U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

25–045 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–13] 

AN INDEPENDENT FLEET ASSESSMENT 

OF THE U.S. NAVY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 8, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama, Vice Chair 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

JODI BRIGNOLA, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................... 3 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Banerjee, Dr. Sunoy, The MITRE Corporation ..................................................... 7 

Clark, Bryan, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ..................................................................................................................... 6 

Werchado, Charles P., Deputy Director, Assessment Division (OPNAV N81B) 4 

Wilson, RADM Jesse, Jr., USN, Director, Assessment Division (OPNAV N81) . 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Banerjee, Dr. Sunoy ......................................................................................... 59 

Clark, Bryan ..................................................................................................... 50 

Courtney, Hon. Joe ........................................................................................... 36 

Werchado, Charles P. ....................................................................................... 44 

Wilson, RADM Jesse, Jr. ................................................................................. 38 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 70 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 69 

(1) 

AN INDEPENDENT FLEET ASSESSMENT OF 

THE U.S. NAVY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 8, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:42 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. WITTMAN. I call to order the Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today for the 

Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee hearing. 

As this is our first subcommittee hearing, I just want to say that 

I look forward to engaging all of our members on what I believe 

is the bipartisan committee in Congress, and I especially look forward to working with my ranking member, colleague, Joe Courtney, and plotting a path forward to meet the requirements for our 

armed services, so Joe, thanks again. Thanks for your service, and 

thanks for your leadership. I really appreciate that. 

Two weeks ago we held a classified briefing with Rear Admiral 

Wilson in regard to the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment. 

The Force Structure Assessment assumed that the future plans for 

the Navy in ship types and numbers of ships would continue with 

ships of similar capacity that serve in the fleet today. This afternoon we transition from looking at the Navy’s Force Structure Assessment to considering three separate future fleet architecture 

studies. These three studies were directed by Congress and completed in recent months. These three fleet architecture studies take 

a different tact and consider what the composition of the fleet could 

be in the future. Some of their proposals include new ship classes, 

increased usage of unmanned vehicles, and redesigned ship configurations, just to name a few. 

We turn to three independent experts to provide more details on 

alternatives to the Navy’s proposed force structure. I hope during 

the course of this hearing we can discuss options that Congress 

could pursue to meet those Navy requirements. I think there is 

broad agreement with the Navy and the three independent studies 

on several themes. 

First of all, the Navy today is insufficient to address the challenges of tomorrow. I think everyone would agree that the 274 
2 

ships of the Navy fleet today are insufficient for a variety of reasons and lead to a variety of bad alternatives, including most 

prominently, aircraft carrier gaps. 

I also believe there is general agreement that the future conflict 

will reside in a contested environment requiring additional large 

surface combatants in more robust weapons. Advancements in 

naval gunfire with the electromagnetic railgun and hypervelocity 

projectile are essential to getting on the right side of the cost curve. 

I also believe that all the studies agree that the United States has 

an asymmetrical advantage in the undersea domain. Maintaining 

this advantage will require increasing the build rate of the Virginia 

attack submarine and introducing the Virginia payload module into 

the next block of attack submarines. 

While I believe the research and development community has 

done a great job with developing unmanned underwater vehicles, 

I also think it is time to down-select to specific systems and rapidly 

deploy these capabilities throughout the fleet. 

As to small surface combatants, I believe that there is general 

agreement on expanding the capabilities associated with a littoral 

combat ship. The Navy concluded a small surface combatant task 

force that determined the requirements for the frigate. However, I 

believe that we need to take a closer look at these requirements. 

I look forward to better understanding capabilities that our witnesses believe should be incorporated into the frigate. 

I also see our amphibious force with its complement of Marines 

as vital to the ability of our Nation to deter aggression. As we look 

to rebuild our Navy, we must ensure that our Marine Corps also 

remains a large part of our plans. I look forward to hearing how 

the L-class ships that make up our amphibious readiness groups, 

our ARGs, can be used in the future. 

As to our preeminent strike capability, the aircraft carrier, I believe that there is general agreement that we need to expand this 

capability but continue to reduce costs associated with the Fordclass aircraft carrier. I do not believe any members of this subcommittee are willing to accept an almost $13 billion unit cost for 

the USS Gerald R. Ford, and efforts need to be taken to reduce 

overall costs. I look forward to options that our witnesses could 

offer to make the Ford-class more affordable, and finally, I look forward to our witnesses better describing the communications challenges that are expected in a contested environment and options to 

address these concerns. 

I would like to welcome all of our members in the distinguished 

panel of experts we have with us today. This afternoon we have 

with us Rear Admiral Jesse Wilson, Jr., Director, Assessment Division, OPNAV N81; Mr. Charles Werchado, Deputy Director, Assessment Division, OPNAV N81B; Bryan Clark, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments; and Dr. Sunoy Banerjee, MITRE Corporation. 

Thank you all for testifying today, and we look forward to your 

thoughts and insights on the fleet, architecture alternatives, and 

other critical pieces of information. 

I would now like to turn to our ranking member, Joe Courtney, 

for any remarks that he may have. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again congratulations on your selection as chairman of this committee, which again 

is a great committee. We have really made a difference over the 

years. Your long years of work on the committee, as well as your 

command of the subject, I think really make you the right guy for 

the job, and I look forward to working with you as well. 

I think we have a great team on both sides of the aisle, and obviously this could be a real sort of historic year given the topic that 

we are going to discuss this afternoon. It is the question of the day, 

obviously the Force Structure Assessment that was produced last 

year and obviously all the force architecture work that these witnesses were involved in. 

So in an effort to sort of get to the heart of the matter, I have 

opening remarks which is in writing. I am going to ask that it be 

submitted for the record, and, again, let’s just jump right into it 

and hear from our great witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. We will now 

go to our witnesses. Begin with Rear Admiral Wilson. 

STATEMENT OF RADM JESSE WILSON, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, 

ASSESSMENT DIVISION (OPNAV N81) 

Admiral WILSON. Good afternoon. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Courtney, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the future fleet architecture studies that were conducted in 

accordance with the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, or the NDAA. 

Three independent studies for a future fleet architecture in the 

2030 timeframe were conducted, and the leads of each team are 

here today to brief the findings of their studies. The Navy-led 

project team, MITRE’s National Security Engineering Center, and 

the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. These studies 

are a starting point in the analysis that the Navy will use to develop our future fleet architecture and design. 

None of them, including the Navy project team study, has been 

endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations as a comprehensive solution set to focus our future fleet development. We will continue 

to incorporate what we have learned from them into our ongoing 

research and development and rapid fielding, our war-gaming, experiments, concept development, and strategic thinking. They will 

contribute to the high-velocity learning that is necessary to 

strengthen our naval power to outpace our pure competitors and 

future threats. 

All three studies were based on a 2030 strategic environment defined by the reemergence of great power competition and the growing availability of high-end warfighting capabilities designed to 
4 

counter U.S. military advantages. While each entity conducted its 

study independently, generated its own assumptions, and performed its own analysis, several common themes emerge across the 

three studies. We are examining these themes and ideas thoroughly. 

Some of the recommendations in the studies will be acted upon 

or acted upon more quickly than was already being planned. Some 

recommendations show promise and will need further analysis and 

exploration. These studies are part of a larger effort to inform and 

focus our future fleet development efforts in order to identify the 

most promising insights from each study for inclusion in our future 

force plans and capability decisions. 

Further analysis will need to be conducted, informed by both the 

studies and future operational concepts, to determine optimum 

fleet size, mix, and required resourcing over time. The Navy looks 

forward to working with the Congress and others to achieve the 

maritime superiority the Nation needs today and in the future in 

order to defend the American people and promote global security 

and prosperity. 

Thank you and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Wilson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Rear Admiral Wilson. Thanks so much 

for your opening statement. 

Mr. Werchado. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. WERCHADO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

ASSESSMENT DIVISION (OPNAV N81B) 

Mr. WERCHADO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senior Ranking 

Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the panel. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the results of the Navy 

project team future fleet architecture study. I led the project team 

with participants from across the Navy as the senior Navy analyst 

and not as the Deputy of the Assessment Division. This is not an 

official Navy study. It was independent by design and does not represent an official Navy position. 

Although this study is focused on the architecture of a future 

fleet, it also explores how that fleet might be used, including alternative concepts of operations. The study was conducted with the 

goal of defeating a near-peer competitor with a robust anti-surface 

capability, while also deterring another threat actor in any theater. 

The project team designed a distributed fleet architecture which 

would allow the Navy of the future to accomplish its missions, providing strong and sustained forward presence to influence geopolitical events, respond to crises, reassure allies, and deter potential aggressors. 

The distributed fleet was conceived to deliver decisive combat 

power as part of a joint force to defeat U.S. adversaries if deterrence fails. It was developed as an asymmetric response to adversaries increasing reconnaissance strike capabilities that can find, 

track, and target our centers of gravity, including large naval formations. By distributing our firepower, we challenged the enemy 

with up to 10 times the number of combat nodes that can strike 

them and attack axis against which they have to defend. 
5 

The distributed fleet would encompass a widely dispersed, robust 

network of air, surface, and sub-surface platforms capable of delivering both kinetic and nonkinetic effects employing three mutually 

supporting concepts of operations: Distributed Fleet Lethality, Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare, and Distributed Agile Logistics. 

The distributed fleet would enable a greater reliance on strikes 

from combat nodes beyond the carrier strike group freeing more 

carrier air wing assets to focus on surveillance, targeting, and electronic attack. 

