(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MANRIQUE v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 15–7250. Argued October 11, 2016—Decided April 19, 2017 

After federal agents found child pornography on petitioner’s computer,

he pleaded guilty to possessing a visual depiction of a minor engaging

in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§2252(a)(4)(B)

and (b)(2), an offense requiring a district court to “make restitution to

the victim of the offense,” §3663A(a)(1). The District Court entered 

an initial judgment sentencing petitioner to a term of imprisonment.

It also acknowledged that restitution was mandatory but deferred determination of the restitution amount. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from this initial judgment. Months later, the District Court entered an amended judgment, ordering petitioner to pay restitution to

one of his victims. Petitioner did not file a second notice of appeal

from the amended judgment. When he nonetheless challenged the 

restitution amount before the Eleventh Circuit, the Government argued that he had forfeited his right to do so by failing to file a second

notice of appeal. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that petitioner

could not challenge the restitution amount. 

Held: A defendant wishing to appeal an order imposing restitution in a

deferred restitution case must file a notice of appeal from that order. 

If he fails to do so and the Government objects, he may not challenge

the restitution order on appeal. Pp. 3–9.

(a) Both 18 U. S. C. §3742(a), which governs criminal appeals, and

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(1) contemplate that a defendant will file a notice of appeal after the district court has decided 

the issue sought to be appealed. Here, petitioner filed only one notice

of appeal, which preceded by many months the sentence and judgment imposing restitution. He therefore failed to properly appeal the 

amended judgment. Whether or not the requirement that a defendant file a timely notice of appeal from an amended judgment impos-
 

 

 

 

 

2 MANRIQUE v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ing restitution is a jurisdictional prerequisite, it is at least a mandatory claim-processing rule, which is “unalterable” if raised properly

by the party asserting a violation of the rule. Eberhart v. United 

States, 546 U. S. 12, 15. Because the Government timely raised the 

issue, “the court’s duty to dismiss the appeal was mandatory.” Id., at 

18. Pp. 3–5.

(b) Petitioner’s argument that his single notice of appeal sufficed

under the Federal Rules to appeal both judgments depends on two

premises: First, in a deferred restitution case, there is only one

“judgment,” as that term is used in Rules 4(b)(1) and (b)(2); and second, so long as a notice of appeal is filed after the initial judgment, it

“springs forward” under Rule 4(b)(2) to appeal the amended judgment imposing restitution. Each premise is rejected. Pp. 5–7.

(1) This Court’s analysis in Dolan v. United States, 560 U. S. 605, 

makes clear that deferred restitution cases involve two appealable

judgments, not one. The Dolan Court did not decide the question

presented here, but the Court was not persuaded by the argument

that “a sentencing judgment is not ‘final’ until it contains a definitive

determination of the amount of restitution.” Id., at 617–618. Instead, the Court recognized, “strong arguments” supported the proposition that both the initial judgment and the restitution order were 

each immediately appealable final judgments. Ibid. Pp. 5–6.

(2) Because petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed well before the

District Court announced the sentence imposing restitution, the notice of appeal did not “spring forward” to become effective on the date

the court entered its amended restitution judgment. By its own

terms, Rule 4(b)(2) applies only to a notice of appeal filed after a sentence has been announced and before the judgment imposing the sentence is entered on the docket. Even if the District Court’s acknowledgment in the initial judgment that restitution was mandatory

could qualify as a “sentence” that the District Court “announced” under Rule 4(b)(2), petitioner has never disputed that restitution is 

mandatory for his offense. Rather, he argued on appeal that the 

amount imposed is unlawful. Pp. 6–7.

(c) Petitioner’s alternative argument that any defect in his notice of 

appeal should be overlooked as harmless error is rejected. Lemke v. 

United States, 346 U. S. 325, on which he relies, has been superseded

by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in two ways. First, the 

Lemke petitioner’s notice of appeal would now be timely under Rule 

4(b)(2). Petitioner in this case cannot take advantage of that Rule. 

