this milestone was redefined as the point in time 

at which phase 1–3 tools are available to all participating civilian 

agencies. Additionally, the Automated Commercial Environment 

program declared a schedule breach in April 2017—its second in less 

than a year—after encountering difficulties developing its remaining 

functionality. These difficulties have caused further delays to the 

program’s final acquisition milestone decision.

• External factors: Officials from the Logistics Supply Chain 

Management System program notified DHS leadership in September 

2017 that the program would not complete all required activities to 

achieve acquisition decision event 3 and subsequent events, including 

full operational capability. The primary reason for the delay was 

because program staff were deployed to support response and 

recovery efforts during the 2017 hurricane season. Additionally, the 

Medium Lift Helicopter program experienced delays in getting key 

acquisition documents approved in time to achieve its acquisition 

decision event 3. These delays were attributed, in part, to DHS 
Page 22 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

leadership directing Customs and Border Protection to develop a 

comprehensive border plan that included the helicopter’s capabilities.

We elaborate on the reasons for all 12 programs’ schedule slips in the 

individual assessments in appendix I.

Of the 14 programs not on track during 2017, 8 revised or breached their 

established cost goals. Four of these 8 programs revised their cost goals 

when they re-baselined to address new requirements and technical 

challenges, among other things.

• When the Passenger Screening Program re-baselined in May 2017, 

the program’s APB threshold for its life-cycle costs increased $418 

million (8 percent) over its previous APB. However, the revised 

threshold is $1 billion below the threshold established in the program’s 

initial APB, which was approved in January 2012. From 2012 to 2015, 

the program’s scope was reduced in response to funding constraints. 

However, emerging threats drove the program to increase capability 

requirements, which has subsequently increased costs.

• When the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program rebaselined in June 2017, the APB threshold for life-cycle costs 

decreased by $15 million (1 percent). However, the program shifted 

some acquisition costs to operations and maintenance (O&M) to be 

consistent with DHS’s new common appropriations structure.21 This, 

in addition to other changes, increased the APB threshold for O&M by 

$631 million (3,712 percent).

• When the National Security Cutter program re-baselined in November 

2017 to account for a ninth ship—as directed by Congress—the APB 

cost thresholds for acquisition and O&M increased by $453 million (8 

percent) and $123 million (1 percent), respectively.

• When the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s TECS 

Modernization program re-baselined in November 2017 in preparation 

for acquisition decision event 3, the APB cost thresholds increased 

overall. Specifically, the acquisition cost threshold decreased by $14 

million (6 percent) when the program included actual costs through 

 21In April 2018, we found that the common appropriation structure streamlined DHS’s 

appropriations, but obscured the reporting of O&M costs for individual programs. For more 

information, see GAO, DHS Program Costs: Reporting Program-Level Operations and 

Support Costs to Congress Would Improve Oversight, GAO-18-344 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 25, 2018). This report refers to O&M as operations and support, which is the title of 

the common appropriations structure account related to these activities.

Programs with Cost Goal 

Changes or Breaches during 

2017
Page 23 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

fiscal year 2016, among other things, and the O&M cost threshold 

increased by $147 million (92 percent) when the program extended 

the estimate by 4 years and included support costs for an additional 

11 years.

The other 4 programs breached their established cost goals during 2017.

• The Medium Lift Helicopter and Electronic Baggage Screening 

programs breached certain APB cost thresholds when they shifted 

costs between categories, such as O&M to acquisitions or vice versa, 

to be consistent with DHS’s new common appropriations structure.

• The Tactical Communications Modernization program experienced a 

cost breach primarily because of increases in costs for contractor 

labor and support for facilities and infrastructure. The program’s APB 

cost threshold for O&M increased by $110 million (23 percent) when it 

re-baselined in November 2017.

• The Automated Commercial Environment program experienced a cost 

breach because it had to extend its contracts to address the 

development difficulties discussed above. The magnitude of the 

program’s cost goal changes is not yet known because the program 

does not plan to revise its APB until August 2018.

We elaborate on the reasons for all 8 programs’ cost goal changes or 

breaches in the individual program assessments in appendix I.

In January 2016, based on several of our past recommendations, DHS 

required major acquisition programs to begin submitting to headquarters 

(1) detailed data on program affordability, such as updates to the 

program’s LCCE and funding source information, to help inform the 

department’s annual resource allocation process, and (2) an annual 

LCCE update.22 These requirements are intended to provide more timely 

information that may improve DHS’s efforts to address acquisition 

program affordability issues, as well as internal and external oversight of 

programs’ progress against its cost goals. These actions are in 

accordance with GAO’s cost estimating best practices, which state that 

cost estimates should be updated with actual costs so that they are 

 22These requirements are only applicable to level 1 and level 2 programs that have not 

reached full operational capability. For our past work, see GAO, Homeland Security 

Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution and Affordability 

Concerns Endure, GAO-16-338SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2016), GAO-14-332, and 

GAO-12-833.

DHS Has Taken Steps to 

Enhance Cost Reporting 

While Some Programs Still 

Face Funding Gaps
Page 24 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

always relevant and current.23 As a result, we have used these sources to 

provide the programs’ current estimate in the individual assessments in 

appendix I, as appropriate, and plan to use these data sources to 

measure programs’ cost changes going forward.

According to officials from the Cost Analysis Division, a program’s annual 

LCCE update should inform the affordability submission to support the 

annual resource allocation process and can be completed at any point 

during the fiscal year leading up to this process. We examined 

documentation to ascertain whether the programs we reviewed complied 

with the two requirements. For the 24 programs we assessed with 

department-approved APBs, we found the following:

• All 24 programs submitted the detailed data on program affordability 

to headquarters by June 2017 to inform the fiscal year 2019 resource 

allocation cycle. Most programs’ submissions accounted for changes 

since the program’s last LCCE was approved by DHS’s Chief 

Financial Officer, except three. For example, the Long Range 

Surveillance Aircraft program’s submission reflected no updates from 

its November 2011 LCCE because the program was in the process of 

re-baselining to account for significant changes. The program began 

re-baselining nearly 3 years ago and has been delayed for various 

reasons, including challenges with the vendor hired to complete a 

revision of the program’s LCCE.

• Eighteen of the 24 programs submitted annual LCCE updates. Three 

programs—Automated Commercial Environment, H-65, and 

Transformation—did not submit an annual LCCE update because 

they were in breach. The other 3 programs—all within the Coast 

Guard—did not submit an annual LCCE because, according to Coast 

Guard officials, they have limited internal cost estimating capability 

and rely on outside sources for this service, which led to delays in 

completing the annual LCCEs for these programs. Coast Guard 

officials said they are reviewing options to resolve these delays and 

improve the Coast Guard’s cost estimating capability.

Cost Analysis Division officials anticipate the Coast Guard will increase 

compliance with the annual LCCE requirement in fiscal year 2018. They 

also plan to update the annual LCCE template to include additional 

information, such as comparisons of the updated estimates to the 

program’s APB cost goals and projected funding.

 23GAO-09-3SP.
Page 25 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

In addition, DHS revised the format of its FYHSP report to Congress, 

improving insight into major programs’ acquisition funding, but decreasing 

insight into O&M funding. In April 2014, we found that DHS could better 

communicate its funding needs for acquisition programs to Congress and 

recommended that DHS enhance the content for future FYHSP reports by 

presenting programs’ annual cost estimates and any anticipated funding 

gaps, among other things.24 DHS concurred with the recommendation 

and, for the first time, included acquisition affordability tables that 

presented programs’ annual acquisition cost estimates compared to 

projected acquisition funding for select major acquisition programs in its 

FYHSP report for fiscal years 2018–2022.

However, DHS no longer reported O&M funding for individual programs. 

DHS reported in the FYHSP that it focused on acquisition information 

because O&M funding estimates are generally stable year-to-year and 

components manage O&M in various ways, such as by individual 

program or across a portfolio of programs. By removing O&M funding 

information in the FYHSP for all programs, DHS presents an incomplete 

picture of programs’ full funding needs and affordability. In April 2018, we 

assessed the extent to which DHS had accounted for O&M costs and 

funding in greater detail and recommended that DHS reverse the 

exclusion of O&M funding at the acquisition program level in its FYHSP 

report to Congress for all components.25 DHS officials stated that they 

plan to re-introduce O&M funding for major acquisition programs in the 

FYHSP report for fiscal years 2019–2023 based on multiple internal 

discussions about the best way to present a more comprehensive view of 

programs’ total costs and feedback from key stakeholders, such as the 

Office of Management and Budget.

Based on the information presented in the FYHSP report for fiscal years 

2018–2022, DHS’s acquisition portfolio is not affordable over the next 5 

years. For example, the report contained acquisition affordability tables 

for 18 of the 24 programs we assessed that have approved APBs. Of 

these 18 programs, 9 were projected to have an acquisition affordability 

 24GAO-14-332. 

25GAO-18-344. The April 2018 report refers to O&M as operations and support, which is 

the title of the common appropriations structure account related to these activities.
Page 26 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

gap in fiscal year 2018.26 However, some of these projections are 

outdated since the FYHSP report—which was issued in September 

2017—relied on cost information as of April 2016. Therefore, we updated 

these tables using the programs’ current acquisition cost estimate 

presented in the individual assessments in appendix I.

Based on our assessment of programs’ current cost estimates, we also 

found that a total of 9 programs are projected to have an acquisition 

affordability gap in fiscal year 2018. However, 3 of these 9 programs were 

different programs than those identified based on the FYHSP report. Of 

the 9 programs we identified with a projected acquisition affordability gap 

in fiscal year 2018, we found the following:

• Five programs identified other funding, such as funding from previous 

fiscal years that remained available for obligation—known as 

carryover funding—which would address their projected acquisition 

funding gap. For example, in the FYHSP report, DHS projected 

allocating approximately $16 million in funding for the Technology 

Infrastructure Modernization program in fiscal year 2018 to cover an 

estimated $16 million in acquisition costs. However, in its November 

2017 annual LCCE update, this program’s acquisition cost increased 

to almost $30 million, resulting in a projected acquisition affordability 

gap of almost 45 percent. The program plans to realign $57 million in 

O&M carryover funding to cover this and any future acquisition 

shortfalls.

• Four programs did not identify other funding that would address their 

projected acquisition funding gap, which increases the likelihood that 

they will cost more and take longer to deliver capabilities to end users 

than expected. For example, in the FYHSP report, DHS projected 

allocating $109 million in funding for the Non-Intrusive Inspection 

Systems program in fiscal year 2018 to cover an estimated $103 

million in acquisition costs. However, in its April 2017 annual LCCE 

update, this program’s acquisition costs increased to nearly $186 

million, resulting in a projected acquisition affordability gap of 41 

percent. The program identified only $2.5 million in fiscal year 2017 

acquisition carryover funding.

 26DHS considers a program to be fully resourced if the latest DHS-approved funding is 

within 5 percent of its current DHS-funded estimated costs in a given year. Additionally, 

DHS reported acquisition funding for the Coast Guard’s Medium Range Surveillance 

program in the FYHSP report, but did not present an acquisition affordability table for this 

program.
Page 27 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Further, 5 of the 24 programs we assessed were not included in the fiscal 

years 2018–2022 FYHSP report because they were no longer expected 

to receive acquisition funding. Officials from 3 of these 5 programs 

projected funding gaps that could cause future program execution 

challenges, such as schedule slips or cost growth. For example, the 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility anticipates a projected funding 

shortfall of approximately $90 million over the next 5 years, which officials 

said could delay a number of activities to make the facility operational. 

We elaborate on programs’ affordability over the next 5 years in the 

individual program assessments in appendix I.

We assessed DHS’s policies outlining the department’s processes for 

acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements and 

found that, when considered collectively, they generally reflect key 

portfolio management practices. In March 2007, we examined the

practices that private sector entities use to achieve a balanced mix of new 

projects and found that successful commercial companies use a 

disciplined and integrated approach to prioritize needs and allocate 

resources when making investments.27 This approach, known as portfolio 

management, requires companies to view each of their investments as 

contributing to a collective whole, rather than as independent and 

unrelated. With this perspective, companies can effectively (1) identify 

and prioritize opportunities, and (2) allocate available resources to 

support the highest priority—or most promising—opportunities. Based on 

this and other work, we identified four key practice areas for portfolio 

management in September 2012.28

We previously assessed DHS’s acquisition management and resource 

allocation policies against our key portfolio management practices in 

 27GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).

28GAO-12-833. See Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

GAO-10-388SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010); Department of Homeland Security: 

Billions Invested in Major Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight, GAO-09-29 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 18, 2008); GAO-07-388; Information Technology Investment Management: A 

Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO-04-394G (Washington, 

D.C.; March 2004); and Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision Making, 

GAO/AIMD-99-32 (Washington, D.C.; December 1998). For more information on the key 

portfolio management practices, see appendix II. 

DHS’s Policies 

Generally Reflect Key 

Portfolio Management 

Practices, but 

Opportunities Exist to 

Leverage Programs’

Post-Implementation 

Results
Page 28 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

September 2012 and April 2014, respectively.29 We found that the 

policies in place at the time of our reviews did not fully reflect all of the 

key portfolio management practices and recommended that DHS revise 

its policies to do so. DHS concurred with our recommendations and 

subsequently took actions to mature and solidify the department’s 

portfolio management processes and policies.

In April 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum 

titled Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort, which aimed to 

strengthen DHS’s structures and processes to improve departmental 

cohesiveness and operational effectiveness, among other things. The 

memorandum identified several initial focus areas intended to build 

organizational capacity, one of which centered on improving and 

integrating the department’s processes for acquisition oversight, resource 

allocation, and joint requirements analysis. To improve these processes, 

the memorandum directed senior DHS leaders to update the existing 

acquisition management and resource allocation processes, as well as 

lead an expedited review to provide alternatives for developing and 

facilitating a component-driven joint requirements process, which 

ultimately led to the re-establishment of the JRC.30

In response to our recommendations and the Unity of Effort 

memorandum, DHS issued new policies outlining the acquisition 

management, resource allocation, and requirements processes in 2016.31

We assessed these policies and found that, when considered collectively, 

they generally reflect the key portfolio management practices, as shown 

in table 5.

 29GAO-12-833, GAO-14-332. 

30DHS initially established a JRC in 2003 to identify common requirements across DHS’s 

components, but it was never fully implemented due to a lack of senior management 

officials’ involvement. In November 2008, we found that the JRC played a key role in 

identifying several overlapping investments and recommended that DHS reinstate the 

JRC to review and approve acquisition requirements and assess potential duplication of 

efforts. See GAO-09-29. 

31In October 2016, we assessed the JRC’s structure and management approach and 

found that they were generally sound. For more information, see GAO-17-171.
Page 29 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Table 5: Assessment of DHS’s Policies on Acquisition Management, Resource Allocation, and Requirements against GAO’s 

Key Portfolio Management Practices

Key practice area Summary of key practices GAO assessment of 

DHS policies

Clearly define and empower 

leadership

Portfolio managers, with the support of cross-functional teams, 

should be empowered to make investment decisions and held 

accountable for outcomes.

Met

Establish standard assessment 

criteria and demonstrate 

comprehensive knowledge of the 

portfolio 

Investments should be ranked and selected using a disciplined 

process to assess the cost, benefits, and risks of alternative 

products to ensure transparency and comparability across 

alternatives.

Met

Prioritize investments by integrating 

the requirements, acquisition, and 

budget processes

Organizations should use long-range planning and an integrated 

approach to prioritize needs and allocate resources in accordance 

with strategic goals, so they can avoid pursuing more products than 

they can afford and optimize return on investment.

Met

Continually make go/no-go decisions 

to rebalance the portfolio

Reviews should be scheduled (1) annually to consider proposed 

changes to program requirements, (2) as new opportunities are 

identified, (3) whenever a program breaches its established 

thresholds to reassess whether it remains relevant and affordable, 

and (4) after investment implementation is completed. Information 

gathered during these post-implementation reviews should be used 

to fine tune the investment process and the portfolio to achieve 

strategic outcomes.

Partially met

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies. | GAO-18-339SP

Note: Appendix II and III present a more detailed description of our key portfolio management 

practices and how we assessed DHS’s policies.

Because DHS’s new policies were issued in 2016, we did not specifically 

assess DHS’s implementation of them. However, we did review 

documentation resulting from the acquisition management, resource 

allocation, and requirements processes since January 2016 to get a 

sense of how the department began implementation. Examples of how 

DHS’s policies reflect the key portfolio management practices and their 

implementation status are outlined below.

• Clearly define and empower leadership: the policies identify the 

roles and responsibilities for decision makers in the acquisition 

management, resource allocation, and requirements processes, as 

well as establish cross-functional teams to support those decision 

makers. For example, to fulfill the role of acquisition decision 

authority, the Under Secretary for Management is supported by the 

Acquisition Review Board, which consists of key DHS senior leaders 

responsible for managing the department’s finances, contracts, and 

testing, among other things.
Page 30 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

We reviewed the memorandums issued since January 2016 that 

document Acquisition Review Board decisions and found that, through 

this group, DHS has taken steps to manage across programs through 

its acquisition management process. For example, after reviewing the 

status of several individual Customs and Border Protection programs 

in 2016, the Acquisition Review Board identified the need for a 

comprehensive border plan that depicts the component’s current land, 

maritime, and air domain awareness capabilities. In October 2016, the 

Deputy Under Secretary for Management—who was serving as 

acquisition decision authority at the time—directed Customs and 

Border Protection to develop such a plan. The plan is to consist of 

separate analyses for each of the three domains—starting with land—

that reflect end users’ capability requirements for systems, such as 

Integrated Fixed Towers, Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft, and 

Medium Lift Helicopter, that address relevant domain threats. As of 

February 2018, Customs and Border Protection had not yet 

completed the analysis for land domain awareness capabilities.

• Establish standard assessment criteria and demonstrate 

comprehensive knowledge of the portfolio: the policies establish 

standard criteria for assessing major acquisition programs through the 

acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements 

processes. For example, the updated resource allocation handbook 

established that PA&E conduct annual assessments of all major 

investments using standard criteria in five main categories—

contribution to DHS’s mission, program health, risk, resources, and 

governance—to assess the portfolio of investments and present 

alternatives for leadership decision.32 PA&E officials told us they used 

these criteria when assessing components’ resource allocation 

requests during development of the President’s fiscal year 2018 

budget to develop funding options for the Deputy’s Management 

Action Group, which is responsible for making resource allocation 

recommendations for the Secretary’s approval. PA&E presented its 

funding options by DHS mission, which, according to officials 

associated with the Deputy’s Management Action Group, allowed the 

group to make cross-component allocation decisions that directly 

 32The criteria for contribution to DHS’s mission includes assessment of benefits to DHS, 

capability alignment to the JRC’s functional portfolios, and shared services; program 

health includes assessment of cost, schedule, and performance; risk includes assessment 

in key areas, such as contracting and human capital; resources includes assessment of a 

program’s cost estimate and affordability; and governance includes assessment of 

accountability and evaluation.
Page 31 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

aligned with the department’s strategic goals. We could not verify 

these officials’ assertions based on the documentation we were 

provided, but will continue to monitor PA&E’s assessment of major 

acquisition programs against the standard criteria as the department’s 

implementation of its resource allocation policies matures.

In addition, PARM formally established its Acquisition Program Health 

Assessments in October 2016 after more than a year of development 

and pilot efforts. These assessments are intended to monitor major 

acquisition programs quarterly (both on an individual program level 

and in aggregate) by rating programs against standard criteria in 

several categories—such as program management, financial 

management, and human capital—that DHS deemed important for 

successful program execution. We reviewed the quarterly reports 

issued from January 2016 to April 2017 and found that they primarily 

focused on individual programs. The portfolio-level information 

contained in these reports was limited to program results grouped in 

various categories, such as by component, by acquisition life-cycle 

phase, and by investment type (e.g., information technology). PARM 

officials said they plan to use the health assessments as a portfolio 

management tool in the future and are working to determine how to 

best to analyze and present portfolio-level data. We will continue to 

track PARM’s implementation of the health assessment process 

moving forward through GAO’s High Risk work to determine DHS’s 

progress in demonstrating that major acquisition programs are on 

track to achieve their established goals.33

• Prioritize investments by integrating the requirements, 

acquisition, and budget processes: the policies identify areas 

where DHS’s requirements, acquisition management, and resource 

allocation processes are integrated and establish processes for 

prioritizing investments. For example, the updated resource allocation 

policies require reviews of DHS’s major acquisition portfolio during 

this annual process. When the portfolio faces a funding gap, programs 

are to be returned to their respective components for scope or funding 

adjustments, or prioritized by department leadership to identify an 

affordable set of programs. For the fiscal year 2018 resource 

allocation cycle, PA&E officials provided an example where DHS 

leadership directed components to identify funding from alternative 

sources to fund specific purposes related to DHS’s mission to prevent 

 33For our most recent report, see GAO-17-317. The next report is expected to be issued in 

February 2019. 
Page 32 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

terrorism and enhance security. However, as previously discussed, 

the resulting FYHSP report for fiscal years 2018–2022 showed that 

DHS’s portfolio of major acquisition programs is not affordable over 

the next 5 years.

In addition, the requirements policies established the Joint 

Assessment of Requirements, an annual process to prioritize 

emerging and existing requirements to inform the department’s 

resource allocation decisions. As we found in October 2016, the JRC 

plans to implement the Joint Assessment of Requirements through a 

3-year phased approach that is expected to be fully implemented in 

time to inform DHS’s fiscal year 2021 budget request. In fiscal year 

2016, the JRC completed the first phase, which included (1) 

developing initial criteria to evaluate emerging requirements, and (2) 

evaluating and prioritizing a sample of those requirements against the 

initial criteria. Based on these results, JRC officials told us in 

September 2017 that they are working to develop assessment metrics 

for the criteria as part of the next phase. We will continue to track the 

JRC’s progress through GAO’s High Risk work to determine DHS’s 

progress to effectively operate the JRC.

• Continually make go/no go decisions to rebalance the portfolio:

the requirements policies outlining the Joint Assessment of 

Requirements process also reflected the key practices to conduct 

reviews (1) annually to make requirement scoping adjustments as 

priorities change and (2) when new investments are identified. 

However, as previously discussed, the JRC is still in the process of 

implementing this process.

We consider this overall key practice area to be partially met because 

DHS’s policies do not reflect the key practice (3) to reassess 

programs that breach established thresholds within the context of the 

portfolio to determine if the program remains relevant and affordable. 

PARM officials told us that—in practice—DHS reassesses programs 

in the context of their component’s overall acquisition portfolio based 

on a certification of funds memorandum submitted to DHS’s Chief 

Financial Officer when programs re-baseline as a result of a cost, 

schedule, or performance breach. The memorandum is intended to 

enable the Acquisition Review Board to discuss affordability by 

certifying a program’s funding levels and identifying trade-offs 

necessary to address any projected funding gaps. We previously 

found that the certification of funds memorandum was an effective tool 
Page 33 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

for DHS leadership to assess program affordability.34 However, DHS’s 

acquisition management policy requires components to submit this 

memorandum prior to most acquisition decision events, but not when 

a program re-baselines as a result of a cost, schedule, or 

performance breach.

During our review of programs’ progress against schedule and cost 

goals in 2017, we found one instance where a component did not 

follow the practice to submit this memorandum when one of its 

programs re-baselined as a result of a breach. Specifically, Customs 

and Border Protection did not submit a certification of funds 

memorandum when the Tactical Communications Modernization 

program re-baselined in November 2017 as a result of a schedule and 

cost breach. Nevertheless, DHS leadership approved the program’s 

revised APB and removed it from breach status, even though DHS’s 

Chief Financial Officer identified that the program’s revised LCCE was 

not affordable. PARM officials stated that this instance was an 

oversight because, at the time, the department was still determining 

when certification of funds memorandums should be submitted.

According to the federal standards for internal control, documentation 

of internal control practices is necessary so that they can be 

implemented effectively.35 By amending its acquisition management 

policy to require a certification when a program re-baselines as a 

result of a cost, schedule, or performance breach, DHS can ensure 

that leadership receives the necessary information to reassess that 

program’s affordability in the context of a larger portfolio. PARM 

officials stated that, moving forward, components will be required to 

submit a certification of funds memorandum for each program when a 

new APB is submitted for DHS leadership approval.

In contrast, the acquisition management policy does reflect the key 

practice (4) to use information gathered from post-implementation 

reviews to fine tune investment processes and the portfolio to achieve 

strategic outcomes. For example, DHS’s acquisition management 

policy requires programs to conduct post-implementation reviews 6 to 

18 months after initial operational capability to identify and document 

 34GAO-16-338SP.

35GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).
Page 34 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

any deployment or implementation and coordination issues, how they 

were resolved, and how they could be prevented in the future. These 

reviews are intended to help identify capability gaps that may inform 

future acquisitions, among other things.

