DOE's HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 

MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY Ai\TD COMMERCE 

AND THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY A.t1\lD MINERAL 

RESOURCES 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 1, 1993 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Serial No. 103--85 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Serial No. 103--85 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

72-587CC 

{J.S. GQVJ!,RNMEN'J.' PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1993 

For sale by 1he U.S. Oovemmenr Priming Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office. Washini1on, DC 20402 

ISBN 0-16-041584-5 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CARLOS J. MOOJUIEAD, California 

PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana THOMAS J. BLILEY, JR., Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Masaachuaetta JACK FIELDS, Texas 

AL SWIFT, Washington MICHAEL G. OX.LEY, Ohio 

CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma DAN SCHAEFER, Colorado 

W.J. "BILLY" TAUZIN, Louisiana JOE BARTON, Texas 

RON WYDEN, Oregon ALEX McMILLAN, North Carolina 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois 

BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico FRED UPTON, Michi,ian 

JIM SLATTERY, Kansas CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

JOHN BRYANT, Texas BILL PAXON, New York 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

JIM COOPER, Tenneeeee SCOTT KLUG, Wisconsin 

J. ROY ROWLAND, Georgia GARY A. FRANKS, Connecticut 

THOMAS J. MANTON, New York JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New Yor~ MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho 

GERRY E. STUDDS, M818achusetta 

RICHARD H. LEHMAN, California 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

CRAIG A. WASHINGTON, Texas 

LYNN SCHENK, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

MIKE KREIDLER, Washington 

MARJORIE MARGOLIES.MEZVINSKY, 

Penneylvania 

BLANCHE M. LAMBERT, Arkansas 

ALAN J. Rora, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DENNIS B. FrrzoIBBONS, Deputy Staff Director fd,\RGARET A. DURBIN, Minority Ch~f Counsel and Staff Director 

$(,JBCOMr,IITl'EE ON ENERGY AND POWER 

PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana, Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, ¥u,achusetta MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD H. LEHMAN, California JQE BARTON, Texas 

CRAIG A. WASHINGTON, Texas J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois 

MIKE KREIDLER, Washingtcm CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

BLANCHE M. LAMBERT, Ariqln888 SCOTT KLUG, Wisconsin 

AL SWIFT, Washington GARY A. FRANKS, Connecticut 

MIKE SYNA.Jl, Oklahoma MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho 

W.J. "SILLY" TAUZIN, Louisiana CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas (Ex Officio) 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JIM COOPER, Tenne~ 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

(Ex Officio) 

JOHN A. RIGGS, Staff Director 

WESLEY WARREN, Special Assistant 

JESSICA LAVER'IY, Mincri_ty Counsel 

(II) 
COMMTITEE ON NATURAL RFSOURCF.S 

GEORGE MIL.l,ER, California, ChainnAn 

PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Ma.uachusetts 

AUSTIN J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

NlCK JOE RAHAU, II, West Virginia 

BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota . 

PAT WILLIAMS, Montana 

RON DE LUQO, Virgin Isla~ 

SAM GEJDENSON, C.Onnecticut 

RICHARD H. LEHMAN, California 

BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexia> 

P~R A DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ENI F.H. FALEOMA V AEGA, Americ;an Samoa 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

LARRY LAROCCO, Idaho 

NEIL ABER~OMBIE, Hawaii 

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California 

CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO, Pueno Rico 

KA,RAN ENGLISH, Arizona 

KARENSHEPHERD,Utah 

NA THAN PEAL, G«>rgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

ROBERT A, UNDERWOOD, Guam 

SAM FARR, Qllifornia 

LANE EV ANS, Illlpois 

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii 

THOMAS J. BARLOW, Ill, ~ntucky 

THOMAS M. BAR~. Wisronsin 

DQN YOUNG, Alaska. 

Ran/ang Republican Mem.ber 

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah 

BARBARA F. VUCANOVICH, Nevada 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ROBERT F. SM111l, Oregon 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

JOH)ll J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JOEL HEFLEY, C.Olorado 

JOHN T. DOOLI'I1LE, California 

WAYNE ALLARD, C.Olorado 

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana 

KEN CAL VERT, California 

SCOTI McINNIS, C.Olorado 

RICHARD W. POMBO, California 

JAY DICKEY, Arka115a$ 

John Lawrence, Staff ~tor 

Ricltard Meltzer. GmmJJ COfUIStl 

Daniel Val Kish, RtpublicQfl Staff [)incw, 

SUBCOMMl1TEE ON ENEROY & MINERAL RJ;SOURCSS 

RICHARD H. ~. Qllifo!'!lia, Cl!atrmu 

PHII.,IP It ~HARP, lnlll11na BAABJ\RA F. VV<=ANOVICH, Nevacl4. 

AUSTIH J. ~liY. Pen~~nia ~g Rtpubl~ ManJHr 

EPWARQ J. MA,RKEY, ~chusetts CR.-\lO 11iOMAS, Wyooling 

JIIICK JO~ ~ II, Wesi Vjrgini11 JOHN T. DOOLl'fn.a Ca.!Uomia 

LARRY LAROCCO, lda!IQ WAYNE ALLARD, O>!Qrado 

!'JA ~ J;>fu\L. ~rgia SCOTT Mc!NNIS, C.Ok>rado 

!'~ A P~MJQ, Qregon RIOIARD PQMBO, ~lifQmia ~AM FARR, Ca!ifomia . 

TiiOMAS, J. ~ARLOW, Ill, Kentucky 

DeboJ'llh von Hoffn!ann l.,aaz.o11e, $taff ~ 

Dean To~I~. COUll,f.tl 

F~brizia ~ Clel1i 

<::hrjstopber B. Kearney, Rtpub/icQII ConsultQ/11 on £""" 

\llll 

CONTENTS 

Testimony of: 

Allen, Clarence R., member, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 

Barrett, Lake H., Acting director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management, Department of Energy ......................................................... . Cantlon, John E., chairman, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board ...... .. Price, Dennis L., member, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board .......... .. Weigel, Dwayne, Assistant Director, Energy and Science Issues, Resources, Community and Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office ............................................................................................. . Wells, Jim, Associate Director, Energy and Science Issues, Resources, 

Community and Economic Development Division, General Accounting 

Office ............................................................................................................. . Material submitted for the record by: Department of Energy: Letter dated September 13, 1993 to Hon. Richard 

Lehman, responding to subcommittee questions ...................................... .. Department of Health and Welfare, INEL Oversight Program: Letter 

dated June 24, 1993, from David L. Humphrey to Augustine A. Pitrolo, 

Manager, DOE, Idaho re corrosion and fuel storage problems at Chem 

Plant, submit~d by Hon. Larry LaRocco ............ : ................. ,. ................... .. General Accounting Office: Responses to subcomllllttee questions ............. . Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board: 

Rec~:1:;t~i:~~~R,~~~ .. ~? .. ~.1:::: .. ~~~~.:~~ .. ~~ ... ~~~~ .. ~: 

Responses to subcommittee questions, by letter dated August 26, 

1993 ........................................................................................................ . 

(V) 

Page 

13 

53 

13 

13 

38 

38 

89 

8 

131 

18 

122 

DOE's IDGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 

MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 

THURSDAY, JULY 1, 1993 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

POWER, AND COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES, 

Washington, DC. 

The joint subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., 

in room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Philip R. 

Sharp (chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power) and Hon. 

Richard H. Lehman (chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources) presiding. 

Mr. LEHMAN. The hearing will come to order. This morning, the 

Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources 

and the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and 

Power are meeting jointly for a hearing on Federal high-level radioactive waste. The Chairman of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, Mr. Sharp, is on his way here, but we will get started anyway, 

and I will acknowledge him for a statement when he arrives. 

We both sit on each other's committees, so we have kind of a rare 

display of legislative efficiency in that regard. We can hold these 

hearings together instead of having two separate hearings on the 

same subject. 

We intend to focus the hearing this morning on recent reports issued by two organizations with ongoing oversight responsibilities 

over the waste program: the Nuclear Waste Technical Review 

Board and the General Accounting Office. Both reports are fairly 

critical of the status and the direction of the program. 

The Technical Review Board was created by the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Amendments Act of 1987 to address weaknesses in the Department of Energy's scientific program supporting waste management. Its sole function is to provide independent, scientific over- sight and advice on the high-level waste program. Pursuant to statute, the board has issued six semiannual reports, and this past 

March issued a special report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy. The board is expected to submit the other report as its testimony today, and it will be made part of the record. 

We are pleased to have among our witnesses today the chairman 

and two other members of that 11-member board. 

The GAO has a continuing oversight function with respect to the 

high-level waste program, and has issued numerous reports on the 

subject during the past few years. In May, GAO issued a special 

report to the Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regu-

(1) 
2 

lation, entitled ''Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing Major Scientific Uncertainties". 

The GAO will be represented today by two witnesses from the 

Energy and Science Issues Office. 

There are several comparable recommendations in the recent 

NWTRB and GAO reports. They both conclude that the program 

deadlines are having a negative impact on the scientific integrity 

of the program. They both complain that DOE is spending too 

much money on program infrastructure and issues other than repository development, such as monitored, retrievable storage and 

transportation systems. They both criticize the unwieldy management structure and planning process of the DOE program and they 

both recommend comprehensive, independent reviews of that program. 

We will be particularly interested today in hearing about DOE's 

actions and plans for response to these critiques. The Secretary has 

already announced several initiatives in the waste program, including her intention to submit to some sort of outside review. Representing the Department today is the Acting Director of the Office 

of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. 

At this time, since Mr. Sharp is not here, I would like to recognize a person who has a great deal of interest in this subject, and 

give her an opportunity to make some opening remarks, the 

gentlelady from Nevada, Mrs. Vucanovich. 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

will thank Chairman Sharp when he gets here. 

As you mentioned, this morning we are here to discuss the important issues raised by the reports of the Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board and the GAO. My long-held concerns about the wasted money and poor-mismanagement of the DOE program are wellknown and have clearly been validated by these two reports. 

As I said in June when Secretary O'Leary testified, the criticism 

raised by the GAO and the TRB are very, very disturbing. 

I have called for an independent review of DOE's activities, having introduced legislation earlier this year, which would mandate 

such a review. 

I was pleased to learn several days ago that Mrs. O'Leary has 

agreed to an outside review of the program, but I am disappointed 

that will focus only on the financial aspects. I am also concerned 

about the lack of detail released so far, which is to say, none. I am 

hopeful that Mr. Barrett will be able to shed some light on the status of that review this morning. 

There are a couple of other issues that I am concerned about that 

I will look forward to discussing. First, I am disturbed about the 

recent decision by the President to appoint Mrs. O'Leary to carry 

out· the duties of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator while serving simultaneously as Secretary. The Negotiator's office was created as 

an independent entity, separate from the DOE, but still within the 

executive branch, to locate an interim nuclear waste facility and a 

high-level waste repository. 

The office was _established in 1987 because the Congress and the 

public had lost faith in DOE's ability to identify potential sites in 

an evenhanded manner. While I have the highest regard for Mrs. 

O'Leary's personal integrity and professionalism, I am deeply trou-
3 

bled about the commingling of the authority vested in the two offices. The President's action appears to permanently taint the independence of the Negotiator's office, and puts DOE in the position 

of negotiating with itself regarding potential grant awards, site locations, et cetera. 

I am most anxious to hear from Mr. Barrett about how the mechanics of this dual responsibility will be carried out by DOE, particularly at the staff level, where some of the key decisions are 

made. The second issue of concern that I will be discussing with the 

witnesses is the possible plan for the siting of an interim nuclear 

waste facility at the DOE site. This should be of interest to anyone 

who is aware of the well-documented, horrendous environmental 

condition of many of those facilities today. Location of an interim 

facility at any DOE facility should be viewed with deep skepticism. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I notice in the DOE testimony that serious discussion within DOE continues regarding means to repay 

revenues from the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund to utilities, due to 

the expected delay of the 1998 date by which DOE is required to: 

"take title to the utilities spent fuel." 

Delays by DOE have caused utilities to begin to expend unanticipated funds to build on-site storage. I have long advocated on-site 

storage as an interim solution to the waste disposal problems of 

this country and believe it should be encouraged. I am pleased to 

see that Mrs. O'Leary is examining this issue, and I will be looking 

forward to the testimony of the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much. At this time, I will recognize the Co-Chairman of this hearing, the Chairman of the Energy and 

Power Subcommittee, Mr. Sharp. 

Mr. SHARP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

that and regret my lateness. There was a leadership meeting that 

lasted longer than usual this morning. 

I just want to make a couple of comments, because I am very 

pleased that the Technical Review Board appears to be very seriously and very aggressively approaching examination of the scientific questions, because when, in 1987, those of us urged its establishment, we felt it had an extremely important role to play. 

Most of us in the Congress do not feel technically competent to 

judge many of the conflicting claims that we get about the quality 

of the science in these various kinds of projects, and it is very important for us to be able to look to credible sources of examination; 

and that is why we established this as an independent board at a 

time when there were many accusations that the Department of 

Energy had an ax to grind and, therefore, could not be counted or, 

for quality science. 

The Department may have disagreed firmly with those views, 

but that was a political question at the time. Naturally, many people in the gentlewoman's State of Nevada have an intense and very 

serious interest in the question of this quality of the science, and 

some of them have challenged many decisions by the Department 

of Energy, as well as the Congress. Our goal was-and I think it 

is being met at this point-that we would have an independent 

panel who understood that their overwhelming function is to try to 
4 

as objectively as possible make decisions about the quality of the 

scientific work being done so that all of us have a place in turn to 

ask questions of individuals involved in the projects, as well as outside observers have a place to go to raise questions and to trigger examination of some of these questions. 

So I want to applaud the work of the board and tell its members 

that we value your work, whether we are always listening or not--

and you may sometimes wonder; but it is an extremely important function in an area that anyone who has dealt with the question of nuclear waste disposal knows is unbelievably emotionally charged in this country. And we have a long way to go before we 

make final decisions, about which-the gentlewoman probably is 

not disturbed that we have a long way to go before we make final 

decisions. 

Our Nevadian colleagues clearly have a great deal at stake, but 

all of us have a stake in this board functioning well, so that we 

can, hopefully, base our ultimate decisions on the best scientific 

evidence. 

Mr. Chairman, I just would add one comment. I hope the Congress and others will not rush too quickly to put everything off 

budget in the Nuclear Waste Fund. I haven't made a final decision 

in my own mind as to whether to do this. But we do have a su~ervisory responsibility over what is a very large investment, and it 

does give Congress the opportunity to have an input from time to 

time on that question. And while I think the cost in this kind of a project is something 

we always ought to examine, the higher, more critical question is 

the ultimate safety and scientific questions that we have to respond 

to; and of course, that is the central role of this board. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The gentleman from Illinois. 

Mr. HAsTERT. Well, I thank the chairman. I want to thank our 

good friend, Mr. Sharp, the chairman of my subcommittee, and you, 

Mr. Lehman, for holding this important hearing for serious oversight of DOE's civilian high-level nuclear waste program in the 

103rd Congress. My State of Illinois is a major stakeholder in the resolution of 

the high-level waste issue. On behalf of the ratepayers of my State, 

I am committed to working to find an environmentally sound solution to the management of spent fuel that ensures that public health and safety are protected. Unfortunately, the resolution of the high-level waste issue has 

been characterized only in terms of, we pay and nothing happens. 

The civilian nuclear waste program has been and continues to be 

constrained by the lack of available funds, despite a $4 billion surplus in the Nuclear Waste Fund. Despite this surplus and the fact 

that the program is over 11 years, behind schedule, the DOE is unable to access this money. I concur with the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in their 

recent report that the lack of funding could impede the progress of 

the program. One solution to this problem is to create a revolving fund that would permanently appropriate the receipts from the 

fund for use by the civilian waste program. 
5 

In my mind, the DOE has also failed to recognize potential cost 

savings from a more thorough integration of the storage, transportation and disposal elements of this program. Both the Isaacs report and the NWTRB report address this integration, and I think 

it is something that DOE should strongly consider. 

Let me also address the issue of statutory deadlines DOE is required to meet in the development of the repository. While I believe 

the schedule is important, I recognize that the integrity of the program must be maintained. 

It is important to remember that the technical and scientific 

oversight of the program is provided by many entities at the Federal level. In addition, ratepayer funds are appropriated from the 

Nuclear Waste Fund for the State of Nevada to conduct scientific 

and technical oversight. I only hope that those funds are being 

used for their stated purpose and not to terrorize residents in 

States such as Illinois with rhetoric ginned up by their antinuclear 

public relations campaign that I like to call the NIMBY Road 

Show. 

As nuclear power plants in my State are running out of storage 

space for their spent fuel pools, it has become clear to me that Illinois has assumed responsibility for 12 nuclear spent-fuel repositories. Before we throw the DOE's statutory deadlines out the windo~, perhaps we should look carefully at changing the funding 

mechanism and developing a more fully integrated plan. 

Lastly, there is the issue of imposing a moratorium on DOE's site 

characterization work at Yucca Mountain. I would concur with Secretary O'Leary's· remarks, saying it was detrimental to the successful completion of the civilian radioactive waste management program. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Idaho. 

Mr. LARocco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to make some opening remarks about the Department of Energy's high-level radioactive waste program, especially in light of 

some recent events in my State of Idaho on this very subject. 

Mr. Chairman, on Monday of this week, U.S. Federal District 

Judge Harold Ryan placed a moratorium on future shipments of 

nuclear waste in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory until 

the Energy Department performs a comprehensive environmental 

impact statement on spent nuclear fuel stored there. This ruling 

covers both commercial and naval reactor fuel. 

I want to say for the record that I totally agree with Judge 

Ryan's decision. In fact, I think this ruling is so important to the 

subject of this hearing I want to take a minute to read from the 

Judge's decision: 

The Court notes that DO E's change of heart comes only after many months of vig- orous litigation by DOE in this matter. The Court has been continually surprised 

and dismayed by DOE's reluctance to perform full NEPA analyses of the actions 

questioned by Idaho in this litigation. DOE's strenuous opposition and the tremendous effort and taxpayer expense associated with such opposition does not seem an appropriate course for an Agency charged with overseeing such important, yet hazardous activities. DOE simply does not seem to understand what this Nation is ex- pecting it to protect the health and safety of all Americans from the dangers associated with its activities. At the very minimum, DOE should always be willing to con- sider thoroughly all of the potential impacts of its proposed actions. 
6 

In light of the fact that DOE now wishes to bring in spent fuel from civilian reac- tors and from foreign reactors, it appears that DOE is quietly attempting to make 

INEL the nuclear waste repository for the United States and the rest of the world. 

Even if DOE were not technically required to perform this comprehensive sitewide EIS on nuclear waste activities at INEL, one would think that rather than 

going through all of the effort and taxpayer expense involved in litigating this case, 

DOE would simply go ahead and prepare the EIS out of a sense of concern for the 

people, the natural resources and the agricultural industry of the State of Idaho. 

Such callous disregard for the legitimate concerns raised on behalf of the citizens 

of Idaho is exactly the type of conduct which tarnishes the image of Federal Government agencies in the eyes of the people. This latest affidavit shows DOE's persistence in downplaying risks and promising 

corrective action. The record reveals that significant safety problems have arisen 

and continue to arise at INEL, that DOE has been advised of these problems, and 

that DOE has failed to take adequate remedial measures. In addition, the record 

shows that the risks of serious environmental contamination and loss of life due to 

increases in additional spent nuclear fuel is brought to INEL under these conditions. 

A few weeks ago I questioned Secretary O'Leary about some potential problems with the high-level waste storage facilities at 

INEL. In his decision, Judge Ryan raised similar questions. Since 

then, however, an internal Westinghouse report has been brought 

to light that suggests the potential for a major radioactive mishap 

at INEL. 

This report, dated June 14th, 1993, titled "Fuel Can Corrosion at 

CPP-603 Underwater Storage Facility," is very disturbing. For example, it states, in a February 25, 1993 corrosion inspection of five 

cans of high-level spent fuel in building 603: "It was determined 

that the corrosion of the cans had progressed to the extent that the 

integrity of the cans could no longer be assumed." 

The report also documents how senior managers at INEL knew 

of the problems with the fuel containers, yet continually put off 

dealing with them. To quote the report: ''There have been a lot of 

correspondence and plans to get fuel out of CPP-603"-get this-

''by the mid-1980's, but the schedules were continually set back. 

Moreover, there was no criteria for judging the integrity of the 

cans." Again, the report says: "Because there was no criteria for the 

corrosion inspection, the situation was never out of specification. 

There were no actions required to be performed because of the corroded condition of the fuel cans." 

It was not like they didn't know they had a problem with corrosion, Mr. Chairman. 

To further quote the report, for over 20 years the supervisors of 

the fuel storage basins have been aware of the problems. Many actions were completed that attempted to correct at least some of the 

problems, but the actions did not include global fixes, timely fixes 

or complete fixes. It appears to this Congressman that money and 

interagency politics had more to do with these decisions than good 

science or concern about public safety. 

On page 16 of the report it says, quote, "There was a perception 

among the Chern Plant management that keeping the Navy happy 

was their most important mission. The Navy was the main source 

of operating money, and they could always pull the funding and the 

mission of the ICPP if management did not continue to accept and 

process Navy fuel." 
7 

I have a letter from David L. Humphrey, the State of Idaho's 

INEL oversight coordinator, that I would like to enter into the 

record at this point. 

Mr. LEHMAN. No objection. [The letter referred to follows:) 
8 

sIaIe of Ida( ( 

DE.Pt'I.RTMENT OF HE,.._L TH AND WELFt'I.RE 

I:--IEL oversighI Program • aoo123_2-INEL 

1410 N. Hilton• Boise, lda/10 83706 

IIOO N, Skyline• Idaho Falls, Idaho 63402 

JllllC 24, 1993 

Augustine A. Pitrolo, Manager 

U.S. Depa.rtIIlent of Energy-Idaho 

785 DOE Place MS1103 

Idaho Falls, ID 83402 

Dear Mr. Pitrolo: 

JIRJ\Y L.. MARAIS 

a., .. ,., 0•,C.. .. NUIUI •114 Welt••• 

DAVID L HUMPHA!V ov.,,1.,., ~ .. ,i,111,-., 

IT~f fl. HILL 

(IK>J)IOlnJW•pe 

(PAJ()20C/2.S4-0&H 

(4") atl/SH•"°' 

(r.U:, JOtlfH·Md 

The Stato of Idah!Mlas reviewed a copy of WINCO's Standing Root Cause Committee 

lllvestigation repon: "Fuel Can Corrosion at CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility"; 

OR-93-0012, issued June 14, 1993. The repon cites a loiig history of corrosion and other 

fuel storage problems at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Of immediate concern, 

the results of recent inspections show that 'the corrosion of the cans (has) progressed to 

the extent that th~ integrity of the cans ( can) no longer be assumed.' (page l) 

Most significantly, the repon details a well-documented and disrurbing history of 

repeated failwe on the part of Chem Plant management to adequately respond to 

evidence of fuel storage corrosion and other problems. There is evidence of "much 

correspondence and plans to get fuel out of CPP-603 by the raid-l980s, but the schedules 

were continually set baclc.• (page 7) Cancellation of a 1987 proposed policy (TS 10E3.l) 

is panicularly disrurbing. This policy would have limited the storage of non-processable 

fuels 10 five yea.rs but was inappropriately identified as "not being safety related and tbat 

violation. .. would only have programmatic impact." {pages 7-8) 

The report indicates that the identified safety problems could have been prevented had 

cenain procedwal safeguards been in place. "U these barriers bad functioned then the 

problem would not have developed. Even tbougb most of these were taken credit for in 

(he safety analysis, they did not wst or were severely compromised." {pages 12-13) 

"For tbe l:ist twenty ye~rs," tbe report continues, "the supervisors of the fuel storage 

b3Sins have been aware of the problems. Many actions were completed that attempted to 

correct at least some of the problems. But the actions did not include global fixes, timely 

fixes, or complete fixes." (pages 12-13) "Aiter the activity during the late 1970s and early 

1980s there were 001 a lot of detectable actions to improve the conditions at 603." (page 1~ . 
Augustine Pitrolo 

Page Two 

June 24, 1993 

9 

'There is an abundance of letters and reports to assure that senior management knew 

about the problems in Cl'P 603." (page 15) The report also stales: "Management did not 

pay adequate auention to the reporrs and other information from their technical and 

staff per,onnel. The risks of not operating the ICPP fuel and waste processing facilities 

overrode the risk that the corroding fuel represented." (page 19) 

The mission and emphasis at the Chem Plant historically hos been to process, not to 

store, spent fuel. '"The company priorities were well documented by their actions." (page 

15) The condition of the storage facilitie~ and equipment has been given much lower 

priority than fuel processing, according to the report. (poge !S) Previous Tiger Team and 

Technical safety appraisal teams have found that "DOE contractors have bad conflicts 

between business risks and operating ri~ks." 

There also has been a perception among the ICPP management that "keeping the Navy 

happy was their moM important mission. The Navy was the main source of operating 

money, and they could always pull the funding and mission of the ICPP if management 

did not continue to accept and proce~s Navy fuel." (pages 16-17) 

These findings arc even more disrurbing in light of the recent Department of Energy 

awarding of an "outstanding" quality assurance management rating to WlNCO, and a 

7.8% increase in bonus fee~. 

Based on the findings in the report, we arc demanding the following: 

I. Immediate transfer of spent fuel out of CPP-603. Either the process of 

transferring fuel to CPP-666 must be accelerated, or the fuel must be transferred 

to a safe, well-operated facility, either on- or off-site. 

2. Immediate cc~sation of additional spent fuel receipts at CPP-666. There i~ great 

concern that there will be inadequate capacity at CPP-666 for fuel transferred 

from CPP-603 ff DOE continues to receive more fuel at CPP-666. 

3. Immediate correction of rnanagcmcnt problems at the fuel storage and h,mllling 

facility. The investigation report states most of the problems could have been 

avoided had management listened to their 0111n staff. 111is must not happen again. 

Immediate changes in management policie~ to correct thi, must he implemented. 
Augustine Pitroln 

Page Three 

/une 24, 1993 

10 

4. An immediate meeting with POE-ID and WINCO persoMel to discuss this 

$ilua1io1;1. Oversight Program staff have repeatedly requested information on the 

fuel stor~g\! jlnd.handling situation during meetings with lJOE•ID aod WINCO 

personnel, but these prnblems have never been revealed 10 us. 

As far back as 1977, operations management of the Chem .Plant said that CPP 603 was 

regarded as •a dump for all garbage fuels that no one else wants." Apparently, the fuel 

storage and handling facillty management has treated their own facility with similar 

~ontempt. This must be changed. g;Y• DA~f:-1~ 

Oversi~~ 

DLH/ch 

c: William Moffitt, WINCO 

Jon Caner 

Peggy Hinman 

Jim Johnston 

Steve Hill 
11 

Mr. LARocco. Over a year ago in this room, the Natural Resources Committee accepted language that I drafted as an amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to put an end to many of 

these out-of-State shipments. I said then and still believe today 

that the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is slowly becoming 

the Nation's de facto nuclear waste dump. To put this much poten- tially leaking high-level radioactive waste on top of one of the largest freshwater aquifers in North America is not right, it is not 

smart and it is not safe. I, along with Governor Andrus, will continue to fight tooth and nail to prevent this from happening. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to think that the days of 

the Department of Energy withholding vital information from the 

public are over. The days of trying to circumvent major environmental laws are over, and that the days of putting everything else 

in front of public health an(l safety are over. It is my sincere hope 

that our new administration will put the word out to DOE, DOD 

and everyone else that this type of activity is no longer tolerated 

and the good old days are indeed over. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. LaRocco. You sure found the right 

judge for that case. 

Mr. LARocco. I sure did. 

Mr. LEHMAN. The gentleman from Washington. 

Mr. KREIDLER. Thank you, Messrs. Chairmen. I would like to 

thank the Chairs for calling this important hearing on such a timely topic. Our two subcommittees have a crucial role to play in 

overseeing the Department of Energy's civilian high-level nuclear 

waste program, and I am glad we are here working together. A 

number of recent reports point to the problems of the DOE's highlevel waste program, including the need for improved program 

management, focus and direction from the DOE, adequate funding and an integrated waste management program. While I am concerned about each of these issues, it is the issue of integrated management of high-level radioactive waste that affects my district, 

particularly regarding multi-purpose canister systems, MPC's. 

I strongly support DOE's endorsement of a multi-purpose canister system for the storage, transport and permanent disposal of 

spent nuclear waste. However, I am concerned that the DOE will 

opt to redevelop this technology rather than looking to existing private sector canister technology. This is a serious issue to me, because a company in my district, Pacific Nuclear, has developed a 

reliable MPC system. 

I realize that this is-that this system, like all other existing 

canisters, does not fully address all repository issues. However, 

even by redesigning the canister, DOE does not expect to be able 

to address all of these issues for a number of years. It does not 

make sense for DOE to go to the expense of redeveloping a technology that already exists, since the redesign is not anticipated to 

improve the product. 

I am pleased that the language in the Energy and Water Appropriations report for fiscal year 1994 directs DOE to consider existing canister technology from the private sector, and I am hopeful 

that DOE will find that this technology is adequate to meet our 

Nation's current needs for high-level waste disposal. 
12 

I have some questions for the witnesses at the appropriate time, 

and I again thank Mr. Sharp and Mr. Lehman for holding this 

hearing. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Kentucky. 

Mr. BARLOW. Thank you very much, Messrs. Chairmen, for holding this joint hearing. I am new to Congress, and look forward to 

working with you gentlemen. 

We have the gaseous diffusion plant at Paducah, which is important to our economy and important to nuclear energy in the Nation 

and in the world; and we are very appreciative not only of the 

input from the plant with regard to energy, but we are appreciative 

of the whole nuclear effort in relation to medicine and industry. 

We are a family-oriented district. We are very sensitive to the 

needs of family health. We defend our air and water and soil quality. I am not here to defend past abuses in the nuclear community 

over the prior decades, which are well documented, but I would like 

to help us find a frame for constructive movement in the nuclear 

area. In that regard, I would like you all to supply us with background information for the record on the radioactive decay that occurs naturally in our environment with regard to the burning of 

fossil fuels. Granted, radioactive decay, as I understand it-and I 

am a layman here, not with training in physics-but radioactive 

decay is going on all the time, just in the natural environment. And 

it possibly, just in the natural course of things, has implications for 

human health over time and human evolution over time. 

We do need to get the waste under control, and I am very frustrated when I see reports coming that schedules are being let slide, 

not just by months or a couple of years, but by many years. I am 

wondering how much of the money that we devote to nuclear cleanup from the Federal standpoint is just paying salaries and shuffling papers, and not actually moving on tying down the by-products or the wastes or the spent fuels, actually physically getting 

them under control. And I would, just for the sake of debate, put 

out the ratio of perhaps we are spending 80 or 90 percent on salaries and paper-shuffling and maybe 10 percent on actually getting 

things physically under control. 

I would posit the position that when we come to this area, there 

is no final solution, that what we are looking at are levels, at best. 

And if we wait for a final solution, we are going to be waiting forever, and that maybe what we ought to be moving on are levels of 

best in progression, and from that standpoint, we would be able to 

be moving now rather than waiting and having Federal judges 

issue their dictums in frustration. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much. 

The gentlelady from Arkansas. 

Ms. LAMBERT. Thank you, Messrs. Chairmen. I, too, would like 

to applaud the two subcommittee Chairs for working together, 

bringing our two subcommittees together; and I look forward to reviewing the issue. 

I think the issue of storage and management of high-level radioactive waste is a critical one for us in this Nation, and a long-term 

issue that we have to begin to deal with. I don't have any nuclear 
13 

facilities in my district; I am simply interested in the issue. So 

from that point of view, I guess I come from a little different direction. But I applaud the subcommittee chairmen and look forward 

to working with you all and the panel as well as the other members of the subcommittees. Thank you. Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much. Certainly the interest this 

morning indicates how contentious and important these issues are, 

and we appreciate everyone's attention today, and especially, all of 

our witnesses for coming. Let's get right into the testimony, and we will start with Mr. Cantlon-Dr. Cantlon, excuse me. 

STATEMENTS OF JOHN E. CANTLON, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR 

WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY 

CLARENCE R. ALLEN AND DENNIS L. PRICE, MEMBERS; JIM 

WELLS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, ENERGY AND SCIENCE ISSUES, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DMSION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY DWAYNE WEIGEL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR; AND 

LAKE H. BARRET!', ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN 

RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. CANTLON. Chairman Sharp, Chairman Lehman, and members of the subcommittees. I am John Cantlon, Chairman of the 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and with me today are two 

other board members, Dr. Clarence Allen and Dr. Dennis Price; 

and we will try to respond to your questions. We are pleased to be 

here at this joint hearing to discuss the key issues of concern related to the civilian radioactive waste management program. 

I will provide a brief statement summarizing the findings of the 

board's recent special report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy, and with your permission, request that the full text of the report, some 20 pages, be entered into the record. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Without objection. Mr. CANTLON. As you know, the board's congressional mandate 

is to review the activities undertaken by DOE to evaluate the potential suitability of the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for a permanent repository for the disposal of civilian spent fuel and about 

8,000 metric tons of high-level defense waste. Congress also 

charged the board with evaluating the DOE's plans to package and 

transport the waste that would be disposed of at the repository. We 

are required to report our findings and recommendations twice a 

year to Congress and the Secretary of Energy. 