Second, Rule 3(a)(2) now provides the consequences for litigant errors

associated with filing a notice of appeal. The court of appeals may, in 

its discretion, overlook defects in a notice of appeal other than the 

failure to timely file a notice. It may not overlook the failure to file a 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

notice of appeal at all. Pp. 8–9. 

618 Fed. Appx. 579, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, 

J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. GORSUCH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 15–7250 

MARCELO MANRIQUE, PETITIONER v.
 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[April 19, 2017] 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Sentencing courts are required to impose restitution as

part of the sentence for specified crimes. But the amount 

to be imposed is not always known at the time of sentencing. When that is the case, the court may enter an initial 

judgment imposing certain aspects of a defendant’s sentence, such as a term of imprisonment, while deferring a

determination of the amount of restitution until entry of a 

later, amended judgment. 

We must decide whether a single notice of appeal, filed 

between the initial judgment and the amended judgment, 

is sufficient to invoke appellate review of the laterdetermined restitution amount. We hold that it is not, at 

least where, as here, the Government objects to the defendant’s failure to file a notice of appeal following the 

amended judgment. 

I 

After federal agents found more than 300 files containing child pornography on his computer, petitioner Marcelo

Manrique pleaded guilty to possessing a visual depiction

of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in viola-
 

2 MANRIQUE v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

tion of 18 U. S. C. §§2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). Under the 

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), the 

District Court was required to order petitioner to “make

restitution to the victim of the offense.” §3663A(a)(1); see

§§2259(a), (b)(2) (“An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with 

[§]3664 in the same manner as an order under [§]3663A”). 

On June 24, 2014, the District Court entered an initial 

judgment sentencing petitioner to 72 months of imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. At the sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged that restitution

was mandatory. But, consistent with the MVRA, the court 

postponed determining the victims’ damages, which had

not yet been ascertained. See, e.g., §3664(d)(5); Dolan v. 

United States, 560 U. S. 605, 607–608 (2010). Accordingly, 

the judgment expressly deferred “determination of restitution” and noted that an “Amended Judgment . . . w[ould] 

be entered after such determination.” App. 39. On July 8,

petitioner filed a notice of appeal “from the final judgment

and sentence entered in this action on the 24th day of

June, 2014.” Id., at 42. 

The District Court held a restitution hearing on September 17, 2014. Only one of the victims sought restitution. The court ordered petitioner to pay $4,500 in restitution to her and entered an amended judgment the next 

day imposing that sentence. Petitioner did not file a 

second notice of appeal from the court’s order imposing

restitution or from the amended judgment.

Notwithstanding his failure to file a second notice of 

appeal, petitioner challenged the restitution amount 

before the Eleventh Circuit, arguing in his brief that the

Government had not shown he was the proximate cause of

the victim’s injuries and that the restitution amount bore 

no rational relationship to the damages she claimed. The 

Government countered that petitioner had forfeited his 

right to challenge the restitution amount by failing to file 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

a second notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeals agreed that petitioner could not 

challenge the restitution amount and declined to consider 

his challenge. 618 Fed. Appx. 579, 583–584 (CA11 2015) 

(per curiam). We granted certiorari, 578 U. S. ___ (2016),

and now affirm. 

II
 

A 

To secure appellate review of a judgment or order, a 

party must file a notice of appeal from that judgment or

order. Filing a notice of appeal transfers adjudicatory 

authority from the district court to the court of appeals. 

The statute that governs appeals of criminal sentences, 18

U. S. C. §3742(a), provides that a “defendant may file a 

notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence” in certain specified circumstances.

See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U. S. 622, 626−628 (2002).

And Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(1) specifies

that “[a]n appeal permitted by law as of right . . . may be

taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district

clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4.” (Emphasis

added.)

Both §3742(a) and Rule 4 contemplate that the defendant will file the notice of appeal after the district court has 

decided the issue sought to be appealed. Section 

3742(a)(1) permits the defendant to file a notice of appeal

of a sentence that “was imposed in violation of law.”

(Emphasis added.) And Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(i) provides generally that, “[i]n a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of 

appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days 

after . . . the entry of either the judgment or the order 

being appealed.” (Emphasis added.)

