IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1747

Filed August 9, 2023

TERESA LIFORD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

CHRISTENSEN FARMS, ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., and SECOND 

INJURY FUND OF IOWA,

Respondents-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Lucy J. Gamon, 

Judge.

Teresa Liford appeals the district court’s ruling that she is not entitled to 

Second Injury Fund benefits. AFFIRMED. 

Michael O. Carpenter (until withdrawal) and Bryan J. Goldsmith of Gaumer, 

Emanuel, Carpenter & Goldsmith, P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.

Abigail A. Wenninghoff of Kuper, Wenninghoff & Block, PC, LLO Omaha, 

for appellees Christensen Farms and Ace American Insurance Co.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sarah C. Timko, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee Second Injury Fund of Iowa.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Teresa Liford appeals the district court’s ruling, which affirmed that she was 

not entitled to Second Injury Fund benefits for a left knee injury. The deputy 

commissioner determined that the injury developed as a sequela to the right knee 

injury that occurred at Liford’s job, which did not justify awarding benefits from the 

Fund. Liford contends that she proved her injury was separate and distinct for the 

purpose of the second-injury claim. She also argues the “separate and distinct”

rule cannot be applied to Second Injury Fund cases due to their conflicting 

purposes. Because substantial evidence shows the left knee injury was a sequela 

to the right knee injury, we affirm the district court’s decision.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In the spring of 2014, Liford was working as a farrower for Christensen 

Farms. This job involved caring for the sows and piglets on the farm and moving 

the livestock. On March 10th, 2014, while reaching for a piglet, Liford’s right knee 

gave out, and she fell to the floor hitting both knees. She saw her family physician

for this injury, with a chief complaint of pain in the right knee. Despite a right knee 

meniscectomy performed by Dr. Vincent Christopher and physical therapy, Liford 

reports the pain persisted.

On December 5th, 2014, Liford visited a family practice for bilateral knee 

pain, reporting an onset of pain sometime between October and November after 

returning to work. Again, she was referred to Dr. Vincent, this time for magnetic 

resonance imaging (MRI) of the left knee. Liford’s left knee pain was traced back 

to overuse from her “babying” the right knee, as well as adjustments to a new 

workplace layout with more twisting in small spaces. She was diagnosed with a 
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left medial meniscal tear. While no specific injury to the left knee was noted, Liford 

was scheduled for a meniscectomy for that knee.

Liford filed for worker’s compensation for both knee injuries, naming her 

employer as well as the Second Injury Fund. From the medical reports and Liford’s 

testimony, a deputy commissioner found that Christensen Farms was liable under 

the worker’s compensation statute. She also found that the left knee injury 

developed as a sequela from the right knee injury. This was based primarily on 

the report from Dr. John Kuhnlein, who performed an independent medical 

examination and affirmed Dr. Vincent’s conclusion that the left knee injury was a 

sequela. The deputy commissioner found that Liford was not entitled to secondinjury benefits as she had failed to prove that the December 5th incident resulted 

from a separate and distinct injury. This was affirmed by the commissioner on 

appeal, as well as the district court following judicial review. Liford appeals the 

district court’s ruling. 

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review workers’ compensation decisions under the standards set in 

chapter 17A (2021). In this case, the agency’s decision was based on the 

interpretation of the worker’s compensation statute. “Interpretation of the workers’ 

compensation statute is an enterprise that has not been clearly vested by a 

provision of law in the discretion of the commissioner.” Gregory v. Second Injury 

Fund of Iowa, 777 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa 2010). We reverse the agency’s 

decision if it is based on an “erroneous interpretation” of the law. Id. Further, 
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because Liford raises an issue of proof of a factual finding, we review the decision 

for substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).

B. Proof of Second Injury

We first consider whether Liford met her burden of proving she sustained a 

second, separate injury that qualifies her for compensation from the Fund. Liford 

asserts that the commissioner incorrectly interpreted Gumm v. Easter Seal Soc’y 

of Iowa, resulting in an erroneous application to the facts. 943 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 

2020). While Liford claims that she only raises a question of law, it follows that we 

must determine whether there was substantial evidence after considering the 

proper reading of Gumm. Id. 

An individual may receive compensation from the Second Injury Fund by 

showing (1) past loss of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye, (2) another compensable, 

work-related injury to such member or organ, and (3) permanent injury. Iowa Code 

§ 85.64(1) (2019); see also Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Bergeson, 526 N.W.2d 

543, 547–48 (Iowa 1995). Liford argues the commissioner’s ruling misstated the 

holding in Gumm by requiring a showing that “the subsequent condition of the 

claimant [was not] a consequence of the first injury.” 943 N.W.2d at 33. Instead, 

Liford asserts the holding in Gumm is captured in the first sentence, which limits 

the “separate and distinct” rule to cumulative injuries stemming solely from 

aggravation of the original injury. Id at 25. From this, Liford contends the 

commissioner should have evaluated whether her second injury was solely the 

result of aggravation of the first injury. 