However, PARM officials said that they do not consider the results of 

the post-implementation reviews when managing the department’s 

current acquisition portfolio because these reviews are typically 

conducted after program oversight shifts from PARM to the 

component. While post-implementation reviews are conducted later in 

the acquisition life cycle, the insights they provide could be leveraged 

by other programs in the acquisition portfolio, not just the program 

under review. For example, the Integrated Fixed Towers program 

completed a post-implementation review in June 2016 after its initial 

deployment of capabilities to the Arizona border. The review found 

that changes in illegal traffic patterns as a result of the program’s 

deployment may be predicted, and other technologies may be able to 

compensate for changes in these patterns. This information could 

help other programs under development plan for similar outcomes or 

enable DHS to change deployment plans for existing programs to 

address changes in threats.

PARM has an opportunity to use the results from programs’ postimplementation reviews since it is responsible for overseeing the 

department’s acquisition portfolio by monitoring each investment’s 

cost, schedule, and performance against established baselines. 

Federal standards for internal control state that management should 

obtain data on a timely basis so that they can be used for effective 

monitoring and that separate evaluations may provide feedback on 

the effectiveness of ongoing monitoring.36 By leveraging the results 

from post-implementation reviews in its monitoring efforts, PARM may 

be better able to ensure that programs in the current acquisition 

portfolio achieve their baselines. PARM officials stated they have 

generally focused on leveraging information gathered from canceled 

acquisition programs, such as where and why plans went wrong. 

However, they agreed that they could better leverage postimplementation review information gathered from programs that 

complete planned capability deployments.

 36GAO-14-704G. 
Page 35 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

DHS’s mission to safeguard the American people and homeland requires

a broad portfolio of acquisitions. However, the performance of DHS’s 

major acquisition portfolio during 2017 did not improve compared to our 

last review because we found that more programs will require more time 

and may require more money to complete than initially planned. DHS is 

collecting more timely cost estimate information on its acquisition 

programs to make more informed investment decisions. Yet DHS 

continues to face challenges in funding its acquisition portfolio, which 

highlights the need for disciplined policies that reflect best practices to 

ensure that the department does not pursue more programs than it can 

afford. DHS leadership has taken positive steps in recent years by 

strengthening its policies for acquisition management and resource 

allocation, and establishing policies related to requirements. Collectively, 

these policies reflect an integrated approach to managing investments. 

However, opportunities remain to further strengthen the acquisition 

management policy by documenting DHS’s current practice to reassess 

programs that breach their established cost, schedule, or performance 

thresholds to ensure they are still worth pursuing within the context of the 

portfolio. Additionally, leveraging information learned once programs 

complete deployment across the acquisition portfolio could help ensure 

that programs stay on track against their baselines in the first place. This 

is particularly relevant because DHS is initiating a number of complex and 

costly acquisition programs, such as development of a wall system along 

the southwest border and the Coast Guard’s Heavy Polar Icebreaker, 

which could benefit from this type of information.

We are making the following two recommendations to DHS:

• The Under Secretary for Management should update DHS’s 

acquisition management policy to require components to submit a 

certification of funds memorandum when a major acquisition program 

re-baselines in response to a breach. (Recommendation 1)

• The Under Secretary for Management should require PARM to 

assess the results of major acquisition programs’ post-implementation 

reviews and identify opportunities to improve performance across the 

acquisition portfolio. (Recommendation 2)

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 36 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In its 

comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DHS concurred with both of our 

recommendations and identified actions it planned to take to address 

them. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or makm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix V.

Marie A. Mak

Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 37 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

List of Committees

The Honorable Ron Johnson

Chairman

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Shelley Moore Capito

Chairman

The Honorable Jon Tester

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Michael McCaul

Chairman

The Honorable Bennie Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Carter

Chairman

The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Program Assessments

Page 38 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

This appendix presents individual assessments for each of the 28 

programs we reviewed. Each assessment presents information current as 

of January 2018. They include standard elements, such as an image, a 

program description, and summaries of the program’s progress in 

meeting cost and schedule goals, performance and testing activities, and 

program management-related issues, such as staffing. Each assessment 

also includes the following figures:

• Fiscal Years 2018–2022 Affordability. This figure compares the 

funding plan presented in the Future Years Homeland Security 

Program report to Congress for fiscal years 2018–2022 to the 

program’s current cost estimate. We use this funding plan because 

the data are approved by the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and Office of Management and Budget, and was submitted to 

Congress to inform the fiscal year 2018 budget process. The figure 

only presents acquisition funding because DHS did not report 

operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs in 

its funding plan to Congress. In addition, the data do not account for 

other potential funding sources, such as carryover.

• Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) vs. Current Estimate. This 

figure compares the program’s cost thresholds from the initial APB 

approved after DHS’s acquisition management policy went into effect 

in November 2008 and the program’s current DHS-approved APB to 

the program’s expected costs as of January 2018. The source for the 

current estimate is the most recent cost data we collected (i.e., a 

department-approved life-cycle cost estimate, updated life-cycle cost 

estimates submitted during the resource allocation process to inform 

the fiscal year 2019 budget request, or a fiscal year 2017 annual lifecycle cost estimate update).

• Schedule Changes. This figure consists of two timelines that identify 

key milestones for the program. The first timeline is based on the 

initial APB DHS leadership approved after the department’s current 

acquisition management policy went into effect. The second timeline 

identifies when the program expected to reach its major milestones as 

of January 2018 and includes milestones introduced after the 

program’s initial APB. Dates shown are based on the program’s APB 

threshold dates or updates provided by the program office.

• Test Status. This table identifies key recent and upcoming test 

events. It also includes DHS’s Director, Office of Test and 

Evaluation’s assessment of programs’ test results, if an assessment 

was conducted.

Appendix I: Program Assessments
Appendix I: Program Assessments

Page 39 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

• Staffing Profile. This figure identifies the total number of staff a 

program needs (measured in full time equivalents) including how 

many are considered critical and how many staff the program actually 

has.

Lastly, each program assessment summarizes comments provided by the 

program office and identifies whether the program provided technical

comments.
Appendix I: Program Assessments

Page 40 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
41

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

PROJECTED

FUNDING

Not included

in funding plan

02/03

Initial release 

deployed

08/13

Initial APB

approved

04/17

Program

breach

TBD

ADE 3

TBD

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 08/2013

08/10

CBP directed to halt

new development

11/16

APB

revised

06/16

Program

breach

11/16

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (08/2013) 2,039 2,412 4,451

Current APB (11/2016) 2,110 2,760 4,870

Current estimate 

(11/2016) 2,096 2,600 4,695

(may not add due to rounding)

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT (ACE)

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

The ACE program is developing software that will electronically collect and process 

information submitted by the international trade community. ACE is intended to 

provide private and public sector stakeholders access to information, enhance the 

government’s ability to determine whether cargo should be admitted into the United 

States, and increase the efficiency of operations at U.S. ports by eliminating manual 

and duplicative trade processes, and enabling faster decision making.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Program declared second cost

and schedule breach in less than 

1 year; re-baseline expected in

August 2018.

Final deployment and 

operational testing of ACE 

functionality delayed.

Program plans to identify an 

approach to address collections 

functionality in March 2018.

We last reported on this program 

in March 2018 and April 2017 

(GAO-18-271, GAO-17-346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

CBP declared a cost and schedule breach in April 2017—5 months after re-baselining 

the program in response to a prior breach—because of difficulties developing the 

collections aspect of ACE’s remaining functionality, which collects and processes 

duties owed on imported goods. CBP reported that its officials were not versed in 

the complexities of collections in the legacy system and underestimated the level of 

effort required to integrate collections capabilities into ACE. As a result, the program 

delayed final deployment of ACE functionality several times and missed the deadlines 

for completing the remaining milestones in its current acquisition program baseline 

(APB), including achieving acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 and full operational 

capability (FOC) by the revised dates of June 2017 and September 2017, respectively. 

Additional coding and testing to complete ACE development also required contract 

extensions that exceeded the current APB cost thresholds.

The program subsequently decoupled collections from ACE’s remaining functionality 

to permit deployment of the other post-release capabilities—such as liquidations and 

reconciliation—using a phased approach between September 2017 and February 

2018. In November 2017, CBP officials estimated that efforts to decouple collections 

from post-release functionality would be an additional $32 million in acquisition costs. 

CBP officials plan to cover these costs with $18 million in fiscal year 2017 carryover 

funding and by reprogramming $14 million from ACE disaster recovery funding. 

CBP is in the process of determining a path forward for collections, which is due to 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership by the end of March 2018. CBP 

then plans to update the program’s acquisition documentation, including APB and lifecycle cost estimate, by August 2018. Until then, the time frame for completing ACE’s 

remaining milestones and true cost of the program, including the cost to complete 

collections development is unknown.

The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 

to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for 

individual programs. CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $535 million in 

O&M funding over this 5-year period.
42

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Collections test

Entry summary

post-release test

Cargo release 

test

Cargo release/ 

manifest test

Export test

Final OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

08/2016

06/2015

11/2017

PLANNING IN PROGRESS

PLANNING IN PROGRESS

PLANNED 05/2018

NONE

NONE

NONE

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

205

6

211

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

7

5

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): CBP OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS

Since June 2015, the OTA has been testing ACE’s key performance parameters (KPP)

in batches as capabilities are deployed because, according to CBP officials, this 

testing approach was more feasible than testing them all at once as initially planned. 

The OTA conducted a series of operational tests that were anticipated to culminate in 

final operational test and evaluation (OT&E) after ACE completed final deployment of 

all remaining functionality, but this has been delayed because of the recent breach. 

In January 2018, CBP officials said that they expect testing for all ACE post-release 

capabilities, except collections, to be complete in May 2018. The dates for final OT&E 

will be determined once the program has identified a path forward for collections.

In June 2017, CBP officials reported meeting three of ACE’s four KPPs, including its 

KPP on availability. However, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation has not 

assessed these results. ACE did not meet its KPP for transmitting data to a separate 

tracking system because, according to CBP officials, there was confusion about which 

data ACE was required to send. CBP officials plan to reassess this KPP in March 2018 

to determine next steps.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

When DHS leadership re-baselined ACE’s cost, schedule, and performance parameters 

in 2013, the program adopted an agile software development methodology to 

accelerate software creation and increase flexibility in the development process. 

As of October 2017, the ACE program office oversees 11 agile teams that conduct 

development and O&M activities. CBP officials said they extended the program’s 

agile development contracts in 2017 to permit further development of the collections 

function. In identifying a path forward for collections, CBP officials stated there are 

three main options:

1. leave collections in the legacy system,

2. continue to pursue development and deployment in ACE, or

3. move collections to a different program altogether.

The program previously experienced a schedule breach in June 2016 because it 

delayed events to address external stakeholders’ concerns about transitioning to ACE.

According to CBP officials, CBP has signed a memorandum of understanding with each 

of the 22 partner agencies responsible for clearing or licensing cargo that provides 

access to ACE. As of February 2018, 21 of the partner agencies had transitioned to ACE 

and the program was piloting a solution for the remaining partner.

In September 2017, CBP reported that ACE continued to lack a director of testing 

and evaluation. CBP officials said they do not plan to fill this vacancy despite plans to 

conduct further testing because existing staff have successfully covered the workload 

and a large portion of testing has already been completed.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT (ACE)

CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
43

0

30

60

90

120

150

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

Not included

in funding plan

06/17

ADE 1

TBD

ADE 2A

TBD

ADE 2B - Air

AS OF 01/2018

INITIAL APB NOT YET APPROVED

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB Not yet approved

Current estimate 

(09/2017) 232 835 1,067

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

BIOMETRIC ENTRY-EXIT PROGRAM

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

The Biometric Entry-Exit Program is developing capabilities to enhance traveler 

identification upon departure from the U.S. at air, land, and sea ports of entries by 

collecting biometric data, such as fingerprints and facial recognition. The program plans 

to match this data to biometric data obtained from travelers upon their arrival into the 

U.S. to identify foreign nationals that stay in the U.S. beyond their authorized periods of 

admission and verify the identities of travelers leaving the U.S.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Program is developing

acquisition documents to

prepare for its initial baseline.

CBP completed four biometric 

pilot programs and selected a 

solution for development.

DHS has explored biometric

exit capabilities since 2009,

but was directed to expedite

implementation in March 2017.

GAO last reported on this 

program in February 2017 (GAO17-170).

COST AND SCHEDULE

In June 2017, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Under Secretary for

Management (USM) granted the Biometric Entry-Exit Program acquisition decision

event (ADE) 1 approval after CBP completed several pilot initiatives to study the

feasibility of proposed biometric exit solutions at air and land ports of entry. The

USM also authorized the program to continue testing a pilot exit solution at

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and conduct technology

demonstrations as needed, but directed the program to achieve ADE 2A prior to

deploying a solution to the 20 U.S. airports with the most international flights.

CBP officials initially planned to achieve ADE 2A approval in September 2017—the

point at which the program would establish cost, schedule, and performance goals in

a DHS-approved acquisition program baseline (APB)—and pursue separate ADE 2B

decisions to initiate development of a biometric solution for each type of port of

entry, starting with air. As of December 2017, the program had yet to conduct its

ADE 2A because CBP officials have had to resolve several issues identified by the

Joint Requirements Council that has delayed approval of the program’s operational

requirements document (ORD). In January 2018, CBP officials said the program

plans to conduct ADE 2A in February or March 2018 and is aiming for ADE 2B for the

biometric air solution in December 2018.

In December 2015, Congress established an account to be used for the

development and implementation of the biometric entry-exit system starting in

2017. Specifically, Congress provided that half the amount collected from fee

increases for certain visa applications from fiscal years 2016 through 2025—up to

$1 billion—would be available to DHS until expended. In February 2017, DHS

leadership approved the program to use about $73 million of this funding in fiscal

year 2017 for information technology investments and programmatic and

operational support, among other things. In September 2017, DHS’s Chief Financial

Officer approved the program’s life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE), which CBP expects

to refine as the program progresses to meet the fee-funding limit. According to CBP

officials, the current funding structure poses challenges because the fees will

fluctuate based on immigration rates.
44

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

TBD

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNING IN PROGRESS

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

64

14

78

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP 1

29 STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: TBD

Since 2015, CBP has conducted a series of biometric pilot programs intended to

inform the acquisition of a biometric entry-exit system that included the following

types of technologies:

• Facial and iris scanning technology at an outdoor land border crossing.

• Mobile fingerprint readers for flights departing the U.S.

• Two facial recognition matching technologies that compared a real-time photo

of a traveler to different sources—one technology compared the photo to the

traveler’s passport upon entrance to the U.S.; the other technology compared

the photo to a gallery of photos based on the outbound flight manifest during an

airline’s boarding process.

According to CBP officials, the facial recognition technology that matched photos

during an airline’s boarding process was the most viable approach and served as

the foundation for its development of the ADE 2A acquisition documents. Officials

stated a similar approach may be feasible for land border crossings, but will require

further planning.

In January 2018, CBP officials stated they were developing a test and evaluation 

master plan—which will outline the developmental and operational test approach—for 

the biometric exit air solution. DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation will need 

to review and approve this plan prior to the program’s ADE 2B.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Since 1996, several federal statutes have required development of an entry and exit

system for foreign nationals. DHS has been exploring biometric exit capabilities

since 2009 and an Executive Order issued in March 2017 directed DHS to expedite

the implementation of the biometric entry-exit system.

The Biometric Entry-Exit Program plans to develop a capability to match a traveler’s

biometric data against data contained in existing DHS biometric data repositories—

primarily the National Protection and Program Directorate’s IDENT system. DHS is in

the process of replacing and modernizing IDENT through the Homeland Advanced

Recognition Technology (HART) program because IDENT is at risk of failure.

However, HART has experienced delays, which could affect the Biometric Entry-Exit

Program’s development progress.

For the air biometric solution, CBP plans to pursue a public/private partnership in

which airlines and airports invest in the equipment to collect biometric data.

According to CBP officials, this approach could reduce program costs and improve

the passenger boarding process. In August 2017, CBP officials told GAO that several

airlines have expressed interest in partnering with the program, including one that

expanded CBP’s pilot of facial recognition matching for outbound flights to

additional gates at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.

CBP officials reported a staffing gap of 14 full time equivalent staff which the

program plans to fill once partnerships with airlines are established. 

BIOMETRIC ENTRY-EXIT PROGRAM 

CBP officials stated that authorized funds are collected from visa fee increases that expire in fiscal year 2025. Beyond 2025,

officials stated that additional funding will need to be appropriated or the fee increases extended to continue the program.

They added that fee collections are currently below forecasted levels and may come under the current $1 billion limit. CBP

officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
45

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2018) 1,548 381 1,928

Current APB (01/2018) 1,548 381 1,928

Current estimate 

(10/2017) 1,346 50 1,396

0

300

600

900

1200

1500

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

Not included

in funding plan

(may not add due to rounding)

AS OF 01/2018

03/23

01/17

Executive Order 

requiring the construction

of a border wall

03/23

Full operational

capability – RGV

AS OF 01/2018

09/19

Initial operational

capability - RGV

01/18

Initial APB 

approved – 

RGV

04/17

Approval to develop 

prototypes and

construct first segment

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

BORDER WALL SYSTEM PROGRAM

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

The border wall system is intended to prevent the illegal entry of people, drugs, and

other contraband by enhancing and adding to the 654 miles of existing barriers 

along the U.S. southwest border. CBP plans to create a border enforcement zone 

between a primary barrier—such as a fence—and a secondary barrier. To establish 

the enforcement zone, the wall system may also include detection technology, 

surveillance cameras, lighting, and roads for maintenance and patrolling.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

DHS is planning construction

of barriers in two locations, but

work is dependent on future

appropriations.

CBP has evaluated prototypes

for new barrier designs, but

risks with planned detection

technologies exist.

CBP is leveraging staff and

the contracting strategy from

prior border fencing programs.

GAO last reported on the

existing Southwest border

barriers in February 2017

(GAO-17-331).

COST AND SCHEDULE

In April 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership granted CBP

permission to procure barrier prototypes to inform new design standards and

approved the construction of the first segment of the wall system. CBP subsequently

awarded 8 task orders with a total value of over $3 million for the development of

prototypes and selected San Diego as the first segment. CBP plans to replace an

existing 14 miles of primary and secondary barriers in San Diego. DHS plans to use

fiscal year 2017 funding for the replacement of the primary barrier, which it plans to

rebuild to existing design standards. DHS has requested funding for replacement of

the secondary barrier beginning in fiscal year 2018 that it plans to rebuild to new

design standards once established. DHS leadership plans to approve acquisition

documentation—including an acquisition program baseline (APB) and a life-cycle cost

estimate (LCCE)—for each segment to determine affordability prior to authorizing

construction. However, CBP officials said they do not plan to develop an APB for the

San Diego segment because DHS already approved construction.

In January 2018, DHS leadership approved an APB establishing cost, schedule, and

performance goals for a second segment in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV), which will

extend an existing barrier by 60 miles. To inform leadership’s decision, DHS

headquarters conducted an independent cost estimate, which CBP adopted as the

program’s LCCE. The LCCE includes costs for both the San Diego and RGV segments.

However, DHS officials stated that the amounts in the LCCE are not releasable until

CBP evaluates the prototypes, determines, and designs a final solution for the San

Diego secondary barrier, and updates the LCCE—which is not expected to be complete

until June 2018.

The costs presented here are only for the RGV segment. CBP reported that

construction of the RGV segment would be sufficiently funded if it receives $1.3

billion of acquisition funding in fiscal year 2018. However, CBP identified a shortfall in

operations and maintenance (O&M) funding from fiscal years 2019 to 2022 that it 

plans to cover with existing funding from the Tactical Infrastructure program, which 

will be responsible for maintenance of the wall system as segments are complete. 

If funded, the program expects to achieve full operational capability for the RGV 

segment in March 2023.
46

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Initial OT&E – 

RGV levee 

portion

Initial OT&E – 

RGV 2.18 miles 

of barrier

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNING IN PROGRESS

PLANNING IN PROGRESS

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

18

18

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

GAP 18

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: CBP LAND SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL TEST AUTHORITY

In December 2017, CBP completed testing of 8 barrier prototypes—4 constructed

from concrete and 4 from other materials—which are intended to help refine the

requirements and identify new design standards for barriers. CBP evaluated the

prototypes in five areas: breachability, scalability, constructability, design, and

aesthetics. CBP officials said the prototype evaluation results are not expected until

February 2018.

The program plans to demonstrate its three key performance parameters related to

preventing unauthorized border crossings, resistance to thrown objects, and

maintainability through a series of test events. In December 2017, DHS’s Director,

Office of Test and Evaluation approved a test and evaluation master plan specific to 

the RGV segment, which calls for modeling and simulation during development and 

initial operational test and evaluation (OT&E) on portions of the barrier as they are 

completed.

The Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of Systems Engineering completed

a technical assessment on the program in November 2017, and identified risks

related to the integration and operation of enforcement zone technologies—

such as cameras and sensors—which had not been clearly defined or planned for

within the wall system. It made several recommendations, including that the program

coordinate with an ongoing CBP study of land domain awareness capabilities, which

DHS leadership directed CBP to conduct in October 2016 to inform a comprehensive

border plan.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The Border Wall System Program was initiated in response to an Executive Order

issued in January 2017 stating that the executive branch is to secure the southern

border through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern

border of the U.S. To expedite the acquisition planning process, CBP officials said

they leveraged expertise from staff that worked on previous border fencing

programs and were familiar with implementation challenges, such as land access.

CBP intends to prioritize segments based on threat levels, land ownership, and

geography, among other things. From fiscal years 2007 to 2015, CBP spent

approximately $2.3 billion to construct pedestrian and vehicle fencing along the

southwest border. CBP’s Tactical Infrastructure program is responsible for

sustaining this fencing and other infrastructure—such as gates, roads, and bridges—

over its lifetime.

CBP plans to continue coordinating with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

for engineering support and for awarding and oversight of construction contracts.

CBP anticipates that all contract awards issued by USACE in support of the RGV

segment will be firm fixed price. If appropriations are received, the program plans to

award construction contracts for the first portion of RGV in May 2018 and for the

secondary barrier in San Diego in August 2018.

In February 2018, CBP officials stated that staffing the program office is a challenge

because funding has not yet been received. CBP officials said that existing work for

the program is being handled by current CBP staff.

BORDER WALL SYSTEM PROGRAM

CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
47

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

2

17

0 0

8

03/12

Initial APB 

approved

10/15

Initial operational 

capability (Nogales)

12/15

APB revised

TBD

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 03/2012

12/17

Schedule

breach

09/15

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (03/2012) 288 673 961

Current APB (12/2015) 341 408 749

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 338 394 732

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

INTEGRATED FIXED TOWERS (IFT)

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

The IFT program helps the Border Patrol detect, track, identify, and classify illegal

entries in remote areas. IFT consists of fixed surveillance tower systems equipped

with ground surveillance radar, daylight and infrared cameras, and communications

systems linking the towers to command and control centers. CBP plans to deliver or

upgrade approximately 53 IFT systems across six areas of responsibility (AoR) in

Arizona: Nogales, Douglas, Sonoita, Ajo, Tucson, and Casa Grande.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Program breached its

schedule because funding

was not received to complete

deployments on time.

System acceptance test

completed in Douglas AoR

and requirements were met.

Program is adequately staffed,

but simultaneous deployments

in the future may have a

negative impact.

GAO last reported on this

program in November and April

2017 (GAO-18-119,

GAO-17-346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

In December 2017, CBP declared a schedule breach of the IFT program’s current

acquisition program baseline (APB) because the program did not receive the funding

needed to complete planned deployments on time to achieve its full operational

capability (FOC) date of September 2020. The program’s FOC date previously slipped

5 years because of delays in the initial contract award process and funding shortfalls.

CBP completed IFT deployments to the Douglas AoR in June 2017 and anticipates

completing deployments to the Sonoita AoR in December 2017, as scheduled.

However, in September 2017, CBP officials stated that they requested—but did not

receive—additional funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to

address new IFT requirements, including camera upgrades and replacement of

existing tower systems deployed under a legacy program. In January 2015, Border

Patrol requested the program prioritize replacement of the legacy systems in the

Tucson and Ajo AoRs because the technology was obsolete and more expensive to

maintain than the IFT technology planned for deployment in other AoRs. Without

additional funding, CBP officials stated that they would be unable to exercise the

contract options for the remaining AoRs on time.

In June 2017, the program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE), which is slightly

less than its current APB cost thresholds. This LCCE update includes estimated costs

for the new requirements. The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be

overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations

and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs. CBP identified $8 million in

acquisition carryover funding for fiscal year 2018 and officials anticipate receiving

$126 million in O&M funding to cover $100 million in O&M costs over the next 5

years.

The program plans to submit a revised APB to DHS leadership by June 2018.