Petitioner filed only one notice of appeal, which preceded 

by many months the sentence and judgment imposing

restitution. His notice of appeal could not have been “for 
 

4 MANRIQUE v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

review” of the restitution order, §3742(a), and it was not 

filed within the timeframe allowed by Rule 4. He thus 

failed to properly appeal under the statute and the Rules

the amended judgment imposing restitution. 

The Government contends that filing a notice of appeal

from the judgment imposing restitution is a jurisdictional 

prerequisite to securing appellate review of the restitution 

amount. See, e.g., Brief for United States 28–31. This 

position follows, according to the Government, from many 

of our cases emphasizing the “jurisdictional significance” 

of a notice of appeal. E.g., Griggs v. Provident Consumer 

Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). Because the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the Government explains, the Court of Appeals was required to dismiss petitioner’s appeal regardless of whether the 

Government raised the issue. 

We do not need to decide in this case whether the Government is correct. The requirement that a defendant file

a timely notice of appeal from an amended judgment

imposing restitution is at least a mandatory claimprocessing rule. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U. S. 

237, 252–253 (2008); see also Rule 3(a)(2) (“An appellant’s

failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a 

notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal,

but is ground only for the court of appeals to act as it

considers appropriate, including dismissing the appeal” 

(emphasis added)). Mandatory claim-processing rules

“seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by 

requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at 

certain specified times.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 

428, 435 (2011). Unlike jurisdictional rules, mandatory

claim-processing rules may be forfeited “if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 15 (2005) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If a party “properly 

raise[s] them,” however, they are “unalterable.” Id., at 15, 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

19. 

The Government timely raised petitioner’s failure to file 

a notice of appeal from the amended judgment imposing 

restitution before the Court of Appeals. See Brief for 

United States in No. 14–13029 (CA11), pp. 22–25 (arguing

that petitioner “waived his right to appeal the district

court’s order of restitution by failing to file a notice of 

appeal from that order” (capitalization omitted)). Accordingly, “the court’s duty to dismiss the appeal was mandatory.” Eberhart, supra, at 18. 

B 

Petitioner disputes this conclusion, arguing that his

single notice of appeal sufficed under the Rules to appeal

both the initial judgment and the amended judgment 

imposing restitution. As we understand it, his argument 

depends on two premises: First, in a deferred restitution

case, there is only one “judgment,” as that term is used in 

Rules 4(b)(1) and (b)(2); and second, so long as a notice of 

appeal is filed after the initial judgment, it “springs forward” under Rule 4(b)(2) to appeal the amended judgment

imposing restitution. We reject each of these premises. 

1 

Petitioner argues that the initial judgment deferring

restitution and the amended judgment imposing a specific 

restitution amount merge to become “the judgment” referenced in the Federal Rules. See Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (notice 

of appeal must be filed within 14 days after “the entry of 

. . . the judgment . . . being appealed”); Rule 4(b)(2) (“Filing 

Before Entry of Judgment”). He argues that his notice of 

appeal, which was filed within 14 days of the initial judgment, was therefore sufficient to invoke appellate review 

of the merged judgment.

Petitioner’s approach is inconsistent with our reasoning 

in Dolan, 560 U. S. 605. The petitioner in that case ar-
 

 

6 MANRIQUE v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

gued that the amended judgment imposing restitution is 

the only final, appealable judgment in a deferred restitution case. See id., at 616. Although we did not decide

“whether or when a party can, or must, appeal”—the 

question presented here—we were not persuaded by the 

argument that “a sentencing judgment is not ‘final’ until it 

contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution.” Id., at 617–618. To the contrary, we recognized 

“strong arguments” supporting the proposition that both 

the “initial judgment [that] imposed a sentence of imprisonment and supervised release” and the subsequent “‘sentence that impose[d] an order of restitution’ ” were each 

immediately appealable final judgments. Ibid. (citing 18

U. S. C. §§3582(b) (imprisonment), 3583(a) (supervised

release), and 3664(o) (restitution)). Consequently, we

were not surprised “to find instances where a defendant

ha[d] appealed from the entry of a judgment containing an 

initial sentence that includes a term of imprisonment” and 

“subsequently appealed from a later order setting forth

the final amount of restitution.” 560 U. S., at 618. Our 

analysis in Dolan thus makes clear that deferred restitution cases involve two appealable judgments, not one.* 

2 

Petitioner’s reliance on Rule 4(b)(2) is also misplaced.