The robust information sharing environment enables us to engage enemy platforms before they can attack, reducing defensive 

weapons requirements and allowing more offensive weapons to be 

deployed. Priority was given to long-range weapons for sea control 

in a contested area as well as multi-mode weapons capable of striking a variety of targets to maximize mission flexibility and ship 

loading. The concept would deploy unmanned air vehicles extensively on platforms to give ships the ability to conduct organic targeting at long-range employing advanced weapons, something the 

current fleet cannot do. It would also call for the development and 

fielding of armed, unmanned surface vehicles transported by and 

deployed from ships that have well decks to further distribute 

shooters within the theater. 

Additionally, the concept would expand the use of unmanned underwater vehicles to provide theater commanders with the ability 

to deploy sensors and weapons into areas that are currently denied. 

Accelerating development and fielding the capabilities for electromagnetic maneuver warfare allow the future Navy to deliver the 

assured communications that is required to net the fleet and enable kill chains while reducing our dependence on military satellites. It will also accelerate the fielding of key capabilities to 

counter adversaries’ surveillance and targeting systems, improving 

fleet survivability, and deliver improved electronic warfare systems 

to better protect both ships and aircraft. 

Finally, distributed agile logistics enables the distributed fleet by 

sustaining combat operations in a contested environment. The U.S. 

Navy has not had to do this since World War II. It shifts reliance 

from vulnerable shore bases to more survivable afloat and expeditionary hubs. It would also improve the Navy’s ability to conduct 

maintenance and reload weapons at sea. 

Given the service life of today’s ships and aircraft, 75 percent of 

the fleet today will still be operating in the year 2030. Adding to 

the years or even decades required to design, build, and field new 

platforms, the Navy must look beyond fleet architecture to new 

operational concepts to rapidly address and defeat emerging 

threats. Implementing the distributed fleet represents a far greater 

opportunity to effect change. Increasing lethality can be achieved 

by distributing strike forces, including unmanned. 

Maneuver warfare provides an assured network and communications system able to provide robust kill chains while denying the 

enemy their targeting. These distributed lethal nodes make every 

platform a sensor, shooter, or communicator, or some combination 

of the three. 

The Navy meets current and anticipates future threats and will 

continue to innovate, adapt, fight and win. This study developed a 
6 

new concept, the distributed fleet, as a fleet design architecture to 

beat the future threat. 

I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Werchado can be found in the 

Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Werchado. Now we will go to Mr. 

Clark. 

STATEMENT OF BRYAN CLARK, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. CLARK. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney, and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 

having us here today to testify on this very important and timely 

subject, as you mentioned. 

I wanted to make five main points regarding the fleet architecture study that we conducted at CSBA. First, as Admiral Wilson 

mentioned, great power competition is going to be the defining feature of the security environment that we are looking at here, which 

is the 2030s. China and Russia already have the desire to pursue 

objectives in their near abroad and accrete influence and territory, 

and in that timeframe they are likely to have the capabilities to be 

able to pursue those objectives with a pretty high degree of aggression. 

We are also going to face regional powers that have the ability 

to use the capabilities that great powers might convey to them like 

long-range missiles and long-range surveillance systems and exploit their geographic advantage, so you think about a country like 

Iran or a country like a North Korea. Their geographic position 

combined with longer range weapons and sensors enables them to 

punch above their weight, if you will. 

The second is the emergence of this great power competition is 

going to put the onus on us to deter conflict with those great powers. A great power war, if we think about historically, could have 

damaging and potentially catastrophic consequences for ourselves 

and for the global economy, as well as our allies. So we are going 

to have to think about deterring those kinds of conflicts and not 

just fighting them. If we get into a position of having to fight a 

China or fight a Russia in a large-scale conflict, then we have probably signed ourselves up for a very damaging set of consequences. 

The fleet architecture that you would need to deter those potential adversaries is a little bit different potentially than what you 

might use if you were simply looking to fight them in some kind 

of scenario that we had developed arbitrarily in advance. So we 

have got to think about how a fleet architecture is prepared to 

deter conflict and then if deterrence fails, shift to be able to actually fight that conflict. And those might be two different things, so 

we need to carefully think about that. 

The third main point is because of this and because the objectives of these adversaries, if you think about the Baltics for Russia, 

or Taiwan for China, or the Senkaku Islands for China, they are 

all relatively close to those countries. They are all relatively close 

at hand, and it wouldn’t take very long for them to begin an act 

of aggression against them and even culminate it before U.S. forces 

and those of our allies would be able to arrive to stop them. 
7 

So our forces, our naval forces in particular, are going to have 

to be able to persist, survive, and then fight in these highly contested environments near the adversaries’ territory, thinking about 

the South and East China Seas when it comes to China or potentially the Baltic or certainly the North Atlantic when it comes to 

Russia. 

This is going to drive us, and that is my fourth point, to new 

operational concepts and new capabilities that enable our forces to 

be able to survive in these high-threat environments. This gets to 

ideas like Mr. Werchado brought up of distributed forces, new concepts for electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and undersea warfare 

that enable us to operate inside environments where the adversary 

can find us relatively easily and certainly attack us with large salvos of missiles. The new concepts are necessary for that, and we 

need to equip the force to be able to conduct those operational concepts, and that is in large part what our study was designed to do, 

is describe that. 

Our force packages that emerged from those operating concepts 

are designed to be able to combine manned and unmanned systems, autonomous unmanned systems, and those in manned platforms to be able to conduct long-range sensing or counter-ISR [intelligence, surveilliance, and reconnaissance] operations, and conduct long-range strike with a distributed force that allows a force 

with a large number of distributed platforms to be able to have the 

same kind of firepower as we would get from a traditional carrier 

strike group for example. 

The fifth point I want to bring up is that this more improved 

fleet and the fleet that is capable of deterring great power conflict 

in the 2030s is going to be larger than today’s fleet and more expensive. Our study found that the 340- to 380-ship Navy we believe 

we need is going to cost 15 to 20 percent more to buy, to maintain 

and operate, and to man than today’s fleet. So we need to be prepared for the fact that entering into a great power competition and 

being able to win or at least sustain an advantage in that competition is going to be more expensive. 

And so I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clark can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Clark. 

Dr. Banerjee, I want to welcome you here today. I know that 

your wife and your mother has accompanied you today. I want to 

welcome you all, too—— 

Dr. BANERJEE. Mother-in-law. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mother-in-law. I am sorry; mother-in-law, got you. 

We will get it straight. My apologies. 

Dr. Banerjee, thank you so much for joining us today, and welcome, and we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DR. SUNOY BANERJEE, THE MITRE 

CORPORATION 

Dr. BANERJEE. Thank you. 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to 

testify on the findings and recommendations of The MITRE’s fu-
8 

ture fleet architecture. Congress directed the Secretary of Defense 

to perform three independent studies of alternative fleet—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Banerjee, if I could get you to move the mike 

just a little bit closer to you. It is a big room; we want to make 

sure everybody can hear you. 

Dr. BANERJEE. Sorry. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. No problem. 

Dr. BANERJEE [continuing]. Alternative future fleet platform architectures for the Navy in the 2030 timeframe. The MITRE Corporation’s National Security Engineering Center and FFRDC [federally funded research and development center] was asked to deliver one of the three studies. MITRE conducted the study over a 

4-month period and delivered the final report consisting of a 70- 

page unclassified report and a 30-page classified annex on July 1, 

2016. 

MITRE recommended a 322-ship fleet in 2030 built around three 

major themes. The first, improving missile defense capabilities 

through the fielding of the hypervelocity projectile in the existing 

5-inch deck guns in the surface force and an aerial layer missile 

system to be deployed within the carrier air wings to deal with 

more advanced missile threats. Our preliminary campaign modeling suggests these two innovations significantly improve the survivability of the naval force. 

Second, improving the long-range strike through fielding of new 

supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missile capabilities into the 

surface and submarine force. These capabilities enable the naval 

force to project power while the carrier force is maneuvering into 

striking range for the carrier air wing. 

Third, increase force size while controlling costs via a high-low 

mix of platforms. The MITRE analysis recommended a missile defense innovations to improve the effectiveness of the existing surface force through a mix of Aegis surface combatants, which is the 

high end, a new fast frigate design built around the hypervelocity 

projectile in the 5-inch deck guns. That is the medium-end capability. And the low end is a magazine ship, so this is a container 

ship that has large numbers of VLS [vertical launching system] 

cells to augment the existing magazines and capacity of the surface 

force. 

The cost savings from these alternative mixes of platforms were 

used to buy an additional 5 Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines, which is a high-end capability, and 14 air-independent 

propulsion attack submarines, which would be a conventional submarine that would be a medium-end capability to significantly increase the size of the surface force—or of the submarine force. 

The study tasking emphasized the numbers and types of ships 

and submarines needed by the future force. However, this force 

also requires new sets of weapons, sufficient number of modern aircraft, resilient C4I [command, control, communications, computers, 

and intelligence] systems, integration of both kinetic and nonkinetic effects and undersea enablers to be effective. A balanced investment across not only shipbuilding but all these other additional 

factors is required for the naval force to improve both its capacity 

and its capability to deter aggression in the future. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 
9 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Banerjee can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Dr. Banerjee. We will now go to Mr. 

Courtney to begin our questions. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 

the witnesses for your testimony this afternoon. 

Again, obviously there is a lot of overlap in terms of the different 

studies that all of you conducted, as well as Admiral Richardson’s 

Force Structure Assessment. And, you know, obviously we live in 

a different sort of realm in terms of increments of 1-year budget 

cycles and 2-year terms. 

And so when we are looking at a target of 2030 to get to the 

numbers which—again, let’s just sort of stipulate you all have the 

same number at the end of the day—if you were sort of advising 

Congress in terms of a short-term to-do list, mid-term, middleterm, medium-term to-do list, and a long-term, as far as, you know, 

how we get there, and I just sort of in terms of where we focus our 

authorizations and appropriations, I think that would be very helpful for the members here to just kind of, like I said, focus it in 

terms of the task ahead in terms of the Congress. 

