Strategy

MCDP 1-1

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 142 000007 00

SEMPER FIDELIS
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

4 April 2018

CHANGE 1 to MCDP 1-1

Strategy

1. This publication has been edited to ensure gender neutrality of

all applicable and appropriate terms, except those terms governed

by higher authority. No other content has been affected.

2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

Reviewed and approved this date.
BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE

MARINE CORPS

ROBERT S. WALSH

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Numbers:

Publication: 142 000007 00

Change: 142 000007 01
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps 

Washington, D.C. 20350-1775

12 November 1997

FOREWORD

This publication is designed to give Marine leaders a solid, common understanding of the fundamental nature of military strategy

that is inherent in each military action. Its intent is to give the

reader the basic knowledge required to think “strategically,” that

is, to be able to examine the particulars of any specific situation

and understand the political and military factors behind the use of

military force.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1 provides the

foundation for thinking strategically. This foundation will enable

Marines to better understand their roles in a particular situation

and to consider the implications of their actions on the military

strategy being employed and the political objectives that strategy

is intended to achieve.

Just as it is important to appreciate what this publication is

designed to do, it is equally important to understand what this

publication does not seek to do. It does not attempt to provide a

solution to current strategic problems, nor is it concerned with

details of current American strategy. MCDP 1-1 does not assume

that war and military strategy are exclusively a matter of international or interstate behavior, and the concepts discussed in it are
not limited to any particular kind of warfare or level of conflict.

Nor does Strategy prescribe any particular strategy, any particular

process for the making of strategy, or any specific techniques and

procedures for handling military forces. It is meant to educate the

mind of future commanders or, more accurately, to guide them in

their self-education, not to accompany them to the battlefield.

Chapter 1 explores the complex nature of the strategic environment, including the relationship between war and politics and the

key factors at work in any strategic situation. Chapter 2 discusses

the essential elements of any strategy, the relationship of ends and

means, and the interaction among political objectives, national

strategy, and military strategy. Chapter 3 looks at a variety of

strategies as they might be developed in different strategic situations. Chapter 4 synthesizes the concepts presented in the first

three chapters by focusing on how strategy is made, who makes

it, what moral criteria guide strategic decisions, and what pitfalls

may occur in the making of strategy.

This publication is primarily for field grade officers. However,

Marines at all levels require a broad perspective and an understanding of how the effects of their actions can influence the attainment of our national objectives. Furthermore, Marines of any rank

or specialty can easily find themselves working for senior leaders

with strategic responsibilities. Those leaders need subordinates

who understand the strategic environment and can provide intelligent and insightful advice on the strategic situation. Therefore, as a
foundation for strategic thought, this publication should be read

and understood by Marines at all levels of command both in the

operating forces and the supporting establishment.

C. C. KRULAK 

General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: 142 000007 00

© 1997 United States Government as represented by the Secretary

of the Navy. All rights reserved.

MCDP 1-1

Strategy

Introduction. The Study of Strategy

Chapter 1. The Strategic Environment

The Nature of Politics and War—Further Defining War—The 

Nature of War-Making Political Entities—Strategic Constants 

and Norms–The Physical Environment–National Character–War 

and the State–The Balance of Power Mechanism—The Trinity

Chapter 2. Strategy: Ends and Means

National Strategy—Ends in National Strategy–Survival and 

Victory–Political Objectives—Means in National Strategy—Adapting Ends to Means, and Vice Versa—Ends in Military Strategy–

Relationship Between Political and Military Objectives–Distinguishing 

Between Erosion and Annihilation Strategies

Chapter 3. Strategic Opposites

Defensive and Offensive Strategies—Symmetrical and 

Asymmetrical Strategies—Deterrence: Strategies of Reprisal 

or Denial—Standardized or Tailored Strategies—Strategy by 

Intent or by Default—Evaluating Opposing Strategies
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Chapter 4. The Making of Strategy

The Strategy-Making Process–The Strategic Assessment–Political 

Objectives–Military Objectives and the Means to Achieve Them–

Strategic Concepts—Who Makes Strategy?—Just War—

Strategy-Making Pitfalls–Strategic Panaceas–Emphasizing 

Process Over Product–The Fait Accompli–Limited and Unlimited 

Wars–Paralysis and Recklessness

Conclusion

Notes
Introduction

The Study of Strategy

“The nation that draws too great a distinction between its

scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.”1

—Unknown

The Study of Strategy

Introduction-3

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting,

stresses that war is fundamentally political in character and that

war must serve policy. What matters ultimately in war is strategic

success: attainment of our political aims and the protection of our

national interests. History shows that national leaders, both political and military, who fail to understand this relationship sow the

seeds for ultimate failure—even when their armed forces achieve

initial battlefield success. Battlefield brilliance seldom rescues a

bad strategy.

The United States Marine Corps is a key instrument in the execution of American national strategy. Marine expeditionary forces

possess extraordinary strategic reach. As an expeditionary forcein-readiness, the Marine Corps has been consistently called upon

to implement key elements of our national security strategy and

its supporting national military strategy. While the Marine Corps

is not a strategy-making organization in the sense of designing a

national military strategy or even drafting strategies to fight particular wars, the effective execution of strategy requires an understanding of both its intent and its context. In order to carry out our

responsibilities to the Nation, Marines must possess the strategic

skills and understanding necessary to participate effectively in the

strategic environment of the 21st century.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Introduction-4

There are three important reasons to develop a fundamental

understanding of strategy:

 Marines will find themselves working for senior leaders who

participate directly in the development of strategy. Such leaders need subordinates who understand their requirements and

the environment they work in.

 An understanding of how strategy is made allows Marines to

see the larger picture. It enables them to better grasp the intent

that underlies the military actions in which they participate and

the constraints placed upon the use of military force during

these actions. It also helps Marine leaders provide useful

answers to questions posed by their subordinates concerning

the purpose and objectives behind our involvement in a particular operation.

 By the very nature of their profession, all Marines are engaged

in the execution of strategy. Every military action has potential

strategic implications. Modern media coverage has intensified

both the awareness of and sensitivity towards any military

action. Marines must understand that the “distance” between

local or tactical actions and the effects of these actions at the

strategic or political level may be very short. Sometimes a

seemingly unimportant action by any participant—a general, a

platoon leader, or even one single Marine—can have a powerful political impact.
The Study of Strategy

Introduction-5

MCDP 1-1 focuses on military strategy in its most fundamental

sense, exploring the question “How do military means relate to

political ends?” It provides a conceptual basis to help us to

understand both our own and our enemies’ political and military

objectives, the relationships among them, and the nature of any

particular situation in which military means might be used. It

explores how political entities integrate military means with the

other elements of their power in order to attain their political

ends. A common conceptual understanding of these matters

helps Marines develop the adaptability that our warfighting philosophy demands.

Chapter 1

The Strategic Environment

“The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far

from the battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why armies are constituted as they are,

and why their leaders conduct them in the way they do.”1

 —Michael Howard

“That the factors are infinitely varied and difficult to determine is true, but that . . . is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching such firm standpoints as are attainable. The

vaguer the problem to be solved, the more resolute must we

be in seeking points of departure from which we can begin

to lay a course.”2

—Julian Corbett

The Strategic Environment

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At its most basic, strategy is a matter of figuring out what we need

to achieve, determining the best way to use the resources at our

disposal to achieve it, and then executing the plan. Unfortunately,

in the real world, all of these things are not easily done. Our strategic goals are complex and sometimes contradictory and may

change in the middle of a military endeavor. The resources at our

disposal are not always obvious, can change during the course of a

struggle, and usually need to be adapted to suit our needs. Our

adversary often refuses to fit our preconceptions or to stand still

while we erect the apparatus for that adversary’s destruction.

THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND WAR

Before we can usefully discuss the making and carrying out of military strategy, we must understand the fundamental character of

politics and the violent expression of politics called war. Let us

start by analyzing Clausewitz’s description of war as both an instrument of policy and of politics with the addition of other means.3

War is a social phenomenon. Its logic is not the logic of art, nor of

science or engineering, but rather the logic of social transactions.

Human beings interact with each other in ways that are fundamentally different from the way the scientist interacts with chemicals, the architect or engineer with beams and girders, or the

artist with paints. The interaction that concerns us when we speak

of war is political interaction. The “other means” in Clausewitz’s

definition of war is organized violence. The addition of violence
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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to political interaction is the only factor that defines war as a distinct form of political interaction—but that addition has powerful

and unique effects.

The two different terms we have used, policy and politics, both

concern power. While every specific war has its unique causes,

war as a phenomenon is fundamentally concerned with the distribution and redistribution of power.4

Power is sometimes material in nature: the economic power of

money or other resources, for example, or possession of the physical means for coercion (weapons and armed personnel). Power is

just as often psychological in nature: legal, religious, or scientific

authority; intellectual or social prestige; a charismatic personality’s

ability to excite or persuade; a reputation, accurate or illusory, for

diplomatic or military strength.

Power provides the means to attack and the means to resist attack.

Power in itself is neither good nor evil. By its nature, however,

power tends to be distributed unevenly in ways that vary greatly

from one society to another.

Power manifests itself differently and in different places at different times. In Japan, during the 16th through 19th centuries, real

political power was exercised by the shogun, who was formally

subordinate to the emperor. Later, senior Japanese military leaders

were for a time effectively controlled by groups of fanatical junior

officers. King Philip II of Spain, whose power was rooted in a

landed aristocracy, was surprised to discover the power that
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Europe’s urban bankers could exercise over his military strategy.

American leaders were similarly surprised by the power of the disparate political coalition that forced an end to the Vietnam War.

One of the major problems of strategy is to determine where and in

what form real power lies and to identify those relatively rare

points where military power can be applied effectively.

Politics is the process by which power is distributed in any society:

a family, an office, a religious order, a tribe, a state, a region, the

international community. The process of distributing power may

be fairly orderly—through consensus, inheritance, election, or

some time-honored tradition—or chaotic—through assassination,

revolution, or warfare. Whatever process may be in place at any

given time, politics is inherently dynamic, and not only the distribution of power but the process by which it is distributed is under

constant pressure for change.

A key characteristic of politics is that it is interactive—a cooperative or competitive process. It cannot be characterized as a rational

process because actual outcomes are seldom what was consciously

intended by any one of the participants. Political events and their

outcomes are the product of conflicting, contradictory, sometimes

compromising, but often adversarial forces. That description

clearly applies to war.

Policy, on the other hand, can be characterized as a rational process. The making of policy is a conscious effort by a distinct political body to use whatever power it possesses to accomplish some

purpose—if only the mere continuation or increase of its own
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power. Policy is a rational subcomponent of politics, the reasoned

purposes and actions of individuals in the political struggle. War

can be a practical means, sometimes the only means available, for

the achievement of rational policy aims—that is, the aims of one

party in the political dispute. Hence, to describe war as an

“instrument of policy” is entirely correct. It is an act of force to

compel our opponent to do our will.

Do not, however, confuse rationality with intelligence, reasonableness, or understanding. Policies can be wise or foolish: they can

advance their creators’ goals or unwittingly contradict them. They

can be driven by concern for the public good or by the most craven

reasons of self-interest. Rationality also implies no particular kind

of goal, for goals are a product of emotion and human desire. The

goal of policy may be peace and prosperity, national unity, the

achievement of ideological perfection, or the extermination of

some ethnic minority or competitor.

Remember too that policy, while it is different from politics, is

produced via a political process. Even the most rational of policies

is often the result of compromises within the political group. Such

compromises may be intended more to maintain peace or unity

within the group than to accomplish any external purpose. They

may, in fact, be irrelevant or contrary to any explicit group goal.

Policy is therefore often ambiguous, unclear, even contradictory,

and subject to change or to rigidity when change is needed.
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Clausewitz’s reference to war as an expression of politics is therefore not a prescription, but a description. War is a part of politics.

It does not replace other forms of political intercourse but merely

supplements them. It is a violent expression of the tensions and

disagreements between political groups, when political conflict

reaches a level that sparks organized violence. Thus war—like

every other phase of politics—embodies both rational and irrational elements. Its course is the product not of one will, but of the

collision of two or more wills.

To say, then, that war is an expression of both politics and policy

with the addition of other means is to say two very different

things to strategy makers. First, it says that strategy, insofar as it

is a conscious and rational process, must strive to achieve the policy goals set by the political leadership. Second, it says that such

policy goals are created only within the chaotic and emotional

realm of politics.

Therefore, the military professional who says, “Keep politics out

of this. Just give us the policy, and we will take care of the strategy,” does not understand the fundamentals of strategy. Strategists

must operate within the constraints of policy and politics. The

only alternative would be for military strategy to perform the functions of policy and for military leaders to usurp political power,

tasks which are generally unsuited to both military strategy and

military leaders.
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FURTHER DEFINING WAR

We acknowledge that war is an expression of politics and policy

with the addition of violent means. Still, this description does not

fully explain war.

