FIFTH DI VISI ON March 19, 2010

No. 1-06-2007

In re JESSICA M., a Minor ) Appeal from the (The Peo ple of the State of I llinois, ) Circuit Court of

) Co ok Co un ty. Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) Jessica M., a Minor, ) Honorab le ) No re en M. Da ly, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presi ding.

PRESID ING

JUSTICE

TOOMI N deliver ed the opi nion of the

court: Following a hearing, the re spondent, Jessica M., was adjudicated delinquent for the offense of aggr

avated battery . On appeal, respondent asserts that: (1) the State failed to prove her delinquent bey

ond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erre d in refusing to allow reputation testimony about the victim; (3) the court er red in finding her guilty

on two counts of aggravated battery, in violation of the one- act, one-crime rule; (4) her sentenc e of probation must be modified t

o end on he

r twenty -first bi rthday ; and (5)the manda tory DNA statu

te is unconstitutional as violative of respondent’s fourth amendment rights and privac y rights unde

r the Illinois Constitution. In our original opinion, we a ffirmed respondent’s adjudication of delinquency , but modified the terms of her sentence of probation. In re Jessica M. , 385 Ill. App. 3d 894, 897 N.E.2d 81 0 (2008). On Novemb er 25, 20 09, pursuant to its su pervisor y a uthority , the I llinois Supreme Court directed this court to vacate its order in In re Jessica M. , 385 Ill. App. 3d 894,1-06-2007

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897 N.E.2d 810 (2008), and reconsider its decision in light of In re Samantha V. , 234 Ill. 2d 359, 917 N.E.2d 487 (2009), to determine if a different result is war ranted. In re Jessica M. , 234 I ll. 2d 522, 917 N.E.2d 526 (2009). As directed by

our supreme court, we vacate our Oc tober 17, 2008, opinion and now

re ma nd th e m at te r t o t he ci rc ui t c ou rt wi th di re ct io ns to va ca te on e f in di ng of de li nq ue nc y, correct the “Trial Order,” and modify responde

nt’s term of probation. BACKGROUND The amended petition for adjudication of wardship of Jessica M. stemmed from her alleged beating of Rosalinda Rodrig uez at 3011 South Farrell, in Chicago, on the night of June 10, 2005. The evidence presented at the adjudica tion hearing established that between 11 and 11:30 p.m., responde

nt and fiv e other g

irls wer e walking down South F arrell St

reet. The girls , who were unusually

loud, stopped by the ga

te to the backya

rd of Rosalinda’s home. Rosalinda, a college student, was at home with her two y ounger sisters when she heard the noise. Rosalinda then looked out the kitchen window into the backy ard and saw six girls standing at the edge of her property . She recognized all the girls, including re spondent, from the neighborhood. Rosalinda walked out of her house and through her ba ckyard a nd out the gate to ask them why there were there. She locked the g ate from the outside behind her, so that the girls could not come into the yard a

nd so her dog would not get out. At that time, the victim was 19 y ears old, and 5-feet-7-inches tall and weig hed 140 pounds. Once Rosalinda was outside the gate, she hea rd respondent mumble something, so she approached respondent to ask her what she had said. According to Rosalinda, respondent then1-06-2007

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punched her in the face with her closed f ist. Rosalinda reacted by punching her back in the face with her fist, and then backed away as respondent closed in on her, pinning Rosalinda aga inst the backya rd fence. Rosalinda ran into the street, where the other girls surrounded her and “c heered on” respondent as she punched Rosalinda in the face a gain with her closed fist. Rosalinda testified that although she tried to back away , she slipped on the curb and fell down on the street. Respondent got on top of Rosalinda and attempted to gouge out he r eyes. Rosalinda r

esisted by twisting her body a

nd moving her head, so respondent gra bbed Rosalinda’s hair and slammed her head against the pavement more than thre e times. Rosalinda managed to push respondent off and started to g et up but respondent then struck her across the face with what she believed was a bottle handed to respondent by one of the other girls. She fell backwards on the ce ment and momentarily lost consciousness. When Rosalinda opened her ey

es, respondent was once aga in on top of her, punching her in the head, while the other girls were kicking he r. She then felt someone pull her and respondent apart. Rosalinda testified that during the attack, she hit respondent back be tween three and five times. Rosalinda’s 12-yea

r-old sister, Priscilla, testified that she ran out of the house when she saw Rosal inda bein

g attac ked and tr

ied to push

responde nt off of her, but one of the

other g irls, Candace A., hit Pris cilla with

a shoe. Although P riscilla initially testifie d that the

girls we re in the backya

rd, she clarified on cross-examination that they were on the sidewalk at the gate to the backya rd. In turn, the victim’s brother, Esvelda, a nd Mike Palamino, a deputy sherif f who lived down the block, both arrived on the scene and pulled the girls apart. When Rosalinda got back1-06-2007

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on her feet, she “blacked out” ag ain and then felt blood on her face. L ater, Rosalinda’s mother accompanied her to L oyola Hospital, where upon admission into the trauma unit, CAT scans and MRI tests were perfor

med. Rosalinda stayed at L oyola Hospital for one da y and rec eived a total of nine stitches on her face, some under her right eyebrow and some on the left side of her chin. Rosalinda’s mother photographed her injuries at the hospital, two of which we re admitted at trial.

