J-S27002-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.A.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 516 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered March 26, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Civil Division at No(s): 

CP-33-DP-0000056-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.A.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 517 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered March 26, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Civil Division at No(s): 

CP-33-DP-0000057-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 1, 2021

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant, C.A.B. (Father), appeals from the order entered on March 26, 

2021, changing the permanency goal for his two children1from reunification 

to adoption. Based upon our standard of review, we are constrained to affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. In August 2019, the children were living with their biological mother 

(Mother)2 and her paramour in Jefferson County, Pennsylvania. On August 

26, 2019, Jefferson County Children and Youth Services (the Agency) was 

granted emergency protective custody of the children after receiving reports 

that their basic needs were not being met, they were enduring physical abuse, 

and that Mother and her paramour were abusing controlled substances in the 

home. At the time the children were removed from Mother’s home, Father 

was in intensive care at Armstrong County Hospital. The children were 

adjudicated dependent on August 28, 2019 and placed together in foster care. 

On October 2, 2019, the Agency initiated permanency and service plans for 

both children. 

In December 2019, the trial court held a permanency review hearing. 

At that hearing, the trial court received a report from Dr. Allen H. Ryen, Ph.D., 

which included a bonding assessment of Father and the children from 

observations during supervised visitation. Following the review hearing, the 

trial court determined that Father was moderately compliant with the Agency’s 

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1 Z.B. (a female born March 2016) and Z.B. (a male born March 2018).

2

 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
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permanency plan but ordered custody to remain with the Agency and 

placement to continue with the original foster family. The trial court held 

another permanency review hearing in June 2020. Again, it found Father 

moderately compliant with the permanency plan. On June 26, 2020, the 

Agency placed the children in kinship care with a paternal aunt and uncle. The 

trial court held another permanency review hearing in December 2020. On 

February 2, 2021, the trial court entered an order modifying the children’s 

placement because the trial court determined that the kinship placement was 

not appropriate. As a result, the children were again placed with the original 

foster family. On March 4, 2021, the Agency filed a petition for a goal change 

from reunification to adoption. On March 24, 2021, the trial court held a 

permanency review hearing and entered orders changing the goal for both 

children from reunification to adoption. Father’s timely appeal resulted.3 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion or 

error of law in finding that [Father] had only made minimal 

progress toward alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement when at the previous 

[p]ermenancy [r]eview [h]earing he had made at least 

moderate progress including the most [recent] hearing held 

____________________________________________

3

 Father filed a timely notice of appeal and corresponding concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). On 

May 12, 2021, this Court sua sponte consolidated the children’s cases. On 

June 1, 2021, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(ii). The Agency and court-appointed guardian ad litem for both 

children filed a joint appellate brief on August 19, 2021, requesting that this 

Court affirm the trial court order’s changing the children’s goal from 

reunification to adoption. 
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December 8, 2020 which was [two] months after his most 

recent hospitalization[?] If this finding is based upon medical 

evidence only, [Father’s] only change in circumstance was a 32 

pound weight gain which cannot be the basis for this finding.

B. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion or 

error law in finding that a goal change as to [Father] from 

“return to parent or guardian” to “adoption” was warranted 

based on the evidence presented by the Agency. Specifically, 

the agency did not present any documented medical evidence 

that [Father] is unable to provide for the safety and well being 

of the children, that the children would not be safe in the care 

of their father, that his ongoing visitations with the children 

were anything but appropriate, and he, in any way, was the 

root cause of the failure of the kinship placement.

C. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion or 

error of law in not considering the best interest of the child[ren] 

in making its determination.

D. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion or 

error of law in failing to provide[] detailed [f]indings of [f]act 

to support [its] decision for [g]oal [c]hange and [p]rogress.

Father’s Brief at 5-6.

Father argues the first two issues presented above in a single argument 

section in his appellate brief and, upon review, Father’s third issue is also 

inter-related. As such, we will examine Father’s first three claims together. 