One frequent error is to describe war as something that takes

place exclusively between nations or states. First, nations and

states are different things. The Kurds are a nation, but they have

no state. The Arabs are a nation with several states. The Soviet

Union was a state whose citizens represented many different

nationalities. Second, many—possibly most—wars actually take

place within a single state, meaning that at least one of the participants was not previously a state. Civil wars, insurrections, wars

of secession, and revolutions all originate within a single existing

state, although they sometimes attract external intervention. Wars

may spill across state borders without being interstate wars, as in

Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds. Third, most interstate wars are

fought not by individual states, but by coalitions. Such coalitions

often involve nonstate actors as well as state governments.

Another mistake is to limit our definition of war to sustained,

large-scale military operations. Here the defining condition is one

of scale and duration. Under headings such as “Military Operations Other than War,” this approach lumps many forms of political conflict that clearly satisfy Clausewitz’s definition of war with

other events—such as humanitarian assistance—that do not.
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In its broadest sense, war refers to any use of organized force for

political purposes, whether that use results in actual violence or

not. When we speak of warfare, however, we almost always mean

actual violence of some considerable scale that is carried out over

some considerable period of time. A single assassination, while

certainly a violent political act, does not constitute a war. On the

other hand, large-scale, long-term violence alone does not necessarily mean war either. For example, over a 25-year period—

1969 through 1994—some 3,000 people were killed in Northern

Ireland for an average of 120 deaths per year in a population of

1.5 million.5

 For that same period, there were approximately 291

murders per year committed in Washington, D.C. in an average

population of 642,000.6

 The former situation is widely recognized as war, while the latter is not. The difference is a matter of

organization. The perpetrators, victims, and targets of the violence in Northern Ireland reflect distinct political groups engaged

in a power struggle. The violent death rate in Washington, D.C.,

roughly five times higher, seems to reflect random violence—a

sign of social dysfunction rather than of some purposeful group

movement toward any political goal.

From all this, we can say that war is—

 Organized violence.

 Waged by two or more distinguishable groups against each

other.

 In pursuit of some political end.
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 Sufficiently large in scale and in social impact to attract the

attention of political leaders.

 Continued long enough for the interplay between the opponents to have some impact on political events.

THE NATURE OF 

WAR-MAKING POLITICAL ENTITIES

Military professionals often seek a “scientific” understanding of

war. This approach is appealing because the human mind tends to

organize its perceptions according to familiar analogies, like the

powerful images of traditional Newtonian physics. Such comparisons can be very useful. Our military doctrine abounds with

terms like “center of gravity,” “mass,” and “friction.”

The attempt to apply a scientific approach can result in some misleading ideas. For example, some political scientists treat political

entities as unitary rational actors, the social equivalents of Newton’s solid bodies hurtling through space. Real political units,

however, are not unitary. Rather, they are collections of intertwined but fundamentally distinct actors and systems. Their

behavior derives from the internal interplay of both rational and

irrational forces as well as from the peculiarities of their own histories and of chance. Strategists who accept the unitary rational

actor model as a description of adversaries at war will have difficulty understanding either side’s motivations or actual behavior.
The Strategic Environment

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Such strategists ignore their own side’s greatest potential vulnerabilities and deny themselves potential levers and targets—the

fault lines that exist within any human political construct.

Fortunately, the physical sciences have begun to embrace the

class of problems posed by social interactions like politics and

war. The appropriate imagery, however, is not that of Newtonian

physics. Rather, we need to think in terms of biology and particularly ecology.7

To survive over time, the various members of any ecosystem must

adapt—not only to the external environment, but to each other.

These agents compete or cooperate, consume and are consumed,

join and divide, and so on. A system created by such interaction is

called a complex adaptive system.

Such systems are inherently dynamic. Although they may sometimes appear stable for lengthy periods, their components constantly adapt or fail. No species evolves alone; rather, each species

“co-evolves” with the other species that make up its environment.

The mutation or extinction of one species in any ecosystem has a

domino or ripple effect throughout the system, threatening damage

to some species and creating opportunities for others. Slight

changes are sometimes absorbed without unbalancing the system.

Other slight changes—an alteration in the external environment or

a local mutation—can send the system into convulsions of growth

or collapse.

One of the most interesting things about complex systems is that

they are inherently unpredictable. It is impossible, for example, to
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know in advance which slight perturbations in an ecological system will settle out unnoticed and which will spark catastrophic

change. This is so not because of any flaw in our understanding

of such systems, but because the system’s behavior is generated

according to rules the system itself develops and is able to alter.

In other words, a system’s behavior may be constrained by external factors or laws but is not determined by them.

For all of these reasons, systems starting from a similar base

come to have unique individual characteristics based on their specific histories.

The reason we use the complex adaptive system as a model is that

it provides insight into human political constructs. Humans build

all sorts of social structures: families, tribes, clans, social classes,

street gangs, armies, religious groups or sects, commercial corporations, political parties, bureaucracies, criminal mafias, states of

various kinds, alliances, and empires, to mention just a few.

These structures participate in separate but thoroughly intertwined networks we call social, economic, and political systems.

Those networks produce markets, elections, and wars.

Such networks and structures create their own rules. The unpredictable nature of these complex systems makes it difficult to predict the outcome of specific events. We can normally analyze,

describe, and explain economic, military, and political events

after they have occurred, but accurately forecasting the course of

such interactions is difficult to do with any consistency.
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When we say that politics and war are unpredictable, we do not

mean that they are composed of absolute chaos, without any semblance of order. Intelligent, experienced military and political

leaders are generally able to foresee the probable near-term

results, or at least a range of possible results, of any particular

action they may take. Broad causes, such as a massive superiority

in manpower, technology, economic resources, and military skill,

will definitely influence the probabilities of certain outcomes.

Conscious actions, however, like evolutionary adaptations, seldom

have only their intended effects. Events wholly outside the range

of vision of political and military leaders can have an unforeseen

impact on the situation. New economic and social ideas, technological innovations with no obvious military applications, changes

in climatic conditions, demographic shifts, all can lead to dramatic

political and military changes. Enemy actions, friction, imperfect

knowledge, low order probabilities, and chance introduce new

variables into any evolving situation.

The problem for strategists is how to develop a lasting and effective strategy in the face of the turbulent world of policy and politics. Despite the difficulty of understanding the interaction of

political entities, they must strive to comprehend the nature of the

problem, anticipate possible outcomes, and set a strategic course

likely to achieve the desired objective. At the same time, strategists

must sense the complex nature of this environment and be prepared for both the unexpected setbacks and the sudden opportunities it is likely to deliver.
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STRATEGIC CONSTANTS AND NORMS

In Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, originally published in

1911, Sir Julian Corbett wrote–

The vaguer the problem to be solved, the more resolute must

we be in seeking points of departure from which we begin to

lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the accidents that

will beset us, and being always alive to their deflecting influences . . . . [T]he theoretical study of strategy . . . can at least

determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it

becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend normally to

produce certain effects.8

Despite the complexity of interactions in the political realm, it is

possible to discern elements that are present in any strategic situation. These elements are at the core of the strategic environment

and are the base from which the strategist develops an understanding of a specific set of circumstances. Because these elements

are present in any strategic situation, we refer to them as constants

and norms. While the particular aspects of these constants and

norms present themselves differently in each strategic situation, an

understanding of their fundamental nature provides a point of

departure for its analysis.

To help understand the distinction between constants and norms

and the fluctuations of a specific policy or conflict, we can use the

following analogy. Annual seasonal climates of most regions of

the world are predictable. Yet the weather on a given day cannot

be predicted far in advance with any confidence. Still, annual

vacationers in northern Pennsylvania know that a warm day in
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January is colder than a cold day in July, and a snow skier does

not plan a ski trip for July, nor does a water skier plan on water

skiing in January. Extreme variables in temporary weather patterns do not affect the long-term power and influence of global

climate patterns.

The Physical Environment

Geography and its related aspects are a constant in any strategic

situation. All parties in a conflict must cope with the physical

environment. One strategic affairs expert has noted—

Misguided strategists who misinterpret, misapply, or ignore the

crushing impact of geography on national security affairs learn

their lessons painfully, after squandering national prestige,

lives, and treasure.

Strategic masters manipulate the physical environment,

exploit its strengths, evade its weaknesses, acknowledge constraints, and contrive always to make nature work for them.9

The physical environment encompasses not only the traditional

elements of geography such as land forms, terrain, oceans and

seas, and climate, but also spatial relationships, natural resources,

and lines of communications. Together, these factors exert considerable influence on a particular strategic situation. The political, economic, and social makeup of a nation results in part from

its physical environment. We refer to Great Britain, the United

States, and Japan as “maritime nations,” while Germany, Russia,

and China have been traditionally labeled “continental powers.”

The location and distribution of natural resources may on the one

hand be a cause of conflict and, at the same time, be a major
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determinant of a conflict’s outcome. The nature of the interaction

between political entities is in large part determined by their geographic relationships. Relations between states that border on one

another are normally considerably different from those between

states separated by oceans and continents.

In order to understand the nature of a problem, strategists must

understand the role of the physical environment in each situation.

Geography influences the way that all elements of national power

are applied. While the effect of geography on a conflict varies

with the nature, location, and duration of that conflict, the physical environment always has an impact. Strategists must analyze

and understand the local, regional, and sometimes global effects

of this environment in order to use the elements of power effectively in a specific strategic situation.10

National Character

Each nation, state, or political entity has its own distinct character. This character is derived from a variety of sources: location, language, culture, religion, historical circumstances, and so

forth. While national character is always evolving, changes generally occur only over the course of decades and centuries and

may be imperceptible to the outside observer. As such, national

character can be looked upon as a norm or constant. National

character is akin to global climate patterns that change very

slowly through history.

Over three centuries, the British national character ran as deep

and sure as the Gulf Stream across the North Atlantic. During this
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time, British national reaction to aggression from France, Germany, or, more recently, Argentina, was marked by many constants. Throw in a resolute and inspirational leader (the elder

William Pitt, Winston Churchill, or Margaret Thatcher), add a villainous opponent bent on European domination (Napoleon, the

Kaiser, or Hitler), and the British response to aggression was both

consistent and predictable.

This is not to say that the British reacted the same way in each situation. The mood and inclination of the British public have been

influenced by various swirls and eddies during periods and

moments when issues were confused, threats ambiguous, and

hopes for peace strong. For example, the British first attempted to

avoid war with Germany by acceding to Hitler’s demands at the

now infamous Munich Conference of 1938. Then when Germany

invaded Poland a year later, natural inclinations and hopes for

peace vanished into a steeled determination to wage war.

Consider too the Russian response to invasions from the West. The

Russians have never deliberately adopted a strategy of retreating

hundreds of miles into their interior without first trying to stop an

invader near their borders. The point is that they have demonstrated

an ability to retreat deeply into their own country if they must do so

in order to survive and ultimately prevail. This demonstrated ability

was a matter of historical record to be considered by Charles XII of

Sweden in 1708, Napoleon in 1812, Kaiser Wilhelm III in 1914,

and Hitler in 1941. It is no coincidence that of these invaders, the

only one to succeed (Germany in World War I) was the one that

adopted a strategy containing a viable political component, in this

case the support of internal revolution, used in conjunction with
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the military component. The Germans in World War I considered

knowable Russian physical and moral characteristics and devised

an effective political-military strategy accordingly. Napoleon and

Hitler had access to similar knowledge but largely ignored the

Russian character in relying on a purely military strategy.

Judging the national character of an adversary (or an ally) goes

well beyond traditional orders of battle and related calculations

regarding military and economic power. It requires consideration

of national history, culture, religion, society, politics—everything that contributes to the makeup and functioning of a nation.

The strategist must compile a complete dossier on a nation similar to that commonly prepared on enemy commanders. In the

popular movie Patton, an impatient Field Marshal Rommel

interrupts his aide: “Enough! Tell me about the man” (referring

to General Patton). Rommel wanted to know about Patton’s personality: Was he a gambler? Would he attack sooner rather than

later? What was his style of warfare and leadership? What did

his troops think of him? Rommel wanted a psychological profile

of the opposing commander to help him understand his adversary.

At the strategic level, success in war is facilitated by having a

similar comprehensive psychological profile of each nation or

political group involved in the conflict, to include enemies, allies,

potential enemies or allies, and even one’s own nation.

It is of critical importance that sweeping dogmatic assertions do

not govern the analysis of national characters. Such assertions

often spring from ethnocentristic attitudes and a failure to examine

the true nature of a political presence. Rather, what is required is

rational, objective, and informed thought about the makeup of a
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national character and its possible effects on a nation’s action or

reaction to an event.

War and the State

The state has been effective in all forms of politics, including war.

It has been so effective, in fact, that virtually all of the world’s

land surface and its people are now recognized as belonging to

some more or less effective territorial state. While entities other

than the state make war, a state will almost always become

involved either in self-defense or in assertion of its monopoly on

the legitimate use of violence. Thus, we must look upon the state

as one of the strategic norms or constants when we are confronted

with a specific strategic problem.

While it has been said that “war made the state, and the state

made war,”11 the state has over time held in remarkable check the

human tendency toward violence. Averaged over the first 90 years

of the 20th century, even Germany’s annual rate of war deaths is

lower than that of many typical primitive societies.12 Although

warfare between states has continued, successful states have been

able to control the costly endemic local warfare typical of nonstate societies.