However, the FOC date may be further delayed because of land access issues. CBP

officials told GAO that they have not yet reached an agreement with the Tohono

O’odham Nation—a sovereign Native American Nation—to access tribal lands, which

these officials said is necessary for the construction of IFTs in the Ajo and Casa

Grande AoRs.
48

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Limited User Test

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

11/2015 NONE

POSITIONS

FILLED

43

5

48

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

1

11 STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): CBP OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION

According to CBP officials, the IFT program has met all three of its key performance

parameters (KPP). These KPPs establish a minimum acceptable range for detection

and identification, and the percentage of time the system must operate as

intended.

In April 2017, the contractor deploying IFT technology completed system

acceptance testing for the Douglas AoR. These test results showed that

requirements had been met. Previously, the OTA found that IFT only met 2 of its 3

KPPs and experienced 5 operational deficiencies during a limited user test

conducted in the Nogales AoR in November 2015. However, program and Border

Patrol officials did not concur with several of the test results and reported

deficiencies with the testing. DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)

did not conduct a formal assessment of the test results because full deployment of

the IFT program had already been authorized. However, a DOT&E official who

observed the test told GAO that he had concerns with how the test data were

collected and the usefulness of test results in assessing IFT’s operational

effectiveness, suitability, cybersecurity or contribution to CBP’s mission.

Border Patrol certified IFT capabilities met operational requirements in March

2016, but added conditions including that the program seek improvements to

optimize video capability. In response, the program plans to install an upgraded

high definition camera suite starting with the Sonoita AoR. However, the program

has not received funding to complete these upgrades.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

When CBP initiated the IFT program, it decided to procure a non-developmental

system, and it required that prospective contractors demonstrate their systems prior to

CBP awarding the contract. The program awarded the contract to EFW, Inc. in February

2014, but the award was protested. GAO sustained the protest and CBP had to

reevaluate the offerors’ proposals before it again decided to award the contract to

EFW, Inc. As a result, EFW, Inc. could not initiate work at the deployment sites until

fiscal year 2015.

According to CBP officials, the number of IFT systems deployed to a single AoR is

subject to change based on assessments by the Border Patrol. DHS leadership

directed CBP to develop a comprehensive border plan in October 2016 that includes

IFT capabilities and—when preparing for the last budget cycle—the program estimated

costs for expansion to the southwest border beginning in fiscal year 2019.

In September 2017, CBP officials told GAO that they did not have any current staffing

gaps. However, CBP officials added that if the program receives full funding and

reaches an agreement with the Tohono O’odham Nation to initiate IFT deployments to

the Ajo and Casa Grande AoRs, while concurrently deploying capability to the Sonoita

and Tucson sectors, they will be short on government and contracted staff.

INTEGRATED FIXED TOWERS (IFT)

CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
49

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

29

14

27 27 27

03/08

CBP initiates 

UH-60A-L

conversions

11/14

CBP proposes

revised UH-60A-L

conversion strategy

01/18

Initial 

operational

capability

TBD

ADE 3

09/22

Full

operational

capability

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 01/2016

01/16

UH-60 APB

approved

09/22

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2016) 306 1,130 2,034

Current APB (01/2016) 306 1,130 2,034

Current estimate 

(08/2017) 440 796 1,848

Note: Life-cycle cost also includes personnel costs.

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTER (UH-60)

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

UH-60 is a medium-lift helicopter that CBP uses for law enforcement and border

security operations, air and mobility support and transport, search and rescue, and

other missions. CBP’s UH-60 fleet consists of 20 aircraft acquired from the U.S.

Army in three different models. CBP previously acquired 4 modern UH-60M aircraft

and converted 6 of its older 16 UH-60A aircraft into more capable UH-60L models.

CBP is replacing the remaining 10 UH-60A with reconfigured Army HH-60L aircraft.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Program breached its current

cost and schedule goals, but

has not yet submitted the

required notification.

CBP test agent and the

Army completed testing of

reconfigured HH-60L prototype.

CBP has initiated efforts to

acquire additional converted

HH-60L aircraft from the 

Army.

GAO last reported on

this program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

The program breached the cost and schedule goals in its acquisition program

baseline (APB) and, as of December 2017, CBP officials stated they were in the

process of developing the breach notification required under the Department of

Homeland Security’s (DHS) acquisition policy.

In its annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update, the program shifted some

operations and maintenance (O&M) costs to acquisitions to be consistent with DHS’s

new appropriation structure. For example, the program shifted costs for recurring

upgrades from O&M to acquisition because these upgrades require development

and production. As a result, the program’s updated acquisition cost estimate

exceeded the APB acquisition cost threshold, which constitutes a cost breach under

DHS’s acquisition policy. CBP officials stated that they did not initially declare a cost

breach because the program’s total LCCE was within the APB threshold.

The program also did not hold its acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 by the APB

deadline of September 2017. The ADE 3 is intended to approve the transfer of CBP’s

remaining UH-60A aircraft for reconfigured Army HH60-L aircraft based on an

evaluation of a reconfigured prototype. According to CBP officials, the program did

not complete the required acquisition documentation by the ADE 3 deadline, in part,

because DHS leadership directed CBP to develop a comprehensive border plan in

October 2016 that includes UH-60 capabilities. It is unclear when the ADE 3 will

occur because, as of December 2017, several documents were pending validation

by the Joint Requirements Council.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because

DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual

programs. In addition, CBP officials previously told GAO that UH-60 O&M is funded

through a separate, central funding account for all of CBP’s air and marine assets.

CBP officials stated that the projected acquisition funding gap in fiscal years 2019

and 2020 is primarily for replacing obsolete parts that were previously considered

O&M. According to these officials, the Army conducts an annual obsolescence study

that will help CBP identify and prioritize replacements across the UH-60 fleet based

on available funding levels.
50

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

UH-60M initial 

OT&E

UH-60L OT&E

UH-60M 

follow-on OT&E

Prototype 

acceptance 

functional flight 

check and 

additional testing

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

06/2012

03/2014

10/2017

11/2011

PENDING

NONE

NONE

NONE

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

13

3

16

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

5

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): CBP AIR AND MARINE TEST AND EVALUATION DIVISION

CBP determined that the converted UH-60L and UH-60M aircraft met all five of the

program’s key performance parameters (KPP) through operational test and

evaluation (OT&E) conducted in fiscal years 2012 and 2014. However, DHS’s

Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) did not validate these results because

UH-60 was not considered a major acquisition when the tests were conducted.

In January 2016, DHS leadership directed the program to conduct acceptance

functional flight checks—which consist of component- and system-level tests—on at

least one reconfigured HH-60L prototype prior to receiving approval to proceed with

the remaining transfers. According to CBP officials, the program’s OTA and the Army

successfully conducted the functional flight check and additional testing in October

2017. DOT&E plans to review the flight test data in support of the program’s ADE 3.

CBP does not plan to conduct formal operational test and evaluation on the

reconfigured UH-60L because, according to CBP officials, the reconfigured HH-60L

has minimal differences from the UH-60L aircraft previously tested. CBP officials also

stated that the program has been able to leverage Army test data, which reduces the

risk and testing costs associated with the program. These officials noted that CBP

pilots will perform additional inspections prior to accepting the aircraft, which is now

anticipated to occur in January 2018—up to 5 months earlier than the APB threshold

date.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

CBP previously acquired UH-60 as a part of its Strategic Air and Marine Program

(StAMP). In July 2016, DHS leadership designated UH-60 as a separate and distinct

major acquisition program.

CBP initially planned to convert all 16 of its UH-60A aircraft into UH-60L models, but

changed its strategy once it learned the Army planned to divest several HH-60L aircraft

that could more easily be converted into UH-60L aircraft for CBP missions. CBP officials

anticipated the new strategy could reduce the program’s costs by an estimated $70

million, accelerate its schedule, and result in newer aircraft since the Army’s HH-60L

airframes had fewer operating hours than CBP’s existing UH-60A aircraft. In September

2017, CBP officials told GAO they had initiated efforts to acquire additional HH-60L

aircraft by conducting a study of current capability gaps and drafting a mission need

statement.

As of September 2017, program officials confirmed that they maintain a consolidated

program office where the same staff from StAMP continue to support all remaining

acquisitions, including the UH-60. However, these officials stated that they plan to 

realign staff to a dedicated asset over time. Program officials also stated that the

program has hired a dedicated cost estimator and would like to hire additional staff to

focus on procuring spare parts and common component issues, such as radio

replacements, for CBP’s air and marine assets.

MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTER (UH-60)

CBP officials reiterated that the changes in acquisition costs were primarily a result of cost realignment and that the

program’s total life-cycle cost is still within the initial APB LCCE goals. CBP officials also stated that—to supplement Army test

data—the program’s OTA participated in the flight tests and will provide a formal report on the results.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
51

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

58 56

64 64

61

09/08

Acquisition 

decision

event 2A

06/11

Initial

operational

capability

09/17

Procurement

approval for

MEA 17

12/18

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 01/2016

01/16

MEA APB

approved

12/18

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2016) 365 1,151 1,516

Current APB (01/2016) 365 1,151 1,516

Current estimate 

(09/2017) 1,102 2,378 3,480

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

MULTI-ROLE ENFORCEMENT AIRCRAFT (MEA)

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

MEA are fixed-wing, multi-engine aircraft that can be configured to perform

multiple missions including maritime, air, and land interdiction, as well as signals

detection to support law enforcement. The current MEA configuration is equipped

with marine search radar and an electro-optical/infrared sensor to support

maritime and land surveillance and airborne tracking missions. MEA will replace

CBP’s fleet of aging C-12, PA-42, and BE-20 aircraft. 

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

On track for MEA 1-16; received

approval for MEA 17; pursuing

total of 38.

Testing of new configuration

planned for May 2018, but

requirements not yet defined.

Began retrofitting accepted

MEA with new mission system

in fiscal year 2017.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017 (GAO-17-

346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

According to CBP officials, the program is on track to meet the cost and schedule

goals in its current acquisition program baseline (APB) for 16 maritime interdiction

MEA and is actively pursuing additional aircraft.

In April 2016, CBP developed a report that identified capability needs in three

mission areas and proposed increasing the program’s total to 38 aircraft by adding

13 air and 6 land interdiction MEA, and 3 signals detection MEA. The Joint

Requirements Council endorsed CBP’s findings, but recommended CBP develop a

number of requirements documents—including an operational requirements

document—to fully validate the findings. As of September 2017, CBP officials told

GAO they were in the process of updating these documents to focus on air

interdiction capabilities—the next MEA configuration. These officials stated that

completing these documents has been delayed, in part, because Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) leadership directed CBP to develop a comprehensive

border plan in October 2016 that includes MEA capabilities.

Despite not yet completing all the updated documents, DHS leadership approved

CBP’s request to procure MEA 17 in September 2017 after the congressional

conferees agreed to an additional aircraft beyond DHS’s budget request. CBP

anticipates delivery of MEA 17 by September 2018, which is within the program’s full

operational capability (FOC) date. However, if the program receives approval to

acquire additional aircraft, the FOC date will be extended.

The program completed an annual life-cycle cost estimate update, which exceeds the

program’s current APB cost thresholds, because it reflects costs for all 38 aircraft,

among other reasons. The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be

overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations

and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs. In addition, CBP officials

previously told GAO that MEA’s O&M is funded through a separate, central funding

account for all of CBP’s air and marine assets. In September 2017, CBP officials said

that the program was fully funded for 17 aircraft but had some affordability

challenges with spare parts, which they are working with CBP and DHS headquarters

to address.
52

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

Initial 

operational test 

and evaluation

Operational 

assessment and 

validation

Air interdiction 

follow-on test

and evaluation

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

05/2013

07/2015

PLANNED 05/2018

POSITIONS

FILLED

13

3

16

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

5

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): CBP AIR AND MARINE TEST AND EVALUATION DIVISION

The MEA program has met all five of its key performance parameters (KPP) for the

maritime interdiction configuration and plans to establish additional KPPs for future

MEA configurations.

CBP is replacing the mission system processor on the MEA with a system used by the

U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard that is intended to enhance operator interface and

sensor management, as well as replace obsolete equipment. CBP’s OTA tested a

prototype of the processor during an operational assessment in July 2015. The OTA

found that the MEA had resolved issues found during prior testing, but also made 29

additional recommendations and findings to improve the aircraft and new mission

system’s effectiveness. DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)

concurred with the OTA’s findings.

The program plans to begin testing MEA air interdiction capabilities in May 2018.

According to CBP officials, the only difference between the maritime and air

interdiction configurations is the radar software. The program initially planned to

modify and test the new configuration prior to delivery, but CBP officials stated they

now plan to do so after delivery to reduce risk by allowing more time for development

of the air-to-air radar software. DHS’s DOT&E plans to review the test plan for the air

interdiction configuration. However, completing development before finalizing KPPs

for the new configuration increases the risk that the aircraft will not meet operator’s

requirements.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

CBP previously acquired MEA as a part of its Strategic Air and Marine Program

(StAMP). In July 2016, DHS leadership designated MEA as a separate and distinct

major acquisition program.

CBP initially planned to procure 50 MEA and awarded the first production contract in

September 2009. However, the aircraft did not perform well during testing. In October

2014, DHS leadership said CBP could not procure or accept transfer of additional MEA

without approval. CBP procured 12 aircraft under the initial contract and—with DHS

approval—CBP awarded a new indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract in

September 2016 for 1 base year and four 1-year options to support procurement of

additional aircraft. In December 2017, CBP officials said the program had received 12

aircraft and awarded contracts for 5 more. According to program officials, MEA 13-16

will be delivered with the new mission system and CBP began retrofitting previously

delivered aircraft in fiscal year 2017.

As of September 2017, program officials confirmed that they maintain a consolidated

program office where the same staff from StAMP continue to support all remaining

acquisitions, including MEA. However, these officials stated that they plan to re-align

staff to a dedicated asset over time. Program officials also stated that the program has

hired a dedicated cost estimator and would like to hire additional staff to focus on

procuring spare parts and common component issues, such as radio replacements, for

CBP’s air and marine assets.

MULTI-ROLE ENFORCEMENT AIRCRAFT (MEA)

CBP officials stated that delays in receiving approval of the program’s requirements documents may pose a risk to exercising

options for additional MEA on an existing contract, which could stop production and increase contract costs associated with

procuring future aircraft. CBP officials added that air and marine requirements officers continue to produce documentation

requested by the Joint Requirements Council to provide sufficient context for the mission need and border security. CBP

officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
53

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

27

109

68 68 68

09/02

Initial

operational

capability

02/08

Critical

design

review

09/24

Full

operational

capability

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 01/2016

01/16

Initial APB

approved

09/24

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2016) 1,896 2,616 4,512

Current APB (01/2016) 1,896 2,616 4,512

Current estimate 

(04/2017) 1,601 2,487 4,088

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION (NII) SYSTEMS PROGRAM

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

The NII Systems Program supports CBP’s interdiction of weapons of mass

destruction, contraband such as narcotics, and illegal aliens being smuggled into the

United States, while facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce. CBP officers use

large- and small-scale NII systems at air, sea, and land ports of entry; border

checkpoints; and international mail facilities to examine the contents of containers,

railcars, vehicles, baggage, and mail.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Life-cycle costs continue to

decrease, but estimate is 9

years short of end date.

CBP initiated efforts for 

future NII requirements and 

procurements.

66 percent staffing gap 

contributed to delays in NII 

deployments.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017 

(GAO-17-346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

The NII Systems Program is on track to meet its approved schedule and cost goals.

The estimates in the program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update

continued to decrease overall compared to its approved acquisition program

baseline (APB) cost thresholds. Specifically, compared to the prior year’s estimate,

the program’s acquisition costs decreased by $96 million and operations and

maintenance (O&M) costs increased by $22 million. However, the LCCE update only

estimated costs through fiscal year 2026—9 years short of the program’s final year.

The LCCE primarily decreased because of a reduction of 1,977 planned additional

and replacement NII systems. CBP officials said fewer large- and small-scale systems

are needed because

• some systems have longer estimated lives than expected, and

• systems procured have better capability.

CBP officials do not anticipate that the reduction in quantities will have an adverse

effect on operations because they stated that the new systems can provide dual

purpose capabilities (i.e., one system can replace multiple separate systems).

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated

because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for

individual programs. CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $605 million of

O&M funding over this 5-year period to cover about $626 million in estimated O&M

costs, which includes $100 million to operate and maintain radiation detection

equipment acquired by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. These officials also

identified $37 million in carryover funding to cover the remaining $21 million of

O&M estimated costs.

However, the program is projected to have a $266 million acquisition funding gap

from fiscal years 2018 to 2022.The program has a plan to address funding shortfalls

but, according to CBP officials, it has not yet needed to implement the strategies in

this plan because of several factors, including cost reductions achieved through

combined life-cycle contracts and lower-than-expected actual technology costs in

fiscal year 2016.
54

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

None

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

NOT APPLICABLE

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

12 23

35

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

3 2

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: NOT APPLICABLE

According to CBP officials, the program continues to meet all 18 of its key

performance parameters (KPP). However, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and

Evaluation has not independently validated CBP’s assertion that it has met its KPPs.

NII systems are commercial-off-the-shelf products, and for this reason, DHS

leadership decided that the NII Systems Program does not need a test and evaluation

master plan. However, the program continues to test NII systems to inform future

acquisitions. For example, in calendar years 2017 and 2018, CBP officials told us

they plan to conduct demonstrations and testing activities on the following type of

technology:

• Two NII systems—one mobile, one fixed—that are designed to examine moving

vehicles for contraband.

• Mobile systems that use high dose X-ray imaging to inspect stationary cargo

vehicles at ports-of-entry.

• Multi-energy portals that use different levels of X-ray imaging to inspect cargo

trucks as they are driven through the inspection portals—low dose X-ray to inspect

the truck cab and high dose X-ray to inspect the cargo trailer.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

In March 2017, the Joint Requirements Council validated a capability analysis report

that assessed current capability gaps in NII operations to assist with identifying

potential upgrades to existing systems and developing requirements for future

systems. According to program officials, CBP plans to review and update, as

necessary, the mission need statement in fiscal year 2018. Additionally, program

officials are preparing a consolidated acquisition plan for future procurements. These

officials said CBP has not yet determined whether future procurements would be

included into the current NII Systems Program of record or constitute a new

acquisition program.

CBP’s ability to successfully execute the existing NII Systems Program and plan for

future efforts may be at risk because of understaffing. As of January 2018, the NII

Systems Program continued to face a staffing gap of approximately 66 percent,

including critical vacancies such as the acquisition program manager and a logistics

program manager. Officials also noted that a lack of adequate personnel to procure,

test, and deploy NII systems forces the program to prioritize its acquisitions, which can

result in delays of NII deployments and testing efforts. For example, one manufacturer

increased its output rate of NII systems, but the program did not have the staff to

accept the systems at the increased rate. Officials anticipate the program may remain

understaffed until CBP completes a reorganization that started more than a year ago,

in which acquisition programs are realigned from a mission-support office to their

operational entity.

NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION (NII) SYSTEMS PROGRAM

CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
55

0

50

100

150

200

250

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

Not included

in funding plan

12/15

Initial operational 

capability for Arizona

TBD

ADE 2A for

Level 1 

expansion

TBD

FOC for

Level 1 

expansion

AS OF 01/2018

04/16

Program 

elevated 

to Level 1

12/16

Full operational 

capability (FOC) 

for Arizona

INITIAL APB NOT YET APPROVED

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB Not yet approved

Current estimate 

(09/2017) 1,470 2,500 3,970

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

REMOTE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (RVSS)

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

The RVSS program helps the Border Patrol detect, track, identify and classify illegal

entries across U.S borders. RVSS consists of daylight and infrared video cameras

mounted on fixed towers and buildings with communications systems that link to

command and control centers. From 1995 to 2005, CBP deployed approximately 310

RVSS towers along the U.S. northern and southern borders, and initiated efforts to

upgrade legacy RVSS towers in Arizona in 2011.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Program elevated to a level 1

acquisition program with a lifecycle cost of nearly $4 billion.

Program does not plan to

conduct additional

operational testing on future

deployments.

Once funded, program plans

to award a new contract for

deployments in sectors along

the southwest border.

GAO last reported on this

program in November 2017

(GAO-18-119).

COST AND SCHEDULE

In April 2016, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership elevated RVSS

from a level 3 program—which focused on upgrading legacy RVSS in Arizona—to a

level 1 program after approving CBP’s plan to expand deployments to the Rio Grande

Valley (RGV) sector and adding an additional 6 sectors along the southwest border. At

this time, DHS leadership approved the program to move forward with deployments to

two RGV stations, which can be completed as options under the program’s existing

contract. However, the program was required to re-baseline to account for its

expanded scope and conduct an acquisition decision event (ADE) to obtain approval

for additional deployments.

As of January 2018, the program had not yet conducted its ADE or obtained DHS

approval for an acquisition program baseline (APB) that established cost, schedule,

and performance goals for the expanded program. In September 2017, CBP officials

told us that they had drafted the APB and other required documentation, such as a

life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE), but were unsure when the ADE would occur because

the program had not received funding for the additional deployments. In addition, the

ADE may have been delayed because DHS leadership directed CBP to develop a

comprehensive border plan in October 2016 that includes RVSS capabilities.

In September 2017, DHS leadership approved the RVSS’s revised LCCE which totaled

nearly $4 billion for all program costs from fiscal years 2011 through 2042, including

expansion along the southwest border and new initiatives such as a pilot for

relocatable RVSS towers. DHS conducted an independent cost estimate for the

program, which DHS cost estimating officials stated was within 2 percent of the

program’s LCCE.

RVSS was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 to 

2022 because it had not yet been elevated to a level 1 program at the time the plan 

was developed. CBP officials stated that the program has received acquisition funding 

to cover the approved RGV deployments. However, CBP officials told GAO that the

program may also assume responsibility for maintaining all legacy RVSS, but has not

received adequate operations and maintenance funding to do so.
56

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Limited User Test

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

08/2015 NONE

POSITIONS

FILLED

25.9

20

45.9

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP 1

7

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): CBP OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION

According to CBP officials, RVSS towers deployed in Arizona met the program’s three

key performance parameters (KPP), which establish a minimum acceptable range for

detection and identification, and the percentage of time the system must be

available to operators. CBP officials said these KPPs will apply to future RVSS

deployments, but that the program does not plan to conduct additional testing unless

major technology changes are required.

In August 2015, the program’s OTA conducted a limited user test on upgraded

equipment deployed in Arizona and found RVSS to be operationally effective but not

operationally suitable. The OTA noted several major deficiencies, including issues

related to the cameras, video signals, and geographic coordinates—some of which

resulted in the program failing its availability KPP. DHS’s Director, Office of Test and

Evaluation did not assess the results of this test because the program was a level 3

acquisition at the time of testing. In January 2018, CBP officials told GAO that they

have worked with the RVSS contractor to address a majority of the deficiencies

identified during testing and continue to monitor those that remain. They also noted

that the program subsequently met its availability KPP.

CBP officials said the RVSS program initiated a pilot of relocatable RVSS towers in

the RGV sector. The program plans to assess the results of the pilot by March 2018.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

In July 2013, CBP awarded a firm fixed-price contract for a commercially available,

non-developmental system. This contract covered the program’s initial scope to

deploy upgraded RVSS in Arizona and two stations within the RGV sector, which can

be completed as options. According to CBP officials, the program will need to award a

new contract to cover expansion to the remaining six sectors along the southwest

border. In September 2017, CBP officials said that the request for proposals for the

new contract had been drafted but it cannot be released until the program receives

funding.

CBP officials told GAO that RVSS is coordinating with CBP’s Border Wall System

Program on some planned deployments within the RGV sector. For example, CBP is

considering moving 2 of the planned RVSS towers to be co-located with the planned

barrier, which officials stated may provide better surveillance. If the Border Wall

System Program does not receive funding, CBP officials said the towers will be placed

in the originally planned locations.

CBP officials stated that the RVSS program requires additional staff for contracting

activities, maintenance activities for legacy RVSS, and for relocatable tower pilot

deployments. To mitigate the staffing gap, CBP officials said they prioritize

responsibilities of current personnel to meet program execution needs.

REMOTE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (RVSS)

CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
57

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

Not included

in funding plan

09/10

Awarded last

contract to

initiate upgrades

07/17

Program

breach

07/11

Initial 

operational

capability

03/19

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 01/2016

01/16

Initial APB

approved

11/17

APB

revised

12/17

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2016) 397 489 1,084

Current APB (11/2017) 399 599 1,233

Current estimate 

(11/2017) 400 539 1,145

Note: Life-cycle cost also includes personnel costs.

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS (TACCOM) MODERNIZATION

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

The TACCOM program is intended to upgrade land mobile radio infrastructure and

equipment to support approximately 95,000 users at CBP and other federal agencies.