Rosalinda filed a police report several day s after the attack; however, she did not tell the reporting officer that there was glass in the street near the g ate to her backy ard that had been broken o ver her

head. Th e State f

iled a petition for

adjudica tion of de linquency a

gainst respondent and later filed an amended petition adding an additional count of aggrava ted battery. At the close of the State’s case, respondent moved for a directed finding, which the court denied. Respondent’s neighbor, Emmanuel Fabela, a ppeared as a witness on respondent’s behalf. Fabela testified that at about 9:30 on the night of the incident he wa s on his front porch smoking a cigarette when he saw

a group of about five girls, including respondent, walking together down Farrell street, talking unusually loudly. They

stopped three houses down from him, at which point the tallest of the girls, whom he identified in court as respondent, started to y ell. Then, accord ing to F abela, a

girl ca me out from the house , jumped over the g ate, and came up t

o respondent. Fabela claimed that the g irl who came out, whom he never identified, got within five inches of respondent’s face and pushed he r. Then the two girls started fighting, f irst trading blows on their feet, and then rolling around on the street. The fight lasted about two minutes and ended when the girls were sepa rated by De

puty Palamino and a male who c ame out from the1-06-2007

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house. According to Fabela, no one hit the girl from the house on the head with a bottle, bange d her head against the curb, or kic ked her when she was on the ground. Under cross-exa

mination, F abela ma

intained that he di d not know t

he rela tives, pa rents, or friends of any

of the respondents. However, Fabela acknowledged that the father of one of the other g irls who w as char

ged put him in touch

with resp ondent’s

counsel. Fabela

spoke with counsel on the tele

phone, th en in per son, and a lso confe rred wit h an inves tigator

from the p

ublic defender’s office, who repr esented other respondents. However, F abela did not speak with any of the investigators or attorney s from the State’s Attorney ’s office who attempted to interview him, nor did he speak with an assistant State’s Attorney who approached him before he testified at trial. Respondent also testified on her own behalf. According to respondent, she was walking to her g randmoth er’s hou se with fo ur girl s. Two of t

he girl s in the g

roup of si x were not a

ctually with her. The girls were talking a mongst themselves and upon approaching Rosalinda’s house, she heard Rosalinda say , “What did you say ? Can you say

it to my face?” Respondent then stopped, at which point Rosalinda jumped over the gate and came up to respondent, causing her to move back about two feet. Rosalinda again stated, “ Say it to my face.” Respondent asked, “Say what?” and Rosalinda then pushed her backwards. Respondent stumbled back and they started to fight, falling to the ground at some point and the n rolling around. Respondent testified that Rosalinda hit her multiple times. Respondent admitted that she also struck the victim, but never with a bottle, and she never bang ed Rosalinda’s head against the gr ound, nor did anyone kick her.1-06-2007

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Respondent testified that after the fight, she had scra tch marks and bruises on her body from the victim’s punches and scratches, and abra sions on her knees and elbows from rolling around. She neve

r sough t medical treatme nt for he r injurie s, nor did she conta ct the pol ice to report that Rosalinda had beaten her. Respondent’s g randmother took pictures of her injuries about a week after the incident, and they were admitted at trial. Rosalinda admitted that the photographs depicted injuries that included wounds caused by her fists. Two repu tation witnesses al so testifi ed on beh alf of re spondent, Jack Wilson a nd Suzie Jimenez, neither of whom was present when the incident happened. Wilson, a vice president of a local small truck parts distributing company , lived in the neighborhood for 36 y ears and had known respondent for about 7 y ears. Wilson testified that he is a good friend of respondent’s family . Responde

nt was Wilso

n’s daug hter’s c ounselor

at the Be ttenhouse Community Settlement for two yea

rs, where respondent supervised around 20 to 25 childre n from Bridgeport. Wilson testified that, based on conversations with his daughter and others, respondent wa s known in the community as a truthful and pe aceful person. Jimenez was a real estate broker and also worked as a n organizer for Chicago Alterna tive Policing Strategy

(CAPS). Jimenez became familiar with respondent through her work. Jimenez testified that, based on her conversations with various members of the c ommunity with whom she dealt as a CAPS organizer, respondent’s reputation for peacefulness and truthfulness was good. Defense counsel then asked Jimenez whether she was aware of Rosalinda’s reputation for peacef ulness thr ough he r contacts as a CAPS c ommunity organ izer, whe reupon the State objected, based on a lack of foundation. The trial cour t sustained the objection, ruling that1-06-2007

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defense counsel failed to lay the proper foundation for such testimony . When defense counsel again a ttempted t

o elicit th e reputa

tion testimony, this time ba sed on he r “exper ience a s a resident of that community,” a s well as her experience as a CAPS community organizer, the trial court again sustained the foundation objection. I n an offer of proof, defense c ounsel represented that if allowed, Jimenez would have testified that Rosalinda’s reputation in the community for peacefulness and truthfulness was not good. The tri al c our t fo und res pon den t d eli nqu ent on b ot h co unt s of aggr ava ted bat ter y. In reachi ng its de cision, th e court n oted that it had con sidered

all of the evidenc e, and re

viewed a ll of the testimony and arg

uments of the parties, as well as the case law and a pplicable statutes submitted by de fense c ounsel. T he court specific ally

found tha

t respond ent was not justifie d in her use of excessive force, even if one assumed that Rosalinda was the initial aggressor, as the response by r

espondent was unreasonable. The court found that r espondent’s continued attacks when she was no longer in any reasonable danger, and the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries, negated her claim of self-de fense. The State also filed petitions against respondent’s minor friends alleg ing aggrava

ted battery that we

re adjudicated in separate but simultaneous hearing s. The trial court acquitted one of the other girls based on her alibi defense , but found the remaining five girls also delinquent based on the agg ravate d batter

y of Rosalinda . The cou

rt senten ced res pondent to

five y ears’ probation, commencing on May 4, 2006, and ordered her to submit a saliva sample for DNA indexing under the controlling statute. ANA LYSIS1-06-2007

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of the Evidence Respondent argues that she was not proven g uilty bey ond a reasonable doubt of aggravated batter

y, beca use the trial court ignored Fabela ’s testimony and rejec ted her claim of self-de fense. On review , the appl icable s tandard is whethe

r the dec ision of the

trial cou rt is agains t the manif

est weig ht of the e

vidence . We must determine, after viewing the evide nce in the light most favorable to the State, whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the elements of the offense were prove n beyond a re asonable doubt. Jackson v. Virgini

a , 443 U.S. 307, 318, , 61 L. E d. 2d 560, 5 73, 99 S. Ct. 2 781, 2788- 89 (1979) ; People v. Pollock , 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217, 780 N.E.2d 669, 685 (2002). To properly raise a claim of self-defense, ther e must be evidenc e of eac

h of the f ollowing elements : “(1) tha

t unlawfu l force was thre atened a

gainst a person; (2) that the person threatened was not the a ggressor; (3) that the dang er of harm was imminent; (4) that the use of force was necessar y; (5) that the person threatened actually and subjectively believed a

danger existed that required the use of forc e applied; and (6) the beliefs of the person threatened were objectively reasona ble.” People v. Lee , 213 Ill. 2d 218, 224-25, 821 N.E.2d 307, 311 (2004). See also 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 2004). A trier of fact is “not obligated to accept a defendant’s claim of self- defense,” but instead must consider the probability or improbability of the testimony , the surrounding circumstances, and the testimony of other witnesses. People v. Rodriguez , 336 Ill. App. 3d 1, 15, 782 N.E.2d 718, 729 (2002). Respondent argues that the trial court erre d when it “ignored” the testimony of her neighbor Emmanuel Fabela. Howe ver, as the record reflects, the trial court expressly stated that it had considered all of the evidence in reac hing its finding of delinquency . Moreover, the court1-06-2007