States are normally replaced by other states. If a state fails to control the use of violence, it will likely be destroyed or taken over

by some new group willing and able to take on this fundamental

function of the state. This new leadership may be another state or

possibly a supranational alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) or the United Nations. It could also be a
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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revolutionary government evolving out of what was formerly a

nonstate political presence.

This is not to say that states or the interrelated system of states

does not change or that strategists can always rely on stability in

the international arena. From 1950 to 1980 in Africa, 47 new

states won their independence. In late 1988, after 73 years of colonial rule, Africa’s last colony, Namibia, gained its independence.13

The United States, which sees itself as a young state, in fact has

the oldest constitutional system on earth. Many people alive today

were born when most of Europe was ruled by kings or emperors.

Powerful states and ideologies, commanding formidable military

machines, have entered and left the world stage while those people

grew up. The Soviet Union, one of the most powerful nations in

human history, covering a sixth of the world’s surface and encompassing hundreds of millions of human beings, lasted less than a

human lifetime.

However, on balance, we can look upon the state as remarkably

tough and enduring. While political movements and individual

states and governments that wage wars evolve and change, we

must address any particular conflict or strategic problem in the

context of the state system. Strategists must take into account the

actions and reactions not only of their adversary, but also the

actions and reactions of other states and nations. At the same

time, we should remember that there is nothing permanent about

any particular political entity. This lack of permanence is important because it reminds us that every enemy, no matter how seamless and monolithic it may appear, has political fault lines that can

be exploited.
The Strategic Environment

1-21

The Balance of Power Mechanism

We have already noted that politics and policy are concerned with

the distribution of power and that conflict often arises out of

attempts to change the distribution of power. One of the ways

political entities achieve stability in the distribution of power and

avoid a continuous state of conflict is by seeking to maintain a

“balance of power.” The balance of power is a mechanism

intended to maintain the status quo in the distribution of power.14 It

describes a system in which alliances shift in order to ensure that

no one entity or group of entities becomes dominant. The balance

of power is “at once the dominant myth and the fundamental law

of interstate relations.”15

The term “balance of power” is usually used in reference to states,

but it is applicable to any system involving more than one political

power center. The balance of power can be global, as it was during

the Cold War, regional/local, as it was among Iran, Iraq, Saudi

Arabia, and the other Persian Gulf states, or internal to one state or

territory, as it was among the various clans in Somalia.

Balance of power considerations are usually at work in any strategic situation. Thus, we can consider the balance of power as a strategic norm or constant. Balance of power systems have appeared

frequently in world history. Normally, such a system is created

when several entities vie for supremacy or at least independence,

yet none individually has the power to achieve it alone.

A balance of power system breaks down for two reasons. The first

is when one or more of the participants in the system rebel against
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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it. Their goal is to eliminate all competitors and achieve dominance. In modern Europe, this goal has been attempted by a number of states and their leaders such as Germany under Hitler and

France under Napoleon. The rebels have never fully succeeded,

largely because they have to take on multiple enemies. Ambitious

powers must always be wary of what Clausewitz called the culminating point of victory.16 This is the point at which one competitor’s success prompts its allies and other groups to withdraw their

support or even throw their weight against it.

The second threat to the balance of power system is the power vacuum that occurs when there is no authority capable of maintaining

order in some geographic area. Power vacuums are disruptive to

the balance of power in two distinct ways. First, the disorder in the

vacuum tends to spread as violent elements launch raids into surrounding areas or commit other provocative acts. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s has provided many

examples of this sort. Another example is the disintegration of

Yugoslavia that resulted in NATO intervention in Bosnia. Second,

a power vacuum may attract annexation by an external power. If

this act threatens to add substantially to the annexing entity’s

power, other states will become concerned and may interfere.

Many Russians saw NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in this light.

NATO’s agreement to Russian participation in that mission was an

attempt to mitigate such concerns.

Some have argued that the balance of power is no longer a useful

concept in the post-Cold War world dominated by a single military superpower. However, it is clear that on a regional and local

level the concept of balance of power remains a useful basis for
The Strategic Environment

1-23

strategic analysis. The balancing mechanism remains a useful

strategic tool and is applicable to all levels.

Strategists must be aware of the dynamics of various balance of

power systems involved in a strategic problem. Like the “invisible

hand” of market economics, the balance of power mechanism is

always at work, regardless of whether the system’s participants

believe that it is a good thing. It influences our actions as well as

those of our adversaries, allies, and neutral powers.

Consider the case of the Gulf War. One of the motives for participation in the conflict by the U.S. and other Coalition forces was

concern over the prospect of a region dominated by Iraq. Conversely, one of the postwar concerns was to avoid the creation of a

power vacuum that could lead to increased instability in the region

or greater influence by Iran. Finally, the dynamics of relations

within the Coalition also involved reconciling sometimes differing

views on balance of power issues. In any coalition, some participants may be only temporary allies with long-term goals that may

diverge widely from one another. Thus, balance of power considerations were at work from start to finish during this conflict.

THE TRINITY

This chapter has described the nature of the strategic environment. This environment is defined by the nature of politics and

the interactions of political entities that participate in the political
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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process. The strategic environment is complex and subject to the

interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of

conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by

forces that defy rational explanation. We can discern certain factors that are at work in any strategic situation—the constants and

norms—and use them as a framework to help understand what is

occurring. At the same time, we realize that each strategic situation is unique and that in order to grasp its true nature, we must

comprehend how the character and motivations of each of the

antagonists will interact in these specific circumstances.

Summarizing the environment within which war and strategy are

made, Clausewitz described it as being dominated by a “remarkable trinity” that is—

composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which

are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance

and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam;

and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of

policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the

second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law,

deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or

seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it

would be totally useless.
The Strategic Environment

1-25

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended

between three magnets.17

Clausewitz concluded that the strategic environment is shaped by

the disparate forces of emotion, chance, and rational thought. At

any given moment, one of these forces may dominate, but the other

two are always at work. The actual course of events is determined

by the dynamic interplay among them. The effective strategist must

master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment.18

Chapter 2

Strategy: Ends and Means

“You [military professionals] must know something about

strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and

politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power.

You must understand that few of the problems of our time

have . . . been solved by military power alone.”1

—John F. Kennedy

Strategy: Ends and Means

2-3

Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and

means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and

means, the product—that is, the strategy—is a specific way of

using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy is thus

both a process and a product. Any discussion of ends and means in

war must begin with two basic points. First, as we have observed,

war is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party

waging war—even though those goals may be social, economic,

religious, or ideological in nature—are by definition political

goals. Second, wars are fought by political entities that have

unique characteristics and often very dissimilar goals and

resources. In order to understand any conflict, we must appreciate

the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Our primary interest is in military strategy, the art and science of

employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of

national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.2

However, in order to place military strategy in its proper context,

it is necessary to understand national strategy. Military strategy is

subordinate to national strategy, which is the art and science of

developing and using political, economic, military, and informational powers, together with armed force, during peace and war,

to secure the objectives of policy.3

 Of necessity, we must begin
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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with national strategy and describe how ends and means must be

related at the very highest levels before we can proceed to determine military objectives and strategies.

At the highest levels, ends are expressed as national interests.

Interests are a nation’s wants, needs, and concerns. Specifically,

national interests normally involve four main areas: survival and

security, political and territorial integrity, economic stability and

well-being, and stability. Conflict can arise as a result of a threat

(or perceived threat) to any one of these four areas. Interests are

central to a discussion of strategy because interests signal a

nation’s desires and intentions to other nations. As discussed earlier, nation and state are not synonymous.

Certain interests that a nation sees as essential are referred to as

vital interests. Vital interests are distinguished from other interests by the fact that nations are usually unwilling to compromise

on them and are often prepared to resort to conflict in support of

them.4 Thus, when examining a strategic situation, a strategist

must identify not only what interests are at stake but also which

interests one or more of the participants view as vital.

National interests are often vague or consist of highly generalized

abstractions. While national interests underpin national strategy,

the specifics of the strategy must focus on more concrete ends. The

specific goals and aims of national strategy are often referred to as

objectives. Objectives are the ends a nation must achieve to promote, protect, or attain its interests. Objectives tend to be more tangible than interests because they normally describe specific

activities or conditions which must be attained. Objectives provide
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-5

the departure point for national strategy in that they describe what

a state is actually trying to do.5

In peacetime, national interests and objectives lead to specific policies and commitments. Policy is a pattern or patterns of actions

designed to attain specific objectives. Policy can represent a broad

course of action or intent. Policy is the ways (methods or patterns)

by which strategy reaches its objectives. Commitments are expressions of a nation’s intention to use its instruments of national

power. Whereas policy might express general intent, a course of

action, or restraints on action, commitments pledge nations to take

specific actions at specific times and places. While conflict is

always related to some national interest or objective, it is normally

the outgrowth of a specific policy or commitment.

The articulation of national interests, objectives, policies, and

commitments linked to use of the instruments of national power

is sometimes referred to as “grand strategy,” “grand national

strategy,” or, currently in the United States, “national security

strategy.” Grand strategies or national security strategies are

implemented by subordinate strategies—political or diplomatic

strategies, economic strategies, national military strategies, and

so forth—for the use of each of the instruments of national power.

Knowledge of this peacetime strategic framework (see figure on

page 2-6) is required in order to comprehend the origins of any

particular conflict situation. However, it is even more important

to understand the links among national strategy, military strategy,

and other supporting strategies during conflict. Without this fundamental understanding, it will be difficult to establish the
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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appropriate relationship between policy and the military action

intended to carry out the policy.

In war, the national strategy focuses the instruments of national

power6 on achieving its political ends or objectives as articulated

by the political leadership. Diplomatic, economic, military, and

informational actions are linked through supporting strategies

that contribute to attaining the objective of national strategy.

Military strategy, in turn, applies the military instrument of

national power towards the accomplishment of the political

objectives of the overall national strategy. The departure point for

NATIONAL STRATEGY

 Relationship of political objectives 

to national strategy and supporting strategies.
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-7

military strategy, therefore, is the objectives of the national strategy. From there, military strategy must identify a military goal or

objective that will lead to accomplishment of the political objective. The military objective then provides the basis for the identification of specific ways to accomplish that objective. The

selection of one of these courses of action and its further development results in a strategic concept that embodies the key components of the chosen military strategy. The military strategy is not

developed in isolation from the other instruments of national

power. The military objectives and strategy must also be compatible with the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives

and strategies.

Strategists must be able to analyze the overall strategic situation

and appreciate the larger context in which military strategy is

executed. In order to formulate and implement an effective military strategy, they must understand the ends and means of the

larger national strategy as well as the strategies of the enemy,

allies, and related neutral parties. In order to develop this understanding, we now look more deeply at ends and means within

national strategy.

ENDS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

Survival and Victory

There are only two fundamental national strategic goals in any

conflict: survival and victory. Any specific aims that we may
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

2-8

pursue will reflect one or both of these two goals. Survival is the

minimum goal of opponents and a prerequisite for victory. Victory is normally associated with the achievement of the political

aims of the war, but it also requires an end to the war and the

reestablishment of peace. The strategist must strive to understand what survival and victory mean in the specific situation at

hand to each of the struggle’s participants.

Survival is the continued existence of the political entity that is at

war. However, survival can mean different things to different

political entities. Survival often equates to the continuance of a

way of life or the well-being of the population. Threats to this

type of survival are usually met with fierce resistance. Sometimes

the survival of a particular individual or group will take priority

over the interests of the whole. In such a case, strategies that seek

to compel submission by threatening the interests of the nation or

of its people may have little direct impact. Finally, some political

groups or ideological movements are willing to fight on until they

are destroyed. Their hopes of survival lie in leaving behind a

heroic legend to influence future generations or in making some

other kind of lasting statement to humanity or God. For these

groups, even the threat of annihilation may have little impact on

their actions.

Victory can be as hard to define as survival. Victory normally

means the accomplishment of the specific political aims for which

the group went to war. In practice, however, victory may mean

merely ending the war on terms less unfavorable to oneself than to

the enemy. If the costs of continuing a military struggle come to
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-9

exceed the value of the goal, meaningful victory is unattainable.

Given the nature of war, however, such cost-benefit analysis is

more easily described than accomplished. A major problem with

victory as a goal is that victory is an emotion-laden word. The

accomplishment of limited military and political aims that do not

satisfy the emotions or seem to justify the costs of the war may not

feel like victory. Because we cannot precisely measure the value of

most wars aims or accurately judge the cost of their attainment, it

is often difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting

exceeds the value of victory.

The main point in this discussion of survival and victory is that

the problem of identifying what survival and victory mean to various participants in war can be extremely difficult. Our analysis

must involve a multitude of considerations that are different in

every conflict.

Political Objectives

Political entities go to war for a variety of reasons, ranging from

the simple, such as seizing or protecting a valuable piece of territory, to the abstract such as “defending national honor” or “maintaining the balance of power.” Despite their diversity, political

objectives in war can be labeled as either limited or unlimited.