Our first six reports dealt primarily with the technical aspects of 

the program. However, as our review has continued, it has become 

clear to us that in certain cases it is difficult to separate technical 

decisions from the policies that guide them. Consequently, in 

March of this year, the board released a more broadly based Spe- cial Report and the board's primary objective in writing this report 

was to make a timely and constructive contribution to the improvement and progress of the civilian radioactive waste management 

program. Indeed, the board made its recommendations at a time 

that it hoped would be most useful to Congress and the new Secretary. We would like to thank the chairmen and members of the 
14 

subcommittees for providing us this opportunity to present the 

three major policy and management issues in the board's report. I will summarize these in just a moment. But first I want to emphasize that the board believes that there are many very caP.able 

people working on this program. Also, based on currently available 

data, we see no technical reason for abandoning either Yucca 

Mountain as a site or the concept of deep geologic disposal. Furthermore, the board strongly believes that the concerns raised in 

our special report can and should be addressed without slowing the 

momentum of important site characterization activities that are 

under way at Yucca Mountain. I would also like to point out that 

the board's Special Report was released just as Secretary O'Leary 

assumed leadership of the DOE. Consequently, some of the issues 

are apparently being addressed as the Secretary continues her review of the program. That said, then let me summarize briefly the 

recommendations. 

First, the board believes that it is highly unlikely that the DOE 

will meet the 1998 date for waste acceptance at an MRS or its 2010 

deadline for beginning repository operations. The board is concerned that attempting to meet these unrealistic deadlines may 

cause the DOE to make important decisions without performing 

sufficient long-term testing and scientific analyses. This could 

cause licensing problems, increase overall program costs, and ultimately delay the program. 

For example, in its fifth report, the board stated that the DOE's 

baseline thermal loading strategy lacked an adequate technical 

basis. This is especially important because the thermal loading 

strategy that is selected may be fundamental to the performance 

of the repository and it affects many of the aspects of waste disposal, including the size and design of the repository, the aging of 

spent fuel, and the design of the waste package. The board recommended that the DOE undertake a comprehensive evaluation of 

alternative thermal loading strategies, and the M&O contractor 

has initiated some work in this area. However, the repository level 

heater tests needed to support this important decision are not 

planned to begin until 1996. Several DOE contractors have commented to the board that these tests could take up to a decade or 

more to complete. The board is concerned that the DOE's repository 

development schedule may not allow sufficient time to complete 

these and other special scientific tests. 

Therefore, recognizing the need for a schedule and to measure 

progress to maintain program momentum, the board recommended 

that the DOE concentrate on establishing and meeting important 

intermediate goals, such as getting underground, determining site 

suitability and completing essentia1 scientific testing. Adopting this 

approach could help the DOE avoid costly errors, save money and 

speed real program progress. It also could facilitate the licensing 

of the facility, should the site be found suitable. Secretary O'Leary 

has recently indicated that final deadlines will not compromise 

technical requirements. The board welcomes this assurance and 

looks forward to seeing tangible evidence of such a policy. 

The board's second major concern relates to the DOE's overall 

plan for managing civilian spent fuel and defense high-level waste. 

Since it issued its first report, the board has repeatedly rec-
15 

ommended that the DOE approach the management of spent fuel 

and high-level waste as an integrated system that includes storage, 

transport and disposal. Many advantages of this approach are enumerated in the board's Special Report. Unfortunately, the DOE's 

current plan is not yet well integrated and contains significant 

gaps. 

For example, even if the currently planned monitored retrievable 

storage facility and a repository are constructed and operating by 

the dates in the DOE's current optimistic schedule, substantial 

amounts of spent fuel will continue to remain at utility reactors for 

decades. Despite this, the DOE's current plan does not consider the 

implications of extended at-reactor storage or other parts of the 

waste management system. In addition, the impact on the renository of the disposal of high-level defense waste and other high-level 

wastes has not been thoroughly evaluated and integrated into an 

overall program plan. The DOE has recognized the existence of these problems, and in 

1991 hired an M&O contractor to help integrate the various aspects and entities involved in the program. The M&O has made 

some progress in meeting this objective. However, the board belieYes that more work on developing an overall systems framework 

for the program is needed. And I believe the DOE has agreed to 

this. 

To that end, the board recommended in its Special Report that 

the DOE place a high priority on developing a comprehensive, wellintegrated plan for managing all of the spent fuel and high-level 

waste that eventually may find its way into a permanent repository. Such a plan should take into consideration the interdependent 

nature of the system and the subsystem components involved in 

storage, transport and disposal of radioactive waste. Secretary 

O'Leary has recently called for the appointment of a chief scientist 

for the Yucca Mountain Project Office. This is one step that could 

improve the integration of site-characterization activities. 

The third and final issue raised in the board's Special Report focuses on the organizational structure and program management of 

the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. As I mentioned before, there are many very capable people working in this 

program. However, the large number of organizations involved, the 

program's multilayered organizational structure and the fact that 

entities are geographically dispersed create substantial challenges for program managers. And the responsibility for decisionmaking 

seems to be shared among people at headquarters, the project of- fice, the M&O contractor and other _private contractors, the national labs, and the U.S. Geological Survey. Furthermore, in the 

board's view, the M&O contractor which was hired to integrate the 

program could probably be used more effectively than it has been. 

The board also is concerned about the allocation of program 

funds. The very high overhead and infrastructure costs for the program leave limited amounts for actual site work and other important research and development for the system as a whole. In light of these concerns, the board recommended that an independent evaluation of the OCRWM's management and organiza- tional structure be undertaken. By this, we do not mean to suggest 

reconsidering the overall objectives or policies underlying the devel-
16 

opment of a deep geologic repository. I would also like to clarify 

that such an independent management evaluation would, by definition, not be an internal review conducted by the DOE itself. 

The board notes with interest that several issues raised in its 

Special Report, specifically the optimistic nature of the schedule, 

the risk of short-circuiting important scientific tests and the relatively small amount of funding available for site-characterization 

activities, are quite consistent with the independent findings of the 

GAO report that also will be discussed here today. However, there 

are different bases for the findings in these two reports that are 

worth noting. For example, the conclusion in the GAO's report that 

site investigation may take 5 to 13 years longer than currently 

scheduled is based primarily on its evaluation of past and projected 

DOE program funding requests from the base plan cost projections; 

whereas the board arrived at its observation that the current 

schedule is unlikely to be met by estimating the actual time that 

will be required to complete some critical scientific tests. 

Although we have said that adequate and predictable funding is 

required for the program, and we think this is important, the board 

believes that simply increasing program funding will not ensure 

that the DOE will meet its 1998 and 2010 deadlines. In addition, 

in making its observations about the limited availability of funding 

for Site work and the total research and development of the system, 

the board considered only the impact of the Yucca Mountain 

Project's infrastructure costs. The GAO considered in its calculations the funding requirements for transportation casks and siting 

a centralized, monitored, retrievable storage facility. 

As pointed out in the GAO report, the funding priorities given to 

siting a monitored retrievable storage facility and investigations on 

transporting spent fuel to such a facility by 1998 have substantially shifted support away from activities related to repository development. This is an example of how decisions made about one component of the waste management program may have significant consequences for another part of the program. It also demonstrates the 

importance of resolving the policy issues associated with beginning 

to accept spent fuel. These difficult issues need to be addressed by 

Congress, the DOE, the utilities and other stakeholders. 

Chairman Sharp and Chairman Lehman, in closing, I would like 

to emphasize that the job that Congress has given the DOE is nationally important and necessary, but it is also extremely difficult 

and complex. This is true not just because of the scientific and 

technical questions associated with the development of this first-ofa-kind geologic repository, but also because of the many political, 

institutional and public acceptance considerations that are involved. However, the board believes that without a strong and defensible scientific and technical underpinning, the other challenges 

facing the program will be even more formidable. 

We are all working toward the same objective: finding a safe and 

environmentally acceptable long0 term option for managing the Nation's spent fuel and high-level waste. The board looks forward to 

continuing to play its role in this crucial national effort. 
17 

Let me thank you once again for allowing the board to present its views. My colleagues and I will be happy to respond to questions. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much for that very comprehensive 

statement. We will hold our questions until all of the witnesses 

have testified. 

[Testimony resumes on p. 38.] 

[The NWTRB Special Report follows:] 
18 

· NWTRB 

Special Report 

to Congress 

and the 

Secretary of 

Energy 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 

March 1993 
19 

'\ \\ I kl, "1,, ,1 I\, ,, 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 

-

Dr. John E. Cantlon, Chairman 

Michigan State University, Emeritus 

Dr. Clarence R. Allen 

California Institute of Technology, Emeritus 

Dr. Garry D. Brewer 

University of Michigan 

Dr. Edward J. Cording 

Universit)' of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 

Dr. Patrick A. Domenico Texas A&:M University 

Dr. Donald Langmuir Colorado School of Mines 

Dr. John J. McKetta, Jr. 

Unfrersity of Texas at Austin, Emeritus 

Dr. D. Warner North Decision Focus, Inc., Mountain View, California 

Dr. Dennis L. Price 

Virginia Polytechn~c Institute and State University 

Dr. Ellis D. Verink, Jr. 

University of Florida, Emeritus 
20 

Executive Summary 

Ten years have passed since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 

1982. During that time, the Department of Energy's (OOE) Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management has been developing a system to manage the 

disposal of spent fuel from the nation's 108 commercial nuclear reactors along 

with some defense high-level waste. The OOE currently is characterizing a site at 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to determine its suitability for construction of a 

permanent radioactive waste repository. Surface-based testing at the site is well 

under way; underground exploration, although delayed for the past three years, is 

slated to begin in 1994. 

Based on its evaluation of the technical aspects of the program, the Nuclear 

Waste Technical Review Board (the Board) believes that three critical concerns 

should be addressed to increase the integrity of the scientific and technical 

program and to improve program effectiveness. 

First, the OOE's program is being driven by unrealistic deadlines to begin 

federal acceptance of spent fuel from utilities in 1998 and to commence repository 

operations in 2010. The repository development schedule docs not reflect a 

realistic assessment of the technical requirements and nontechnical considerations 

associated with the development of a geologic repository. The Board is concerned 

that attempting to meet unrealistic long-term deadlines may force the OOE to 

make imponant technical decisions without first performing the appropriate 

technical and scientific analyses. This could lead to mistakes and costly remediation or potential licensing problems. The Board believes that schedules should be 

based on realistic target dates for achieving imponant intuim goals, such as 

getting underground, completing critical testing, and determining site suitability. 

Second, existing OOE plans for managing spent fuel and high-level waste are 

not well integrated and contain significant gaps. In developing its plans, the OOE 

has not considered sufficiently the interdependent nature of storage, transpon, and 

disposal of the waste. Consequently, some imponant decisions may be made 

without an adequate technical evaluation of their implications for other components of the waste management system. The Board believes that the OOE should 

place a high priority on developing a comprehensive, well-integrated plan for the 

overall management of a// spent fuel and high-level defense waste from generation 

to disposal. This plan should be based on a systematic assessment of options 

related to storage. transpon, and disposal. 

Third, the large number of organizations involved in the implementation of 

the U.S. program and the diffuse nature of its organizational structure create 

substantial challenges for program managers. As a result, management problems 

seem to be affecting some critical technical aspects of the program adversely. The 

Board belie\'es that an independent e,·aluarion of the Office of Civilian Radioac~ 

ti\o·e Waste Maitagemenfs organi zation and management should be undertaken. 

Taking a look at approaches used in other countries could be helpful in such an 

evaluation. 

As the new Secretal'}' of Energy assumes her duties and the 103rd Congress 

begins its work. the opportunity exists to creatively evaluate the status of this 

important program. The Board believes that any needed changes to the program 

can and should be accomplished without slowing the progress of imponant 

site -characterization acti\'ities at Yucca Mountain. 
Introduction 

21 

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (the Board) was created by Congress 

in 1987 to review the scientific and technical validity of the Department of 

Energy's (DOE) civilian radioactive waste management program. The goal of the 

DOE's program is to design and develop a system to manage and safely dispose 

of the spent nuclear fuel being produced at the nation's 108 commercial nuclear 

·power planlS1 along with some high-level reprocessing wastes from defenserelated activities. 

During its review of the program. the Board has witnessed considerable 

progress, especially in site characterization and data collection at Yucca Mountain. 

and. given existing data. there appear to be no scientific or technical reasons to 

reject the site at this time. In general, the Board believes that individuals working 

on the program - mostly scientists and engineers - are enthusiastic and very 

competent in their fields. 

However. designing and implementing a nationwide high-level radioactive 

waste management system is a uniquely challenging undenaldng. For example. a 

disposal system for spent fuel has never been developed before. and the regulations require that after disposal the waste will not pose a threat to human health 

and the environment for the next 10,000 years. As a result, there are many 

different. sometimes conflicting, views about the scientific. organizational. and 

public policy issues facing the civilian radioactive waste management program. 

Furthennore, questions persist among the public about all things nuclear and about 

the OOE"s ability 10 manage radioac1ivc waste. 

This NWTRB S(Hcial Report to Congre.u and tAe Secretary of Ener11_v briefly 

outlines three of the Board's major concerns: (I) the program·s unrealistic 

deadlines, (2) the need for an integrated overall waste management plan. and o, the effectiveness of program management. The Board believes that these concerns 

should be addressed immediately. concurrent with ongoing site•characterization 

work, to ensure that 1he program has a strong technical and scientific base and to 

facilitate program progre". 

I IOM unit\ with opcr.11m~ hu:n ..... , . ~ ..Jtli1iunal unit\ have heen gnntal ctNNrvclion pcrmih 11 :S< 'El\ 

l'H:\1. 

-
22 

Spent Fuel and Defense High-Level Waste Management 

Evolution of the Current Program 

.. . 110 technical or 

.1·cie11tijic.fi1<·tors 

appear w exi.H 1'1111 

would prel'e/11 ti,e 

de,·elopment of11 s11/e 

wulerground 

reposiwryfor 

high-/e1·el »·,me 111 a 

witab/e site. 

The safe disposal of the country ·, spent fuel and high-level defense wastes is an 

issue of long-standing imponance. In 1957, the National Academy of Sciences 

first examined nuclear waste disposal and recommended pennanent burial of the 

waste in underground repositories (NAS 1957). The Board concurs with current 

worldwide scientific consensus that no technical or scientific factors appear 10 

exist that would prevent the development of a safe underground repository for 

high•level waste a, a suiwhle site. 

Before a judgment can be made about a given site's suitability or tinal 

decisions made about components of a radioactive waste management system. 

extensive surface•based testing and underground excavation and te!iting mus.1 be 

undenaken and the resulting data carefully analyzed. Presently. the DOE is 

carrying out surface•based testing at a site at Yucca Mountain. Nevada. as pan of 

a site-characterization program to detennine its suitability for a radioactive waste 

repository. The DOE plans to begin construction of an underground exploratory 

studies facility using tunnel boring machines in March I 994. Preparation of the 

tunnel en1rance and construction of support facilities for tunnel boring are pres• 

ently under way at the site. 

The selection of Yucca Mountain. Nevada. evolved from a series of scien1itic. 

budgetary, and political considerations. In 1982. after the DOE and its predecessor 

agencies had tried for more than a decade to find a potential repository site. 

Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which established a process for 

evaluating sites for two repositories. A number of potential sites were being 

studied in both the eastern and western United States when lhe Secretary of Energy 

in I 986 deferred the search for a repository site in the East. Critics contend that 

because the majority of the nuclear reactors are located in the East. the decision 

to proceed with a repository in the West placed an unfair burden on that region. 

where sites in Nevada. Texa.'i, and Washington were beingevaluate:d. Finally.after 

considering a number of i~'iues. including the expense associa1ed with charac• 

terizing three sites, Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987. 

selecting Yucca Mountain. Nevada a.'i the sole site to be characterized for the 

possible development of the first high-level radioactive waste repository. 

Yu<.·ca Mountain is located in southern Nevada. about 100 miles northwest of 

Las Vegas and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site. The DOE's 1988 baseline 

repository plan calls for thl.! h~rial of spent fuel and high-level Jct'ense wast!.! in ;.1 

rcposi1ory consisting of more than I 00 miles of tunnels exc.·av~1te<l in rock ahou1 

JOO meters below the ~urface of the mountain hut we ll a hove 1he watC"r table ( DOI: 

19XH). The repository would he sealed approllimatcly ~O ye~1rs after ini1ial wasti: 

emplacement 

Federal standards and regulations (some of which 1.."U rrcntly are under ri:vicw I 

will serve as a basis for detcrrnining site su itahility and for au1hnri1.ing rons1n1..:• 

titm and licensing ,,peration ,,f the rCJXlsitt,ry if 1he si1c pnwcs suitahlc. 
23 

\\1111 ", l,1 0 

Observations about the DOE's Program 

During its detailed review of the DOE's program to manage the nation·s ci,·ilian 

spent fuel and high-level del'ense wastes. the Board has made numerous technical 

recommendations in six pre\'ious repons. The following discussion. holA·e,·er. 

addresses three concerns 1he Board believes have major implica1ions for the 

scientific and technical integrity of the program and for e\·entual program success. 

Unrealistic Deadlines are Driving the Program 

... w11·ealfatic 

deadlines 11wy.f,1rce 

the DOE to make 

important tech11ica/ 

de, ·isitm:.. n·irhow.first 

/1£'1:fi,rmillg the 

a1111m11rime t,•c/111ica/ 

and scicntUic wwl_rses. 

-

Obsen•atim1 /: The DOE's cfriUan radioactire waste mauagemem program is 

Ming drll'en by unrealistic deadlines to begin federal accepwnct' ,t spem _fitt!I 

from the utilities in /998 and to comme,ice repositc!I)' operatim,s i11 1010. 

Repository de,·eh>pmem schedules da nm reflect a relllistic a.ue.u mem ,!f the 

technical reqHiremellts associated with the dei·elopmeut of a first-,~fa-kind geologic repository. Attempting to meet tlrese unrealistic deadlines may forc'e the 

DOE to make importam technical decisions 1ritlwut first pe,fomriug the ap1,mpriate redmica/ and sciem~fic analyses. 

Tire Curnnl Schedule 

The 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act authorized the DOE to enter into contrnc1s 

wilh the utilities for the acceptance. trnnsport. and disposal of their spent fue l. 

According to the Act. federal acceptance of spent fuel for disposal in a repository 

was to begin by January 31. 1998. In January 1987. realizing that this deadline 

could not be met. the DOE changed the planned start-up date for repository 

operations to 2003 (DOE 19871. only to change it again two years later to 2010 

(DOE 1989). The Board has examined similar programs in other countries. and 

the U.S. program is the only one the Board is aware of that has been given a 

/egislatfrelr mandated date 10 begin disposal of spent nuclear fuel tNWTRB 

December 19921. 

Because a repository will not be availahle by 1998. the DOE has planned 10 

site and construct a centralized incerim slOrnge facility to store commercial spc:nt 

fuel until repository operations can begin. Since 1989. the Stcretary of Energy" s 

two primary goals for the program have been 10 (I) begin receiving spent fuel at 

a (:entralized interim storage facility in 1998 and(~) begin ~posilory operations 

in 2010 (DOE 1989). Congress established the Ollie< of the Nuclear Waste 

Negotiator in 1987. Since his app,.>intment in 1990. the Negotiator has initiated a 

volun1ary pmcess to find a site for the storage facility. Although the Negotiator 
... gin·11 u/1,ftht· 

11ecessury .,·de11,ifh·. 

reg111'1Tory. u11d 

i11s1i11,1i01h1l uuin'rics 

.. it seems t1/1fimisric 

r,, u.\'.\/IIIH' tlwr u s11e111 

Jitd r<'p,1si1,,r_Y u·i/1 ht· 

t1J1Cr(11i11:,..: l>y ~0/0. 

24 

l ll , il1~1 c J ~ 1dl11lc ~ 

has mi.11.k s1lmc" prog:re-ss and a ft.'w in1erestc-<l p,mies havi: hc-c-n identitit'd. it 

~,ppe;,trs 1hat insuffo.:ien1 lime: n:m,1ins 10 find a nlluntary hosl si1e and l·onstrucl 

an interim storage' fa1..·ili1y 10 ht'g:in spc-nt fud re-cc-ipt by I t>98. 

On Dtl'c'lll~r 17. 199:!. in a lc-nc-r 10 Sc-nator Bc-nnen John:-.IOn. Chairman of 

1he Senate Commiuee on Enc"rnv and N,nural Ri:soun.·c"s. 1hen-Sc-1..·re1,1ry of Enauv 

J;.mh::s Watkins .id.:.nowh:dgc:J ihat no voluntary sit<'.' haJ been idencificd that " ·nu~l<l 

allow the DOE to meet the 1998 deadline and asked Congress to authorize and 

dire1.·t the' DOE to select altemati\"t~ candidate sites for interim storage of spent 

fuc-1 ·

1

.1 fc:deral go\'ernment si1es. Considering initial rc-actions from potential host 

states. this op1ion also may prove difficult to imph!menl. h therefore appears 

unlikely 1hat any l·entr:.llized interim stornge facilit y will be available 10 al·cept 

:,;pent fud from the u1ili1ies by 1998. 

There Ma_v Not Be Time to Complete Essential Testing 

The original 1998 date for repository operations had to be 1.:hanged because it 

was nol based on a realis1ic assessment of the technical requirements of the 

program. and. given all of the necessary scientific. regulatory. and institutional 

:.1c(i\·ities imegral 10 repository development i1 also seems optimistic to assume 

that a spent fuel repository will be operating by 2010. According to the DOE. to 

meet the 2010 goal it will be necessary to apply by 2001 to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission for authotiz:.llion to construct the repository. However. there may nor 

be lime lo complele es.,.ential technical activities before that date. 

I. Exploratory smdit,sj(1ciliry. Before filing an application for authorization 

to construct a repository. it is necessary to demonstrate whether or not the site at 

Yucca Mountain is suitable for repository development. Suitability cannot be 

determined. however. until an underground e.'<ploratory studies facility is cons,ru'-.'ted at 1he site. Scien1i:-ts will 1hen have direc1 access 10 the complex underground geology at Yucca Mountain and can beg.in some of the testing necessary 

to evaluate site suitability and predict repository ~rt·onnance. The DOE plans to 

initiate underground tunneling in Marc!-1 1994. but testing in the tunnels may not 

begin until I 996. 

2. Underground resrin_~. Long-tenn heating and other underground experiments are needed to pro\·ide critical information on the effects of heat from the 

waste (the th.:rmal load) on the surrounding rocks. This information is crucial for 

detennining site suitability and designing 1he repository system. The Board is 

concerned that. since 1he tests have not been initiated. there may 11or be e11011gh 

rime to l.:'Omplete them by the 200 I deadline. Several DOE contractors have 

-
25 

'\. \\ ) f\j{ \j c I 1,,. , • 

... technical actil"ities ... 

lrm·e heen postponed 

repeated!_,. d11ri11g the 

last three _l"ears. and 

fi1t11re de/a_l"s cannot 

he mled out. 

-

commenled to the Board that somt! of this testing could require a decade or more. 

If testing at the repository level does not begin until 1996. only five year,; remain 

to collect the data on which to ba"e important licensing and repository design 

decisions. 

3. Was"/t' package design and del·elopmel11. The waste package is a key 

component in the rndioactive waste management system. The Board has emphasized the imponance of adequately and dependably funding research and development of waste package designs (NWTRB November I 990. May I 991. 

December 1991. June 1992 ). Yet the DOE has reduced funding to this program 

during the la.st three year,;. thus delaying imponant research. Deciding which 

wa'ite package design is most appropriate requires extensive testing of materials 

- gathering data on how a variety of materials will hold up over thousands of 

years under various underground conditions. Under the current schedule. sufficient time may not remain to perfonn this testing adequately. 

These and other technical activities crucial to gathering the infonnation 

required to detennine site suitability and to make repository design decisions 

needed for licensing the repository have been postponed repeatedly during the last 

three years. and future delays cannot be ruled out. As a result. there may not be 

enough time to do the testing and analyses necessary to suppon imponant 

technical decisions. 

Other Factors Could Impede Program Prognss 

A number of other factors beyond the DOE's control also could contribute 

significantly to funher delays in program progress and affect the current schedule. 

I. Funding uncenainties. To meet its 2001 deadline. the DOE has said that 

it will need an average of approximately $600 million per year for the next seven 

years 'just for site-clurracteri:.ation activities.:! The DOE has never submitted a 

request to Congress for funding at this level (GAO December 1992). Current 

funding for the entire program is approximately half this amount. Given ongoing 

concerns about the large federal budget deficit. it appears far from cenain that the 

Administration will request. or Congress approve. such increases. 3 

Carl Genz in a prcsenta1ioo lo the Nuclear Waste Tcthnical Rc,·icw Board. January 5-6. 199.l 

3 A ... "\."Ording: to an attachment 10 a January 12. 1993. letter to Senator Bennett Johnston. the DOE 

recommended 10th< Office of' Manag:cmen1 and Budget rhat the Nuclear Was1c Fund be taken nff 

budg:cl. 
The DOE already 

seems to lu11·e made 

some important 

choices hased on 

expediency without 

first performing a 

thorough technical 

analysis ... 

2. Changes in radiation safety standards. In the fall of 1992. Congress 

passed legislation establishing a three•year process for promulgating a revised 

radiation safety standard and for subsequently revising the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission's current regulations and technical requirements for waste disposal 

(Congress 1992a). Changes in the current standard or in the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission's requirements could affect test plans and also could require changes 

in the design of the waste package and the repository. 

3. Delays in the legislatively mandated process. The Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act requires the program to meet a series of milestones prior to applying for 

construction authorization, including submission of a final environmental impact 

statement and subsequent approval of the site by Congress by 2001. However, 

given the history of opposition to the program in the state of Nevada and the 

general lack of public confidence in DOE decisions.4 court challenges and 

procedural delays are quite likely. 

4. Unforeseen problems. There is no allowance in the current schedule for 

accommodating unforeseen technical uncertainties or institutional problems that 

inevitably arise during such first-of-a-kind projects. 

Considering past delays and the potential for future delays, the Board seriously 

doubts that either the 200 I construction application deadline or the 20 IO repository operation deadline can be met. 

Deadlines May Force Premature Technical Decisions 

The Board is especially concerned that attempting to meet current unrealistic 

deadlines may force the DOE to make important technical decisions without first 

performing the appropriate technical and scientific analyses. This could lead to 

mistakes. costly remediation. or licensing problems. 

The DOE already seems to have made some important choices based on 

expediency without first performiqg a thorough technical analysis of the data or 

of possible alternatives. An example of this is the DOE's selection of a thermal4 See Flynn et al. 1992. In addition. the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on Radioacti\'e 

Waste Managcmem was assigned the task of considering what additional steps the DOE could take to 

increa~ public trust and confidence in the DOE·s civilian radioac1ive waste managemem program. It~ 

draft repon was completed in December 1992 !SEAB December 1992) 

-
The Board . Jidh 

suppol'ls 1l1e 11eedfi,r 

,chec/11/e, 11 ·irh wr~er 

dates mu/ i11fl!ri111 

t!,Olll.\ {O lllt'llS/fH' 

pro~ram pr<1~ress. 

-

27 

loading strategy for its baseline plan. 

5 In its fifth repon. the Board pointed out that 

there is not an adequate technical basis for the DOE" s choice of a thennal-loading 

strategy. The baseline strategy is consistent with accomplishing two objectives. 

First. it would allow the DOE to quickly demonstrate a capability to dispose of 

spent fuel (by 20 I 0) and. second. it would minimize the need for long-tenn spent 

fuel storage. Attempting to meet these goals seems to have led program management to select a single baseline thennal-loading strategy without first perfonning 

a thorough analysis of alternative. perhaps better. thermal-loading options. 

Unrealistic deadlines also are forcing the DOE to undertake activities simultaneously that might better be conducted sequentially. For example. it appears that 

to meet the 200 I construction application deadline and the 20 IO date for repository 

operation. the DOE has selected 25- to 30-ft tunnels for the exploratory studies 

facility. Although perhaps appropriate for a repository. they are much larger than 

the Board believes is necessary for testing for site suitability and perfonning site 

characterization (NWTRB December 1991. June 1992). 

Excavating such large tunnels may only add to existing concerns that: ( I ) large 

investments of time and money are crea1ing institutional momenlum that inevitably will lead to the selection of Yucca Mountain regardless of its suitability and 

(2) with no alternative or back-up site. Yucca Mountain must become the 

repository. These perceptions tend to undennine the DOE' s credibility. which 

already has suffered as a result of problems associated with the management of 

radioactive wastes at defense facilities. 

Summary 

The Board understands and fully suppons the need for schedules with target 

dates and interim goals to measure program progress. However. keeping to the 

current unrealistic deadlines may force premature technical decisions before 

sufficient data can be gathered and analyses perfonned to support these decisions. 

This ultimately may undennine the technical validity of the program and delay 

program progress. It also may further undennine the program's credibility among 

the technical and lay communities. 

The Board supports adopting the approaches of other countries it has visited. 

where efforts are focused on achieving interim technical milestones. and where 

schedules for repository operation are tentatively set based on a realistic asses"-

S 1bc 1ltem'1'4I loadiff.~ smnegy is a plan for achieving the desired lemper:i.tures wi1hin the repo\llor~ 

O\·er a chosen 1ime pt:riod. To dcvdop a stra1egy. a number of issues must be considered. '>Ul"h a, 

ag,eing. waste packaje de\1gn. and repository ~ize and design. (Stt NWTRB June 19921. 

72-587 0 - 93 - 2 
28 

\\ 1,ll \l 111 1, < llll ru I'[ Ill 

men! of program requirements. Most olhercounlries visited by the Board have set 

goals for n:pository opcra1ion for 2020 or later. 1ben: could be many advantages 

associated with establishing a new, more flexible long-term schedule that incorpora11eS jinn target dates for inrerim goals, such as getting underground. determining site suitability, and completing essential testing. Because decisions made 

under pressure can lead to mistal<es and costly remediation or potential licensing 

problems. ~g a more realistic schedule may actually speed real program 

progiess over the long run. 

The Program Needs an Integrated Waste Management Plan 

l .. ,ooki11g at u·aste 

111wwge111e111 m <1 

system is_ rhe own 

t{/icient u·t1y to set 

priorities . 

Observazion 2: Existing DOE plans for mm,aging spent fuel and high-le,•el 

wa<te are not well inlegrated and contain signijicanr gaps. In developing its plans, 

rhe DOE has not co,uidued sufficiently the inlerdependent nature of the sys rem 

and subsystem COflt/KJMnJS involved in the transpon, storage, and disposal of 

radioactive waste. ConMquently, s~ crucial decisions ma_y be mtJde without an 

tukqllak tec:luucal evaluation of their impacts on other system components. 

From the time it issued its first n:port in early 1990, the Board has recommended Iha! the management of spent fuel and high-level waste be viewed as a 

system of interrelated components. Looking at the generation. storage, transpon, 

and disposal of the waste as a system is essential for several reasons. 

I. o.cisions made about one component of the waste management system 

may significantly affect other components, and a choice made in isolation could 

foreclose alternatives Iha! might la!er be shown to be better for the system as a 

whole. 

2. Making decisions without adlCquately assessing their systemwide consequences could jeopardize the licensing of the proposed repository. 

3. Developing program plans based on a sound analysis of the system helps 

avoid errors Iha! may require costly and time-consuming remediation. 

4. Looking al waste management as a system is the most efficient way to set 

priorities, to determine the logical sequence of activities, to integrate the activities 

of various entities involved in the program. and 10 develop contingencies to deal 

with the many uncertainties associaied with this first-of-a-kind program. 

Imponant coacems r<:lau:d to the tim,e main components of the waste management system - storage. transport. and disposal- are discussed below. 

-
... suh.\'fautial cmwtml.'i 

o{s/'elll_/iwl 11 ·i// 

remain in storage ar 

reactor sites_f()r 

den ,de.\·. 

1111 

29 

Interim Spent Fuel Storage 

The DOE's baseline plan for the interim storage of radioactive spent fuel 

requires constructing a centralized interim storage facility in time 10 begin 

accepting speni fuel from the utilities by January 31. 1998. Currently. there are 

approximately 25.(X)() metric tons of spent fuel stored at reactor sites around the 

country,

6 and this amount is being added to at the rate of about 2.000 metric tons 

per year. Under existing law. the capacity of the interim storage facility is limited 

to only 10.000 metric tons before repository operations begin. Therefore. e\'en if 

such a centralized interim storage facility and a repository are constructed accord· 

ing to the DOE' s schedule. substantial amounts of spent fuel will remain in storage 

at reactor sites for decades. The implications of extended interim storage have not 

been addressed in systems planning. 

Safely storing spent fuel does no1 appear to present any serious technical 

problems. Spent fuel can continue to be stored at the reactor sites in the spent fuel 

pools (if capacity is available) or in dry casks. as is presently the case at some 

utilities. 7 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined that spent fuel may 

be stored safely - wet or dry - for at least I 00 years. 8 However. as spent fuel 

pools near capacity. some utilities have met with resistance in obtaining permits 

from state and local authorities to use dry cask storage. due in large part to lack 

of strong evidence that a repository will be available in the foreseeable future. 

As discussed in the Board's sixth report. the need for extended inierim storage 

for all of the spent fuel is anticipated in other countries visited by the Board and 

has been integrated into their wasie managemenl plans (NWTRB December 

1992). Spent fuel and high-le"el waste in these countries will continue to be stored 

at a centralized facilitv or at reactor sites until final decisions are made about 

reposi1ory development. Because extended interim storage has not been planned for 

in this country. it is \'iewed by some as signifying a failure to meet program goals. 