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sp ec if ic al ly i de nt if

ie d p or ti on s o f F ab el a’ s t es ti mo ny t ha t c or ro bo ra te d o th er ev id en ce , n am el y, that the girls were unusually loud for the time and location and that they had stopped and congregated behind the vic tim’s property. Howe

ver, the court specifically stated that it did not find cre dible Fa

bela’s te stimony

that the victim pushe d respond ent first . Thus, the

record clearly contradicts respondent’s claim that the trial court “ignor ed” Fabela’s testimony

. In rejecting

respondent’s claim of self-defense, the trial c ourt relied, inter alia, on People v. Balfour , 148 Ill. App. 3d 215, 498 N.E.2d 547 (1986). I n Balfour , as in the instant case, the defendant claimed the victim initiated the fight. Nonetheless, entitlement to self-de fense was negated by

evidence showing that the defendant then pr oceeded to beat the victim to death by kicking and stomping on him after he was ly ing unconscious on the ground. Balfour , 148 I ll. App. 3d at 222-23, 498 N.E.2d at 553-54. However, in the instant case, the c ourt found that while Rosa

linda may have be en up clos e to resp ondent, she was not the agg ressor, and that b oth Rosalinda’s and respondent’s own testimony supported that finding. The trial court found that respondent punched first, and the attack rapidly escalated from there. Moreover, the court further reasoned that “even assuming arg uendo” that Rosalinda shoved respondent first, any claim of self-defense could not be “reasona bly raised” in lig

ht of the severity of

the beating of Rosalinda, and that respondent’s continued attacks were objec tively unreasona

ble and constituted excessive use of force, thereby

negating one of the nece ssary eleme nts of self-defense. We conclude from our review of the record that the seve rity of Rosalinda’s injuries, contra sted with the few abrasions respon

dent susta ined, man ifestly supports t

he trial c ourt’s fi

nding tha t respond ent’s use of force was unreasonable a nd excessive, thus warranting rejection of her c laim of self-defense.1-06-2007

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We further find that respondent’s reliance on People v . Bowie , 36 Ill. App. 3d 177, 343 N.E.2d 713 (1976), and People v . Mitche ll , 152 I ll. 2d 274, 6 04 N.E.2d 877 (1992 ), is entir

ely misplace d, as the r

ecord in the instan

t case c learly

demonstr

ates tha t the tria l court c onsidere d all the evidence in making its credibility determinations. The court’s decision to believe Rosalinda’s account of the attack, rather than r espondent’s, is virtually unassailable on a ppeal. People v. Titone , 115 Ill. 2d 413, 422, 505 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1986) (“I t is peculiarly the prerogative of the trier of fa ct to judge the credibility

of witnesses”). This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions involving the credibility of witnesses. People v. Coleman , 301 Ill. App. 3d 37, 42, 704 N.E.2d 690, 694 (1998). Respondent has not met her burden to show that no rational trier of fact could ha ve found that the elements of the offense were proven bey ond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, w e will not disturb the judgment of the trial court. II . Exclusion of Evidence of Rosalinda’s Reputaion Respondent next contends that the trial court erred when it sustained the State’s foundation objection, thereby preventing defense counsel fr om eliciting testimony conce rning the violent character of the victim. On review, a tria l court’s decision concerning the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a c lear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the defendant. People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56, 463 N.E.2d 696, 702 (1984). I n meeting that standard, it is incumbent upon the complaining party to demonstrate that the trial court’s determination was

“arbitr ary , fancif

ul, or unr easonab le,” or “

where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by

the trial court.” People v. Donoho , 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182, 788 N.E.2d1-06-2007

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707, 721 (2003). Genera lly, charac

ter evid ence re gardin

g a vict im’s prope

nsity for viole nce is ad missible when self-defense is interposed to show that the victim was the aggressor or where there are conflicting accounts about what happened. People v. Lynch , 104 Ill. 2d 194, 199-200, 470 N.E.2d 10 18 (1984) ; In re D.N. , 178 Ill. App. 3d 470, 474-75, 533 N.E.2d 84 (1988). Proper foundati on for re

putation te stimony

is establi shed whe

n the witne ss is shown t

o have “ adequa

te knowledge of the person queried a bout” and the evidence of reputation is “based upon c ontact with the subject’s neighbors and associates rather than upon the personal opinion of the witness. [Citations.]” People v

. Moretti , 6 Ill. 2d 494, 523-24, 129 N.E.2d 709, 725 (1955). Here, the court specifically stated that its ground for excluding this evidence was base d on the fa ct that Jimenez’s knowledge c ame sole ly th rough h er position as a CAPS organize r: “Counsel , I don’t know w here y ou are g oing with

this line [of

questioni ng] with respect to her position in the CAPS division. And this court is familiar with respect to the CAPS volunteers. I don’t know how you are e ver going to get into this line of questioning in that reputa tion unless you are going to on this wi

tness set s pecific , somewha

t specifi c founda

tion, but it i s not goin

g to come in on this basis.” Then def ense cou nsel once more atte mpted to e licit the r

eputatio n testimony

, this time based on her “expe

rience as a res ident of that commun ity, ” as well

as her experienc e as a CAPS community orga

nizer. Again, however, the recor d fails to reflect that a satisfactory foundation was la id; t hat J imene z’s p urpor ted kn owled ge of Ro salin da’s ch aracte r was t hrough1-06-2007