Essentially, Father argues that “the [trial] court ignored the fact that [the 

children’s d]ependency was based upon Father’s hospitalization for an 

infection and now [decided] Father [] can no longer expect to reunify with, 

and see his children, because he is obese.” Id. at 14. Father argues that the 

trial court erred by relying upon only certain portions of Dr. Ryen’s bonding 

assessment performed 17 months before the review hearing at issue. Id. at 

14. More specifically, Father asserts that the trial court only relied upon a 
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portion of Dr. Ryen’s report wherein he “noted that Father, though engaged 

with his children the entire time, was not the one initiating physical contact; 

rather, the children were going to him to interact on account of his 

compromised mobility.” Id. Instead, Father points to other portions of Dr. 

Ryen’s findings to show that he is bonded with the children including, inter 

alia, the children were excited to see Father during visitation and have a 

secure bond with him and Father was responsive, fully engaged, and easily 

able to redirect and quietly discipline them. Id. at 15. Dr. Ryen also opined 

that he did not have safety concerns for the children and believed 

unsupervised visitations with Father were imminent at the time of the 

assessment. Id. at 16. Father maintains that severing the “bond between 

[F]ather and children will have a devastating impact on the children and is not 

in their best interests.” Id. at 23. 

Regarding his health, Father concedes that he was admitted to the 

hospital for two weeks when the children were removed from Mother’s home 

when his continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine malfunctioned, 

and he was breathing carbon dioxide. Id. at 16. Father also “admitted that 

he was hospitalized a second time during the 18 months [when the children 

were dependent], in November of 2020, this time for pneumonia which 

[produced] blood clots in his legs.” Id. at 17. Father further acknowledges 

that he suffers from hypertension, hypothyroidism, supraventricular 

tachycardia, gastroesophageal reflux disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary 

disease, asthma, and nocturnal respiratory issues. Id. at 17-18. However, 
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Father claims that the trial court erred by finding his health issues warranted 

the goal change because the testifying Agency caseworker admitted that 

Father’s medical issues were controlled by current therapy and medication, 

and she did not provide Father’s current medical records to the court. Id. 

Moreover, Father maintains “[t]here is nothing that Father has not completed 

[with regard to the children’s permanency service plan], or [that he] failed to 

cooperate with the Agency in terms of tasks and services[.]” Id. at 19. Father 

also claims that, in assessing safety within his home, the trial court erred by 

overlooking evidence that Father’s aunt currently resides there, as well. Id.

at 20-21. In sum, Father claims that he “has not failed to perform his parental 

duties, nor has he relinquished them, [but his rights] are being taken away 

for [] only one reason: because the Agency, and the trial c]ourt, thinks he is 

too fat.” Id. at 22.

We adhere to the following standards:

When we review a trial court's order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our 

standard is abuse of discretion.[4] In order to conclude that 

the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine that 

the court's judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the 

court did not apply the law, or that the court's action was a 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the 

record. We are bound by the trial court's findings of fact 

that have support in the record. The trial court, not the

appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of 

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4

 Appellant cites the proper abuse of discretion standard of review in his scope 

and standard of review section of his appellate brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 

4. However, in the summary of the argument section of his brief, Appellant 

incorrectly asserts that a goal change is reviewed under the clear and 

convincing evidence standard. Id. at 11.
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evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any 

conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these 

responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence. When the trial court's findings are 

supported by competent evidence of record, we will affirm 

even if the record could also support an opposite result.

Next, we note that in matters of placement for a dependent child, 

the trial court must be guided by the best interests of the child—

not those of his or her parents.

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent 

children are controlled by the Juvenile Act, [42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 6301–6365,] which was amended in 1998 to conform to 

the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”)[, 42 

U.S.C. § 671 et seq]. The policy underlying these statutes 

is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster 

care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and 

long-term parental commitment. Consistent with this 

underlying policy, the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile 

Act, as required by the ASFA, place the focus of dependency 

proceedings, including change of goal proceedings, on the 

child. Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child 

must take precedence over all other considerations, 

including the rights of the parents.

