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HfRTOFCRIMIN^lAPPEALS SIP 30 2§i5Opinion issued June 30, 2015

In The 

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NO. 01-14-00620-CR
BRODRICKRENALDA FRENCH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


### On Appealfrom the 176th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1394253

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

### Brodrick French was convicted by ajury ofrobbery.1 After finding two enhancement paragraphs to be true, the trial court sentenced him to 27 years'

Tex. PenalCodeAnn. § 29.02 (West 2011) (robbery).confinement. In two issues, French contends that the evidence was legally insufficientto support his conviction.
We affirm. Background N. Rivas stopped at a local gas station and, while standing on the driver's side putting gas into her car, noticed that her passenger door was opening. She walked around the back ofher car and found French reaching into the car to take 

### her purse. She attempted to take the purse back from him, but he was able to pull it from her grasp. According to Rivas, French threw the purse into an open window ofa white car that had pulled up next to her car. He then opened the door to the 

### white car, got in, and told the driver to leave. According to Rivas, the white car's open door struck her as the car was fleeing, and she was injured. French was charged with robbery, described in the indictment as 

### intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing bodily injury to Rivas by hitting her with a car door while in the course ofcommitting theft. He pleaded not guilty. 

### The jury convicted him ofrobbery. French pleaded guilty to two enhancement 

### allegations based on earlierconvictions for murder andpossession of a controlled substance. The trial court found the enhancement allegations to be true and 

### sentenced French to 27 years' confinement. He appealed, challenging the legal sufficiencyofthe evidence to support his conviction.Standard ofReview We review French's challenge to the legal sufficiency ofthe evidence under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We examine all ofthe evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, AA2> U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. Our review includes both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 

### S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Although we consider all evidence presented at trial, we do not reevaluate the weight and credibility ofthe evidence or 

### substitute our judgment for that ofthe factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the 

### credibility ofthe witnesses and ofthe weight given to their testimony, any conflicts

or inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor ofthe verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

### Legal Sufficiency ofEvidence on Causing Bodily Injury 

### A person commits the offense ofrobbery if, "in the course ofcommitting theft," with the intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, a person 

### "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another" or

### "intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear ofimminent bodily injury or death." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02 (West 2011). The indictment specifically alleged that French injured Rivas by striking her with the car door. Consistent with that allegation, Rivas testified that French opened the door ofthe white car and that it hit her before she could get out ofthe way. She also testified that the impact knocked her to the ground, leaving her with scrapes and bruises. French contends that the evidence is legally insufficient on that issue 

### because Rivas's testimony that she was hit by the car door was inconsistent with (1) her original explanation ofthe events, (2) the police report prepared based on 

### her original comments, and (3) all other evidence. According to French, the other evidence suggests that Frenchjumped into an open window and never opened the
white car's door. 

### During Rivas's cross-examination, French's attorney asked Rivas ifshe had 

### previously told the police that Frenchjumped through an open back window inthe white car instead ofopening the door as Rivas was now claiming. Rivas insisted 

### that she told the police the same version of events as she had just described. Nonetheless, one ofthe investigating officer, Houston Police Department Sergeant 

### J. Beddingfield, agreed that Rivas had, at an earlier point, stated that French 

### jumped through an open backwindow. Thesurveillance video did not clearly showeither to be true. The video captured an image ofthe white car next to Rivas's car and, in the next frame, the white car was no longer in view. "The jury is the exclusive judge ofthe credibility ofwitnesses and ofthe weight to be given testimony, and it is also the exclusive province ofthe jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence." Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 111. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to thejury's verdict and deferring to thejury's 

### credibility determinations, we conclude that Rivas's testimony provided legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that French struck Rivas 

### with the car door and injured her, in the course ofcommitting theft, to find him guilty ofrobbery. To the extentthat other evidence contradicted Rivas's testimony, 

### the jury was free to discount that evidence and believe her legally-sufficient trial testimony instead. We overrule French's first issue. 

### Legal Sufficiency ofEvidence ofMental State In his second issue, French contends that the evidence is legally insufficient 

### to establish the requisite intent for conviction because the mental state alleged in the indictment was phrased as "intentionally, knowingly, andrecklessly" while the 

### mental state specified in the jury charge was phrased as "intentionally,knowingly,


### orrecklessly." AccordingtoFrench, thisvariance ismaterial andrequires reversal.When an offense can be committed in more than one way, the indictment may allege alternative methods ofcommitting the offense. Nickerson v. State, 782 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Hough v. State, 929 S.W.2d 484, 489 

### (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, pet. refd). The culpable mental state may be pled in the conjunctive and submitted to the jury in the disjunctive. Cruz v. State, 838 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. refd) ("It is proper to allege the culpable mental states in the conjunctive and to charge the jury in the disjunctive . . . ." (citing Rogers v. State, 11A S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989))); Belcher v. State, 962 S.W.2d 653, 656 n.l (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.); see Zanghetti v. State, 618 S.W.2d 383, 386-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); 

### Knorpp v. State, 645 S.W.2d 892, 904 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1983, no pet.) ("conjunctive pleading of the intentional and knowing mental states . . . will supporttheir disjunctive submission to thejury."). French's reliance on Planter v. State, 9 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), 

### is misplaced. In Planter, the evidence established an offense that was different 

### from the one alleged in the indictment and set out in the jury charge. Id. at 159. The evidence tended to show that the defendant attempted to induce another to pay 

### him to kill a person, but the indictment and jury charge set forth a different scenario in which the defendant attempted to induce another to kill the person himself. Id. The variance resulted in a reversal. Id.Unlike in Planter, the only variance between French's indictment and jury 

### charge was the replacement ofthe conjunctive with the disjunctive with regard to the defendant's mental state. This form of variance is not error. Rogers, 11A S.W.2d at 251; Nickerson, 782 S.W.2d at 891; Cruz, 838 S.W.2d at 684.
We overrule French's second issue. Conclusion Thejudgment ofthe trial court is affirmed.
Harvey Brown Justice Panel consists ofJustices Jennings, Bland, and Brown. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).a? -j I-*Hw w o •35 O a) 

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