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conversations with either her neighbors or a ssociates. As noted, the deci sion of wh ether a witness is

sufficie ntly qualifie d to testif

y a s to reputation rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and a reviewing court will not disturb it absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Clauson , 261 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377, 633 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1994). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony

where it was based on discussions with half a dozen unidentified members of the commu

nity through the witne ss’s role

as a CAPS or

ganizer , and no e

vidence was offe red to show that the proffered reputation testimony was based on contact with individuals who were Rosalinda’s neighbors and associates. The offer of proof was similarly inadequate to show that the testimony would ha ve been admissible . An offe

r of proo f rega

rding th e reputa

tion testimony s ought to b e admitte d would include t he found ation pre requisite to the adm

ission of su

ch evide nce at tr ial ( Clauson , 261 I ll. App. 3d at

377, 633 N .E.2d at 9 18), but he re the of fer did n ot addre ss whethe

r any of the pe ople Jimenez spoke

with in the

“communi

ty” were e ither Rosa

linda’s n eighbo rs or ass ociates . This crucial missing link to the victim undermined the requisite foundation for such evidence

. Moreover, the record also supports the State’s asser tion that the reputation evidence was properly e

xcluded because the trial court rejected responde nt’s claim of self-defense, thereby rendering any

testimony as to Rosalinda’s reputation for pe acefulness irrelevant. See In re D.N. , 178 Ill. App. 3d 470, 475-76, 533 N.E.2d 84, 88 ( 1988). Given the trial court’s finding of excessive force, we hold that the court’s ruling wa s reasonable. Therefore, we affirm the tria l court’s ruling excluding Jimenez’s proffered chara cter1-06-2007

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evidence regarding

Rosalinda. III. Application of the One-Ac t, One-Crime Rule in Juvenile Cases Responde nt submits th at the tri al court erred i n adjudic ating he

r delinquent on two

counts of agg ravate d batter

y w here bot h counts w ere bas ed on a sin gle ac t. In t he instan t case, t he State charged respondent with two counts of ag gravated battery

based upon sections 12-4(a) and 12- 4(b)(8) of the Criminal Code of 1961. (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), (b)(8) (West 2004). Count I alleged that resp ondent ca

used gr eat bodil y ha rm to Rosal inda by

striking her in the

head mult

iple times , causing a laceration that require d stitches, whereas count II alleged that she struck Rosalinda multiple times, causing lacerations to her face a nd body, while Rosalinda was on a public way. Because the State charg ed respondent with the same conduct under differe nt theories of culpability, she arg

ues that under the King

doctrine multiple adjudications cannot stand. People v. King , 66 Ill. 2d 551, 559-66, 363 N.E.2d 838, 841-44 (1977). See a lso People v. Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335, 342-44, 788 N.E.2d 1117, 1121-22 (2001). The State initially argue s that res

pondent h as waive d this arg ument on a

ppeal by failing to raise this issue orally bef

ore the trial court or in her posttrial motion. However, the rule of waiver o perate s as a limita

tion on the

parties a nd not as a

limitation on the juris diction of this

court. In re W

.C. , 167 Ill . 2d 30 7, 323 , 657 N .E.2d 908, 9 17 (19 95), c itin g In re C.R.H. , 163 I ll. 2d 263, 644 N.E.2d 1153 (1994). Notwithstanding respondent’s forfeiture of this claim, in the interest of justice we choose to address this issue. As the issue presents a question of law , our review i s de novo

. The State subm

its that the

one-act, one-crime rule

does not a

pply to juvenile

procee dings,1-06-2007

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which are “distinct and different from a c riminal prosecution.” In re C.J. , 328 Ill. App. 3d 103, 111, 7 64 N.E .2d 11 53, 11 59 (20 02), q uoti ng People v . Woo druff

, 88 Ill. 2d 10, 18-19, 430 N.E.2d 1120 (1981). The State posits that

under the Juvenile Cou

rt Act of 1987 (705 IL CS 405/1-1 et seq . (West 2004)), “juvenile offenders are not cr iminals; proceedings under the Act

are not c riminal pr osecutions; adjudi cations u nder the Act are not convic

tions and a

minor so adjudicated does not suffer the consequence s of a criminal conviction.” Wood ruff , 88 Ill. 2d at 19, 430 N.E.2d at 1124. We reject the State’s argument. I n People v

. Artis , 232 Ill. 2d 156, 902 N.E.2d 677 (2009), decided after our orig inal opinion was issued, our supreme court declared that the oneact, one-crime rule does indeed apply in juvenile proceedings. I n Artis , the court recognized that the protections afforded to defendants by the one-act, one-crime rule are integral to maintaining the integrity of

the judicial process. Artis , 232 Ill. 2d at 168, 902 N.E.2d at 684-85. I n In re Samantha V. , the court reaffirmed its holding in Artis , finding that the tr

ial cour t violated the rule where, as here, it found respondent g uilty of both counts of ag gravated battery based upon the same act and failed to merge the c ounts or otherwise indicate on the record that respondent’s adjudication of delinquency was based on only one

count of aggravate d battery. In re Samantha V. , 234 Ill. 2d at 378, 917 N.E.2d at 499. Consistent with Artis and In re Samantha V. , and as directed by our supreme court’s supervisory orde

r, we agree that under the one-act, one-crime rule, one of the f indings of delinquency e

ntered against respondent should be vaca ted. Specifically, r

espondent should be sentenced on the most serious offense and the less serious offe nse should be vacated. Artis , 2321-06-2007

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Ill. 2d at 170, 902 N.E.2d at 686. I n determining which offense is the most serious, a review ing court should consider the plain language of the statutes, as common sense dictates that the legislature would prescribe gr eater punishment for the offense it deems the more se rious. Artis , 232 Ill. 2d at 170, 902 N.E.2d at 686. I f the punishments are identical, we then consider which offense has the most culpable mental state. In re Samantha V. , 234 Ill. 2d at 379, 917 N.E.2d at 500. In the instant case aggravated battery that causes great bodily

harm (720 IL CS 5/12-4(a) (West 2004)) and aggrava ted battery on a

public way (720 I

LCS 5/12-4(b)(8) (West 2004)) are both Class 3 felonies, which require that the offender ac t intentionally and knowingly when committing the offense. Because we are unable to determine which offense is more serious, we must remand the matter to the trial court for that determination. In re Samantha V. , 234 Ill. 2d at 379-80, 917 N.E.2d at 500. On remand, we direct the trial court to corre ct the “Trial Order,” which indicates that respondent has been found guilty as to counts I and I