In addition to expanding pool and dry cask storage. some nuclear u1ilities. 

faced with the prospei.:1 of long-tenn on-site storage. have investigated multipurpose container concepts that could be used to store. transport. and. perhaps. to 

dispose of the spent fuel." The DOE also is increasing its efforts to develop a 

6 By 1030. approx imatd~ l-7 .fMIO lll<'tn.: llm, 11! spent foci 1,1.·ill hti\'C ::,,cc:umulatcd. 

7 Dry cask s1oragt is beini; u,,..J r,~ \ 1rginia Po1,1.·er :u i1 s Sun: S1at1on . by Duke Po1,1.·cr at Oconel" . :mJ 

b~: Carolina Pov>('f and Lish1 at 1b R,,tiinson S1a1ion. 

8 This de1crmina1ion is Sl"I fonh iu th<' :-.:uckar Regula10~ Commission ~gu!a1ion IOCFR 51 . 

9 Such COOl'tplS ha,c bten ai,; ,e-.-.<J t>~ i11h<'r..: in I~ p:.i:il. induding thr !'tatr oiTtnnt'S'.'« in lhe 

mid-to-1:ue \91!,0-.. 
30 

multipurpose container. Thc stale of Nevada has provided important and constructive technical commcnls on proposed multipurpose container concepts. And 1he 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been quite positive in ils comments about 

the prospect., of licensing such containers. The Board has Jong advoca1ed 1he 

development of alternative container concepts. including the multipurpose container. and is encouraged by these recent developmenls. 

Tnuupo,t 

Spent fuel has been shipped routinely and safely for lhe past 40 years. 

However. tr.inspOrt to a repository involves more than shipping. It includes 

removing the spent fuel from stor.,ge al the reactors. loading it into the transport 

cask. loading and unloading it at points of origin and destination. storing it, and 

'finally placing it in a repository. Once reposilory operations are under way. the 

number of annual shiprncnls of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste will 

increase dramatically from historic levels. And willt the much higher levels of 

activity and the greater number of people involved. opponunities for human error 

and equipment failures will increase:. and hazards not apparent in the past may 

become evident. Therefore. rnasures an, needed that will enhance current DOE 

safety practices. Since ils first report. the Board has continued to urge the DOE to 

incorporate the principle,; of system safety and human factors engineering into its 

program to enhance safety performance. The use of a multipurpose container also 

could help minimize handling and reduce ~sks associated with transporting 

radioactive spent fuel. 

The t~mtal-/1,udinx .,1ru1~11.,· sekcted for the repository has implications for 

other componenti,. of the waMe management system. including the ageing o f 

the spent fuel and the design of both the waste package and the repository.'" The 

OOE's baseline plan ..:all, for the disposal of relatively young spent fuel to create 

above-boiling rcmper•tun:,, within the repository for 300 to 1.000 years. and 

below-boiling rcmperJtun:s ,hereafter. It is nol clear that lltis is the mosl desirable 

strategy. In ib fifth report. the Board recommended a systematic evaluation o f 

alternative thennal-Jnadin~ ,1ra1egies (NWTRB June 1992). Although 1he DOE 

ltt SpaM rud ~'Gf'Hi,c,.. l'lf'dun· ~W .,..,.._ of tadic-.-tivity and heal ftherm:d cncr1=y J after 1hcy 

.-c- m,11rwa:I rnw1 die 1..,_ ut .a AUC:lc.. ~ - n.: diamal uutpue nf ,;peril foci UCl:re:a-.e, 

-.ipiftearllly 1f\"tf 1inlt rc-.pn:wlly dltn"f die f"aN: ,;cwe:n.J ~ ,. Sauring ~ fuel 10 mlucc 11 , 

1hcnnal •-rpul hefun: dr.f-NJ f,art:1n,, i.. c111E ••y of aMllmllingor mantpUlMin,: 1~ thermal l1 ,.1ll •1I ;1 

rrpiNt•.-y. 

Ill 
'\\ ! I~ II '1 ' 11 R I I 

... the Board belieres 

1111 en11 i11 eered bllrrier 

.,·_,·stem thllf i11d11de.,· ii 

mh11st. lrm11-li1·ed 

waste pllckage sluJL1 /d 

redtu-e ow!IYtll 

uncertaintiex ahou/ the 

per/immmce ,,(a 

rt!ptJSitor_,·. 

.. 

31 

has ini1iated -;ome work in 1his area. a comprehensive and systematic analysis of 

alternative. and poten1ially bener. thermal-loading smuegies for the proposed 

Yucca Mountain site has not been completed. As a resu lt. an adequate technical 

basis for the DOE's choice of a baseline thermal-loading strategy has not been 

establ ished . Yet decisions ti ed to that choice are being or soon may be made about 

mJltipurpose container concepts and reposilory and waste package designs. 

The 1hermal-loading stra1egy also has implications for the enginl!ert'<I barrier 

sy.wem.

11 Federal licensing standards require the engineered barrier system to 

work together with the natural barriers to isolate radionuclides from the a,:cessible 

environment for many thousands of years. Although engineered barrit:rs may have 

shorter lifetimes than do natura l geologic barriers. it will be possible to predict the 

performance of engineered barriers wirh greater confidence than is possible for 

natural barriers. For this reason. no matter where a repository is locatc!'d and no 

mauer what the geology of the site. the Board believes an engineered barrier 

system that includes a robust. long-li ved waste package should reduce overall 

uncenainties about the perfo rmance of a repository. As indicated previously. the 

DOE has not given sufficient attention to waste package design. · 

Other aspects of waste disposal should be more thoroughly evaluated and 

addressed in a plan to manage all high-level radioactive waste. For example. since 

I 985. federal high-level de fense waste disposal policy has been to commingle 

canisters of solidified high-level defense waste with containe rs of spent fuel in the 

same repository. 1:? Current eslimares of the number of defense waste canislers are 

very broad - ranging from 15,000 to more than 200.000 - resulting in a more 

complicated and difficult design process for the disposal system. Other high-lev<I 

radioactive wastes, such as the Three Mile Island<.'! core. spent naval reactor fuel. 

and other defense reactor spenl fuel. will probably require disposal in a repository 

(NWTRB December 1992). The special problems posed by the disposal of 

high-level tlt!fen.'te lt·a .\ll's and other hixh-lt',·el wasre.'t should be evaluated and 

integrated into the DOE', plan. 

Another issue lhal should he considered is how long the spent fue l should 

rem.Jin retrie,•ahle after it h..is ht:en placed in tht repository . Current indi1.:atinns 

are that 1he DOE intends to dc!'-ign the Yun.-a Mountain repository to med the 

11 Tht: 1:n$1lk:,:n..-J b:mi,:r ,y,11:111 Im l·unrr:--.i In lhl' 11 :nur.il gl·ultll!K harril'rl ,, m.:w.k upof1ht' 

cun,tr!J\:t,:U, or cngin1:1:rc,J, lll1Hfll111Cnt, t•f :r U1:--pu1-al .,y:--1cm 1l,:i-i$nl·U 10 pr,:v,:nt Chl· n.·l~as,,: 11f 

r:,Ji11nud1\k:.~ fmm ihl' unt.lcrgrouud lai:iluy iruo 1hc ~:.l'ohyJrulugic -..:uin$. It induJ,:i- th,: 

lhcrrnal-lnaJin$ ,1r:1l,:}!y. r,:[ll.-.1hlr:, \k,i~n. w:!'lc form. wa,,~· ~·on1:1in.:ri-, maccrial plan•J 1•wr :md 

aruun<l , u~·h t:lml;1i ncr\. ;11 1U h:11.- kfill 111011,:ri:II . 

12 Ptl·,it.knl t,l11n;1hJ k,:;1t!;m :m111~uk:~•\I llu, \k,:1,ion in ;1 n11..•111t~lil1h11n 1,1 Sl-cr,:tary ,11" F.ni'Tf!)' hlhn 

fkrri11g11t11, .. l>.-.p.r..al nf lkfcn"'-· Wa,1i· m .1 ('ummcn-1otl H: ..-p.~ih,ry." A(lf1I .\0. l~.'i . 
... 1he DOE s/11111/d ... 

set priorities tmwng 

1/,e m<111r sciemific 

i111 ·estigatio11s h('i11g 

plw111ed. 

32 

,, \I I '' I It I',,, 

50-year relfic,:al rcquirement. 1·\ Howe\·er. a longer rctriev:11 period for spent fuel 

may offer some advantages. such a..;. being able to monitor waste package performance or recover spent fuel foe- c:conomic reasons. There also are disadvan1ages. 

such as cost~ a.~sociatcd " 'ith monitoring and maintaining: the reposirory , The pros 

and cons a.<SOCialed with long-1enn reuievabiliry op1ions should be analyz<d 

1horoughly. before reposilory design decisions are made. 

The same principles that are used to evaluate decisions related to the t.werall 

system also should be applied to lhc- repository. Perfomwnce a .Ul!!i.'W1ent is rhe 

primary 1001 being used 10 evalu.ire 1he safely of wasie disposal al Yucca 

Moun1ain. II is used 10 compare predicted repository perfonnance v. i1h heahh and 

safety standards. Since irs first report. !he Board has been urging 1he DOE 10 begin 

a process of iter.uivc performance assessment. by which periodic evaluations point 

out those areas of investigation that nttd emphasis. to detenninc site suitability 

and 10 ensure safely. In 1991. lhe DOE comple1ed ii< tirsl i1era1ion in 1he 

performance assessment oflhe proposed reposirory al Yucca Mounrain. Although 

addilional work may be needed 10 improve 1he level of sophis1ica1ion. 1he DOE 

should use this and other similar studies to sel priorities among the matiy s1.:"ic"miti1.-· 

inves1iga1ions being planned. 

Summar, 

The Board has urged the DOE ro conduct top-le\'el. systemwide w;.tstc 

management trade-off studies and perfonnance assessment studies whilt" 1he 

program is stilt in its conceptual pha.",C so that decisions made now d~1 no1 preclude 

options that may later be shown to be preferable. The managemem and opc!rations 

conlractor. who wa...; hired to provide progr..i.m integr.uion. has recently ini1iah:J 

some work in this area. Howe,·er. a.~ stated in its sixth report. the Board heli~n:s 

that the studies undenaken to dale arc seriously limited hy a number of assumptions being mack- by the DOE. This will foreclose a serious e\'aluatinn llf snm1..· 

ptttenrially viable all<malives 1NWTRB De.:ember 19911. 

Ill 
33 

Program Management Needs Improvement 

... lack of imegrarion 

remains a major 

problem that 

contributes 10 

inefficiencies in the 

program ... 

Ill 

Obsen·atimr 3: The large number of orga11i:atio11s inruh-ed in the U.S. program 

and the diffuse narure of its orgw1i:.miom1/ srmcrure create subsrawial challenges 

for program managers. ,-\J Cl remit. managemem problems seem to be adn:'r.'iel_, 

a/fecriug some critical rec:hnical aspects of the program. 

The ch·ilian radioactive waste managemen1 program encompasses work undertaken by 1he DOE. its dozen or so private contractors. a number of national 

laboratories. and the U.S. Geological Survey. as well as many others. The number 

of people working on the program now totals ~!most 2.000 (roughly ~00 DOE 

employees and 1.750 contractor employeesJ.

1 The program·s organizational 

structure is multilayered. and the entities are geographically dispersed. Responsibility for decision-making is shared among the program director and associate 

directors. 15 the management and operations contractor. other private contractors. 

subcontractors. national laboratories. and the U.S. Geological Survey. Consequently. responsibility for program decision-making seems to be diffuse. 

The large and unwieldy organizational structure of this DOE program also 

creates substantial integration problems. The management and operations contractor was hired in I 990 in an effort to consolidate and integrate program 

activities. Howe\'er. the management and operations contractor is not being used 

effectively .

16 Thus. the Board believes that lack of integration remains a major 

problem that contributes to inefficiencies in the program, especially in the development of a well-integrated waste management plan. This remains a major 

concern to the Board because. as discussed in the previous section. the lack of a 

plan affects every aspect of the technical and scientific program. 

Another area of Board concern is funding allocation decisions. For example. 

in fiscal year 1993. funding for overhead and infrastructure - according to the 

DOE, the basic costs necessary to keep the program operating - will account for 

approximately 56 percent of total funds for site characterization (Edison Electric 

I-& In communii.:ation, ~ irh 1h(: DOE Office of Ci\·ilian Radioac1i\-e Waste Management '.'"c>,embcr l'M~ 

IS 1be progr.un ha\ had -.e,~n director.. in ten year;_ Fiveoflht !.t,·en sel'\·cd in the capacity of acting di~,1,,, 

16 Edi,on Ekc1ric ln~1i1u1e comrmntcd in a reccn1 ~pon that lhe mana@'tment and operation"' l.'.Onlr;.u:, .. , 

wa, being u~d a!<> if i1 \l>Cre ·ju,1 ;inothtr .;..-on1rac1or:· The :-.u1rc\1ion wa.'i miKk 10 allo~· them III J,. 

the job 1hc~ were hired to do. 1Edi~in Eic..:1 ric ln:-1i1u1c 199:?t. 
All11cmi11g such " high 

propor1io11 ojjimds to 

m·erhead and 

i1~fi·astn1Cfllre ... may 

hal'e comribwed ro 

de/tl_l's i11 rhe i11iriatio11 

o/' 1111dergm1111d 

excarntio11 and i11 the 

dei-e/opme111 ofa 

/011g-lil'ed 11·aste 

package. 

34 

J •I' \I ,11 I \ ,,, I 

Institute I 992). Allocating such a high proportion of funds 10 overhead and 

infrastructure leaves limited funding for important testing and research and may 

have contributed to delays in the initiation of underground exca,·ation and in the 

development of a long-lived waste package. 

Other coun1ries visited by the Board provide in1eresting alternali\'eS to 1he 

U.S. program's organizational approach. For example. in some countries. a 

government-sponsored corporation or organization has been created to implement 

waste management programs. In addition. in mos1 of 1he countries the Board has 

visited. spent fuel producers are responsible for safely managing nuclear waste -

including. in most cases. planning. financing. and executing all research. interim 

storage. transponation. and disposal activities. There seems to be more financial 

and managerial accountability in these countries. and their programs appear 10 be 

managed more effectively than the program in the United States (NWTRB 

December 1992). 

Alternatives to the current U.S. organizational and management approach 

were evaluated in 1wo congressionally mandated s1udies in 1he mid- 1980s IOTA 

1985. Advisory Panel 1984). Since then, no detailed comparison of the U.S 

approach with alternative approaches has been undertaken . However. Secre1ary 

of Energy Hazel O"Lcary, at her confirmation hearing in January. indicated that 

she might undertake an evaluation of the civilian radioactive waste management 

·program. The Board believes that an independent review of the program· s 

organizational structure would be needed and welcome part of that effort. 

The Board believes that the effectiveness of program managemenl and integration needs to be improved and that the program would benefit from a 1horough 

independent review of its organizational structure. Reviewing the approaches 

being used in other countries could be useful in such a review. 

Ill 
35 

Board Recommendations 

1111 

Ten years have passed since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 

1982. The Board has concluded from its review of the program that. although 

significant progress has been made in site characterization and the collection of 

dala at Yucca Mountain. much more remains to be done. Critical interim milestones. such as constructing the underground exploratory studies facility and 

detennining site suitability. have not yet been achieved. There may nm be time to 

complete the testing and analyses necessary to make imponant repository and 

waste package design decisions before the 2001 construction application deadline. 

and circumstances beyond the DOE·s control could make it impossible to meet 

the 2010 deadline for beginning repository operations. Furthermore. the program 

still lacks a well-integrated overall radioactive waste management plan. 

In light of the high cost of the program and the many uncertainties surrounding 

program progress. it is not surprising to hear public debate escalate over the DOE's 

radioactive waste management program. In its draft repon to then-Secretary of 

Energy Watkins on January 14. 1993. the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board·s 

Task Force on Radioactive Waste Management recommended measures the DOE 

might take to strengthen public trust and confidence in the civilian radioactive 

waste management program. Although somewhat pessimistic about increasing 

public trust and confidence over the short term. the report does recognize that 

without a strong technical and scientific program that is based on sound technical 

analyses. the DOE has liule chance of improving public confidence in its radioactive waste management program (SEAB December 1992). 

Recent initiatives on the part of the UOE suggest that program managers sense 

a need for change. In December 1992. the DOE recognized the need to look at 

alternatives to finding a voluntary host for an interim storage facility. This could 

result in the serious consideration of a range of options for the interim storage of 

spent fuel. The DOE also recently announced several new initiatives. including 

effons to develop a multipurpose container for the storage of spent fuel and plans 

to investigate modifications to 1he existing waste management strategy.

17 

In addition to these ne-.. proposals by the DOE. regulatory changes may come 

about: The federal standards and regulations to be used in siting. constructing. and 

licensing a repository will be reevaluated in the next few years through a process 

established in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Problems with the standards and 

regulations have been discussed to varying degrees in previous Board reports. 

Standards and regulations were addressed in more detail in the National Academy of 

Sciences report Rethi11ki11g Hi_~h-Le,·e/ Radioacri,·e Waste Disposal (NAS 1990). 

17 Ll"ners da1N December 17. 19'>~. :i.nJ fanuary 1-:.. 1993. from lhl" Stcrc1ary ofEncrg~ Ja~s W:i.tkins 

to S<na1or Bcnn~H Johm.ion 
... WI_\" program rerit•u· 

.-/u,11/d l•e ,·,111d11cred 

concurn~nrly ll"ith 

ongoing ll'f>r/.:. at 

l°ucn1 .\lmmtain ... 

36 

At her confirmation hearing in January. Secretary O'Leary suggested convening a broad-based group to review the waste management program. The Board 

suppons Secretary o ·Leary·s sug:ses1ion and believes that as she assumes her 

duties and the 103rd Congress begins its wort. a unique opportunity e>ists 10 

review 1hc program·s curTCnt status. to evaluate new proposals. and to address 

concerns about and make needed improvements 10 the program. The Board 

believes any program review should be conducted concurrently with ongoing 

work. at Yucca Mountain to ensure that current site<haracterization activities 

continue. 

The Nuclear. Waste Technical Review Board hopes that the following recommendations will prove helpful 10 Congress and the Secretary of Energy as they 

make imponant decisions about the future direction of the civilian radioactive 

waste management program. 

· A,,.,nd tltt C urrenl Sclttdult 

The Board recommends a more nexible schedule for the development of this 

first-of-a-kind geologic repository. Such a schedule should contain realistic target 

dates for achieving important interim goals. such as getting underground. determining site suitability. and completing critical testing. The DOE should set testing 

and funding priorities 10 achieve these interim goals. Once some of the interim 

goals have been achieved. it should become easierto realistically predict long-term 

schedules for repository operation. 

IH~lop a Compnlttn,frt Wa,lt Managtmtnl Plan 

The Board recommends that the DOE place a high priority on developing a 

comprehensive, well-integrated plan for the managemen1 of all spcnl fuel and 

high-level waste, including its storage. traospon. and disposal. This plan should 

be based on a systematic assessment of the interdependent nature of the various 

waste management components. It should include an evaluation of the following: 

• a range of options for accomplishing the long-term storage of all spent fuel: 

• the development of a multipurpose container concept that will help minimize 

handling of the spent fuel; 

• the incorporation of system safety and human factors engineering to enhance 

the safety performance of the total system; 

Ill 
37 

\. \\ I KB ')i'~, I K, 1111r1 , 

• the relative trade-offs associated with choosing among the various alternative 

thermal-loading strategics; 

• the potcn1ial contribution of engineered barriers. including a robust, longlived waste package to reduce the uncertainties associated with the long-term 

performance of the repository; 

• the potential impacts of various options for incorporating disposal of other 

types of wastes into the waste management system; and 

• the desirability of maintaining retricvability of the spent fuel beyond the 

currently projected period of 50 years after initial emplacement. 

Revi,w Program Organization and Manag,m,nt 

The Board recommends that an independent evaluation of the Office of 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management's management and organizational structure be undertaken. Reviewing approaches used in other countries could be useful 

in such an evaluation. 
38 

Mr. LEHMAN. And I will recognize Mr. Wells at this time. 

STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Messrs. Chairmen. 

As I begin, I would like to introduce my associate, Dwayne 

Weigel, who is our Assistant Manager, who did the most recent 

work on Yucca Mountain, but over the years has been involved in 

the waste disposal program. We are pleased to be here today to discuss Yucca Mountain as a potential disposal site. 

As evidenced by these hearings today and the attendance, this 

program has had a troubled history and is facing a complex future. 

In our most recent May report, we found that DOE has given relatively low priority to scientific investigations at the mountain. 

DOE is only requesting about half of the funds that it estimates 

are needed to complete the investigation project on schedule because of competition for the funds among all of .its energy-related 

programs and competing activities, even within the disposal program. 

If DOE continues to request and allot funds for the investigation 

project at recent levels, the project could take at least 5 to 13 years 

longer than planned and increase the total cost of the disposal program. 

To streamline the project, DOE has compressed the time permitted for various scientific studies and is considering similar 

measures to reduce costs. These initiatives, Messrs. Chairmen, are 

increasing the risk that the investigation of the site will be inadequate. 

Since our report, DOE has gone on record wanting to establish 

a revolving fund to ensure that adequate funds are made available 

to this disposal program. While the Department's proposed legislation would make more funds available to accomplish existing program objectives, it does, however, have implications for the Federal 

deficit, for congressional oversight and the program's financial 

health over the long term that need to be fully considered. 

Turning now to the specifics, if I may. As you know, in 1989, 

DOE established the current schedule for the investigation of 

Yucca Mountain. DOE estimated that the investigation of the site 

and the preparation of the license application could be completed 

by the year 2001 at a total cost of $6.3 billion, and that if the site 

proved to be suitable, a repository could be in operation in 2010. 

As DOE has tried to meet this schedule, a significant gap exists between the amount of funds that DOE has estimated are needed to 

complete the investigation on schedule and the amounts actually 

budgeted and appropriated. 

For 1991 and through 1993, where we took a look, DOE requested only half of the $1.2 billion that it itself had estimated it 

would need for that time period. The budget proposed for the fiscal 

year 1994 would basically continue this trend. 

There are two reasons why the actual funding requested by DOE 

is so much less than the estimated needs. First, the disposal program competes with other DOE programs for the available funds. 

Although the disposal program is funded by a special fund in the 

Treasury called the Nuclear Waste Fund, it competes within DOE 
39 

for not only departmentwide budget allocated each year by the 

0MB, but competes with programs within the disposal program. 

Second, with the appropriation that DOE receives for the disposal program, site-investigation activities have had to compete for 

funds with other program objectives and priorities. In 1989, DOE 

told us that they established two program objectives of equal rank, 

number one being to begin accepting waste in 1998 by transporting 

it to an interim facility for temporary storage; and the number two 

priority, to begin permanently disposing of waste in the repository 

by the year 2010. Although the budget for the disposal program has not been adequate to fund all of the program activities at the planned level, 

DOE has continued to try to meet both objectives. We found that 

site investigations have gotten low priority. For example, in January of 1992, DOE's disposal program director told us that DOE 

would not take any action that would prevent DOE from beginning 

to accept waste in 1998, such as deferring any procurement of 

transportation casks. When faced with the shortfalls in appropriations, the director said that DOE would fund in descending order 

of priority, one, the foundation or the infrastructure of Yucca 

Mountain, basically to maintain its continuity; the second priority, 

activities that would be related to developing the MRS facility and 

a transportation system at levels sure.dent to allow adequate acceptance of waste in 1998; and third, site investigation activities 

that would enable DOE to maintain its schedule at the repository-. These priorities, quite frankly, for the disposal program have in 

fact limited progress on the Yucca Mountain Project because the 

scientific and the technical activities that must compete to investigate the site have been last in line for funding. In 1992, for example, after program prioritizations, only $60 million, or 22 percent 

of the program appropriation was left for scientific and technical 

activities. This amount is only one-third of what DOE had estimated in its costing schedule that it would need for the scientific 

and technical activities. 

If DOE continues to request and allot funds for the investigation 

of Yucca Mountain at these same levels, as it has in recent years, 

it could take at least 5 to 13 years longer than the 2001 to complete all planned investigative activities. A longer site-investigation 

period, quite frankly, would also increase the cost of the disposal 

program. 

According to DOE cost estimates for the project, about 45 percent 

of the required funds would be used for scientific and technical activities, and about 55 percent would be used for infrastructure activities. In 1992, when we did our audit, however, based on the 

data we were able to obtain, DOE allocated only 36 percent of the 

Yucca Mountain Project allotment of funds to its scientific and 

technical activities; and a similar situation had occurred in 1991. 

Unless DOE reduces this proportion of spending on infrastructure 

activities and uses more of the available funds for science and technical activities, the project's total cost incurred over a longer period 

will definitely increase. 

For example, DOE estimated that it would spend approximately $1.25 on infrastructure activity for every $1 that it spent on science 

and technology activities. In 1992, we found, however, that DOE 
40 

was spending approximately $1. 77 on infrastructure activities, 

funding for these costs and slippages. 

DOE recently compressed the time allowed for various site-investigative activities in an attempt to maintain its schedule for the 

Yucca Mountain Project, and it may take similar steps to reduce 

costs. 

In 1992, DOE began efforts to adjust the scope of the site investigation and to reduce the total cost of the project by as much as 

10 percent. DOE has instructed its contractors that all data required for its licensing application in the year 2000 would have to 

be gathered no later than 1999, and that planned-work that they 

had planned to do would have to be adjusted as necessary. Thus, 

adjustments made during this study to the contractors' scope of 

work has compressed the time that will be allowed for completing 

various scientific and technical activities. 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, which is working on the packaging for the nuclear waste, expressed the concern to DOE that a 

credible license application could not be prepared by the year 2001 

under the revised constraints, and added that these constraints 

perhaps reflect DOE's growing tendency to focus on superimposed 

milestones rather than on genuine technical capabilities. Even the 

Geological Survey, which is also responsible for much of the scientific Earth science investigation work at the mountain, is also 

telling DOE that further reducing the scope of the survey's work 

would increase the licensing risk, and that perhaps they would not 

be able to allow the Survey to resolve any scientific questions that 

would be raised later. 

Not only are the project scientists expressing concern, but the 

board even today has expressed similar concern that DOE's reliance on its current schedule may not allow enough time to collect, 

to analyze some data, and to resolve unanticipated technical problems and questions about the unpredictable conditions that are so 

important to the repository's performance. 

Examples of just a few of the emerging technical issues include 

how best to manage the heat generated by the spent fuel over thousands of years and even new concerns raised about the Ghost 

Dance Fault which crosses Yucca Mountain. 

If I might just turn a minute to the revolving fund issue, most 

recently the Secretary of Energy has asked 0MB to propose legislation that would establish a nuclear waste revolving fund to provide 

an appropriate level of funding for the disposal program. The Secretary noted that the nuclear waste fund annually receives about 

$600 million in disposal fees, earns $200 million in interest, and 

has a current balance of approximately $4 billion. 

This proposal, on the one hand, would help ensure that the increased level of revenues would be available to the Agency to accomplish the objectives of timely acceptance and disposal of the nuclear waste and we do not disagree with that. 

However, on the other hand, the proposal does raise several issues that also need to be considered. First, it could increase outlays 

for the disposal program from the current rate of under $300 million to as much as $800 million, which would certainly, as it currently stands, increase the Federal deficit unless corresponding reductions were made in other programs under the existing budget. 
41 

Second, the proposal would reduce congressional control over the 

disposal program because expenditures from the revolving fund 

would not be subject to annual appropriations. 

And third, the proposal does have some implications on the longterm financial health of the disposal program, how funds for the 

disposal program may be used and how they would be expended. 

For example, the proposal provides DOE general authority to use 

revolving funds to construct or expand facilities. This appears, 

based on our review by our general counsel, to provide a broader 

grant of the authority than DOE now currently enjoys under the 

act. 

Under current law, no funds from the nuclear waste fund may 

be expended by the Secretary for the construction or expansion of 

any facility unless such construction or expansion is expressly authorized by the Congress. The proposal also would allow, perhaps, 

storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites as a permissible use 

of funds from the revolving funds. Allowing funds to be used for 

this purpose would, according to the Secretary, enable DOE to possibly compensate utilities for their on-site spent fuel storage costs 

after 1998 if the Department is unable to accept waste by that 

date. 

Finally, I think by the year 2010, when, according to DOE's 

schedule, the repository at Yucca Mountain will be ready to operate, utilities' nuclear plants will, in increasing numbers, be reaching the end of their 40-year operating licenses. As these plants are 

retired, the fee base that the program now receives and the revenues will decline. However, the costs of shipping the waste to the 

repository and operating that repository will still lie ahead for 

DOE. The Department's most recent cost estimates for the disposal 

program, made in 1990, shows that the cost to dispose of waste in 

the repository over a 30-year period would be about $12 billion. 

Therefore, as you consider such proposals, any increase in the use 

of disposal program revenues, whether by means of a revolving 

fund or even higher annual appropriations, must be carefully monitored to ensure that these funds will be available to pay the costs 

of the program once a repository has been completed. 

If I could just briefly, in conclusion, DOE is only requesting 

about half of the funds that it estimated that it would need. Funds 

spent have not emphasized the central science and technology activities with most of the funds in the years we looked at allocated 

to the project to maintain project infrastructure. 

DOE is reducing the scope and trying to reduce costs. DOE will 

almost certainly not have a MRS facility available in 1998, and 

having an operational repository is definitely moving further in the 

future. 

We and others are raising questions today about the pace and 

the direction of the disposal program. We know that the Congress 

wants a repository and you passed laws to make it happen. These 

laws have included certain assumptions that may no longer be applicable or perhaps invalid. Examples are having an earlier repository, being able to obtain a willing host, and even getting at the 

linkage that currently exists in the acts between developing an interim storage and final storage. 
42 

DOE, quite frankly, has marched to designing a program that 

follows the course like building a construction project. In reality, 

we are probably dealing with a one-of-a-kind project here that basically needs a lot of flexibility in making some course changes. Ten 

years have passed. We believe that an independent review of the 

disposal program is in order. 

Let me say, as Dr. Cantlon of the board said earlier in his testimony, that their concerns can be addressed without slowing the 

momentum of site characterization. We also are not suggesting that 

the program be stopped while this review takes place. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Energy review the program 

goals and objectives in the context of the prowam's current low 

funding priority that is occurring. We also beheve that the Congress should defer consideration of the legislation that would 

change the method of funding for adding funds for DOE until the 

Secretary of Energy has completed her review of the program and, 

most importantly, an independent review of the program has been 

completed. This concludes my remarks and we will be glad to answer questions at the appropriate time. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wells. 

[Testimony resumes on p. 53.] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:] 
43 

STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS, AssOCIATE DIRECTOR, ENERGY AND 

ScIENCE lssm:S, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND E CONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DMSION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of 

Energy's (DOE) disposal program for highly radioactive waste. Our 

testimony will be drawn primarily from our May 1993 report on the 

scientific investigation of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as a potential 

disposal site. 1 In this report, we reviewed whether the level of 

funding for the site investigation project would permit DOE to meet 

its schedule and, if not, how long the investigation might take. 

We also examined whether DOE's initiatives to streamline the 

investigation could affect its technical quality. In addition to 

summarizing our findings on these issues, our testimony today will 

address DOE's recent proposal for establishing a revolving fund for 

the disposal program. 

In summary, we found that: 

DOE has given a relatively low priority to scientific 

investigations of Yucca Mountain. DOE is only requesting 

about half the funds it estimates are needed to complete 

the investigation project on schedule because of 

competition for funds among all of its energy-related 

programs and competing activities within the disposal 

program. 

If DOE continues to request and allot funds for the 

investigation project at recent levels, the project could 

tak~ at least 5 to 13 years longer than planned and 

increase the total cost of the disposal program. 

To streamline the project, DOE has compressed the time 

permitted for various scientific studies and is considering 

similar measures to reduce costs. These initiatives 

increase the risk that the investigation of the site will 

be inadequate. Moreover, they have come at a time when 

unanticipated technical issues have emerged that could 

lengthen the investigation project. 

DOE wants to establish a revolving fund to ensure that 

adequate funds are made available to the disposal program. 

The Department's proposed legislation would make more funds 

available to accomplish program objectives; it does, 

however, have implications for the federal deficit, 

congressional oversight, and the program's financial health over the long term that also need to be considered. 

'Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing 

Major Scientific Uncertainties (GAO/RCED-93-124, May 21, 1993). 

1 
44 

BACKGROUND 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended in 1987, 

requires DOE to investigate Yucca Mountain and, if the site is 

selected for a repository, to apply to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) for a license to construct a repository. The 

amended act also authorizes DOE to develop a monitored retrievable 

storage (MRS) facility for storing nuclear waste temporarily before 

disposing of it permanently in a repository. However, the 

amendments prohibit, among other things, construction of an MRS 

facility until NRC has authorized DOE to construct a repository. 

In 1989, DOE established the current schedule for the 

investigation of Yucca Mountain and defined the technical 

requirements to determine the site's suitability and prepare a license application. It also developed a formal estimate of the 

annual cost to complete these requirements on schedule. DOE 

estimated that the investigation of the site and preparation of a license application could be completed in 2001 at a total cost in 

year-of-expenditure dollars of $6.3 billion2 and that, if the site 

proved to be suitable, a repository could be in operation in 2010. 

DOE also said it would work with the Congress to modify the 

statutory links between the repository and an MRS facility and that 

it would embark on an aggressive program to develop a facility and 

begin accepting nuclear waste there by 1998 or soon thereafter. 

DOE has since relied on the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator 

to negotiate an agreement with a state or Indian tribe to host an MRS facility on DOE's schedule. 

SITE INVESTIGATION IS LOW PRIORITY 

A significant gap exists between the amounts of funds that DOE 

has estimated are needed to complete the investigation of Yucca 

Mountain on schedule and the amounts budgeted and appropriated. 