It is replacing obsolete radio systems with modern digital systems across various

sectors located in 19 different service areas, linking these service areas to one another

through a nationwide network, and building new communications towers to expand

coverage in 5 of the 19 service areas.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Program re-baselined in

November 2017 after declaring

cost and schedule breach, but

faces affordability shortfalls.

Issues related to security

requirements have delayed

full operational capability by

more than a year.

Program is being re-organized

under Border Patrol, but still

faces staffing challenges.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership re-baselined

the TACCOM program, removing it from breach status after the program experienced

a schedule slip and cost growth. In July 2017, CBP officials notified DHS leadership

that the program would not achieve full operational capability (FOC) as planned due

to issues related to federal information security requirements. The program now plans

to achieve FOC by March 2019—more than a year later than its initial acquisition

program baseline (APB) deadline. According to CBP officials, FOC will include planned

upgrades to the San Diego system, which requires transitioning management of the

legacy system from the Department of Justice to DHS. In August 2017, CBP officials

stated that both agencies were reviewing an agreement with plans to complete the

transition in fiscal year 2018.

CBP officials stated that the program realized it would exceed its initial APB cost

thresholds as it was developing its annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update and

subsequently submitted a revised LCCE for DHS leadership approval. The program’s

costs primarily grew because of increases in costs for contractor labor and support for

facilities and infrastructure. CBP officials said the program’s initial estimates were

immature; however, DHS leadership approved the initial LCCE in December 2015—4

years after the program began sustaining capabilities.

DHS’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) approved the program’s revised LCCE in

November 2017, but noted that the program’s estimate exceeded its available

funding and requested that the program address the affordability gap before it was

re-baselined. CBP officials said that they are conducting an affordability analysis,

which they anticipate will be completed by March 2018. Nevertheless, DHS

leadership approved the program’s re-baseline in November 2017. CBP officials

subsequently identified errors in the approved APB cost threshold tables and provided

revised amounts, which are presented here.

The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018

to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for

individual programs. CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $120 million in

O&M funding over this 5-year period.
58

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

OA

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

Limited User Test 12/2013

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

06/2016 NONE

POSITIONS

FILLED

58

11

69

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

11

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): CBP OPERATIONAL EVALUATION BRANCH

In August 2017, CBP officials told GAO that the TACCOM program continued to meet

its two key performance parameters, which measure coverage area and the

percentage of time the systems are available. In May 2014, the DHS Director, Office

of Test and Evaluation determined that the TACCOM systems were operationally

effective, but test data were insufficient to determine operational suitability. The

program’s OTA subsequently found that the TACCOM systems were operationally

effective and suitable based on the results of an operational assessment (OA)

completed in June 2016.

In July 2017, an analysis of the program’s operations showed that the program was

meeting mission needs, but technical issues and vulnerabilities could cause

schedule delays. That same month, the program declared a schedule breach

because of issues related to federal information security requirements. The TACCOM

program first identified these issues in February 2016, but efforts to address them

within the established APB schedule were unsuccessful. CBP officials said that, since

the program’s inception, they have held weekly and quarterly meetings with the

vendor to identify and address any issues and that they anticipate the vendor will

address all remaining issues by March 2018. They added that both the vendor and

CBP will conduct security scanning and acceptance testing after deployment to each

sector; however, the program does not have plans for future operational testing.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

CBP officials told GAO that in January 2018, the program will move from a mission 

support office to a joint program office under Border Patrol as a part of CBP’s

reorganization that started more than a year ago. The goal of this move is to make CBP

land mobile radio capabilities seamless by combining the mission critical voice

functions of Air and Marine Operations, the Border Patrol, and the Office of Field

Operations—the TACCOM program’s primary customers—under one organizational

leader, the Border Patrol Chief.

CBP officials anticipate that the current TACCOM program structure will remain in place

after this move with the exception of the program’s engineers, which will move to

CBP’s Office of Information and Technology but be assigned to support TACCOM full

time. In August 2017, CBP officials told GAO they were in the process of hiring staff to

fill the program’s vacant positions. They added that the fiscal year 2019 budget

contains plans for additional infrastructure enhancements, which will require technical

staff to assist in the planning and execution of these efforts and may put additional

strain on the program’s limited government technical staff. They noted that the hiring

and retention of qualified land mobile radio engineers and information technology

technical staff is a challenge because of competition with the private sector, among

other factors.

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS (TACCOM) MODERNIZATION

In addition to maintenance of the CBP Land Mobile Radio System that provides critical communication needs for CBP agents

and officers protecting U.S. borders, CBP officials stated the TACCOM program is providing infrastructure, such as building an

engineering lab to facilitate design, development, test, and evaluation activities, to support improvements in CBP’s current and

future Land Mobile Radio Systems. CBP officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO

incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
59

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

Not included

in funding plan

11/10

Initial APB

approved

08/14

Initial

operational

capability

12/16

Operational 

capability at 

primary data center

07/17

ADE 3

03/18

Operational capability

at secondary data

center/FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 11/2010

07/16

APB

version 4

approved

12/15

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (11/2010) 220 466 685

Current APB (07/2016) 235 457 693

Current estimate 

(07/2017) 227 438 665

(may not add due to rounding)

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

TECS MODERNIZATION

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

TECS (not an acronym) is a law-enforcement information system that has been in

place since the 1980s and helps CBP officials determine the admissibility of

persons entering the United States at border crossings, ports of entry, and 

prescreening sites located abroad. CBP initiated efforts to modernize TECS to provide

users with enhanced capabilities for accessing and managing data. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement has a separate TECS Modernization program.

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

Full operational capability

delayed 9 months and current

cost estimate incomplete.

System operationally

effective and suitable, but

cybersecurity testing needed.

CBP working to address and

prevent major system outages.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017 

(GAO-17-346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

In July 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership granted the program 

acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 approval, but required CBP to conduct follow-on 

operational test and evaluation (OT&E) before declaring full operational capability 

(FOC). This is more than a 2-year delay from CBP’s initial FOC date and a 9-month 

delay from its most recent revised FOC date. DHS approved the fourth version of the 

program’s acquisition program baseline (APB) in July 2016. In this APB, CBP split FOC 

into two separate operational capability milestones at its data centers to better reflect 

the program’s activities. 

• CBP delivered operational capability at the primary data center in December

2016, which included transitioning all TECS users to the modernized system.

• CBP delivered operational capability at the secondary data center in June 2017—

as scheduled—which provides redundant TECS access to minimize downtime

during system maintenance or unscheduled outages. However, not all test results

were available in time for the program’s ADE 3 decision, which contributed to DHS

leadership’s decision to delay declaring FOC.

The program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for ADE 3, which is within its 

current APB cost thresholds. However, the LCCE only included costs through fiscal year 

2021—7 years short of DHS’s guidance that states program cost estimates should 

cover at least 10 years from the FOC date. Nevertheless, DHS granted the program ADE 

3 approval without an understanding of the program’s full life-cycle costs, as required 

by its acquisition policy. CBP officials plan to update the LCCE by the end of calendar 

year 2018 to include costs for future years and other items, such as costs associated 

with follow-on OT&E and moving the data centers to a cloud environment—a CBP-wide 

initiative.

The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 

to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for 

individual programs. CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $205 million 

in O&M funding over the next 4 years and have identified carryover for each year. 

However, CBP officials said there may be a small funding gap starting in fiscal year 

2020, but they expect to achieve savings by migrating the data centers to a cloud 

environment.
60

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

Consolidated 

secondary 

inspection system 

increment 1 OT&E

Secondary 

inspection land 

OT&E

OT&E

Follow-on OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

11/2012

06/2017

07/2010

PLANNED COMPLETION 02/2018

POSITIONS

FILLED

40.9

3

43.9

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

4.3

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): CBP OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS

In June 2017, the OTA completed a series of operational tests that included three

test events—one event each at a land border crossing, a seaport, and an airport—and

a fourth test event to verify final integration of the system’s hardware at both the

primary and secondary data centers.

In July 2017, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) determined that

the modernized TECS system was operationally effective and operationally suitable,

but that the tests were not adequate to assess operational cybersecurity. The test

results validated that the program had met all eight of its key performance

parameters (KPP), but the test team identified several deficiencies related to mission

support and CBP users identified operational considerations for system or process

improvements. DOT&E recommended that CBP conduct a threat assessment, threatbased cybersecurity operational testing, and follow-on OT&E to reassess known

deficiencies and user operational considerations. In August 2017, DHS leadership

directed CBP to complete these actions by the end of February 2018.

In January 2018, CBP officials stated that they continue to work with the OTA to

address the deficiencies and develop a plan for follow-on OT&E. They noted that

completion of this plan is dependent on the scope for cybersecurity testing and they

are working with DOT&E to define the scope since the requirements have been

evolving. CBP officials also stated that they monitor the program’s KPPs monthly and

plan to conduct monthly tests and quarterly maintenance checks to ensure

operational functionality is maintained at both data centers.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Since the program has completed development, CBP is focused on ensuring that the

modernized TECS system works as intended by addressing operational issues as they

are identified. For example, on January 2, 2017, a primary TECS Modernization

application experienced a major outage that resulted in long airport delays. In August

2017, CBP officials said they continually monitor system health through a 24/7

operations center and have established a group dedicated to addressing the issues

related to the January 2, 2017, outage.

In September 2017, DHS’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that nearly 100

outages, periods of latency, or degraded service were reported for three TECS

Modernization applications between June 2016 and March 2017. The OIG also found

that CBP’s monthly reports on TECS system availability did not include periods of

slowness or service interruptions that were caused by external factors. For example,

the January 2, 2017, incident was identified in CBP outage reports, but was not

captured in the monthly report because it was caused by a change to an external feed

to the TECS system. CBP officials clarified that the monthly reports only account for

interruptions that result in a full loss of operations for all TECS system users. The OIG

recommended that CBP develop a plan to address factors that contributed to

challenges regarding availability of primary traveler screening applications, among

other things. CBP concurred with the recommendations.

On January 1, 2018, the TECS system experienced another major outage that caused

long airport delays; CBP officials said this incident is under review.

TECS MODERNIZATION

CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
61

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

PROJECTED

FUNDING

Not included

in funding plan

08/09

Program

initiated

12/15

Initial APB

approved

03/19

ADE 3

06/19

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 12/2015

01/13

Initial

operational

capability

11/17

APB

revised

09/17

Schedule

breach

12/18

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (12/2015) 288 526 814

Current APB (11/2017) 288 526 814

Current estimate 

(03/2017) 287 445 732

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 

(LSCMS)

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

LSCMS is a computer-based tracking system that FEMA officials use to track

shipments during disaster-response efforts. It is largely based on commercial-off-theshelf software. FEMA initially deployed LSCMS in 2005, and initiated efforts to

enhance the system in 2009. According to FEMA officials, LSCMS can identify when

a shipment leaves a warehouse and the location of a shipment after it reaches a

FEMA staging area near a disaster location.

Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Program breached its schedule

because of 2017 hurricane

response efforts.

FEMA now anticipates reaching

full operational capability by

June 2019, up to 6 months late.

Recent testing shows progress,

but additional operational

testing delayed to May 2018.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).

COST AND SCHEDULE

In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved a

revised acquisition program baseline (APB) after the LSCMS program experienced a

schedule breach. In September 2017, FEMA officials notified DHS leadership that it

would not complete all required activities—including follow-on operational test and

evaluation (OT&E)—to achieve acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 and full operational

capability (FOC) by its initial APB dates of September 2018 and December 2018,

respectively. According to FEMA officials, the delay was primarily caused by the need

to deploy LSCMS program personnel in support of response and recovery efforts

during the 2017 hurricane season. The program now plans to achieve FOC by June 

2019—up to 6 months later than initially planned.

DHS leadership authorized LSCMS to resume all development and acquisition efforts

in March 2016 after a nearly 2-year program pause following program management

issues. In October 2017, FEMA officials told GAO that they had completed several

development efforts—such as integration with DHS’s asset management system—and

were in the process of adding Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to allow LSCMS to

interface with its partners’ information systems.

The program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update continued to be within

its APB cost thresholds. However, the program’s APB thresholds are not adjusted to

account for risk, which increases the chance that the program could experience a

cost breach. As of November 2017, FEMA officials did not anticipate that its schedule

delays would lead to a cost breach.

The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years

2018 to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M)

funding for individual programs. FEMA officials anticipate receiving approximately

$157 million in O&M funding to cover the program’s estimated $129 million in O&M

costs over this 5-year period, which may result in a surplus of $28 million. However,

these officials noted that they will revisit the program’s LCCE
62

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

Initial OT&E 

OA

Follow-on OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

06/2014

12/2017

PLANNED 05/2018

NONE

POSITIONS

FILLED

28.2

3

31.2

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

1

9

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): GARUD TECHNOLOGY SERVICES

According to FEMA officials, LSCMS previously demonstrated it could meet all seven

of its key performance parameters (KPP) through either operational or developmental 

testing. However, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) determined 

in June 2014 that the prior operational test was inadequate and recommended that 

FEMA select a new OTA and retest LSCMS. DOT&E subsequently approved a new OTA 

and testing approach for the program that included plans for evaluating unresolved 

issues from previous testing along with new capabilities and cybersecurity.

FEMA officials reported that LSCMS successfully demonstrated two of its seven KPPs 

during an operational assessment (OA) conducted by its new OTA in July 2017. The 

OTA found that the KPP related to the system’s ability to handle a certain number of 

simultaneous users had not been observed during the assessment and would require 

a model and simulation test. The OTA extended its OA to December 2017 to collect 

actual operational data during the 2017 hurricane response effort. In January 2018, 

FEMA officials subsequently reported that LSCMS successfully demonstrated the

remaining five KPPs including the ability to support at least 200 simultaneous users

during performance testing.

All seven of the KPPs will be assessed as part of follow-on OT&E, which has been

delayed from January 2018 as a part of the schedule breach. FEMA officials reported

that they now plan to complete follow-on OT&E by May 2018, once the addition of

EDI is complete.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The LSCMS program previously experienced significant execution challenges because

of poor governance. FEMA initially deployed the enhanced LSCMS in 2013 without

DHS leadership approval, a DOT&E letter of assessment, or a DHS-approved APB

documenting the program’s costs, schedule, and performance parameters, as

required by DHS’s acquisition policy. DHS’s Office of Inspector General also found that

neither DHS nor FEMA leadership ensured the program office identified all mission

needs before selecting a solution. In response, DHS leadership paused all LSCMS

development efforts in April 2014 until the program addressed these issues, among

others. FEMA subsequently completed an analysis of alternatives and developed an

APB based on this assessment. DHS leadership approved the APB in December 2015

and authorized FEMA to resume all LSCMS development and acquisition efforts in

March 2016.

In October 2017, FEMA officials told GAO that the LSCMS program had minimal

staffing shortages and was working to recruit additional staff. Officials previously

attributed the program’s governance and testing challenges, in part, to staffing

shortages and we previously found that it only had 7 of the 22.5 full time equivalents

it needed in fiscal year 2014. Although the program has obtained more staff since

then, FEMA officials noted in October 2017 that during disasters—such as 2017

hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria—LSCMS program personnel are deployed to

support response and recovery efforts, which leave program positions vacant for the

duration of the deployment.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (LSCMS)

FEMA officials stated that during the response to hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria in 2017, LSCMS processed supply

chain transactions that exceeded the total number of transactions from the preceding 12 years—which includes the

response to Hurricane Katrina. They added that the program provided support for nearly 130 million meals in 2017

compared to a total of approximately 84 million from the 12 previous years. FEMA officials also provided technical

comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
63

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

0

20

0 0 0

10/11

Initial APB

approved

06/16

IOC

08/17

FOC

03/18

ADE 3

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 10/2011

06/14

APB

revised

02/16

Schedule

breach

12/17

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (10/2011) 311 507 818

Current APB (11/2017) 225 307 532

Current estimate 

(11/2017) 223 275 498

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

TECS MODERNIZATION

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE)

Since the 1980s, TECS (not an acronym) has provided case management,

intelligence reporting, and information sharing capabilities to support ICE’s mission to

investigate and enforce border control, customs, and immigration laws. ICE initiated

efforts to modernize TECS in 2009 to replace aging functionality and provide end

users with additional functionality to meet mission needs. Customs and Border

Protection (CBP) executes a separate TECS Modernization program. 

Source: Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Completed final deployment

ahead of schedule; costs

increased to account for

additional years and support.

Conducted additional testing

of a revised key performance

parameter and cybersecurity.

Program has improved

integration with external

systems.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved a

revised life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) and acquisition program baseline (APB) in

preparation for the program’s acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 following deployment

of final functionality. According to ICE officials, the program completed deployment of

full operational capability (FOC) functionality in August 2017—4 months earlier than

initially planned. FOC functionality included enhancements to case management

capabilities, such as improved system search capabilities. The functionality was

deployed in conjunction with enhancements and fixes for initial operational capability

(IOC) functionality. The program achieved IOC in June 2016, which entailed delivering

80 percent of the modernized TECS functionality and successfully transitioning ICE off

the legacy system.

The overall cost thresholds in the current APB increased compared to the program’s

prior APB from July 2016. Specifically, the acquisition cost threshold decreased by

$14 million and the operations and maintenance (O&M) cost threshold increased

by $147 million. These costs changed for various reasons, such as the following:

• The acquisition cost threshold decreased when ICE included actual costs

through fiscal year 2016 and accounted for funding shortfalls. ICE officials

told GAO that the program experienced a funding shortfall in fiscal year 2017

that led it to adjust spending under multiple contracts and shift some costs to

fiscal year 2018.

• The O&M cost threshold increased when ICE extended the estimate from fiscal

years 2024 to 2028 and continued contractor and systems engineering

support for an additional 11 years.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because

DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual

programs. ICE officials anticipate receiving approximately $94 million in O&M funding

to cover an estimated $105 million in O&M costs over this 5-year period. ICE officials

said that they are pursuing strategies to reduce future O&M costs, such as awarding

a competitive contract in March 2018 for O&M activities and any future

enhancements.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
64

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

Operational

assessment

Initial OT&E 

Follow-on OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

05/2016

10/2016

09/2017 PENDING

POSITIONS

FILLED

41.8

41.8

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

4.3

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS SPECIAL AGENT

In July 2017, the program revised one of its three key performance parameters

(KPP)—the KPP related to the number of concurrent users—to better reflect realistic

conditions. The KPP was revised to state that the system shall have the ability to

support 5,000–10,000 active users on a monthly basis, as opposed to 6,000 users

concurrently. DHS’s Joint Requirements Council confirmed that the initial KPP was

excessive and not testable.

The program’s OTA completed follow-on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) in

September 2017, which focused on evaluating the revised KPP, FOC functionality,

and deficiencies identified during the program’s initial OT&E. In March 2017, DHS’s

Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) found that the program was

operationally effective and suitable with limitations, but that the test was not

adequate to evaluate operational cybersecurity. DOT&E recommended that the

program conduct threat-based operational cybersecurity testing, among other things.

ICE officials said that the program completed threat-based cybersecurity tests in

September 2017 and had begun to address identified vulnerabilities. DOT&E

anticipates assessing the results from the program’s cybersecurity testing and

follow-on OT&E by mid-February to support the ADE 3 decision.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

ICE officials continue to work closely with CBP to provide users access to various

systems through the modernized TECS system. The program previously worked to

resolve technical problems with CBP support services that emerged during final

integration testing of the ICE and CBP modernized TECS systems, which contributed to

a 3-month delay in achieving IOC. Users reported during initial OT&E that the

modernized ICE TECS system was an improvement over the legacy system but they

requested better integration with external systems, such as CBP’s Seized Assets and

Case Tracking System (SEACATS), which they use to determine the disposition of

seized assets for case management and reporting purposes.

According to ICE officials, CBP subsequently decided to modernize SEACATS. ICE

officials stated that they have coordinated closely with CBP to integrate the two

modernized systems and ensure un-interrupted access to SEACATS for TECS users. For

example, ICE developed a workaround so that TECS users maintain access to the

latest seizure data available from the modernized SEACATS. ICE officials added that

they continue to make improvements in interfaces with other external systems as

prioritized by end users.

In July 2017, ICE reported that the program was fully staffed.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) TECS MODERNIZATION

ICE officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
65

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

148

185

104

96

132

06/13

Initial APB approved

09/19

Phase 3

IOC

09/22

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 06/2013

03/19

Phase 2

IOC

12/16

Phase 1 initial 

operational 

capability (IOC)

06/17

APB version

4 approved

07/18

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (06/2013) 2,076 1,173 3,249

Current APB (06/2017) 2,007 648 2,655

Current estimate 

(05/2017) 1,742 564 2,306

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION (CDM)

NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD)

The CDM program aims to strengthen the cybersecurity of the federal government’s

networks at more than 65 participating civilian agencies by providing tools and

dashboards that continually monitor and report on network vulnerabilities. Tools are

delivered in four phases: phase 1 and 2 tools report vulnerabilities in hardware and

software, and user access controls, respectively; phase 3 tools will report on efforts to

prevent attacks; and phase 4 tools will provide encryption to protect network data.

Source: National Protection and Programs Directorate.

CDM re-baselined for the third

time in August 2017 to initiate

phase 3 and address phase 1

challenges.

Program revised its key

performance parameters and

test and evaluation master 

plan as a part of its rebaseline.

Program plans to change

its acquisition strategy and

continues to face workforce

challenges.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In June 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership re-baselined the

CDM program for the third time to approve initiating development of phase 3 and to

address challenges encountered during phase 1. Specifically, contractors previously

found large gaps—ranging from 19 to 384 percent—in the actual number of devices

needing phase 1 tools than what was originally reported by 12 agencies.

The program’s new acquisition program baseline (APB) modified the program’s

cost, schedule, and performance parameters. For example:

• The operations and maintenance (O&M) cost thresholds increased by $631

million when the program shifted some potential acquisition costs to be

consistent with DHS’s new appropriation structure, among other things. The 

O&M cost thresholds previously decreased by $1.2 billion, in part, because 

DHS leadership determined the program would only fund CDM tools for the 

first 2 years after deployment. The acquisition costs did not increase despite 

phase 1 challenges, in part, because coverage for the U.S. Postal Service— 

which had the largest gap in estimated devices—will no longer be funded by the 

CDM program.

• The program’s full operational capability (FOC) date slipped almost 4 years after 

it was redefined from deployment of phase 1-3 tools at 5 agencies to the 

availability of these tools to all participating agencies.

However, the program’s costs will increase and its FOC date may slip further once 

the program establishes goals for phase 4. NPPD officials said they were unable to 

complete planning efforts for phase 4 in time to incorporate it into the most recent 

APB revision and, therefore, plan to re-baseline the CDM program again in 2018.

The CDM program identified a potential acquisition affordability gap in fiscal year

2018 based on its revised life-cycle cost estimate, which it addressed by adjusting

the phase 3 schedule to shift some acquisition costs out to fiscal year 2020. The

affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s

funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs.

However, the program anticipates receiving approximately $281 million in O&M

funding over the 5-year period.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
66

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Initial OT&E

OA Phase 3 

and federal 

dashboard

OA Phase 2 

and federal 

dashboard

OA Phase 1 

and federal 

dashboard

Follow-on OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED 06/2022

PLANNED 09/2021

PLANNED 03/2019

PLANNED 09/2018

PLANNED 03/2018

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

88.5

16

104.5

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED 1

8.2 STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 

As part of its re-baselining efforts, the CDM program updated its operational

requirements document and test and evaluation master plan. At the direction of DHS 

leadership, the program consolidated its previous 12 key performance parameters 

(KPP) into 5 main KPP functions—identification, protection, detection, response, and 

recovery—some of which have multiple sub-measures. The revised KPPs are intended 

to better align with the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Cybersecurity 

Framework and were developed in collaboration with key stakeholders, such as the 

Joint Requirements Council, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), 

and the program’s OTA.

The CDM program is only authorized to conduct testing on DHS networks, which

means the other departments and agencies are responsible for testing the CDM

tools and dashboards on their own networks. Under the program’s revised test and 

evaluation master plan, the OTA plans to perform operational assessments (OA) on 

DHS’s network to incrementally demonstrate each phase’s capabilities as they are 

deployed and to reduce risk prior to conducting formal program-level operational 

test and evaluation (OT&E). NPPD officials anticipate the first OA will be completed 

in calendar year 2018 and will test integration of phase 1 tools and dashboard 

reporting. NPPD officials previously told GAO that they had observed operational 

testing conducted at three other agencies and, in September 2017, said they continue 

to work with the program’s OTA to identify opportunities to observe testing at other 

agencies.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The CDM program updated its acquisition plan as a part of its re-baselining efforts,

which reflects a change in strategy for procuring CDM tools and integration services

for participating agencies through the General Services Administration (GSA).