And, again, if anyone wants to jump in first or just go right 

across the table, whatever you are comfortable with. 

Admiral WILSON. Ranking Member Courtney, I will start. 

Let me first say that we have already talked about the Force 

Structure Assessment and the 355-ship Navy that that directed or 

the results of that study resulted in. To accelerate to a point that 

we feel we need to get to, and the future fleet architecture three 

studies, are the results from them, there are ongoing efforts right 

now to build a path to accelerate with existing industrial-based capacity that we know we can already ramp up with. And that information will be coming out soon. 

So we know we need to grow the force. We know we need to grow 

it to 355 right now with existing platforms and ways of fighting. 

So to get the rudder over, so to speak, we will start building a path 

to start ramping up as rapidly as we can where we know we can 

get started right away. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Thank you. Ranking Member Courtney and Mr. 

Chairman, in the interest of domestic harmony, I would like to 

point out that my lovely wife is here as well. 

Sir, my recommendation would be to go for a capability over platform. Naval weapons have gotten so long range, so precise, and so 

lethal, that in hundreds of studies that Admiral Wilson and I run 

a year for the Navy, what really comes out strongly is that it is 

the battle of the first salvo. 

Naval forces by their nature are mobile, and therefore they have 

to be targeted to be hit. And so whichever side completes that targeting kill chain first and fires first almost always wins. So I would 

make my investments in counter-C4ISR. Where is our decoy ship? 

Where is our electronic warfare to create false targets? Let’s make 

us hard to find while we make ourselves more capable of finding 

them. 

I think if we make the investments in the counter-C4ISR realm, 

there are going to be higher payoff first. We have lots of cruise missiles. We can use them. We have lots of VLS cells on the combat-
10 

ants, but we need to be able to complete the targeting chain to 

make them effective. 

Mr. CLARK. Congressman, a couple of things I would say in the 

near term are, just like Mr. Werchado was saying, we need to invest in the unmanned vehicles that are going to be the things that 

carry around these payloads of counter-C4ISR systems or sensors 

to be able to enable things like distributed lethality. 

So investing in and buying new extra-large unmanned undersea 

vehicles, buying new large unmanned surface vehicles, the common 

USV and also the extra-large USV which may be a variant of the 

DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] Sea Hunter 

program. Those would be the platforms that carry around some of 

these sensor packages and some of the jammers and decoys that we 

are going to need to deploy in order to keep platforms inside these 

highly contested environments. 

The other thing we can do in the near term is to accelerate construction of those ships that are already in construction where 

there is additional margin available. So accelerating LXR, as the 

Congress is already moving toward, accelerating perhaps the next 

LHA; and then in addition to that, we are going to have to make 

some investments in the shipyards in order to enable them to further increase production. In particular, if you think about Electric 

Boat up in Connecticut, they are largely going to be maxed out in 

terms of their near-term industrial capacity with the Columbia 

class and if we tried to do two attack submarines. 

But they have workforce limitations that are going to keep them 

from growing further. There are some facilities constraints that 

just over time that have grown and need to be addressed. So putting some money into facilities and a training infrastructure so 

that the shipyards are going to be able to bring on the workforce 

they need to grow in order to start doing the construction at the 

rate that we would need to get to a 350-ship or so Navy. 

And then in the mid term, I think the key will be to facilitate 

in the Navy being able to create the kind of network infrastructure 

it is going to need for these unmanned vehicles with the sensors 

and the countersensors to be able to talk to each other and then 

also talk back to their manned platforms that are controlling them. 

And so investments in some of the new line-of-site data links, improvements to Link 16 that are currently making their way into 

the program of record, those are going to be essential in order for 

us to make our forces able to talk to one another in an environment 

where it is going to be highly contested, lots of jamming, loss of 

GPS [Global Positioning Satellite] is likely. 

So Link 16 in particular I think is a capability we need to continue to enhance, and there is more room to grow for it. 

Dr. BANERJEE. I would just like to elaborate on what Mr. 

Werchado said. I think that in the past it has always been the one 

who strikes first does the most damage. One of the things we were 

looking at is the hypervelocity projectile, railgun, and aerial-layer 

missile system to provide us the capability to actually absorb that 

first hit, minimize the damage to the force, and then enable us to 

have a counterstrike that is both powerful and can deliver a powerful blow to the adversary. 
11 

So in terms of things that can be done in the near term, further 

maturation of the hypervelocity projectile, integrating new seeker 

heads into that. If we are looking at actually deploying railguns on 

ships when we think about new ship designs, how do we get the 

24 megajoules of wall plug power so you can fire that thing continuously as opposed to having to charge it off of a capacitor. Development and maturation of the aerial-layer missile system that can 

be deployed on either an F–18 or the new F–35Cs, or even the Marine Corps F–35 Bravos, to be able to provide a long-range ability 

to intercept really advanced hypersonic threats that are coming in 

towards the naval force. That also is going to require an ability to 

target those types of weapons and systems at range and the battle 

management capability to be able to coordinate those types of engagements. 

I think in the mid term, building platforms that can actually 

hold those capabilities and operate them in the manner we think 

we are going to have to fight would be the second piece. And to the 

extent that we can leverage work that has already been done, if 

there are designs that are available that other navies have that we 

can quickly leverage and deploy, or leverage existing designs for 

AIP [air-independent propulsion] submarines that we can license 

and then actually build here at U.S. shipyards to get the numbers 

and the capacity that we need in the mid term. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

All of you have mentioned many of the same things as a part of 

your studies, whether it is weapons and/or connectivity or command and control or whatever it might be. 

Where are the long poles in the tent for getting all of that done? 

The 2030 array of 240, 340, whatever the number of ships you have 

got, assume a rational progression across all those lines of things 

to be developed. Where are the ones that are most likely to give 

us the most head-scratching or the most trouble trying to keep up 

with all the other things? You can put the hulls in or the keels 

down; you can do that pretty mechanically. But all the other stuff 

you are talking about, what are the choke points across that array 

of stuff? 

Mr. CLARK. So, I will jump in there. One thing in particular we 

are finding trouble with is battle management. So you can have 

great data links to be able to communicate with all your unmanned 

vehicles, and they can be off sensing the environment, and you can 

have all these weapons, but the problem is that the speed of conflict is going to happen so quickly that I need something autonomous to be able to look at a threat, decide what it is, decide what 

the best weapon is to address it, and then where that weapon is, 

be able to send it from that platform to address the threat. 

Or on the other side, attack a target that maybe is amenable to 

a particular kind of weapon but not other kinds of weapons. But 

having the battle management to be able to coordinate all that information coming in and then be able to make a decision as to 

what to do about it autonomously is a key capability that there has 

been lots of projects going individually on, but there has not been 

anything that has totally cracked that nut. 
12 

Mr. CONAWAY. So if you can’t do that, then you have to have 

more ships because you have to have losses associated with—unable to do that. Where is the break point? Your assessment assumes that gets done. And if it doesn’t happen, how many more 

ships do you have to have? 

Mr. CLARK. So in our assessment, we were pretty conservative 

with regard to our ability to do autonomous battle management. So 

our fleet in some respects reflects the fact that you are going to 

need more manned platforms to control unmanned systems that 

are operating somewhat independently of you. 

If you could get more autonomy in your battle management system—you think about Aegis system that automatically does decision making for you—if you had that and were able to apply it 

across the whole force, you might be able to reduce the number of 

manned platforms significantly down from 350 to somewhere in the 

lower 300s range. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What about the weapons side, the railguns, directed energy, those things, where is the—— 

Mr. WERCHADO. Sir, that one, if I can talk to that, we are really 

taking a two-track approach. Right now there is over 100 barrels 

in the fleet that can fire an HVP [hypervelocity projectile], and 

Dahlgren is working together with the Army, and they are coming 

along well on the testing. That one could be fielded very quickly. 

Railgun is going to be a lot longer. We have to solve a lot of problems: barrel wear, the repetitive rate, you mentioned the recharge. 

So I think the low-hanging fruit is to get HVP out as fast as we 

can. It does really well against cruise missiles. It probably doesn’t 

take down a ballistic missile, but it would be a huge benefit to us 

to be able to have an interzone cruise missile defense. 

One thing Bryan alluded to is the command and control. We 

have to assume that every time we go out we are going to get 

jammed. We might have people take out our satellites. It is always 

going to be a contested environment. At a minimum there will be 

cyberattacks against our unclass networks. So we should only train 

in areas where we can fight through a limited data. So bringing 

UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] to do our own COMMs [communications] links, do our own surveillance. Doing that organically is 

going to be huge. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Dr. Banerjee, are there other things that are just 

wishes that are still in the development process? 

Dr. BANERJEE. I agree, I mean, the battle management to be able 

to sort out and make the target weapon pairing, and I think the 

challenge is how do you do that in a highly contested environment. 

And I guess I would say the cyber threat, I think there are ways 

of getting around the jamming, and depending on how denied space 

is through line-of-site relays and other capabilities, I think the long 

pole in the tent is how to do that in a highly contested cyber environment. 

I think that was a big concern that we had when we were doing 

the study, and part of the reason we had the classified annex to 

talk to what were some of the threats, and how do you actually 

build a resilient architecture to try to deal with some of those 

threats. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Chairman—yes sir, Admiral Wilson. 
13 

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. I do want to mention an effort that is 

ongoing as we speak. So right now at the Center of Naval Analyses, we have a war-gaming tabletop exercise ongoing, and it incorporates representatives from all three study teams, the Marine 

Corps, and several other key stakeholders, to really look at what 

are the long poles in the tent, as we look across these three future 

fleet architecture studies, and also to identify those key enablers 

that we will need to fight in various scenarios and theaters as it 

relates to each separate study. And we are going to be doing some 

red-teaming. And several of the people here will also be in the 

room as well. 