For fiscal years 1991 through 1993, DOE requested only about one- half of the $1.2 billion that it had estimated it would need for 

that time period. The budget proposed for fiscal year 1994 would 

continue this trend. There are two reasons why the actual funding 

requested by DOE is so much less than estimated needs. 

First, the disposal program competes with other DOE programs 

for funds. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 established 

procedures for reducing or limiting growth in the federal budget 

deficit each year through fiscal year 1995 by, among other things, 

2

DOE arrived at this figure by first estimating the total cost of 

the site investigation in constant 1992 dollars. The total 

estimated cost was almost $5,7 billion. DOE then applied 

escalation rates to the constant dollar estimates for each year 

after 1992 to determine the estimated cost in year-of-expenditure 

dollars. 

2 
45 

setting yearly spending limits on discretionary spending. Thus, 

although the disposal program is funded from a special fund in the 

Treasury, called the Nuclear Waste Fund, it competes with all other 

programs within DOE for the Department-wi de budget allocation 

provided each year by the Office of Management and Budget . 

second, within the appropriati on that DOE receives for the 

disposal program, site investigation activities have had to compete 

for funds with other program objecti ves and priorities. In 1989, 

DOE established two program objectives of equ~l rank: (1) to begi n accepting utilities' waste in 1998 (by transporting it to an MRS 

facility for temporary storage) and (2) to begin permanently 

disposing of waste in a repository in 2010. Although the budget 

for the disposal program has not been adequate to fund all of the program's activities at planned levels, DOE has tried to meet both 

of its program objectives. 

For example, in January 1992, DOE ' s disposal program direc tor 

stated that DOE would not take any action, suc h as deferring the 

procurement of transportation casks, that would prevent DOE from 

beginning to accept waste in 1998. When faced with shortfalls in 

appropriations, the director said that DOE would fund, in 

descending order of priority, (1) the foundation, or infrastructure, 1 of the Yucca Mountain project to maintain its 

continuity; (2) activities related to developing an MRS facility 

and a transportation system at l evels sufficient to allow 

acceptance of waste in 1998; and (3) site investigation activities 

that would enable DOE to maintain its schedule for the repository. 

These priorities for the disposal program have limited 

progress on the Yucca Mountain project because the scientific and 

technical activities that must be c ompleted to investigate the site 

have been last in line for funding . In fiscal year 1992, for 

example, DOE used $106 million of its program appropriatio n of $275 

million for infrastructure activities and used another $110 mi llio n for other program activiti es, such as developing a waste 

transportation system. This left only $60 million, or 22 percent, 

of the program appropriation for sci entific and technical 

activities. The latter amount is only one - third of what DOE had 

estimated that it would need for scientific and technical 

activities. 

We and others have questioned DOE's pursuit of dual program 

objectives . For example, in a September 1991 report, we said it 

'According to DOE, infrastructure costs are incurred to manage 

contractors' activities; provide assistance to Nevada, its 

university, and affected local governments; operate and maintain 

facilities and equipment; comply with applicable laws and 

regulations; and provide training to staff, communicate wi th the 

publ ic, and implement a quality assurance program . 

3 
46 

was highly unlikely that DOE could develop an MRS facility by 1998 

because, among other reasons, it was unlikely that a state or 

Indian tribe would be willing to host this facility.' Also, in a 

March 1992 report, we concluded that in the absence of an MRS 

facility, DOE would not need t o procure transportation casks for 

nuclear waste until about 2005. ' We therefore recommended that the 

Department bring its cask development activities to a n orderly 

close. DOE disagreed with o ur positions because it believed that 

it would meet its 1998 objective for beginning to accept waste for 

storage at an MRS facility. Subsequently, however, DOE 

acknowledged that the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator had 

not succeeded in find i ng a site for the facility in time to permit 

the Department to meet its schedule for accepting waste at an MRS 

facility. 

CURRENT FUNDING PRIORITY WILL ADD 

YEARS TO PROJECT SCHEDULE 

If DOE continues to request and allot funds for the 

investigation of Yucca Mountain at the same levels it has in recent 

years, it could take at least 5 to 13 years longer than the 

Department had estimated to complete al l of the planned 

investigation activities and increase the total cost of the 

disposal program. For example, surface drilling at the site, 

through whi ch core samples of rock are extracted from the ground 

for study, has been slowed in part bec ause of funding limitations. 

Completing the drilling program on schedule would require working 

24 hours a day, 7 days a week, but current funding can support only 

one 8-hour shift, 5 days a week. At this rate, collecting core 

samples for analysis will take at least 3 years l onger than 

planned. 

We estimated how long it could take DOE to complete the 

originally planned scientific and technical ac tivities if annual 

funding for the Yucca Mountain project continued at assumed levels 

--$200 million, $250 million, and $300 million (in 1992 dollars). 

These funding levels are similar to recent actual funding levels 

for the pro j ect . According to DOE's cost estimate for the project, 

about 45 percent of the required funds would be used for scientific 

and technical activities and about 55 percent would be used for 

infrastructure activities. Using this ratio of costs, we projected 

the number of years it would take to complete the planned 

scientific and technical activities at the three funding levels we had selected. 

'Nuclear Waste: Operation of Monitored Retrievable Storage 

Facility Is Unlikely by 1998 (~AO/RCED-91-194, Sept. 24, 1991). 

'Nuclear Waste: Develooment of casks for Transoortina Spent Fuel 

Needs Modification (GAO/RCED-92-56, Mar. 13, 1992). 

4 
47 

Our estimates show that it would take from 5 to 13 years 

beyond 2001 to complete the planned scientific and technical 

activities. These estimates are conservative because they assume that DOE would be able to maintain the same ratio of spending on scientific and technical activities and infrastructure activities--

45 percent and 55 percent. In fiscal year 1992, however, DOE 

allocated only 36 percent of the Yucca Mountain project's allotment 

of funds to scientific and technical activities, and a similar 

situation occurred in fiscal year 1991, 

Unless DOE reduces the proportion of funds for the Yucca 

Mountain project that it has been spending on infrastructure 

activities and uses more of the available funds for scientific and 

technical activities, the project's total cost, incurred over a longer period, will increase. The increase will occur because, for 

each dollar of scientific and technical work performed, DOE is 

incurring higher infrastructure costs than it had projected in the 

project's cost estimate. For example, DOE estimated that it would 

spend about $1,25 on infrastructure activities for every dollar it 

expected to spend on scientific and technical activities. In 

fiscal year 1992, however, DOE spent about $1.77 on infrastructure 

activities for every dollar it spent on scientific and technical 

activities. 

A longer site investigation period would also increase the 

cost of the disposal program. DOE's $6.3 billion cost estimate for 

the project includes only the costs of DOE's contractors for the 

Yucca Mountain project. It does not include the project's share 

--about $46 million in fiscal year 1992--of the costs of 

programwide managerial and technical support. If the site 

investigation takes 5 to 13 years longer to complete, the program's 

costs could increase from $230 million to $600 million (in 1992 

dollars). 

EFFORTS TO STREAMLINE THE PROJECT 

CONSTRAIN SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS 

DOE recently compressed the time allowed for various site 

investigation activities to maintain its schedule for the Yucca 

Mountain project and may take similar steps to reduce costs. 

Project scientists have expressed concern that these initiatives 

increase the risk that DOE will not be able to demonstrate that the 

site meets all licensing requirements. At the same time, the 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board has concluded that DOE may not 

be allowing enough time to study complex technical issues as thoroughly as necessary to complete a sound license application. 

In September 1992, DOE completed a study leading it to 

conclude that, by adjusting the scope of the site investigation, it 

could still submit a license application to NRC in 2001. In 

conducting the study, DOE assumed that funding for the Yucca 

Mountain project would be adequate to complete all investigation 

5 
48 

a c tivities on time. DOE instructed its contractors that all data 

required for a license application in 2001 would have to be 

gathe red by 1999 and that planned work would have to be adjusted as 

n ecessary. Thus, adjustments made during the study to contractors' 

s cope of work compressed the time allowed for completing various 

s c ienti fic and technical activities. 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which is responsible 

for developing the packaging for the waste that would be put into a 

r e pository at Yucca Mountain, expressed its concern to DOE that a 

c r e dible l i cense application could not be prepared by 2001 under 

the r e vised constraints and added that these constraints reflect 

DOE's growing tendency to focus on superimposed milestones rather 

than on genuine technical capabilities. 

DOE also began a n effort in September 1992 to reduce the total 

c ost of the Yucca Mountain project by as much as 10 percent. 

Pro j ect contractors are concerned that reducing their funding will 

also reduce the a mount of sc i entific and technical work that can be 

c ompleted and, therefore, jeopardize the sci entific quality of a 

future license appl i cation for a repository. For example, the U.S. 

Ge ological Survey, which is responsible for much of the scientific 

inve stigation of Yuc c a Mountain, stated in a September 1992 letter 

to DOE that further reducing the scope of the Survey's work would 

inc rease the licensing risk and would not enable the Survey to 

resolve questions raised by the Nat i onal Academy of Sciences and 

the Nuclear Waste Technical Rev i ew Board . 

The Nuclear Waste Te~hnical Review Board has expressed concern 

t h at DOE's relianc e on the current schedule may not allow enough 

time to (1) collect and analyze some data, (2) resolve 

u n anticipated technical problems and questions about unpredictable 

conditions important to the repository's p e rformance, and (3) 

eva l uate the repository 's design and the alternatives for the waste 

management system. In a recent repo rt, the Board urged DOE to 

c o nsi der a management approach u nde r which exi sting schedules would 

b e taken seriously but not allowed to drive the program's 

scientific and technical goals. The Board said that attempting to 

meet unrealistic long-term deadlines might force DOE to make 

important technical decisions without first performing the 

appropriate technical and scientific analyses . 

Emerging technical issues i llustrate the Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board's concern over DOE'S schedule. For example, 

the Boa rd is concerned that DOE's strategy for managing the heat 

g e nerated by spent fuel in the repository over thousands of years 

i s not supported by scientific evide nce. Therefore, the Board has 

r ecommended that the agency complete extensive, previously 

unplanned, testing. This issue has implications that go beyond 

safety to the potential disposal capacity of the site and to the 

l e ngth of time that nuclear waste mi ght need to be stored for 

cooling before it is emplaced in a repository . 

6 
49 

In addition, new findings at the Ghost Dance Fault at Yucca 

Mountain could affect the time needed to adequately characterize 

the site. Recent findings by the survey indicate that this fault, 

which crosses Yucca Mountain, may be more complex than originally 

thought. If this is the case, ·according to survey offic i als, they 

may need to expand their examination of the site, and their 

examination results could affect the locati on and design of the 

repository and a determination about the suitability of the site. 

The Survey's representative said that the scientific investigation 

of the fault illustrated how unanticipated geologic findings might 

require additional time and resources for further investigation but 

that DOE's planned cost reductions would not, if implemented , permit the survey to resolve this issue. 

DOE WANTS TO ESTABLISH A REVOLVING 

FUND TO INCREASE PROGRAM FUNDING 

on May 25, 1993, the Secretary of Energy asked the Office of 

Management and Budget to approve proposed legislation that would 

establish a Nuclear Waste Revolving Fund to provide an "appropriate" level of funding for the disposal program. The 

Secretary noted that the Nuclear Waste Fund annually receives about 

$600 million in disposal fee payments, earns $200 million in 

interest from Fund investments, and has a current balance of about 

$4 billion. 

Under DOE's proposed language, beginning in fiscal year 1994, 

all income realized on the total face value of amounts in the 

Nuclear Waste Fund would be credited to a separate account in the 

Treasury known as the Nuclear Waste Revolving Fund. In addition, 

beginning in fiscal year 1995, all nuclear waste fund revenues received by the Secretary and income realized on this revenue would 

be credited to the revolving fund account. These funds would be 

available to the Secretary for waste storage, disposal, and related 

activities, including the acquisition of real property, the 

construction or expansion of facilities, and the storage of waste 

at reactor sites, without further appropriation. In addition, the 

Secretary could request an appropriation from the Nuclear Waste 

Fund if the balances in the revolving fund account were insufficient to carry out these activities. 

In our May report, we discussed the implicat~ons of a revolving fund at a conceptual level because the details of DOE's 

proposal for a revolving fund were not then available. Since then, 

however, we have reviewed OOE's specific proposal. The proposal 

would, on the one hand, help ensure that an increased level of revenues were available to the agency to accomplish its objectives 

of timely acceptance and disposal of nuclear waste. On the other 

hand, the proposal raises several issues that also need to be 

considered. First, the proposal could increase annual outlays for 

the disposal program from the current rate of under $300 million to 

7 
50 

as much as $800 million. This would increase the federal deficit 

unless corresponding reductions were made in other programs . 

Second, the proposal would reduce congressional control over the disposal program because expenditures from the revolving fund 

would not be subject to annual appropriations. As we pointed out 

in our report, congressional appropriations committees recently 

expressed their concern about the "spiralling" cost estimates for 

investigating Yucca Mountain and conducting other aspects of the 

program and stated that they were prepared to give DOE specific 

line-item direction in the future. This type of committee scrutiny 

would be missing under DOE's proposal, 

Third, the proposal has implications for the long-term 

f i nancial health of the disposal program. Not only would the 

program revenues available to DOE be greatly increased, as discussed above, but DOE ' S proposed language would modify and 

expand how funds for the disposal program may be used. For 

example, the proposal provides authority for using the revolving 

fund for such activities as constructing or expanding facilities. 

This appears to be a broader grant of authority than DOE now enjoys. Under current law, no funds from the Nuclear Waste Fund 

may be expended by the Secretary for the construction or expansion 

of any facility unless such construction or expansion is expressly 

authorized· by the Congress. The proposal also adds storage of 

spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites as a permissible use of funds 

from the revolving fund account. Allowing funds to be used for 

this purpose would, according to the Secretary, enable DOE to 

possibly compensate utilities for their onsite spent fuel storage 

costs after 1998 if the Department is unable to accept waste by 

that date. 

By 2010, when, according to DOE'S schedule, a repository at 

Yuc ca Mountain will be ready to operate, utilities' nuclear plants 

will, in increasing numbers, be reaching the end of their 40-year 

operating licenses. As these plants are retired, the fee base for 

program revenues will decline . However, the costs of shipping the wa ste to the repository and of operating the repository will still 

lie ahead for DOE. The Department's most recent cost estimate for 

the disposal program, made in 1990, shows that the cost to dispose 

of waste in the repository over a 30-year period would be about 

$12 billion in constant 1988 dollars. Therefore, any increase in 

the use of disposal program revenues, whether by means of a revolving fund or higher annual appropriations, must be carefully 

monitored to ensure that funds will be available to pay the costs 

of the program once a repository has been completed. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

In 1989, DOE established dual objectives of beginning to 

accept waste at an MRS facility in 1998 and having a repository 

ready to operate in 2010 by, in part, submitting a license 

8 
51 

application to NRC in 2001. Budget requests, however, show that 

DOE has requested only about one-half of the funds for the Yucca 

Mountain project that it had estimated would be needed. 

Furthermore, DOE's priorities for using the funds have not 

emphasized essential scientific and technical activities. Instead, 

DOE has pursued its objective of accepting waste in 1998 and has 

used most of the funds allotted to the project to maintain the 

project's infrastructure. 

DOE has reduced the scope of the investigation of Yucca 

Mountain in an effort to adhere to its schedule and is considering 

further measures to reduce costs. The Department has also 

developed proposed legislation to change the way the funds are provided for the disposal program so that annual funding would be 

based on need rather than on ability to compete with other programs 

for limited appropriations. These initiatives fall short of the 

mark, however, because they address only specific problems 

perceived by DOE. The initiatives do not comprehensively address 

the disconnection between funding and policies for the disposal 

program. 

Specifically, DOE will almost· certainly not have an MRS 

facility available by 1998, and it is uncertain whether any state or Indian tribe will volunteer to host an MRS facility on any 

schedule. Yet, the time when DOE might have an operational 

repository is moving farther into the future, in part because of 

the relatively low priority DOE has assigned to funding essential 

investigation activities at Yucca Mountain. These conditions raise 

questions abo•1t the pace and directicn of the disposal program that 

must be answered if the program is to proceed in an orderly 

fashion: 

What are the federal government's obligations to begin 

accepting nuclear waste in 1998? 

How can considerations about the investigation of Yucca 

Mountain be separated from considerations about the 

temporary storage of nuclear waste until a repository has 

been developed for permanently disposing of the waste? 

Should essentially all of the funds appropriated for the 

disposal program be used to investigate Yucca Mountain? 

Can enough funds be made available to investigate Yucca 

Mountain, meet appropriate short-term objectives of the 

program, and ensure the long-term solvency of the Nuclear 

Waste Fund? 

How might DOE reorganize and manage the Yucca Mountain 

project to increase the efficiency with which it uses the 

funds allotted to the site investigation and thereby 

minimize the duration and cost of the investigation? 

9 
52 

These questions are not all-inclusive but are ones that have 

arisen from our recent review. Some of these questions address 

basic policy issues pertaining to the management and disposal of 

nuclear waste. For this reason, we believe that an independent 

review of the disposal program is in order. We are currently 

working on a report that will, among other things, suggest ways 

that such a review might be carried out. 

Meanwhile, it is imperative that DOE, as the federal agency 

charged with implementing the disposal program, address questions 

pertaining to the interrelationships between program funding and 

objectives and decide how the Yucca Mountain project should be 

organized and managed before it asks the Congress to change the 

method of funding the program. Therefore, we recommended in our May report that the Secretary of Energy review the program's goals 

and objectives in the context of the program's current low funding 

priority. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary review 

and adjust the project's cost and schedule each year in view of 

actual allotments of funds to the project, realistic assessments of 

future funding for the project, and progress in resolving technical 

issues. 

We also recommended in our May report that the Congress defer 

consideration of legislation that would change the method of 

providing funds to DOE for the disposal program until (1) the 

Secretary of Energy has completed the review of the program that we recommended, (2) an independent review of the program has been 

completed, and (3) appropriate legislative, policy, and/or 

programmatic changes to the program have been implemented. 

Messrs. Chairmen, this concludes my prepared remarks. I will be 

pleased to respond to any questions from the Subcommittees at this 

time. 

(302092) 

10 
53 

Mr. LEHMAN. At this time we will recognize Mr. Barrett. 

STATEMENT OF LAKE H. BARRETT 

Mr. BARRET!'. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Lake Barrett. I am the Acting Director of the U.S. 

Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. 

I am pleased to be here today to present an overview of that program and to discuss the recent findings and recommendations of 

the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the General Accounting Office. 

I would like to submit my formal statement for the record and 

briefly highlight my testimony. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Without objection. Mr. BARRET!'. Thank you. 

I would like to talk briefly about the recent accomplishments of 

the program as well as the steps Secretary O'Leary is taking in her 

ongoing review of the program. We are making significant progress in our characterization of 

Yucca Mountain. A more detailed discussion of the progress is contained in the formal statement. 

Last November, we began surface preparation for the Exploratory Studies Facility, the underground laboratory that will consist 

of some 14 miles of tunnels where our scientists will conduct vital 

geotechnical studies critical to determining whether or not Yucca 

Mountain is suitable for development of a geologic repository. 

We started actual underground construction using the drill and 

blast method this April, and we are now approximately 130 feet 

into the mountain. Next year, we will switch our construction 

method to mechanical excavation with a 25-foot diameter boring 

machine. This past May, we awarded a contract for purchase of 

this machine. And we plan to begin installing the tunnel boring 

machine in the starter tunnel late next spring and begin tunnel 

boring operations approximately 60 to 90 days later. 

With this machine, we expect to complete a one-mile tunnel and 

reach the main test level, approximately 1,000 feet below Yucca 

Mountain, late in the fall of 1994. 

In addition, we have an extensive surface-based testing program 

that operates in parallel. We have developed our LM-300 specialized deep dry drilling rig. We have now reached approximately 880 

feet of our second deep borehole which we began after completing 

drilling our first deep borehole to a depth of nearly 1,700 feet. The 

purpose of these deep boreholes is to conduct tests of air permeability, hydrogeochemistry, matrix hydrologic properties, and to do 

seismic profiling. 

We intend to start closure on scientific issues with the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission as early as practicable as site characterization proceeds. This should result in overall cost and schedule savings. 

For example, by the end of fiscal year 1994, we hope to reach closure with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff on the issue of 

extreme erosion and to present a rationale to the Commission supporting resolution of the seismic hazard issue. If the erosion issue 
54 

can be closed, we project a $2 million to $4 million savings by the 

elimination of unneeded work in this area. It must be noted that our activities to study Yucca Mountain are 

now only limited by funding. We agree with the recent GAO report 

that, due to less than optimum funding, the project schedule has 

slipped resulting in increased total project costs. If we had additional funds we could, for example, be doing around-the-clock drilling and buying additional drilling and excavation equipment. 

Aside from the activities on Yucca Mountain, we are moving forward to develop a standardized multi-purpose canister system. This 

concept· will facilitate a more efficient handling of spent fuel at re- actors during at-reactor storage, during transportation, for storage 

at a Federal receiving facility, and would also be compatible with 

the ultimate geologic disposal system. This multi-purpose canister 

system is building upon current technology that Congressman 

Kreidler referred to earlier. And, in fact, this morning I met with 

150 representatives of the industry, including Pacific Nuclear, to 

build upon that to be sure this is integrated in our program along 

the lines that Dr. Cantlon referred to earlier. 

In order to secure a consistent and adequate budget for the program in the future, we are now fully involved with the Office of 

Management and Budget in developing an alternate funding mechanism so the ratepayers' funds will be fairly applied to this program. 

Secretary O'Leary is reviewing the program, as was stated. She 

has met with many external parties, reviewed numerous reports, 

and has been reviewing the status of the program. During this ongoing review, she has found that the program needs to refocus its 

efforts to improve in two broad areas: Increased emphasis on the 

highest quality scientific work and the more effective inclusion of 

external parties in program development and its implementation. 

During the past several months, the program has received recommendations from a number of sources. Earlier this spring, as 

has been described, the General Accounting Office published its report that criticizes the program for continuing to pursue dual objectives of developing a repository by 2010 and accepting utilities' 

spent nuclear fuel by 1998, while under budgetary constraints. As I stated before, we agreed that, due to less than optimum 

funding, schedules have slipped resulting in increased project costs. 

The GAO findings are based on program funding levels and activity allocations for fiscal years 1991 and 1992 and do not account 

for changes in allocations for fiscal year 1993 and those we have 

projected for 1994. For example, we have approximately doubled 

the amount of scientific funding relative to 1992. 

In addition, the GAO report does not reflect a number of corrective actions that have already been implemented. Examples are: 

Transferring funds from headquarters to the Yucca Mountain site 

so that the Yucca Mountain site characterization is number one in 

our priority scheme. And we have decreased the emphasis on stor- age facility and on transportation as well. We also have initiated significant efforts to reduce characteriza- tion costs including monthly review of all contractor activities at 

Yucca Mountain. 
55 

Further, it must be understood that when GAO categorizes costs 

as infrastructure, this category includes legislated and necessary 

oversight and compliance activities, such as funding for the State 

of Nevada a1iJ affected local counties; compliance with environmental laws, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; 

and the interaction with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 

the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. In fact, we believe that 

over half of the so-called "infrastructure costs" could be categorized 

as compliance activities which are necessary before most scientific 

or technical work can begin. 

Secretary O'Leary has taken a number of initiatives that respond 

directly to the GAO findings, including the initiation of a collaborative consultative process for external review of the program and 

instructing the program to develop a more flexible schedule based 

on interim milestones. 

We believe that collectively these actions accommodate many of 

the valid concerns raised by GAO. We will continue to examine its 

recommendations and findings in an effort to further improve the 

program. 

In March of this year, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review 

Board issued its "Special Report" which has already been described. 

Secretary O'Leary has acknowledged that the program has fallen 

into the untenable position of attempting to meet rigorous schedules without adequate funding. As mentioned above, the Secretary 

has directed the development of a program plan that is not schedule-driven but that demonstrates measurable progress and places 

increased emphasis on performing the highest possible quality scientific work. 

We are also evaluating system concepts and working with the 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board to develop a program approach that addresses its specific concerns. For example, on July 13 

and 14, in the next 2 weeks, a meeting will be held in Denver to 

discuss thermal loading, a subject which is an important feature in 

its Special Report, and is a very important issue to us also. Secretary O'Leary will consider these GAO and TRB reports and 

other past recommendations regarding program management and 

organization as she prepares her new guidance for the program. 

We believe that the recent initiatives and future program plans 

combine to form a sound program that is responsive, cost-effective, 

and productive, while allowing us to continue to maintain our momentum to show that significant progress is being made on this 

program. 

I will be happy to answer any questions that the committee 

would like. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much and, again, I will thank all 

the witnesses for their testimony today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barrett follows:] 

STATEMENT OF LAKE H. BARRETT, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CMLIAN 

RADIOACTIVE WAJITE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Chairman Sharp, Chairman Lehman and members of the subcommittees, I am pleased to be here today to present an overview of current activities of the Office 

of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management at the Department of Energy, including its fiscal year 1994 Budget request. This program has responsibility for implement-
56 

ing permanent disposal of the Nation's spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste as directed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. By its 1987 Amendments 

to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Congress directed that site characterization activities be focused only at Yucca Mountain, Nevada to evaluate whether or not that site 

is suitable for development of a repository for spent fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste. Achieving success in implementing this program is very important to the Nation, not only because it will solve one of the greatest environmental challenges facing us-that is safe, permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste-but also 

because it will allow us to maintain the significant contribution which nuclear en- ergy currently makes to our energy demands. 

With the current direction of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program and the fiscal year 1994 budget request, we are responsive to President Clinton's plans for achieving National economic renewal and to his promise to make government more responsible, accountable, and cost effective. We are also directly re- sponsive to Secretary of Energy O'Leary's recent guidance that we place greater em- phasis on achieving the highest quality in our scientific work, and that we include 

external parties more effectively in program development and implementation. 

Secretary O'Leary is continuing the review of the Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management Program she began shortly after her confirmation. Last April she an- nounced early results of her review and identified activities within the program 

which should proceed as planned. These included beginning construction of the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) and underground exploration, which she believes to 

be absolutely necessary to determine whether or not Yucca Mountain is suitable for a geologic repository, as well as continuing the surface-based site characterization 

activities where the program has realized significant gains since initiating new work 

in July 1991. 

We are making significant progress in these areas. By the end of fiscal year 1993, we expect to complete the 200-foot starter tunnel for the ESF. As of June 29, we were 130 feet into this starter tunnel. Our budget request for fiscal year 1994 will 

permit tunneling of approximately 5,000 feet into the Mountain by the end of fiscal 

year 1994. In the spring of 1994 we expect to begin tunnel boring with a 25-foot 

diameter tunnel boring machine for whose purchase we have just awarded a con- tract to Construction & Tunneling Services, Inc. of Kent, Washington. Our budget 

will also permit us to continue necessary surface-based drilling and to complete two 

additional deep boreholes for downhole testing below the water table, as well as 17 

shallow boreholes for natural infiltration studies. We also plan to achieve closure 

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff on the issue of extreme erosion, es- tablish that volcanism is not a site disqualifier, and complete and present to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a rationale to support resolution of the seismic hazard 

issue. 

Secretary O'Leary also directed that the program continue developing a multi-purpose canister system concept that would provide canisters for storage, transpor- tation, and eventually, disposal. In fiscal year 1994 we plan to complete conceptual 

design and initiate certification of the design of this multi-purpose canister system. 

Finally, the Secretary directed us to continue developing an alternative funding 

mechanism which would consider the unique aspects of the ratepayers' payments to 

the Nuclear Waste Fund, in order to secure a consistent and adequate budget for 

the program in the future. We are now actually engaged with the Office of Management and Budget on developing an alternative funding mechanism. We expect shortly to inform Congress on a proposal to change the current approach, including the 

possibility of amending the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

Also as a result of her early review, the Secretary identified two new activities 

to be initiated immediately. These are creation of a Chief Scientist position with the 

Yucca Mountain Project Office; and initiation of negotiations with eligible parties on the Payments-Equal-to-Taxes issue. Regarding the Chief Scientist position, the Secretary is currently evaluating a proposal for creating such a position to oversee the 

scientific investigations at Yucca Mountain. The purpose of this position is to en- hance the program's scientific credibility, especially with interested parties, affected 

governments, public interest groups, and the public. Regardin~ Payments-Equal-toTaxes, we have received requests from three eligible jurisdictions: Benton County, 

Washington; Washington State; and Nye County, Nevada. We are now analyzing these requests and working with these jurisdictions to come to closure on the appropriate amounts for these payments. As a point of information, Payments-Equal-ToTaxes to Benton County, Washington and the State of Washington are one-time 

payments based on their eligibility as candidate repository sites for the period May 

1986 to December 1987. 
57 

The Secretary continues to consider activities that she intends to evaluate with 

substantive external consultation. These include: 

-ability to accept spent fuel in 1998, including possible utility compensation alternatives should that goal not be met; 

-<>ptions for obtaining early spent fuel storage _pending disposal, such as: --continued support of the voluntary negotiated siting process for a Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility; --departmental siting initiatives including the use of existing Federal facilities; 

-pnvate sector opl?ortunities; and 

-alternative repository licensing strategies. These are issues on which it is difficult to reach consensus. Over the past months, 

the Secretary and her staff have evaluated many previous comments, studies, and 

reports prepared on this program, and have held numerous meetings and conversa- tions with external groups and other interested parties to elicit views and sugges- tions. Because of the diversity of these groups with their strongly differing viewpoints and varying interests, it is a challenge to accommodate them all as we de- velop policies and strategies on major issues. While it may not be possible to reach consensus on all issues, we strive for that goal, especial!>: on major l)rogram issues. Where consensus is not achievable, we will at least identify views ano concerns with 

the objective of respondin~ to them wherever possible. 

As the next step in this process, we are preparing to hold a series of issue-oriented meetin~s to discuss major policy issues facin~ the program and to elicit opin- ions of participants. The proceedings of these meetings will be recorded and will be 

publicly available. The first meeting to discuss the overall process is planned for August 3. Since mid-1991, the program has made significant progress in conducting scientific investigations and gathering the data necessary to evaluate Yucca Mountain 

and to determine whether or not that site is suitable for development as a repository. New work was begun after issuance of required permits by the State of Nevada, and consisted of extensive surface-based activities including h:ydrologic and 

geologic drilling, trenching, seismic monitoring, and soil sampling. This work is directed at characterizing site hydrology, geologic features, existing faulting conditions, seismic activity and volcanism. A series of technical models and reports will 

be developed in 1994. These models and reports will represent the synthesis and 

integration of information supporting the geology, hydrology, climatology, and geochemistry studies. Extensive environmental studies were conducted to establish the 

existing baseline and to provide the basis for any mitigation and i-estoration activities that may be required. These activities will be continued, along with our extensive public outreach activities. 

To build on our continuing progress in characterizin~ the Yucca Mountain site, our fiscal year 1994 budget request for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 

Program is $380 million. This includes $260 million from the Nuclear Waste Fund, 

which is funded through fees paid by ratepayers of nuclear-generating utilities, and 

$120 million from the Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal appropriation. Our first priority in this budget is Yucca Mountain site characterization, and $262 million of our request is for those activities. Also, in response to the Secretary's guidance, in 1994 we are requesting $15. 7 million in the spent fuel storage area that focuses on development of the multi-purpose canister. The remainder of the budget is allocated for 

systems integration efforts; regulatory compliance activities; interactions with the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board; 

international cooperative agreements in support of Yucca Mountain activities; State 

and local oversight of the Yucca Mountain project; and program administration. 

To further enhance site characterization progress, a total of $22 million has been 

shifted within the Program to Yucca Mountain scientific investi~ation activities. 

This comes from two sources. First, over $12 million has been shifted from Head-

!tUarters activities to the Yucca Mountain Project. Second, approximately $10 milhon has been shifted from Yucca Mountain infrastructure costs to scientific work. 

During the past several months, the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management program has received input from a number of sources, including. the fiscal year 1993 

i\ppropriations Conference Report, the General Accounting Office, and the Nuclear 

Waste Technical Review Board. We have carefully evaluated this input, prepared re- sponses, and developed plans to implement recommendations wherever possible. The fiscal year 1993 Appropriations Conference Report expressed continuing con- cern over cost estimates for the site characterization of Yucca Mountain. In response 

to this Conference Report, we have taken a number of corrective actions: (1) increased emphasis on, and funding for, Yucca Mountain site characterization; (2) de- creased emphasis on monitored retrievable storage and transportation; (3) shifted 

funding from DOE Headquarters to scientific studies at Yucca Mountain; (4) initi-
58 

ated a significant effort to reduce site characterization costs, including strengthening our oversight of contractor accounting and cost reporting, our control of project 

baselines and our direction of program activities through guidance and work authorization; and (5) conducted a program business management review. We believe that, as a result, we have a program plan and budget request for fiscal year 1994 that 

is based on cost containment and productivity enhancement, while still assuring full 

compliance with all safety, environmental, health, and quality assurance requirements. Earlier this spring, the General Accounting Office GAO published a report entitled "Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing Major 

Scientific Uncertainties." In this report, GAO criticizes the Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management Program for continuing to pursue the dual objectives of developing a repository by 2010 and accepting utilities' spent nuclear fuel by 1998 while 

under budgetary constraints. It also recommends that the program undergo independent evaluation. 