The distinction is fundamental. An unlimited political objective

amounts to the elimination of the opponent as a political entity. A

limited political objective, on the other hand, is one in which the

enemy leadership can survive and remain in power. See figure on

pages 2-10 and 2-11.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

2-10

When a political entity seeks an unlimited political objective, its

enemy’s leadership is to be removed (perhaps merely deposed,

perhaps exiled, imprisoned, or executed), while the enemy’s former assets (territory, population, economic resources) may be

absorbed, redistributed, or eradicated. Absorption can mean

many things. With the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia began an

effort to systematically reabsorb each of the newly established

states with the intent to reestablish a new Yugoslavia under Serbian control. 

On the other hand, the United States’ invasion of Panama successfully disposed of the current regime but upon reconstitution

left the Panamanian people in control of their government. Both

cases provide examples of unlimited political objectives. The

first demonstrates the desire to remove the current leadership

and absorb territory, population, and resources. The second

 Limited and unlimited political objectives.

LIMITED

POLITICAL OBJECTIVE

OPPOSING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SURVIVES

INTIMIDATE CAUSE

 CHANGE

 IN POLICY

 REDUCE

 ENEMY

 MILITARY

CAPACITY

 TAKE

 SLICE

 OF

TERRITORY
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-11

demonstrates the desire to remove the current leadership and

redistribute the sources of power.

An unlimited political objective, then, may embrace anything

from merely deposing a particular leader to physically exterminating an entire people or culture. Ideological revolutionaries,

would-be world conquerors, and both sides in most true civil

wars7

 tend to seek unlimited political objectives. Occasionally,

defensive alliances seeking to eliminate a habitual aggressor will

also pursue an unlimited political objective.

Conversely, a limited political objective includes anything short

of eliminating the political opponent. It is envisioned that the

enemy leadership will remain in control after the conclusion of

hostilities, although some aspects of its power (influence, territory, resources, or internal control) will be reduced or curtailed.

 Limited and unlimited political objectives—Continued.

UNLIMITED

POLITICAL OBJECTIVE

OPPOSING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS REMOVED

 CHANGE

 REGIME

 CHANGE

 FORM OF

 GOVERNMENT/

 RULING CLASS

 CONQUER/

 ABSORB

 EXTERMINATE

 (GENOCIDE)
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

2-12

Limited political objectives are characteristic of states seeking

better positions in the international balance of power, clans vying

for political position within a larger society, mafias or street

gangs battling for “turf,” and reformist political movements.

MEANS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

In the purest sense, the means in war is combat—physically attacking the enemy or defending against enemy attacks upon us.

However, war is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means are only one element used to implement a national

strategy. The relative importance placed on the military element

of the national strategy varies greatly depending on the nature and

the particular circumstances of the struggle. All of the instruments

of power—diplomatic, economic, military, and informational—

must be brought to bear and exploited to the fullest in war.

Diplomacy is the art of employing communications and establishing relationships in the global environment. Ideas, prestige,

and commitment are the currencies of the field. The diplomatic

instrument uses a nation’s international position combined with

diplomacy to achieve national objectives. Diplomatic tools may

include negotiations, political recognition, treaties, and alliances.

While the diplomatic instrument is normally emphasized before

hostilities actually begin, it remains a key element of the national

strategy in any conflict situation. In certain situations (especially

military operations other than war), the diplomatic instrument
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-13

continues to be the main effort, even after the commitment of

military forces.

The economic instrument uses the application of material resources to achieve national objectives. Nations employ economic

means to protect their own industries and markets, to improve the

quality of life of their people, to stabilize the economy and government of friends and allies, and to deter destabilizing and hostile

actions by other nations. Specific economic means include regulation of trade practices, loans and loan guarantees, monetary and

investment policies, foreign aid, subsidies, and technology transfers. As with the diplomatic instrument, the economic instrument

generally has primacy over the military instrument during peace

and is often used before military force during a crisis; changes in

trade or monetary policy, economic sanctions, or some type of

embargo are frequently the first steps taken in an effort to influence an adversary’s behavior. However, economic considerations

continue to be at the forefront of any conflict, and the use of economic measures to support the friendly war effort and to undermine the enemy’s ability to resist continue throughout the course

of a war.

The military instrument is the use of force or the threat to use

force to achieve national objectives. Military power is the sum of

a nation’s weapons and equipment, trained manpower, organizations, doctrines, industrial base, and sustainment capacity. The

military instrument can be employed in a variety of ways that are

short of combat such as training allies, establishing presence, or

acting as a show-of-force. However, the main use of military
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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power is in conflict. While the military instrument is often the

main effort during war, the nature and objectives of the particular

conflict must be examined to determine the appropriate relationship between the use of military force and the application of the

other instruments of national power.

The informational instrument (previously known as the psychological element or instrument) refers to the use of information and

ideas to advance the interests and achieve the objectives of the

nation. The objective in the use of the information instrument is

to influence the perceptions and attitudes of allies, adversaries,

and interested observers. Informational tools include the expression of intent and motive propaganda and press releases, information and personalities, food drops and medical care for refugees—

in short, anything that affects the rational or emotional components of the human mind.

While less tangible than the others, the power of ideas and information is real and should not be underestimated. With the informational instrument, a nation can create a psychological impact

causing responses ranging from awe or admiration to fear or

loathing. This psychological impact can influence not only political and military leaders but the societies of the nations involved

and world opinion. It can generate sympathy or antipathy inspired

by the culture, ideas, values, and stated cause and objectives for

which the parties are fighting.

The instruments of national power overlap and interconnect. Diplomats’ power to sway other governments is greatly dependent on

those governments’ awareness of economic and military power

and on their assessment of a nation’s willingness to use that power.
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-15

Economic power is bolstered by military power that can defend

economic interests. Military power is often dependent on the diplomats’ ability to gain basing rights and overflight permission

from other countries or to enlist them in alliances and coalitions.

Military power is directly dependent on the financial and technological strength of the nation’s economy.

Military professionals naturally concentrate on the military

means of strategy, but they should also be conscious of the other

means that can be exploited and must be defended in the larger

political struggle. Most importantly, they must understand that

military force is an inappropriate tool for the solution of most

political difficulties. Force is at best a necessary means for clearing obstacles to more peaceful solutions. This appreciation of the

role of force is a vital component of military professionalism, for

military leaders have a responsibility to ensure that political leaders understand both the capabilities and the limitations of the military instrument.

In appraising the relationship between the military and nonmilitary instruments of our national power in any given situation, we

must be prepared to ask:

 How can our military capabilities complement or assist the

other instruments of national power in achieving our political

goals?

 How can diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments

of our national power aid our military efforts?

 How might our uses of force impede or imperil the achievement

of our political goals?
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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We must seek to achieve our goals as economically as possible

and with the right combination of means—diplomatic, economic,

military, and informational. The way in which we combine these

means in any given conflict will be greatly affected by the kind of

strategy we pursue and by the strategic goals we seek.

ADAPTING ENDS TO MEANS, AND VICE VERSA

When discussing strategy in the abstract, we often treat means

and ends as fixed. In practice, however, we frequently adjust

both. The occurrences of war—successes and failures, lessons

learned, new ideas, the entry of new combatants—may cause us

to shift both our means and our goals. As our resources increase,

as we gain confidence in our abilities, and as we find our enemy

more vulnerable than we had imagined, we tend to expand our

goals. On the other hand, when we find our resources or abilities

inadequate, we cut our ambitions to match.

Given time, determination, and creativity, means can be developed to achieve many reasonable goals. Means are adjustable to

some degree at every level. Moreover, our ends can affect the

means available to us. War aims that evoke popular enthusiasm

can give leaders access to resources otherwise unavailable. The

emotions created by violence can help war to feed itself, as it

energizes people to greater efforts and sacrifices than would be

otherwise obtainable.
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-17

Another example of the different ways strategic means can be

adjusted to match strategic ends can be found in the shifting American strategy of the Cold War. From the Truman administration on,

the American government pursued the goal of containing the

Soviet Union. The means adopted, however, tended to shift from

administration to administration.8

President Eisenhower’s administration employed a strategy

labeled “massive retaliation,” which relied on the United States’

nuclear superiority to deter Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union

possessed huge conventional forces but could not match the

American nuclear capability. Eisenhower wished to avoid building and maintaining large conventional forces, arguing that

nuclear weapons provided “more bang for the buck.” Rather than

attempt to match the Soviet’s conventional military power, massive retaliation threatened a nuclear response to any aggressive

move by the Soviet Union.

Although containment remained the broad goal, President Kennedy’s following administration had an entirely different approach

to means. The strategic situation was changing to some extent

because of the very success of the earlier massive retaliation strategy. The Soviets’ nuclear arsenal was growing, and they had

found a way around the American nuclear umbrella by sponsoring

numerous “wars of national liberation.” It became necessary to

confront the Soviets with conventional and counterinsurgency

forces as well as with nuclear arms. The Kennedy administration

formulated the strategy of “flexible response,” requiring forces

capable of deterring and, if necessary, fighting the Soviets at all

levels of conflict.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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The resources and commitments necessary to carry out “flexible

response” proved too costly for the Nation, and President Nixon’s

administration again changed the means used to pursue the goal

of containment. The strategy of détente was intended to convince

the Soviets to restrain themselves based upon a combination of

pressures and inducements. Among these pressures and inducements were the conduct of direct negotiations with the Soviet

Union on issues such as arms control, the establishment of links

to the People’s Republic of China, and a new set of policies

toward United States’ allies which has been called “the Nixon

doctrine.” The Nixon doctrine emphasized establishment of a

series of bilateral and multilateral alliances to contain Soviet

expansion. The United States would provide economic and military support to its allies, many of whom bordered on the Soviet

Union or one of its clients. Military aid consisted primarily of air

and naval support along with the implicit protection offered by

the United States’ nuclear capabilities. As a result of the United

States’ experience in Vietnam, however, the commitment of

United States’ ground units would occur only in cases of longstanding treaty obligations such as in Western Europe or Korea.

ENDS IN MILITARY STRATEGY

Just as a national strategy will have a number of political objectives, a particular military strategy will have a number of specific

military objectives. However, there are only two fundamental

ends behind the use of military force. The first is to physically
Strategy: Ends and Means

2-19

overpower the enemy’s military capacity, leaving the enemy

unable to resist our demands. The other is to inflict such high

costs on the enemy that negotiations on our terms becomes a

favorable option. The first of these alternatives represents what

we call a strategy of annihilation.

9

 In an annihilation strategy, our

military objective is unlimited: we seek to eliminate the enemy’s

ability to resist, thus leaving the enemy helpless to oppose the

imposition of our will. The second alternative is a strategy of erosion.

10 Here, our military objective is limited: we seek only to

raise the enemy’s costs so high that the enemy will find ending

the war on our terms more attractive than continuing to fight.

The goal of a strategy of annihilation is to deprive the enemy of

the ability to resist, to make the enemy militarily helpless. Annihilation does not require the complete physical destruction of the

enemy’s military forces. Rather, it requires that the forces be so

demoralized and disorganized that they become unable to effectively interfere with the achievement of our political goals. What

is being annihilated—literally “made into nothing”—is the

enemy’s physical means to oppose us.

Normally, a strategy of annihilation is viable only when one of

the participants possesses some very great superiority over the

other in terms of brute strength, military skill, leadership, technological capabilities, or morale. Without such an advantage, annihilation strategies often fail, resulting in protracted conflicts and

requiring such a commitment of resources that one or all the parties find themselves exhausted before the enemy can be eliminated. The 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War and the Bosnian conflict

from 1992 to 1995 are representative examples of what happens
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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when states pursue annihilation strategies without the necessary

advantages. Sometimes the necessary superiority can be obtained

through surprise, although this is hard to achieve and dangerous

to rely on. If the opponent has any strategic depth, the opponent

may recover from surprise before victory is assured.

The objective of the second approach—a strategy of erosion—is

to convince the enemy that settling the political dispute will be

easier and the outcome more attractive than continued conflict.

To put it another way, erosion strategies seek to present the

enemy with the probability of an outcome worse in the enemy’s

eyes than peace on the adversary’s terms. This is accomplished

through eroding or wearing down the enemy’s will to fight, rather

than destroying the enemy’s ability to resist.

Erosion strategies are used to pursue a limited political objective

when one combatant is either unable or unwilling to destroy the

opponent’s war-making capability. In many cases, an erosion

strategy is required simply because the enemy is too powerful or

difficult to annihilate. In other cases, this approach is used

because one party does not want or need to destroy the other’s

military capacity. Perhaps the goal requires such a modest concession from the enemy that it is reasonable to believe the enemy

will acquiesce after modest resistance. In another example, there

may be a continuing need to keep the opponent’s military forces

in existence as a buffer or as a factor in the balance of power.

Relationship Between Political and Military Objectives

Political objectives and military objectives are very different

things. Political objectives describe, in a sense, where we want to
Strategy: Ends and Means

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go. Military objectives describe what we have to accomplish militarily in order to get there.

If the political objective is unlimited, the military strategy must

be unlimited. Conversely, a limited political objective may call

for a military strategy with limited objectives—that is, an erosion

strategy. In Afghanistan, the Mujahidin and their Western backers

sought a limited political objective: to get the Soviet Union to

withdraw from the struggle. Accordingly, they pursued an erosion

strategy, seeking to make the Afghan adventure too costly for the

Soviet government to sustain.