And so yesterday was the first day, and so we got a clear indication of the cooperation and kind of the open-mindedness that we 

have in discussing these types of issues, and we think we are going 

to get a lot of fruit out of that. We will be able to come back and 

tell you the results. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I look forward to that. Sounds great. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

We will now go to Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

to all of you for being here. 

I have been dealing more in personnel these last number of 

years, so this is very interesting, but it just takes a while to get 

it all, and I wanted to thank you for speaking English for most of 

the time. I appreciate it. 

I think, Mr. Werchado, you made the statement, I believe, something to the effect that the Navy would have written this differently, perhaps focused on different things, and Admiral you 

might speak to this as well. How? In what way? I mean, do you 

think that your experiences are lending a different—these reports 

are lending a whole different view to what is required and what 

kind of capacity we have to deal with it today versus down the 

line? 

Mr. WERCHADO. Thank you, ma’am. I appreciate the question. 

I would say that the only difference would have been because I 

was, and my team, we were given intellectual freedom to look at 

the range of possibilities. And we aren’t geniuses. Distributed lethality was proposed by SURFOR [U.S. Navy Surface Forces] 2 

years ago. We just expanded it to all the fleet versus just the surface ships. 

I think what would have happened if it was an official Navy 

study is it would have been chopped by the surface community, the 

submarine community, the aviators, the Marines, and everybody 

would have said I don’t play enough in it. So we had the freedom 

to not vet it. I don’t think there was any new, brilliant ideas that 

came out of it, but we were able to say what is the most effective 

force to fight a high-end threat, not what is the balanced, equal opportunity force. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah, and part of it too is the parochialism which 

sometimes tends to seep into the discussion. Admiral, yes? You 

smiled when I said that. 

Admiral WILSON. No. I agree with what Mr. Werchado said. Now 

although he had representatives across all those resource sponsors, 
14 

I think the nature of the culture that he developed in the study 

team is that, hey, leave your badge at the door, and we are going 

to be open-minded about this. 

And not only that, the NDAA specified that they weren’t, you 

know, encumbered to anchor themselves on programs of record, so 

they didn’t have to incorporate any—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. How confident are you then that as we move 

forward, that those kinds of recommendations will come forward as 

opposed to having people fall back on some of the other ways? 

Admiral WILSON. No, ma’am. I am very comfortable that we will 

get kind of the honest assessment. As a matter of fact, in the assessments division, that is kind of our job to be the honest brokers 

on how things should be assessed throughout the building cycle of 

how the Navy resources. 

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Anyone else want to comment on that? 

Mr. CLARK. Well, as a former employee of the N81 Assessments 

Division, I can attest they do very good work in there, but in some 

ways in the Navy you are constrained by what it is that the Secretary of Defense is going to use to grade your homework. 

So when you send your recommendations up in terms of the 

budget, they have a set of scenarios and objectives that they are 

going to grade that against. And so if we as a department have established a set of requirements that are maybe not reflective of 

what the future might really hold, then we may be going down the 

wrong path in terms of our force structure decisions, and so by 

doing it this way, you sort of freed the teams to come up with their 

own assessment of what we think the future operating environment is going to be and what may be required of naval forces. 

So at least you get a better idea of what I guess the operating 

space might be, like how big a fleet, what kind of fleet, what mix 

of fleet, might be necessary to address the future operating environment. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you think that how we prioritize the ships and 

capabilities would be different under that? I mean, there is such a 

range that we are talking about, and we obviously don’t have unlimited funds. 

Mr. CLARK. I think the priorities would be different, but I think 

that there is a fairly limited range of fleet architectures that make 

sense given the great power competition we are going to face. And 

it all comes down to specifics with regard to am I looking to deter 

a certain kind of conflict or fight a different kind of conflict, so it 

kind of comes down to exactly what the instantiation of that future 

threat might be, but there is bounds on it. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I wonder, Doctor, do you see the flexibility in what 

we are looking at as well because we never can quite predict that 

next war? 

Dr. BANERJEE. Yeah. As Bryan said, that is always the challenge. 

And I think that is also compounded by the fact that with ships 

they are 30- to 50-year hulls. So even though we are looking out 

to 2030, and I think Mr. Werchado mentioned this at the kickoff 

of the war game, that about 75 percent of the force that is going 

to be there in 2030 is kind of the same ships and hulls that we 

have today. 
15 

So the challenge is how do you adapt that force over time to meet 

these advanced threats and these new challenges within the constraints of the fact that the vast majority of the force you are going 

to have in the future is very similar to what you have today. So 

it is a complex problem. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Admiral, quickly. 

Admiral WILSON. Yes, ma’am. I did want to add one additional 

point. Although there were three separate studies across the table 

here, there is not a lot of difference in the DNA of the groups here. 

Bryan even mentioned he used to be in 81, and so although we are 

getting different kind of opinions in ways of fighting, we are also 

casting a wider net to what else is out there. There are things that 

didn’t show up in any of the three studies, new technologies that 

we get from industry or from academia, that may be beneficial and 

help us as well, so we are looking at those things also. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. We will now go to Mr. 

Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to go back a little bit. I sit on Science, Space and 

Technology. We talk about a couple of these things, but one of them 

is hypersonic weapons. And we have been talking about hypersonic 

for about 65 years in America. And we seem to start a program, 

stop a program, start a program, stop a program, collect data, give 

data to somebody else, wait for the Chinese to steal it, and then 

that is kind of where we are. I would like that to stop, and I know 

that the Navy, we have had several admirals in here before that 

have talked about hypersonic weapons and what kind of a game 

changer that would be. I understand HVP is helping quite a bit, 

but that doesn’t get us to moving somebody way away because you 

are now going 4,800 miles an hour. 

So give me an idea, and I know that we have problems with the 

railgun, and I think that we will continue to have problems with 

the railgun for a very long time just because of the nature of what 

we are working there, and maybe we are just not quite smart 

enough to get through the physics of what the railgun brings to us. 

So give me an idea of where we are, what that would mean to 

our fleets. I think I know what that would mean to the Air Force, 

but I also know that that would probably bring a greater issue to 

the Navy than any of the four services, so I will start with the Admiral. 

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir, I concur with your comments. 

I particularly kind of locked on how we talk in open forum, and 

one of the key words that we talked about at the very beginning 

was this is a competition. And when you are in high-level competition, you are very careful as to what information you give your adversary. And so we do need to think more about how we do that 

in the future and not talk about what we can’t do and what we 

cannot do and let the adversaries know kind of where we are at. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Sir, I would like to address a particular aspect. 

You mentioned the different weapons and their capabilities. Radar 

resources plays a huge part. I think everybody here is aware of the 

Navy’s effort for AMDR, advanced missile defense radar, on the 

Flight III DDG [guided-missile destroyer]. I appreciate all the sup-
16 

port that program has gotten to date, and we look toward to using 

that against future threats, including hypersonic. 

Mr. CLARK. So I would add to that that one thing that U.S. naval 

forces have as an advantage potentially is that you are co-locating 

your missile defenses with the target. So if the hypersonic weapon 

is coming at you and you are on the ship and you have got some 

defensive systems, you can still shoot at it because it has still got 

to eventually come to you. 

And so the fact that the hypersonic weapon is going mach 5 or 

beyond is somewhat mitigated by the fact that it has to eventually 

arrive at your location. So some of these missile defense capabilities that might be very difficult to use in defense of somebody else 

are somewhat effective when you are dealing with getting shot at 

yourself. 

The other thing we have to think about is us using hypersonic 

weapons against the enemy, and there has been a lot of work going 

on in the development of new hypersonic weapons that U.S. forces 

could use. And so that is where I think we should be investing 

more time and effort, because clearly if we are worried about the 

threat coming from Russia or China, there is no reason why we 

wouldn’t be able to develop our own hypersonic threat, whether it 

is air launched or potentially even surface launched, ship launched. 

Dr. BANERJEE. Thank you, Bryan. That is exactly where I was 

going to go. In the MITRE study, we recommended an aerial-layer 

missile system, so that was actually a hypersonic terminal seeker 

to be able to deal with some of the hypersonic threats that are coming in and try and engage them at range and potentially even at 

longer range engage those platforms that are going to be launching 

large numbers of antiship cruise missiles and other things coming 

at us. 

So our report talked about how through the aerial layer, and 

then also we talked about a Pershing 3 variant, so the [Chinese] 

DF–21 missile is based off of the Pershing 2. You know that is an 

example of where they have taken our design and used it against 

us. The thought here is to have a Pershing 3 variant that could be 

launched from a ship so we could still comply with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. But that would be now 

something that they would have to deal with, and now they will 

have to build defensive systems to try to figure out how they are 

going to save their light holes in the South China Sea or their 

ships. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Knight. We are just 

looking. There is a vote that has been called, so we are going to 

try to get through a few more questions here. 

Mr. KNIGHT. That is why I was fast. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. We are going to go 

to Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for the witnesses, a big thank you. Like Ms. Davis, a lot of this is new. I have 

been on other subcommittees, mostly on strategic arms. Some of it 

seems to intersect here. 

Of particular interest to me is the unmanned vehicles of various 

kind, underwater, surface, and the like. Mr. Werchado, you seem 
17 

to be enamored by these. I would like you to explain more completely why and how they fit into the battlefield. And also in this 

context, maybe all of you would like to comment on the near term, 

all of which, of which all of you seem to comment on requires defense, electromagnetic defenses, cyber warfare, and the like. 