Previously, the CDM program issued task orders for these tools and services through

blanket purchase agreements established under vendors’ GSA Federal Supply

Schedule contracts. These agreements are set to expire in August 2018. Going

forward, the program plans to use an existing GSA government-wide acquisition

contract—known as Alliant—to obtain CDM tools and services. According to NPPD

officials, the new acquisition strategy is intended to provide greater flexibility in

contracting for current capabilities and to support future capabilities. It will also allow

participating agencies to order additional CDM-approved products or services from

GSA’s schedule for information technology equipment, software, and services;

however, as of September 2017, NPPD officials stated they were in the process of

determining how this process will work.

NPPD officials said that the program continues to face workforce challenges related to

managing the program’s change in contracts and planning for phase 4. In February

2018, NPPD officials stated that they had on-boarded 5 staff to help address the

program’s reported fiscal year 2017 gap of 16 full time equivalents. They noted that

another 5 candidates were in the hiring process and that NPPD continues to work with

officials from DHS’s Office of the Chief Security Officer to reduce continued challenges

in onboarding new staff due to the lengthy security clearance process.

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION (CDM)

In addition to activities outlined in this assessment, NPPD officials stated that the CDM program continues to manage its

budget to ensure program costs match available funding, and is leveraging the collective buying power of federal agencies and

strategic sourcing to achieve government cost savings on CDM products. NPPD officials also stated that, as of December 2017,

CDM has deployed agency dashboards to 23 agencies and was conducting and testing information exchanges of data between

agency dashboards and the federal dashboard.
67

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

49 40

4 1 0

04/16

Initial APB

approved

TBD

Full

operational

capability

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 04/2016

06/17

Program

breach

09/17

Contract award 

for increments

1 and 2

TBD

IOC

09/21

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (04/2016) 273 5,563 5,836

Current APB (04/2016) 273 5,563 5,836

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 227 5,149 5,376

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

HOMELAND ADVANCED RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 

(HART) 

NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD)

HART will replace and modernize the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) legacy

biometric identification system—known as IDENT—which shares information on foreign

nationals with U.S. government and foreign partners to facilitate legitimate travel,

trade, and immigration. NPPD plans to develop HART in four increments: increments 1

and 2 will replace and enhance IDENT functionality; increments 3 and 4 will provide

additional biometric services, as well as a web portal and new tools for analysis and

reporting. Source: National Protection and Programs Directorate.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In June 2017, NPPD declared a schedule breach when it determined the HART

program would not be able to meet its initial acquisition program baseline (APB)

milestones. DHS leadership approved the program’s APB in April 2016 and

authorized the program to initiate development efforts for increments 1 and 2 in

October 2016. NPPD officials attribute the schedule slip to multiple delays in

awarding the contract for increments 1 and 2 as a result of issues with the request

for proposals (RFP). The program released the RFP in February 2017 and awarded

the contract in September 2017—approximately 9 months later than NPPD officials

had planned. However, the program experienced additional delays after a bid protest

to the contract award was filed with GAO in October 2017. GAO subsequently denied

the protest and NPPD officials said the program plans to initiate work with the

contractor in March 2018.

HART initially planned to achieve initial operational capability (IOC) with the

deployment of increment 1 in December 2018, at which point program officials

anticipated beginning to transition users from IDENT to HART. However, it is unclear

when this will now occur, which is a significant challenge because IDENT is at risk of

failure and may be unable to fully support requirements related to new programs—

such as Customs and Border Protection’s Biometric Entry-Exit. As a result, delays in

HART could contribute to delays in other DHS acquisition programs.

The program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) in June 2017 to inform the

budget process. This LCCE is within its current APB cost thresholds, but does not

account for the contractor’s solution. The program plans to update its LCCE and other

acquisition documentation, such as its APB, after initiating work with the contractor.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because

DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations and maintenance

(O&M) funding for individual programs. However, the program anticipates receiving

approximately $1.3 billion in O&M funding to cover $1.5 billion in O&M costs. NPPD

officials explained that the current O&M cost estimate includes costs for maintaining

IDENT. Future LCCE updates will reflect delivery of services through HART, which

NPPD officials anticipate will be more cost effective.

Program experienced a

schedule breach in June 2017

—14 months after initial

baseline was established.

Key performance parameters

will be demonstrated as

capability is developed.

Program has developed

mitigation plans to address

workforce risks.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
68

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

Increment 1 

OT&E 

Increment 2 

OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED TBD

PLANNED TBD

POSITIONS

FILLED

49.7

5.5

55.2

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP 1.5

14.3 STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

HOMELAND ADVANCED RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (HART) 

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TEST COMMAND

HART plans to demonstrate its eight key performance parameters (KPP) as

capabilities are developed. Increment 1 has two KPPs that establish requirements for

system availability and a fingerprint biometric identification service. Increment 2 has

four KPPs that establish requirements for multimodal biometric verification services

and interoperability with a Department of Justice system. Increments 3 and 4 each

have one KPP that establish requirements for web portal response time and reporting

capabilities, respectively. However, NPPD officials stated they will revisit the KPPs for

increments 3 and 4 as they define requirements for these increments.

In September 2016, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation approved HART’s

test and evaluation master plan after the program incorporated feedback from DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and its OTA. The program initially planned 

to conduct operational test and evaluation (OT&E) for increment 1 in June 2018 prior 

to achieving IOC, but this will likely be delayed because of HART’s schedule breach.

S&T’s Office of Systems Engineering completed a technical assessment on HART in

February 2016, and concluded that the program had a moderate overall level of

technical risk. In October 2016, DHS leadership directed HART to work with S&T to

conduct further analysis following the program’s initial contract award for increments

1 and 2. However, these efforts have also been delayed.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

NPPD officials told GAO they are currently planning for increments 3 and 4 and plan to

refine the cost, schedule, and performance goals for these increments in its next APB.

NPPD plans to pursue a separate contract for the development and delivery of

increments 3 and 4. However, the program will require DHS leadership approval prior

to initiating these development efforts.

In September 2017, NPPD officials told GAO they had hired two staff and planned to

hire additional staff to address the program’s staffing gap of 5.5 full time equivalents.

In response to DHS leadership’s direction, the program coordinated with DHS’s Chief

Technology Officer to assess the skills and functions of staff necessary to execute the

program and to develop the HART staffing plan. In its June 2017 staffing plan, the

program identified workforce risks, including the potential for experiencing insufficient

technical skillsets and inadequate resources to simultaneously execute development

of HART and operate IDENT. To mitigate these risks, the program plans to develop a

training plan to address the gap in skills, leverage support within the program by crosstraining staff, and issue contracts for additional support as needed, among other

things. However, if the program does not have adequate staff to complete these

efforts, it may experience further schedule delays.

NPPD officials stated that the program’s schedule delays pose a challenge because IDENT remains at risk of failure despite

incremental improvements to extend its service life and may be unable to fully support new customer requirements or

requirements related to new programs. They added that the program has a risk management process, which it is using to

manage a variety of identified risks—including several related to workforce. They noted that these risks have not yet materialized.

NPPD officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
69

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

45 56

39 40 41

02/09

Initial APB

approved

03/19

Block 2.2

ADE 3

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 05/2011

05/12

Program authorized to

change Block 3.0

to E3A strategy

01/15

APB version

4.0 approved

09/16

APB version

4.2 approved

01/18

E3A ADE 3

03/13

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (02/2009) 1,029 922 1,951

Current APB (09/2016) 1,278 4,414 5,692

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 766 3,965 4,731

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION SYSTEM (NCPS)

NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD)

NCPS is intended to defend the federal civilian government from cyber threats. NCPS

develops and delivers capabilities through a series of “blocks.” Blocks 1.0, 2.0, and 

2.1 are fully deployed and provide intrusion-detection and analytic capabilities across 

the government. The NCPS program is currently deploying EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated 

(E3A) to provide intrusion-prevention capabilities and plans to deliver block 2.2 to 

improve information sharing across agencies.

Source: National Cybersecurity Protection System.

COST AND SCHEDULE

NPPD officials said the program is on track to meet the schedule and cost goals in its

current acquisition program baseline (APB), which reflected changes resulting from

the adoption of some of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland

Security Information Network (HSIN) capabilities for block 2.2 rather than developing

custom solutions. However, challenges in completing test plans delayed testing:

• Initial operational test and evaluation (OT&E) for E3A—intended to inform the

acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 for approving E3A transition to sustainment—

slipped from September 2016 to May 2017.

• The initial test event for block 2.2—intended to inform the ADE 2C for deploying

additional block 2.2 capabilities—slipped from March 2017 to September 2017.

As of August 2017, NPPD officials said NCPS had adopted all planned HSIN

capabilities but one because of security concerns, which HSIN is addressing by

piloting a new tool.

The program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) in June 2017 to inform the

budget process, which is within its current APB cost thresholds. However, the

program plans to update the LCCE again to support the E3A ADE 3 and block 2.2 ADE

2C. Both of these milestones were expected to occur in December 2017, but were

scheduled for January 2018 to allow for the completion of required documentation.

NPPD officials noted that the revised LCCE will include new assumptions for how

acquisition and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are estimated. The NCPS

LCCE initially increased when DHS leadership re-baselined the program in January

2015 to account for block 2.2, refinements to E3A, and costs through fiscal year

2022.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because

DHS’s funding plan no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs. NPPD

officials anticipate receiving $1.8 billion in O&M funding over this 5-year period. The

program is also projected to have an $83 million surplus in acquisition funding over

this 5-year period, which NPPD officials anticipate will be less once the LCCE revision

is complete.

Program on track against

cost and schedule despite

testing delays.

Program completed E3A initial

testing in August 2017, but

cybersecurity testing delayed

to 2018.

As of January 2018, the NCPS

program has integrated E3A

at 95 percent of agencies and

departments.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
70

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Block 2.2 OA

E3A Initial OT&E

E3A OA

E3A OA

Block 2.2 OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED 12/2018

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

08/2016

03/2015

08/2017

10/2017

POSITIONS

FILLED

318.5

48

366.5

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

6

30.2 STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION SYSTEM (NCPS)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

In January 2018, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) evaluated

the E3A initial OT&E results and determined that:

• E3A met its three key performance parameters (KPP) for coverage, accuracy, and

timeliness.

• E3A is operationally suitable and operationally effective with limitations primarily

because it lacks the desired ability to share threat information.

• The test was not adequate to assess cybersecurity and recommended the

program take actions to strengthen future testing.

NPPD officials said that a full cybersecurity assessment will not be conducted until

calendar year 2018. As a result, DHS will not have a full picture of E3A performance

to inform the program’s ADE 3 decision.

In October 2017, the NCPS program completed the first block 2.2 operational 

assessment (OA), which focused on testing delivery of an information sharing portal

to inform the program’s ADE 2C. In January 2018, DOT&E determined that it was too

soon to assess block 2.2 progress toward operational effectiveness, suitability, and

cybersecurity. DOT&E also noted block 2.2 is at risk of not meeting user needs

because the portal comprises a small portion of planned capabilities and alignment

with the operational requirements is unclear. DOT&E made a number of

recommendations, including repeating the OA before conducting initial OT&E.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Since May 2015, NPPD officials stated that the E3A intrusion-prevention capabilities

have been primarily provided through sole source contracts with internet service

providers (ISP) and a contract to provide basic intrusion-prevention services. In

December 2015, Congress required DHS to make available for use by federal

agencies, certain capabilities, such as those provided by NCPS’s E3A, to prevent

network traffic associated with certain cybersecurity risks by December 2016. By

December 2016, NCPS had integrated E3A at approximately 93 percent of civilian

federal agencies and departments and, in January 2018, NPPD officials said NCPS

was up to 95 percent. According to NPPD officials, the program first focused on

integrating E3A at the largest departments and agencies and is now focused on

integrating the remaining smaller agencies. These officials previously cited legal and

network challenges as barriers to integration because they must negotiate and

customize E3A for individual agencies and departments, but stated that they continue

to work with all agencies and departments to provide E3A services.

In January 2018, NPPD officials stated that one critical position had been filled and

the other five are for contracting officers dedicated to NCPS. They added that the

program is currently supported by four contracting officers matrixed from elsewhere

in DHS, but this staff also supports other contracts. NPPD officials did not attribute

any negative affects to workforce shortages and said they continue to work with DHS

to successfully recruit and retain talented cybersecurity staff, which has been a

challenge. For example, according to NPPD officials, DHS posts continuous open

announcements for candidates and has initiated a cyber pay initiative, among other

things, which has yielded positive results for the program.

NPPD officials stated that, since the last assessment, the NCPS program has made progress toward achieving program

objectives. For example, departments and agencies have continued to onboard E3A services and approximately 95 percent of

the federal civilian .gov user population is protected by at least one E3A service. NPPD officials reiterated that the NCPS program

executed initial OT&E for E3A and an OA of NCPS block 2.2 information sharing capabilities in 2017. NPPD officials also

provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
71

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

43

49

4 4

51

01/11

Initial APB

approved

12/19

Increment 2

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 01/2011

9/13

Increment 1

IOC

08/17

Increment 2

IOC

03/19

Increment 1

FOC

06/17

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2011) 244 469 713

Current APB (11/2013) 691 409 1,100

Current estimate 

(11/2017) 660 0 660

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS PRIORITY SERVICES 

(NGN-PS)

NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD)

NGN-PS is intended to address an emerging capability gap in the government’s

emergency telecommunications service, which prioritizes select officials’ phone calls

when networks are overwhelmed. NPPD executes NGN-PS through commercial

telecommunications service providers, which addresses the government’s

requirements as they modernize their own networks. NPPD is executing NGN-PS in

two phases—(1) voice and (2) data and video.

Source: Leidos.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In November 2017, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Chief Financial

Officer approved a revised life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for NGN-PS, which includes

costs for the entire program’s voice phase and eliminates operations and

maintenance (O&M) costs. The program removed O&M costs because capabilities

acquired through NGN-PS are transferred to and funded through NPPD’s Priority

Telecommunications Service (PTS) once they become operational. NGN-PS is currently

focused on delivering its voice phase, which is divided into three increments:

• Increment 1 maintains current priority service on long distance calls as 

commercial service providers update their networks;

• Increment 2 delivers wireless capabilities; and

• Increment 3 is intended to address landline capabilities.

The program’s previous LCCE and current acquisition program baseline (APB) only

include costs associated with increments 1 and 2. NPPD officials told GAO they plan

to update the program’s APB in January 2018 to include costs, schedule, and

performance goals for increment 3 and expect to receive DHS leadership approval to

initiate development by August 2018.

NGN-PS remains on track to meet its cost and schedule goals for the first two

increments of the voice phase. The program’s full operational capability (FOC) for

increment 1 previously slipped from June 2017 to March 2019, which NPPD officials

attributed to funding shortfalls. NGN-PS achieved initial operational capability (IOC)

for increment 2 wireless capabilities in August 2017 when priority service via cellular

towers was demonstrated by the program’s largest service provider.

The program projects an acquisition affordability gap of $92 million from fiscal years

2018 to 2022. However, DHS’s current funding plan does not include funding for

increment 3, which accounts for the funding shortfall in fiscal years 2021 and 2022.

NPPD officials said they anticipate receiving an additional $79 million in acquisition

funding over this 2-year period, but will continue to prioritize capabilities if additional

funding is not provided. These officials also said the program has achieved cost

savings on increments 1 and 2 that will mitigate some of the projected shortfall in

fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

Revised life-cycle cost estimate

includes costs for additional

capabilities, but eliminates

sustainment costs.

Initial operational capability

for voice phase wireless

capabilities achieved in

August 2017.

Acquisition of data and video

phase capabilities to begin

in September 2021.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
72

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

None

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

NOT APPLICABLE

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

18

1

19

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

1

18 STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS PRIORITY SERVICES (NGN-PS)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

According to NPPD officials, NGN-PS continues to meet its six key performance

parameters (KPP) for the voice phase, but DHS’s Director, Office of Test and

Evaluation has not validated the program’s performance. In April 2017, the Joint

Requirements Council validated an operational requirements document, which

included KPPs for phase 2 video and data capabilities; however, NPPD officials

told GAO that phase 2 was still in the early planning stages.

NGN-PS capabilities are evaluated through developmental testing and operational

assessments conducted by service providers on their own networks. However,

NPPD officials noted that each emergency is unique and that performance can be

affected by damage to telecommunications infrastructure. NPPD officials review

the service providers’ test plans, oversee tests to verify testing procedures are

followed, and approve test results to determine when testing is complete. The OTA

does not conduct a stand-alone operational test event for NGN-PS. Instead, the

OTA leverages the service providers’ test and actual operational data to assess

program performance. NPPD officials also said that they continuously review

actual NGN-PS performance and that all service providers undergo annual network

service verification testing under the PTS program.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

NGN-PS was established in response to an Executive Order requiring the federal

government to have the ability to communicate at all times during all circumstances

to ensure national security and manage emergencies. A Presidential Policy Directive

issued in July 2016 superseded previous directives requiring continuous

communication services for select government officials. According to NPPD

officials, the new directive validates the program’s requirements for the voice phase

and was used to develop requirements for the video and data phase. The program

expects to begin the acquisition of the phase 2 for video and data in September

2021.

In July 2017, NPPD reported that the program needed a systems engineer and was

mitigating the vacancy with contracted support staff. The program also identified a

need for an additional systems engineer and program support staff starting in fiscal

year 2019 to support the start of increment 3. In August 2017, NPPD officials told

GAO they continue to face challenges hiring and retaining engineers with adequate

experience because of competition with the private sector. The program has

historically mitigated staffing gaps by leveraging support from contracted and PTS

program staff, as needed.

In addition to activities identified in this assessment, NPPD officials stated that the program has received Joint Requirements

Council validation of the phase 2 concept of operations and DHS leadership approval of the phase 2 operational requirements

document. As of January 2018, the updated APB was in the approval process. NPPD officials also provided technical comments

on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
73

0

20

40

60

80

100

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

Not included

in funding plan

07/14

Initial APB

approved

08/23

Complete

transition

to NBAF

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 07/2014

05/06

Program 

initiation 

authorized

05/15

Primary

construction

contract awarded

05/21

Facility

commissioned

12/22

Full

operational

capability

08/23

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (07/2014) 1,298 8,341 9,639

Current APB (07/2014) 1,298 8,341 9,639

Current estimate 

(03/2017) 1,251 8,250 9,501

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY (NBAF)

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE (S&T)

The NBAF program is constructing a state-of-the-art laboratory in Manhattan,

Kansas to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. The facility will enable

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Agriculture

(USDA) to conduct research, develop vaccines, and provide enhanced diagnostic

capabilities to protect against foreign animal, emerging, and zoonotic diseases that

threaten the nation’s food supply, agricultural economy, and public health.

Source: NBAF Design Partnership.

COST AND SCHEDULE

The program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update is within its current

acquisition program baseline (APB) cost thresholds and, according to NBAF officials,

the program remains on track to meet its schedule goals. In August 2017, NBAF

officials said that construction activities thus far—such as pouring concrete for the

main laboratory and steel framing—have proceeded as anticipated and will continue

through December 2020. NBAF officials told GAO the program has already received

full acquisition funding for facility construction efforts through federal appropriations

and gift funds from the state of Kansas.

As construction continues, the program plans to begin operational stand-up activities

for the facility. However, a potential affordability gap may delay the program’s ability

to complete these stand-up activities, which are needed to begin conducting

laboratory operations. The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to

Congress for fiscal years 2018 to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and

maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs. However, NBAF officials

anticipate receiving only $149 million in O&M funding to cover an estimated $239

million in O&M costs over the next 5 years, resulting in a projected shortfall of

approximately $90 million.

NBAF officials stated the O&M funding gap could delay a number of operational

stand-up activities, including plans to award a management operations and research

support contract in October 2018, the purchase of laboratory and information

technology equipment, and hiring of operations management staff. According to

NBAF officials, if operational stand-up activities are delayed, there is a risk the

facility will not be fully operational by December 2022, as is currently planned. This

may delay the transition from the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which is

nearing the end of its useful life. NBAF officials reported that S&T plans to

communicate the program’s future funding needs to DHS leadership through the

annual budget process. If the program does not receive the funding it requests,

these officials stated that S&T will prioritize the operational stand-up activities that

best reduce the risk of schedule delays.

Construction on track, but

projected funding gap may

delay operational stand-up.

Commissioning process

underway, but performance

will not be demonstrated until

construction is complete.

NBAF adequately staffed, but

staffing needs will change as

operational stand-up activities

begin.

GAO last reported on this 

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
74

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

None

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

NOT APPLICABLE

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

22.9

22.9

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

9.6

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY (NBAF)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: NOT APPLICABLE

In May 2013, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation determined he was not

responsible for overseeing NBAF because it was a facility, as opposed to a system.

According to NBAF officials, the program has implemented a commissioning process

for the facility to determine whether it can meet its sole key performance parameter

(KPP) for laboratory spaces that meet various biosafety standards.

A third-party commissioning agent has been retained as a subcontractor to the prime

construction management contractor, and NBAF officials stated that a

commissioning plan has been in place since 2012. According to NBAF officials, the

commissioning agent worked with the facility design and construction teams to

develop the commissioning plan, and detailed procedures are in place to install and

commission equipment in the facility. The commissioning agent will monitor and test

the facility’s equipment and building systems while construction is ongoing to ensure

they are properly installed and functioning according to appropriate biosafety

specifications. The commissioning agent will report its findings directly to program

officials and coordinate with other entities involved in the commissioning process,

including the NBAF program office, the construction management contractor, and

end users, among others. Full commissioning of the facility is scheduled to be

completed by May 2021, 6 months after the completion of construction. 

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

NBAF officials reported that they coordinate regularly with key stakeholders. For

example, they hold regular coordination meetings with USDA officials to discuss NBAF

operations, including operational stand-up activities and future procurement. The

NBAF program office has also begun outreach to the federal regulators responsible

for awarding the registrations needed for NBAF to conduct laboratory operations to

begin planning for this authorization process.

The NBAF program office is currently fully staffed. However, NBAF officials reported

the program’s staffing needs will change in the coming years, as the program

progresses through construction and begins operational stand-up of the facility. For

example, over the next 5 years, the program will need to hire an operations director,

bio-risk manager, chief information officer, and facility manager, among others, for

NBAF operations management. However, the projected O&M funding shortfall during

this same period could affect the program’s ability to hire new staff when needed and

complete operational stand-up activities on time.

NBAF officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
75

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

282 277 282 283 284

02/02

Deployment of initial

electronic baggage 

screening equipment

08/12

APB approved

09/18

IOC for systems that detect additional

materials and provide an advanced

threat detection algorithm

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 08/2012

05/16

APB

revised

11/09

Acquisition 

decision event

2A/3

09/18

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (08/2012) 14,465 6,733 21,198

Current APB (05/2016) 13,920 5,052 18,972

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 12,131 5,088 17,219

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

ELECTRONIC BAGGAGE SCREENING PROGRAM (EBSP) 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

Established in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, EBSP tests,

procures, and deploys transportation security equipment, such as explosives trace

detectors and explosives detection systems, across approximately 440 U.S. airports to

ensure 100 percent of checked baggage is screened for explosives. EBSP is primarily

focused on delivering new systems with enhanced screening capabilities and

developing software upgrades for existing systems.

Source: Transportation Security Administration.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In the program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate update, its operations and

maintenance (O&M) costs exceeded the acquisition program baseline (APB) cost

threshold, which constitutes a breach under the Department of Homeland Security’s

(DHS) acquisition policy. The O&M costs increased when TSA accounted for updated

maintenance costs and quantities, and shifted salaries from acquisition to O&M to

align with DHS’s new appropriation structure. TSA officials said they did not submit a

breach notification because they considered the movement of salaries to be an

administrative change. The program plans to update its APB in calendar year 2018 to

reflect a new plan for procuring equipment under its current acquisition strategy. TSA

officials said this APB will also reflect the cost changes.

In May 2016, DHS leadership approved a revised APB for EBSP, which reflects its

current acquisition strategy to competitively procure systems on an ongoing basis

using qualified product lists. The program’s revised APB cost thresholds decreased

compared to its initial APB, which TSA officials attributed to various reasons, including

shortening the program’s end date by 3 years and lower than anticipated actual

costs, among other things.

TSA officials told GAO that one of their primary challenges is funding, and the

program is projected to face a $72 million acquisition funding shortfall in fiscal year

2018. TSA identified $70 million in carryover funding to address this gap. To mitigate

anticipated funding gaps in future years, TSA officials said they may shift projects

from one fiscal year to another or cancel them altogether, which may result in the

delay or elimination of screening capabilities. The affordability gap from fiscal years

2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer

contained O&M funding for individual programs. TSA anticipates receiving $980

million in O&M funding over this 5-year period to cover $1 billion in O&M costs.

TSA officials anticipate achieving the program’s final APB milestone—initial

operational capability (IOC) for systems that detect additional materials and provide

an advanced threat detection algorithm—by its revised threshold date. Previously,

EBSP planned to award contracts for these systems in September 2015 and

September 2018, respectively.