Though our political objective is limited, it does not necessarily

follow that our military strategy must also be limited (see figure).

The Gulf War provides an example of an unlimited military

 Relationship between political and military objectives.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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strategy applied successfully in pursuit of a limited political

objective. The Coalition had a limited political objective: restore

Kuwait’s independence. In order to attain this objective, however,

it was necessary to destroy all capability of the Iraqi forces to

resist and forcibly eject them from Kuwait. Thus, the Coalition

employed a strategy of annihilation, pursuing the total defeat of

Iraq’s military capacity within the Kuwait theater of operations.

Strategies of annihilation are conceptually simple. The focus of

operational efforts is the enemy’s armed forces and the object is

to render them powerless. Those forces may be annihilated

through battle or through destruction of the social or industrial

infrastructure that supports them. The main effort is the armed

forces. The diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments

of national power support the military effort. Victory is easily

measured: when one side’s fighting forces are no longer able to

present organized resistance, the other side has won.

By comparison, erosion strategies involve many more variables.

In erosion strategies, there is a much wider choice in the designation of a main effort among the instruments of national power, the

relationship of military force to the other instruments of power,

and the definition of victory. Attacks may be focused on the

enemy’s armed forces, as in an annihilation strategy, or some other

valuable resource such as territory, commerce, or financial assets

may be seized, threatened, or neutralized. Military forces are normally the main effort in the seizing and holding of territory. Successful embargoes and the freezing of financial assets, on the other

hand, often depend primarily on diplomatic and economic power.

It may also be possible to undermine an enemy’s domestic or
Strategy: Ends and Means

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international political position through the use of informational or

psychological operations.

Victory in a strategy of erosion can be more flexibly defined or

more ambiguous than is the case with an annihilation strategy.

The enemy’s submission to our demands may be explicit or

implicit, embodied in a formal treaty or in behind-the-scenes

agreements. Convinced that we have made our point, we may

simply “declare victory and go home.” A compromise may allow

both sides to claim success. Victories in erosion strategies thus

tend to be undramatic, but they can have tremendous political

consequences. The West’s success in its containment of the Communist bloc, essentially a very long-term erosion strategy, offers a

powerful example.

Distinguishing Between Erosion and Annihilation Strategies

Although annihilation and erosion are conceptually quite different, in practice it is often hard to distinguish between them. There

are several reasons for this ambiguity. First, annihilation and erosion become practically indistinguishable when one side or both

pursue annihilation, but neither has an overwhelming military

superiority. In such a case, unlimited political and military objectives can be obtained only through “slugging it out.” This guarantees roughly comparable losses on both sides and can lead to

negotiated settlements, even though one or both sides originally

sought unlimited objectives.

Second, these two strategies can overlap, or one can lead to the

other. Sometimes it is the threat of annihilation that forces the
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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enemy to make a deal. In that case, the difference between an erosion strategy and one of annihilation is that the enemy is offered

an option of settling the issue before being made helpless. Conversely, if an enemy cannot be worn down through an erosion

strategy into accepting a settlement, it may be necessary to switch

to a strategy of annihilation.

Third, a strategy that has not yet fully taken shape may be ambiguous. In some cases, this ambiguity reflects calculation: either the

strategy is decided but is being disguised, or the strategist has

goals that can be fulfilled via either approach and is waiting to see

how his/her opportunities develop. In other cases, ambiguity

reflects poor strategy making: the strategy maker does not know

what he/she wants to achieve or how to achieve it. Ultimately,

however, a successful strategy must turn out to be one or the

other. At war’s end, a strategy that has neither eliminated the

enemy’s ability to resist nor worn down the enemy’s will to continue the struggle is a strategy that has failed.

The distinction between strategies of annihilation and erosion is

fundamental. The successful strategist must be able to distinguish

which strategy is being pursued or should be pursued in a given

situation. The ability to determine which strategy is appropriate

in turn depends upon the strategist’s understanding of the ends of

national strategy and the means employed to achieve those ends.

Without this foundation, it is impossible to arrive at the specifics

of a particular military strategy: the determination of military

objectives, the identification of the appropriate means to achieve

those objectives, and the development of the strategic concept.
Chapter 3

Strategic Opposites

“Grand strategy must always remember that peace follows

war.”1

—B. H. Liddell Hart

Strategic Opposites

3-3

It is crucial to distinguish between annihilation and erosion strategies and to understand who is pursuing which goal and why.

There are, however, a great many other dimensions to any strategic situation. The dynamics of a struggle are affected not only by

the differing political and military goals of the antagonists but by

similarities and differences in their character, the kinds of forces

they employ, the techniques they use, and the ways they see—and

are seen by—the world. In making a strategic assessment, such

factors are more important than a simple numerical comparison

of units and equipment.

In this chapter, we will examine several sets of strategic opposites

that are helpful in understanding the nature of the strategic problem. All of these pairs of opposites do not necessarily apply to

every strategic situation, nor do these approaches necessarily

influence each other. For example, whether a strategy is symmetrical or asymmetrical has little bearing on whether it is annihilative or erosive. Nonetheless, a grasp of these concepts will help

us to formulate the questions we must ask as we try to understand

the specific problem before us.

DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE STRATEGIES

The strategic attacker is the antagonist seeking to add to his/her

relative power. It usually is the side that initiates a war, although

defenders sometimes launch preemptive attacks. An attacker may

be seeking to completely overthrow the balance of power or may
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simply want an upward adjustment in his/her relative position.

This distinction affects the kinds of strategies both sides pursue

and the intensity of the struggle.

The strategic defender is the participant that wants to keep what

he/she has or to maintain his/her relative position in a balance of

power system. In many important respects, defense is inherently

stronger than offense. The strength of the strategic defense

derives from human psychology and the balance of power mechanism as well as the forces of friction and inertia. People are naturally willing to endure great sacrifices in defense of their homes

and homelands and much less willing to endure such sacrifices in

military adventures abroad. An aggressor’s action frequently

causes anxiety and hostility in neighboring allied and neutral

countries; they often interpret a challenge to the existing balance

of power as a threat and are more naturally inclined to support the

defender. Friction and inertia are normally on the side of the

defender as well: it is inherently easier to hold onto something

than to take it away from someone else.

These political and psychological strengths of the strategic

defense are present in all wars, even those in which territorial

gains and losses are not a major factor. The strength of the defense

is often reinforced operationally since the attacker is normally

moving away from his/her base of supply and the center of his/her

political power, while the defender is falling back on his/hers.

Note, of course, that this superiority of the strategic defense is not

an absolute. Obviously, a defender with few resources and poor
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3-5

leadership is not stronger than an attacker with vastly greater

resources and good leadership. However, all other things being

equal, the defender has the advantage.

At the tactical and operational levels, the roles of attacker and

defender may frequently change hands or even be shared more or

less evenly. At the strategic level, however, the roles tend to be

fixed throughout any given conflict. In World War II, for

instance, the Western Allies held the advantages of the strategic

defense even as their armies marched into Germany. They were

perceived as being restorers of the balance of power rather than as

threats to it. However, in some situations, the roles of strategic

attacker and defender can be reversed. When war is endemic in a

society, when the origins of the conflict are poorly remembered,

or when the war guilt has come to be equally shared, the advantages of the original defender tend to be lost. In such a case, the

balance of power mechanism usually tends to support the current

defender and to oppose whichever contender seems momentarily

to have the initiative.

SYMMETRICAL AND ASYMMETRICAL STRATEGIES

Strategies can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. That is, the

contending powers may pursue mirror-image ends or rely on similar means, or they may pursue quite different kinds of goals or

apply dissimilar means.2
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A symmetrical military strategy is one that attempts to match—or

rather, to overmatch—the enemy strength for strength, to beat the

enemy on his/her own terms. An asymmetrical strategy is one

that attempts to apply one category of means against another category, to use some means to which the enemy cannot effectively

respond in kind.

Many wars are fought between very different enemies and are thus

profoundly asymmetrical in character. For example, a terrorist

organization may wage war against a government or even against

the international community as a whole. The terrorist campaigns

of the Irish Republican Army against the United Kingdom and the

Palestine Liberation Organization against Israel are illustrations.

Most states would like nothing better than for terrorists to act symmetrically and resort to open battle, which would make them vulnerable to the state’s superior conventional military forces. On the

other hand, terrorists may also seek to provoke a symmetrical

response: the purpose of many terrorist attacks is to provoke governments into actions that antagonize ordinary citizens such as

restrictive security measures or even reprisals in kind. These acts

undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the government and

play into the hands of the terrorist strategy. Because of the fundamentally different natures of the adversaries, the political effects

of these similar actions are dramatically different.

Most real-world strategies are a mixture of symmetrical and

asymmetrical elements, and it is often difficult to determine the

overall balance between them. Thus any discussion of symmetry
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3-7

or asymmetry in war is a matter of degree as well as kind. The usefulness of the concept is that it helps us analyze the dynamics of a

struggle. For example, the American strategy of containment

during the Cold War always involved strong elements of both

symmetry and asymmetry. From a military standpoint, Eisenhower’s massive retaliation policy was fundamentally an asymmetrical strategy: the United States would reply to any type of

Soviet aggression “by means and at places of our own choosing.”3

 This was generally interpreted to mean a U.S. nuclear

response to a conventional Soviet provocation. From the national

strategic standpoint however, Eisenhower’s strategy was broadly

similar to the Soviet Union’s in that both relied primarily on

deterrence rather than on the actual application of military force.

The Kennedy administration’s subsequent flexible response

strategy was militarily a symmetrical strategy of matching the

Soviets strength for strength. However, it also took advantage of

economic and political asymmetries.

There is no innate advantage or disadvantage to either a symmetrical or asymmetrical strategy. The choice depends on the situation and on the constraints of time and creativity. The interplay

between symmetry and asymmetry in any struggle is unique and

covers a wide range of possibilities. In India’s post-World War II

struggle for independence, for example, British military power

was overthrown by the most asymmetrical approach imaginable:

Gandhi’s campaign of nonviolence.

A particular strategy must take into account the similarities and

differences between the opponents and must—when necessary or
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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advantageous—seek to create new ones. The effective strategist

is not biased in favor of either symmetry or asymmetry but is

keenly aware of both and of the interplay between them.

DETERRENCE: 

STRATEGIES OF REPRISAL OR DENIAL

Deterrence means dissuading an enemy from an action by means

of some countervailing threat. There are essentially two methods

of deterrence: denial and reprisal.

To deter by denial means to prevent an enemy’s action by convincing the enemy that his/her action will fail. Conceptually, this

is a symmetrical approach (although the actual means of denial

may be either symmetrical or asymmetrical). For example, a state

may deter conventional invasion by maintaining sufficiently

credible forces to defend its borders. It may deter the use of poison gas by training and equipping its forces and population to

function effectively in a chemical warfare environment. Terrorists

may be deterred from attacks on airports by tight security.

The second approach, reprisal, is conceptually asymmetrical. We

may concede that the enemy is capable of taking an action against

us, but we must convince the enemy that the gain from such an

action will not be worth the cost. For example, a state weak in

conventional forces may seek to deter enemy occupation by credibly preparing to wage a long, painful guerrilla war of resistance.
Strategic Opposites

3-9

Conventional invasion might also be deterred through the threat

of nuclear retaliation.

There are overlaps between denial and reprisal. Tight airport

security may deter terrorists by convincing them either that their

efforts will fail (denial) or that they will be caught and punished

(reprisal). A demonstrated capability to wage chemical warfare

may deter a gas attack both by denying the enemy an advantage

and by threatening to retaliate in kind.

As these examples indicate, in practice denial and reprisal are often

more effective when applied in tandem. The ability of one side to

deny its enemy an advantage cannot always be absolutely convincing, especially if the other side is inclined to take risks. Deterrence

by denial also implies a certain passivity. An enemy may be willing to test the defenses if the enemy believes that failure carries no

further penalty. On the other hand, while deterrence by reprisal

compensates for some of the weakness of denial, reprisal has its

own weaknesses. Retaliation, even if carried out successfully, may

come too late to avoid suffering significant damage.

STANDARDIZED OR TAILORED STRATEGIES

Usually, when we talk about the conscious formulation of a particular strategy, we are talking about a specific way of using specific

means to reach specific ends. This is a strategy “tailored” to deal
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with a particular problem. Our means are finely adapted to fit our

ends, and vice versa.

There are classes of problems, however, that do not initially lend

themselves to such tailoring. These problems usually fall into one

or both of two categories:

 First, we lack the time to tailor a unique response to a specific

problem. This can be the case in rapidly unfolding strategic

problems or when we are unwilling or unable to adapt for some

other reason.

 Second, we lack the specific knowledge needed to craft a

unique strategy but recognize the problem as fitting a certain

pattern.

In such cases, we normally adopt a standardized strategy, whether

or not it is truly appropriate to the specific problem.

Standardized and tailored strategies are not mutually exclusive.