I. We note that the “Sentencing Order,” making respondent a ward of the cour t, and the “Probation Order,” detailing the terms of he r sentence, do not list the offenses for which she was found g uilty and, therefor

e, do not require modification. IV. Modification of Term of Proba tion The parties agree that re spondent’s term of probation should be modified to terminate on respondent’s twenty -first birthday, which is on June 20, 2010. The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides that all proceedings under the Act ter minate automatically whe n the minor attains the01-06-2007

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age of 21 y

ears. 705 IL CS 405/5-755 (West 2004). See also In re Jaime P. , 223 Ill. 2d 526, 539- 40, 861 N.E.2d 958, 966 (2006) (the plain intent of the legislature was to set the a ge of 21 as the maximum term

for dispo sition, with

the limited

exception

of extende d jurisdiction juven ile prosecu tions). Th erefor

e, under the clea r mandat e of the l egisla

ture’s provisions

in the Juven

ile Court Act, as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Jaime P. , we modify respondent’s term of probation to terminate on June 20, 2010.

V. Constitu

tionality of the Popu

lation Stat

istics Da tabase Finally, responde

nt argues that section 5-4-3(f) of the U nified Code of Corrections (730 IL CS 5/5-4-3(f) (West 2004)), the DNA indexing statute, is unconstitutional on the following ground s: violation of her f ederal and state constituti onal rig

ht to be fr ee from unreasonable searches and seizures; violation of privacy rights under the Illinois Constitution because minors are entitled to greater privac y rights than a

dults (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6) ; and additional privacy intrusions

resulting from the c

reation of a popu

lation sta tistics da tabase a ccessin g high ly personal genetic information. Notably, howeve r, the recent Illinois Supreme Court dec ision In re Lakisha M. , 227 I ll. 2d 259, 8 82 N.E.2d 570 (2008 ), is pre cisely

on point, a s there the Ill inois Supreme Court clearly

and succinctly r

ejected all of these arguments except the last one. Respondent acknowledges the holding of Lakisha M. in her reply br ief, but stands on her opening brief, thus leaving unresolved the issue of the constitutionality of the provision promulg ating th e crea

tion of a “

population statistic s databa se.” The Illinois Supreme Court in Lakisha M. was presented with “as applied” fourth amendme nt and privacy c

hallenges to the statutory provision for the population statistics database , which it rejected. Here, we are01-06-2007

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presented with a facial constitutional challenge to the provision under the privacy rights of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. In this case, respondent cle arly ar gues that the population statistics database provision is unconstitutional generally , and she does not limit her argument to unconstitutionality as a pplied to her as a minor or as a nonsexual offender. Thus, the constituti onality

of the pr ovision for the use

of gen etic mar

ker gr ouping a naly sis information in the population statistics database presents a justiciable issue, and respondent’s constitutional challenge to the face of the statute is ripe for consideration by this court. Since the constituti onality

of a statu te prese nts a ques tion of law , our rev iew is de novo

. People v . Garvin , 219 Ill . 2d 10 4, 116 , 847 N .E.2d 82, 89 (2006 ), cit ing People v. Wilson , 214 Ill. 2 d 394, 399, 827 N.E.2 d 416 (200 5). To suc cessful ly c halleng e a statu

tory provision

on its face, respondent “must fulfill the difficult task of establishing the statute’ s invalidity under any set of facts.” (Emphasis in original.) Garvin , 219 Ill . 2d at 117, 8 47 N.E .2d at 89, ci ting People v. Greco , 204 Ill. 2d 400, 407, 790 N.E.2d 846 (2003). Theref ore, we must begin with the presumption that section 5-4-3 is constitutional, and we are constrained to construe this section as constitutional “whenever reasonably possible.” Garvin , 219 Ill. 2d at 116, 847 N.E.2d at 89, citi ng Wilson , 214 Ill. 2d at 398-99, 827 N.E.2d 416. As the challeng er in this case, respondent bears the heavy

burden of demonstrating a clear c onstitutional violation. Garvin , 219 Ill. 2d at 116, 8 47 N.E .2d at 89, ci ting Wilson , 214 Ill. 2d at 399, 827 N.E.2d 416. Respondent asserts that the use of genetic marke r grouping analy

sis for a “population statistics database” under section 5-4-3(f)(iii) ra ises Illinois constitutional privacy concerns because that phra se is unde fined. Moreover , she cla ims the sta

tute “ap pears to allow the State to01-06-2007

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statistically chart personal genetic information” obtained from offe nders’ DNA to “determine the characteristics most often attributed to offenders” a nd is “seemingly

allowing behavioral researc h on possible genetic links between race, g ender, genetic-based be havioral disorders, or phy sical characteristics and certain ty pes of criminal behavior.” Responde nt’s arg ument cle arly

misappre hends the very nature o f the information that is included in the database, as well the legitimate use of the information it contains

. As will be demonstr ated, the geneti c marke

rs that ar e analy zed and ma

intained within the

databas e simply do not contain the type of g enetic information assailed by respondent. A cursory r

eview of the widely accept ed and c ommonly

understo od theory

and tech nology of DNA pr

ofiling will serv e to dispel respondent’s misconceptions. Additionally, an a nalysis of the enac

tment and the statutory scheme will reveal the legislative intent relative to re spondent’s facial constitutional challenge. DNA is composed of the familiar double-helix strand of nucleotide base pairs whic h form the sugar-phosphate “double ladder” backbone of the DNA on a chromosome. Chromosomes are found in the nucleus of a cell. However, within DNA, there are “c oding” sections of base pairs that are the “ge nes,” an d “intron s” or inte

rvening sequenc es that do

not code f

or any human tra

its or characteristics, sometimes referre d to as “junk” DNA. J. Butler , Foren sic DN A Typing: Biology & Technology