This study was initiated a year ago and therefore does not reflect a number of 

corrective actions that have already been implemented. The GAO findings, based 

largely on program funding levels and activity allocations from fiscal years 1991-

92, do not account for changes in allocations for fiscal year 1993 or proposed activity 

levels for fiscal year 1994. As previously discussed, Secretary O'Leary has already 

initiated a collaborative, consultative process for an external review of the program. 

She has also instructed the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program to develop a more flexible schedule based on interim milestones. We believe that collectively, all of these actions work to accommodate many of the valid concerns raised 

by the GAO. We will continue to examine the GAO recommendations and findings 

in a context of ways for improving the program. 

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) was created by the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 and is charged with evaluating the scientific 

and technical validity of activities undertaken by the Department of Energy in its 

civilian high-level radioactive waste management program. This includes evaluating 

the characterization of the Yucca Mountain site as a potential location for a repository. In March of this year, the NWTRB issued a "Special Report to Congress and 

the Secretary of Energy'' in which it observes several areas where modifications are needed and recommends corrective actions. This report observes that unrealistic 

deadlines are driving the program, specifically the 1998 date for Federal acceptance 

of spent nuclear fuel from utilities, and the 2010 date for commencement of repository operations. It also observes the need for an integrated waste management plan, 

and the need for improvement of the program's management. Secretary O'Leary acknowledges that the program has fallen into the untenable 

position of attempting to meet schedules without adequate funding. She has directed 

that a program plan be developed that is not schedule-driven, but that recognizes that measurable progress must be made. Recognizing the importance of a well-integrated plan, we are currently evaluating system concepts and working with technical staff of the NWTRB to ensure development of a program approach that will 

address their specific concern. In addition, the review currently underway by Sec• 

retary O'Leary will consider these and past recommendations regarding program 

management and organization as she prepares her new guidance for the program. Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires that, based upon and con- sistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, 

the Environmental Protection Agency will promulgate new public health and safety 

standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials 

stored or disposed of in a repository at the Yucca Mountain site, if it is found suitable. The National Academy of Sciences is currently evaluating this issue and plans 

to release their report by December 1994. The Department interacts with the Academy upon its request to provide information to support their evaluations. In addition, the Academ~ holds regular _public meetings in which the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the State of Nevada, as well as the Department and others, participate to provide information for its consideration. 

The first such meeting was held last May 27-29 in Las Vegas, Nevada. Section 803 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires that the Department of Energy prepare and submit to Congress a report discussing whether current programs 

and plans for management of nuclear waste as mandated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 are adequate for management of any additional volumes or categories of nuclear waste that might be generated by any new nuclear power plants 

that might be constructed and licensed after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

A draft of this report was released for public review and comment last month. Two 

public meetings will be held later this summer to answer questions about the report 
59 

and its findings. We are on schedule to submit the final report to Congress by the 

end of October. 

We believe that the recent initiatives and future program plans described above 

combine to form a sound program that is responsive, cost-effective, and productive, 

and will allow us to continue to maintain our momentum and show significant 

progress toward meeting our program goals, especially our first priority of determin- ing whether or not the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for development as a repository. They will also allow us to increase the number, and ensure the quality, of our scientific investigations. Finally, we believe these initiatives will also allow us to move forward to establish new and more effective methods of external interaction 

and to seek consensus with interested parties, affected governments, public interest 

groups, and the public itself wherever possible. 

Mr. LEHMAN. I guess what we have got here basically is a conflict between deadlines that have been set in law and the financial 

constraints that are there and the need on the other hand for comprehensive, credible, politically and legally, sustainable scientific 

analysis. 

Mr. Barrett, both Dr. Cantlon and Mr. Wells representing the 

Technical. Review Board and the GAO are very critical of where 

they see DOE coming down here, that is, on cutting back on what 

they think is the emphasis on scientific analysis and research and 

some potential problems that that might create not just for safety 

but for the credibility of the whole program and our ability to go 

forward with it up against what are going to be an enormous number of challenges. They both note that you proposed to reduce both 

the duration and the scope of the scientific tests at Yucca Mountain 

in response to those scheduling and funding measures. 

Some of your project scientists, in addition to that, have been 

very critical of those reductions. For example, the project officer at 

the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory a year ago said: "It is my firm 

view and that of my technical staff that a credible license application cannot be prepared by 2001 given the constraints prescribed 

in this recent work plan request. The recent work plan exercise reflects a growing tendency of the project office and M&O to rely on 

superimposed milestones rather than the genuine technical capa- bilities. We are deeply concerned that this specious information will 

be used to persuade senior DOE management and ultimately Congress that a 2001 licensing date is achievable when, given the constraints in this budget exercise, that is highly questionable." 

And similarly, the project officer at USGS wrote last August: 

"This strategy does result in less earth science knowledge about the 

potential repository site and therefore increased risk of failure at 

licensing. For example, some of the questions or concerns addressed by the National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board and others will not be resolved by the reduced program." 

I guess my question is, in light of that, the criticism that your 

scientific program has long received from so many quarters, the 

high likelihood of unexpected scientific questions arising during 

characterization, and the Secretary's directive that this program 

should be driven by science rather than schedules, how can you 

justify, then, pursuing a reduced science program at this time? 

Mr. BARRETT. The report that has been quoted here is the 2001 

study that we did within the program to evaluate what could be 

done with various funding scenarios. It is only a study. It has not 

changed the baseline program. The science still drives the program 

72-587 O - 93 - 3 
60 

and that exercise was to see what could be done for what costs. If 

you had infinite dollars, the scientists would still wish to do more. 

There needs to be adequate science done and it has to be good 

quality science that would sustain a proof to the overseers, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the licensing process, the State of 

Nevada, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, that the decision of DOE regarding the site suitability would be sustained. We 

will not short the science by the schedule. 

That was an exercise to see what we could do. We have not 

changed the baseline. The science will drive the program. Some of 

the science may be deferred and that would then defer the schedule. The science will come first to ensure that the proposed site 

suitability decision would be environmentally and safety sound. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Is the Department at this time legally obligated to 

begin accepting utilities' spent fuel by 1998? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. We have an obligation per the contract to accept 

fuel in 1998. I am not an attorney so I don't know exactly if it is 

a legal obligation or a moral obligation, but we are obligated and 

we are doing everything within our power to achieve that. 

It is very difficult as you all know, with trying to find a host volunteer site, that we can put the fuel at. That is the main problem 

we have and the lack of substantial progress in that area has 

caused us to reallocate substantial funds from those programs of 

fuel acceptance to Yucca Mountain. 

The only substantial work we are doing in the fuel acceptance 

area is along the lines of the multi-purpose canister system, which 

we think has great advantages for the entire Nation, the Department of Energy, and the utilities. That is the only work we are 

doing other than Yucca Mountain in a programmatic sense. Mr. LEHMAN. You state that the Secretary has directed the program to develop a more flexible schedule based on, I guess, interim 

milestones. What does that mean with respect to the status of the 

ultimate milestones, 1998, and 2001, 2010 that have been driving 

the program in the past? 

Mr. BARRETT. The 1998 date is one that is specified in the contract and is specified in the 1982 statute. The 2001 and the 2010 

dates were the Department's 1989 estimates of, if we had had certain funding profiles, what we would be able to do. Those funding 

profiles that were projected in the 1989 study did not come to pass 

and, therefore, those schedules became compressed and they were 

very hard to recover. 

If you go back in history in the 1991, 1992, 1993 budget activities, you would have seen that always in the next year there would 

have been almost a doubling of the program's available funding. 

Those never took place under the overall national budgetary concerns with the deficit. We reached a point now where the 2001 

date, as both groups have stated, is probably not recoverable even 

if we were not under funding constraints. 

Part of the long-term problem here, as the Secretary so stated, 

is finding some mechanism that would allow appropriate funding 

so that the fees the ratepayers do put into the system can be used 

so this important task can go forward. Mr. LEHMAN. Assuming you got the funds that you think you 

need, then what is your best estimate of the time and the expense 
61 

that would be required before we get-assuming Yucca Mountain 

is formally accepted, when would you be able to file a license application? 

Mr. BARRETT. That all depends on what the funding profile 

would be. If we were not funding limited--

Mr. LEHMAN. Let's suppose you got what you want. 

Mr. BARRETT. If we got what we wanted, it would be shortly after 

2001 if we were not funding constrained. If that is 2002 or 2003, 

it all depends on whether it was 1994 when we got the funds or 

1995 when we got the funds and how much those funds were. Mr. LEHMAN. What is the answer, 1 or 2 years after 2001? 

Mr. BARRETT. It could be just a few years. 

Mr. LEHMAN. A few years. 

Mr. BARRETT. It could be a couple of years after 2001 butMr. LEHMAN. What you are saying is you don't know. I hear you 

saying you don't know. 

Mr. BARRETT. No, sir, I don't know because I can't predict what 

the funding will be. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Assuming you got the funding-do you know what 

you need? 

Mr. BARRETT. If we had unconstrained funding starting in 1994, 

2002 would be attainable based on the work plans without cutting 

back along the lines that you were concerned about in your earlier 

question. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Do you know what funds you need? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir. We have a work plan that is based on the 

plan, yes. 

Mr. LEHMAN. I guess I want to be more precise here, what we 

are up to. We have a requirement first for the 1998 deadline, then 

we have got the 2001 date. We know that based on what is occurring now you won't make those deadlines. So obviously what I am 

hearing you saying is we are not going to make those deadlines no 

matter what, so we have to have I guess in our minds some timeframe out there based upon some level of funding to get it there, 

and what I want is to help us help you. Tell us what that is. 

Mr. BARRETT. I did not say we would not make the 1998 date. 

The 1998 date is a very difficult date to make. That all really 

hinges upon finding the volunteer host for a Federal fuel receipt facility. It is possible to make 1998 if a volunteer host can come forward fairly soon. That is the hard one to do. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Everyone else is very certain you are not going to 

make the 1998 date. At least when the Technical Review Board has 

talked to me, they made that clear, and I think the GAO study 

does as well. 

If you got the same level of funding that you got in fiscal year 

1993 and projected that out, when would you be able to get the job 

done then? 

Mr. BARRETT. It would be post 1998 as far as receipt and the repository would slip substantially. GAO made an estimate of 5 to 13 

years, and I wouldn't argue with that under that scenario. 

Mr. LEHMAN. OK. Let me ask you-I will move on because I 

know other members will have questions about this-I will ask several questions about the revolving fund. 
62 

The Secretary's proposal would add payment of utilities' at reactor storage costs as an activity for which money in the revolving 

fund could be used. Would DOE have to increase the fee rate 

charged to utilities so as to recover this new type of authorized program cost and, if so, wouldn't the net result be that the added costs 

to some utilities of storing waste after 1998 would merely be shifted to all the utilities to pay the disposal fees? 

Mr. BARRETT. That is a very complex issue as you stated. The 

Secretary has expressed her desire to enter into a consultative 

process with the various constituent parties to discuss exactly that 

issue and how that could be done in a fair, equitable way. 

What she had asked for in the recommendation on alternative 

funding was to have the flexibility if that consultive process produced a proposal, that would give her the authority to address that 

from a financial point of view. 

Until that consultive process takes place, I can't put a cost estimate as to how much that would be and if it would really change 

the waste fund fee. 

As Congressman Hastert mentioned, there is $4 billion in the 

fund and we do receive approximately $600 million every year from 

the ratepayers to address this issue, and the main thrust is to 

allow those funds to be used for the purposes that they were intended to be in the original 1982 act. 

Mr. LEHMAN. The law requires the Secretary to evaluate the adequacy of that fee, I think, annually and propose any adjustments 

to it. When was the last time that was done? 

Mr. BARRETT. I believe that was 2 years ago. 

Mr. LEHMAN. So we have not done it on an annual basis? 

Mr. BARRETT. We are in the process of doing another one at this 

point, but that is correct. 

Mr. LEHMAN. When would you expect the new one, then? 

Mr. BARRETT. We probably won't have a total cycle cost and fee 

analysis done until after the Secretary has finished her review and 

we adjust the program accordingly. Then, with input we receive 

from the Congress, we would rebaseline the program and see where 

we are and see where the fee is. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you. 

Before I surrender the mike here, I wanted to ask another question at this time of Mr. Cantlon. Your report is somewhat of a departure from prior practices in that you address the management 

issues as well as the technical issues. Why? 

Mr. CANTLON. Chairman Lehman, it was the feeling of the combined board that in order to look at the technical issues and the 

scientific issues there, independent of the management of those scientific and technical issues, was very complex. In other words, the 

scientific answers aren't going to get you where you want to be. 

If the system is being managed or the funds are being allocated 

in different ways where there is not a real total systems approach 

of linking the individual scientific parts together into a coherent 

story, we could not serve the function we thought Congress had assigned us to achieve. So we felt that it would be useful this one time to give an instruction to the Secretary and to Congress that while it isn't our 

charge to look at the management issues, the management issues 
63 

needed to be looked at in order that the scientific and technical 

components could actually be arrayed in a way that would be useful in looking at the safety and indeed the suitability of the Yucca 

Mountain site. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Does DOE ask your advice on technical issues? 

Mr. CANTL0N. We have several meetings a year of p~mels and the 

total board and in those sessions, we have our specialists both on 

the board and our technical staff interacting with the scientists in 

the DOE and its contractors and there is a great deal of discussion. 

Mr. LEHMAN. So you are satisfied with the amount and quality 

of the dialogue? 

Mr. CANTL0N. Yes. We have every one of our recommendations 

responded to in writing by DOE and we publish those responses in 

our subsequent reports. 

Now, not surprisingly, they don't take all of our advice and recommendations but they do respond, and in some cases where they 

haven't taken them, we have come back to that issue and raised 

it again in a different context. For instance, we have had thermal 

loading for a number of our sessions and, as you just heard from 

Dr. Barrett here, we are going to be meeting in a few weeks again 

in Denver on that issue, so we keep needling them to come back 

to that issue to address it. So we can't quarrel with the response. Mr. LEHMAN. Yes. Mr. Wells. 

Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, might I interject here with a question 

about why they got involved in management? We in GAO are not 

scientists and we have kind of looked at the board to do the technical side of the program. We actually welcome their participation 

in helping us in some of the management issues. So it was nice to 

have them with us. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you. Mr. Sharp. 

Mr. SHARP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

We appear to be at a natural point here for a thorough review 

of where we are. We obviously have a new administration, a new 

Secretary. We have some significant reports here that are being 

discussed here publicly today that have been with us for several 

months now from GAO and from the Technical Review Board. And 

so my question really relates to whether we are fully seizing this 

moment and making the most of it? 

Mr. Barrett, you obviously are well aware, and the discussion 

was just about the question of management and that means many 

different things to many different people; and I understand that 

you folks at the Department have an independent examination 

going on on the issue of fiscal management, how the money is managed, if I understand, and of course in our corporate systems and 

in Congress and what not, that is always a central piece of judging 

management; and it is the most obvious and it is the one we can 

get our hands on. But there are obviously other very significant 

management questions. 

Dr. Cantlon was alluding to how one organizes the various 

projects so that they seem to end up at the same time when they 

are needed and how answers in one may impact on decisions in another part of the program. So my question is: What kind of review 

of the broader question, which gets at the other issue raised by the 

TRB, the question of the integrated plan, and whether you take ex-
64 

ception to what the review board has said about the existence of 

an integrated plan-I have sort of jumbled the questions up. 

Mr. BARRETT. No, we don't take exception with the TRB on an 

integrated plan. We would like to do much more technical integration of the program. Unfortunately, what starts to happen with a 

limited budget, we are trying to get the scientific data first on 

Yucca Mountain, as GAO has eloquently spoken. They don't think 

we are spending enough money on the science on that. 

To do some of this technical integration, you have to look at the 

reactor situation, the transportation, the storage, and you have to 

keep a lot of options open because we have no designated MRS 

storage site. So you have to look at all kinds of options there. As 

we try to get our arms around these very complex, not well-defined 

surface locations and what options the whole system might look 

like, that takes a lot of time and energy and expertise and we 

haven't been able to do as much in that as I would like to have 

done, or my predecessors would liked to have done, and certainly 

not as much as the Technical Review Board would like to see being 

done. 

We are trying to get underground and get the underground scientific data, as the Technical Review Board has urged us to do. It 

is hard to balance this on a very limited budget based on what the 

needs are as the GAO has described. We don't take exception to 

what they have said. Mr. SHARP. Let me turn to-part of that question is what kind 

of review is underway. You mentioned you have used the language, 

the ongoing review of the Secretary, and certainly she, in my view, 

has done a great job coming into office in this horrendous array of 

complex issues and organizational and programs that really don't 

all fit together. But I am asking when the issue is ongoing, is there 

a plan at this point in a sense to conclude? There is always an ongoing review on everything. Is there a plan of action or a plan of 

analysis here at what p0int you sort of hope to have concluded, how 

much more needs to be done on the fiscal side, how much more 

needs to be done on integrated planning, or how much more or different needs to be done in terms of other management issues? 

Mr. BARRETT. I believe the Secretary's review that she has initiated and that is underway will include the broad range of issues 

through this consultative process. 

You mentioned the financial aspects of the review but I also believe it will include the technical management of things, the balancing, the situation of how to find a DOE site for an interim site, 

et cetera. I believe her review will include the broad range of the 

entire program and include the management aspects and the technical management as well. 

The details of that I do not have, as she is formulating that. And 

I am not the reviewer, I am the reviewee in this case, so I really 

don't know all the details of it. I know she has various proposals 

and she is actively involved in determining how she is dealing with 

it. 

Mr. SHARP. Let me ask Mr. Wells and Dr. Cantlon if they have 

any suggestion on how the independent outside review of the 

broader questions might occur. How can we do it elsewhere in gov-
65 

ernment agencies? I am sure Mr. Wells is in the habit of that, I 

should start with him. 

Mr. WELLS. Yes, sir, I would be glad to. 

First, let me say that we in GAO-it is a good thing that DOE 

is doing something, and that the Secretary has announced she is 

going to do, some internal look at the program as well as some external look. We are in agreement that it is probably not enough, 

that alone, if you consider the independence and the credibility of 

DOE, they need to go somewhere other than DOE. And again we 

still don't know a lot about the details, the scope, the limits, and 

what kind of membership that might exist, but I think from a GAO 

perspective and the independent review we recommended, we are 

in agreement with Dr. Cantlon and the board that this definitely 

needs to be led perhaps and managed by someone other than DOE, 

and we think it ought to be at a very fairly high level. 

We are 10 years into this program and they have had a number 

of successes but probably more failures, and I think it raises a lot 

of fundamental questions even getting at the national nuclear 

waste management policy. 

Our current thinking is not only does it have to be at a high level 

but from the past experience, that performing this review may not 

be able to be done by just the stakeholders alone, but it is important that all the stakeholders be heard. But what really is needed 

is an objective evaluation of the program. 

There are several possible models, as GAO has looked over the 

years at other Federal programs, to suggest not only hearings by 

the appropriate congressional committees, maybe a specially constituted committee of the Congress. There have been special commissions that have been established through legislation that might 

be applicable. What comes to mind is one like the Monitored Retrieval Storage Review Commission, or even an existing body such 

as the National Academy of Public Administration. 

And why I say that is that a lot of the questions and problems 

in existing programs are not necessarily scientific. A lot of them 

are of a management and organizational structure and there is a 

governmental entity out there that is extremely good at recommending management and organizational changes. 

Another option might be a presidential commission such as the 

presidential commission that was established after the accident at 

Three Mile Island a number of years ago. Again, I need to point 

out that we at GAO are currently studying this very thing in terms 

of trying to get information over the next several months about 

various options and what perhaps could be done and who could 

lead that study. 

Mr. SHARP. So you say in the process of providing information on 

what options--

Mr. WELLS. We are looking at these various options and the advantages and disadvantages, and we hope to have that together in 

the next couple of months to be made available to this body. It is 

part of our ongoing responsibility to review the Nuclear Waste Act. 

Mr. SHARP. Dr. Cantlon, I don't know if you or your board had 

recommendations or suggestions on how that might be accomplished. 
66 

Mr. CANTL0N. Our board being composed of scientists and engineers are probably not the most highly qualified to talk about these 

kinds of management issues. In our special report, we did point out 

the possibility of including some of the top managers from other 

countries who have this identical challenge, recognizing that the 

social context in which this works is totally different from ours beeause their utility industries are for the most part government-operated utilities and so the challenge is very different. On the other hand, it would give whatever body is designated to 

do this external review an opportunity to see how some of the countries have put together an extremely efficient management. 

I would suggest that some countries other than England be 

looked at. We just returned at looking at theirs and I would not 

want to emulate that. 

Mr. SHARP. I recently read this is a bad year for Great Britain 

in many respects. They seem to be jumping right on the bandwagon. Well, let me just quickly indicate, and I will close my ques- tions here, that certainly it seems worthy, logical, and both at GAO 

and Mr. Wells and the board have suggested that we do such a review and indeed the Secretary, Mr. Barrett, understanding or seeking various reviews of that. 

The caveat, to qualify the occasion, is that we have done all this 

stuff many times on many agencies on many programs and oftentimes the reviewers are not particularly well organized or well informed and we don't always get the quality of what we want. We 

all know there is a greater ideal out there somewhere and the congressional committee doesn't strike me as necessarily the role 

model to follow for organization, management, discipline, and quality work. We have great staff. But it does strike me that we are at a time 

when we ought to seriously pursue these opportunities because 

once individuals become a part of the system, they naturally, as we 

do-well, I mean no congressional incumbent would be this waynaturally get wedded to certain practices and things, and it is difficult to open our eyes. 

So I think it is very important that we seize this opportunity and 

I would urge the Secretary and the DOE to capitalize on this time 

period. I think those of us on the outside looking in must be careful 

not to just fall into what is the easiest criticism we ever made, 

"Well, somebody else ought to run it better." We never know quite 

who that is, or where that is. Corporate America is struggling with that today, after all, and 

some of the great corporate bureaucracies are not performing at the 

peak of efficiency at the moment. But I nonetheless, with Dr. 

Cantlon, feel that there obviously are models and possibilities we 

are to follow and this is really the moment to look at in terms of 

the broad context. We obviously up here at some point are perhaps going to have 

to deal with issues of timetables and funding mechanisms, and we 

have got to be prepared to take that responsibility. I think the administration will serve themselves, us, and the program well if 

they will review before we start darting out on one aspect, because 

I might indicate it is unlikely we will be able to discretely take just 

one of these issues if we get into the legislative arena. Those who 
67 

simply want to deal with off-budget I think will quickly find that 

others will feel compelled to deal with other issues at the same 

time. So I think the wisdom is to try to get as many of these ducks 

in a row before we start trying to clean them up, up here. 

With that, I do thank everybody here, including Mr. Barrett, for 

their work on this. Because we have a responsibility on the congressional side, and you folks have responsibility for something 

that is horrendously complex to carry out in a politically charged 

environment in which most of us, we are counting on you not being 

among this most, really don't have a very good comprehension of 

the technical side of things. 

But these are profound issues for our society; and so I do appreciate the work of all of you; and I want to go back to the board simply because I want to make sure that we keep this board an integral and important part of an objective review where I think it has 

a very important function in helping us to clarify issues and to reduce the misunderstandings that will occur politically. Thank you. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Vucanovich. 

Mrs. VUCAN0VICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I was thinking back when Chairman Sharp was speaking 

that he was instrumental in the Nuclear Waste Technical Review 

Board being formed, and as a matter of fact I remember thinking, 

gosh, that is not such a good idea, but since then I have changed 

my mind. I think it has turned out very well. Of course, Mr. Barrett is the target here and I would like to ask 

him a couple of questions but before I do, Dr. Cantlon is a former 

Nevadan and I would like to ask him a question or two, and also 

Dr. Allen but, Dr. Cantlon, you know, in your testimony, you indicate that attempting to meet these unrealistic deadlines, 1998 and 

2001, could cause licensing problems, increase overall · program 

costs and ultimately delay the program. 

Would you explain what the licensing problems might be and 

particularly what the extent of delay in the program would be--

would happen, would result? 

Mr. CANTL0N. Yes. And I think it is important here to give this 

caveat that what I am talking about are "for instances" not things 

that have actually happened. 

Mrs. VUCAN0VICH. Sure. 

Mr. CANTL0N. But there was some early interest expressed to us 

on the part of some of the program managers to very quickly settle 

on the thermal strategy for the repository because that so pervasively influences everything from the design of the repository to the 

feed system of the spent fuel coming in, all of those things are really determined by the thermal strategy chosen. 

And it was our feeling that the technical basis for choosing one 

or the other of an array of different thermal strategies was totally 

inadequate, so in trying to move quickly on one of those, we felt 

would really put in the minds of the critics of the program a technical basis for essentially attacking the way in which it was being 

put together. That is one illustration. 

The other illustration, I think, in trying to address the 1998 date 

of accepting fuel, was driven to select a particular cask and whether or not that cask is ideal for the way the repository will actually 
68 

be designed and the system of delivering it, the human safety factors in where you have to load or unload that ft,1el. All of those 

things should be in the final design, but 1998 drives us to need 

some kind of a container early, so those are two illustrations. 

Mrs. VucANOVICH. You are sort of talking about the heater tests 

and some of those things, is that--

Mr. CANTLON. Right. Yes. In order to choose a thermal strategy, 

one must understand what heating for long-term periods of time in . that volcanic tuff does. Does it alter the capacity of that rock to 

continue to retain radionuclides that will eventually escape from 

the containment? 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. I know with your scientific background you 

know you would be able to help on this, but it would seem to me 

that it is pretty hard to get that information over when you are 

looking at a 10,000 year storage. Mr. CANTLON. Oh, yes. No one has done a 10,000 year experiment. Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Not that we know of. 

Mr. CANTLON. What we would have to do, obviously, is to run experiments for a certain time period where various of the physical 

processes have begun to change. We have used the analogy elsewhere that if you wanted to speed up baking a cake, you can't run 

the oven at 500 or 800 degrees in order to speed up the cake baking. The chemistry and the physics of the cake change, and similarly one has to heat up that rock at a temperature that is compatible with the way the water crystallization makes . the different 

minerals behave and you drive off the shelves of water around the 

particles. All of those things have physical limits and parameters and so 

one must run those heating experiments in a particular kind of 

way to generate the type of information that will permit the modelers then to make these long range extensions of behavior. So that 

is why we think don't rush it, do it right. 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Sure, well, it makes sense. 

Dr. Allen, you sat patiently for 1 1⁄2 hours, so I want to ask you 

a question to allow you to speak. 

You know about a year ago the Little Skull Mountain earthquake 

rocked Yucca Mountain, and about a week prior the largest U.S. 

quake in nearly two decades hit Yucca Valley in California, and I 

was in Las Vegas, about 20 floors up, when the ground motion 

shook Nevada quite noticeably, and so the TRB has questions 

about the Ghost Dance Fault at Yucca Mountain. 

Can you tell the subcommittee about scientific concerns regards 

seismic activity and the repository? How the effects-what the ef- fects would be? 

Mr. ALLEN. In the first place, let me state that although I can't 

claim to be a Nevada native the way Dr. Cantlon is, I grew up just 

across the border in Owens Valley, California, even closer to Yucca 

Mountain. 

The subject of seismic hazard to the test site is one of great concern to everybody, particularly the public. The public has considerable concerns about that and that is among the reasons why we 

have to look at it very carefully. It has been a very important part 
69 

of and continues to be an important part of the Department of Energy's program, particularly through the U.S. Geological Survey. 

There are numerous faults within the Yucca Mountain area, even 

much closer than the locality of where the Little Skull Mountain 

earthquake occurred last year. And it has long been recognized 

that these potentially could cause earthquakes even larger than the 

Little Skull Mountain earthquake and that, as far as I know, is 

being considered in the planning of the facilities, the tunnels, and 

the handling facilities. 

Of particular interest, of course, is the Ghost Dance Fault which 

goes right squarely through the repository. I think it is not surprising to any geologist to discover that even though it was initially 

mapped by the geologic survey with a single line, as we look at it 

more carefully it turns out to be a more complicated feature than 

initially had been thought, and that is one of the reasons why we 

are anxious to get under ground and see what that fault zone looks 

like at the repository level. 

Three items are of particular concern here. One, is the fault an 

active fault in the sense that it could generate an earthquake or 

suffer fault displacement during an earthquake in the foreseeable 

future? If it hasn't moved, for example, in the last 5 million years, 

then I don't think we are concerned in the next 10,000. On the 

other hand, if it has moved in the past 10,000 years, which is possible, then one has to recognize maybe it could move during the 

next 10,000 years. 

Second, we are concerned about how many branches of the fault 

there are. If it is just a single feature, it is much easier to deal with 

and step back from. And if it turns out to be a number of branches, 

it is a concern to look at these branches and see how important 

they are relative to the main branch. 

And third, the problem of, even if the fault does break or even 

if the branches break, does that necessarily violate the integrity of 

the waste packages and so forth, so the nature of the waste packages comes back to the system of planning. 

The nature of the waste package also is relevant to the seismic 

hazard and must be considered in the overall picture and how the 

waste packages are placed in the underground facility so the Ghost 

Dance Fault is an important feature. 

Studies are vigorously underway, particularly by the geological 

survey. I would say that the board is already on record as saying 

that we know of nothing at this time that · necessarily makes the 

site unsuitable. 

There is still a lot of work to be done including work on the 

Ghost Dance Fault to relieve any lingering doubts that may be 

there concerning the possible effects of that fault and other faults 

adjacent. 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. So the deadline is really pressuring a little bit 

probably more than we need. I won't belabor this point any longer, 

but I would like to ask Director Barrett a couple of questions. 

How is DOE carrying out the dual role of fulfilling the responsibility of the Nuclear Waste negotiator's office and the activities 

associated with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management? 
70 

Mr. BARRE'IT. There is no connection between the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management and the Office of the Negotiator. We are a staff apart from the Office of the Negotiator. They 

report to Secretary O'Leary. My organization reports to Secretary 

O'Leary. The Office of the Negotiator does not work for me and 

there is independence between the two. 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. So you are satisfied that they are really two 

separate entities? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. Yes, ma'am. 

Mrs. VucANOVICH. Well, there are some of us who might not 

agree but I am concerned about that particular situation. 

What is the status of the proposal DOE is considering regarding 

possible use of a Federal facility, a Federal facility as the location 

for an interim nuclear waste site? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. The Secretary wants that to be considered by the 

consultative process, involving the various constituents on how we 

should handle the immediate and near-term issues with the program, that is, basically the 1998 date through 2010. That issue 

needs to be dealt with by that broad group so that we can get the 

external input that the Secretary wishes and that a consensus be 

reached by the various parties on what is the right thing for the 

Nation to do concerning the 1998 date. 

When you start to deal with the 1998 date, you immediately get 

involved in siting. So that will be all intertwined together. 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. What criteria would be used for a Federal 

site, for a candidate site? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. If it is technical criteria or? 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. What criteria, period. 

Mr. BARRE'IT. The issue hereMrs. VucANOVICH. Technical or scientific or political. Political, 

probably. 

Mr. BARRE'IT. The issues of siting are primarily dominated by 

what I say are institutional issues. The technical issues are minor 

and inconsequential. Almost any existing DOE sites are fairly large 

sites. Technically, the storage of spent fuel could be handled at any 

of the DOE sites. The issue here becomes institutional, 99.9 percent. 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Thank you. 

I am going to ask one question of Mr. Wells and then yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. Wells, you indicate that DOE is not adhering to its Mission 

2001 document with respect to its baseline projections for site characterization. Is the Mission 2001 document still in place as the 

guiding document for the Yucca Mountain project? 

Mr. WELLS. As far as we know, yes. I was interested in listening 

to Mr. Barrett's discussion that this was a planning document and 

estimate and it doesn't necessarily direct the schedule to what was 

happening. I also listened with interest when you raised the question about a heater test and how important that was. 

We would like to relay what the scientists at Lawrence 

Livermoore discussed with us and perhaps have Mr. Barrett respond to that, but basically the people at Lawrence Livermore who 

have the responsibility for conducting the heater test which is critical and important had indicated and designed their test around a 
71 

12-year focus of getting that scientific work done. When asked by 

DOE to respond to their Mission 2001 request to compress and look 

at reducing costs, the scientists responded in the order of magnitude of getting the test down to approximately 6 years and we 

understand what was actually agreed to and somewhat demanded 

by DOE as a result of the study is that, no, that test had to be con- ducted in 3 years. So it would be interesting to see on where they 

stand on actually doing that heater test. 

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. I have some other questions for all of the pan- elists and I will submit them for the record. I appreciate all of you 

being here. Thank you. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Without objection, all members will be allowed to 

submit questions of the panel and we ask that you respond to 

those. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Since I allowed Mr. Sharp to speak as Chairman 

of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, I would like to recognize 

Mr. Bilirakis, the ranking member of that subcommittee. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you, but Mr. LaRocco has 

been sitting here very patiently all of this time. If you don't mind, I would like to yield to him in a sense of fairness. 

Mr. LEHMAN. I was trying to keep the mike away from him, 

but-the gentleman from Idaho. Mr. LARocco. Thank you, and I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Mr. Barrett, I would say that in response to Mrs. Vucanovich's 

question about the DOE's policy on Federal facilities being looked 

at as interim storage that your answer is in contradiction to what 

the Secretary told this committee about a month ago in direct questioning from me. I said that Admiral Watkins, walked out the door and left the 

committee a hand grenade with the pin pulled out of it on the floor. She said she was going to put the pin back in. Obviously, my concern is over how the DOE regards the facility 

in Idaho Falls, in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. So 

I think more coordination needs to be made between yourself and 

the Secretary. It is not my understanding that this is being looked 

at in the framework that you presented this committee, at least 

from the Secretary's standpoint. We have an aquifer out there in Idaho. We are not a repository. Yet, we have a facility that has served historically as an advanced 

research facility but now it is being used as a repository and I 

think we should examine what the DOE's position is. The judge, I am quoting from the judge's decision, but I think it 

is germane. He said: "Idaho represents to the court that its present 

challenge was triggered in part by DOE's announcement that the 

spent fuel being brought to INEL would no longer be reprocessed." 