That Rule provides that a “notice of appeal filed after the

court announces a decision, sentence, or order—but before 

the entry of the judgment or order—is treated as filed on 

the date of and after the entry.” A prematurely filed

notice of appeal will become effective under the Rule to 

challenge a later-entered judgment in some circumstances. 

As this Court explained in construing Rule 4(a)(2)’s paral-

—————— 

*We do not intend to call into question this Court’s decision in Corey 

v. United States, 375 U. S. 169, 176 (1963) (holding that a defendant

may challenge his conviction after a single notice of appeal filed from a

final sentence imposed under §4208(b)). 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

lel provision for civil cases, the Rule “was intended to 

protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of appeal

from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly believes 

to be a final judgment, while failing to file a notice of 

appeal from the actual final judgment.” FirsTier Mortgage 

Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U. S. 269, 276 

(1991).

By its own terms, however, Rule 4(b)(2) applies only to a

notice of appeal filed after a sentence has been “announce[d]” and before the judgment imposing the sentence 

is entered on the docket. See Rule 4(b)(6) (“A judgment or

order is entered for purposes of this Rule 4(b) when it is 

entered on the criminal docket”). If the court has not yet

decided the issue that the appellant seeks to appeal, then

the Rule does not come into play. Accordingly, it does not 

apply where a district court enters an initial judgment

deferring restitution and subsequently amends the judgment to include the sentence of restitution. By deferring 

restitution, the court is declining to announce a sentence. 

When petitioner filed his notice of appeal in this case,

the District Court had observed only that restitution was 

“mandatory.” App. 27. The court did not announce the 

restitution amount (or even hold a hearing on the issue)

until months later. Even if describing restitution as mandatory could qualify as a “sentence” that the District Court

“announced” under Rule 4(b)(2), petitioner has never 

disputed that restitution is mandatory for his offense. 

Rather, he argued on appeal that the amount of the restitution imposed—an issue the court did not consider until

months later—is unlawful. Because petitioner’s notice of 

appeal was filed well before the District Court announced 

the sentence imposing $4,500 in restitution, the notice of

appeal did not “spring forward” to become effective on the

date the court entered its amended judgment imposing 

that sentence. 
 

8 MANRIQUE v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

Finally, petitioner argues in the alternative that any 

defect in his notice of appeal should be overlooked as 

harmless error, citing Lemke v. United States, 346 U. S. 

325 (1953) (per curiam). In that case, the petitioner filed a 

notice of appeal the day after his sentence was announced 

but three days before the judgment was entered. Id., at 

326. His notice of appeal was dismissed as premature 

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(a)(2), which 

then governed notices of appeal in criminal cases. This 

Court reversed on the ground that the premature filing 

was harmless error under Rule 52(a). Ibid. 

The Court’s holding in Lemke does not apply to petitioner’s

failure to file a notice of appeal from the amended judgment. Lemke has been superseded by the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure in two ways. First, the Lemke petitioner’s notice of appeal would now be timely under Rule

4(b)(2). As discussed in Part II–B–2, supra, petitioner

here cannot take advantage of that rule. Second, Rule 

3(a)(2) now provides the consequences for litigant errors

associated with filing a notice of appeal. The court of 

appeals may, in its discretion, overlook defects in a notice

of appeal other than the failure to timely file a notice. It 

may not overlook the failure to file a notice of appeal at

all. The filing of a notice of appeal from an amended 

judgment imposing restitution is at least a mandatory 

claim-processing rule, Part II–A, supra, meaning that the 

requirement to file such a notice is unalterable, so long as

the opposing party raises the issue. By definition, mandatory claim-processing rules, although subject to forfeiture, 

are not subject to harmless-error analysis. 

