Filed 2/15/24 P. v. Jones CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHARLES FRANKLIN 

JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B326463

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. A362278)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Charles Franklin Jones appeals from an order denying his 

petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His 

appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 

14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed a supplemental 

brief. We review the contentions appellant raises in his 

supplemental brief and affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 7, 1980, the Los Angeles County District 

Attorney filed an information charging appellant with the 

murder of Terry Shackelford (§ 187). The information also 

alleged that appellant personally used a firearm during the 

commission of the crime (§ 12022.5) and suffered a prior 

conviction for first degree robbery with use of a firearm (§§ 211, 

667.5, subd. (a), 12022.5). 

On June 5, 1981, the trial court instructed appellant’s jury 

with the following CALJIC instructions: 8.10 (Murder), 8.11 

(Malice Aforethought), 8.20 (Deliberate and Premeditated 

Murder), 8.30 (Unpremeditated Murder of the Second Degree), 

8.42 (Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion and Provocation 

Explained), 8.44 (No Specific Emotion Alone Constitutes Heat of 

Passion), 8.50 (Murder and Manslaughter Distinguished), 8.52 

(Murder or Manslaughter—Cooling Off Period), 8.70 (Duty of 

Jury as to Degree of Murder), 8.71 (Doubt Whether First or 

Second Degree Murder), 8.72 (Doubt Whether Murder or 

Manslaughter), and 8.74 (Unanimous Agreement as to Offense). 

The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder. (People v. 

Jones (Jan. 29, 1982, No. 40543) [nonpub. opn.].) A different 

panel of this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated. 
3

(Ibid.) We grant appellant’s request that we take judicial notice 

of the appellate opinion, which was omitted from the appellate 

record, but we rely on its procedural history only.2 (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (d)(3); see People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 

292-293.) 

On March 21, 2022, appellant filed a form petition for 

resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.3

The court appointed counsel for appellant. The People opposed 

the petition, arguing that appellant was ineligible for relief 

because his jury was not instructed on natural and probable 

consequences, felony murder, or “aiding and abetting in any 

form.” The People also argued that the jury necessarily found 

appellant acted with malice, because it convicted him of first 

degree murder despite being instructed on lesser included crimes 

including manslaughter. The People attached the jury 

instructions and verdict form to the opposition. 

Appellant filed a reply brief. He urged the court to 

“examine the jury instructions and jury questions alongside the 

court’s answers to determine whether there was an avenue for 

either felony-murder liability or [natural and probable 

consequences] NPC-liability.” Appellant argued that the matter 

should proceed to an evidentiary hearing because appellant 

“averred it was possible” for the jury to have convicted him on a 

2 The prosecution attached a copy of the appellate opinion to 

its brief opposing appellant’s petition for resentencing. Appellant

also attached a copy of the opinion to his supplemental appellate

brief. 

3 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was 

renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 

2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
4

now-improper theory. He did not address any specific jury 

instructions. 

The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that 

appellant failed to make a prima facie case of eligibility for relief. 

The court stated that it reviewed and considered appellant’s 

petition, the People’s opposition brief, appellant’s reply brief, the 

available court minutes, the jury instructions given at appellant’s 

trial, and the oral arguments counsel made during the hearing. 

It “considered no other sources of information in reaching its 

decision,” including the appellate opinion. Based on the 

information it considered, the court concluded that appellant’s 

murder conviction “necessarily means he actually killed the 

victim” because the jury was “not instructed on accomplice 

liability, aider and abettor liability, felony-murder, natural or 

probable consequences, on [sic] liability under the theory 

defendant counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, 

or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder, or any 

other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based 

solely on that person’s participation in a crime. Thus, 

Petitioner’s murder conviction necessarily means the jury 

determined he actually killed the victim.” 

Appellant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

Appellant’s appointed attorney filed a brief raising no 

issues and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to 

Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court advised appellant of 

his right to file a supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14 

Cal.5th at pp. 231-232), and appellant did so. We evaluate the 

arguments set forth in that supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232 

[“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or 
5

letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific 

arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written 

opinion”].)

Appellant first argues that he made a prima facie case for 

relief because the facts of his case “fit a theory morso [sic] of that 

of involuntary manslaughter than that of first degree murder.” 

He points to an attached declaration, in which he asserts that he 

feared for his life when the victim, who was substantially larger 

than he was, “suddenly tried to grab the pistol out of my back 

pocket.” Appellant asserts that he and the victim were “in a life 

or death struggle,” and the gun discharged accidentally. He 

contends that this new evidence, which was not presented during 

his trial “to appellant’s demise,” shows the absence of malice.

This argument misapprehends the scope of the court’s 

limited prima facie review. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

952, 971.) At the prima facie stage, the court considers the 

allegations made in the section 1172.6 petition and makes a 

preliminary assessment of whether the petitioner would be 

entitled to relief if the allegations were proved. (Ibid.) The court 

“‘should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on 

credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary 

hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s 

own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in 

the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility 

determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Ibid.) “In reviewing 

any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a 

trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the 

weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’’ (Id. at p. 972.) 

Appellant’s declaration goes beyond the allegations of the petition 

and invites the sort of factfinding and evidentiary weighing that 
6

is not permitted at the prima facie stage. Here, the court 

properly considered the allegations in appellant’s petition and the 

jury instructions given at appellant’s trial and concluded from 

them that he could not have been convicted under a theory of 

imputed malice. 

Appellant also argues that he is entitled to release because 

he has served a term in excess of that permitted by regulation. 

He cites a document titled “ISL Release Date Calculation” 

attached to his supplemental brief, which he asserts 

demonstrates that he should have been released from custody 

more than 13 years ago. This argument is beyond the scope of 

section 1172.6, which concerns only revisions to sections 188 and 

189. Moreover, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate 

term, which does not have a set release date; the document he 

attached appears to concern his eligibility for a parole hearing.

The proper way to seek review of a decision of unsuitability or 

ineligibility for parole is to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 584.) 

DISPOSITION

The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

MORI, J.