So if you can hit both of those, it would be helpful to me. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Yes, sir, I would be glad to. It was not a pleasant moment, but I had an IPR, a [interim] progress report, with 

our mutual boss, Admiral Richardson, and I used that comment 

about 75 percent of the force still being here in 2030, and he said 

only if I keep buying the same things. And he challenged us to see 

how different we could make our force by 2030. And you know 

what, you really can’t do that through just manned systems. If you 

want to build things quickly, they have to be affordable, and unmanned is a great way to get there. 

So we said if we opened the aperture, what could we do? So we 

gave ourselves some constraints. We couldn’t invent a new unmanned platform that didn’t exist. It had to be either in development or based on a current manned platform. 

So we said what do we need to do? We need to have a backup 

to satellites, so we said what kind of surveillance could we provide? 

And we looked at what DARPA was working on, they had TERN 

[Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node], excellent capability, so 

we put that on the surface combatants. We wanted to make ourselves more offensive, so we looked at the Mark 6 patrol boat. We 

said easy to make that into a robot boat. Can put four cruise missiles on it without exceeding its displacement. So now we have four 

times the strike capability. 

So we went for niche unmanned capabilities where we needed it. 

We wanted to have the decoy. I don’t want a manned ship to be 

the decoy because it will get shot. I used unmanned surface vehicles for the decoys so we went after niche capability where unmanned was better than manned, and the technology supported it. 

Mr. CLARK. I would say, sir, in addition to what Mr. Werchado 

just talked about, we looked at using unmanned systems as an adjunct to manned systems because they are going to be able to give 

you that longer reach and that greater persistence, and operate in 

environments where you may need to depend on them to be your 

eyes and ears, if you will. 

So large unmanned vehicles like Mr. Werchado talked about 

were essential. A couple of limitations that we found, in the work 

we have been doing with DARPA, one is the sensor capability that 

an unmanned vehicle has is usually pretty limited compared to a 

manned platform, because we want these unmanned vehicles to be 

relatively small and relatively inexpensive, so we don’t put the very 

sophisticated sensors on them. That means that the brains in 

them, the autonomy, isn’t necessarily always going to be able to 

make the right decision because it may not be able to see what is 

going on around it. So you got to network them together to have 

one maybe one with a really good sensor and others that will be 

able to talk to it but that means you have to have these communications that are sometimes highly contested in those environments. 
18 

And then the other thing with unmanned vehicles, when you 

think about deterrence and in peacetime how you might use them, 

is they don’t necessarily provide the deterrent effect that you are 

looking for in terms of preventing conflict. Not necessarily because 

people don’t respect them because there is no people on them, but 

more so because they can’t defend themselves. So if you are driving 

around the South China Sea and you run up against an unmanned 

Mark 6 patrol boat, you can’t have it just start shooting at people 

that happen to wander up to it because in peacetime that is not 

appropriate. 

So it limits your ability to deter conflict in peacetime if you depend entirely on an unmanned solution. 

Dr. BANERJEE. I think all three reports, MITRE report agreed 

that unmanned, I think, has a huge role on the undersea side, and 

we were all for having unmanned underwater vehicles as a critical 

enabler. I think our report differed from the others in the sense 

that we deemphasized the role of unmanned on the surface and on 

the air side. I think there is a role for it in the air wing that needs 

to be worked out, but our concerns were again from a counterC4ISR perspective and a counter-space perspective, to what degree 

are you going to be able to actually network these types of platforms together and use them effectively. 

And then our other concern was from a cyber perspective, how 

well are these platforms going to work in a highly contested cyber 

environment. So MITRE made a conscious decision to kind of deemphasize the unmanned on the surface and the air side to some 

extent in our report. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. [Audio malfunction in hearing room.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. I am going to go to 

Mr. DesJarlais. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. I know we just have a minute before we have 

to leave for votes. I have a quick question, and I will start with Dr. 

Werchado. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Go ahead and take your full 5 minutes. We are 

going to have some folks coming back so we are going to keep the 

hearing going. So please take your time. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Gotcha, okay. Some advocates have indicated a 

high-low mix of attack submarine assets to include diesel submarines. What are the pros and cons associated with a high-low 

mix of attack submarines? 

Mr. WERCHADO. Thank you, sir. Excellent question. I had the fortune to be on the Virginia-class analysis of alternatives back in the 

1990s and we did look at diesels. The problem is we don’t have the 

luxury of fighting close to our shore. We play an away game. And 

if I was a country like China, I would buy a lot of diesels because 

I know you are going to come and fight me near home. We have 

to deploy, and the only way to deploy is to bring your own fuel with 

you. 

When we buy a Virginia, it comes with a lifetime of fuel. And so 

I have nothing against diesel submarines, but you have to say I am 

going to be fighting within a few hundred miles of where I based 

them, or else now I have to buy extra oilers. I am going to make 

them vulnerable when I refuel them. They are going to have to 
19 

snorkel. They are going to become vulnerable. It is just not an option for us as long as we have to be a global navy. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Anybody else have a comment? Doctor. 

Dr. BANERJEE. I will take that. So MITRE put that into the report. Our concern was on the capacity side and actually bringing 

up the number of attack submarines, I think Mr. Werchado pointed 

out that the diesels are going to have issues with the speed of advance and magazine depth. They don’t have the magazine depth 

that you are going to have with the Virginia and the VPM [Virginia payload module]. But our thought was base them forward. 

Base them in Guam and Japan or the Baltics and so they are close 

to the fight. 

And then when the balloon goes up, flush them out early because 

it is going to take them a while to get there and the Virginias and 

the nuclear submarines that are deploying from CONUS [continental United States] or from other locations can speed into the 

AOR [area of responsibility] and get on station very quickly. 

Once they are on station, there is something that the adversary 

is going to have to worry about, and so this is a way of actually 

increasing the size of the submarine force relatively cheaply because you can buy, you know, our back of the envelope math suggests that you can get three diesels for the cost of one Virginia, so 

it is a way of increasing it quickly to try to overcome a loss of the 

Los Angeles class as they retire out of the force. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you. That is all I have. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. DesJarlais. 

Okay. We are going to go to a very brief recess. We have sent 

some members off to vote. They are going to come back. Mr. Conaway will take the chair as we head off to vote, so we will be back 

and continue the hearing, so just hang in there with us for a few 

minutes. We are trying to navigate these votes. 

So we will recess briefly. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CONAWAY [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Mr. Gallagher 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There has been a lot 

of talk, by all of you, about the concept of distributed lethality, and 

to quote a fellow Wisconsinite, Rear Admiral Fanta, if it floats, it 

fights, and Mr. Werchado, your study goes particularly far in sort 

of incorporating this concept into a distributive fleet, and you sort 

of claim this with an increased independent units capable of offensive operations tenfold over the current force. 

In your study, the small surface combatant fleet would be 20 percent higher than the current 30-year shipbuilding plan, 48 vessels 

versus—48 vessels versus 40 vessels. The LCS [littoral combat 

ship], we make it in Wisconsin. I would just be interested in your 

thoughts on the LCS, in terms of supporting the concept of distributed lethality in the future. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Thank you, sir. Admiral Fanta was at—chairing 

a meeting I was at this morning. I think there is a distinction to 

be made in our force structure. So we have 28 LCS. We need those. 

We use those for mine countermeasure missions and antisubmarine 

warfare missions. We don’t trade those against other ships. We also 
20 

have 20 small surface combatants. We need those ships. Those 

would be doing part of the antisurface battle network. 

So we have requirement for 48 small combatants. Twenty-eight, 

which is the number that we have currently under contract for 

LCS, we need every one of those. We also see a need for 20 more 

of the small surface combatant to extend our distributed lethal network. So I just wanted—it is not 48 of the same ship. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Uh-huh. Well, on that point, Mr. Clark, I would 

ask you to talk about this. Is there a need for a more survivable 

and lethal frigate than is now being considered by the Navy acquisition strategy, or what requirements need to be built in that don’t 

currently exist in the LCS program as we look towards a frigate 

of the future? 

Mr. CLARK. Yes. Thanks, Congressman. So I think we definitely 

recommended a larger, more survivable, and more lethal frigate 

going forward. So in our fleet architecture, we recommended that 

the Navy continue to build the LCS and the frigate version of the 

LCS unless that design is ready to be built, which we anticipate 

it not happening until the 2020 timeframe, and then we would 

transition to that frigate. 

We think the essential capabilities needed in that frigate are the 

ability to do air defense for another ship so it could do an escort 

mission, which we saw in our analysis as being an increasingly important mission for a situation in which our logistics forces and civilian convoys and noncombatant ships are going to be at risk of 

being attacked by an enemy that is willing to go all out and attack 

civilians as well as attacking just strictly military ships. 

So we saw the need to have the ability to do air defense of another ship as being essential. The other thing it has to be able to 

do is antisubmarine warfare, and in particular, using new antisubmarine warfare [ASW] concepts that will leverage things like the 

variable depth sonar that the LCS mission package has, and the 

medium—or the multifunction towed array, which the LCS mission 

package has as well. 

What those capabilities do is allow us to transition from having 

a strictly, you know, man-on-man or single-ship-on-submarine kind 

of ASW to now do multi-static ASW where multiple ships can look 

for multiple submarines, and then we need standoff weapons to be 

able to engage those submarines rapidly, which could be from a 

TERN type of unmanned vehicle that an LCS or a frigate could deploy. 

But those capabilities that we need in that frigate end up requiring a ship that is larger than the LCSs that we currently are building. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And Dr. Banerjee, you seem to—is it fair to say 

you disagree kind of with both those approaches. Your report argues for the cancellation of the program. Have you done any analysis of what that would do to the defense industrial base, because 

I am sure you know this isn’t sort of turn it off and turn the spigot 

on somewhere else. I mean, this is years of developing a skilled 

workforce and improvements and efficiencies that happen every 

single day to make it more affordable. 