Program breached its cost

goals and faces funding

shortfalls in fiscal year 2018.

Program is incorporating

requirements to address

cybersecurity risk for existing

systems.

EBSP plans to pursue a new

procurement approach in

2018, and staffing

challenges exist.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
76

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

OT&E of a 

reduced-size 

standalone 

system

OT&E for two 

system variants

OT&E of a 

reduced-size 

standalone 

system

OT&E of a 

medium-speed 

system 

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

01/2014

03/2017

05/2017

02/2013

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

257.8

8

265.8

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

8

17.1 STAFFING

GAP

Note: Table above depicts results from assessments issued 

since August 2013. DOT&E issued seven other assessments on 

EBSP systems prior to this date.

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ELECTRONIC BAGGAGE SCREENING PROGRAM (EBSP)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: TSA OFFICE OF SECURITY CAPABILITIES’ TEST AND EVALUATION BRANCH

TSA officials previously stated that EBSP has demonstrated that all deployed

systems can meet the program’s key performance parameters, including automated

threat detection, throughput, and operational availability. In September 2017, TSA

officials said they had identified a critical need for improved cybersecurity

requirements and plan to update the program’s acquisition documentation starting

in 2018.

Since March 2011, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has

assessed the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) results of 11 EBSP systems

from multiple vendors and determined that 6 are effective and suitable. Most

recently, DOT&E found that a medium-speed explosives detection system with an

advanced threat detection algorithm tested in May 2017 was effective with

limitations and not suitable, primarily because of the increase in manpower needed

to operate the system on a long-term, continuous basis. TSA officials do not have

any plans to retest this system within the next year. DOT&E also found that a

reduced-size standalone explosives detection system tested in March 2017 was

suitable with limitations, but not effective because of multiple factors resulting in the

inability of operators to maintain control of baggage.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

As of December 2017, EBSP had deployed 1,664 explosives detection systems

and 2,638 explosives trace detectors nationwide. In 2018, EBSP plans to pursue a

new competitive procurement approach to replace and update existing systems

that will include:

• New contract vehicles to better align EBSP procurement activities with the

program’s strategic roadmap.

• Updates to EBSP’s vendor qualification process to allow for vendor collaboration

before testing.

• Transitioning from procuring systems with different sizes and speeds to two

types: (1) inline systems that integrate with a baggage handling system and are

linked through a network and (2) standalone systems that may be integrated with

a baggage handling system, but not linked to a network.

The program is in the process of updating its acquisition documentation to reflect

this new procurement approach and TSA officials anticipate opening a qualified

products list for new systems starting in June 2018.

TSA officials said that staffing remains a challenge for the program because of cuts

in government and contracted mission support staff and critical vacancies, including

a division director. In September 2017, TSA reported that existing personnel across

the program have assumed responsibilities of these positions, but workloads are

unsustainable at current staffing levels.

TSA officials stated that EBSP continues to procure, test, and deploy equipment and capabilities to recapitalize older equipment,

improve security screening capability at airports, and enhance the detection capabilities of the fleet. They added that TSA

employs extensive testing to verify the suitability and effectiveness of equipment to meet requirements. Moving forward, EBSP

intends to establish IOC milestones for new technologies and capabilities, while allowing TSA the flexibility to make risk-based

decisions. TSA officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
77

0

50

100

150

200

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

1 1 1 1 1

12/21

CAT FOC

(precheck

lanes)

01/12

APB 

version 3.1

approved

09/21

CAT ADE 3

(standard

lanes)

12/23

CAT FOC

(standard

lanes)

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 01/2012

05/17

APB 

version 6.0 

approved

01/16

Schedule

breach

03/20

CAT ADE 3

(precheck 

lanes)

06/16

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2012) 4,623 1,853 6,476

Current APB (05/2017) 3,546 1,915 5,460

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 2,146 2,538 4,683

(may not add due to rounding)

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PASSENGER SCREENING PROGRAM (PSP)

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established PSP in response to the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. PSP identifies, tests, procures, deploys,

and sustains transportation security equipment across approximately 440 U.S.

airports to help TSA officers identify threats concealed on people and in their carryon

items. The program aims to increase threat detection capabilities, improve the

efficiency of passenger screening, and balance passenger privacy and security.

Source: Transportation Security Administration.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In May 2017, the DHS Under Secretary for Management (USM) approved the sixth

version of the PSP acquisition program baseline (APB) and subsequently removed the

program from breach status. In January 2016, TSA declared a schedule breach of a

key milestone—acquisition decision event (ADE) 3—for the Credential Authentication

Technology (CAT) because of delays in incorporating new cybersecurity requirements.

Consistent with previous versions of the program’s APB, the new baseline modified

the program’s cost, schedule, and performance parameters. For example, the

program established the following:

• Separate CAT milestone dates for TSA Precheck and standard lanes. TSA 

officials stated there is no capability difference between screening lanes, 

but an initial focus on TSA Precheck lanes will assist with demonstrating CAT 

requirements and resolving past testing issues that contributed to an initial 4-year 

delay to CAT’s full operational capability (FOC) date. PSP now plans to reach FOC 

for CAT more than 5 years later than its revised target of June 2018 and more than 

9 years later than initially planned.

• New FOC dates for other technologies, which TSA officials said are expected

to be more realistic about delivery dates and account for changes in some FOC

quantities. For example, TSA requested and received approval in September 2017

to increase FOC quantities for second generation Advanced Technology (AT-2) Tier

I systems to meet increasing passenger volume and expected airport growth.

In May 2017, the USM also directed the program to revise its life-cycle cost estimate

(LCCE) in response to less-than-expected funding levels. The new LCCE also shifted

some acquisition costs to operations and maintenance (O&M) to be consistent with

DHS’s new appropriation structure. TSA officials believe the new funding profile will

be sufficient to sustain legacy PSP equipment, but will significantly limit the

program’s ability to enhance existing equipment capabilities and support operational

needs. The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated

because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for

individual programs. TSA anticipates receiving $906 million in O&M funding over this

5-year period to cover $923 million in O&M costs.

DHS approved PSP’s sixth

baseline to remediate

schedule breach; costs

revised due to funding cuts.

Started testing on the

Credential Authentication

Technology in TSA Precheck

lanes during 2017.

Critical staffing vacancies

persist and may delay followon

acquisition planning efforts.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
78

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Advanced

imaging 

technology-2

OT&E

CAT phase I 

operational test 

AT-2 tier II 

follow-on

operational test 

& evaluation

(OT&E)

Automated 

screening lanes 

operational utility 

assessment

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

11/2014

08/2016

04/2017

11/2014

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

148

7

155

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

7

24

STAFFING

GAP

Note: Table above depicts assessments for tests completed 

since November 2014. DOT&E issued eight other assessments 

on PSP systems prior to this date.

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

PASSENGER SCREENING PROGRAM (PSP)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: VARIOUS

Since August 2010, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has

assessed the test results of eight PSP systems from multiple vendors and

determined that three are effective and suitable. Most recently, DOT&E reviewed the

results from an assessment of automated screening lanes, which TSA began

pursuing in fall 2016 in response to an urgent operational need to address

increasing passenger wait times. DOT&E found that automated systems showed

potential to increase passenger screening rates, but noted some adverse impact on

system performance and availability.

Going forward, TSA plans to conduct testing on updates made to existing PSP 

systems, as well as complete testing of CAT. TSA initiated CAT developmental testing

in TSA Precheck lanes in late fiscal year 2017 and anticipates completing operational

testing by June 2019. Testing will expand to standard screening lanes shortly

thereafter and is expected to be complete by September 2020. However, in

November 2017, DHS leadership approved TSA’s proposal to transfer requirements

from the Security Technology Integrated Program, which provides critical data

connectivity capabilities, to CAT to reduce the dependency between the programs.

DHS leadership directed TSA to complete several actions to account for this change,

including updating CAT’s operational requirements document and test and evaluation 

master plan. In January 2018, TSA officials said that they determined CAT’s current 

operational requirements document was still valid and anticipate updating the test 

and evaluation master plan by March 2018.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

TSA employs two acquisition strategies to acquire PSP systems:

• Qualified Product List (QPL) approach—used for proven technologies when

capability requirements are rigid and contractors’ systems are mature. Any

contractors’ systems that demonstrate they meet the capability requirements are

added to the QPL. TSA has used this approach to acquire the second generation

AT-2 systems, Bottled Liquid Scanners, and Explosive Trace Detectors.

• Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) approach—used when capability requirements

are flexible and contractors’ systems are evolving. Under this approach, PSP uses

a series of development contracts to enhance systems’ capabilities over time. PSP

is currently using this approach to acquire CAT.

TSA planned to initiate new acquisition programs starting in fiscal year 2018 that will

replace PSP, but this effort may be at risk because of understaffing. In August 2017,

TSA reported that its checkpoint screening division—whose staff is concurrently

responsible for PSP and its follow-on programs—continued to have staffing vacancies,

including project managers, analysts, and a deputy program manager. TSA is

mitigating these gaps with existing staff and, according to TSA officials, the staffing

challenges may decrease because the new programs may be delayed in response to

funding cuts.

TSA officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
79

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

17 16

7 7 7

11/11

Initial APB

approved

03/22

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 11/2011

05/14

Initial operational

capability – 

Maritime segment

09/14

Program

breach

01/15

TSA directed

to halt new

development

09/16

APB revised

12/15

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (11/2011) 253 146 398

Current APB (09/2016) 472 988 1,460

Current estimate 

(11/2017) 349 957 1,306

(may not add due to rounding)

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION (TIM) 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

The TIM program was initiated to address shortfalls in TSA’s threat assessment

screening and vetting functions by providing a modern and centralized end-to-end

credentialing system. The TIM system will manage credential applications and the

review process for millions of transportation workers and travelers across three

segment populations: maritime, surface, and aviation. It will support large programs,

such as TSA Precheck and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential.

Source: Transportation Security Administration.

COST AND SCHEDULE

The TIM program is on track to meet the cost and schedule goals in its current

acquisition program baseline (APB). In September 2016, the Department of

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Under Secretary for Management approved the TIM

program’s revised APB—which reflected a new technical approach to deploy

capabilities using an agile development methodology—and subsequently removed the

program from breach status, authorizing TSA to resume new development after a

nearly 22-month pause. DHS leadership paused new development in January 2015

after the program breached its initial APB goals for various reasons, including

technical challenges, insufficient contractor performance, and the addition of new

requirements after DHS leadership had approved the program’s initial acquisition

strategy. The program now plans to achieve full operational capability (FOC) in March

2022 and its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) increased to account for this 6-year

schedule slip and integration with the Transportation Vetting System, among other

things.

Since the program’s re-baseline, it has been developing and deploying capabilities in

2-month incremental agile releases, such as functionality to transition TSA Precheck

program to the TIM system. The program updated its LCCE in November 2017 to

inform a program review with DHS leadership, which is within its current APB cost

thresholds. The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be

overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations

and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs. TSA officials anticipate

receiving approximately $318 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period, which

includes nearly $118 million in fees from vetting programs. TSA officials plan to

realign $57 million to cover the projected acquisition shortfall, and said any

additional surplus funding available in fiscal year 2022 would be used to implement

new system requirements identified by the program’s customers.

In November 2017, TSA officials identified several program and technical risks that

could affect the program’s cost, schedule, and performance. These risks include 

an increase in new requirements and increased risk of system vulnerabilities and 

cyberattacks if the program does not identify a provider to perform software updates 

on open source code. TSA officials are working to mitigate these risks.

Program on track against its

revised cost and schedule

goals.

Operational testing identified

limitations with the system;

cybersecurity has not been

assessed.

Staffing gaps in key areas,

such as systems engineering

and testing, are a significant

program risk.

GAO last reported on this 

program in October and April 

2017 (GAO-18-46, GAO-17-

346SP).
80

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Operational 

testing for agile 

release 5

Operational 

testing for agile 

release 4

Operational 

testing for agile 

release 3

Follow-on OT&E

OT&E

Cybersecurity 

test and 

evaluation

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

08/2017

09/2017

11/2016

06/2015

06/2017

PLANNED 11/2018

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

NONE

NONE

NONE

POSITIONS

FILLED

34

9

43

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

9

6

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION (TIM)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): TSA’S TEST AND EVALUATION BRANCH

In April 2017, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) assessed the

results of the program’s November 2016 follow-on operational test and

evaluation (OT&E) for the maritime segment and determined that the system:

• met two of its four key performance parameters (KPP),

• was operationally effective and suitable with limitations, and

• was not cyber-secure because threat-based cybersecurity testing was deferred to

November 2018, after the program completes its migration to a new production

environment.

The OTA did not evaluate the program’s KPP related to enforcing system user access

controls because it was new to the TIM program when testing began. In addition, the

OTA cannot conduct testing on the program’s remaining KPP related to information

reuse until the surface and aviation segments are deployed.

In March 2017, DOT&E approved a new test and evaluation master plan for the TIM 

program, which calls for the OTA to conduct continuous operational testing for each 

2-month agile release and document the results in a dashboard. According to TSA

officials, the results of each release are provided to DOT&E, but DOT&E does not 

provide a formal assessment of these results. DOT&E plans to assess the results of 

the program’s cybersecurity testing in late calendar year 2018.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Under the program’s new technical approach, TSA plans to replace the TIM system’s

existing commercial-off-the-shelf applications with open source applications—software

that can be accessed, used, modified, and shared by anyone—and move to a new

virtual environment. The program’s new agile development methodology develops,

tests, and deploys capabilities using an iterative, rather than a sequential approach.

Consistent with this strategy, TSA awarded task orders in 2016 and 2017 totaling

$34.5 million to the program’s existing contractor for agile design and development

services, and plans to competitively award a new contract by May 2018.

In October 2017, GAO found that TSA had not fully implemented several leading

practices to ensure successful agile adoption. GAO also found that TSA and DHS

needed to conduct more effective oversight of the TIM program to reduce the risk of

repeating past mistakes. DHS concurred with all 14 recommendations made by GAO to

improve program execution and oversight, and identified actions DHS and TSA can take

to address them.

TSA reported that staffing challenges are a significant risk to the program’s success

and identified gaps in key areas—such as systems engineering, testing, and agile

development. Program officials told GAO these positions cannot be filled because of a

hiring freeze within TSA, which the component has imposed to assess their current

workforce and restructure, if necessary. Program officials told GAO they requested

waivers from the hiring freeze and, as of January 2018, they had received approval to

hire 4 additional staff.

TSA officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
81

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

335

240

26 18

335

09/08

Phase 1 

contract 

award

08/09

Initial APB

approved

05/16

Phase 2

contract

award

03/27

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 08/2009

08/13

IOC

10/12

APB

revised

09/13

Acquisition

decision

event 3

09/22

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (08/2009) 4,243 11,391 15,634

Current APB (10/2012) 4,243 11,391 15,634

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 3,342 10,998 14,340

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

FAST RESPONSE CUTTER (FRC)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The USCG uses the FRC to conduct search and rescue, migrant and drug interdiction,

and other law enforcement missions. The FRC carries one cutter boat on board and

is able to conduct operations in moderate sea conditions. The FRC replaces the

USCG’s Island Class patrol boat and provides improved fuel capacity, surveillance,

and communications interoperability with other Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) and Department of Defense assets.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

COST AND SCHEDULE

According to USCG officials, the FRC program is on track to meet its current cost

and schedule goals. The USCG plans to acquire 58 FRCs and, as of September

2017, 25 had been delivered and 19 were on contract. To inform the budget

process, the program updated its life-cycle cost estimate in June 2017, which is

within its current acquisition program baseline (APB) cost thresholds.

Previously, the program’s initial operational capability (IOC) date slipped after a bid

protest related to the program’s initial contract award—now known as phase 1—and

the need for structural modifications. USCG officials attributed the 5-year slip in the

program’s full operational capability (FOC) date to a decrease in annual

procurement quantities under the phase 1 contract. Specifically, in fiscal years

2010 and 2011, the quantities decreased from 6 FRCs per year to 4. In May 2014,

the USCG determined that it would procure only 32 of the 58 FRCs through this

contract and initiated efforts to conduct a full and open competition for the

remaining 26 vessels—known as phase 2.

In May 2016, the USCG awarded the phase 2 contract for the remaining 26 FRCs,

which has a potential value of $1.42 billion. Under the phase 2 contract, the USCG

can procure 4 to 6 FRCs per option period. The USCG ordered 6 FRCs at the time of

the phase 2 award and, in June 2017, exercised an option for an additional 6 FRCs.

The USCG has established that the annual procurement quantity will be dictated by

funding levels, and funding shortfalls could cause further schedule delays. The

affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because—as

we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain

operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs. USCG officials

anticipate receiving $1.6 billion in O&M funding over this 5-year period. USCG

officials stated that they expect to exercise an option for 4 FRCs in fiscal year 2018

and that the USCG plans to prioritize acquisition funding in fiscal years 2019 and

2020 to procure the final 10 hulls and complete procurement of all 58 FRCs.

Program on track to meet

cost and schedule goals;

ordered 6 FRCs in June 2017.

FRC found operationally

effective and suitable, and

all key performance

parameters validated.

Main diesel engine issues

persist, which may require

further retrofits.

GAO last reported on this

program in March and April

2017 (GAO-17-218, GAO-17-

346SP).
82

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

Initial OT&E

Follow-on OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

07/2016

01/2013

POSITIONS

FILLED

93.8

1

94.8

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

25

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

United States Coast Guard (USCG) FAST RESPONSE CUTTER (FRC)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE

In February 2017, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) assessed

the results from the program’s July 2016 follow-on operational test and evaluation

(OT&E) and determined that

• the program met its six key performance parameters, and

• the FRC was operationally effective and suitable.

During follow-on OT&E, the OTA found that several deficiencies from the program’s

initial OT&E had been corrected. For example, the OTA closed a severe deficiency

related to the engines based on modifications to the FRC’s main diesel engines.

However, five major deficiencies remain. According to USCG officials, the remaining

deficiencies are related to ergonomics (e.g., improving the working environment for

operators) and issues with stowage space. USCG officials stated that they plan to

resolve the remaining deficiencies by fiscal year 2020.

DOT&E noted that these deficiencies do not prevent mission completion or present a

danger to personnel, but recommended that they be resolved as soon as possible.

USCG officials indicated that they plan to resolve the remaining deficiencies through

engineering or other changes.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The USCG continues to work with the contractor—Bollinger Shipyards, LLC—to address

issues covered by the warranty and acceptance clauses for each ship. For example, 18

engines—9 operational engines and 9 spare engines—have been replaced under the

program’s warranty. According to USCG documentation, 65 percent of the current

issues with the engines have been resolved through retrofits; however, additional

problems with the engines have been identified since our April 2017 review. For

example, issues with water pump shafts are currently being examined through a root

cause analysis and will be redesigned and are scheduled to undergo retrofits starting

in December 2018. We previously found that the FRC’s warranty resulted in improved

cost and quality by requiring the shipbuilder to pay for the repair of defects. As of

September 2017, USCG officials said the replacements and retrofits completed under

the program’s warranty allowed the USCG to avoid an estimated $104 million in

potential unplanned costs—of which $63 million is related to the engines.

The FRC program does not have any critical staffing vacancies, but the USCG identified

insufficient staffing for shore-side support groups as a potential risk that could affect

the asset’s operations. These groups provide maintenance to the FRCs while they are

in port. In order to mitigate this staffing issue, the USCG is using commercial contracts

for maintenance to supplement the capacity of the USCG’s maintenance staff.

USCG officials stated that the FRC program is fully funded, executable, and on track to reach FOC by March of 2027. They added

that FRCs were recently delivered to locations in Mississippi, Alaska, and Hawaii. USCG officials stated that FRCs are integral to

USCG operations, such as providing critical support during the recent hurricane season, and that the program office continues to

work with the contractor and stakeholders to quickly and properly address issues with FRCs as they are identified. USCG officials

also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
83

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

47

22

52 50 50

02/11

APB approved

TBD

Full

operational

capability

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 02/2011

11/16

Program

breach

TBD

Avionics initial

operational 

capability 

03/14

APB revised

TBD

Avionics

ADE 2C

09/20

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (02/2011) 1,150 7,033 8,184

Current APB (03/2014) 935 12,927 13,863

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 936 15,651 16,587

(may not add due to rounding)

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

H-65 CONVERSION/SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM (H-65)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The H-65 aircraft is a short-range helicopter that the USCG uses to fulfill its missions,

including search and rescue, ports and waterways security, marine safety, and defense

readiness. The H-65 acquisition program increased the fleet’s size by 7 aircraft, added

armament capabilities, upgraded navigation systems, and replaced each of the

helicopters’ engines. The program is currently focused on upgrades to radar sensors,

the automatic flight control system (AFCS), and avionics.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

COST AND SCHEDULE

As of November 2017, the program remains in breach of its current acquisition

program baseline (APB). In November 2016, the USCG notified Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) leadership that it would not complete all activities

required—including developmental testing and an operational assessment—to

achieve acquisition decision event (ADE) 2C for low-rate initial production of the

avionics and AFCS upgrades by its current APB threshold date of March 2017.

USCG officials primarily attributed these delays to an underestimation of the

technical effort necessary to meet the requirements and have subsequently

worked with the contractor to continue development of avionic upgrades.

In January 2017, DHS leadership directed the program to update its APB, life-cycle

cost estimate (LCCE) and test and evaluation master plan by May 2017. However, 

the USCG did not meet this deadline, in part, because it decided to add a service life 

extension program (SLEP) to the H-65 program. The SLEP is expected to extend the 

current 20,000 flight hour service life of each aircraft by another 10,000 flight hours 

by replacing obsolete aircraft components. USCG officials stated that this will allow 

the USCG to delay purchasing new aircraft to prioritize funding for the Offshore Patrol 

Cutter.

USCG officials plan to obtain approval for the SLEP when the program submits its

revised APB for DHS approval, which is expected by March 2018. The program is

revising its LCCE, but provided an update in June 2017 to inform the budget

process. This update exceeds its current APB thresholds because it includes an

initial estimate for the SLEP. The USCG estimates that the SLEP will cost $54

million for the entire fleet. USCG officials attributed the increase in operations and

maintenance (O&M) costs to the additional extension of the aircraft’s operational

life. The program’s O&M costs previously increased due to the USCG’s decision to

extend the aircraft’s operational life from 2030 to 2039.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because—

as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain O&M

funding for USCG programs. USCG officials anticipate receiving $1.6 billion in O&M

funding over this 5-year period. 

Program remains in breach;

new baseline expected to

reflect USCG plans to extend

H-65 service life.

Operational assessment of

avionics upgrade planned to

start in February 2018.

Program fully staffed, but

schedule slips raise risks with

future staffing requirements.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
84

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Operational 

assessment 

Initial OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED 11/2018

PLANNED 02/2018

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

21

21

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

1

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

H-65 CONVERSION/SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM (H-65)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE 

According to USCG officials, the H-65 program has demonstrated 16 of its 18 key

performance parameters (KPP), but has not yet demonstrated its 2 avionics KPPs.

USCG officials previously stated that the aircraft have not consistently met the 3 KPPs

related to operational availability during actual operations because of difficulties

maintaining aging equipment, among other things, which the avionics upgrades

should address.

According to USCG officials, the program has completed several years of

developmental testing on the avionics and AFCS upgrades. In July 2017, the program

made minor updates to its test and evaluation master plan to account for the avionics 

schedule slips and SLEP addition. In September 2017, USCG officials stated that 

two aircraft had received the avionics upgrades and flown a combined 800 test 

hours. Data collected from these aircraft will be used to inform the ADE 2C. The 

USCG subsequently plans to modify a third aircraft with both the avionics and SLEP 

upgrades to validate and verify the implementation of the modifications into the fleet 

simultaneously.

The program’s OTA plans to conduct an operational assessment starting in February

2018 to identify areas of risk before beginning initial operational test and evaluation

(OT&E) in late calendar year 2018. Initial OT&E is intended to test all of the H-65

upgrades installed throughout the life of the program to support approval for full-rate

production.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The USCG awarded new contracts to Rockwell Collins—the original equipment

manufacturer of the legacy AFCS and avionics—to address the challenges

encountered with development of the new upgrades. Specifically, the program

awarded new contracts to support continued development of the AFCS and avionics

upgrades in July 2016 and March 2017, respectively. As of September 2017, the

combined value of both contracts totaled more than $15 million.

The USCG cancelled development of a dedicated surface search radar capability for

the H-65 in 2014, but USCG officials said a commercial off-the-shelf weather radar

with surface search capability will be installed as part of the avionics upgrade.

USCG officials said there is some risk involved with extending the aircrafts’ service life

beyond 20,000 flight hours since it has never been done by other agencies that

operate the H-65. However, USCG officials stated that the aircraft manufacturer,

Airbus, assisted the USCG’s chief aeronautical engineer in identifying specific parts

needing replacement and is providing support.