Behind STR Markers 13-17 (2001). Marker s used for human ide

ntity testing are found in the DNA either betwe en the genes or within genes a nd simply do not code for genetic variation. The location of “ markers” in these highly

polymorphic or varia

ble regions is called a “locus” (plural “loci”), and a variant of the DNA sequence at a g iven locus on a chromosome is called an “allele.” J. Bu tler, Forens ic DNA Typing: Bi ology & Tech nolo gy01-06-2007

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Behind STR Markers 13-17 (2001). In its earliest form, DNA for ensic technology

focused upon those parts of the DNA molecule where there is a significa nt variation of base pair patterns. People v. Miller , 173 Ill. 2d 167, 184-85, 670 N.E.2d 721, 730 (1996). Identified a nd denominated “Variable Numbers of Tandem Repeats” (VNTRs), these area s of DNA are particularly convenient as markers for forensic identification because they contain a very

large number of tandem repe at units of differing base pair leng

ths. National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DN A Evidence 14 (1996). The VNTRs themselves are not genes, as they do not code for any particular human characteristic or tra it. Rather, they are

noncoding regions that produce no product and have no known effect on the per son other than for forensic identification determination. National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic D NA Evidence 14 (1996). Over the

ye ars, the

technolo gy

evolved a

nd now foc

uses on a c lass of po lymorphisms in DNA cal led “Shor

t Tandem R

epeats” (STRs), wh

ich are even sho rter in ba se pair le ngth. STRs are readily

amplified by a proc ess known as “polymer ase chain reaction” (PCR) technology . The number of repeats in STR markers can be hig hly variable a

mong individuals which makes them parti cularl y desirab le for ident ifica tion determ inati ons. S ee J. Butle r, Fore nsic D NA Typing: Biology & Technology

Behind STR Markers 53 (2001). Like VNTRs, the current tec hnology of STRs also focuses upon the small noncoding regions of the DNA molec ule, or the “junk” DNA. The number of repeats of a specific STR sequence present at a given locus, combined ove r a designa ted numbe

r of loci, create s a unique DNA “pr ofile” o f an individual. J. Bu tler, Forensic01-06-2007

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DNA Typing : Biology &

Technology

Behind STR Markers 18 (2001). From its inception, DNA profiling or testing has involved two distinct procedur es or analy ses. The first pro cedure

is biolog ical and

goes toward iden

tification to deter

mine if the

re is a “match,” a laboratory

determination that the suspect cannot be excluded as the source of genetic material found at the crime sc ene or on the victim. See People v. Watson , 257 Ill. App. 3d 915, 930, 689 N.E.2d 634, 637 (1994), aff’d on appeal after remand, 214 Ill. 2d 271, 825 N.E.2d 257 (2005). The second procedure, gr ounded in population genetic statistics, is employe d only in the event of a nonexclusion utilizing a database to calculate the probability of a random “match.” As the court in Watson explained, this analysis gene rates a statistical likelihood that an unrelated person chosen at random from a particular popula tion could have the same DNA “profile” as the suspect. Watson , 257 Ill. App. 3d at 918-19, 629 N.E.2d at 637. At the time Watson was decided , the method of cal culating these sta tistical probabilit

ies had no t ye

t been g eneral ly accepted in the relevant scientific community . Since then, however, the I llinois Supreme Court has held t hat the me

thodolog y a t issue (th e “produ

ct rule” ) in proba

bility statistics had bec ome generally accepted by

experts and courts and accordingly is admissible. Miller , 173 Ill. 2d at 188-89, 670 N.E.2d at 731. Population statistics databases have thus been employ ed as a valuable tool in the development of DNA profiling to establish the likelihood or probability of a “match” in a way that is meaningful as well as understandable to the trier of fact. Early

on, in People v. Miles , 217 Ill. App. 3d 393, 404-05, 577 N.E.2d 477, 484-85 (1991), the c ourt upheld the admissibility of01-06-2007

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DNA forensic testing procedure s as well as the use of a database to determine the sta tistical probability of a “ma

tch.” The defendant’s DNA was matche d to samples from the crime scene, and then compared to information from the Cellmark laboratory ’s database to determine the likelihood of a random match to any other African-American in the community

. Miles , 217 I ll. App. 3d at 404-05, 577 N.E.2d at 484-85. Interest ingly, st atist ical p robab ilit y project ions actual ly predat e DNA pr ofili ng, particularly w

ith regard to serology

testing. In People v. Contreras , 246 Ill. App. 3d 502, 508, 615 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (1993), a forensic gene ticist testified that electrophoresis testing on samples taken from the defendant revea led a rare genetic va

riant that was likewise present in the crime scene evidence. I

n turn, population statistics databases were used to determine the frequency with which the variant occurred in the male Mexican-Amer ican population, of which the defendant was a part. The court upheld the admission of this testimony based on the threshold reliability of the population statistics database s. Contreras , 246 Ill. App. 3d at 511, 615 N.E.2d at 1268. The use of population statistics databases thus evolved out of the necessity to estimate the random ma

tch proba bility of a possi

ble sourc e of a DN

A profile occurr ing withi n the appr

opriate reference population. As the Illinois Supreme Court recognized in Miller : “For a match to be meaning ful, a sta

tistical a naly sis is requ

ired. The statistica l analy sis deter mines the f

requenc y in which a match would occur in a database population.” Miller , 173 Ill. 2d at 185, 670 N.E.2d at 730. The i dentity

of the oth er prof

iles in the databas e is of no s ignific ance in c alculati ng these random statistical probabilities.01-06-2007

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In 19 89, a wo rki ng gr oup spo nso red by th e Fe der al B ure au o f Inv est iga ti ons (FB I) laboratory pr

ovided the framework for a combined DNA I ndex System among crime labor atories to share DNA profiles, much like the fingerpr int matching system. Ther eafter, the DNA Identification Act of 1994 forma lly authorized the FB I to maintain the Combined DNA I ndex Syst em (CODI S) with inpu

t of DNA profiles f

rom loca l, state a nd nationa

l levels . All thre e levels contain the convicted offender and ca sework indexes and the population data file. There are now 13 STR lo ci that are anal yzed by the FBI and used for comparison of unknown profiles obtained from cri me scene evidenc e with the

known pro files in th e databa se. Aga in, these marker s “are i

n the non-c oding re gions of the DNA a

nd are no t known to h ave any associa tion with a

geneti c di se as e o r a ny o th er ge ne ti c p re di sp os it io n. ” J . B ut le r, Fo re ns ic DN A T ypi ng : B io lo gy & Technology

Behind STR Markers, 241-45 (2001). In the CODI S system, the profiles consist of a specimen identifier that reference s the originating forensic laboratory , together with the number of tande m repea ts for ea ch of the alleles c omprising

the 13 STR lo ci. CODI S does not c ontain any persona l identity informat ion, such a s names, d

ates of b irth, or so cial sec urity numbers. J. Butler, Forensic DNA Ty ping: Biology

& Technology

Behind STR Markers 242 (2001).