Dr. BANERJEE. Roger that. To the first part of the question that 

we agree with CSBA, I think we agree that it has to be a larger 
21 

frigate, larger size. We did look—and we were looking, again, at an 

area of air defense, antisurface warfare capability that was built 

around the hypervelocity projectile, launched out of a 5-inch gun, 

I mean, the first part of analysis that we did was to look at, okay, 

what kind of frigate designs do that. It turns out there was a Garcia-class, you know frigate, you know back in the 1980s that was 

a 35, a 100 ton, so it is about LCS size that had two 5-inch deck 

guns. The naval architect that was on our team didn’t think that 

that was something that was—although it was done back then, 

that it was something that was doable today. 

So we actually recommended something that was a larger size. 

I think we looked at a German, you know, F–125, which is a 7,200- 

ton, you know, frigate design that had the two deck guns, could get 

you some VLS cells as well as EW [electronic warfare] capabilities 

and decoys and things you would need to make that a much more 

robust and survivable ship within this particular threat environment. 

Now, the question in terms of whether or not that could be built 

in those shipyards and whether those yards could be expanded to 

handle a larger ship size—— 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Uh-huh. 

Dr. BANERJEE [continuing]. That wasn’t something that we 

looked at. What we did think about was whether it would be possible to actually potentially license a design to try to actually get 

something built sooner. If it is a design that could be licensed and 

then manufactured at, you know, either or both of the existing LCS 

shipyards and what modifications that they would have to do at 

the yards to be able to do that, we didn’t actually look at that. 

The other potential option—I mean, we did also talk about a couple of different alternatives for the amphibious force. One of that 

would be, you know, an option to build a smaller—a number of 

smaller platforms for the new dock ship. Now, I know since the 

study came out, there—I think there has been a decision as to 

what that design is going to be, but if the Navy and Marine Corps 

wanted to go down that road, then that could potentially be another ship that is built within the existing shipyards and facilities. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, gentlemen, for your work. Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. Norcross, 5 minutes. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman, and hopefully you didn’t 

address this while I was gone voting, but I hear more diverse, 

spread our risk out, hidden, unmanned. Tell me how our aircraft 

carriers fit into this new world and new vision that you have been 

talking about? So start right with the admiral, work our way down. 

Admiral WILSON. Well, sir, I would like to defer to the study 

team leads and let them explain how they incorporated our existing 

carriers and how they are planning on using either an America 

class or some alternate carrier in the future force. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Thank you, Admiral. I think one of the key parts 

of our study that really hasn’t gotten the visibility is the synergy 

that you can have between a large aircraft carrier like a Nimitz or 

a Ford and a big deck amphib. One thing that doesn’t get pub-
22 

licized too well is the Marines are far ahead of the Navy in terms 

of fielding fifth gen fighters. 

The F–35 Bravo will be out in numbers before the F–35 Charlie 

is, so the big deck amphib, which can host up to 23, 35 Bravos, you 

probably wouldn’t want to deploy that many for operational reasons, but it could host say 20, it could go to sea and provide 2 extra 

squadrons of fifth gen fighters which the Navy couldn’t field until 

2026 at current acquisition plans. 

However, it can’t carry AEW, advanced early warning, airborne 

early warning, it can’t have electronic attack, so you wouldn’t want 

it to be out by itself. But if you put it out with the big deck carrier, 

there is a win-win because now the carrier air wing has fifth gen 

squadrons earlier and the L-class ship affords the protection from 

the E–2s and the Growlers that are on the big carrier. 

So when we said we had so many more combat nodes, when we 

deploy for combat, we send carriers out in twos. The reason for that 

is you have to have 24/7 flight ops and you have to have down time 

on the flight deck. So if I have to send my carriers out in twos, I 

can cut the number of strike groups in half that I can send to war. 

If I pair them up with big deck amphibs, I am back to each carrier 

can be a strike group with an L-class ship next to it. 

Mr. NORCROSS. But the point I am trying to make is they are 

larger, you are not going to hide them. If it does break out, what 

are the chances of that surviving the first 10 minutes of any conflict? 

Mr. WERCHADO. It is large, sir, and it is hard to hide, but it also 

hard to find. Remember, it is mobile. And so, big Pacific Ocean. I 

can know a carrier is there, but I have to get its location within 

the acquisition circle of my missile, and I have to transmit that 

data to a firing unit before that circle grows. You know, at 30 

knots, I know where your carrier is right now, go call the missile 

shot, get them to shoot something. Every minute that circle is 

growing area of uncertainty because the carrier is doing 30 knots. 

And so what you really want to do is say you may know I have 

a carrier there but you can’t solve the firing solution and you can’t 

launch on it, and so all those things we have been talking about, 

the decoys, electronic warfare, the cyber, that is to keep the uncertainty. They may know we have a carrier out there, but unless they 

can put a weapon on it, it doesn’t help. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. 

Mr. CLARK. So one thing I would say in addition to that is it also 

depends on how you use your carrier. If you use your carrier as the 

front line of defense and deterrence, then you are putting it into 

an environment where it is much more likely to be found, targeted, 

and shot at. And what we found in our analysis is not so much that 

the carrier gets sunk, is that its operations get suppressed because 

it is driving around trying to avoid being shot and it is not able 

to launch aircraft, and therefore, it is not really doing its job. 

So what we did in our fleet architecture study is we took the carriers, which are very good at delivering combat power at moderate 

levels for a really long period of time, and moving them outside 

that immediate area of the conflict where things might start. So 

you think about the South and East China Seas in the Western Pacific, and we put the distributed forces that we have been talking 
23 

about inside that area because they have missile-based fires that 

are much faster and can be delivered in high volume for a short 

period. 

So in a war, these distributed forces we are talking about are 

likely to use up all their weapons relatively quickly. So within a 

few days, they might be out of ammunition and have to sort of 

withdraw, or they get attacked and sunk. So we need somebody to 

be able to flow in behind them to be able to continue the fight once 

those distributed forces have to start withdrawing, and that is 

what the carrier strike groups are able to do. 

One, they are a little bit farther away as they are able to maneuver and take advantage of the larger space they have at their disposal, so they are harder to find, and they are also then coming in 

at a point where we maybe started to attrite the enemy a little bit 

and reduced his ability to launch large salvos at the carrier. 

So separating the force into these forward forces and this larger 

carrier-based force enables you to take advantage of what both do 

really well and minimize the chance that the carrier will be suppressed. 

Mr. NORCROSS. But you also have to keep them outside of the 

range so that they are not going—they are going to stay out in the 

North Atlantic in case the Balkans—are particularly when we are 

dealing down there. 

Mr. CLARK. Right. So they stay outside the immediate area of the 

conflict so they could still be attacked by some small number of 

very, very long-range weapons, but you don’t put them in the place 

where necessarily they are going to be able to be hit by large numbers of shorter range weapons. 

Dr. BANERJEE. In the MITRE study, we talked about using the 

hypervelocity projectile to deal—you know, basically use the surface combatants to protect the carrier from the cruise missile 

threats, and we also talk about an aerial air missile system to try 

to engage the more capable hypersonic threats, as well as trying 

to actually shoot down the bombers and the strategic aircraft that 

they are going to launch those things off of at range. 

So we use that to try to protect the carrier and provide kind of 

a layered defense that is more robust and can be layered on top 

of the existing standard missile systems and the existing point defense systems within the strike group. 

To get to the unmanned question, I think the interesting question there is if you are on a combat air patrol where you are trying 

to perform this mission, that is actually a fairly nice role to actually have for an unmanned system because they can stay up there 

for a long period of time and it is a relatively boring job for a fighter jock to do, but then actually slave the fire control for that system back to either the E–2D or back to an Aegis combatant to actually perform—you know, put that cap up while you are not conducting large-scale flight operations. It is an interesting potential 

role for unmanned systems for a carrier defense. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN [presiding]. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. 

We now go to Ms. Hanabusa. 
24 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, and if I ask any of the same questions, please excuse me. I 

am coming from a vote. 

So this is for Rear Admiral as well as Mr. Werchado. I am sort 

of confused as to what the right number is for you for the Navy 

because the FSA [Force Structure Assessment] in December 2016 

said 355 and some of you are concurring or nodding to 355; but in 

your report, you seem to go to a total of force, 57; manned, 321, 

which is a force of 355, that number; and unmanned, 136. So what 

is the number? What is Navy’s position? 

Admiral WILSON. Yes, ma’am. Let me clarify a little bit, and I 

mentioned this earlier, but as you mentioned, you may not have 

been in the room then. Three fifty-five was the results of the Force 

Structure Assessment. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Uh-huh. 

Admiral WILSON. And that relates to current programs of record, 

current platforms that the Navy has using current warfighting concepts and keeping things fixed such as our strategic laydown that 

we currently have. 

Now, that is the foundation and the baseline for where we need 

to go in the future. So right now that number is 355, but as we 

look to future fleet architectures, different concepts of fighting, different platforms, so within that 355 number, there are no unmanned platforms. 

So if you look at how you are fighting in a more distributed fashion, how your forces are more netted and integrated, now you can, 

you have an opportunity to replace some manned platforms with 

some unmanned platforms, for example, and some other things 

that are—have different technologies, and then you are going to 

fight those things a different way. So that number will look different. 

One of the things that drives us to do a Force Structure Assessment is change in strategy, change—a significant change in 

programmatics. This is one example if you are going to a more unmanned kind of centric force, and significant changes in the threat, 

and that is what drove the 2016, significant changes in the threat 

and there was a change in the strategy, that is what drove the increase of the number. Any of those changes that happen in the future, it will change the number again. We will do another Force 

Structure Assessment, and it will reflect what a future force would 

need to look like. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand that, but the problem with doing 

that is that if you—we can’t, and then basically the industrial base 

can’t switch that simply. So for example, one of the things that I 

noticed, which is dear to Hawaii, is the fact that where everyone 

else seems to agree that the Virginia-class attack sub should be 

around 66, one of you is higher than 66, you are not, and in terms 

of the Navy system is not. 

