1 Filed 1/16/14 In re R.R. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AND SOCIAL SERVICES , Plaintiff and Respondent; v. RICHARD R., Defendant and Appellant. E059109 (Super.Ct.No. RIJ113791) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Tamara L. Wagner, Judge. Affirmed. Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel and Ju lie Koons Jarvi, De puty County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Richard R., father of R. R., appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights after he failed to visit his child fo r six months and did not participate in reunification services. On appeal, he argue s that reversal is required because the Riverside County Department of Public Soci al Services (DPSS) failed to adequately investigate R.R.’s Indian heritage and to properly notify the Choctaw tribes, thereby violating the Indian Child We lfare Act (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (ICWA)). We affirm. BACKGROUND R.R. was born in 2007, testing pos itive for methamphetamine at birth. A dependency petition was filed alleging ne glect (Welf. & Inst. Code 1 , § 300, subd. (b)), and failure to provide support on the part of an alleged father. 2 (§ 300, subd. (g).) Mother denied having any I ndian ancestry. The petition was sustained and R.R. was adjudged a dependent. R.R. was placed in the home of her maternal grandmother and mother was ordered to participate in reunification services. At the six month status review hearing, R.R. was returned to her mother’s custody under Family Maintenance Services upo n the recommendation of DPSS, based on mother’s cooperation w ith the case plan and her significant progress. On April 17, 2008, the dependency was terminated. Up to this point, R.R. was reaching all developmental milestones.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

2 Mother initially identified another man as the father, and his whereabouts were unknown.3 On April 12, 2012, mo ther called 911, crying. When police arrived at the home, they found puddles of blood ou tside the home. When they k nocked, mother answered the door carrying R.R., and inform ed the officers that she was home alone, and was going to sleep. The police demanded entry because of the trail of blood outside, and found mother’s then boyfriend on the couch with a puncture wound to his left arm. 3 Mother admitted she had thrown glasses, plates and a knife at the boyfriend, causing the wound. Mother appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine, having relapsed approximately six months befo re this incident. Mother attributed her relapse to the stress of caring for R.R., w ho was diagnosed as autistic. Mother was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon and bein g under the influence of methamphetamine. She identified R.R.’s fa ther as Richard R. and acknowledged a history of domestic violence with him, whic h resulted in a restraining order against him in 2010. A paternity judgment named Richard as father in July 20 09. Father had not visited R.R. because of the 2010 restraini ng order, which denied vi sitation, and because he lived in Las Vegas. A new dependency petition was filed, naming father along with two other alleged fathers. 4 R.R. was removed from her mother’s home and placed with her maternal grandmother. Mother again denied having any Native American heritage, but father

3 The police report indicated the victim was found on a bed in the bedroom.

4 This petition was subsequently amende d, but the particular allegations are irrelevant to this appeal.4 informed the social worker that he was one -sixteenth Choctaw thro ugh his mother, whose great, great, great paternal grandfather ha d married a full blooded Choctaw woman. 5 The social worker contacted father’s mother wh o could not provide the names or dates of birth of her Native American ancestors, alt hough the ICWA notice includes the name of her father. Notice of the dependency proceedings was se nt to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, the Jena Ba nd of Choctaw Indians, and the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. The notice c ontained the paternal grandmother’s names (maiden and married), address, birth date a nd place, as well as the paternal great grandfather’s name and an incomplete birth da te. Return receipts for the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, the Jena Band of Choctaw Indians, and the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians were filed. On May 29, 2012, th e Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma wrote a letter indicating that the child is not enro lled or eligible for enrollment. On June 8, 2012, the court conducted the jurisdictional and disp ositional hearing. The court found the allegations of the petition were true and that ICWA did not apply to the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, but may a pply (to the other named tribes). Custody was removed from the parents and services we re ordered for mother and father. An