Like the district court, we disagree with this premise. While Liford quotes

the beginning of Gumm, she omits the rest of the paragraph, which relates the 
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cumulative-injury standard to the relevant issue of review-reopening. Those

circumstances are not before us today. Further, the court in Gumm clearly states 

its holding, which ultimately rules on the issue of review-reopening.1 Id. at 33. If 

a cumulative injury is found, then the injury must be distinct and separate, with the 

language in Gumm suggesting that aggravation is one factor in determining that 

separate injury. Id. 

Even if Gumm did apply in this case, it does not require that the agency

conclude the second injury was in fact solely the result of aggravation from the first 

injury. The district court correctly stated that the burden of proof is on the 

petitioner; Gumm was not intended to shift that burden to the defendant. See id.

at 28.

2

 All relevant factors were considered, including the timing of both injuries 

and Liford’s symptoms prior to getting the original injury evaluated.

Liford also cites Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Greenman, which more 

closely reflects the fact pattern here. No. 05-0855, 2006 WL 3017955, at *1 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006). In both cases, the claimants injured an extremity on one 

side before bringing an injury for the other side; Liford asserts the distinction 

between two separate body parts was the force behind the decision to award SIF

benefits. Yet, Greenman addresses other factors that led to this decision, such as 

the duties being performed when each injury manifested. 2006 WL 3017955, 

1

“[We] hold the commissioner and the district court correctly ruled that where a 

claimant has received disability benefits for a prior compensable injury, the 

claimant is limited to the review-reopening remedy for additional disability benefits 

unless she can prove she has suffered another injury.” Gumm, 943 N.W.2d at 33.

2

“A compensable review-reopening claim filed by an employee requires proof by 

a preponderance of evidence that the claimant’s condition is proximately caused 

by the original injury.” Gumm, 943 N.W.2d at 28 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).
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at *4.

3

 Even though the second injury was in the nature of a sequela to the first 

injury, the court in Greenman still emphasized that the second injury could not be 

“merely a consequence” of the first. 2006 WL 3017955, at *2. As the district court 

stated, we are not compelled to find the same outcomes among all similar cases. 

The record demonstrates the substantial evidence necessary to support the finding 

that Liford did not have a separate and distinct second injury. 

C. Applicability of “Separate and Distinct” to Second Injury Fund 

Claims

Next, Liford argues the “separate and distinct” rule does not apply to the 

Second Injury Fund because of their contradictory purposes. She asserts that 

applying this rule to this form of compensation results in a greater award for her, 

less accurately reflecting what her employer actually paid. We disagree with this 

interpretation.

i. Error Preservation

The Fund argues this issue was not expressly raised before or decided by 

the agency or the district court on judicial review. Liford contends the argument is 

merely “additional ammunition” for her preserved claim. See JBS Swift & Co. v. 

Ochoa, 888 N.W.2d 887, 893 (Iowa 2016). Assuming the issue is properly before 

us, we resolve this claim on the merits.

3 Greenman injured her right arm “repeatedly lifting tubes out of a packer,” while 

her left arm was injured doing computer work. Greenman, 2006 WL 3017955, 

at *4.
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ii. Merits

The Second Injury Fund was intended to encourage employers to hire 

previously disabled employees, while the “separate and distinct” rule was intended 

to prevent claim splitting when employees attempted to collect on cumulative 

injuries. Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994); 

Excel v. Smithart, 645 N.W.2d 891, 898 (Iowa 2002). From this, Liford concludes

that the “separate and distinct” rule was not meant to be applied in this case. While 

Liford does accurately state the purpose of the Second Injury Fund, she 

misconstrues the process by which the court assesses its obligations. 

With a second-injury claim, the employer is responsible for the injury caused 

during the employment, while the Second Injury Fund is responsible for the 

cumulative effect of the injuries; however, the obligations of the Fund are not 

assessed until the liability of the employer has been decided. Second Injury Fund 

v. Neelans, 436 N.W.2d 355, 358 (Iowa 1989); Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. 

Braden, 459 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 1990). This does not indicate the explicit 

claim splitting that Liford asserts. Additionally, the language in section 85.64 

suggests the commissioner should analyze for two distinct injuries as the code 

references a “previous” injury, and the second injury must be deemed 

compensable. Iowa Code § 85.64(1); Bergeson, 526 N.W.2d at 547–48. This is 

further evidenced by the fact that, as the Fund points out, there is no requirement 

that the first injury be work-related. Gregory, 777 N.W.2d at 400 (Iowa 2010).

As the Fund argues, the commissioner assessed the employer’s liability for 

the alleged injury to the left knee before assessing the Fund’s involvement and

found no compensable injury separate from the incident on March 10th. The 
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findings clearly state that the right knee injury was compensable while the left knee 

injury was deemed a sequela. Again, this finding has substantial evidence to 

support it, and we find that Liford did not satisfy the necessary elements to earn 

her benefits from the Second Injury Fund. For these reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s ruling.

AFFIRMED.