The FSA is at 66, and we are also at the same number, I believe, 

in the Columbia-class subs, so it seems to me that one of things 

that I would like to know, first of all, is who do you—who do you 

perceive to be the, quote, enemy that you have to fight? Because 

if it is Russia and China, as many of you allude to or actually state, 

then we shouldn’t have this kind of a discrepancy in my mind. 
25 

We should have some understanding of, one, where is that force 

going to be? Is it going to be in the Pacific? Is it going to be under 

the Arctic? Or is it going to be in the Atlantic? So if you could— 

one of you could answer that. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Yes, ma’am. I think there is an apparent disconnect that isn’t. So Admiral Wilson said he looked at manned 

platforms in the Force Structure Assessment. He gets 66. MITRE 

looked at a mixture of nuke and diesel and if you add the two. We 

had 53 SSNs [nuclear attack submarines], but we also had 48 large 

displacement UUVs [unmanned underwater vehicles], so whether 

you do it all through manned, through manned nuke and manned 

diesel or manned nuke and unmanned diesel, I think what you are 

really talking about is a capability. 

And I love the fact that you went from asking about the total 

force structure number to the individual submarine number. Inside 

the Pentagon, we never say 313, 325, 355 because it is a not meaningful number. We say how many carriers do I need, how many 

amphibs do I need, how many submarines do I need. That is where 

the discussion really should take place. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So what about my question about where is the 

threat? I assume all of this is driven by where is the threat? So 

it has got to be some assessment on all of your parts as to who or 

where is that threat. 

Mr. WERCHADO. In order to keep it unclassified, we specified we 

would take—be able to handle a high-end threat with large antiaccess capability. My colleague named two countries that I 

wouldn’t disagree with. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Somebody named them. I read it. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Yes, ma’am. I can. But while doing that, deter 

anyone else. So that could be the next level tier of country. So if 

you can handle one of the big ones, you should be able to handle 

one of the medium ones and keep them deterred. That is [inaudible] our construct. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa. 

We will now go to Mr. McEachin. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Up until December 

31, I was just a small-town lawyer trying to make good, and now 

I am trying to learn all these newfangled concepts, and Admiral, 

you and I had a discussion the other day and I went and did a little research and it turns out that I think we are working under the 

assumption that we have to fight at least two—we need to be prepared to fight two significant conflicts, maybe with a non-state 

actor, maybe one with a state actor, and that is what drives our 

preparedness numbers, and that what drives presumably this 355 

number with some variation. 

And then I see my President propose this $54 billion to be added 

in investment to defense, and then he flies down to the south side 

of my district into Newport News, stands on a carrier and starts 

talking about how wonderful this amount of money is for building 

up our, presumably, our Navy. That is certainly the implication. 

And then I start hearing all these whispers about, well, the $54 

billion really isn’t all for the Navy. It is for, you know, most of it, 

quite frankly, is going to the Department of Energy for our nuclear 
26 

weapons systems. I don’t know if any of that is true. I don’t want 

to deal with alternative facts. If anybody at this table knows, how 

much of that $54 billion would actually be going to building ships, 

hopefully, out of Newport News and Connecticut and maybe elsewhere, too, but how much of that $54 billion will actually be going 

to building ships? 

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. I can’t comment on specifically how 

much money would be going towards building ships, but some of 

that money will go towards making the current force whole, and 

some of it will go towards ramping up and building the ships; but 

specific dollar figure, I can’t give you here. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. I appreciate that, and thank you for gently chiding me in that fashion. To the extent that you can comment, does 

any part of that $54 billion put us on track to get to that 355-ship 

level, because I have got a whole bunch of folks who are looking 

for work in Virginia, in Virginia’s Fourth Congressional District, 

and they are mighty excited. But I am hearing things to say we 

need to slow down, we are not going to get there too quickly with 

that number. 

Admiral WILSON. No, absolutely. Congressman, we will be—well, 

there is efforts ongoing right now to see what we can do to ramp 

up in the industrial base where we can and start moving quickly 

to that 355 number for platforms that we know we are going to 

need. 

Mr. WERCHADO. Yes, sir. Also, the Secretary of Defense indicated 

his priority would be first restoring readiness, fixing holes in the 

programs, and then growing force structure. I would just point out 

that a lot of restoring readiness means Norfolk Naval Shipyard because we do have to do the repairs to those ships to get them back 

out, so I would expect a lot of the investment would be going to 

increase the rate of overhauls and the capacity to do overhauls. 

Mr. CLARK. Also keep in mind that the ship maintenance industrial base would benefit from some of this money going into readiness because right now all of our surface combatants, all of our amphibious ships get maintained at private shipyards. There is a 

bunch at Norfolk, there is a bunch along the East Coast, and so 

there is a lot of workers that are going to be brought in to help 

with that because that is where a lot of our expansion volume is, 

if you will, in the ship maintenance industrial base. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. If you care to comment. You don’t need to feel 

compelled. 

Dr. BANERJEE. No. I don’t know where that $54 billion is going. 

I don’t have anything to say on that. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. McEachin. I just wanted to let you 

know, too, we have asked the Congressional Budget Office to outline for us the pathway to get to 355 ships in a 15-, 20-, 25- and 

30-year scenario. So we will have some additional information for 

the committee as far as the pathway there so it will give you a little more information to go on. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. Thank you. We will now go to Mr. 

Langevin. 
27 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

panel for your testimony here today. Admiral, thank you for your 

service and all of you, good work that you do in behalf of our Nation. Thank you for your work. 

Admiral Wilson, Mr. Werchado, so I am a long-term member of 

this subcommittee, and I am very proud to represent Rhode Island’s Second District where we begin the build process for our Nation’s submarine fleet. So I—I have to, say, though, I am frustrated 

that such a dramatic increase to our naval fleet from 274 to 355 

ships in the future was announced so quickly it seemed without 

very little conversation. 

So can you discuss with the subcommittee the decision-making 

process that took place prior to this announcement and what factors were most heavily weighted, and how are you preparing to 

move forward now with this plan? I think it caught a lot of people 

off guard that it happened so quickly, and I have been around here 

for awhile, and to see that kind of a dramatic shift so quickly was 

surprising, so—— 

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. I think you are referring to the announcement of the 355-ship Navy? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yeah. 

Admiral WILSON. I would answer that by saying that our study 

was complete, and we had briefed leadership, and so once you have 

a completed study and you brief leadership, leadership then has— 

it is their prerogative on whether they want to go public with it 

or not, and the Secretary of the Navy chose to go public with that 

information, which was complete at the time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Werchado, do you want to add 

anything? 

Mr. WERCHADO. No, I think that covered it. I would just point 

out that the work for the FSA actually started under Admiral Wilson’s predecessor, Admiral Mercado. It took us about almost a year, 

so we had to go out to all the fleet component commanders and the 

COCOMs [combatant commanders] and find out what their demand signal was, we compared it to the results of our campaign 

modeling the analysis we do for the war plan, so it was an involved 

process. It may have seemed overnight based on the speed of the 

roll-out, but again, that was SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] determined. We had been working pretty much since last January on 

it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. All right. Thank you. Dr. Banerjee, so I— 

I see that the MITRE study included the addition of an electromagnetic railgun onboard a new frigate and supplemental platforms. 

So I have been a long-time advocate for things like directed energy and high-velocity projectile technologies, and I understand 

that high-velocity projectiles have been discussed today already, 

but did you evaluate directed energy technologies outside of railgun 

in your study? If not, why not. 

Dr. BANERJEE. No, we didn’t look at things like the solid state 

laser technology maturation [SSLTM] program and some of the 

other systems that are out there. I think our thought, those are interesting technologies, technologies we should continue to invest in. 

I think that there is still that capability there potentially from— 

a counter-C4ISR perspective, but our thought was that the hyper- 
28 

velocity projectile was further along and something that was, at 

least when launched from a 5-inch deck gun, could be deployed 

within the existing force. 

In terms of the railgun, our thought was, if practical, if you could 

put the power plant in to be able to operate it in the new frigate 

design, that would be great. The other option that we had put forward was potentially in the magazine ship concept, if you are actually going to put VLS cells and other capabilities into a commercial 

hull, in a commercial hull, you can buy containerized power plants 

that could deliver that type of power for a railgun and you could 

drop them in and that might be the quickest way to actually get 

something like that to the fleet. 

We were focused on what could be done in the next 10 to 15 

years, and I think our concern is, although I know SSLTM and 

other capabilities are moving forward, we just weren’t sure you 

were going to get the power level out of those systems to have effects against the types of systems that we are worried about. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. All right. And I would just point out that 

the—we do have a 30-kilowatt laser right now on the USS Ponce 

that is in theater. We don’t have a railgun in theater yet. I know 

it is only 30-kilowatt, but we are certainly experimenting with an 

actual platform. 

Dr. BANERJEE. Yeah. So for that, I mean, to go against a FAC/ 

FIAC [fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft] type threat or 

small boat threat, or a UAV threat, I think you can get away with 

it. 

I mean, the question is though when we are talking about the 

South China Sea and dealing with those type—the types of platforms that they are going to launch out at us and the ranges that 

we are going to be operating at is that what impact is it going to 

have in that particular fight. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Did you want to add something? 

Mr. CLARK. Yeah, Congressman, I will rise in defense of directed 

energy. But we included in our study both solid state laser, because 

in the 2030 timeframe it is completely realistic to think that you 

could have a 150- to 300-kilowatt laser that you could use. 