Often a standardized strategy provides the point of departure for a

tailored strategy that evolves as the situation develops. If we run

into certain types of problems often enough, we develop standardized responses that are generally appropriate to that type of

problem. Experience has taught us they will work more often

than not. In many cases, standardized strategies are designed to

gain time to find an appropriate, specific solution.

Standardized strategies are not fixed; they can be changed and

improved, usually on the basis of experience. These strategies
Strategic Opposites

3-11

build a certain reputation that may strongly influence the behavior

of friends, foes, and neutrals. Standardized strategies generally

find expression not within a single war, but over the course of

many conflicts. Such a strategy’s immediate payoff in any particular case may be less than completely satisfying, but it can offer

great advantages over the long term.

As an example, the United States has employed a standardized

strategy of providing nation-building support to defeated enemies.

During the period of reconstruction, the United States assists in

rebuilding the defeated states’ industrial base and infrastructure.

Two notable examples are the reconstruction of Germany and

Japan following World War II. More recently, the United States

provided postconflict aid to Grenada, Panama, and Haiti.

In its conduct of war, the United States pursues a standard strategy that includes respect for the independence of allies, relatively

mild occupation policies, the generous and systematic reconstruction of conquered states, as well as a persistent economic isolation of hostile nations. These policies reflect a recognition that

wars end and that the victors must live with the survivors. This

approach also makes it easier for other states to act as American

allies and difficult for enemies to create and sustain popular resistance to American power and influence. Combined with the

American reputation for overwhelming firepower and a demonstrated willingness to use it in war, such policies have contributed

greatly to America’s strategic success.
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STRATEGY BY INTENT OR BY DEFAULT

Not all strategies are the product of conscious thought. Warfare is

driven by politics, and rational calculation is only one of many

factors in politics. Strategies by intent are those developed primarily through the rational consideration of options and their

likely implications. Strategies by default, on the other hand, are

those dictated by circumstances or determined primarily by ideologies, unconscious assumptions, and prejudices that prevent strategists from considering all of their options in what many would

consider a fully rational manner. While conceptually distinct, the

two are rarely mutually exclusive; most strategies involve elements of both intent and default.

Consider the Russian strategic response to invasion by Germany

in World War II. The Russian intent was to defend their country at

the border. The strength of their enemy forced the Russians into a

strategy of delay and withdrawal until the invader could be worn

down sufficiently to be defeated. Conversely, the Nazis’ blind

adherence to their racial ideologies led to their failure to take

advantage of the indifferent attitudes of the Belorussian and

Ukrainian peoples towards the Soviet regime. Had they pursued a

rational policy towards the population of occupied Soviet territory, they might have undermined the growth of a powerful partisan movement behind their lines.

The functioning of coalitions offers another illustration of the

interplay between strategies of intent and default. Coalition warfare is often entered into as part of an intentional strategy. However, strategies adopted by the coalition are complicated or even
Strategic Opposites

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subverted by the ideological motivations of the participants. Dictatorships generally have difficulty participating in coalition warfare.

However sensible it might be to cooperate with other political entities in pursuit of common goals, dictatorships by their very nature

demand the right to make decisions unilaterally. They attempt to

treat potential allies as servants, subordinating others’ interests

completely to their own. Theocratic states that find their justification for existence in the demands of God may have a similar

difficulty in making rational strategic compromises. Liberal democracies that are cooperative, compromising, balance-of-power

entities internally are much more likely than dictatorships or theocracies to demonstrate these same characteristics in their external

relationships. They are also more likely to attempt to treat very different kinds of political entities as if they shared those values.

What we have described are only tendencies. Insightful and strongwilled leaders occasionally overcome such tendencies. Strategists

must seek to understand which elements of their own and the

enemy’s strategies are fixed by nature and which are subject to conscious change. A policy that seeks to convince the enemy to change

his/her behavior will fail if he/she is incapable of change.

EVALUATING OPPOSING STRATEGIES

The purpose of presenting the sets of opposing strategies in this

chapter is analytical rather than prescriptive. We must use these
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concepts to understand what we, our allies, our enemies, and relevant neutral forces are doing and why. They deepen our understanding and throw new light on sometimes inscrutable

opponents. Faced with the possibility of war, however, the strategist must return to the fundamentals we described in chapter 2:

What are the political objectives of each participant? Are they

limited or unlimited? How do the opponents perceive each other’s

objectives? The answers to these questions will have implications

for the fundamental character of any resulting conflict and the

adoption of a particular strategy. We must appreciate which elements of the situation are fixed and which are subject to conscious change. We must be prepared to deal with the constants

and norms as well as uncertainty and ambiguity. Only then can

we intelligently discuss the strategy-making process, as we do in

the following chapter.
Chapter 4

The Making of Strategy

“Modern warfare resembles a spider’s web—everything

connects, longitudinally or laterally, to everything else;

there are no ‘independent strategies,’ no watertight compartments, nor can there be.”1

—John Terraine

The Making of Strategy

4-3

Having considered the nature of the environment within which

strategy is made, the fundamental goals of all strategies, and

some ways to categorize a strategy, we now consider how strategy is actually made.

THE STRATEGY-MAKING PROCESS

Despite all that we have said about the nature of politics and policy,

people generally think of strategy making as a conscious, rational

process—the direct and purposeful interrelating of ends and means.

In fact, strategy is very seldom if ever made in a fully rational way.

Each political entity has its own mechanism for developing strategy. While certain elements of the strategy-making process may

be clearly visible, specified in a constitution and law or conducted

in open forum, many aspects of the process are difficult to observe

or comprehend. Participants in the process itself may not fully

understand or even be aware of the dynamics that take place when

dealing with a specific strategic situation. Thus, it is impossible to

define any sort of universal strategy-making process. It is possible,

however, to isolate certain key elements that any strategy maker

must take into account to arrive at a suitable solution to a particular problem. We must focus on these elements if we are to understand the strategy and strategic context of any particular conflict.

Strategy making is in effect a problem-solving process. In order

to solve a particular problem, the strategist must understand its
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nature and identify potential solutions. We start with the nature of

the problem and the particular political ends of each of the participants in the conflict. This helps us to identify the specific political objectives to be accomplished. These objectives lead to

development of a national strategy to achieve them. From there,

we proceed to military strategy.

While it is difficult to specify in advance the content of a military

strategy, it is easier to describe the questions that military strategy

must answer. First, we must understand the political objectives

and establish those military objectives that enable us to accomplish the political objectives. Second, we must determine how

best to achieve these military objectives. Finally, we must translate the solution into a specific strategic concept: Will our strategy result in the requirement for multiple theaters or multiple

campaigns? What are the intermediate goals and objectives

within these theaters and campaigns that will achieve our political

objectives? The military strategic concept incorporates the

answers to these questions and provides the direction needed by

military commanders to implement the strategy.

The Strategic Assessment

When confronted with a strategic problem, strategists must first

make an assessment of the situation confronting them. This assessment equates to the observation-orientation steps of the observation-orientation-decide-act loop.2

 While the factors involved and

the time constraints at the strategic level are different from those at

the tactical or operational levels, the principle is the same: without

a basic understanding of the situation, decisionmaking and action

are likely to be seriously flawed.
The Making of Strategy

4-5

The assessment begins with observing and orienting to the strategic landscape. Strategists look at the factors discussed in chapter 1:

the physical environment, national character, the interplay between

the states, and balance of power considerations. Once they have an

appreciation for the landscape, they must focus on and determine

the nature of the conflict.

Assessing the nature of the conflict requires consideration of

questions like these: What value do both sides attach to the political objectives of the war? What costs are both sides willing to

pay? What is the result of the “value compared to cost” equation?

What material, economic, and human sacrifices will the participants endure? For how long? Under what circumstances? Will the

societies expect regular, measurable progress? Will they patiently

endure setbacks and frustration?

Such questions are fundamentally related to the ends of the conflict and the means employed to achieve those ends. The answers

to these questions are required to determine the nature of the

political objectives—the ends—of the conflict and the value to

both sides of those political objectives. The value of the objective, in turn, is a major indicator of the resources—the means—

that both sides will likely commit and the sacrifices they will

make to achieve it. An understanding of both ends and means is

required in order to develop an effective military strategy.

Political Objectives

Political objectives are the starting point for the development of a

strategy. The first step in making strategy is deciding which political objectives a strategy will aim to achieve. In order to design
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

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the military action that will produce the desired result, the military strategist needs to know what that desired result is, that is,

what the political objective is. From the political objectives, the

military strategist can develop a set of military objectives that

achieve the political objectives.

In theory, the setting of political objectives seems like a relatively straightforward proposition, and sometimes it is. The World

War II stated political objective of unconditional surrender by the

Axis powers was simple. In practice, however, setting political

objectives involves the solving of not one but several complicated

and interrelated problems. Multiple problems require the simultaneous pursuit of multiple and imperfectly meshed—sometimes

even conflicting—strategies. The constant pressures and longterm demands of our economic and social strategies tend naturally

to conflict with the demands of preparedness for the occasional

military emergency. The demands of warfighting, of coalition

management, of maintaining domestic unity, and of sustaining the

political fortunes of the current leadership often pull us irresistibly

in different directions. It is always crucial to remember that military strategy making is but one element of the much broader

dynamic of political interaction that goes into the making of

national strategy.

At a minimum, the determination of political objectives must

establish two things in order to form the basis for the development

of a sound military strategy. First, it must establish definitions for

both survival and victory for all participants in the conflict. As discussed in chapter 2, without an understanding of how each participant views its survival and victory, it will be impossible to
The Making of Strategy

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identify the military strategy that can attain either goal. Second,

the political leadership must establish whether it is pursuing a

limited or unlimited political objective. The identification of the

nature of the political objective is essential to ensuring the right

match between political and military objectives.

Military Objectives and the Means to Achieve Them

With an understanding of the political objectives, we then turn to

selection of our military objectives. Military objectives should

achieve or help achieve the political goal of the war. At the same

time, the use of military power should not produce unintended or

undesirable political results. Fighting the enemy should always

be a means to an end, not become an end in itself.

As with political objectives, the choice of military objectives may

seem relatively simple. However, selection of military objectives

is not a trivial matter. First, strategists may select a military objective that is inappropriate to the political objectives or that does

not actually achieve the political objective. Second, there may be

more than one way to defeat an enemy. As an example, will it be

necessary to defeat the enemy army and occupy the enemy country or might a naval blockade accomplish the objective? Third,

the pursuit of some military objectives may change the political

goal of the war. Successful pursuit of a particular military objective may have unintentional effects on the enemy, allies, neutrals,

and one’s own society. This is particularly true in cases where a

delicate balance of power is in place; achieving a given military

objective may alter the balance of power in such a way that the

resulting political situation is actually less favorable to the victor.
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Successful military strategies select a military goal or goals that

secure the desired political objectives, not something else.

The designation of limited or unlimited political objectives is a

necessary prerequisite to selecting the type of warfighting strategy that will be employed—either a strategy of annihilation or a

strategy of erosion. The choice of an erosion or annihilation strategy drives the selection of specific military objectives, the design

of our military actions, the effects we hope to achieve, and the

weight we give to our military efforts relative to the use of other

elements of our national power.

In annihilation strategies, the military objective is to eliminate the

military capacity of the enemy to resist. This almost always

involves the destruction of major elements of the enemy’s military

forces. Attacks against other targets—seizing territory, striking

economic capacity, or conducting informational or psychological

warfare against the enemy leadership or population—are normally

pursued only when they are directly related to degrading or

destroying some military capability. Thus, specific military objectives and the means for striking at those military objectives grow

out of the assessment of the nature and functioning of the enemy’s

military capacity.

In contrast, the focus of an erosion strategy is always the mind of

the enemy leadership. The aim is to convince the enemy leadership that making concessions offers a better outcome than continuing resistance. The military objectives in an erosion strategy

can be similar to those in an annihilation strategy, or they can be

considerably different.
The Making of Strategy

4-9

The first category of targets in an erosion strategy is the same as

in an annihilation strategy: the enemy’s armed forces. If the

enemy is disarmed or finds the threat of destruction to be credible, the enemy may submit to the conditions presented. On the

other hand, certain assets that have limited military importance

but are of critical economic or psychological value—a capital city

or key seaport—may be seized. Similarly, the enemy’s financial

assets may be frozen or trade may be blockaded. Again, if submission to stated demands is less painful for enemy decisionmakers than continuing to do without the lost asset, they may concede

defeat. A third possible target in an erosion strategy is the enemy

leadership’s domestic political position. Money, arms, and information can be provided to internal opponents of the leadership.

The purpose is to make enemy leaders feel so endangered that

they will make peace in order to focus on their domestic enemies.

Choosing military objectives and the appropriate means to pursue

those objectives requires the consideration of two closely related

concepts: the center of gravity and the critical vulnerability.3

A center of gravity is a key source of the enemy’s strength, providing either the physical or psychological capacity to effectively

resist. The utility of the concept is that it forces us to focus on what

factors are most important to our enemy in a particular situation

and to narrow our attention to as few key factors as possible.

At the strategic level, the range of possible centers of gravity is

broad. The enemy’s fighting forces may be a center of gravity.