5 There is no blood quantum requirement for obtaining a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood Card for the Choctaw tribes. Tribal membership may be acquired as long as one can establish he or she is a descende nt of someone enrolled on the final Choctaw Dawes Commission Rolls by blood. ( http://www.choctawnation.com/ services/departments/enr ollment-cdib-and-tribalmembership/ [as of December 3, 2013].)5 assessment of father’s home was ordered to be conducted through th e Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC). On June 20, 2012, the social worker s ubmitted a tribal resp onse letter from the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians indicati ng that none of the named individuals was enrolled in the tribe. In the meantime, father seem ed hesitant to proceed with the ICPC evaluation and indicated he might be unable to participate in his case plan. For her part, R.R. was functioning at the level of an 18-month old due to her autis m. Her condition had been diagnosed at the age of 22 months due to la nguage regression. She had difficulty with advance motor skills, such as wa lking backwards or jumping in place, had problems with inattention and impulse control, and needed assistance to take care of individual needs, so she continued to wear a diaper. R.R. receive d services from the Center for Autism and Related Disorders. During the first status review period, moth er did not participate in her plan and tested positive for methamphetamine on more than one occasion. In August 2012, mother attempted to visit while under the influence of drugs. For this reason, mother was informed that visits, which ha d taken place at the maternal grandmother’s home to this point, would now take place at the Child Protective Serv ices (CPS) office. The first visit at CPS went well, but on August 21, 2012, th e second visit was te rminated early when mother spanked R.R. for trying to eat her fe ces while mother changed her diaper. Mother was informed that she would ha ve to drug test prior to fu ture visits, and no subsequent6 visits occurred. On December 7, 2012, DPSS filed an application to change the prior court order (§ 388; Form JV-180), seeking to terminate mother’s reunification services. Father did not participate in his plan, eith er, and he did not request visits. In an addendum report subm itted on December 14, 2012, the so cial worker recommended that services be terminated as to both parents and that a sectio n 366.26 hearing be ordered. The mother was living with friends but had been in jail for two weeks prior to that. She was now motivated to enter a rehabilitation program and ha d scheduled an appointment with MFI Recovery. Neither parent had main tained regular contact with DPSS, nor had they begun any component of their case pl an. The maternal grandmother, with whom R.R. remained placed, was inte rested in adopting the child. The social worker also requested that the court find ICWA did not apply. On January 29, 2013, the court conducted th e contested six-month review hearing. At the hearing, County Counsel requested a finding that ICWA did not apply in light of the passage of time without a response indicating that R.R. is an Indian child. The court made the finding that ICWA did not apply, an d terminated father’s reunification services because he had made no progr ess and because he had not ha d contact with R.R. for six months. The court granted the section 388 petition filed by the county, terminating mother’s reunification services for failing to participate regularly in the case plan. On May 29, 2013, the court conducted the section 366.26 hearing. Mother filed a section 388 petition on the day of the heari ng, seeking reinstatem ent of reunification services. The court denied the application, and proceeded to terminate parental rights, freeing R.R. for adoption. Father timely appealed.7 DISCUSSION Father argues on appeal that the social worker failed to adequately investigate father’s Indian heritage and failed to send proper notices to the Indian tribes. We disagree. ICWA was enacted to promot e the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards fo r removal of Indian children from their families and placement of such children in fo ster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture. ( In re C.Y. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 34, 39 ( In re C.Y .); In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195.) In state court proceedings involving the foster care placement of, or termination of pare ntal rights to, an Indi an child, the Indian custodian of the child and the In dian child’s tribe have the ri ght to intervene at any point in the proceeding. (25 U. S.C. § 1911, subd. (c).) Thus, in any involuntar y proceeding in a state court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party se eking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child must notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tr ibe of the pending procee dings. (25 U.S.C. § 1912, subd. (a).) A social worker has an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child in a section 300 proceeding is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) If a social worker has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the social worker is required to make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child. (§ 224.3, subd. (c).) However, neither the court nor DPSS is required to condu ct a comprehensive8 investigation into the mi nor’s Indian status. ( In re C.Y, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 39; In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App. 4th 1148, 1161 ( In re S.B .).) Father argues that the social welfare ag ency and dependency court have a duty to inquire about, and, if possible, obtain [italics in AOB] the information, citing In re Nikki
R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 844, 848. However, Nikki R. merely points to affirmative duties of both the court and the county welfare department to inquire whether a dependent child is or may be an Indian child. ( Ibid. ) None of father’s authorities, nor any that we have found in our own research, support such an expansive interpretation of the social worker’s or the court’s obligations . Our interpretation is also supported by the Federal Guidelines: they require only that “the state court shall make inquiries to determine if the child invo lved is a member of an Indian trib e or if a parent of the child is a member of an Indian tribe a nd the child is eligible for memb ership in an Indian tribe.” (Bureau of Indian Affairs Guid elines for State Courts, 44 Fed. Reg. 67584, 67588, (Nov. 26, 1979).) Decisional authority is in accord. In In re C.Y., the mother, who had been adopted, claimed Indian heritage, but did not kn ow the name of the tribe, and had lost the document that indicated her biological pare nts’ lineage. Subsequently discovered paperwork reaffirmed that her biological father was “‘ German and a little American Indian,’” but did not provide the names, birt h dates, or birthplaces of her parents or grandparents, and did not name a particular tribe. ( In re C.Y ., supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 38.) On appeal, mother ar gued that the social services agency failed to adequately investigate her Indian ancestry by failing to pursue avenues of inquiry which might have9 revealed additional information about her he ritage. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that while the social worker has an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian chil d, neither the court nor the social services agency is required to conduct a comprehensive investigation. ( Id., at p. 39.)
In In re S.B, the court observed that mother could argue that the so cial worker did not make any inquiry of the maternal gr andmother to follow up after mother had indicated the child had no Indian heritage. ( In re S.B., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1160-1161.) However, the court answered the rhetorical question in the negative, stating that “as long as the social worker did inquire of the parents, and as long as the parents failed to provide any information requiring follo wup, she had no further duty of inquiry.” ( Id., at p. 1161.) Here, father provided inform ation to the social worker that he may have Choctaw ancestry. The social worker contacted the pa ternal grandmother to make further inquiry, and apparently learned the name of the patern al great grandfather, along with incomplete information about that relativ e’s date of birth. The paternal grandmother had no additional information. The so cial worker provided all th e information she had obtained from both the father and the paternal grandm other to the Choctaw tribes. Two tribes responded that father and R.R. were not members and not elig ible for tribal membership, and no other responses were received for more than 60 days. The court made sufficient inqu iry into R.R.’s possible Indian heritage. The social worker conducted an adequate investigation a nd made sufficient inquiry of father and the paternal grandmother. Father did not provide additional in formation requiring followup,10 and did not indicate there we re other relatives who might have provided additional information to includ e in the ICWA notice. No furt her investigation was required. Because the court and the social worker adequately discharg ed their duties of inquiry, the court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was proper. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J.

We concur: HOLLENHORST J. KING J.