Would no longer be reprocessed. That was the initial role at the installation. So spent fuel is being sent there just to be stored. This announcement signaled a potentially significant change in 

the entire purpose of INEL, which for much of its history has 

served as an advanced research facility. In light of the fact that DOE now wishes to bring in spent fuel 

from civilian reactors and from foreign reactors, it appears that 

72-587 0 - 93 - 4 
72 

DOE is quietly attempting to make INEL the nuclear waste repository for the United States and the rest of the world. I have a copy of a consolidated contract request for proposal. In 

the discussion about spent fuel on this request for proposal, it says, 

"The contractor will manage the DOE's national spent fuel program." It covers the whole spectrum for the entire DOE system. 

And my question simply is, are we a repository out in Idaho, or are 

we a research facility? And what should we expect of-I mean, why 

has the mission gotten so off track? 

Mr. BARRETI. I believe there is some confusion as to which spent 

fuel is being referred to here. The Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program deals with commercial spent fuel from commercial electricity-producing power reactors. When we use the word 

"spent" fuel-and I have used the word "spent" fuel-that is what 

I have been referring to. 

In the research and development activities at Idaho, that has 

been Navy fuel, Department of Energy research and development 

fuel that is being talked about there. That is not the fuel that I 

have referred to in my testimony. 

Mr. LARocco. Well, but you know, this court decision started 

with the discussion about the spent fuel from the civilian reactor 

at Fort St. Vrain. Mr. BARRE'IT. Which was a demonstration plant, and there were 

contracts between the Department of Energy and Public Service 

Colorado where that fuel was done by the research program. 

Mr. LARocco. I understand about the contracts, but in the court 

decision they say that Fort St. Vrain had actually made an application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to store spent fuel at 

their site and that, in total disregard of the fact that they could 

store it in an on-site facility that was licensed, instead, they sent 

it to Idaho which is not established as a storage facility and a repository. That is what triggered this whole thing, that there has been a 

constant, continual effort by the DOE to just keep bringing waste 

into Idaho; and I don't think there is any such thing as temporary 

waste storage or an "interim" storage facility. I think the judge is 

right, that the DOE had intended and quietly attempted to make 

INEL the nuclear waste repository for the United States and the 

rest of the world. 

It is not designed for that. It is a research facility. And I thought 

that the Secretary was backing away from Admiral Watkins's cavalier approach to our water and way of life out in Idaho; and you 

are now telling me that that is not true. I think we are going to 

have to reexamine that. But what is your reaction to this, about making INEL the nuclear waste repository? Why has this gone on this way? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. Well, the civilian high-level waste program is not 

making Idaho a repository. When theMr. LAROCCO. They are just storing it there forever? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. Well, but that court ruling and that material has 

nothing to do with the material that is in this program. What the 

Secretary stated when she was here last time before this committee, when she referred to the hand grenade, was that the way it 
73 

was left by Admiral Watkins was, the Department of Energy was 

going to start off by itself and identify Federal sites. 

We are not-the Department of Energy does not today have an 

active Federal siting program to identify a Federal site. That will 

not be done unilaterally by the Department of Energy. That would 

only be considered if it was to ever be considered, through the consultative process; and the State of Idaho would certainly be involved in that before any such thing would be done. 

So I don't see that there is an inconsistency between what the 

Secretary said and what I previously said. 

Mr. LARocco. Well, I know, but the State of Idaho has been run 

over in the past in spite of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The reason I attempted to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is because 

the State was totally ignored by saying that there was an existing 

contract in force; never mind the fact that PSC had the storage facilities; it was just keep the trucks moving and just keep them 

headed towards Idaho, keep the trains going. I am just trying to get some commitment from the DOE that 

INEL is not viewed as a repository. We want to keep the research 

going out there-I am not trying to stifle those attempts-but I 

think the judge has pointed out here that there is a long history 

of the DOE just using that site out there for storage. Also, there 

is another problem here. 

On this Westinghouse report, on page 12 it says, "In addressing 

storage building CPP-603, it stated there were no established criteria for corrosion inspection of the fuel storage cans." Because 

there were no criteria for inspection, the cans were never out of 

specification, so there is no criteria. They just kept corroding. 

So how could this be? Doesn't DOE have an established method 

of inspecting corrosion of its fuel storage vessels? I mean, they just 

kept corroding. This is an alarming report. It just came out on 

June 14th. After all of the concerns of the State of Idaho over the 

years, here we have this. Are there any criteria? Or does DOE have 

an established method of inspecting corrosion of its fuel storage 

vessels? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. That is out of the jurisdiction of this program. I 

will be happy to take any questions back for the record to the Department and have the appropriate people address those questions, 

sir. 

Mr. LARocco. Well, that would be appreciated. Because this is 

causing quite a bit of concern out in my State, and I think the rubber has just finally hit the road here. I agree with Judge Ryan's 

decision wholeheartedly. I think that he has put his finger on 

something here that we have been saying for a long time out in the 

State, to just keep trucking the waste in, is not OK. 

There are rooms out there that aren't safe; they have known it 

for years. The gentlelady from Nevada talks about seismic activities. We have reports that say that if there is any seismic activity 

there could be a calamity out there; it could leak into the aquifer, 

the Snake River aquifer, one of the Nation's greatest resources. So 

that is why I am at this hearing today, to try and determine what 

the policy is of DOE. I heard some contradictions, quite frankly, between your statement and the Secretary's, and I hope we can get 

that resolved. 
74 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you. 

[The following information was received for the record:] 

The mission of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) is to develop advanced 

technologies to process spent nuclear fuel for permanent off-site disposition while 

minimizing waste. It is not the intention of the Department of Energy that the ICPP 

act as a permanent repository. The Department does agree that there are major safety concerns at the old Fuel 

Storage Facility (CPP-603). These concerns are being actively addressed and in- clude: (1) systematically identifying fuel storage issues and root causes of problems, (2) prioritizing resolution of critical issues in fuel storage consistent with governing safety documents, (3) developing a complete program to identify corrosion concerns 

early, (4) upgrading storage equipment, racks and procedures, and (5) applying les- sons learned from spent fuel storage activities within the Department and in the 

private sector. A program and schedule to remove all fuels from CPP-603 has been developed. Current plans call for all spent fuel to be removed from the CPP-603 North and 

Middle basins by the end of calendar year 1997 and from the South basin by the 

end of calendar year 2005. We are evaluating this schedule and any feasible option that can expedite the schedule is being explored. 

Mr. LEHMAN. The gentleman from Florida? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you didn't mind 

my yielding the way that I did. 

Mr. LEHMAN. I did, but that is OK. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Wells, did GAO talk to State regulators who 

are, I assume, so frustrated by the DOE's slow pace? 

Mr. WELLS. State regulators? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. State regulators. 

Mr. WEIGEL. Our discussions for the May report that we issued 

were confined to the National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. All right. Well, you didn't talk to State regulators 

directly; you did talk to the National Association. What did you 

learn? 

Mr. WEIGEL. They would like to see this program move. Mr. BILIRAKIS. I guess that is no surprise. Does GAO have any opinion as to how much Secretary O'Leary's 

recent decision to review the program-to, quote, "review the program," might delay completion of the siting and construction of the 

repository? 

Mr. WELLS. As I commented earlier, quite frankly, we have 

heard and seen in the trade press various announcements about 

what is planned to do, but quite frankly, they lack a lot of details, 

so I have seen no more details about the membership of this committee or even objectives on how far they are going to go. I haven't 

seen anybody talking about how long that would take. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. The law was created-the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act was created in 1982. The board was created in 1987. This is 

now 1993, and we are still at that point. 

Dr. Cantlon, you said that your board is familiar with what I call 

the real world problems that DOE might be having regarding the 

repository? 

Mr. CANTLON. If you are referring to the political and the social 

concerns--

Mr. BILIRAKIS. That is all part of it. 

Mr. CANTLON. We are certainly aware of it, and we try as meticulously as we can to make certain that what we are addressing 
75 

are the scientific and technical aspects of concern. We have had a 

hearing or two in which people have come before our group with 

an attitude about risk that we felt was certainly not based on any 

technical or scientific understanding of the--

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, now, who are these people? In other words, 

people living in Nevada? 

Mr. CANTL0N. Some. 

Mr. BrLIRAKIS. You hold, in other words, public hearings? 

Mr. CANTL0N. We have. As we started, we felt it was important 

to hold some public hearings so we could make certain that as we 

looked at the technical and scientific aspects of what DOE was 

doing, that we were focusing on the areas of concern. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Have you been the chair of the board since it was 

created? 

Mr. CANTL0N. No. I just assumed the chair last year. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. And who preceded you? 

Mr. CANTL0N. Dr. Donald Deer, University of Florida. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. University of Florida. 

Well, Doctor, in your opinion-I am not trying to pit you against 

Mr. Barrett here, so please don't take it that way. But I guess I 

am trying to learn; that is what these hearings should be all about. 

Should your board-and Mr. Sharp mentioned the words "handson," should your board have more operational authorization, more 

hands-on authorization? You have talked about meeting periodically, and then being faced or discussing with DOE certain problems that they have run into and that they would like to get opinions from you. This is the way at least I picture those gatherings. 

But if they don't bring up a point to you, and if the public in your 

public hearings don't bring up a point to you, do you have what we 

call here, I guess, "oversight authority"? 

Mr. CANTL0N. Yes. Our agendas are fixed by us. As we looked 

at the statements, we looked at the site characterization plan, 

which is the base starting point from which DOE has been operating. This is a 1988 document that, you know, in many ways is now 

being departed from, but--

Mr. BILIRAKIS. What is a 1988 document? 

Mr. CANTL0N. The site-characterization plan, how they were 

going to go about characterizing the site and articulating that repository proposal to the total waste system. That is the point of departure. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, in the discussions, the exchanges between 

Mrs. Vucanovich, who has left, and Dr. Allen, they talked about the 

fault-the faults in that locale; and I assume when you are talking 

about investigating the faults, or the activity, you are talking about 

seismographic types of information, Doctor. Or are we well past 

that point now? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. The study of faults involved not only seismographic, but also geological, both of these areas, and some engineering. That is, what effect the ground shaking will have on this. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How much of that have we already done? 

Mr. ALLEN. I don't quite understand your question. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, how much study of this fault and 

whether--

Mr. ALLEN. A great deal. 
76 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. A great deal? 

Mr. ALLEN. And a lot of work is still underway. It is one of those 

issues that we may be approaching some sort of closure on-I 

shouldn't say closure; we are approaching the end. That is-the 

question was brought up earlier, when is enough, enough-and I 

think that is one thing this board is concerned about; and the scientific and technical efforts, when is enough, enough. 

And so the seismic effort is one that a great deal of effort has 

gone into; and I think maybe a few years down the line we will say 

that we have done enough. Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. ALLEN. I might point out that we worked closely with the scientists from the State of Nevada, many of whom have the same 

sort of local concerns as Mrs. Vucanovich. Mr. BILIRAKIS. In the meantime, we are putting billions of dollars 

into this repository. Are we likely to reach a point a couple of years 

from now or 5 years from now where we come to a conclusion that 

the-there has been enough activity, fault activity, over the last so 

many thousands of years; and therefore, this makes this site not 

appropriate? 

Mr. ALLEN. I suppose that is a possible conclusion, because the 

studies are not yet completed. Nevertheless, as I pointed out earlier, this board, looking at the 

situation very carefully, sees no reason at this time to say the site 

is necessarily unsuitable for this or any other reason. Mr. BILIRAKIS. So all of this seismographic and geological activity 

has been taking place during this period of time, ever since the site 

was selected? 

Mr. ALLEN. It has been a major effort for many years, including 

the years before the Yucca Mountain was identified as the one site 

for characterization. There was a great deal of work by the Geological Survey that went on before that time. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. All right. If you reach the point, God forbidmaybe I shouldn't put it that way, but if you reach the point that 

fault activity would dictate that it is the wrong location, that it is 

dangerous for future generations, are we going to shut it down? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, certainly our board is--

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Certainly your board will recommend it? 

Mr. ALLEN. We will make a review of the scientific and technical 

work. If we felt that that represented a problem that made the site 

unsuitable, we will certainly say so. We cannot declare it, but we 

will say so. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. You have no political pressure as far as your 

board is concerned; you are above all that? 

Mr. ALLEN. No political pressure, and nothing--

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Not even the Congress, I would like to thinkwell, you feel that way, no political pressure. All right. 

Let me ask you-and less significant I think in the scheme of 

things-my gosh, you are throwing additional dollars at this; and 

then some day somebody comes to the conclusion, hey, there has 

been such activity in the past, particularly in those areas, in west 

California and those areas where you have all of those faults. I 

think it should be clear that being located in the area of a fault 

is not in itself dangerous; is that correct? 
77 

Mr. ALLEN. I think that is a fair statement. The important effect 

is what would happen because of an earthquake or the associated 

faulting that might prejU<!ice the containers and then lead to release of radioactivity. 

Basically, tunnels behave very well even under severe shaking. 

So the ultimate problem is whether or not we would in any way 

prejudice the containment of the radionuclides. 

I might point out that every State in the country, including Florida, has had earthquakes. Mr. BILIRAKIS. That is why I made the comment that being in 

that location on top of a fault, or in that location is not necessarily 

inherently dangerous; it is just what might happen that would 

make it dangerous. 

Mr. ALLEN. Let me make it quite clear that northern Nevada has 

a higher seismic activity than in other part of the country. There 

are other areas of the country where seismic hazard-including 

California, Oregon, Washington-where we have successfully put 

nuclear plants; and other critical facilities have been licensed by 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

So, yes, there are other places in the country that have lower 

seismic activity, but that does not, at least to me, indicate that Nevada, the Nevada site, the proposed site at Yucca Mountain is necessarily unsuitable. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. And your background, sir, is in the area of geology? 

Mr. ALLEN. Geology and seismology, yes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, let me ask just maybe a final question; and 

I am trying to get it clear in my mind. We are talking about this 

MRS. Won't it really be a miniature Yucca? Isn't that really what 

we are talking about? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. No, sir, I believe it is quite different. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. No? Well, aren't we talking about a miniature 

Yucca-first of all, it would be miniature, right? I mean, it would 

be a miniature repository as against Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. Well, I am not sure. If you look at it from an airplane, the MRS might even be larger than a repository as far as 

buildings and such. But the MRS, the Federal receiving facility for 

storage, would strictly be a surface storage operation where fuel 

would be placed, probably in dry storage until the repository at 

Yucca Mountain is ready, if Yucca Mountain was determined suitable. 

But it would basically be a way station where it would be held 

in storage. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. All right. So it would be an interim repository. 

Mr. BARRETT. It would be an interim-the word "repository" 

sounds like it is indefinitely, and designed that way. Some people 

would use it that way; I would not, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. All right. So we use a different word. 

But the concerns, what you are running into regarding Yucca 

Mountain, the legal concerns, the safety concerns, all of those 

things, won't they also exist regarding the MRS when you ever find 

a location for it? 
78 

Mr. BARRETT. There will be safety concerns that will be raised, 

yes, sir. However, a fine repository is more complex in that you 

must prove before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 

oversight Technical Review Board and others that you have an indefinite 9,000, .10,000-year safety storage to go with that, basically 

a fuel storage. 

You can deal with engineered barriers which you, on the surface, 

can manage, and society can handle, for the nominal-let's say 100-

year time period. That is a much easier case to present-that safety will be afforded for this operation. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes, I guess logically that follows; but also I think 

logically it follows that the people who live in these areas today are 

concerned probably more with today, their children, their grandchildren, maybe their great-grandchildren. I am not sure that we can even see 10,000 years from now, although I know we have to look forward. 

But I guess my concern is-and I will finish up with this, I just 

worry that we are diluting our resources by taking away from 

Yucca Mountain, which has apparently already been decided 

upon-I know there are a lot of obstacles there. Where you talk 

about the expense there and that sort of thing, and you are going 

to have probably, I guess realistically, the same kind of problems 

in terms of the licenses, in terms of the approvals, in terms of the 

acceptance by local residents. 

I don't know, if we are talking about Idaho, for instance-and I 

shouldn't say that-eertainly you are going to run into problems. 

You already have in Idaho, and you haven't done anything there 

yet. Isn't that true? 

I mean, we are talking about only so many resources available, 

and yet aren't we going to be diluting them? Is it likely to slow 

down? 

Maybe I should ask GAO this; maybe they can answer the question more objectively. But is an MRS likely to slow down the permanent progress towards Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. BARRETT. That is a matter of funding. The programs can be 

run in parallel, and the MRS does not impact Yucca Mountain site 

suitability and development. If it turns out to be suitable, provided 

there is sufficient funding, then we have to make trade-offs of a 

certain amount of money; and then one will start to impact the 

other. What you will start to find is that Yucca Mountain, using 

their numbers of 2010 and later for waste emplacement, is a long 

time off while 25,000 tons of commercial spent fuel exists today, 

and it is accumulating at nominally 2,000-ton per year. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. And something has to be done with it, sir, and I 

am supportive of that. 

Mr. BARRETT. And those costs, society's costs, have to be paid for 

by society through the ratepayers or however that gets done. Society has to spend a lot of money to take care of that material safely 

for a long time. 

We basically have 70 sites across this country where this has 

happened. We have some decommissioned reactors that are shut 

down where they would like to get rid of the fuel; and it is costing 

money to society for it to be there. 
79 

If you can put it into one place-the difficulty is finding the one 

place-it is probably better for society. Because it is cheaper and 

safer and a lot of other reasons, we believe that an MRS-type receiving facility, in concert with an ultimate repository, is the best 

thing for the Nation. It is not an easy thing to do, sir; but you are 

absolutely right. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, your job is a tough one and the job that all 

of you gentlemen and ladies do is tough; there is no question about 

that. But I would just hate to see the dilution of our resourceslimited resources-slowing down the process insofar as Yucca is 

concerned, and concentrating more on the MRS. I agree with you 

when I see that some States are already having problems-Minnesota, Wisconsin. So something has to be done there. 

All right. Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further. I probably have 

already used my time. I appreciate your consideration, sir. Thank 

you. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much. 

I will recognize the gentleman from Washington. 

Mr. KREIDLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Cantlon, I would like to go back to the issue that I raised 

earlier in my opening comments-multi-purpose canister systems. 

I would like your thoughts as to why DOE is going out and designing its own system if there are canisters currently available. 

Mr. CANTL0N. Well, certainly the DOE can speak for itself, but 

the board, in looking at the challenge of the waste management 

system, feels very strongly that the system should be viewed as an 

interactive system, and that if one rushes in to adopt an array of 

different containers so that each utility has a different container, 

you encounter a great deal more risk to the people and to the communities of having different kinds of containers in different parts 

of the system. 

Standardization around a container that has the features that 

adapt it not only for short-term surface storage, which would be an 

MRS-type facility, but also would then lend itself well to transportation, and then the ease of putting it into whatever external con- tainer the repository requires, is essentially the challenge. And it 

is not-you know, we have not looked in detail at the particular 

model that your company is proposing. DOE, I know, is in conversation with the group. But it is more 

than simply picking what would be the best container for the nearterm study that is the long-term challenge of containers. In rushing 

to meet the 1998 challenge, we may end up with a container that 

is-requires a great deal of adaptation to make it totally safe for 

the long-term positioning of those containers in the jackets that 

would put it into the repository. Mr. KREIDLER. Well, I guess I am looking at it primarily from a 

scientific standpoint right now. 

By the way, this issue was raised because I was aware of the fact 

that this company had canisters in my district. I called them and 

asked them how come DOE was out there working on these 

cannisters. I should note that there are probably several private 

companies that manufacture or have designs out there right now 

that have been approved. 
80 

What I am trying to figure out right now is, from a scientific 

standpoint, is there something wrong to your knowledge with the 

existing technology that is out there that would require DOE to go 

out and reinvent the wheel? 

Mr. CANTLON. Let's put the expert on it. 

Mr. PRICE. There is a disciplined way of going about approaching 

the issues in which you come up with the requirements; and by the 

way, the DOE is 10 years into the program and still hasn't produced its requirements documents. You develop the concept with a 

variety of alternatives to meet the concepts, and the concept of the 

cask and its transportation is interrelated with the waste package, 

interrelated with the mountain, interrelated with interim storage. 

And you come up with your requirements, the concepts which will 

meet those requirements. 

The trade-offs then are studied and made, and you come up with 

some kind of design which meets the requirements. 

Mr. KREIDLER. Excuse me, but DOE is involved right now with 

designing its own, it is not developing the parameters of what they 

need in order to meet the three standards that they are looking for, 

storage transportation and disposal. They are out there designing 

one right now, and I am wondering whether the current technology 

in the private sector is such that they need to do that, or can DOE 

rely on what is out there in the private market already? 

Mr. PRICE. But I would like to stand firm and say that there is 

a disciplined systems engineering way of going about doing these 

things, and that is what the board has been encouraging the Department of Energy to do. We have been encouraging them to take 

the systems engineering evaluation analysis approach to these 

kinds of things; and in our support of the multi-purpose canister, 

it has been supported as an alternative among the single-purpose, 

the dual-purpose existing designs and so forth, to be put into the 

overall milieu against the requirements that exist with proper alternatives. 

And I would like to say, one of our big thrusts has been to try 

to encourage the Department of Energy and the Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management to take a systems engineering approach to the things, and perhaps that has been one of the shortfalls. 

While I have the mike, I might be able then to say, I think one 

of the reasons why they do not come forth-perhaps one of the reasons why they do not come forth with an overall systems grasp of 

the generation of waste all the way through and interrelate all of 

these things has to do-and some comment was made earlier about 

real world problems, and so I am throwing this out on the table--

has to do with the fact that they have a director who may be in 

place as a full-fledged authorized director less than 20 percent of 

the time. 

They have had 7-o or 7 acting directors, maybe only two actual 

directors; and in the process, the director takes a little while to 

come up to speed. Then he begins to understand and know the 

names of the people in the M&O, know the names of the people, 

the contractors, and understand all of the national labs, and then 

he has this systems view that he needs to get into. 
81 

About the time that he begins to get an understanding of it, his 

term is over in some way, and another acting director, and in all 

due defense of Lake Barrett, that that is the role that they have 

to play without being able to take aggressive action. 

And somehow I think we have to be able to address this management problem, to do this thing in a scientific and in a technical 

way. 

Mr. KREIDLER. Good point. I ·appreciate that. 

Mr. Barrett? 

Mr. BARRE'IT. Regarding the multi-purpose canister, we are following the engineering discipline that Dr. Price outlined. What we 

are presently doing, we are not designing final multi-purpose canister systems within the Department of Energy. What we are doing 

is what is known in the engineering profession as a conceptual design to determine what the specifications are for a multi-purpose 

canister. 

There are no multi-purpose canisters in the world. What does 

exist are storage canisters for at-reactor storage. There are two 

companies that are developing what is known as dual purpose 

casks, meaning it is good for storage at reactors and good for transportation. 

No one has taken the next big jump-and it is a big jump-to 

say this canister would also be good for 10,000 years in ultimate 

disposal. 

There are a great number of very difficult technical issues. For 

example, assuring some criticality for 10,000 years versus an engineered canister that you can go up and look at it through shielding. 

It is a very different situation. 

What we are doing, and the reason there are 150 people over in 

Virginia that I spoke with this morning, is to put together the conceptual design, which DOE and its contractor is doing, to establish 

what the specifications are so that private industry can then go out 

and do what is known as certification designs. The designs can 

then be submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and reviewed by the Technical Review Board and all of the utilities, who 

we hope would use these things to standardize this across the United States. We want a consistent, integrated system along the lines 

that the Technical Review Board has been urging us to do. And I 

would like to do more of it, OK, to have that happen. 

But we are not going out and designing a government-designed 

thing rather than having private industry do it. 

Mr. KREIDLER. Well, correct me if I'm wrong, but I think we are 

years away before we will probably be in the position to know what 

we are really going to design for the disposal of waste. 

Mr. BARRET!'. No. For disposal, our program goal, and the only 

thing I am really funding with the scarce funds that I have in the 

storage area, is this multi-purpose canister. I have to deal with the 

thermal strategy and all the other issues the board has very ably 

described, and deal with those issues to have these canisters available and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for storage at reactors, or for transportation, and to be compatible, to the 

best of our knowledge, with the ultimate repository system. 
82 

This is not a solution to the 1998 problem, but it is our goal in 

designing the program to mitigate the impacts in 1998 by having 

these available. 

I do not know if it can technically be done. I believe it can be 

done, but it takes time and money and a lot of energy to do it. And 

that is why we have people trying to do that, because we believe 

that it is a good thing for the Nation. And the Secretary has directed us to pursue along this line. I am not sure all of these technical things can be overcome. Mr. KREIDLER. Mr. Barrett, it seems to me that you are rejecting 

any of the current technology that is presently out there by saying 

that we need to go through a particular process to come up with 

a difficult design to meet the needs for storage and transportation, 

and then eventually come up with the specifics regarding disposal. 

I am concerned that DOE is rejecting current technology that 

meets those other two standards. It seems to me that if there are 

designs that can be used for both storage and transportation, and 

they meet your standards, that they should be the ones that are 

opted for rather than trying to go through a great deal of effort 

right now. Extra efforts now will obviously mean that until a system is ready to address the final question on disposal, that a lot 

of money and a lot of time is going to be lost. 

Mr. BARRETT. We believe that if we can develop this multi-purpose canisters building upon the technology that exists for storage 

and transportation which is being developed today, this would give 

great advantages to the United States. A standardized system 

where the Federal Government eventually will start to receive this 

material, where you don't have to go open up the canisters, handling bare fuel assemblies, causing more exposure to workers and 

potentially having to deal with the fuel in that manner, it can save 

potentially billions of dollars to the total life cycle costs of the system. 

We believe it is worth investing to do that. We have been urged 

to do this standardization by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

we have been urged by the Technical Review Board, and we think 

it is a good idea and we are proceeding to do it. We are not disregarding or reinventing the wheel; we are building this on the existing technology with those very same companies that you have 

mentioned. . Mr. KREIDLER. Mr. Wells, do you have any concerns from GAO 

relative to those activities? 

Mr. WEIGEL. Mr. Weigel with GAO. Yes, this sounds very much 

like what has happened already with the MRS and transportation 

programs over the last several years. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act, because of the 

linkages between the MRS and the repository schedules, it is not 

within DOE's power to develop on its own-to find a site and develop on its own-an MRS until at least 2004, according to its repository schedule. Yet, for the last several years, DOE has spent 

millions of dollars, tens of millions of dollars, developing MRS designs and various alternative designs, developing transportation 

cask designs, all oriented towards having an MRS facility available 

by 1998, in the expectation that the nuclear waste negotiator would 

be successful in finding a host willing to accept it on that schedule. 
83 

As we said, almost 2 years ago now, there is no evidence that 

that would occur. So what has happened is, the money that has 

been spent on the MRS program and the transportation program, to date, in the attempt to reach that really unachievable 1998 date, 

has not been productively used. A lot of it, I think, could have been 

used better on the Yucca Mountain Project to advance the site 

characterization. 

What I am hearing here today-we don't know a lot about the 

multi-purpose canister program, but what I am hearing today is 

that the schedule for this program again is oriented around the 

1998 date. And the question, since the canister has to eventually 

go into the repository for that final 10,000-year waste emplacement 

period, then it just-I would hate to see a repeat of what happened 

with development of transportation casks and MRS designs without 

taking everything into account. Mr. KREIDLER. Would you go as far as to say that there may be 

existing private sector technology. 

Mr. WEIGEL. That, I do not know. Mr. KREIDLER. Do you think that there is reason to suspect that 

this should be further investigated, before DOE spends more of its 

resources? 

Mr. WEIGEL. The only point I would like to make is that developing a multi-purpose canister by 1998 should not be the issue, the 

purpose. 

The rurpose-it may be good to develop a multi-purpose canister. I have no idea what that canister should look like. But it should 

be developed with a systems approach in mind, and if it takes 

longer than 1998 to develop it, then it should take longer. Setting 

a deadline of 199~r an objective, an objective of 1998 is fine, but 

the purpose should be to develop the canister, not to meet the 1998 

date. Mr. KREIDLER. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman, if I might just say, that I think there may be 

room for some further investigation along these lines, given the 

limited resources that the DOE has, and being realistic about the 

time lines and what we may be able to hope would come from that 

particular expenditure of resources by DOE; and given the poten- tial-looking to private resources, that indeed, we may see dollars 

spent much better, particularly in the short run, over the next few 

years. And as an intermediary step, if actions like that were taken, 

rather than postponing coming up with the multi-purpose canister 

system that is going to be necessary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEHMAN. I thank the gentleman, and certainly we will work 

together in that regard. I know Mr. Sharp feels the same way. 

The gentleman from Idaho. 

Mr. CRAPO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to-first of 

all, Mr. Chairman, I have been asked to request unanimous consent that the statement of the Honorable Scott Klug be inserted 

into the record. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. CRAPO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Scott Klug follows:] 
84 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT KLUG 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, not only for holding this most important hearing, but also for yielding me this time to discuss this issue. The United States nuclear power industry currently is the source of energy for 

22 percent of our country. But, in addition to powering homes and businesses, nu- clear power has also fueled a great deal of controversy. I believe that while nuclear 

energy may not happen to be the ''be all, end all" of our energy needs, it should 

be preserved as one the energy options for our country. Nuclear power is a domestically-produced energy source that has many benefits, including the fact that it does 

not directly contribute to global warming. However, regardless of where you stand on the use of nuclear energy, the most 

important issue for the nuclear power industry, as well as the human community, 

is how we plan to handle and store spent nuclear waste. It has been 20 years since we have had a new nuclear plant built in this country, and if another plant is never built, we still will have to dispose of nuclear waste. Constantly delaying on this matter will not make high-level nuclear waste disappear any faster-and, this may be 

announcing the obvious. Last year, during the debate on the House floor on the National Energy Policy 

Act, I supported nuclear licensing reform, I supported moving forward at the Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada site, and I continue to believe that standardizing nuclear plant 

designs will help our efforts to tackle safe disposal of high level nuclear waste. 

It is disappointing to me that we needed provisions in last years energy bill, and 

oversight hearings like this one, to jump-start efforts on this matter. In 1982, Congress mandated the U.S. Department of Energy to site and construct a high-level 

radioactive waste repository. Five years later, congress passed legislation mandating 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the waste site if the Department of Energy found it to 

be technically fit. Unfortunately, we are not much closer to opening this site in 

1998, as was mandated by law, than we were in 1987. Today, we are looking more towards an opening in the year 2010. 

Mr. Chairman, our hearing will be focusing on the Special Report prepared by the 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review board. This group, established in 1987to review 

the Department of Energy's civilian radioactive waste program, recently rec- ommended its thoughts to us concerning the high-level waste program. There are parts of that report in which I share agreement, and other parts that I hope our hearing clarifies for me. Secretary O'Leary has called it the "moral responsibility" of DOE [sic] to take 

spent nuclear fuel. I share her concern that we get going on the things we need to 

do. Nuclear utilities have paid hefty user fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund to cover the cost of developing and operatin~ repositories. I am worried that moneys intended to deal with this problem will be used for other budget needs. Last year alone, between utility payments and interest paid on those payments, $919 million 

had accumulated in the fund. Congress had appropriated only $324 million of that 

money, leaving the other $595 million in dedicated moneys unspent. The $4 billion 

surplus resting in the Nuclear Waste Fund was paid in good faith and I believe we need to honor this covenant. I will be watching the House-Senate budget conference 

to see that we act in the proper manner on this subject. In the meantime, I believe we must continue to work on making Monitored Re- trievable Storage facilities safe, effective, and available. Many utilities planned their 

waste needs around the Federal Government's ability to make good on its promise 

to take on the high-level waste in 1998. In my home State of Wisconsin, two of our nuclear utilities use variations of the dry cask storage method. While many have 

tried to delay use of this method through political activity, dry cask storage has 

served as a safe, well-administered alternative. I look forward to hearing the panel's 

views on the universal container system. Many have asserted that these canisters, 

similar to the dry cask, would standardized storage and transportation as well as save our nuclear waste program millions of dollars. This is something with which we can all be happy. 

Mr. Chairman, although I have called on the Federal Government to decisively move forward on this matter, I must acknowledge the shared belief that I have with 

my constituents about the safety and integrity of this project. Above all, I believe 

all our efforts and decisions should be rooted in science. Deadlines are irrelevant 

if we skew the facts for a predetermined decision. Yucca Mountain has been chosen as our site, but if the site characterization proves it to be unfit, we should prudently move on to what needs to be done. The safety and health of our people, our econ- omy, and our domestic energy needs warrants no less. Again, thank you for yielding me this time and I look forward to listening to the 

panel. 
85 

Mr. LEHMAN. We have the whole Idaho delegation here today. 

Mr. CRAPO. That is right. Gentlemen, I am the other Congressman from Idaho. There are two of us. In fact, the INEL facility that we have been discussing here 

today is physically located in my district, and I want to get to that. 

But before I do, I would like to first express to the whole panel my 

agreement with some of the concerns that have been raised by numerous members here, most recently Mr. Bilirakis, about the 

delays that we seem to be facing and the frustration with why we 

cannot move forward more expeditiously. 

I would like to address my first question to Mr. Wells. 