Strength may flow from a particular population center, a region

providing manpower, or a capital city. A capital city may draw its

importance from some practical application such as functioning as
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a transportation hub or as a command and control nexus. The capital’s importance may be cultural, supplying some psychological

strength to the population. In the case of nonstate political entities,

the source of the enemy’s motivation and cohesion may be a key

individual or clique or the public perception of the leadership’s

ideological purity. Public support is often a strategic center of

gravity, particularly in democratic societies.

In contrast to a center of gravity, a critical vulnerability is a key

potential source of weakness. The concept is important because

we normally wish to attack an enemy where we may do so with

the least danger to ourselves, rather than exposing ourselves

directly to the enemy’s strength. To be critical, a vulnerability

must meet two criteria: First, the capture, destruction, or exploitation of this vulnerability must significantly undermine or destroy

a center of gravity. Second, the critical vulnerability must be

something that we have the means to capture, destroy, or exploit.

If the center of gravity is the enemy armed forces, the critical vulnerability may lie in some aspect of its organization or its supporting infrastructure that is both key to the armed forces’ functioning

and open to attack by means at our disposal. During World War II,

the Allies sought to focus on the German armed forces’ logistical

vulnerabilities by attacking the German petroleum industry, ball

bearing supplies, and transportation infrastructure.

As an example of how centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities are used to determine military objectives and the means to

achieve them, consider the North’s use of General Winfield Scott’s

“Anaconda Plan” during the Civil War. The plan identified the
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4-11

South’s physical and emotional capacity to sustain a defensive war

as one of the strategic centers of gravity. Critical vulnerabilities

associated with this strategic center of gravity included the South’s

small industrial capacity, limited number of seaports, underdeveloped transportation network, and dependence upon foreign

sources of supply for foodstuffs, raw materials, and finished

goods. The Anaconda Plan targeted this center of gravity by

exploiting these vulnerabilities. The plan called for a naval blockade to wall off the Confederacy from trading with Europe, seizure

of control of the Mississippi River valley to isolate the South from

potential sources of resources and support in Texas and Mexico,

and then capture of port facilities and railheads to cut lines of

transportation. These actions would gradually reduce the South’s

military capability to resist as well as undermine popular support

for the rebellion. While initially rejected as being too passive, the

Anaconda plan revisited and reimplemented, eventually became

the general strategy of the North. Scott’s experienced analysis of

the South’s centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities resulted

in an effective military strategy which led directly to the defeat of

the Confederacy.4

An understanding of centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities

forms the core for the development of a particular military strategy. Among the centers of gravity, strategists find military objectives appropriate to the political objectives and the warfighting

strategy being pursued. Among the critical vulnerabilities, strategists find the most effective and efficient means of achieving those

military objectives. Together these concepts help formulate the

strategic concept that guides the execution of the military strategy.
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Strategic Concepts

An essential step in the making of effective strategy is the development of a strategic concept.5 Derived from the strategic estimate of

the situation and the political and military objectives, this concept

describes the course of action to be taken. The strategic concept

should provide a clear and compelling basis for all subsequent

planning and decisionmaking.

As with the strategy itself, the strategic concept begins with the

political objectives. It should identify the military objectives to be

accomplished and how to reach them. It should establish the relationship and relative importance of the military means to the

other instruments of national power that are being employed. It

should address priorities and the allocation of resources. These, in

turn should help determine the concentration of effort within a

theater or campaign.

Sometimes a war is fought in one theater, sometimes in several. If

there is more than one theater, a choice has to be made on how to

allocate resources. This cannot be effectively done without some

overall idea of how the war will be won. The strategic concept provides this idea. Normally, military objectives are achieved by conducting a number of campaigns or major operations. What should

be the objective of a given campaign? Again, it is the strategic concept that answers that question. It gives commanders the guidance

to formulate and execute plans for campaigns and major operations.
The Making of Strategy

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World War II provides a clear example of the use of the strategic

concept. This concept naturally evolved throughout the course of

the war. It was modified in response to various political, economic,

and military developments and as a result of disagreements among

the Allies. It is important to note that the strategic concept was not

a single document, but rather a series of decisions made by the

leaders of the Alliance. Nevertheless, in this general strategic concept, military leaders could find guidance from their political leadership for the formulation of specific theater strategies and

campaign plans.

It was immediately apparent that, given the global scale of the

conflict, the strength of the enemy, and the differing political

objectives, philosophies, postures, and military capabilities of the

Allied nations, a unifying strategy was needed. The strategic concept adopted by the Allies called for the defeat of Germany first,

effectively setting the division of labor and establishing priorities

between the European and Pacific theaters. As the concept developed, it forced a sequence and priority among the campaigns and

operations within theaters and set specific objectives for each of

the campaigns. Germany would be engaged through continuous

offensive action until a decisive blow could be launched from

Britain. Japan would be contained and harassed until sufficient

resources were available to go on the offensive in the Pacific.

Ultimately, this concept led to the achievement of the military and

political objective—in this case, unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

4-14

WHO MAKES STRATEGY?

Strategy making is almost always a distributed process. The various elements of any particular strategy take shape in various

places and at various times and are formed by different leaders

and groups motivated by varying concerns. Elements of the strategy eventually adopted may surface anywhere in the organization. We need to understand the particular characteristics,

concerns, and goals of all significant participants if we are to

understand a specific strategic situation.

Without a detailed examination of the particular political entity

and its strategy-making process, it is impossible to determine

who is providing the answers to a particular question. Nevertheless, at least in terms of the division between military and civilian

decisionmakers, it is possible to identify who should be providing

these answers.

Earlier, it was argued that certain questions have to be answered

in order to make strategy. The question, “What is the political

objective the war seeks to achieve?” must be answered by the

civilian leadership. The question, “The attainment of what military objective will achieve, or help achieve, the political objective of the war?” should also be answered primarily by the

political leadership. They alone are in the best position to understand the impact that achievement of the military objective will

have on the enemy, allies, neutrals, and domestic opinion. In

answering the question, “How can the military objective be
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4-15

achieved?” the military leadership comes more to the fore. However, the civilian leadership will want to make sure that the

means used to achieve the military objective do not themselves

have deleterious effects, effects that may overshadow the political objective of the war. The question, “If there is more than one

theater, how should the war effort be divided among theaters?”

is likely decided primarily by the political leadership, because

this question can be answered only with reference to the overall

structure of the war. The questions, “Within a given theater,

should the war effort be divided into campaigns?” and “What

should be the objective of a given campaign?” would seem to be

primarily military in nature. Nevertheless, decisions made here

can also affect political objectives or concerns as well as impact

on the availability and consumption of scarce human and material resources. No political leader would want to entirely relinquish the decision about what the primary objectives of a

campaign should be.

Thus we can see that the making of military strategy is a responsibility shared by both political and military leaders. Military institutions participate in the political process that develops military

strategy. The military leadership has a responsibility to advise

political leaders on the capabilities, limitations, and best use of the

military instrument to achieve the political objectives. Military

advice will be meaningless, and political leaders will ignore it

unless military professionals understand their real concerns and

the political ramifications—both domestic and international—of

military action or inaction.
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JUST WAR

Traditionally, Western societies have demanded two things of their

strategic leaders in war. First is success, which contributes to security and societal well-being. Second is a sense of being in the right,

a belief that the cause for which the people are called to sacrifice is

a just one. Strategists must be able to reconcile what is necessary

with what is just. The “just war” theory provides a set of criteria

that can help to reconcile these practical and moral considerations.

Just war theory has two components, labeled in Latin jus ad bellum

(literally, “rightness in going to war”) and jus in bello (“rightness

in the conduct of war”). There are seven jus ad bellum criteria:6

 Just Cause. A just cause involves the protection and preservation of value. There are three such causes: defense of self

or of others against attack, retaking of something wrongly

taken by force, and punishment of concrete wrongs done by

an evil power.

 Right Authority. The person or body authorizing the war must

be a responsible representative of a sovereign political entity.

 Right Intention. The intent in waging war must truly be just

and not be a selfish aim masked as a just cause.

 Proportionality of Ends. The overall good achieved by the

resort to war must not be outweighed by the harm it produces.

 Last Resort. We must show that there is no logical alternative

to violence.
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 Reasonable Hope of Success. There can be neither moral nor

strategic justification for resorting to war when there is no hope

of success.

 The Aim of Peace. Ends for which a war is fought must

include the establishment of stability and peace.

Satisfying just war criteria is often not a simple or clear-cut process. We want to believe in the ethical correctness of our cause. At

the same time, we know that our enemies and their sympathizers

will use moral arguments against us. Therefore, though the criteria

for the rightness in going to war may be met, the translation of

political objectives to military objectives and their execution cannot violate jus in bello—rightness in the conduct or war. The

destruction of a power plant may achieve a tactical or operational

objective; however, the impact of its destruction on the civilian

populace may violate rightness in conduct and result in loss of

moral dignity, adversely affecting overall strategic objectives.

In sum, the just war criteria provide objective measures from

which to judge our motives. The effective strategist must be prepared to demonstrate to all sides why the defended cause meets

the criteria of just war theory and why the enemy’s cause does

not. If a legitimate and effective argument on this basis cannot be

assembled, then it is likely that both the cause and the strategy are

fatally flawed.
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STRATEGY-MAKING PITFALLS

Given the complexity of making strategy, it is understandable that

some seek ways to simplify the process. There are several traps

into which would-be strategists commonly fall: searching for

strategic panaceas; emphasizing process over product in strategy

making; seeking the single, decisive act, the fait accompli;

attempting to simplify the nature of the problem by using labels

such as limited or unlimited wars; falling into a paralysis of inaction; or rushing to a conclusion recklessly.

Strategic Panaceas

Strategists have long sought strategic panaceas: strategic prescriptions that will guarantee victory in any situation. The strategic panacea denies any need for understanding the unique characteristics

of each strategic situation, offering instead a ready-made and universal solution.

Examples abound. In the 1890s, the American naval writer Alfred

Thayer Mahan convinced many world leaders of the validity of his

theories centered on capital ships and concentrated battle fleets.7

These theories prompted Germany to challenge Great Britain for

naval dominance, contributing to the tension between the two

countries prior to the outbreak of World War I. Similarly, the theories of German Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen fixated on

strategies of annihilation and battles of envelopment. These prescriptive theories dominated Germany’s strategic thinking in

both World Wars. The deterrence strategies embraced by American Cold War theorists were equally influential. American forces
The Making of Strategy

4-19

accordingly designed for high-intensity warfare in Europe

proved inappropriate to counter Communist-inspired wars of

national liberation.

Emphasizing Process Over Product

The second major trap is the attempt to reduce the strategy-making

process to a routine. The danger in standardizing strategy-making

procedures is that the leadership may believe that the process

alone will ensure development of sound strategies. Just as there is

no strategic panacea, there is no optimal strategy-making process.

Nonetheless, political organizations, bureaucracies, and military

staffs normally seek to systematize strategy making. These processes are designed to control the collection and flow of information, to standardize strategy making, and to ensure the consistent

execution of policy.

Such systems are vitally necessary. They impose a degree of

order that enables the human mind to cope with the otherwise

overwhelming complexity of politics and war. However, they

may also generate friction and rigidity. Standardized strategies

can be valuable as a point of departure for tailored strategies or as

elements of larger tailored strategies. However, when the entire

process is run by routine, the results are predictable strategies by

default that adversaries can easily anticipate and counter.

The Fait Accompli

One class of strategic-level actions is worth considering as a distinct category. These are strategies in which the political and
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

4-20

military goals are identical and can be achieved quickly, simultaneously, and in one blow. Done properly, these actions appear to be

isolated events that are not part of larger, continuous military operations. More than raids or harassment, these actions aim to present

the enemy with an accomplished fact, or fait accompli—political/

military achievement that simply cannot be undone. In 1981, the

Israelis became extremely concerned about Iraq’s nuclear weapons

development program. They launched an isolated bombing raid

that destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility. The Israelis had no

further need to attack Iraqi targets, and Iraq had no military means

of recovering the lost facility.

A coup d’état is usually designed as a fait accompli. The political

and military objectives are the same thing: seizure of the existing

government. Noncombatant evacuations are also normally executed as faits accomplis. In a noncombatant evacuation, one

country lands its troops for the purpose of evacuating its citizens

from a dangerous situation, as in a revolution or civil war. Once

the evacuation has been accomplished, the cause for conflict

between the state conducting the evacuation and those engaging

in the hostilities that led to it has been removed.

The fait accompli is another potential strategic pitfall. It is

immensely attractive to political leaders because it seems neat

and clean—even “surgical.” The danger is that many attempted

faits accomplis end up as merely the opening gambit in what

turns out to be a long-term conflict or commitment. This result

was normally not intended or desired by those who initiated the

confrontation. In 1983, the Argentines assumed that their swift
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4-21

seizure of the nearby Falkland Islands could not be reversed by

far-off, postimperial Britain and that therefore Britain would

make no effort to do so. They were wrong on both counts.

Limited and Unlimited Wars

Another common error is the attempt to characterize a war as

either “limited” or “unlimited.” Such characterizations can be

seriously misleading. While we can generally classify the political and military objectives of any individual belligerent in a war

as limited or unlimited, seldom can we accurately characterize the

conflict itself as limited or unlimited. To do so may leave us badly

confused about the actual dynamics of a conflict.