Petitioner in this case did not file a defective notice of 

appeal from the amended judgment imposing restitution, 

but rather failed altogether to file a notice of appeal from

the amended judgment. Courts do not have discretion to 

overlook such an error, at least where it is called to their 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

attention. 

* * * 

We hold that a defendant who wishes to appeal an order 

imposing restitution in a deferred restitution case must

file a notice of appeal from that order. Because petitioner

failed to do so, and the Government objected, the Court of

Appeals properly declined to consider his challenge to the

amount of restitution imposed. The judgment of the Court 

of Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 15–7250 

MARCELO MANRIQUE, PETITIONER v.
 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[April 19, 2017] 

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR 

joins, dissenting. 

Time limits, such as those stated in Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, and other limitations prescribed in a procedural rule, this Court has held, are 

claim-processing rules, not jurisdictional requirements. 

See, e.g., Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 15–19 

(2005) (per curiam); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 448, 

452–456 (2004). That matter is settled, and the Court, 

today, leaves undisturbed prior opinions distinguishing 

claim-processing rules from jurisdictional orders. See, e.g., 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 141–143 (2012); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435–436, 441–442 

(2011); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 413–414 

(2004); cf. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209–213 (2007) 

(distinguishing statutory prescriptions from procedural 

rules).

As I see it, a defendant wishing to appeal his sentence 

and conviction when a restitution determination has been 

deferred has two choices: (1) He may immediately appeal

his conviction and sentence of imprisonment, and later 

appeal the restitution order when made; or (2) he may 

await the restitution order and then appeal, through a 

single notice, his conviction, sentence of imprisonment,

and restitution order. But even assuming, arguendo, that 
 

 

2 MANRIQUE v. UNITED STATES 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

separate appeal notices are ordinarily required, I would

hold that Manrique is not barred from appealing the

restitution order in the circumstances of this case. Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(j)(1)(B) states: 

“Appealing a Sentence. After sentencing—regardless 

of the defendant’s plea—the court must advise the defendant of any right to appeal the sentence.” 

The District Court gave Manrique the requisite advice

upon sentencing him to imprisonment on June 23, 2014,

see App. 29; that court gave no such advice upon amending its judgment on September 18, 2014 to include the 

amount of restitution ordered, see id., at 10, 46–65. The 

Government agrees that the District Court was “absolutely”

required to advise Manrique of his right to appeal the

restitution order, and anticipates that the required advice 

“will prevent cases like this from arising again in the

future.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. 

Aware of its obligation to advise Manrique of his right to

appeal, the District Court appears to have assumed that 

no second notice was required to place the restitution

amount before the Court of Appeals. Without awaiting

another appeal notice, the District Court clerk transmitted

the amended judgment, five days after its entry, to the

Court of Appeals, which filed that judgment on the docket 

of the appeal from the conviction and sentence already 

pending in that court. App. 10. In turn, the Eleventh 

Circuit’s clerk asked the District Court reporter to send up

the transcript of, and record from, the restitution hearing. 

See Docket in No. 14–13029 (CA11). 

In light of what occurred here, I would hold that the

clerk’s dispatch of the amended judgment to the Court of

Appeals “confer[red] jurisdiction on the court of appeals.” 

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 

58 (1982) (per curiam). In other words, in lieu of trapping

an unwary defendant, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, I would rank 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

the clerk’s transmission of the amended judgment to the

Court of Appeals as an adequate substitute for a second 

notice of appeal.*

Because I would treat the clerk’s transmission of the 

amended judgment as tantamount to, or effectively doing 

service for, a second appeal notice, I would reverse the 

Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and allow Manrique to include the restitution order in his appeal. 

—————— 

*Given the steps taken by the District Court, Court of Appeals, and 

the clerks of those courts, it was likely no surprise to the Government

when Manrique challenged the restitution award in his opening brief 

on appeal. See Brief for Appellant in No. 14–13029 (CA11), pp. 23–29.