In July 2017, the USCG reported that the program was fully staffed, but that the

schedule slips have introduced potential risks with future staffing requirements. The

program is mitigating these risks by extending some military personnel and ensuring

rotating personnel are replaced by new staff with the expertise needed to complete

the program’s planned activities, such as testing.

USCG officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)
85

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

50

19

430

300

150

AS OF 01/2018

09/29

06/14

ADE 1

06/21

ADE 2C

12/23

Initial 

operational 

capability

09/29

Full operational

capability

AS OF 01/2018

02/18

ADE 2A/2B

01/18

Initial APB

approved

Note: Life-cycle cost also includes costs for disposal.

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (01/2018) 3,207 6,594 9,827

Current APB (01/2018) 3,207 6,594 9,827

Current estimate 

(01/2018) 2,789 5,734 8,545

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

HEAVY POLAR ICEBREAKER

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The program is intended to assist the USCG in maintaining the capability to access

the Arctic and Antarctic polar regions. The USCG requires its icebreaking fleet to

conduct multiple missions, including defense readiness; marine environmental

protection; ports, waterway, and coastal security; and search and rescue. The USCG

plans to acquire three heavy icebreakers to recapitalize the only existing

operational heavy icebreaker, which is nearing the end of its service life.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In June 2014, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership granted the

program acquisition decision event (ADE) 1 approval. The Acting Under Secretary for

Management also acknowledged the USCG’s need to accelerate the acquisition

process to mitigate gaps in the heavy icebreaking capability because the service life

of the USCG’s only heavy polar icebreaker, which had already been extended, could

end as early as 2020.

In January 2018, DHS leadership approved the program’s initial acquisition program

baseline (APB) establishing cost, schedule, and performance goals. The USCG

planned to achieve a combined ADE 2A and 2B by December 2017, which would

authorize the initiation of development efforts. According to DHS officials, this

milestone was delayed to February 2018 to allow for the completion of required

acquisition documents to inform the decision, such as the program’s life-cycle cost

estimate and APB.

The USCG is partnering with the Navy to leverage shipbuilding expertise and engaging

early with potential shipbuilders through industry studies to mitigate some risks

associated with the program’s accelerated acquisition schedule. However, GAO

previously found that the program faces challenges in implementing the accelerated

schedule. For example, the first icebreaker—which is preliminarily estimated to cost

about $750 million to design and construct—would need to be fully funded in fiscal

year 2019 at the same time the USCG is expecting to prioritize funding for the

Offshore Patrol Cutter.

In fiscal year 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act or associated explanatory

materials, reflected funding for the program, including $150 million for advance

procurement of heavy polar icebreakers and $25 million to the USCG for

programmatic costs, respectively. USCG officials stated that the Navy funding could

cover most of the design costs but would not cover long lead items or construction

costs for any of the ships. They further stated that uncertainties with the amount and

source of future appropriations have made planning the icebreaker acquisition

challenging. 

Initial cost and schedule

goals approved; program

faces challenges with funding

and accelerated schedule.

Program initiated model

testing of hull and propulsion

systems, which will inform

design decisions.

Program office integrates

USCG and Navy personnel,

but funding responsibilities

may cause challenges.

GAO last reported on this

program in September 2017

(GAO-17-698R).
86

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Initial Operational 

Test and 

Evaluation

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED 03/2024

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

30

2

32

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

7

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

HEAVY POLAR ICEBREAKER

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE 

DHS leadership approved four key performance parameters (KPP) related to the

ship’s ability to independently break through ice, the ship’s operating duration, and

communications.

In May 2017, the USCG began model testing of potential hull designs and propulsion

configurations. USCG officials explained that the hulls of icebreakers are unique from

other ships because they must balance a hull design optimized for icebreaking, which

are generally broad and blunt, against a hull design optimized for seakeeping, which

are generally narrow and streamlined. USCG officials noted that the power demands

and propulsion system for the ship are dependent on the hull design. USCG officials

stated that maneuverability was identified as a challenge during model testing and

explained that azimuthing propulsors—propellers that sit below the ship and can

rotate 360 degrees—offered better maneuverability than traditional propulsion

systems. USCG officials said these propulsors are widely used on commercial ships,

but may need modification to meet the USCG’s requirements. USCG officials

anticipate results from the model testing to be completed by March 2018 and plan to

use these results to inform the final specifications for the ships.

In November 2017, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation approved the 

program’s test and evaluation master plan, which calls for additional model testing to 

assess resistance, propulsion, and maneuverability.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The USCG established an integrated heavy polar icebreaker program office with the

Navy and in 2017, DHS, the USCG, and Navy entered into several agreements that

outline oversight roles, among other things. For example, these agreements state that

the program will follow DHS acquisition policies with DHS leadership serving as the

acquisition decision authority for program milestones. However, the Navy will review

and approve acquisition documents before the program seeks DHS approval. These

agreements also state that the program’s contracting actions could be funded by

either USCG or Navy appropriations, and the source of the appropriations will award

the contract.

The program plans to competitively award a contract, which would include options for

the detail design and construction for all three ships to a single shipbuilder by June

2019. Program officials stated they plan to award the contract under full and open

competition to obtain competitive prices and include the construction of the three

ships as options to accommodate the program’s funding uncertainties. In February

2017, the USCG awarded contracts to five shipbuilders—valued at approximately $4

million each—for design studies which will inform program decisions. Program

officials stated that under these design studies contracts, the shipbuilders

developed several potential ship designs and preliminary costs, with a focus on

alternative propulsion options and hull designs.

In August 2017, USCG officials told GAO that the program’s staffing gap was not

negatively impacting program efforts.

USCG officials stated that the program office had completed requirements for ADE 2A and 2B, and is on track to release

the request for proposals for the detail design and construction contract by March 2018. These officials added that, during

2017, the program office refined the program’s requirements, completed ice and open water model testing, and partnered

with five industry teams to evaluate multiple design solutions. USCG officials also provided technical comments on a draft

of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)
87

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

6 0 0

100

18

05/09

HC-130J 

APB approved

03/27

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 06/2009

07/12

Combined

HC-130H/J

APB approved

06/09

HC-130H

APB approved

09/17

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (06/2009) 866 16,226 17,092

Current APB (07/2012) 3,038 13,174 16,213

Current estimate 

(11/2011) 2,761 12,704 15,465

(may not add due to rounding)

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-130H/J)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The USCG uses HC-130H and HC-130J aircraft to conduct search and rescue

missions, transport cargo and personnel, support law enforcement, and execute other

operations. Both aircraft are quad-engine propeller-driven platforms. The HC-130J is a

modernized version of the HC-130H, which has advanced engines, propellers, and

equipment that provide enhanced speed, altitude, range, and surveillance capabilities.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

COST AND SCHEDULE

During 2017, the USCG continued a nearly 3-year effort to re-baseline the program—

which includes revisions to the program’s life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) and

acquisition program baseline (APB)—to account for significant changes. Specifically,

the USCG decided to pursue an all HC-130J fleet and, in fiscal year 2014, Congress

directed the transfer of 7 HC-130H aircraft to the U.S. Air Force. The USCG was in the

process of upgrading these aircraft, but cancelled further HC-130H upgrades. In

September 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership directed the

USCG to submit the revised APB by January 2018.

According to USCG officials, the re-baseline has been delayed, in part, because

Congress also directed the USCG to conduct a multi-phased analysis of its mission

needs. In November 2016, the USCG submitted the results of its analysis for fixedwing aircraft, which confirmed the planned total quantity of 22 HC-130J aircraft and

an annual flight-hour goal of 800 hours per aircraft. USCG officials said the results of

the analysis will be reflected in the program’s revised LCCE and subsequent APB, but

noted that challenges with the vendor hired to complete the LCCE revision have also

contributed to delays. The program submitted cost information in June 2017 to

inform the budget process, but it reflected no updates from the program’s November

2011 LCCE. USCG officials previously attributed the acquisition cost growth and

schedule slip from the program’s initial APB to the increase in HC-130J quantities

from 6 to 22. However, when the revised LCCE is complete, estimated costs may

decrease since the HC-130J aircraft are less expensive to maintain.

As of December 2017, USCG officials stated they had received 11 HC-130J aircraft

and had awarded contracts for 3 more—some of which were not requested. USCG

officials previously stated that the program needs to acquire 1-2 HC-130J aircraft per

year to meet its full operational capability (FOC) date. However, it is unclear how the

USCG will meet its FOC date because it only requested funding for 1 aircraft over the

next 5 years. The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated

because—as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not

contain operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs. USCG

officials anticipate receiving approximately $1.4 billion in O&M funding over this 5-

year period.

Program updating baseline

to reflect significant program

changes.

Performance testing of new

mission system processor

complete. 

Transfer of HC-130H aircraft

to other agencies ongoing.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017

(GAO-17-346SP).
88

POSITIONS

FILLED

20

1

21

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED 2

STAFFING

GAP

DATE

COMPLETEDEFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

HC-130J mission 

system processor 

testing

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

06/2017 NOT APPLICABLE

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-130H/J)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: NOT APPLICABLE 

The HC-130J will not be able to meet two of its seven key performance parameters

(KPP) until the USCG installs a new mission system processor on the aircraft—an

effort that is already underway. These two KPPs are related to the detection of

targets and the aircraft’s ability to communicate with other assets. The USCG is

replacing the mission system processor on its fixed-wing aircraft—including the

HC-130J—with a system used by the U.S. Navy and DHS’s Customs and Border

Protection. The new mission system processor is intended to enhance operator

interface and sensor management, and replace obsolete equipment.

The USCG conducted developmental testing on a prototype of the HC-130J mission

system processor. According to USCG officials, this testing was completed in June

2017 and successfully demonstrated the new mission system processor in a variety

of operational environments. The USCG does not plan to operationally test the new

processor on the HC-130J, in part, because the aircraft has already been tested. In

2009, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation and the USCG determined the

HC-130J did not need to operationally test the airframe because the U.S. Air Force

conducted operational testing on the base C-130J airframe in 2005. Instead, the

USCG plans to operationally test the new mission system processor in fiscal year

2021 during operational testing on the C-27J, which is new to the USCG’s fixed-wing

fleet. As of November 2017, the USCG had accepted three HC-130J aircraft outfitted

with the new mission system processor.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

In December 2013, Congress directed the transfer of 7 HC-130H aircraft to the U.S. Air

Force for modifications—which consists of upgrades and installing a fire retardant

delivery system—and subsequent transfer to the U.S. Forest Service. This direction

factored into the USCG’s decision to pursue an all HC-130J fleet. As of December

2017, the Forest Service had not yet received any modified aircraft primarily because

of issues with contractors. According to USCG officials, the original contract the Air

Force awarded to install the fire retardant delivery system in May 2016 was terminated

7 months later due to an unqualified vendor and a new contract has not yet been

awarded. In the meantime, the Forest Service is using 2 of the 7 HC-130Hs. USCG

officials said these aircraft are not modified, but outfitted with a less effective

firefighting device.

As of November 2017, the USCG plans to operate 14 of its HC-130H aircraft until the

end of their service lives or until they can be replaced with new HC-130J aircraft.

However, as previously discussed, the USCG has not requested funding for the

additional HC-130J aircraft to support this plan.

In October 2017, USCG officials reported that they were in the process of hiring staff to

address the program’s staffing gap.

USCG officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)
89

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

97

52

100

40

145

02/09

HC-144A 

APB approved

03/25

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 02/2009

08/16

Combined 

aircraft APB 

approved

10/14

Combined 

aircraft program

established

09/20

06/21

C-27J Initial 

operational 

capability 

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (HC-144A 

only) (02/2009) 2,223 10,062 12,285

Current APB (08/2016) 2,507 12,680 15,187

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 2,219 10,185 12,404

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

MEDIUM RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-144A/

C-27J)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The USCG uses HC-144A and C-27J aircraft to conduct all types of missions,

including search and rescue and disaster response. All 32 aircraft—18 HC-144A

aircraft and 14 C-27J aircraft—are twin-engine propeller driven platforms. The

interior of both aircraft are able to be re-configured to accommodate cargo,

personnel or medical transports.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

COST AND SCHEDULE

USCG officials said the program is on track to meet the cost and schedule goals in its

current acquisition program baseline (APB), which Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) leadership approved in August 2016 to reflect the restructuring of the HC-144A

acquisition program. The USCG initially planned to procure a total of 36 HC-144A

aircraft, but reduced that number to the 18 it had already procured after Congress

directed the transfer of 14 C-27J aircraft from the U.S. Air Force to the USCG in fiscal

year 2014.

The program’s APB divides the program into two phases: phase 1 includes

acceptance of the 18 HC-144A aircraft and upgrades to the aircraft’s mission and

flight management systems, and phase 2 includes acceptance of and modifications

to the C-27J aircraft to meet the USCG’s mission needs. In October 2017, USCG

officials told GAO that the program had initiated phase 1 efforts to upgrade the first

HC-144A aircraft. The USCG plans to complete upgrades on all HC-144As by the end

of fiscal year 2021. For phase 2, the USCG has accepted all 14 C-27Js from the U.S.

Air Force and plans to complete the modification of all C-27Js by March 2025 to

achieve full operational capability (FOC).

To inform the budget process, the program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE)

in June 2017, which is within its current APB cost thresholds. This estimate includes

C-27J modification costs, such as installation of a new sensor package and new

mission system processor. The program’s LCCE for the 36 HC-144A aircraft

previously increased to $28.7 billion in 2012 when the USCG accounted for 5 years

of additional costs, among other things. The current LCCE represents a considerable

decrease, but also reflects a reduction in the number of aircraft and planned flight

hours.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because—as

we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain operations

and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs. USCG officials anticipate

receiving nearly $1.7 billion in total funding over this 5-year period to cover nearly

$1.8 billion in total costs.

Program is on track to meet

its cost and schedule goals.

Developmental testing of new 

mission system processor is 

ongoing.

Program continues to

face challenges related to

purchasing spare parts and

accessing technical data.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017 and

March 2015 (GAO-17-346SP,

GAO-15-325).
90

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Initial OT&E - 

HC-144A

Initial operational 

test and 

evaluation

(OT&E) - HC-27J

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED FISCAL YEAR 2021

07/2012

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

79

1

80

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

6

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

MEDIUM RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-144A/C-27J)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE 

Neither the HC-144A nor the C-27J will be able to meet two of their seven key

performance parameters (KPP) until the USCG installs a new mission system

processor on the aircraft—an effort that is already underway. These two KPPs are

related to the detection of targets and the aircraft’s ability to communicate with other

assets. The USCG is replacing the mission system processor on its fixed-wing aircraft—

including the HC-144A and C-27J—with a system used by the U.S. Navy and DHS’s

Customs and Border Protection. The new mission system processor is intended to

enhance operator interface and sensor management, and replace obsolete

equipment.

In October 2017, USCG officials said the new mission system processor was

undergoing developmental testing on the HC-144A, but that the test report is not

anticipated until June 2018. The USCG does not plan to operationally test the new

processor on the HC-144A, in part, because the aircraft has already undergone

operational testing. In August 2012, DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation

assessed the initial test results for the HC-144A and determined that the aircraft was

effective with limitations and suitable with limitations. USCG officials previously stated

that they are addressing these limitations with upgrades to the new mission system.

The USCG plans to operationally assess the new mission system processor during

operational testing of the C-27J, which is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2021.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The USCG still faces challenges in transitioning the C-27J into the USCG fleet. In

March 2015, GAO found that the successful and cost-effective fielding of the C-27J

aircraft is contingent on the USCG’s ability to address risk areas including, purchasing

spare parts and accessing technical data, among other issues.

According to USCG officials, the program continues to face challenges purchasing

spare parts and accessing technical data. The program is reliant on the aircraft

original equipment manufacturer for about 35 percent of spare C-27J parts. For other 

parts, USCG officials said that the USCG continues to look for ways to provide the same 

or similar parts for the aircraft at a faster rate and the USCG plans to award contracts to 

two additional manufacturers in calendar year 2018.

USCG officials stated that retrieving technical data for the C-27J aircraft remains a

challenge, but the USCG is working with the Department of Defense to obtain rights to

data currently owned by the original equipment manufacturer. Once the USCG

receives appropriate rights to C-27J technical data, the USCG officials said they can

begin modification of the aircraft. The USCG also plans to purchase the same surface

search radar used on the HC-144A or the HC-130J for the C-27J, which will give the

USCG some commonality in maintenance, logistics, and training for this aspect of the

aircraft.

In October 2017, USCG officials told GAO that the program’s staffing is adequate and

the gap has not negatively affected the program.

USCG officials stated that the program remains on track to meet the cost, schedule, and performance goals outlined in its

current APB and that they monitor APB key parameters in accordance with DHS guidance. These officials added that market

research continues to increase supply chain sources and to identify products for new mission systems. USCG officials also

provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)
91

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

65 54

21

7

65

12/08

Initial APB 

approved

09/21

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 12/2008

01/14

APB revised

05/08

Initial 

operational 

capability

09/16

11/17

APB revised

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (12/2008) 4,749 19,528 24,277

Current APB (11/2017) 6,135 16,410 22,545

Current estimate 

(10/2017) 6,030 14,270 20,299

(may not add due to rounding)

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER (NSC)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The USCG uses the NSC to conduct search and rescue, migrant and drug

interdiction, environmental protection, and other missions. The NSC replaces

and provides improved capabilities over the USCG’s High Endurance Cutters. The

NSC carries helicopters and cutter boats, provides an extended on-scene

presence at forward deployed locations, and operates worldwide.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

COST AND SCHEDULE

In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved a

revised acquisition program baseline (APB), which accounted for the addition of a

ninth NSC to the program of record. The USCG originally planned to acquire only eight

NSCs; however, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Congress directed

that not less than $640 million be immediately available and allotted to contract for

the production of a ninth NSC. In December 2016, the USCG awarded a contract to

produce the ninth NSC and, as of November 2017, six NSCs had been delivered and

three were under construction.

The USCG anticipates delivery of the ninth NSC in September 2020, which coincides

with the program’s prior APB threshold date for full operational capability (FOC).

However, the revised APB extends this date by 1 year to account for any risks in

delivering the additional ship. The program’s FOC date previously slipped 4 years,

which USCG officials attributed to funding shortfalls, among other things.

The ninth NSC contributed to a $453 million and $123 million increase in the 

program’s APB cost thresholds for acquisition and operations and maintenance

(O&M), respectively. However, the program’s revised life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) is

still lower than its initial estimate for eight ships, which USCG officials attribute to

more accurate estimates. The revised LCCE also included costs for several design

changes the USCG has had to implement on equipment with known issues. As of

September 2017, 12 equipment systems required design changes, which totaled an

estimated cost of over $260 million. This work includes structural enhancement work

on the first two NSCs and the replacement of the gantry crane, which aids in the

deployment of cutter boats.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because—

as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain O&M

funding for USCG programs. USCG officials anticipate receiving approximately $2.1

billion in O&M funding over this 5-year period to cover the NSC’s estimated $1.8

billion in O&M costs, but stated it will refine its annual budget request based on the

program’s needs each year. The USCG also identified carryover funding to cover the

projected acquisition funding shortfall in fiscal year 2018.

Program revised schedule

and cost goals to account

for a ninth NSC.

Follow-on operational testing

began in October 2017,

but cybersecurity testing

delayed.

The USCG is conducting a

study to determine root

cause of propulsion

system issues.

GAO last reported on this

program in March and April

2017 (GAO-17-218, GAO-17-

346SP).
92

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Initial OT&E

Follow-on OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED FISCAL YEAR 2018

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

04/2014

POSITIONS

FILLED

127

2

129

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED 15

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER (NSC)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE 

DHS’s Under Secretary for Management (USM) directed the USCG to complete followon operational test and evaluation (OT&E) by March 2019. According to USCG

officials, the program’s OTA began follow-on OT&E in October 2017, which will test

unmet key performance parameters (KPP) and address deficiencies found during

prior testing. The NSC completed initial operational testing in 2014, but did not fully

demonstrate 7 of its 19 KPPs, including those related to unmanned aircraft and

cutter-boat deployment in rough seas. According to USCG officials, operators have

since demonstrated these KPPs during USCG operations. For example, USCG officials

stated that they successfully demonstrated operations of a prototype unmanned

aircraft on an NSC. However, the USCG will not evaluate the NSC’s unmanned aircraft

KPP until the unmanned aircraft undergoes initial OT&E, currently planned for June

2019. In addition, the NSC will be the first USCG asset to undergo cybersecurity

testing. However, this test has been delayed over a year with the final cyber test event

scheduled for August 2018 because of a change in NSC operational schedules,

among other things.

The DHS USM also directed the USCG to complete a study to determine the root

cause of the NSC’s propulsion system issues by December 2017; however, as of

January 2018, the study was not yet complete. GAO previously reported on these

issues—including high engine temperatures, cracked cylinder heads, and overheating

generator bearings that were impacting missions—in January 2016.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The NSC program does not have any critical staffing vacancies. However, in July 2017,

the program reported that the greatest staffing challenge is a potential extension to

the program’s end date if the USCG acquires more than 9 NSCs. If this occurs, the

program office must reassess future staffing requirements to ensure adequate

program oversight continues until the last NSC completes post-delivery activities.

In addition, the USCG has made changes to its staffing model for operating the NSCs.

The USCG initially planned to implement a crew rotational concept in which crews

would rotate while NSCs were underway to achieve a goal of 230 days away from the

cutter’s homeport. In February 2018, USCG officials told GAO they abandoned the

crew rotational concept because the concept did not provide the USCG with the

expected return on investment. Instead, USCG officials said a new plan has been

implemented that does not rotate crew and is anticipated to increase the days away

from home port from the current capability of 185 days to 200 days.

USCG officials stated that NSCs had a record year of narcotics seizures in 2017. In addition to the test activities identified in

this assessment, USCG officials stated that the first follow-on OT&E event was completed in December 2017 and the first

cybersecurity test event is scheduled for February 2018. They also noted that the shipbuilder continues to show improving

cost performance and is completing construction within budget. USCG officials also provided technical comments on a draft of

this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)
93

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

400

500

716 700

457

04/12

Initial APB 

approved

06/35

Full

operational

capability

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 04/2012

09/14

APB revised

03/24

Initial 

operational 

capability

03/34

09/19

Acquisition 

decision 

event 2C

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (04/2012) 12,101 41,895 53,996

Current APB (09/2014) 12,101 41,895 53,996

Current estimate 

(06/2017) 10,449 36,204 46,653

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER (OPC)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The USCG plans to use the OPC to conduct patrols for homeland security, law

enforcement, and search and rescue operations. The OPC is being designed for

long-distance transit, extended on-scene presence, and operations with

deployable aircraft and small boats. It is intended to replace the USCG’s aging

Medium Endurance Cutters (MEC) and bridge the operational capabilities provided

by the Fast Response Cutters and National Security Cutters (NSC).

Source: © 2016 Eastern Shipbuilding Group, Panama City, FL.

COST AND SCHEDULE

According to USCG officials, the OPC program is on track to meet its cost and schedule 

goals. In September 2014, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership 

approved the program’s current acquisition program baseline (APB), which accounts 

for schedule slips resulting from delays in awarding the program’s initial contracts and 

a subsequent bid protest. The USCG expects to start construction of the first OPC in 

fiscal year 2019 and procure a total of 25 ships. The USCG plans to initially fund one 

OPC per year and eventually two OPCs per year until all 25 OPCs are delivered. USCG 

officials have stated that additional OPC delays will decrease the USCG’s operational 

capacity because the MECs will likely require increased downtime for maintenance 

and other issues, reducing their availability. 

In January 2016, DHS leadership directed the USCG to revise the OPC life-cycle cost 

estimate (LCCE) and submit it for approval within 6 months of awarding the detailed 

design and construction contract for the ships—which the USCG subsequently 

awarded in September 2016. In June 2017, the program submitted an updated LCCE 

to inform the budget process that—while not approved by DHS leadership—accounts 

for the contract award and the program’s schedule slips. As of December 2017, 

the program’s revised LCCE still had not been approved. It is unclear whether it will 

address other issues, such as an increase in the estimated weight of each ship. The 

OPC’s initial LCCE was based in large part on the estimated weight of each ship. 

However, in November 2017, USCG officials said the ship is expected to weigh up to 

35 percent more than originally estimated. Nevertheless, USCG officials expect to 

procure all 25 OPCs for the program’s APB objective cost of $10.5 billion because the 

contractor identified cost efficiencies to compensate for the increased weight. 

GAO previously raised questions about the OPC’s affordability and its effect on other

USCG acquisition programs, such as the Heavy Polar Icebreaker. Specifically, GAO

noted that the OPC procurement will consume about two-thirds of the USCG’s planned

acquisition budget between fiscal years 2018 and 2032 based on recent funding

history. The program’s affordability gap from fiscal years 2020 to 2022 may be

overstated because—as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does

not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs. USCG

officials anticipate receiving $103 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period.