If we examine the conflicting aims of the belligerents in the Vietnam War, we can see that this was never a limited war from the

North Vietnamese perspective nor should South Vietnam have

pursued only limited political objectives. North Vietnam’s political goal was the elimination of the South Vietnamese government

as a political entity and the complete unification of all Vietnam

under northern rule. The North Vietnamese leadership saw victory in this struggle as a matter of survival. While the North Vietnamese military strategy against the United States was erosion,

against South Vietnam it was annihilation. The South Vietnamese

leadership was weak, enjoying little legitimacy with a population

that had no hope of conquering the North. Its only goal was to

survive. The American strategy against North Vietnam was one

of erosion. However, the United States was never able to convince North Vietnam that peace on America’s terms was preferable to continuing the war.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

4-22

All wars can be considered limited in some aspects because they

are generally constricted to a specific geographic area, to certain

kinds of weapons and tactics, or to numbers of committed combatants. These distinctions are the factors at work in a particular

conflict, not its fundamental strategic classification. Another

common error is the assumption that limited wars are small wars

and unlimited wars are big ones. This confuses the scale of a war

with its military and political objectives. Large-scale wars can be

quite limited in political and/or military objectives, while a relatively small conflict may have unlimited political and military

objectives. The U.S. action against Panama in 1989 can be considered a very small-scale war, but both its political and military

objectives were unlimited. Panama’s capacity to resist was annihilated, its regime was deposed, and its leader was put on public

trial and imprisoned. It is possible that had the United States pursued more limited objectives, the result might have been a war of

attrition much more destructive to both sides.

The strategic pitfall in characterizing wars as limited or unlimited

is that such a label may lead to adoption of an incorrect strategy.

This is particularly true in the case of limited wars. There are

always temptations to limit the military means employed, even

when the political objectives demand a strategy of annihilation.

Such inclinations stem from the psychological and moral burdens

involved in the use of force, the desire to conserve resources, and

often a tendency to underestimate the enemy or the overall problem. Strategists must correctly understand the character and the

resource demands of a strategy before they choose it.
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4-23

Paralysis and Recklessness

Competent strategic-level decisionmakers are aware of the high

stakes of war and of the complex nature of the strategic environment. Successful decisions may lead to great gains, but failure can

lead to fearful losses. Some personalities instinctively respond to

this environment with a hold-the-line, take-no-chances mentality.

Others display an irresistible bias for action.

Unless we understand the specific problems, dangers, and potential gains of a situation, the two approaches are equally dangerous. Paralysis is neither more nor less dangerous than blindly

striking out in the face of either threat or opportunity. Unfortunately, the very process of attempting to ascertain the particulars

can lead to “paralysis by analysis.” Strategy makers almost

always have to plan and act in the absence of complete information or without a full comprehension of the situation.

At the same time, strategists must guard against making hasty or

ill-conceived decisions. The strategic realm differs from the tactical arena both in the pace at which events occur and the consequences of actions taken. Rarely does the strategic decisionmaker

have to act instantaneously. The development of strategy demands

a certain discipline to study and understand the dynamics of a situation and think through the implications of potential actions. While

it is often possible to recover from a tactical error or a defeat, the

consequences of a serious misstep at the strategic level can be catastrophic. Boldness and decisiveness, which are important characteristics of leadership at any level, must at the strategic level be

tempered with an appropriate sense of balance and perspective.
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4-24

The strategist’s responsibility is to balance opportunity against risk

and to balance both against uncertainty. Despite the obstacles to

focusing on specific strategic problems and to taking effective

action, we must focus, and we must act. Success is clearly possible.
Conclusion

“War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province

of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory

that it be thoroughly studied.”1

 —Sun Tzu

“As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the superstructure, is radically marred and imperfect if the foundation be insecure—so, if the strategy be wrong, the skill of

the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the

brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of

their effect.”2

—A. T. Mahan

Conclusion

Conclusion-3

We have explored the nature of politics, policy, and the political

entities that wage wars. We have examined the most fundamental

aspects of national and military strategy and have identified the

basic questions we must answer when considering the use of military means to gain political goals. We have examined some basic

types of military strategies and the ways in which those strategies

relate to political objectives. We have also considered some of the

problems in translating our understanding of these strategic fundamentals into practical military action. Now we must ask, What

does this mean for us as Marines?

The modern strategic environment poses a significant challenge

for the United States and its armed forces. The collapse of the

Soviet Union has changed the existing strategic environment

from one dominated by bipolar considerations to one that is in

transition. Long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and even personal

hatreds have spawned an increase in local and interstate violence.

Terrorism, civil wars, and secessions threaten to fracture existing

states and break down regional order. The strategist can no longer

be guided by the Cold War’s overarching strategic concept of

containment. That said, strategic thinking must adjust to the

evolving strategic environment.

The Department of Defense 1997 Joint Strategy Review concludes that the 21st century security environment will be characterized by chaos, crisis, and conflict. Global instability will

continue to arise from the world’s littorals, where well over half

of the world’s population resides. Thus, naval expeditionary

forces will remain one of the U.S.’s most reliable and flexible

tools of global influence both for today and into tomorrow. The
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Conclusion-4

Marine Corps will be at the center of our national security and

military strategies for addressing these challenges. Therefore,

Marines must possess the strategic skills and understanding necessary to participate effectively in this environment.

As we noted at the beginning, the United States Marine Corps does

not make national strategy, nor even the military strategy for fighting a particular war. However, individual Marines may well play a

role in the making of strategy. Moreover, the Marine Corps is often

intimately involved in the execution of strategy, and its effective

execution requires an understanding of both the intent and the context behind the strategy. Strategic execution is not simply carrying

out a fixed plan. Rather, it is a complex matter of both initiating

action and effectively responding to events as they unfold. Without

proper grounding in the strategic situation, the political and military objectives of the strategy, and the strategic concept, Marines

will not be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances.

The individual Marine must appreciate the complexities and difficulties of strategy. Few Marines will be in a position to fully grasp

the larger strategic picture, especially while in the field executing

a mission. Nonetheless, a fundamental understanding of the problems of strategy will help Marines to appreciate the importance of

their role and their unit’s role. It will help Marines to understand

the significance of constraints like rules of engagement and to

understand why policy guidance is sometimes unclear or often

fluctuates. In the increasingly complex operations of the postCold War era, an awareness of the short distance between tactical

action and its strategic impact may help individual Marines or
Conclusion

Conclusion-5

Marine leaders to avoid actions that damage the United States’

interests or image. This awareness should not impede action, but

instead assist Marines in the evaluation of their situation and provide the basis for an intelligent response.

Marines will also serve on staffs or in commands where strategic

decisions are made. They must be prepared to participate intelligently, tactfully, and energetically in the strategy-making process. They must be prepared to ask tough questions concerning

both political and military objectives and to advise our political

leaders on the capabilities and limitations in the use of the military instrument.

There is no shortcut to strategic wisdom. While some have predicted that the United States will be able to control the course of

future conflicts through “information dominance” or a “system of

systems,” Marines continue to believe that people, not systems or

machines, define success in war. Success in military action

whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level will continue to depend greatly upon the judgment, experience, and education of our Marines. The concepts of this publication cannot be

mastered without serious and ongoing contemplation. Neither can

they be turned into a strategic template to be laboriously worked

through on every occasion. We must think about these concepts,

internalize them, and constantly seek to improve our understanding of the strategic environment. Such an understanding, based on

a professional approach to the complexities of war and politics, is

the essence of “fighting smart.”
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Conclusion-6

[T]here is no substitute for the judgment and intuition of

experienced and properly educated commanders.

Our goal is to equip every Marine with the thinking ability to

win on the battlefields of the 21st century.3
Notes

Notes-1

The Study of Strategy

1. Unknown.

The Strategic Environment

1. Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,”

Paramaters (March 1981) p.14.

2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988) pp. 8–9.

 3. See Carl von Clausewitz, “War As An Instrument of Policy,” On

War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1976) pp. 605–610.

4. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free

Press, 1973) p.114.

5. National Geographic (September 1994) p. 32.

6. Based on the 1972, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1996

versions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States distributed by the

U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.).

7. For the best overall introduction to complexity theory, see M.

Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of

Order and Chaos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). See also Alan

Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,”

International Security (Winter 1992/1993) pp. 59–92.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Notes-2

8. Corbett, pp. 8–9.

9. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973) p. 167.

10. Ibid., p. 168.

11. Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western

Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 42.

12. Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization, “Table 6.1, Annual

Warfare Death Rates” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 195.

13. Compton’s Interactive Encyclopedia, version 2.01VW,

“Africa” (1994).

14. Blainey, pp. 109–114.

15. George Liska, quoted in Michael Sheehan, The Balance of

Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 2.

16. Clausewitz, pp. 566–573. Do not confuse this political idea

with Clausewitz’s closely related concept of the “culminating point of

the offensive” which is primarily an operational and logistical concept.

17. Clausewitz, p. 89.

18. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming

the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters (Autumn 1995) pp. 9–19.
Notes

Notes-3

Strategy: Ends and Means

1. President John F. Kennedy’s address at the U.S. Naval Academy Commencement, Annapolis, Maryland, June 7, 1961. Reprinted in

Theodore C. Sorensen et al., Let the Word Go Forth: The Speeches,

Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy (New York: Delacorte

Press, 1988) p. 243.

2. Military strategy: “The art and science of employing the armed

forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the

application of force or the threat of force.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

3. National strategy: “The art and science of developing and using

the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together

with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

4. Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy:

An Introduction to National Security Process and Problems (Maxwell

Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988) pp. 27–28.

5. Collins, p. 3.

6. Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments

make up the instruments of national power. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified

Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 Feb 1995. In earlier joint doctrine

publications, instruments of national power were referred to as elements

of national power, and the informational instrument was called the psychological instrument. The February 1995 edition of Joint Pub 0-2

updated this terminology.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Notes-4

 7. In a true civil war, two sides are fighting for ultimate control of

the same state or nation. The American Civil War was a war of secession;

had it succeeded, there would have been two independent nations in place

of the old United States. We call it a civil war because the secession failed

and the Union remained intact.

8. Discussions in this publication of American Cold War strategies

are strongly influenced by the analysis of John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies

of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National

Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

9. In classical military theory, the traditional term is strategy of

annihilation. See Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War Within the

Framework of Political History, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., especially

vol. 4, chap. IV (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).

10. Strategy of erosion is known as strategy of attrition in classical

military theory. The concepts are the same. We use the term erosion to

avoid confusion with the tactical concept of attrition warfare. See Hans

Delbrück, vol. 4, chap. IV.

Strategic Opposites

 1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, Dictionary of

Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval

Institute, 1966) p. 311.

2. There is a long tradition of military theory involving asymmetrical strategies. It appears in Chinese military theory most prominently in

Sun Tzu and in the works of Mao Zedong. A particularly clear discussion appears in Edward O’Dowd’s and Arthur Waldron’s, “Sun Tzu for

Strategists,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 10 (1991) pp. 25–36. British
Notes

Notes-5

military thinker B. H. Liddell Hart propounded asymmetry in his theory

of the “indirect approach” most powerfully in his books, The British

Way in Warfare (London: Faber & Faber, 1932), The Ghost of Napoleon

(London: Faber & Faber, 1933), and Strategy (New York: Praeger,

1954). See also Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1971) especially the introduction written

by Griffith.

3. John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,”

Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Department of State

January 25, 1954).

The Making of Strategy

 1. John Terraine, A Time For Courage: The Royal Air Force in the

European War, 1939–45 as quoted in Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and

Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1990) p. 8.

 2. Used as a simple but effective model of the command and control process, the observation-orientation-decide-act (OODA) loop applies

to any two-sided conflict. For a detailed description, see MCDP 6, Command and Control (October 1996) p. 63.

 3. Critical vulnerability is a Marine Corps doctrinal concept that

appeared first in FMFM 1, Warfighting (March 1989) pp. 35–36. The

term center of gravity found its way into our strategic vocabulary via

Clausewitz’s On War. Clausewitz used the term frequently and in a variety of meanings. See Clausewitz, pp. 595–597. For a full discussion of

center of gravity and critical vulnerability, see MCDP 1, Warfighting

(June 1997) pp. 45–47.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Notes-6

 4. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of

Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper

Collins, 1993) p. 952. See also: Shelby Foote, Fort Sumter to Perryville

(New York: Random House, 1986) pp. 110–114.

5. Strategic concept: “The course of action accepted as the result of

the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be

done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the

military, diplomatic, economic, psychological and other measures which

stem from it.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

6. James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of

War, “A Moral and Historical Inquiry” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) pp. xxii–xxiii.

7. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–

1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1942).

Conclusion

1. Sun Tzu, p. 63.

2. A. T. Mahan as quoted in Heinl, Dictionary of Military and

Naval Quotations, p. 311.

3. Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, before combined hearings of the Procurement and Research

and Development Subcommittees of the House National Security Committee, March 29, 1997. This testimony can also be found in “Information

Superiority,” Marine Corps Gazette (June 1997) pp. 59–60.