Mr. Wells, your report seems to document the tension between 

unfettered scientific investigation and expeditious siting and construction of a repository. How would you weigh one of the problems 

that we face with the frequent delays in finding a permanent repository for nuclear waste and nuclear spent fuel? We could be 

looking at a serious impact on the continued operation of the nuclear reactors that are now operating in this country, representing 

about 22 percent of the electricity in this country. 

Have you or the GAO weighed the adverse economic and health 

consequences that would flow from nuclear power plants having to 

shut down due to the inability to produce electricity and no place 

to store the spent fuel which they are generating? 

Mr. WELLS. Yes, we have. We have thought about that. 

Mr. WEIGEL. I think this points to one of the questions that we 

raise in the conclusions of our report, that one of the reasons why 

we believe a thorough review of this program is necessary, is because somehow-I mean, the evidence is that it is going to take 

longer to develop a repository, even if it is built at Yucca Mountain, 

which is still not a certainty. 

So somehow there has to be a disconnection between the whole 

issue of storage of spent fuel until a repository is ready, and the 

repository program itself. But I don't have that answer. I mean, I 

can't tell you what should be done to make that disconnection. 

Mr. CRAPO. With regard to the consequences in this country as 

a result of a shut down of a significant energy supply, isn't that 

in and of itself going to pose serious questions about the impact on 

our health and on the economy of this country? 

Mr. WEIGEL. There is no physical reason to shut any of these 

plants down as a result of delay in the nuclear waste program, so 

it really comes down to an economic or a political reason, for lack 

of a better word, at the State level in terms of, do they want to 

allow the utility-if the utility is planning to build on-site dry storage facilities, do they want to allow them to do that, or do they 

want to shut the plant down instead? 

So that is really what the issue boils down to. Mr. CRAPO. OK. Thank you. I see we just got called for a vote, so I am going to move immediately to the Idaho facility and ask just a few quick questions 

there. 

Mr. Barrett, with regard to the INEL facility, I think that one 

of the concerns-and you have heard the concerns expressed by 

Congressman LaRocco earlier, but one of the concerns that we face 

is the continuous question being posed as to whether the Idaho Na-
86 

tional Engineering Laboratory is suitable as a site for permanent 

storage of spent nuclear fuel, it being located over an aquifer. 

To me, that question has been answered many times; but I would 

like to ask it again here today. Is there any question in your mind 

as to whether permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel is possible 

at that site? 

Mr. BARRETT. Do you mean permanent, like underground geologic disposal; or do you mean permanent as in an engineered facility that stores fuel on the surface and is controlled by man? 

Mr. CRAPO. Well, I guess I am assuming that by permanent, I 

am talking about the type of facility we are looking at at Yucca 

Mountain; but if there is another type of above-ground storage that 

is going to be permanent, I would like to know about that, too. 

Mr. BARRE'I'T. I use the word "permanent" to mean underground 

disposal. Some people refer to above-ground storage where we don't 

have any definite answer as to where it is going to go as "permanent" because you have no other apparent alternative. 

Mr. CRAPO. No, that is not what I am referring to. 

Mr. BARRETT. There are two criteria for that and one of those is 

geologic; and I do not know enough about the geology of the site 

to tell you if that site would be considered or not. It is not one that 

we are looking at. 

We are following the law, which is to characterize one place, and 

that is Yucca Mountain; so I do not know whether Idaho would or 

would not be a possible permanent geological site. 

Mr. CRAPO. But it is not being looked at at this point? 

Mr. BARRETT. No, sir. 

Mr. CRAPO. I guess the next question I have is with regard to the 

concern that Mr. LaRocco made relating to temporary storage or 

looking at the INEL as almost a de facto place where storagewhere fuel will be located. Mr. LaRocco was referring to the pin 

being pulled out of the grenade, with the announcement that that 

was a possibility several months back as the administration 

changed hands. And it was an understanding, I think, that most 

of us received, that, no, indeed, that was not being considered. 

Do you have any information on that? 

Mr. BARRETT. Nothing further than what I have said earlier; that 

is, the Secretary wishes to have a consultative process to look at 

the front end of the system; and that would include looking at how 

the Nation could deal with this institutional problem of finding a 

place. 

Mr. CRAPO. With regard to the development of MRS facilities, 

that is basically the interim type storage facilities, correct? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CRAPO. With regard to the development of those facilities, is 

it correct to assume that with the exception of the fact that you 

have got to look at storing for 10,000 years as opposed to a shorter 

period of time, that the same kinds of considerations with regard 

to permanent storage would be in place? 

In other words, you would-I am thinking primarily about the 

Idaho aquifer and some of those considerations. Is that going to be 

a factor in those considerations? 

Mr. BARRETT. If you are talking about interim storage and an 

MRS-type of thing, you can deal with that from an engineering 
87 

point of view. And that could be located over an aquifer; it could 

be located with very little geologic restriction. There are some places you wouldn't want to place facilities, such 

as a floodplain, but generally you could put that in many places 

across the United States; and Idaho would be one where, from an 

engineering, technical point of view, you could put an engineered 

interim storage facility. 

Mr. CRAPO. But to your knowledge, that consideration-that decision with regard to Idaho or other places is not under consideration 

at this time? 

Mr. BARRETT. No. We have no active siting program for that. 

Only through the negotiator and the volunteer process. 

Mr. CRAPO. OK. So the only possibility of that kind of thing happening with regard to current DOE activities is through voluntary 

activity or the negotiating process, through the negotiator? 

Mr. BARRETT. I don't know of anything other than that. 

Mr. CRAPO. OK. Thank you. 

I have no further questions. Thank you. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you very much. 

I also note we have a vote on, and I don't want to keep any of 

the members here any longer than they have already been. We 

really appreciate your spending almost 3 hours with us. We could 

have put you on separately, and it might have been easier on you, but we just felt it would be better to have this kind of discussion 

and give every member here an opportunity to take all the time 

that we needed. I just want to make a final comment. GAO has been critical of 

DOE for giving what they think is relatively low priority to the investigations at Yucca Mountain and, in fact, contending that at the 

present time, funding level and activity level, the project will take 

at least 5 to 13 years longer than planned, and obviously costs, a 

good deal greater. 

In addition to that we have a recommendation that there be an 

independent review being made by the Technical Review Board 

here. I just want to let you know, Mr. Barrett, that we want to 

work with you and the Department so that we can get some of 

these criticisms and problems behind us. I know you have the assurance of Chairman Sharp and every member of this committee 

in that regard. We don't want to create problems for you. But as you can tell already from the attendance here this morning and the comments, this is a very contentious, controversial 

issue. We just want to help do it right. 

We really appreciate the board, GAO, and the Department for all 

they have done. 

Mr. Sharp, I will recognize you. Mr. SHARP. I appreciate the chairman recognizing me. 

I just would confirm what he is saying, so that there is no misunderstanding, at least as to what I said or I think, by many other 

members. Mr. LEHMAN. Myself as well. 

Mr. SHARP. No one is trying to get a moratorium on activity; nobody is trying to bring a halt to what is going on. When we talk 

about a policy review, we believe that doesn't mean you stop what 

you are doing. We just think it is an ideal time to take a com-
88 

prehensive, in-depth look to see whether we ought to be accelerating or decelerating something, or whether we ought to be reorganizing; and this is an ideal time to do it. This isn't just a we'll 

wait-and-see proposition. 

But I thank the chairman, and I certainly thank our witnesses. 

Mr. LEHMAN. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

[The following responses to subcommittee questions were received for the record:] 
89 

@ DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Washington, DC 20585 

September 13 , 1993 

The Honorable Richard Lehman 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral 

Resources 

Committee on Natural Resources 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

On July 1, 1993, Lake H. Barrett, Acting Director, Office of 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, testified before your 

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources and the House 

Committ.ee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and 

Power regarding High Level Radioactive waste. 

~ nclosed are the answers to the questions that you, 

Representatives Vucanovich, Thomas, Kreidler and Hastert 

submitted. 

If we can be of further assistance, please have your staff 

contact our Congressional Hearing Coordinator, Renee Wilhite, on (202) 586-4273. 

Enclosures 

@ Printed with soy ink on rec';cied paper 
90 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN LEHMAN 

High-Level Waste 

Question 1: The hearing record ts not clear concerning the current status of 

the "Mission 2001• doclllN!nt or study. Please describe in detail 

the current status of the Mission 2001 study. 

a) Is the GAO incorrect tn tts view that the Mission 2001 

docwnent is curre~tly the guiding scheduling docuaent for the 

Yucca Mountain P.Jject? 

b) Are DOE and its waste program contractors currently operting on the basis of the schedules and test plans identified or recommended in the Mission 2001 exercise? 

c) What is the current planned duration of In situ heater tests 

during site characterization (prior to NRC license 

application) at Yucca Mountain? 

Answer a): Yes. The Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project guiding 

schedule document is the 1991 Energy System Acquisition Advisory 

Board approved cost and schedule baseline which, like the Mission 

2001 Report, also shows the year 2001 as the planned date to 

submit a license application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission . The Mission 2001 Study was undertaken in 1992 because 

the planned cost profile in the cost and schedule baseline had not 

been met by appropriations in Fiscal Years 1991, 1992 , and 1993 . 

This funding shortfall appeared to Project Managetnent to put the 

submittal of a license application in 2001 in jeopardy. The 

highest risk areas are described by the Lawrence Livennore 

National Laboratory concerns over the duration of the in situ 

heating tests. 

The Mission 2001 Report showed that the l icense application in 

2001 was still viable If future funding levels for Fiscal 
91 

2 

Years 1994 and beyond were equal to or exceeded those in the 

Energy System Acquisition Advisory Board approved cost and 

schedule baseline. Even if unfunded work in prior years can be 

••ade-up• with higher level funding in future years there is some 

risk to the 2001 date . 

Answer b): The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its waste program 

contractors are not currently operating on the basis of the 

schedules and test plans identified or reconrnended in the 

Mission 2001 exercise because the budgets required to accomplish 

those schedules and tests have not been made available. For 

example, the assumption for the repository program budget for 

Fiscal Year 1993 in Mission 2001 was $321 mill ion while the actual 

budget received was S252 million. For Fiscal Year 1994, the 

assumption in Mission 2001 was $685 million, while the expected 

funding is $268 million. The testing program that is being 

conducted is consistent with the program scope laid out in the 

Site Characterization Plan in 1988, but due to funding limitation 

is progressing slower than planned. 

Answer c): The in situ heater tests to be conducted in the Exploratory 

Studies Facility are planned for a duration of five to six years 

prior to Nuclear Regulatory C011111ission license application. 
92 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN LEHMAN 

Question 2: The Yucca Mountain project officer at Lawrence Livermore National 

Lab wrote, a year ago: 

It is my firm belief, and that of ay technical staff, that a credible license application can not be prepared by 2001 

given the constraints prescribed tn this recent work plan request. 

The recent work plan request exercise reflects a growing tendency of the Project Office and MlO to rely on superimposed •ilestones rather than genuine technical 

capabtltttes. We are deply concerned that this specious information will be used to persuade senior DOE management and, ultimately, Congress that a 2001 licensing date ts 

achievable when, given the constraints in this budget exercise, it ts htgh questionable. 

Similarly, the Project officer at USGS wrote last August: 

[T]his strategy does result tn less earth-science knowledge about the potential repository stte and, therefore, increased 

risk of failure at licensing.*** For example, some of the 

questions or concerns expressed by the National Academy of 

Sciences, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and others 

will not be resolved by the reduced program. 

a) How have the concerns expressed by these technical contractors 

been resolved? 

b) Does the Department still plan to proceed wtth the testing schedules those technical contractors objected to tn those 

letters? 

c) If so, what ts the justification for the shortened test 

program? If not, please describe the current testing schedule. 

Answer a): The technical contractor's views were based on assumptions about 

the levels of rtsk that the DOE should accept when trying to 110ve 

the repository progru forward. No ftxed scope of work can be 

defined that, tf accQ11Pltshed, guarantees DOE wtll have adequate 

tnfonutton to submit an acceptable license application for the 

Yucca Mountain stte to the Nuclear Regulatory Co•• tsston. The 
93 

2 

issue of whether a 2001 license application date could be aet 

clearly rests on what level of risk the DOE wishes to take at 

submittal of that application that the Connission will not 

consider the application to be complete. It is fully recognized 

that the Coatsston is likely to ask for additional infonution . 

Answer b): Yes. The in situ heater tests are needed to gather infoniation 

regarding the physical characteristics of the site, utilizing 

si1111lated repository heat loading . The tests require several 

years to COffll)lete. The priority of the Oepart111ent is to perform 

underground excavation to allow for an early start of these 

iaportant experiaents to gather enough infoMRation to 

sublltt a license application wtth IIOderate rtsk. It ts the intent 

of the Oepartaent to c011plete these tests, even though these 

experiments will continue after license application submittal. If 

data indicates such a need, an amended license application will be 

subsequently subllitted. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission repository licensing regulations 

allow for conftnutory tests, which can span decades and can be 

underway while a repository ts being constructed fn stages. 
3 

Answer c): As noted In the response to Question 2b), "It ts the tntent of the 

Departaent to coaplete these tests, even though these expert•nts 

will continue after license application subatttal ••• • 

Consequently, there will be no shortened test progru. The 

current plan for the heater tests ts to begin early tn 1997 and 

corttno;,, fo.- ti.. 1lan,led Ft fll. t.o s Ix years duratioa. 

Hlah•Level Vaste 

Question 3: 

Answer: 

Your testillllfty antions "1chtevtng closure" with the NRC 

staff on the issue of ext,... erosion, Uld "resolution" of 

the setsatc hazard issue. Since III lltC ltcenstng proceeding for the repository ts at least 10 years tn the future, tn 

what sense can Issues be "closed" or "resolved"-? 

During the prellcenslng phase, issues can be •resolved" at 

the DOE/Nuclear lte9ul1tory c-tsston staff level. 

Resolution of an Issue does not preclude Nuclear R19ulatory 

c.,.,ission staff or c-issioners froa revisiting an issue 

based on additional tnfol'llltion received at any ti•, 

particularly during the licensing hearing. Issues will not 

be considered "closed" until a license ts Issued by the 

Comission for construction of the geologic repository. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 1: 

Answer: 

High-Level Waste 

Question 2: 

Answer: 

95 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE VUCANOVICH 

How is DOE carrying out the dual role of 

fulfilling the responsibilities of the Nuclear Waste 

Negotiator's Office and the activities associated with the 

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management? 

President Clinton designated Secretary O'Leary as the acting 

Nuclear Waste Negotiator pending the n0111ination and 

confirmation of a new Negotiator. The activities associated 

with the Negotiator's office are being carried out by 

Department of Energy ell!Rltnts not associated with the Office 

of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. No Departmental 

personnel are assigned jointly to both the Office of 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management and the Office of the 

Nuclear Waste Negotiator. 

What is the status of the proposal DOE is consideri, regarding possible use of a ftcleral facility as the ocation 

for an interi• nuclear waste site? 

The proposal to use an existing Ftcleral site as an interi• 

storage facility was put forth by tlll previous 

ad•inistration. This ad•inistration is currently reviewing 

the Civilian Radioactive Waste Nanag-.it Progr• with 

respect to the issues of interi• storage and waste 

acceptance. This review will be conducted through 

consultation with stakeholders external to the Progra. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 3: 

Answer: 

Question 4: 

Answer: 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE VUCANOYICH 

What criteria would DOE use tn cleteratntng which Federal 

facility to consider 1s a candidate site? 

Any site, Federal or non-Federal, selected for an interi• 

storage facility would be required to •et the criteria 

established by the Nuclear Regulatory Co.ission in Title 10 

of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72, Subpart E. The 

Department has not established criteria that would be used 

to select one Federal site over another. 

Is it true that DOE has directed its contractors to curtail 

the scientific work that DOE has previously considered 

necessary, in order to stay on schedule to •et the 2001 

license application deadline? If true, how can this be 

Justified? 

The U.S. Department of Energy has not directed its 

contractors to curtail scientific work tn order to aeet the 

2001 license application deadline. Rather, any work that 

has been deferred is due to lack of funding or shifting 

priorities. For example, high priority has recently been 

placed on the Exploratory Studies Facility, which has caused 

diversion of funds from other scientific work. 
Question 5: 

Answer: 

Question 6: 

Answer: 

97 

In your testi110ny you indicated that you have 

received a p1yaent-1qu1l-to-t1xes request fro11 

Nye County. Could you tell• what the status of the 

request is and the likelihood that it will be approved? 

We are reviewing Nye County's request for payaents-equal-totaxes and, in keeping with the Secretary's dtrectton that we 

negotiate on payaents-equal-to-taxes, are actively working 

with the county in an effort to reach agreeaent on an 

appropriate payment. The Department has already .. de a 

partial payments-equal-to-taxes payment to Nye County in the 

amount of Sl million. 

Can you explain what thenaal loading ts? llhat you are doing 

to address the probleas associated with tt, and how that 

relates to your current schedule for license appltcatton? 

Spent nuclear fuel asstllblies will generate heat for a 

period of years after they are r1110ved fro11 the reactor 

core. The 1110unt of heat produced by an ass•ly dtpends on 

the type of assltlbly, the 1110unt of energy obtained fro11 the 

fuel in a reactor (burnup), and tiae since the asstllbly was 

removed from the reactor core. The tenn "therul loading" 

refers to the thennal characteristics (both near-tena and 

long-term) of the repository, waste packages, and 

surrounding strata resulting from the heat generated by the 

fuel assemblies. Thennal loading is typically described in 

terms of area mass loading (aetric tons of uraniia per unit 

of area) or area power density (kilowatts per unit of area). 

The thermal loading can be controlled by repository design 

features such as the age of the fuel at tiae of eaplac-nt, 

number of fuel assemblies per waste package, the waste 

package eaplaceaent IIOde, the distance between waste 

packages in a drift, and the distance between drifts. The 

range of therul loadings being considered ranges fna very 

low thenaal loading to very htgh then11l loading. TIie 

objecttve of a low then11l loading would be to t11tn11lly 

perturb the repository and surrounding strata as little as 
98 

possible. Tht obJ1cttv1 of a high tht,..1 strategy ts to 

aovt any water that IIIY exist in the pores of the rock in 

the aountatn away frOII the repository, thus rtcluctng the 

corrosion potential of the waste packages, 1.t., a •dry• 

repository. 

A Th1r11al Loading Syst• study ts in progress. This study 

will address the issues associated with the various the,..l 

loading strategies. The study will utilize μrtclictive 

110dels supported by field and laboratory tests and natural 

analogue studies to evaluate each potential thenul loading 

strategy in ten1s of pre- and post-closure perfonunce. Two 

of the tests currently planned to support the thenul 

loading decision are the Exploratory Studies Facility 

in situ test and the large block heater test. 

A ther11al loading decision •st be nde in advance of the 

Departaent of Energy sublllitting a license application. 
Question 7: 

Answer: 

Question 8: 

Answer: 

Question 9: 

Answer: 

99 

Is there I relationship between the thenul loading strat;, 

that you wtll pursue and the ulttaate design of the 

universal casks? 

There ts I relattonshtp bet .. n thenul loading and the stze 

and design of the universal ~antsters or other conftguratton 

of waste package that wtll be eaplaced tn I repository. For 

instance, tf I low thenul loading strategy ts selected to 

keep the repository rock and surface of the waste packages 

below the boiling point of water at 111 ttaes, the nlaber of 

nuclear spent fuel asseabltes that could be placed tn each 

waste package would be stgntftcantly less than the nlaber 

that could be 1ccoaod1ted tf I high thenul loading 

strategy were selected. 

At the current pace of the progr•, when do you expect to 

file I license 1ppltc1tton wtth the NRC? 

As stated tn the •Report to Congress on Reassessaent of the 

Ctvtltan Radioactive Waste Nanageaent Progra,• dated 

Novlllber 1989, DOE planned to clllll)lete stte ch1r1ctertz1tton 

and file for license 1ppltc1tton tn 2001. However, the 

current pace of the progr111 ts constrained by less than 

optt1111m resources and uy place thts date tn jeopardy. 

In your testt110ny, you indicate that the DOE expects shortly 

to tnfora Congress on I proposal to change the current 

approach of funding the Nuclear Waste Fund, including the 

posstbtl tty of uiendtng the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. What 

do you mean by this? 

The Department of Energy and the Office of Manageaent and 

Budget are actively engaged tn discussions to coordinate an 

Admtntstratton proposal to the Congress that wtll ensure 

adequate and predictable funding for the Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management Program for the future. Some 

options would require uiendtng the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 
High-level Waste 

Q4estion 10: 

Answer: 

100 

You indicate in your testimony that the Secretary is 

considering "alternative repository licensing strategies.• What do you mean by this and when will you have a decision? 

The Secretary is interested in evaluating alternative 

strategies for implementing site characterization activities 

at Yucca Mountain in an effort to assure scientific 

credibility while potentially reducing project costs and 

enhancing schedule confidence. In addition, the Secretary 

is interested in evaluating alternative strategies that 

address the more efficient licensing, construction and 

operation of high-level waste facility. One alternative 

strategy to· repository licensing has been proposed by a Task 

Force that was initiated in the beginning of the year. 

External groups have also alluded to other strategies that 

could be implemented. As part of the external consultative 

process of the Secretary's review of the program, comments 

will be sought from interested parties on these issues. Any 

Departmental decisions on alternative strategies for the 

Yucca Mountain Project will occur after the completion of 

the Secretary's review of the program later this year. 

In this regard, the Secretary believes, however, that the 

established national policies of a "once-through" fuel cycle 

for civilian nuclear power plant fuel, the concept of deep 

geologic disposal as the ultimate disposal method for highlevel radioactive waste, and the Congressional direction 

to characterize the Yucca Mountain site to detennine its 

suitability as a repository are not issues open for 

reconsideration. 
Hiqh•Ltvel Waste 

Question 11: 

Answer: 

101 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE VUCANOVICH 

In your testi1110ny you say "The Secretary has instructed the 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Manage111ent Progru to develop a 110re flexible schedule based on interi• •ilestones.• What 

is • eant by this state• ent? Is there any written docu• ent 

from the Secretary regarding this that you can provide the 

Subc01a11ittees? 

The Secretary issued guidance to the Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management Program on April 6, 1993, that addressed 

several areas of the program. The specific guidance that 

addresses the above question follows: "The progru has 

fallen into the untenable position of atte• pting to • eet 

unrealistic schedules without adequate resources. To 

alleviate this problem, I will no longer allow the progru 

to be unnecessarily schedule driven, with the attendant risk 

of sacrificing high quality science to • eet artificial and 

unrealistic deadlines. However, I do expect • easurable and 

continued progress toward • eeting progru goals and 

continued results in cost reduction and contairaent.• 

Developing a 110re flexible schedule with near-ter• 

• ilestones will be the Progru's response to that portion of 

the Secretary's guidance. A copy of the entire April 6, 

1993, guidance - • orand1a entitled "&utdance for the Site 

Characterization Plan at Yucca Mountain" fnNI the Secretary 

to the Acting Director of the progru is attached. 
~· 

~ 

102 

The Secretary or Energy 

Wuhinglon, DC IOSl5 

Apr11 I, 1993 

M£MORANOUP1 FOR LAKE H. BARRETT, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE DF 

CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE VAST[ MANAGEMENT 

SUBJECT: Cuidance for the Site Characterization Plan at 

Yucca Mountain 

The successful completion of the aission of the Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management program Is one of the ac,st critical 

environmental challenges facing the Nation. Since bec0111ing the 

Secretary of Energy, I have 11tt with • any interested parties, have 

reviewed numerous written reports and have been reviewing the 

status of the program. During this early stage of •y review I 

have found that the program needs to refocus its efforts to 

improve in two broad areas: increased emphasis on the highest quality scientific work and the 110re effective inclusion of 

external parties in program development and i• plementation. 

As my review of the program continues, I will detennine the 

classification of program activities into three broad categories: (l) activities within the program that should proceed as presently planned; (2) new activities and policies that will be implemented 

now; and (3) those activities within the program that require further reconsideration and that will be reviewed fonnally with 

substantial external consultation. 

My assessment of the scientific viewpoints on the issue of 

pursuing underground explorations of Yucca Mountain at this time 

has convinced me that the key to detennining site suitability lies 

in exploration of the underground geology and hydrology through tunnel excavation. Excavation and tunneling activities for the 

exploratory studies f1cility at Yucca Mountain will continue as 

currently planned. 

I have also reviewed the tunnel sizing issue for the exploratory studies activity. After carefully considering conments from 

various perspectives and in keeping with 111 co11111it1111nt to the 

highest standards of worker health and safety conditions for the 

Department's work force; in recognizing that there will be • any uncert1intles as the scientific exploration continues; and given 

ay responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and 

associated regulations to protect the Integrity of the site, should it be found suitable for geologic disposal, I have 

concluded that a 2S•foot diameter tunnel is appropriate. 
103 

2 

Other program act1v1t1es .. Y continue 11111111 IIJ reviews continue . [11mplts of such art the dtvtlopatnt of a design for standardized 

containers to support spent fuel transportation, storage, and 

disposa1 and a proposal for revolving fund legislation for 

congressional consideration. 

To enhance the prograa's scientific credibility, I want a plan developed to initiate the creation of I senior position for a 

Chief Scientist to oversee the 1c1ent1f1c 1nvestlgat1ons at Yucca 

Mountain. Tht role of the Chief Scientist would be to assure that 

all work conducted at Yucca Mountain achieves the highest scientific quality and that the work 11 focused on resolving the 

issues that art cr1t1c1l to ·deterw1n1ng the 1ult1b1llty of the 

site. Tht Chief Scientist would also be charged with establishing 

1 systematic peer review process for the program, that will 

include nationally rtcogntzed eaperts 1n appropriate scientific 

disciplines. 

The program his fallen Into the untenable position of attempting 

to ineet unrealistic schedules without adequate resources. To 

alleviate this problem, J plan to no longer allow the program to 

bt unnecessarily schedule driven, with the attendant risk of 

sacrificing high quality science to Met artificial and 

unrealistic deadlines. However, J do expect 111asurable and 

continued progress toward Mtting program goals and continued 

results in cost rtduction and containment . Thus, to assure consistent resources for the program, and as J Indicated above, 

J want a proposal deve1oped for ltgislation for the est1b1ishment 

of a revolving fund for the program. 

During my review, one of the aajor criticisms J have heard consistently about the program is its lack of process for insuring the serious and systematic tnvolv11111nt of the program's stakeholders In shaping program decisions. To Improve this area, 

J want the program to confer with key national stakeholders and to 

report back to me within 60 days with a plan for broad 

consultation on specific Issues I have Identified. As part of 

that consu1tation, the program will work with stakeholders to 

develop, for my approval , 1 process for their regular tnvolvtaent 

in tht program. 

During this consultation 111 viewpoints will be brought together by an independent facilitator, who will frame an approach to each 

Issue for my consideration. Special emphasis should be given to 

the views of elected and appointed public officials having direct 

constituent responsibilities. The program's activities should 

also be closely coordinated with separate discussions with 

Governors and with the consultative activities 1nlt11ttd by the 

National Association of Regulatory Utility COMlssloners. 

72-587 0 - 93 - 5 
104 

J 

Areas of the pr09r1• llhlch likely will nquirt further 

rtconsidtration include: consideration of an approach for the 

lt98 waste acceptance requlrt11tnt, including utility coapensatlon alttrnatfves; a full range of options for the near-ter11 storage of 

spent fuel pending ultiute disposal; and alternative nposttory licensing strategies. 

Allong tht 1aportant staktholdtrs art the States and counties 1n 

llhich site characterization had, or ts continuing, to take place. The issue of pa,-nts-equal-to-taxes continues to lie• contentious 

issut with these governaents, and I would like to lff the 

Otpartatnt 1nit fate negot tat ions to identify llhethtr grounds for 

agrttatnts can bt reached. 

Dtvisi119 an acceptable strategy for the lont tera •nag1Mnt of 

nuclear waste is both I national priority and an opportunity for 

the United States to set the standar~i2r an tntemational 

environ11tnt1l initiative of o~/.g conse~3/~ 

/.).,., ·~ 
High-level Waste 

Question l: 

Answer: 

105 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS 

On May 25 , 1993, Secretary O'Leary sent to 0MB proposed legislation that creates I revolving fund for the high-level 

waste program. Vhen do you expect I response to the 

proposal? 

(1) Does DOE expect to pursue legislation this session of 

Congress, or will DOE wait until next session? 

The Departinent of Energy and the Office of Manageaent and 

Budget are actively engaged in discussions to coordinate an 

Administration proposal to the Congress that will ensure 

adequate and predictable funding for the Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management Program for the future. 

A schedule for submission of this proposal to Congress by 

the Admin istration has not been determined and is dependent 

upon the satisfactory completion of the ongoing discussions 

between the Department and the Office of Management and 

Budget. 
High-Level Wiste 

Question 2: 

Answer: 

106 

QUESTIONS FRON REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS 

The revolving fund propos1l 111ows DOE to spend 111 receipts received by the revolving fund. Soae publtc utility co.issions are wiry of giving DOE 1 •blink check.• Whit 

congressional oversight of DOE spending does your legisl1tion provide? 

(a) How does this differ with the present congressional oversight? 

The revolving fund proposal to whtch you refer was •rely a 

drift proposal for the purpose of tntti1ttng discussions 

with the Office of M1nage111ent and Budget ind, thus, ts only 

one alternative U10ng • any possible solutions to the 

Program's funding problems. It ts not the Depart• ent's 

desire or intent to exe• pt a proposed "revolving fund," the 

existing Nuclear Waste Fund, or the Ctvtltan Radioactive 

Wiste M1nagement Progr111 from congresston1l oversight . 

While the details of the proposal have not been finalized, 

it is 1nttctp1ted that there will be no ch1nges to the 

existing oversight provided by the respective c01111tttees of 

jurisdiction. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 3: 

Answer: 

107 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS 

The proposed legislation does not address what will happen 

to the existing balance in the nuclear waste fund. What is 

the balance in the nuclear waste fund, and how much interest 

does the U.S. Treasury pay into this fund annually? 

(a) How does DOE propose Congress resolve this issue? 

The balance in the Nuclear Waste Fund as of July 31, 1993, 

was S4,021 million. 

The interest earned annually by the Nuclear Waste Fund is 

reflected in the following Table: 

Fiscal Year 

1983 

1984 

1985 

1986 

1987 

1988 

1989 

1990 

1991 

1992 

Interest Earnings (Millions) 

so 

0 

(73)* 

73 

89 

158 

196 

161 

241 

261 

The disposition of the existing balance in the Nuclear Waste 

Fund is one of the subjects under discussion with the Office 

of Management and Budget. No conclusions have, as yet, been 

reached. 

* Premiums paid on investment purchases minus interest earned on investments. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 4: 

Answer: 

108 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS 

One of the developaents 1n the high-level waste progru ts 

the industry's work on I universal container syst111. This 

systea would standardize the storage, transportation and 

disposal of spent nuclear fuel, including the use of aulttpurpose canisters. Moreover, I understand that the UCS 

systn will save the progr• • illions of dollars. 

1. What are the Depart• ent's plans for developing the UCS 

progra• ? 

In December 1992, the Department completed a preliminary 

evaluation of the use of • ulti-purpose canisters within the 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Managetnent System. The 

preliminary evaluation identified and quantified • any of the 

benefits that the • ulti-purpose canister systn • ight 

provide. As a result of that evaluation, the Departaent 

initiated conceptual design of a multi-purpose canister 

system. The conceptual design and supporting studies will 

be used to evaluate the cost, schedule, and feasibility of 

illl)ll!lllnting the waste • anagetnent system with • ulti-purpose 

canisters. These studies will be completed by the beginning 

of Fiscal Year 1994 and a decision regarding the further 

developaent of the aultt-purpose canister syste• will be 

• ade shortly thereafter. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 5: 

Answer : 

109 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE Tl!(IMAS 

I also understand that I consortiu. of industry utilities 

ind vendors asked DOE to fund I proposal to develop the UCS 

system. But, that proposal was denied. 

a. Who is responsible for developing the UCS systea and 

what role has the industry been asked to play in developing the system? 

In accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 19B2, 

ultimate responsibility for developt111nt of the Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management System lies with the Department 

of Energy . With respect to the develop1111nt of a system that 

utilizes technologies such as multi-purpose canisters that 

may be utilized for use at reactors as well as within the 

Federal Waste Management System, it is important that the 

Department work closely with the utility industry and 

vendors to develop the appropriate systea. In that reg1rd, 

the Deμartment anticipates issuing a request for proposals 

to design, certify, and fabric1te I aulti-purpose canister 

systea. It is anticipated that utilities or teaing 

arr1ngeaents between vendors, utilities, and fabricators • ay 

wish to sub• it proposals. 
High-level Waste 

Question 6: 

Answer: 

110 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS 

I understand the Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office has 

received more than $50 million of ratepayer funds during the last decade for scientific oversight of the 

Department's activities at Yucca Mountain. Who is 

responsible for auditing how that money is spent? 

The State of Nevada is required by Public law 102-377, 

the Energy and Water Appropriations Act of 1993, to 

provide certification to the DOE that all funds expended 

from such direct payment monies have been expended for 

activities as defined in Public law 97-245, the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, as amended. The State of Nevada 

annually requests an audit from an independent auditor 

and provides the audit report to the Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management for review. Additionally, 

the General Accounting Office and Headquarters Department 

of Energy Inspector General may perform audits at any 

time. 
High-level Waste 

Question 7: 

Answer: 

111 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS 

Recently, Secretary O'Le1ry indicated that DOE has the 

responsibility to begin taking spent fuel by 1998. What is 

DOE doing to ensure it can begin this process by that time? 