Program is on track to meet 

cost and schedule goals, but 

increased ship weight may

lead to cost increases.

Program plans to refine the

ship’s design, as needed, based 

on early operational assessment 

results.

Program’s acquisition

strategy incorporated some

best practices.

GAO last reported on this

program in April and June 2017

(GAO-17-346SP, GAO-17-654T).
94

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

Initial OT&E

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

PLANNED 12/2023

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

POSITIONS

FILLED

55

37

92

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

7

9

STAFFING

GAP

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER (OPC)

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT: U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE 

DHS approved six key performance parameters (KPP) for the OPC related to the ship’s

operating range and duration, crew size, interoperability and maneuverability, and

ability to support operations in moderate to rough seas. The first OPC has not yet

been constructed, so the USCG has not yet demonstrated whether it can meet these

KPPs. The USCG plans to use engineering reviews, and developmental and

operational tests throughout the acquisition to measure the OPC’s performance.

USCG officials told GAO that the program completed an early operational assessment 

on the basic ship design in August 2017, which entailed a review of the current design

plans. The program plans to refine the ship’s design as needed based on preliminary

test results. However, as of December 2017, USCG officials had not received the

results of this assessment.

The USCG plans to conduct initial operational test and evaluation (OT&E) on the first

OPC in fiscal year 2023. However, the test results from initial OT&E will not be

available to inform key decisions. For example, the results will not be available to

inform the decision to build 2 OPCs per year—which USCG officials said is scheduled

to begin in fiscal year 2021. Without test results to inform these key decisions, the

USCG must make substantial commitments prior to knowing how well the ship will

meet its requirements.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The USCG is in the process of completing the design of the OPC before starting

construction, which is in-line with GAO shipbuilding best practices. In addition, USCG

officials stated that the program is using state-of-the-market technology that has been

proven on other ships as opposed to state-of-the-art technology, which lowers the risk

of the program.

The USCG used a two-phased down-select strategy to select a contractor to deliver the

OPC. For phase 1, the USCG conducted a full and open competition and selected three

contractors to perform preliminary design work. For phase 2, the USCG selected one of

the phase 1 contractors—Eastern Shipbuilding—to develop a detailed design of the OPC

and construct no more than the first 11 ships. The contract—worth approximately $110

million—includes separate options for each ship. The options for ships 10 and 11 were

unpriced and included in the solicitation as an incentive to convert the contract type

from fixed price incentive to firm fixed price. These options will be included in a repricing

proposal submitted by the contractor for ships 6-9 after delivery of the first ship.

USCG officials have stated the USCG will decide whether to exercise the option for

ships 10 and 11 based on the contractor’s re-pricing proposal for ships 6-9. The USCG

plans to re-compete the contract for the remaining 14-16 ships.

The OPC program continued to increase its required staffing level and the USCG

reported that adjustments to staffing will continue as the program matures. The

program faces shortages including engineers, a logistics manager, and a technical

director, but USCG officials said they are hiring staff to address these gaps.

USCG officials stated that the OPC program is fully funded, executable, and on track to award construction for the first OPC in

September 2018. These officials said design efforts are on track and the contractor is meeting the milestones to deliver the

first OPC in 2021. USCG officials noted that they are continuing to increase staff at the contractor’s facility to prepare for the

start of construction for the first OPC. USCG officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which

GAO incorporated as appropriate.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)
95

0

50

100

150

200

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

PROJECTED

FUNDING

ACQUISITION 

COSTS

OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M)

COSTS

54

97

0 0 0

07/11

Initial APB

approved

TBD

FOC

AS OF 01/2018

AS OF 07/2011

09/16

Program

breach

04/15

APB revised

TBD

Citizenship line 

of business 

products complete

06/14

ACQUISITION

COST

O&M

COST

LIFE-CYCLE

COST

Initial APB (07/2011) 1,356 718 2,074

Current APB (04/2015) 1,631 1,487 3,118

Current estimate 

(06/2017) N/A N/A 2,792

TBD = To be determined

FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 AFFORDABILITY

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

APB THRESHOLDS VS. CURRENT ESTIMATE

DOLLARS IN MILLIONS

SCHEDULE CHANGES

key

findings

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

TRANSFORMATION

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS)

The Transformation program was established in 2006 to transition USCIS from a

fragmented, paper-based filing environment to a consolidated, paperless

environment for processing immigration and citizenship applications. The program

developed a new system architecture and delivers capability through releases that

correspond to new product lines within four lines of business: Citizenship,

Immigrant, Non-Immigrant, and Humanitarian.

Source: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

COST AND SCHEDULE

The program remains in breach of its current acquisition program baseline (APB). In 

September 2016, the Transformation program experienced a schedule breach when it 

failed to complete deployment of all the product lines associated with the Citizenship 

line of business. The deployment was delayed because of challenges processing new 

product lines on the new system architecture and other technical issues with the case 

management system. Prior to the breach, the program deployed six product lines, 

which supported approximately 24 percent of the total workload processed by USCIS 

in fiscal year 2016. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership previously rebaselined the program in April 2015 after USCIS determined that it could not use any 

of the architecture delivered under its initial strategy, despite having invested more 

than $475 million in its development.

In December 2016, DHS leadership directed USCIS to stop planning and 

development for new product lines, develop a breach remediation plan, and update its 

acquisition documentation. In February 2017, DHS leadership approved the program’s 

remediation plan and the program has since made progress in implementing this 

plan. However, DHS leadership elected to continue with the program’s pause in new 

development following program reviews in March 2017, July 2017, and October 2017.

USCIS officials said they are revising the program’s acquisition documents—including 

its APB and life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE)—and plan to re-baseline by March 2018. 

The program updated the total costs in its LCCE to inform the budget process, but 

these costs do not reflect the program’s re-baselining plans. As a result, the status of 

the program against its cost and schedule goals is unclear. However, the program is 

more than 3 years past its original full operational capability (FOC) date.

The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because 

DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations and maintenance 

funding for individual programs. USCIS uses revenue from premium processing fees to 

fund the Transformation program and routinely collects more fees than the program’s 

estimated costs.

Program remains in breach;

re-baseline expected in

March 2018.

Revision of key performance

parameters and test and 

evaluation master plan in 

progress.

Program is reorganizing

to leverage expertise

within USCIS and revise its

approach.

GAO last reported on this

program in April 2017 and July

2016 (GAO-17-346SP, GAO-16-

467).
96

DATE

COMPLETED

EFFECTIVE

SUITABLE

SECURE

CYBE

TEST EVENT R

PASS PASS WITH

LIMITATIONS FAIL NOT ASSESSED

OA – Automation

of resident card 

replacement 

applications

OA – Immigration 

visa fee product 

line

OA – Citizenship 

line of business

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TEST

AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

08/2015

03/2016

TBD

NONE

NONE

POSITIONS

FILLED

519.3

7

526.3

TOTAL FTES

NEEDED

CRITICAL

FILLED

CRITICAL

GAP

5.5 46.5

STAFFING

GAP

TBD = To be determined

TEST STATUS

STAFFING PROFILE

IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTE)

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) TRANSFORMATION

PERFORMANCE AND TESTING

OPERATIONAL TEST AGENT (OTA): PPT SOLUTIONS, INC

In September 2017, USCIS officials told GAO that the program is updating its key 

performance parameters (KPP) and test and evaluation master plan as part of 

its re-baselining efforts because the program continues to struggle to meet its 

requirements.

DHS leadership previously approved a revised set of eight KPPs for the program in 

April 2015. However, USCIS could not fully demonstrate these KPPs until it achieved 

FOC. In the interim, the program’s OTA conducted operational assessments (OA) 

of new product lines as capability was deployed. The OTA completed two OAs since 

the program updated its KPPs, but DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation 

(DOT&E) did not verify all of the results. DOT&E reviewed the results of the first OA and 

concluded that the system met 6 of the 7 tested KPPs, but noted that the capability 

assessed was a minor subset of the system’s FOC.

The OTA subsequently initiated an OA intended to inform DHS leadership’s acceptance 

of the Citizenship line of business. However, in December 2017, USCIS officials 

reported that the assessment had not yet been completed.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

USCIS officials told GAO that the program office underwent a reorganization in 

January 2017 to help address the program’s recent challenges. This effort included 

dismantling the program office and repositioning Transformation under the USCIS Office 

of Information Technology so the program could leverage expertise in areas such as 

engineering within USCIS. USCIS officials reported that the program no longer plans 

to deliver capability by product lines because this strategy focused too narrowly on 

the automation of forms associated with the lines of business. Going forward, USCIS 

officials said the program plans to develop capabilities that will address broader 

objectives, such as reducing the time it takes to process applications and decisions.

The program previously made significant changes after it experienced a 5-month delay 

with its first release, which was deployed in May 2012. DHS attributed this delay to 

weak contractor performance and pursuing an unnecessarily complex system, among 

other things. To address these issues, the Office of Management and Budget, DHS, and 

USCIS determined the program should implement a new acquisition strategy, which 

allowed for an agile software development methodology and increased competition for 

development work. This strategy was reflected in the program’s April 2015 re-baseline.

USCIS officials told GAO that they plan to address the Transformation program’s staffing 

gap now that the reorganization is complete.

USCIS officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
Appendix II: Key Portfolio Management 

Practices

Page 97 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

To help determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes 

to better reflect key portfolio management practices, we assessed the 

department’s requirements, acquisition management, and resource 

allocation policies using key practices we established in September 

2012.1 These key practices are based on our past work, in which we 

examined the practices that private sector entities use to achieve a 

balanced mix of new projects and found that successful commercial 

companies use a disciplined and integrated approach to prioritize needs 

and allocate resources.2 As a result, these organizations can avoid 

pursuing more projects than their resources can support and better 

optimize the return on their investments. This approach, known as 

portfolio management, requires companies to view each of their 

investments as contributing to a collective whole, rather than as 

independent and unrelated.

The following portfolio management practices—organized into four key 

practice areas—can improve outcomes when managing a portfolio of 

acquisition programs.

1. Clearly define and empower leadership

• Those responsible for product investment decisions and oversight 

should be clearly identified and held accountable for outcomes

• Portfolio managers should be empowered to make decisions 

about the best way to invest resources

• Portfolio managers should be supported with cross-functional 

teams composed of representatives from key functional areas

2. Establish standard assessment criteria, and demonstrate 

comprehensive knowledge of the portfolio

• Specific criteria should be used to ensure transparency and 

comparability across alternatives

 1

GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to 

Help Meet Mission Needs, GAO-12-833 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2012).

2

GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).

Appendix II: Key Portfolio Management 

Practices
Appendix II: Key Portfolio Management 

Practices

Page 98 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

• Investments should be ranked and selected using a disciplined 

process to assess the costs, benefits, and risks of alternative 

products

• Knowledge should encompass the entire portfolio, including 

needs, gaps, and how to best meet the gaps

3. Prioritize investments by integrating the requirements, 

acquisition, and budget processes

• Requirements, acquisition, and budget processes should be 

connected to promote stability and accountability

• Organizations should use an integrated approach to prioritize 

needs and allocate resources, so they can avoid pursuing more 

products than they can afford, and optimize return on investment

• Resource allocation across the portfolio should align with strategic 

goals/objectives, and investment review policy should use longrange planning

4. Continually make go/no-go decisions to rebalance the portfolio

• Program requirements should be reviewed annually to make 

recommendations on proposed changes or options to reduce the 

scope

• As potential new products are identified, portfolios should be 

rebalanced based on those that add the most value

• If a program’s estimates breach established thresholds, the 

program should be immediately reassessed within the context of 

the portfolio to determine whether that program is still relevant and 

affordable

• Agencies should use information gathered from postimplementation reviews of investments, as well as information 

learned from other organizations, to fine-tune the investment 

process and the portfolios to shape strategic outcomes
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 99 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

The objectives of this audit were designed to provide congressional 

committees insight into the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

major acquisition programs. We assessed the extent to which (1) DHS’s 

major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost 

goals and (2) DHS has taken actions to enhance its policies and 

processes to better reflect key portfolio management practices. To 

answer these questions, we reviewed 28 of DHS’s 79 major acquisition 

programs.1 We reviewed all 16 of DHS’s Level 1 acquisition programs—

those with life-cycle cost estimates (LCCE) of $1 billion or more—that had 

at least one project, increment, or segment in the Obtain phase—the 

stage in the acquisition life cycle when programs develop, test, and 

evaluate systems—at the initiation of our audit. Additionally, we reviewed 

12 other major acquisition programs—including 8 Level 1 programs that 

either had not yet entered or were beyond the Obtain phase, and 4 Level 

2 programs that have LCCEs between $300 million and less than $1 

billion—that we identified were at risk of not meeting their cost estimates, 

schedules, or capability requirements based on our past work and 

discussions with DHS officials. Specifically, we met with representatives 

from DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management 

(PARM)—DHS’s main body for acquisition oversight—as a part of our 

scoping effort to determine which programs (if any) were facing difficulties 

in meeting their cost estimates, schedules, or capability requirements. 

The 28 selected programs were sponsored by eight different components, 

and they are identified in table 7, along with our rationale for selecting 

them.

 1

Our review included 24 of the 26 programs we reviewed in GAO, Homeland Security 

Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions 

Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress, GAO-17-346SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2017). We 

did not include the Land Border Integration program in this review because it achieved full 

operational capability in September 2016. We also did not include the Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program—

known as C4ISR—because, as we found in April 2017—it is focused primarily on 

improving the C4ISR system on the National Security Cutter and responsibility for C4ISR 

systems for other Coast Guard assets are being managed by the respective assets’

program offices.

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 100 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Table 6: Rationale for Selecting DHS Major Acquisition Programs for Review

Component Program Level 1 program in 

the Obtain phase at 

the initiation of our 

audit

At risk of not meeting 

cost estimates, schedule, 

or capability 

requirements

Customs and Border Protection Automated Commercial Environment X —

Biometric Entry-Exit Program — X

Border Wall System Program — X

Integrated Fixed Towersa — X

Medium Lift Helicopter (UH-60) X —

Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft X —

Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems Program — X

Remote Video Surveillance System X —

Tactical Communications Modernization — X

TECS (not an acronym) Modernizationa — X

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

Logistics Supply Chain Management Systema — X

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

TECS (not an acronym) Modernizationa — X

National Protection and 

Programs Directorate 

Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation X —

Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology X —

National Cybersecurity Protection System X —

Next Generation Networks Priority Services X —

Science and Technology 

Directorate 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility X —

Transportation Security 

Administration 

Electronic Baggage Screening Program X —

Passenger Screening Program X —

Technology Infrastructure Modernization X —

U.S. Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter — X

H-65 Conversion/Sustainment Program X —

Heavy Polar Icebreaker — X

Long Range Surveillance Aircraft (HC-130H/J) — X

Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft (HC144A & C-27J)X —

National Security Cutter — X

Offshore Patrol Cutter X —

U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services 

Transformation X —

Legend: X = yes; — = no; shaded rows = new program reviewed in 2018.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data. | GAO-18-339SP

a

Level 2 program.
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 101 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

To determine the extent to which DHS’s major acquisition programs are 

on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, we collected key 

acquisition documentation for each of the 28 programs, such as all 

LCCEs and acquisition program baselines (APB) approved at the 

department level since DHS’s current acquisition management policy 

went into effect in November 2008. DHS policy establishes that all major 

acquisition programs should have a department-approved APB, which 

establishes a program’s critical cost, schedule, and performance 

parameters, before they initiate efforts to obtain new capabilities. Twenty 

four of the 28 programs had one or more department-approved LCCEs 

and APBs between November 2008 and December 31, 2017.2 We used 

these APBs to establish the initial and current cost and schedule goals for 

the programs. We then developed a data collection instrument to help 

validate the information from the APBs and collect similar information 

from programs without department-approved APBs. Specifically, for each 

program, we pre-populated a data collection instrument to the extent 

possible with the schedule and cost information we had collected from the 

APBs and our 2017 assessment (if applicable) to identify schedule and 

cost goal changes, if any, since (a) the program’s initial baseline was 

approved and (b) January 2017—the data cut-off date of the report we 

issued in April 2017. We shared our data collection instruments with 

officials from the program offices to confirm or correct our initial analysis 

and to collect additional information to enhance the timeliness and 

comprehensiveness of our data sets. We then met with program officials 

to identify causes and effects associated with any identified schedule and 

cost goal changes. Subsequently, we drafted preliminary assessments for 

each of the 28 programs, shared them with program and component 

officials, and gave these officials an opportunity to submit comments to 

help us correct any inaccuracies, which we accounted for as appropriate 

(such as when new information was available).

Additionally, in July 2017, we collected copies of the detailed data on 

affordability that programs submitted to inform the fiscal year 2019 

resource allocation process. We also collected copies of any annual 

LCCE updates programs submitted in fiscal year 2017. For each of the 24 

programs with a department-approved APB, we compared (a) the most 

 2

The remaining 4 programs—Biometric Entry-Exit, Border Wall System Program, Remote 

Video Surveillance System, and the Heavy Polar Icebreaker—did not receive department 

approval of their initial APBs by December 31, 2017; therefore, we excluded them from 

our assessment of whether programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals 

during 2017. 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 102 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

recent cost data we collected (i.e., a department-approved LCCE, the 

detailed LCCE information submitted during the resource allocation 

process, a fiscal year 2017 annual LCCE update, or an update provided 

by the program office) to (b) DHS’s funding plan presented in the Future 

Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) report to Congress for fiscal 

years 2018–2022, which presents 5-year funding plans for DHS’s major 

acquisition programs, to assess the extent to which a program was 

projected to have an acquisition funding gap in fiscal year 2018.3 These 

calculations also accounted for any funds that programs brought into 

fiscal year 2018 from sources, such as fiscal year 2017 carryover, reprogramming, and fees. We shared our analysis with officials from the 

program offices to confirm or correct our calculations. We also identified 

actions DHS had taken or planned to take to address projected program 

funding gaps by reviewing key documentation, such as certification of 

funds memorandums, submitted in 2017. We also met with program 

officials to identify causes and effects associated with any projected 

funding gaps, and interviewed senior financial officials from DHS 

headquarters to discuss actions they had taken to implement our prior 

recommendations on addressing program affordability issues.4 Through 

this process, we determined that our data elements were sufficiently 

reliable for the purpose of this engagement.

To determine the extent to which DHS has taken actions to enhance its 

policies and processes to better reflect key portfolio management 

practices, we compared the department’s current policies for 

requirements, acquisition management, and resource allocation 

processes to key practices we established in a September 2012 report—

 3

The FYHSP reports information by the department’s new common appropriation 

structure, which created standard appropriation fund types including (1) procurement, 

construction, and improvements and (2) operations and support. We refer to these types 

of funding as (1) acquisition and (2) operations and maintenance throughout this report.

4

For example, see GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened 

Management, but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO-16-338SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2016), and Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could 

Better Manage Its Portfolio to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with 

Congress, GAO-14-332 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2014).
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 103 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

which are listed in appendix II—and identified any significant shortfalls.5

Specifically, we assessed the joint requirements directives and instruction 

manual; DHS’s Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, Acquisition 

Management Instruction 102-01-001, and other related guidance; and 

DHS’s resource allocation directive, instruction, and handbook. First, we 

assessed each group of policies against the key practices using the 

following ratings:

• Met—the documents fully reflected the key practice.

• Partially met—the documents reflected some, but not all parts of the 

key practice.

• Not met—the documents did not reflect the key practice.

We shared our preliminary analysis for each group of policies with the 

DHS officials responsible for implementing them—specifically, the Joint 

Requirements Council (JRC), PARM, and the Office of Program Analysis 

and Evaluation (PA&E)—to discuss our findings, identify relevant sections 

of the documents we had not yet accounted for, and solicit their thoughts 

on those key practices that were not reflected in the policies. Second, we 

used the scores for each group of policies to develop a department-wide 

rating for each key practice. When applicable, we weighted the 

department-wide rating based on the intent of the key practice. For 

example, the department-wide rating for the key practice related to 

resource allocation across the portfolio was based more heavily on the 

rating for the resource allocation policies, rather than the ratings for the 

requirements or acquisition management policies. Third, we rolled-up the 

ratings for all the key practices in a particular area—as identified in 

appendix II—to establish a department-wide overall rating for each key 

practice area. We concluded that a key practice area was met if all ratings 

for the individual key practices in that area were met; partially met if the 

ratings for the individual key practices in that area were all partially met or 

 5

We established GAO’s key portfolio management practices in GAO, Homeland Security: 

DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to Help Meet Mission Needs, 

GAO-12-833 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2012). We initially included the Chief 

Information Officer’s policies for portfolio management of information technology programs 

in our assessment. We ultimately decided to exclude these policies because DHS officials 

told us they are in the process of revising them and DHS’s requirements, acquisition 

management, and resource allocation policies are applicable to information technology 

programs. In addition, we assess DHS’s portfolio management of information technology 

programs through our high-risk updates. For the most recent report, see High-Risk Series: 

Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, 

GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017).
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 104 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

a mix of met and not met; or not met if the ratings for the individual key 

practices in that area were all not met.

In addition, we reviewed documentation that resulted from DHS’s 

requirements, acquisition management, and resource allocation 

processes since January 2016 to get a sense of how the department has 

implemented its current policies. For example, we reviewed JRCvalidated requirements documents; acquisition decision memorandums; 

Acquisition Program Health Assessment reports; and documentation 

related to the development of DHS’s fiscal year 2018 budget request and 

the fiscal year 2018–2022 FYHSP report, including resource allocation 

guidance, presentations to DHS leadership, and preliminary decisions. 

We also interviewed officials from the JRC, PARM, PA&E, and the 

Deputy’s Management Action Group to identify any current and planned 

initiatives to improve management of the department’s portfolio of major 

acquisition programs. We then compared our assessment of DHS’s 

current policies, practices, and planned initiatives to our previous findings 

and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.6

We conducted this performance audit from March 2017 through May 

2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 6

GAO-12-833, GAO-14-332, and GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: September 2014).
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 105 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 106 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 107 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Marie A. Mak, (202) 512-4841 or makm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact listed above, Rick Cederholm (Assistant 

Director), Aryn Ehlow (Analyst-in-Charge), Pete Anderson, Lorraine 

Ettaro, Helena Johnson, TyAnn Lee, Alexis Olson, Sylvia Schatz, 

Roxanna Sun, and Lindsay Taylor made key contributions to this report. 

Other contributors included Mathew Bader, Carissa Bryant, Andrew 

Burton, Erin Butkowski, Lisa Canini, Jenny Chow, John Crawford, Lindsey 

Cross, Laurier R. Fish, Betsy Gregory-Hosler, Claire Li, Sarah Martin, 

Marycella Mierez, Erin O’Brien, Katherine Pfeiffer, John Rastler, Ashley 

Rawson, Andrew Redd, Jill Schofield, Charlie Shivers III, and Jeanne 

Sung.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Page 108 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

DHS Program Costs: Reporting Program-Level Operations and Support 

Costs to Congress Would Improve Oversight. GAO-18-344. Washington, 

D.C.: April 25, 2018.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Identifying All Non-Major Acquisitions 

Would Advance Ongoing Efforts to Improve Management. GAO-17-396. 

Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2017.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and 

Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing 

Progress. GAO-17-346SP. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2017.

Coast Guard Cutters: Depot Maintenance Is Affecting Operational 

Availability and Cost Estimates Should Reflect Actual Expenditures.

GAO-17-218. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2017.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Joint Requirements Council’s Initial 

Approach Is Generally Sound and It Is Developing a Process to Inform 

Investment Priorities. GAO-17-171. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2016.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, 

but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.

National Security Cutter: Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure 

Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed.

GAO-16-148. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2016.

TSA Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to Improve Efficiency of 

Screening Technology Test and Evaluation. GAO-16-117. Washington, 

D.C.: December 17, 2015.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal 

Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GAO-15-171SP. Washington, 

D.C.: April 22, 2015.

Coast Guard Aircraft: Transfer of Fixed-Wing C-27J Aircraft Is Complex 

and Further Fleet Purchases Should Coincide with Study Results.

GAO-15-325. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2015.

Related GAO Products
Page 109 GAO-18-339SP Homeland Security Acquisitions

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Should Better Define Oversight 

Roles and Improve Program Reporting to Congress. GAO-15-292. 

Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2015.

Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and 

Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls. GAO-14-450. Washington, D.C.: 

June 5, 2014.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage Its Portfolio 

to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with Congress.

GAO-14-332. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2014.

Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment 

Management to Help Meet Mission Needs. GAO-12-833. Washington, 

D.C.: September 18, 2012.

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs 

Lack Appropriate Oversight. GAO-09-29. Washington, D.C.: November

18, 2008.

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