At each review hearing for a dependent child who has been 

removed from the parental home, the court must consider the 

following, statutorily-mandated factors:

the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan 

developed for the child; the extent of progress made 

towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated 

the original placement; the appropriateness and feasibility 

of the current placement goal for the child; [] a likely date 

by which the goal for the child might be achieved[; whether 

reasonable efforts were made to finalize the permanency

plan in effect; and whether the child is safe]. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6351(f).

* * *

When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to 

return a foster child to his or her biological parent, but those 
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efforts have failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts 

towards placing the child in an adoptive home. This Court has held 

that the placement process should be completed within 18 

months.

* * *

While this 18–month time frame may in some circumstances seem 

short, it is based on the policy that a child's life simply cannot be 

put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 532–534 (Pa. Super. 2007) (case citation and 

original brackets omitted; internal footnotes incorporated; emphasis added).

“The official change in goal by the court is most commonly initiated by 

the agency.” In Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

However, “there is no statutory requirement that a juvenile court must provide 

express notice that it is contemplating a goal change.” Id. “If reunification 

with the child's parent is not in a child's best interest, the court may determine 

that [a]doption is the appropriate permanency goal.” Interest of H.J., 206 

A.3d 22, 25 (Pa. Super. 2019), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(2). “A 

placement goal change to adoption does not terminate the parents' rights; 

however, it is a step in that direction.” Id. (citation omitted). “By allowing 

the agency to change its goal to adoption, the trial court has decided that the 

agency has provided adequate services to the parent but that [the parent] is 

nonetheless incapable of caring for the child and that, therefore, adoption is 

now the favored disposition. In other words, the trial court order is the 

decision that allows the agency to give up on the parent.” In re N.C., 909 
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A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation and emphasis omitted). “[W]hile 

parental progress toward completion of a permanency plan is an important 

factor, it is not to be elevated to determinative status, to the exclusion of all 

other factors.” In re A.K., 936 A.2d at 534, citing In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 

824–827. “When circumstances are such that the best interests of the child 

dictate a goal change to adoption, then the trial court acts well within its 

authority to order the goal change—even if the parent has made substantial 

progress toward completion of his or her permanency plan.” Id. When 

determining goal changes, the trial court should also consider input from an

appointed guardian ad litem. See In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 826.5

Upon review of the certified record, we note the following. At the March 

2021 permanency review hearing, there was evidence that Father weighed 

over 400 pounds, and had gained 32 pounds after the initial Agency 

intervention. N.T., 3/24/2021, at 21, 30. Father acknowledged that his 

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5 Additionally, further independent research reveals at least one decision from 

the Court of Common Pleas addressing obesity and reunification. See 

Ralston v. Ralston, 55 A.3d 736, 740, n.2 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“Decisions of 

the Courts of Common Pleas are not binding precedent for the appellate 

courts, but may be considered for their persuasive value”). In the case of In 

re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353 (CCP 2002), the Common Pleas Court of 

Northumberland County was called upon to determine whether a mother and 

her 16-year-old son, both described as morbidly obese, should be reunified. 

Ultimately, the court adjudicated the minor dependent on the basis that the 

mother’s extreme obesity limited her ability to parent her son. The D.K. court 

ordered the mother to provide a safe, stable, and healthy environment for the 

minor child and for her to “address her own health concerns and well-being in 

order to care for D.K.” Id. at 362. 
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weight was a concern for his overall health. Id. at 57-58. The Agency 

caseworker testified that she had concerns that Father could not walk upstairs 

quickly, that “his capabilities are certainly a part of [a] safety assessment, 

[and, as a result, she could not] say [the children] would be safe” in Father’s 

home. Id. at 21-23. Father testified that it takes him “[a]bout three or four 

minutes” to walk upstairs in his residence. Id. at 73. Father, however, claims 

that he may have recently gained weight from his current thyroid medication 

and that his doctors are trying different prescriptions to alleviate the effects, 