In I llinois, through subsequent enactments, our legislature has re cognized the distinction between the two procedures of biologic al testing of the sample and calculating the sta tistical probabil ity o f a rand

om match. Section 11 6-3(a)of the Cod e of Crimin

al Proce dure (72 5 IL CS 5/116-3( a) (West 2 004)) pr ovides tha

t: “A defendant may

make a motion before the trial court that entered the judg ment of conviction in his or her case for the perfor mance of fingerprint or fore nsic DNA01-06-2007

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testing, including comparison analy sis of genetic marker gr

oupings of the evidence collected by c

riminal justice agencies pursuant to the allege d offense, to those of the defendant, to those of other forensic evidence , and to those maintained under subsection (f) of Se ction 5-4 -3 of the Unified C ode of Cor

rection s, on evide

nce that was sec ured in relation to the tria

l which re sulted in h

is or her convicti on, but whi ch was no t subject t o the testing which is now requested because the te chnology for the testing was not available at the time of trial.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(a) (West 2004) (added by Pub. Act 90- 141, §5, eff. January 1, 1998, a nd amended by Pub. Act 93-605, §15, eff. November 19, 2003). Section 11 6-3 open ed a door for conv icted de fendant s who maint ain their innocenc e to test genetic material capable of pr oviding “new and dramatic evidence materially re levant to the question of the defendant’s actual innocence.” People v. Henderson , 343 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1114, 799 N. E.2d 6 82, 68 8 (200 3). As secti on 116 -3(a) a utho rized “foren sic DN A test ing, including compari son of g enetic ma rker g rouping s of the e

vidence ,” (730 I

LCS 5/1 16-3(a)

(West 2004)) it is readil y a pparent that the st

atute encompasse s both the b iologic al and g enetic statistical probability components of DNA pr ofiling. However, in later legislation, section 116-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enabling a def endant to move for a DNA database sea rch of genetic marker gr

ouping comparisons, did not embrace the biological c omponent, but solely the genetic analysis aspects of the science. The search ma y include the “g enetic profile” of the defendant, the forensic evidence ( secured in relation to the trial), or the gene tic profiles of offenders that are maintained in the section 5-4-3( f) database. 725 ILCS 5/116-5(a) (West 2004).01-06-2007

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Also, “[i]f r

equeste d by

the defe nse, a de fense r

eprese ntative shall be all owed to vi ew any geneti c marker grouping analy

sis conducted by the De

partment of State Police.” 725 ILCS 5/116-5(c) (West 2004) (added by

Pub. Act 93-605, §15, eff. November 19, 2003). By its lang uage, the statute strictly limits this viewing to genetic ma rker analy sis; that is, viewing the computerized patterns of the genetic marker g roupings within the database, rather than the initial biologica l testing of the samples themselves. Similarly, the terms DNA or g enetic “profile” and “ge netic marker grouping ana lysis” are used interchangeably

in the statutory provisions relating to the DNA database. Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which requires the extraction of DNA samples for persons convicted of or found delinquent for certain off enses, uses the terms “genetic marke r groups” and “gene tic marke r group ing ana

lys is.” 730 I

LCS 5/5 -4-3 (We st 2004). Se ction 5-4 -3(d-2) instructs that the sa

mples obta

ined “sha ll therea fter be forwar ded to the Illin ois Depa rtment of State Police, Division of Forensic Services, for analy sis and categorizing into genetic marker groupings ,” (emphasis added) and these “g enetic marker groupings” shall be maintained by the Illinois Department of State Police, Division of Forensic Ser vices. 730 IL CS 5/5-4-3 (d-2)(e) (West 2004 ). Additionally , section 5-4-3(f ) provide s that all g enetic ma rker g rouping analy sis information shall be maintained “in a single State data base, which ma y be uploaded into a national database.” 730 IL CS 5/5-4-3(f) (West 2004). Moreover, contrary

to respondent’s assertions, procedures do indeed exist mandating the removal of individuals’ names or other identifiers from the g enetic marker groupings in the population statistics database. The Illinois State Police are direc ted by reg ulation to ensure01-06-2007

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privacy pr

otection in that the material stored for forensic purposes may be used for a population statistics database only “if pe rsonal identifying

information is removed.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code §1285.60(b) amended at 31 Ill. Reg . 9249, eff. June 12, 2007. The regulation underscores the fact tha t the popul ation stat

istics dat abase is maintaine d for the

purpose o f estimat

ing alle le frequencies within the referenc ed population after the initial biological determination of an ostensible “match.” See J. Kimme lman, Riski ng Ethic al In solvency : A Survey of Trend s in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. Med. & Ethics 209, 211 (2000). We stress again that the science of DNA “ finger

printing ” to obtai

n the prof iles tran smitted an

d ultimate ly in

cluded within the single database simply does not use those portions of a subject’s DNA that actually code for genetic character

istics. Of course, the presence of some identify ing information within the Illinois State Police database of all DNA profiles is necessary to determine whether someone is included or excluded as the possible offender, otherwise there would be no way to identify to whom a profile belongs. The FBI’ s CODIS sy stem turns to state and local crime laboratories for such identify ing information in the event of a database match. Turni ng to a d irect analysis of the face of secti on 5-4 -3(f)( iii) , it i s clear that t he lan guage of the sta tute itsel f and the

statutory scheme show that th

is practi cal unde

rstandin g and us age is what the legislature intended. “The ca rdinal rule of statutory inter pretation, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” People v. Maggette , 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346 (2001). A court must consider the e ntire statute and interpret each of its relevant parts tog ether. Paris v. Feder , 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177, 68801-06-2007