The Oepartinent is reviewing options for waste acceptance in 

1998, including utility compensation alternatives and a full 

range of options for the near-term storage of spent nuclear 

fuel pending ultimate disposal. The Department believes 

that finding a reasonable solution to the nuclear waste 

disposal issue will require an alliance of wide-ranging and 

often conflicting constituencies. Acconiplishing this will 

depend on establishment of a collaborative dialogue with 

stakeholders. Toward this end, the Oepartntent held a 

ineeting on August 10, 1993, with a broad range of 

stakeholders to discuss the process for addressing the 

issues of 1998 waste acceptance, interi• storage and 

alternative repository licensing strategies. 

Another of the Oepartinent's recent initiatives involves the 

develop11ent of a design for a standardized canister system 

for spent fuel transportation, storage, and disposal. In 

July, the Oepart111ent conducted the first in a series of 

•ulti-purpose canister workshops with stakeholders to 

discuss with them a concept for such standardized 

cont1iners. A second workshop is planned for October 1993. 

The Oep1rt111ent continues to support efforts to find a 
112 

z 

volunteer host for 1110nitored retriev1ble stor1ge f1cility 

in order to achieve ti111ely acceptance of spent fuel. In 

addition, the Depart•nt has been working with the Office of 

Nanage•nt and Budget to develop proposals for a revolving 

fund that would assure the requisite funding for the 

progru, while uint1intng Congressional and Federal 

oversight. 
High-level Waste 

Question I: 

Answer: 

Question 2: 

Answer: 

113 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE KREIDLER 

Please provide a description of the DOE's activities 

regarding development of 1111lti-purpose canister syste•s. 

In December 1992, the Department c011pleted a preli•inary 

evaluation of the use of 1111lti-purpose canisters within the 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System. The 

preliminary evaluation identified and quantified • any of the 

benefits that the multi-purpose canister system might 

provide. As a result of that evaluation, the Department 

initiated conceptual design of a multi-purpose canister 

system. The conceptual design and supporting studies will 

be used to evaluate the cost, schedule, and feasibility of 

implementing the waste management system with multi-purpose 

canisters. These studies will be completed by the beginning 

of fiscal year 1994 afid ! d9cls1on regarding the further 

development of the multi-purpose canister system will be 

made shortly thereafter. 

Does the DDE expect to be able to establish in the near future the parameters for an MPC system that is 

significantly better than systems that already exist in the 

private marketplace? 

The objective of the multi-purpose canister system is to 

have a canister certified by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Co111nission that, with appropriate overpacks, can be used for 

storage, transport, and disposal for a wide variety of spent 

nuclear fuel. This will require the canister to meet the 

requirements of 10 CFR 72 for storage, 10 CFR 71 for 

transport, and 10 CFR 60 for disposal. At the present time, 

there are no certified technologies that meet these 

requirements or, moreover, even meet the requirements of 

both storage and transportation. 
High -Level Waste 

Question 3: 

Answer: 

114 

QUESTIONS FRON REPIESENTATIVE KREIDLER 

Accordint to a publication prepared for the DOE entitled "A 

Prell•lnary Evaluation of Using Multi-Purpose Containers 

Within the Civilian Radioactive Waste Nanage• ent Syste••, repository issues relating to the acceptability of a 

canister will not be known for several years. ,1ven this 

fact, how confident are you that your canister syst• will 

be able to be used for all three stages of the waste cycle, 

storage, transport, and disposal. 

At the present ti•, this 1s an area of uncertainty. 

However, we are working to • 1nl• tze the risks of having a 

canister that would not •et the require• ents of 10 CFR Part 

60 for disposal tn a repository. · SoM of the concerns will 

not be known for several years. However, we tan identify 

para• eters that tan be incorporated into the design that 

will address aany of the repository licensing issues. At 

the ti• e a license application ts subllitted to the Nutle1r 

Regul1tory C011111ission for a repository these issues will be 

• ore fully understood. If a design change ts necess1ry to 

address those issues tt could be • ade at that tt•. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 4; 

Answer; 

115 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE KREIDLER 

What effort is being ude to evaluate the ust cf existing canister-based storage syst•s for t~iate use by DOE? 

As part of the preli• inary evaluation that was c011pltttd in 

Dece• ber 1992, existing syste•s •re ev1lu1ttd to dtter• ine 

whether any of the existing canisters ustd for storage 

technologies could •et the requir-nts for storage, 

transportation, and disposal. The conclusion was that none 

of the existing canisters would be able to Met the three 

require111ents. The Departaent is evaluating the use of 

existing storage systees to deter• ine how a • ulti-purpose 

canister would work with these syste•s. Wt have requested 

infor• ation fro• vendors of :xisting syste•s to help in this 

evaluation. When the Depart• ent is in I position to solicit 

for• al proposals, the Industry will be able to tailor its 

existing technologies to • eet the requireMnts established 

by the Depart• ent. Although there are no existing systees 

that are licensed for storage and transportation, the 

Depart• ent is aware of the work being conducted within the 

industry to develop such technology. As part of the •ltipurpose canister conceptual desip and evaluation process, 

the Departaent is also evaluating the cost and benefits of 

using dual purpose (i.e., transportation and storage) 

canisters cOllpartd with •lti-purpose canisters. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 5: 

Answer: 

116 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE KREIDLER 

I am concerned that we are spending 1110ney on problems that 

have already been solved by the private sector. Is it 

possible to redirect money spent on the DOE's MPC system towards resolving other radioactive waste disposal issues 

and DOE priorities in general? 

The multi-purpose canister system being evijluated by the 

Department represents new technology that does not currently 

exist. Therefore, we are in the process of developing a 

design for standardized containers to support spent fuel 

transportation, storage, and disposal, and we are working 

closely with the utility industry and vendors in developing 

such a design. The funds being utilized on the multipurpose canister system evaluation are appropriated from the 

Nuclear Waste Fund and, therefore, can only be used for 

activities authorized by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as 

amended. They cannot be redirected to other "DOE priorities 

in general." 
High-Level Waste 

Question 6: 

Answer : 

117 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE KREIDLER 

Why shouldn't the DOE defer any potential MPC redesign until 

the repository para•ters are available and, in the 

•anti•, use existing storage syst1111s. 

Additional on-site storage for spent fuel is needed by a 

nllllber of electric utilities now. The nUllber of reactor 

sites needing additional storage will grow in the COIiing 

years. The additional storage provided so far has been 

furnished by a nllllber of c-rclal vendors. Many plant 

sites hive chosen different storage concepts and designs. 

For the aost part, these existing storage syst1111s have not 

considered future transportation or final disposal 

requlretaents. As a result, spent fuel in dry storage at 

reactor sites will have to be re110ved fr011 its storage 

container and transferred into a transportation container. 

Ultiaately, the spent fuel would have to be handled again to 

be put into a waste disposal package. This, in turn, 

results in higher occupational radiation exposures to 

workers. 

This current approach is not consistent with Nuclear 

R19ulatory Coaission regulations that stress the need for 

coapatibility aaong el1Mnts of the waste aana91Mnt and 

disposal syst• and the • ini•ization of fuel handling_. It 

is for this reason, -ng others, that aany elKtric 

utilities and regulatory and ldvisory bodies 
118 

2 

encouraged the Department to look at developing mult ipurpose containers that could be used for on -site storage at 

reactor sites, subsequent transportation, and disposal. 

The Department is pursuing a multi -purpose canister that 

could be stored and then used directly with an appropriate 

overpack for transport and another overpack for disposal . 

We will use the best available infonnation concerning 

repository parameters to provide the greatest assurance that 

the multi -purpose canister will be compatible with the final 

disposal requirements. If successfully developed, this 

system would reduce occupational radiat ion exposures, 

minimize fuel handling operations, and possibly result in 

overall system cost reduct ions. 
High-Level Waste 

Question I: 

Answer: 

119 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE HASTERT 

In a May 25 letter to 0MB Director Leon Panetta, Secretary O'Leary proposed the establishment of a revolving fund as a successor to the Nuclear Waste Fund. She wrote, "We are now in the position that progress toward effective radioactive 

waste storage and disposal activities will be constrained by budgetary limitations, despite the surplus collections 

accumulating in the Nuclear Waste Fund, unless the program is given access to all the Fund's annual revenues. Without 

action, the balance in the Nuclear Waste Fund will continue 

to grow and the Federal Government will not be able to 

deliver the radioactive waste management and disposal services for which the utility ratepayers are being charged and the nuclear utility companies have contracted." 

What is the status of the Secretary's proposal to 0MB and 

how does it relate to the provision to take the Nuclear 

Waste Fund off-budget that was propo£ed by Senator Johnston as part of the Budget reconciliation and subsequently withdrawn? 

The Department of Energy and the Office of Management and 

Budget are actively engaged in discussions to coordinate an 

Administration proposal to the Congress that will ensure 

adequate and predictable funding for the Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management Program for the future. While 

both the Administration and Chairman Johnston seek to 

achieve this goal, the Administration's approach to a 

resolution may differ with respect to impacts on the deficit 

and on discretionary spending limitations. 
High-Level Waste 

Question 2: 

Answer: 

120 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE HASTERT 

Recently, • uch attention has been focused on the Depart• ent 

of Energy's responsibility for taking title to spent nuclear 

fuel in 1998, as outlined in standard contracts entered into 

between the Depart• ent and nuclear utilities. Why ts this 

target date so illll)ortant and why ts the high-level waste 

storage issue such an acute proble• ? 

Tne 1998 target date was identified originally _in 

Section 302 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and 

subsequently incorporated in the standard contracts entered 

into between the Department of Energy and the nuclear 

utilities. Many nuclear utilities have infonied us that 

they undertook long-range planning for the acceptance of 

their spent fuel by the Department and for the need for 

possible onsite storage based on the Department initiating 

spent fuel acceptance in 1998. 

By the end of 1998, it is projected that approxi• ately 38,200 

• etric tons of spent nuclear fuel will be in storage at reactor 

sites across the country. Until the Federal Gover,-nt begins 

to accept the spent nuclear fuel fro• utilities, available 

storage capacity at each reactor site will continue to decrease 

and other alternatives such as dry storage will be needed. It 

is projected that by 1998, 1,650 • etric tons of uraniu• fro• 28 

reactors will be in dry storage at 19 different reactor sites in 

17 States and, if the Federal Govern• ent does not begin 

accepting the spent fuel by 2010, 11,500 • etric tons of uraniu• 

fro• 82 reactors will be in dry stor19e at 54 different reactor 

sites in 30 States. 
121 

QUESTIONS FRON REPRESENTATIVE HASTERT 

High-Level Waste 

Question 3: As you may be aware, this Connittee has been very interested over the past several years in the Department of Energy's statutorily required studies of Yucca Mountain, Nevada to 

determine its suitability as a repository for high-level radioactive waste. We have been gratified recently to see several steps taken at Yucca Mountain to move forward, including beginning construction of an exploratory studies facility and 

the recent purchase of a state-of-the-art tunnel boring machine. 

At the same ti11e, Secretary O'Leary has reportedly agreed to a review of the progru. While I appreciate and support a review 

of the program, it is critical that the progress that the 

Department is currently • aking continue. 

Answer: 

What is your understanding of the scope of the proposed review? 

Will it include a review of the policy of deep-geologic disposal 

upon which there is worldwide scientific consensus and which is 

enshrined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982? 

Secretary O'Leary has directed that a multi-phase approach be 

implemented for review of the Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management Program. This approach is based on the established 

national policies of a "once-through" fuel cycle for civilian 

nuclear powerplant fuel and ultimate deep geologic deposition as 

the disposal • ethod, and the congressional instruction to 

characterize the Yucca Mountain site to determine its 

suitability as a repository. These established national 

policies are not being reconsidered. The elements of the review 

are: 1) an independent financial and management review of the 

Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project; and 2) general 

consultation with stakeholders for the process to reviaw 

acceptance and near-ter• storage issues, and for review of 

alternative repository program strategies. The process for this 

second ele• ent of the review will be initiated at an August 10, 

1993, • eeting in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
122 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD 

1 IOO Wilson 8<.mlcvarJ. Suilc lJIO 

The Honorable Philip R. Sharp 

Chairman 

Arlin~lon. VA 2220'! 

Subcommittee on Energy and Power 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

The Honorable Richard Lehman / 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources 

Committee on Natural Resources 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Chairmen Sharp and Lehman: 

August 26, 1993 

I join Ors. Allen and Price and the other members of the Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board (the Board) in thanking you for providing us an opponunity at 

the joint hearing on July 1 to present the findings and recommendations contained in our 

Special Report. We also appreciate very much your gracious comments regarding the 

contnbution of the Board to the civilian radioactive waste program. 

Enclosed are the Board's answers to the follow-up questions forwarded by 

Chairman Lehman, and Representatives Hastert and Vucanovich. The questions are 

both thoughtful and thought provoking. We hope that the Board's responses will prove 

helpful. Should you require additional information or clarification, please contact me. 

The Board looks forward to continuing to work with the Subcommittees to make 

improvements to and speed progress in this important program. 

Enclosure 

Sincerely yours, 

~£~ John E. Cantlon 

Chairman 

Telephone: 703-235-4473 Fax: 703-235-4495 
123 

POST-BEARING QUES'DONS FOR 1HE NWl'RB 

Quesdoll #1 

You state that the management d: operations contractor for the program is not being 

used as effectively as ii could be. 

a) How could the Md:O conlnlctor be used more effectively, in your view? 

b) To what extenl, if any, do you think the Md:O contractor contributa to the 

excessive emphasis on program infrastructure which you cite? 

Board response to qaestioa #1 

EDSl41V4 

a) In the Board's view, the principal functions of the management and 

operating (M&O) contractor should be (1) developing a technically supportable 

basis for prioritizing program activities; (2) integrating the program's many and 

diverse activities related to scientific research and development, engineering. and 

construction; and (3) helping the Department of Energy (DOE) ensure that the 

program as a whole will achieve its goals in the most cost-effective and timely 

manner possible. Currently, however, it is not clear that the M&O has been given 

the authority to carry out these functions effectively. Furthermore, there seems to 

be substantial duplication of effort between the M&O and other DOE contractors. 

During the start-up phase for the M&O, some duplication was unavoidable. Now, 

however, the DOE needs to be more aggressive in assigning clear responsibilities 

and in eliminating redundancies. 

b) It is unclear to what extent the M&O contnbutes to the program's high 

infrastructure costs. However, redundancies in the program and continuing 

problems with setting priorities will naturally affect program costs. We believe 

that this question and the other issues raised above should be addressed as part of 

the independent review of the management and organizational structure of the 

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) called for in the 

Board's Special Report. 
124 

Question #2 

What is the appropriate degree of technical conservatism in a program of lhis kind? 

Is ii appropriate for the program to embrace·a higher degree of conservatism than is 

considered technically necessary in order to help address the public acceptance 

problems of the program? 

Board response to question #2 

To determine the appropriate degree of conservatism in a program of this 

kind, one must consider several factors. Among these are (1) purely technical 

issues, (2) the consequences of failure, and (3) the level of uncertainty the public 

is willing to accept. In general, the overall level of conservatism need not be very 

different from that which the nation has found acceptable for other critical, and 

often controversial facilities. Critical facilities are those facilities that society needs 

but whose failure could lead to serious consequences. 

The DOE faces the challenge of siting and building a first-of-a-kind 

geologic repository that can safely isolate radioactive waste for thousands of years. 

The best approach, as required in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, is to 

develop a repository system that relies on multiple barriers. Such barriers could 

include a long-lived waste package, favorable geology, and a favorable hydrologic 

regime, all of which can act independently and together to isolate the waste. The 

pivotal question facing those involved in repository development should not be the 

elimination of all scientific uncertainty; there will always be uncertainties in such a 

venture. Rather, the DOE should strive to increase the robustness of the 

repository system, or its capacity to protect the public and the environment, in the 

presence of these uncertainties. 

Public acceptance, however, may be linked only tenuously to the ability of 

the technical community to ensure safety and demonstrate conservatism. Beyond 

some as of yet undetermined point, increasing conservatism will have little or no 

effect on public acceptance. 

Question #3 

In your Special Repon, you noted that other factors beyond DOE's conlTOI could also 

conlribute significantly to funher delays in program progress. 

a) 

b) 

Could you provide us with some insights 10 the kind of technical or 

institutional problems that could occur? 

Are the kinds of delays you would expect in terms of years or decades? 

2 
125 

Board response to qnestion #3 

According to the DOE, 1 to meet its 2010 deadline for beginning repository 

operation, it must assume the absence of the following: 

political or legal obstruction; 

difficulty in clearly resolving site suitability issues; 

difficulty in resolving licensing issues; 

continuing evolution of regulatory requirements; 

insufficient program funding levels. 

However, any number of factors substantially, if not entirely, beyond the 

DOE's control could invalidate this already very optimistic set of assumptions. 

For example: 

Legal challenges could be raised by the State of Nevada or other inlervenors. 

The controversial nature of the repository may continue to generate 

opposition by the State of Nevada or other opponents of the repository. 

Legal challenges to the development of the repository cannot be ruled out. 

• There could be dif!icuJties or delays in resolving site-suiJabilily and licensing 

issues. Insufficient time has been allowed in the schedule to acquire and 

analyze the data necessary to resolve scientific uncertainties associated with 

geologic features that will likely be encountered once underground 

exploration and testing is initiated. Furthermore, to accommodate the 2010 

date for repository operation, the DOE assumes that the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) will accept its data and analyses and issue a 

license to construct a repository within a three-year period. Given the 6rstof-a-kind nature of this facility, this time frame may be optimistic. 

• Changes in radiation-safety standards may affect licensing requimnents. In 

1992, Congress passed legislation establishing a three-year process for 

promulgating a radiation-safety standard and for revising the NRC's criteria 

and technical requirements for waste disposal at Yucca Mountain. It now 

seems likely that three years may not be adequate to complete this process. 

In addition, changes in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

standard and the NRC requirements could affect the waste package design 

and the time required to conduct some scientific tests. 

• Annual approprialion levels have been less than the program says ii n«ds to 

meet cunm1 program deadlines. The DOE has indicated that to meet its 

schedule for site evaluation it will need $700 million per year, just for sitecharacterization activities, to apply for a license to construct the repository 

1 Jobn Banlett, DOE, Jaa,wy 7, 1991, Board meeting, transaipt pages 21-24 and associated 

vlcwpaplls. 

IDll_,4 3 
126 

by 2001. However, annual budgets for the program have been considerably 

below this amount. This situation is not strictly outside the DOE's control 

since it has never requested anything approaching this amount for the 

program. However, it is unclear whether Congress would approve such 

substantial increases in program funding. 

b) It is difficult to predict how long it could take to resolve any one or all of 

these issues, should they arise. However, it is safe to say that any one of these 

uncertainties, especially a legal challenge, has the potential of delaying the 

program for periods of time ranging from a few months to several years or more. 

In view of such uncertainties, the Board has suggested that real program progress 

can be measured more meaningfully by setting and achieving realistic intermediate 

goals, such as getting underground, completing critical testing, and determining site 

suitability. 

Question #4 

Your Special Repon states that the waste package is a key componenl of the waste 

management system, and several earlier repons urged DOE to place greater emphasis 

on this component of the waste system. Contrary to your recommendations, DOE 

has reduced funding for R&.D in this area for the last 3 years. 

a) Please discuss what effect this strategy could have on overall safe disposal of 

nuclear waste. 

b) In your view, what degree of reliance would be appropriate to assign to a 

robust, long-lived waste package when planning the overall repository design? 

c) Is the cu"ent NRC standard requiring a 300 to 1,000-year period of 

substantially complete containment of waste in the waste packages adequate? 

Board response to question #4 

a) The DOE has recently indicated interest in considering a much more 

robust waste package than is included in the 1988 baseline plan. However, the 

DOE's pattern of significantly underfunding necessary waste package research is 

shortsighted. To validate the selection of container materials for the waste 

package, short- and long-term tests of the materials proposed to be used in the 

waste package will be required. Citing budget constraints, the DOE has 

underfunded this area, which has resulted in delays in initiating these tests. Under 

the current schedule, there may be insufficient time to complete long-term testing. 

This could result in the preemptive rejection of potentially superior, or more costeffective, materials, which require longer test periods, or in the DOE's inability to 

demonstrate credibly the long-term performance of these materials. The former 

4 
127 

could result in greater cost and/or reduced repository safety performance, the 

latter in licensing problems. 

b) The Board believes that the use of engineered barriers in combination with 

a well-characterized and suitable site is the most effective way to increase our 

confidence in predictions of repository performance over thousands of years. One 

of the most imponant components of the engineered barrier system is the waste 

package. The Board sees no technical reasons why a waste package with a 

lifetime of several thousand years, and perhaps more, cannot be developed by the 

U.S. program. Indeed, some programs in other countries the Board has visited 

provide for a waste package lifetime that is considerably longer than this. 

The Board does not believe that the waste package with a lifetime of 300-

1,000 years in OOE's baseline design meets the criteria for a robust, long-lived 

waste package. We hope that the OOE's recent efforts related to a multipurpose 

container will include the development of a robust, long-lived waste package. 

c) The Board believes that the current NRC repository criteria that include a 

radionuclide containment requirement of 300 - 1,000 years should be viewed as a 

minimum standard and that the program should strive to exceed this requirement. 

One way to do this is to design a robust, long-lived waste package that by itself 

could be shown to have a reasonable assurance of containing radioactive waste for 

thousands of years. 

s 
128 

Qaestloa#l 

In 1M ~ you say that •Safely Jtoring spe1II fuel doa not appear to praml any 

serio,u t«hnkal problems. .. The Board has long advocated 1M developmOII of 

alurnaliff conlainer concepts.• Doa this mean 1M Board would ,uppon on..riu 

storage as an accep,able alternative to an inlerim rwckar wa.ue facility until a high-

~ wa.ru rq,osilo,y is built? 

lloucl rapoaee to flantloD #1 

-

We see no technical basis for disagreeing with the NRC's determination 

that spent fuel can be stored safely at reactor sites or at a centralized interim 

storage facility for at least 100 yean. That said, the Board has advocated the 

deYelopment of alternatives to the DOE's baseline container concept and overall 

high-level waste management system because of the potential to reduce handling 

of the waste and increase the level of safety in the waste management system. 

Our position should not be regarded as implicit support for one storage alternative 

over another. As stated in the Special Report, given the current Jaw, even if a 

centralized interim storage facility is sucx:essfully sited and constructed, much spent 

fuel will likely remain stored at many reactor sites for extended periods. Thus, 10111C on-site storage will almost certainly have to be part of any waste 

management plan. 

In your totimony, you indicate that •anempdng to mut thae wwo1istic tka4linG 

(1998 and 2001) ... could cauu licensing problmu, incrww owra1l profffOffl c.a 1111d 

ullimauly delay tlw program.• 

Could you pkase aplain what 1M licensing problems might be, and ponkula,ly what 

1M aunt of delay in the program would 1UUltr 

6 
129 

Board respoase to qaestioBs #2 & #3 

Licensing problems could result from a failure to collect scientific data of 

sufficient duration, quality, and/or quantity to adequately support a license 

application. Some site-investigation studies need to be carried out over several 

years or more if they arc to produce the information needed to demonstrate 

repository safety. For example, in-situ heater tests that are needed to choose and 

scientifically justify the appropriate thermal-loading strategy for the repository 

oould take up to a decade or more to oomplete. The thermal-loading strategy, 

which dcscnl>es how to achieve a given range of temperatures within a repository 

and in the surrounding rock over a chosen period of time, will affect the size and 

design of the repository, the ageing of the spent fue~ and the design of the waste 

package. The Board is ooncemed that attempting to meet the deadlines in the 

current schedule could result in shortening the duration of these heater tests or 

the corrosion tests necessary to demonstrate the performance of materials used in 

the waste package. This could reduce the scientific quality of test results and 

cause the NRC to require the DOB to initiate additional testing before a 

repository license could be obtained. 

Qaesdon #4 

Given your cridcisms of the DOE program, what type of independent review do you 

envision of the DOE program and who do you suggest conduct such a review? 

Board response to qaesdoa #4 

The Board has recommended an independent review of OCRWM's 

management and organizational structure. Such a review should not be conducted 

or sponsored by the DOE. However, we are unaware of any currently existing 

entity that would be ideal for this job. Obviously, it would be important to include 

on such a review panel experts with experience in the management of 

underground projects of commensurate complexity. The Board strongly believes 

that any review of the program should be conducted concurrently with ongoing 

site-characterization activities to preserve continuity and facilitate program 

progress. 

QaeltJoa#S 

In 1M Report, you $llJ "wwalistic deadlina also are forcing the DOE to undmake 

activida limullaMOUSly that mighl better be conducted sequenaally. • What's tM 

impact of this statonall on the Board's confidence in the DOE's scienlijic activida 

Ill Yucca Mounlllin? 

7 
130 

Board response to question #5 

The Board's concern in this area is that conducting some activities 

simultaneously could lead to costly mistakes, could create inefficiencies, and could 

cause further program delays. The Board believes it is very important that the 

DOE not make decisions or commit to strategies or designs that may rule out 

options that might later be shown to be preferable. For example, to be able to 

accept spent fuel at a centralized interim storage facility, the DOE had decided to 

begin procurement of transportation casks before completing research on 

alternative container concepts such as the multipurpose container. Earlier this 

year, the DOE modified its approach, emphasizing the development of a more 

flexible multipurpose container that could be used to transport, store, and, 

perhaps, dispose of spent fuel The Board is encouraged by this change. 

However, the development of a container concept is now being conducted 

simultaneously with thermal and materials testing that will take several years, 

perhaps up to a decade, to complete. Consequently, it is important that the DOE 

maintain the flexibility to modify its multipurpose container designs based on the 

outcome of these tests or to develop an multipurpose container that can 

accommodate a range of thermal-loading alternatives. 

Question from Representative Hastert 

QuatioD #1 

It has #nm n,ggut«I that 1M IHpartmml of Energy should JJOSlpOM worlc on tM 

Yucca MOUlllain me chamcterization pending a comprd,msive ,mew of 1M highlevel waste program. Wouldn't this simply funher delay 1M program in Nevada7 

Board response to questioD #1 

The Board has explicitly stated that any review of the program •can and should be 

accomplished without slowing the progress of important site-characterization 

activities at Yucca Mountain. io2 The Board does not support postponement of 

site characterimtion pending the outcome of a comprehensive review. Postponina 

this important work, or any significant part of it, such as underground exploration 

and testing, could increase overall costs, delay the determination of lite suitability, 

and cause substantial additional delays in addressing the problem of disJ)!Jling of 

radioactive waste. Such a delay also could affect efforts across the nation to 

expand on-site storage of spent fuel at reactors. The Board believes that any 

review of the program can and should be conducted concurrently with ouaoinl 

site-characterimtion activities. 
131 

GAO Re•ponae• to Poat-hearing oueat1on1 

Que•tiona froa Repre•entative Vucanovich 

1. In your report you raise some serious questions about the 

extent to which DOE has pressured its contractors to reduce 

the time that they need to conduct necessary teats to 

determine if the site is suitable in order for the 2001 date 

to be met. Will you expand on these concerns and please 

provide a specific example of what I consider to be a very 

serious probl-? 

GAO response 

Both the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the U.S. 

Geological Survey have expressed their concerns to DOE'a Yucca 

Mountain Project Office that actual and potential reductions 

in the scope of planned site characterization teats may 

adversely affect DOE'a ability to obtain an adequate 

scientific understanding of the Yucca Mountain site. 

The Survey is particularly concerned that cuts in planned site 

investigations to achieve cost savings will also reduce 

confidence in earth-science knowledge of the site and, 

therefore, pose potential delays or decreased probability of success in a future repository licensing proceeding. The 

Survey•a position, for example, is that the more modest earth 

sciences program under consideration does not allow for 

dealing with unanticipated geologic or hydrologic findings, 

such as recent preliminary results from studies of the Ghost 

Dance Fault. According to the Survey, these results have 

shown the need for expanded--rather than reduced--reaourcea 

and time to resolve the unanticipated findings. 

Livermore is especially concerned about reductions in the time 

permitted to conduct a planned "engineered barrier system 

field test" which, simply stated, is a teat of the effects of 

heat on the repository. According to Livermore, scientists 

would be most comfortable with a 12-year teat period but 

agreed that a teat period of about 6 years can be technically supported. As a result of the Mission 2001 project, however, 

the planned 6-year teat was shortened to 3 years so that the 

schedule for coapleting site characterization and filing a license application with the Nuclear Regulatory Ca.ai••ion by• 

October 2001 could by maintained. Also, material• testing 

elements originally planned have now been eliminated. 

Livermore does not expect this •horter period to provide the 

necessary data. The laboratory believes that a future 

licensing proceeding would probably be delayed to allow for 

the acquisition of data from a ••cond teat of longer duration. 

In this regard, the laboratory•• position 1• that it will not 

defend a licen•e application ba•ed on the liaited inforaation 

obtainable from then- 3-year teat period unle•• (1) the 
132 

laboratory is allowed to follow the initial test with a second 

test lasting about 5 years and (2) the information obtained 

from the second tests confirms the validity of the initial 3-

year test. 

2. You indicate that DOE is not adhering to its "Mission 2001" 

document with respect to its baseline projections for site 

characterization. Is the Mission 2001 document still in place as the guiding document for the Yucca Mountain project? 

GAO response 

DOE's Yucca Mountain Project Office and its project 

contractors have been implementing the results of the Mission 

2001 study. Thus, at that level within DOE, the Mission 2001 

study now represents the guiding document for planning the 

characterization of Yucca Mountain on a schedule that would 

lead to a license application by October 2001. For example, 

the duration of the engineered barrier field test, discussed 

in response to the earlier question, is now planned for 3 

years, rather than 6 years, because the 2001 milestone could 

not be met with a test period of longer than 3 years. 

However, as the Acting Director of DOE's Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management pointed out at the July 1, 1993, 

hearing, the changes brought about by the Mission 2001 

exercise have not been formally incorporated into the official 

technical, schedule, and cost baseline for the Yucca Mountain 

site characterization project. Moreover, DOE has not 

incorporated into this baseline the $563 million difference 

between actual funding for the project in fiscal years 1991 

through 1993 ($566 million) and the amount ($1.159 billion) 

that the original project baseline shows would be needed in 

those years to complete all planned site characterization 

activities on schedule. In other words, the official baseline 

does not yet recognize (1) that over $500 million of site 

characterization work planned for those three fiscal years was not funded and, therefore, was initially deferred to later 

years and (2) the subsequent adjustments that DOE made to its 

site characterization plans, such as cutting the engineered 

barrier field test duration from 6 to 3 years, to adhere to 

its October 2001 license application milestone date. 

3, When do you expect your recommendations regarding an outside 

review to be available? Could you give us some examples of 

the type of entity you envision? 

GAO response 

We expect to address the subject of outside review of the 

civilian nuclear waste disposal program in our next 

legislatively-mandated report on the program expected to be 

2 
133 

issued later this year. There are several forms that a review 

of the disposal program could take. In our view, the key 

factor to be considered in establishing such a review ie the 

independence of the reviewing organization from the Department 

of Energy and stakeholder entities to ensure that the scope of 

the review is sufficiently broad, the conduct of the review is 

objective, and the review results are credible. 

Although questions about the way DOE has organized and managed 

the disposal program would be important aspects of an independent review, the review should, in our view, be 

structured around the recognition that development of a 

repository for disposal of highly radioactive waete--whether 

at Yucca Mountain or eleewhere--ie likely to take much longer 

than DOE's current schedule--• schedule that is already 12 

years longer than anticipated in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 

of 1982. This condition has significant policy implications 

related to storage of utilities' spent fuel, the preferred 

management approach to investigating and potentially 

developing the Yucca Mountain site, and disposal program 

financing over the long term. Because of these policy 

implications, we favor a review of the disposal program that 

is independent of DOE and program stakeholders, is managed at a very high level, and that gives both DOE and program 

stakeholders ample opportunity to provide their views on the 

disposal prograa to whatever entity actually conducted the 

review. There are a number of possible review approaches that 

could be taken and that we are assessing, including 

hearings by appropriate congressional co-ittees or by a specially-constituted committee of the congress; 

a special co-ission established through legislation, such as the Monitored Retrievable Storage Review Commission 

created by the Nuclear Waste Policy Aaendaents Act of 1987 

to report on the need for a aonitored retrievable storage 

facility as part of the nation's nuclear waste manag-ent 

syst-; 

a presidential ca.mission, such as the President's 

co-ission on the Accident at Three Mile Island; .or 

an existing body, such as the National Academy on Public 

Adainistration, with expertise in policy analysis and 

organization and -n•g-nt issues. 

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4. On another subject, I understand that you are close to 

completing your audit of the Office of the Nuclear Waste 

Negotiator. When do you expect that to be completed and when can you provide my staff with a copy of the report? 

GAO response 

We expect to issue the subject report to the Chairman of the 

Committee on Natural Resources about September 1, 1993. The 

report will be publicly available within 30 days of its 

issuance. 

Question from Representative Hastert 

1. Recently, Secretary O'Leary endorsed an independent review of 

the Department's management of the Yucca Mountain site 

characterization process. Since then, some have indicated 

that while this review is taking place, there should be a moratorium on any further characterization work. 

Given the number of reviews that have already taken place, and 

the fact that the entire characterization process is seriously 

behind schedule, shouldn't the Department be permitted to 

continue its scientific work at the site concurrently with the 

independent review? 

GAO response 

GAO believes that an independent review of the civilian 

nuclear waste disposal program should be conducted but does 

not suggest that the program, including characterization of 

the Yucca Mountain site, be stopped while this review occurs. As we stated in our testimony, it is our view that concerns about the disposal program can be addressed without slowing 

the momentum of site characterization. 

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