September 19, 1978

78-52 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON LIBRARIES AND

INFORMATION SCIENCE

National Commission on Libraries and Information

Science (20 U .S.C . § 1501 et seq.)— Quorum Under 

Commission’s Sunshine Act— Delegation of Authority 

by the Librarian of Congress

This responds to your request for our opinion whether the Librarian of 

Congress can delegate his duties as an ex officio member of the National 

Commission on Libraries and Information Science (Commission) to the Deputy 

Librarian of Congress, and whether the Commission’s Sunshine Act regulations affect the Commission’s quorum. We conclude that the Librarian can 

delegate his official duties, and that the Commission’s Sunshine Act regulations do not affect the quorum.

I.

When former Librarian of Congress H.R. Spofford testified before the Joint 

Committee on the Library of Congress (Committee) in 1896, he told the 

committee its chairman had advised him that he had the authority to deputize an 

assistant to whom he could delegate certain of his official duties.1 In making 

recommendations to Congress on the reorganization of the Library, the 

Committee said that the Librarian of Congress should have complete control 

over the Library’s management and expressly declined to propose a change in 

the Librarian’s authority.2 The Librarian’s authority to delegate his official 

duties is also supported by the provision for compensation for a Deputy 

Librarian of Congress without specifying his duties.3

The Librarian of Congress has the statutory authority to “ make rules and 

regulations for the government” of the Library of Congress.4 Substantially

'S . Rept. No. 1573, 54th C ong., 2d sess. 129 (1897).

2Id„ at 1-2.

32 U .S.C . § 136 a-1 (1976).

42 U .S.C . § 136(1976).

208
identical grants of rulemaking power to the heads of the executive departments 

are considered general authorizations for their delegation of authority,5 although 

certain powers have been held nondelegable where Congress has so indicated. 

In United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), the Court found that the 

legislative history of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976), shows that Congress did not intend to authorize 

the Attorney General’s delegation of authority to approve wiretap applications 

to the Attorney General’s Executive Assistant; it held that a wiretap application 

approved by the Executive Assistant was invalid. The legislative history of the 

National Commission on Libraries and Information Act, 20 U.S.C. 1501-1506 

(1976), shows no intent by Congress to limit the delegation of authority by the 

Librarian of Congress. We believe that the grant of rulemaking power to the 

Librarian of Congress implies the authority to delegate his official duties. This 

authority is also strongly suggested by Congress’s provision for compensation 

for a Deputy Librarian, without specifying the Deputy’s duties, and Congress’ 

earlier tacit approval of the Librarian’s delegation of authority.

The Librarian of Congress is a member of the Commission ex officio; his 

membership is an extension of his duties as Librarian of Congress.6 Because the 

Librarian of Congress can delegate his official duties, he can also delegate his 

duties stemming from his membership on the Commission to his Deputy, and 

allow the Deputy both to vote and to be included in the Commission’s quorum.

II.

The Commission’s Sunshine Act regulations define the Commission’s 

quorum to be “ a majority of the Commission’s members who have been 

appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. ” You ask whether this 

definition of a quorum in the Commission’s regulations is authority to allow 

less than 8 members, which is a majority of the Commission’s statutory 15 

members,7 to conduct the Commission’s business when the Commission has 

less than 15 members confirmed by the Senate.

The National Commission on Libraries and Information Science Act, 20 

U.S.C. §§ 1501-6 (1976), does not specify a quorum for the Commission. The 

courts have uniformly held that a failure of Congress to specify a quorum 

authorizes the adoption of no less than a common-law quorum, a majority of 

the statutory membership of a collective body.8 We can find no authority for the 

Commission’s authorizing a quorum of less than a majority of its statutory 15 

members. We must therefore conclude that the Commission cannot adopt a 

quorum of less than 8 members; thus the Commission’s regulation defining the

>E.g., Fleming v. Mowhawk Wrecking £ Lumber Co., 331 U.S. Ill, 121 (1946); Wirtz v. 

Atlantic Stales Construction C o., 357 F. (2d) 442, 445 (1966); Plapao Labs. Inc., v. Farley, 92 F. 

(2d) 228, 229 (D .C. Cir. 1937), cert, denied, 302 U .S. 732 (1937).

620 U .S.C. § 1505 (1976).

720 U .S.C. § 1505 (1976).

*E.g.. FTC v. Flotill Products, Inc., 389 U .S. 179, 182-184 (1967).

209
Commission’s quorum must be interpreted to require a majority of the 

Commission’s statutory 15 members for a quorum.

LEON U l m a n 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

210