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N.E.2d 13 7, 139 (19 97). Her e, in looki ng at al l releva

nt parts o f the stat

ute as a w hole, it is apparent that but one database is used inter alia to identify or exclude potential suspects or offenders as well as for random statistical probability calculations. By its terms, section 5 -4-3(f )(iii) c learly

manifest s the leg islative p urpose de lineated

in the indexin

g statut e. Thus, t he enactment expre ssly

limits the a

uthorized uses of th e gene

tic marker groupin g analy sis information to: “(i) valid law enforcement identification purposes a nd as required by

the Federal Burea u of I nvestig ation for

particip ation in the

National DNA data

base, (i i) technolo gy

validation purpose s, (iii) a population statistic s databa se, (iv) quality assurance purposes if personally identifying infor

mation is removed, (v) assisting in the defense of the criminally accused pursuant to Section 116-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or (vi) identify ing and assisting in the prosecution of a person who is suspected of committing a sexual assault as defined in Section 1a of the Sexual Assault Survivors Emergency Treatment Act.” 730 IL

CS 5/5-4-3(f) (West 2004). The law enforcement purpose in maintaining the da tabase as a means to identify or exclude su spects is f

urther e vidence d by

the fac t that the r

elease of such in formation is only allowed t o design ated persons. The

statute sp ecifica

lly p rovides: “The genetic marker g

rouping analy sis information obtained pursuant to this Act shall be confidential and shall be released only to peace officers of the United States, of01-06-2007

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other state s or te rrito ries, of the insu lar po ssess ions of the Unit ed St ates, of fore ign countrie s duly

authorize d to rece ive the sa me, to all p eace of

ficers o f the State

of Il linois and to all prosecutorial agencies, and to de fense counsel as provided by Section 116 -5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963." 730 I LCS 5/5-4-3(f) (West 2004)

. Thus, by this enactment, the leg islature has codified the accepted fore nsic science uses of DNA profiling both in apprehending or e xcluding suspects and in calculating statistical probabilities of DNA profiles for use in criminal trials. The statute itself does not define the terms “g enetic ma

rker g rouping analy sis” and “ population statistic s databa se,” per haps bec ause they are so commonly used and understood in the a rea of forensics and criminal law that the legislature deemed it unnecessary to define them. At any rate , the common understood meaning of these terms, the

other sta tutory provision s and stat

utory scheme a s a whole

clarify their meani ng. Our supreme court has likewise placed its imprimatur on the statute in holding that the primary purpose

of section 5-4-3 is the creation of a criminal DNA da tabase. Garvin , 219 Ill. 2d at 119, 847 N.E.2d at 90. The appellate courts have also re cognized that “[t]he statute’s primary purpose is to create and maintain a database that c an be used to identify f elons and compare samples taken from crime scenes to convict or exonerate individuals.” People v. Edwards , 353 Ill. App. 3d 475, 486, 818 N.E.2d 814, 821 (2004). Further, the statute provides additional protection in that use of the "genetic mar ker grouping analy

sis information, or any other infor mation derived from a DNA sample, bey ond the01-06-2007

-28-

authorize d uses as provided u nder this Section, or any

other Illinois law , is guilty of a Class

4 felony, and sha

ll be subje ct to a fin

e of not le ss than $5, 000." 73 0 IL CS 5/5-4-3 (f-5) ( West 2004). Cle arly , the statu

te limits the

use of its s ingle D

NA datab ase to the

purposes set forth in the enactment. Moreover, the legislative recognition and authorized use of the population statistics database is again simply a universal facet of DNA profiling allowing for the calculation of statistical probability estimates when DN A evidence is admitted in criminal trials. In summary , respondent’s alleged fear of the use of the population statistics database for monitoring

persona l informa tion, for unauthor ized “behavioral

resear ch” or to discriminate against certain individuals or groupsis manifestly gr oundless. As courts have recognized, “[n]owhere in section 5-4-3 is the gathering of ‘ uniquely private g enetic facts’ authorized.” People v. Butler , 354 Ill. App. 3d 57, 68, 819 N.E.2d 1133, 1141 (2004). All 50 states and the federal government have a dopted genetic marker testing a nd storage statutes similar to the one here in Illinois, and rejecte d constitutional challenges. See People v . Garvin , 349 Ill. App. 3d 845, 853-54, 812 N.E.2d 773 ( 2004) (statutes cited therein). Therefore, respondent’s fac ial constitutional challenge to the statute under the I llinois Constitution’s privacy clause must fail.

Last ly, we reje ct respondent’s argument that the lack of a n anonymity

provision for the population statistics database under section 5-4-3(f)(iii) rende rs the statute unconstitutional for this reason. As the court in Edwards recognized, “the State has a strong inter est in obtaining reliable DNA identification evidence and in proper ly identify

ing convicted felons.” Edwards , 353 Ill. App. 3d at 483, 818 N.E.2d at 821. I n practical application, the presence of limited identifying infor

mation within the crime laboratory is necessary

for identifying

or excluding01-06-2007

-29-

possible offenders, and, as we explained above, the I llinois State Police regulation mandates that geneti c marke

r group ing information ma y be used in the

population statistic s databa se only if all personal identifying

information is removed. Therefore, respondent’s fac ial challenge to the

statute on this additi onal basi s also fa ils. Moreover, she

has not shown that the

statute is invalid under any se

t of circumstances. See Garvin , 219 Ill. 2d at 117, 847 N.E.2d at 89.

CONCLUSIO

N For the foregoing r

easons, we affirm the judgment of the circ uit court and remand the matter with directions to vacate one finding of delinquenc y, corre ct the “Trial Order,” and modify the term of re spondent’s probation to terminate on June 20, 2010. Affirme d and remanded wi th direc tions. O’MARA FROSSARD, P.J., with FITZGERAL D SMITH, J., concur.