And then also, high-powered radio frequency or high-powered 

microwave could be an effective technology in that timeframe, so 

we included both in our study. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I have another question I would like 

to submit for the record, but I know my time is expired, so I will 

yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. We appreciate our witnesses here. 

We do have to get down to the floor and vote on fiscal year 2017 

Department of Defense appropriations, so I think we want to make 

sure we get down there and do that. 

So I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. We deeply 

appreciate your perspectives, and we will continue the conversation 

about future fleet architecture. 

Thanks again, and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 8, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 8, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To all witnesses—I am concerned that parts of these studies 

seemed to take place without any regard to funding feasibility. Were budgetary realities used as a qualifier across your studies? And what do you recommend, or what 

would you implement, as far as cost-savings measures go so that we are ensuring 

our dollars are spent effectively without having to cut other critical programs across 

the Department as well as the whole of government? 

Admiral WILSON. Each of the studies used their own base assumptions and were 

not directed to be constrained by current year budgetary realities. As we start to 

determine best practices from the study recommendations and other discoveries 

from our wargaming and experimentation exercises then these results will have to 

compete with other Navy programs within the Navy’s TOA. Once we determine 

what our funding levels are then we will balance our acquisition strategy against 

acceptable risk to best meet warfighting demands. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To all witnesses—I am concerned that parts of these studies 

seemed to take place without any regard to funding feasibility. Were budgetary realities used as a qualifier across your studies? And what do you recommend, or what 

would you implement, as far as cost-savings measures go so that we are ensuring 

our dollars are spent effectively without having to cut other critical programs across 

the Department as well as the whole of government? 

Mr. WERCHADO. The NDAA Language did not specify if the architectures were to 

be constrained or unconstrained fiscally. Our original analysis did place due regard 

on funding feasibility. We used current projected funding levels from the actual 

shipbuilding, aircraft and weapons funding account (SCN, APN and WPN) out to 

2030 and then removed that funding, except for COLUMBIA Class SSBN, which 

was considered mandatory to fund. With those three accounts providing an asset, 

we funded our recommended concepts of operation—Distributed Fleet Lethality, 

Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare, and Distributed Agile Logistics. After the 

enablers for warfighting were funded—the sensors, communication systems, and 

weapons—we assembled the manned and unmanned platforms to populate the fleet 

architecture with a focus on fighting a major conflict. Later, when we saw preliminary drafts of MITRE and CSBA’s reports we realized that we need not constrain 

ourselves to accept that much risk, so we went back and added assets to the deterrence/presence force. The Navy FFA leverages emerging technologies and operating 

concepts, including unmanned systems, in accordance with the NDAA direction to 

consider ‘‘opportunities for reduced operation and sustainment costs’’ and the ‘‘role 

of evolving technology on future naval forces, including unmanned systems.’’ 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To all witnesses—I am concerned that parts of these studies 

seemed to take place without any regard to funding feasibility. Were budgetary realities used as a qualifier across your studies? And what do you recommend, or what 

would you implement, as far as cost-savings measures go so that we are ensuring 

our dollars are spent effectively without having to cut other critical programs across 

the Department as well as the whole of government? 

Mr. CLARK. The tasking in the 2017 NDAA required the Navy conduct fleet architecture studies to idenitfy the required size and shape of the future fleet and develop a plan to implement it, including associated costs. The Fleet Architecture 

study conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments did take 

funding into account. We built a shipbuilding plan to describe how the Navy could 

reach the fleet size and mix we recommend. Using models from the Navy and the 

Congressional Budget Office, we developed estimates for the shipbuilding and operations and maintenance costs associated with our shipbuilding plan and fleet architecture. We constrained the implementation of the future fleet by the capacity of the 

shipbuilding industrial base. To account for funding feasibility, we also established 

an upper limit of 20 percent for the increase in the shipbuilding and operations and 

maintenance costs associated iht the proposed fleet architecture. These two limitations resulted in the shipbuilding plan we proposed in our study. We did not incorporate two approaches into our study that the Navy should consider to reduce costs 

associated with growing the fleet. First, the Navy could procure and build ships faster to maintain the shipyards at a more efficient pace. For example the Navy re-
70 

cently reported it could save tens of millions of dollars per ship by building two T– 

AO(X) oilers per year instead of only one. Similarly, Huntington Ingalls Industries 

assesses it could save hundreds of millions of dollars per ship if the Navy purchased 

aircraft carriers (CVN) at three-year intervals, rather than every 5 years as they 

are today. These cost savings result from the shipyard being able to maintain workers on the same job in the shipbuilding process for each ship. If ships are started 

less frequently, workers at the beginning of the shipbuilding process, such as 

shipwrights, will be idle between ships. During that interval they loose proficiency 

and need to be repurposed in other jobs for which they are not as well-trained. The 

other approach the Navy could use ot reduce costs is to expand the number of multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts it uses, even for larger ships not normally bought 

using this method. MYP contracts allow the Navy and shipbuilders to purchase materials and equipment in larger quantities for a group of ships, which normally results in savings of 10 percent or more per ship. The Navy could expand the use of 

MYP contracts to CVNs, amphibious assault ships (LHA/LHD), or the new amphibious transport dock (L(X)R). The Navy could also reduce its shipbuilding costs by 

keeping some ships in service longer to allow new construction to be reduced. For 

example, the Navy’s guided missile cruiser (CG) phased modernization plan will 

keep CGs in the fleet until the 2030s and enable the Navy to reduce guided missile 

destroyer (DDG) construction. Some amphibious landing docks (LSD) that will start 

retiring in the next decade could also be modernized again and retained in active 

service to conduct lower end missions. Although this may not alleviate any new construction of more capable ships, these ships may enable the Navy to fill gaps in the 

current fleet to conduct missions such as training and maritime security. Overall, 

the Navy will need decades to reach the fleet size and mix it needs to address the 

emerging security environment. A larger fleet will cost more to procure and operate 

than today’s fleet. How much more, ihowever, is dependent on how much money the 

government is able to allocate toward this priority. Because the fleet buildup will 

take 20–30 years, there will be ample opportunity for this Congress and Administration, as well as future ones, to adjust the pace of building in concert with the government’s fiscal situation. The most important consideration now is to simply start 

the process of growing and evolving the fleet. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To all witnesses—I am concerned that parts of these studies 

seemed to take place without any regard to funding feasibility. Were budgetary realities used as a qualifier across your studies? And what do you recommend, or what 

would you implement, as far as cost-savings measures go so that we are ensuring 

our dollars are spent effectively without having to cut other critical programs across 

the Department as well as the whole of government? 

Dr. BANERJEE. Budget instability forces the Navy to make acquisition decisions 

that undermine affordability initiatives. By the end of 2016, the national debt will 

be $20 trillion dollars—more than triple what it was on 11 September 2011—and 

for the last four years, the Navy has been operating under reduced top-lines and 

significant shortfalls. There will likely continue to be increasing pressure on the procurement accounts, which in turn threatens the near-term health of the defense industrial base. 

The MITRE study assumed the Navy will receive historical levels of funding and 

will not be subjected to further Budget Control Act or sequestration actions. All cost 

estimates were based on analyses reported by the Congressional Budget Office, with 

rough extrapolations to estimate the cost of the new ship classes proposed. More detailed cost estimating is required for all options recommended by our study. Admiral 

Zumwalt outlined a high-low concept in 1962 that is still relevant today. The only 

means of achieving both effectiveness and capacity, within the constraints of expected budgets, is to build varying amounts of exquisite (i.e., high), capable (i.e., 

moderate), and expendable (i.e., low) platforms. MITRE’s recommendations for the 

numbers, kinds, and sizes of ships leverages this high-medium-low force mix concept, with several focused investments, to deliver a force that is more effective, has 

increased capacity, yet is affordable. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. With a potential greater reliance on unmanned assets and 

networked defense playing a greater role there is a greater risk for cyber intrusion. 

Can you address how the Navy is working to ensure the command and control networks of these assets will be hardened against cyber intrusion while allowing communication with the Joint Force and potentially our allies? 

Admiral WILSON. Navy understands the requirements for resilient communications pathways and the increasing dependence of that resilience on defense in cyber-
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space. Navy continues to architect our systems—from platform sub-components up 

through Fleet Command and Control structures—to provide resilience. Navy’s 

TENTH Fleet has engaged in active defense of our networks to date. In fact, Mr. 

Stackley and the VCNO have signed a Joint Memo recently mandating cyber standards to which all systems will be held accountable. From these experiences, Navy 

has aligned cyber defense of afloat missions, to include hardening of critical platform networks, defending key cyber terrain and the deployment of Service-aligned 

cyber protection teams. To assure mission success of current and planned unmanned 

vehicles, Navy is investing in specifically designed command and control architectures featuring multiple pathways, hardened communication designs and supported 

by cyber hardened platforms linked to active defense capabilities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. With a potential greater reliance on unmanned assets and 

networked defense playing a greater role there is a greater risk for cyber intrusion. 

Can you address how the Navy is working to ensure the command and control networks of these assets will be hardened against cyber intrusion while allowing communication with the Joint Force and potentially our allies? 

Mr. WERCHADO. Within the context of the Future Fleet Architecture, defense of 

unmanned vehicle (UV) command and control (C2) structures and against cyber intrusion are provided through orchestrated investment strategies (Assured C2 and 

Cyber Resiliency). These strategies harness multiple programs of record (PoRs) that 

allow for robust communication pathways to support necessary assets as well as defend our platforms in cyberspace. These strategies capitalize on investments in platform cyber defense to provide networked, automated defense capabilities which will 

permit active cyber defense measures that provide resilience for Navy C2. 

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