but Father acknowledged that he has suffered from hypothyroidism and being 

overweight since he was sixteen years old. Id. at 15, 57. The Agency 

caseworker testified that Father’s “health has deteriorated, and it still remains 

an issue.” Id. at 24. She further testified that she’s “had many conversations 

with [Father] about his medical issues that he faces.” Id. at 27. Father’s 

doctors have “discussed lifestyle modification for disease management and 

prevention” and recommended “a whole food diet rich in plant[-]based foods”

and “exercising five days a week for thirty minutes” for Father. Id. at 68-69. 

Father claims that he has tried his best to follow doctor recommendations but 

admitted that since the inception of the case with the Agency, he has struggled 

with his own health issues. Id. At the time the children were removed from 

Mother’s home in August 2019, Father was hospitalized for two weeks after 

his CPAP machine malfunctioned. Id. at 3, 53. Father was hospitalized again 

in November 2019 for pneumonia and blood clots in his legs. Id. at 53. In 

March 2020, Father had a same day surgical procedure at Armstrong Hospital 
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to remove an “IVC filter on [his] neck” that “help[ed] with the blood clots.” 

Id. at 56. Father also admitted to using smokeless tobacco against his 

doctors’ recommendations, but claims he is trying to quit and uses nicotine 

lozenges. Id. at 66. 

At the conclusion of the review hearing, the trial court offered its 

reasoning for the goal change:

For [Father], his house was never inappropriate from a physical 

standpoint. It was his health, and it still remains his health, and 

[] the evidence shows his health, which, this is the only case I can 

recall that I’ve had this as a goal change, his health leaves him in 

a position where today, I don’t think he’s able to care for the 

children medically, and I’m not – certainly no one in this room 

should have more sympathy than me for his condition. 

I can certainly say I get really annoyed at doctors telling me to 

lose weight, but I’ve heard it since I as five years old, and it’s not 

happening.

But I don’t have a two year-old and a four year-old, and I’m not 

near as obese, although I am overly obese by charts, as [Father], 

and I think the testimony of the [Agency] caseworker is credible. 

We know he couldn’t care for the children at the time of the initial 

placement, which was eighteen months ago. 

Although he may be in better personal medical health, I don’t 

think he is in any better shape to take care of the children this 

day.

Id. at 79-80. The trial court, however, also noted that it would conduct “a 

review in six months.” Id. at 81.

Here, there is no dispute that the children had been placed in the 

Agency’s care for almost 19 months at the time of the review hearing. This 

Court has held that the placement process should be completed within 18 
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months, because the children’s lives simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that Father will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting. 

See In re A.K., 936 A.2d at 534. The safety, permanency, and well-being 

of the children takes precedence over all other considerations, including the 

rights of Father. Id. Ultimately, in this case, the trial court determined that 

the children were removed from their home, because Father was hospitalized 

and in intensive care at the time. The trial court found that Father had not 

remedied the conditions that had led to the children’s removal. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 6/1/2021, at *1 (“Father, at the time they were removed from 

Mother’s home, was not a placement option because he was in the ICU, and 

to date he suffers from a myriad [of] serious health problems exacerbated by 

obesity, the severity of which renders him incapable of properly caring for a 

3- and 5-year-old.”). The trial court determined that while “Father may love 

his children, the objective reality is that his weight and attendant health 

problems would in fact make it difficult, if not impossible[,] for him to 

adequately respond” to their safety needs. Id. at *2. More specifically, the 

trial court concluded that Dr. Ryen’s assessment that Father’s mobility was 

compromised and Father’s testimony that it took him three to four minutes to 

walk upstairs in his residence was “plain evidence of Father’s physical 

incapacity ... in the event of an emergency.” Id., citing N.T., 3/24/2021, at 

72-73. Further, the trial court determined that Father’s aunt, who the trial 

court described as “elderly,” was not a proper substitute resource if Father 

were unavailable. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/2021, at *2. Finally, the trial 
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court recognized that “the children are happy and thriving” in foster care, the 

foster parents were excited to have the children back in their care and 

expressed their desire to adopt, and, therefore, it was in their best interest to 

change the goal from reunification to adoption. Id. 

Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s assessment. Father admits 

that his overall health is a concern in caring for the children. While he 

contends that medication is to blame for his recent weight gain, Father admits 

that he has been overweight, and had associated medical conditions, since he 

was a teenager. Record evidence shows that the Agency addressed its 

concerns with Father about his medical conditions, but Father made no 

improvement and the children’s safety remains a paramount concern. 

Accordingly, the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in 

concluding that Father’s “weight and attendant health problems would prevent 

him from being an appropriate full-time caregiver” and Father “is not a viable 

permanency option.” See Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/2021, at *2. Again, under 

well-settled Pennsylvania law, the trial court was not required to wait while 

Father summoned the ability to deal with his weight and related medical 

issues, in order to properly care for his children. As D.K. makes clear, it is 

not unreasonable for a court to base its goal change decision on a parent’s 

inability to address his or her own health concerns related to obesity before 

reunification may occur. The record in this case demonstrates Father’s 

increased absence from the home due to his ongoing health issues. Father 

has required hospitalized care on three separate occasions since the children’s 
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removal from Mother’s home. Obviously, during these absences, Father could 

not attend to the safety and well-being of his young children and there is no 

evidence of a reliable substitute parental resource in Father’s home.6In 

addition, the trial court was justifiably concerned that Father’s mobility created 

an unsafe environment in the event of an emergency. By his own admission, 

Father recognizes the limitations of his mobility. Thus, the trial court’s 

rationale that Father is not a viable permanency option is not merely 

speculative and has support in the certified record. 

Even though Father made progress with many aspects of the Agency’s 

permanency plan, the trial court properly determined that the goal change to 

adoption was in the children’s best interests. See In re A.K., 936 A.2d at 

534. The trial court found that the goal of adoption by the foster parents was 

in the best interest of the children, their well-being, and their need for 

permanence. The record supports that determination. Finally, the children’s 

guardian ad litem agrees that the children’s goal be changed from reunification 

to adoption. Based upon our standard of review, applicable law, and review 

of the certified record, we discern no abuse of discretion in changing the 

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6

 There is no record evidence that Father’s aunt was a proper alternative 

resource. Upon review of the record, there is only evidence of the aunt’s 

name, her age (68 years old at the time of the review hearing), and that she 

resided with Father. N.T., 3/24/2021, at 52. While Father complains that the 

“Agency offered no evidence that the aunt is a threat to the children and 

nothing more than a helping hand[,]” Father has not offered any evidence that 

his aunt was an appropriate, substitute caregiver. Father’s Brief at 20-21. 

With such scant evidence regarding aunt, we may not disturb the trial court’s 

findings and credibility determinations. 
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children’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. As such, Father’s 

first three appellate issues lack merit.

Finally, in a three-sentence paragraph without any citation to legal 

authority, Appellant claims in his fourth issue on appeal that the trial court 

failed to provide detailed findings of fact to support its goal change decision. 

See Father’s Brief at 24. Father has waived this issue. Umbelina v. Adams, 

34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa Super. 2011), citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“[W]here an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to 

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion 

capable of review, that claim is waived.”). However, we note that Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(ii) governing children’s fast track appeals provides, in pertinent 

part, that “[u]pon receipt of the notice of appeal and concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal [] the trial judge who entered the order giving 

rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear 

of record, shall [] file [] at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, 

[] but need not[] refer to the transcript of the proceedings.” Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(ii). Here, the trial court complied with Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) by filing 

a brief opinion on June 1, 2021. Accordingly, Father’s final claim is waived, 

but otherwise without merit.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/1/2021