2016 IL App (4th) 160189 

NO. 4-16-0189 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

JULIE A. SCHMIDT,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

STATE OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD; CHARLES 

W. SCHOLZ, ERNEST L. GOWEN, WILLIAM J. 

CADIGAN, ANDREW K. CARRUTHERS, BETTY J. 

COFFRIN, JOHN R. KEITH, WILLIAM M. 

McGUFFAGE, and CASANDRA B. WATSON, All in 

Their Official Capacities as Members of the Duly Constituted State Officers Electoral Board; JOHN A. 

CUNNINGHAM, Not Individually but in His Capacity as 

Kane County Clerk; DAVID ORR, Not Individually but 

in His Capacity as Cook County Clerk; and ANNA 

MOELLER,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Sangamon County

No. 16MR22

Honorable

John P. Schmidt,

Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 In December 2015, plaintiff, Julie A. Schmidt, filed a petition with the Illinois 

State Board of Elections, sitting as the State Officers Electoral Board (Board), objecting to the 

nominating papers of defendant, Anna Moeller, a Democratic candidate for the office of Representative in the Illinois General Assembly for the 43rd Representative District. In response, 

Moeller filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Board granted. On judicial review, the 

circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. Schmidt appeals, arguing Moeller’s nominating paFILED

December 8, 2016 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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pers were invalid because, during the same election cycle, she signed both her own statement of 

candidacy as a Democratic Party candidate and the nominating petition of a Republican Party 

candidate in violation of section 8-8 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/8-8 (West 2014)). We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The undisputed facts demonstrate that, on September 5, 2015, Moeller signed petition sheets in support of her nomination as the Democratic Party candidate for the office of 

Representative for the 43rd District. On September 26, 2015, she signed a petition sheet for 

Sandy Wegman, a Republican Party candidate who sought nomination for the office of Kane 

County Recorder. On November 23, 2015, Moeller filed her own nomination papers with the 

Board to place her name on the March 15, 2016, primary election ballot as a candidate for the 

office of Representative for the 43rd District. Her papers included a signed statement of candidacy, notarized on November 19, 2015, in which she asserted that she was “a qualified primary 

voter of the Democratic Party.” 

¶ 4 On December 7, 2015, Schmidt filed a verified objector’s petition with the Board, 

objecting to Moeller’s nomination papers. She cited section 8-8 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 

5/8-8 (West 2014)), which provides that “[a] ‘qualified primary elector’ of a party may not sign 

petitions for or be a candidate in the primary of more than one party.” Schmidt argued Moeller 

violated that section by signing the nominating petition of a Republican Party candidate and running for office as a Democratic Party candidate. She asked that the Board declare Moeller’s nominating papers and petition defective or invalid and bar Moeller’s name from being printed on the 

March 15, 2016, primary election ballot. 
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¶ 5 On December 16, 2015, Moeller filed a motion for summary judgment. She 

agreed with Schmidt’s assertion that “a person may not sign the petitions of more than one political party in any particular primary election.” However, Moeller cited the First District’s decision 

in Watkins v. Burke, 122 Ill. App. 3d 499, 461 N.E.2d 625 (1984), for the proposition that “when 

a person signs for more than one political party at the same election, the first signature in time is 

valid and all subsequent signatures for a different political party are invalid.” Moeller alleged she 

signed her own nominating petition and those of other Democratic Party candidates prior to signing a petition for Wegman, a Republican Party candidate. Thus, she maintained she affiliated 

herself with the Democratic Party prior to signing Wegman’s petition and, as a result, her own 

nominating papers were valid. 

¶ 6 On December 23, 2015, a hearing was conducted before the Board’s hearing officer. On January 5, 2016, the hearing officer recommended that the Board grant Moeller’s motion for summary judgment and overrule Schmidt’s petition in its entirety. On January 7, 2016,

the Board conducted a hearing in the matter. It granted Moeller’s motion for summary judgment 

and overruled Schmidt’s objection. The Board found as follows: 

“[Moeller’s] Statement of Candidacy does not violate Section 8-8 

of the Election Code because [Moeller] has not impermissibly 

signed a nominating petition for a candidate of one established political party and subsequently run as a candidate for another established political party in the same election cycle; rather, [Moeller’s] 

first act of political affiliation was to align herself with the Democratic Party by signing her own petition. The act of signing a Re-
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publican candidate’s petition after signing her own Democratic petition and before seeking nomination as a Democratic Party candidate rendered [Moeller’s] signature on the Republican petition invalid but did not invalidate her petition.” 

¶ 7 On January 12, 2016, Schmidt filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s 

decision pursuant to section 10-10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2014)). On 

February 10, 2016, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. 

¶ 8 This appeal followed. 

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, Schmidt argues the Board erred in overruling her objection to 

Moeller’s nomination papers and granting summary judgment in Moeller’s favor. “Where *** an

electoral board’s decision is challenged in court pursuant to section 10-10.1 of the Election Code 

[citation] the proceeding is in the nature of administrative review.” Jackson-Hicks v. East St. 

Louis Board of Election Commissioners, 2015 IL 118929, ¶ 19, 28 N.E.3d 170. On appeal, we 

review the electoral board’s decision rather than that of the circuit court. Id. Additionally, where 

the “facts are admitted or established and the only dispute concerns whether the governing legal 

provisions were interpreted correctly,” we apply a de novo standard of review. Id. ¶ 20. 

¶ 11 A. Mootness 

¶ 12 Initially, we note Moeller argues Schmidt’s appeal is moot. “A case on appeal is 

moot where the issues raised below no longer exist because events subsequent to the filing of the 

appeal make it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the complaining party effectual relief.” Hossfeld v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 238 Ill. 2d 418, 423-24, 939 N.E.2d 368, 371 
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(2010). We find the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies under the circumstances presented. That exception “permits a court to reach the merits of a case which would otherwise be moot if the question presented is of a public nature, an authoritative resolution of the 

question is desirable for the purpose of guiding public officers, and the question is likely to recur.” Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill. 2d 398, 404, 948 N.E.2d 580, 584 (2011). A question of election law is, inherently, a matter of public concern. Id. at 404, 948 N.E.2d at 585. Further, we find 

no case addressing the precise factual question presented here. Therefore, an authoritative resolution is desirable for guiding public officers. Finally, contrary to Moeller’s assertion, we find the 

issue presented by this case is likely to recur. Therefore, we will address the merits of Schmidt’s 

appeal.

¶ 13 B. Validity of Moeller’s Nomination Papers 

¶ 14 On appeal, Schmidt asserts Moeller’s nomination papers should be held invalid.

She argues the plain language of section 8-8 of the Election Code prohibited Moeller from signing petitions or being a candidate for more than one party in a single election cycle and Moeller 

violated that provision by being a candidate for the Democratic Party and signing the nominating 

petition of a Republican Party candidate. 

¶ 15 The issue presented on appeal concerns the Board’s interpretation of a provision 

of the Election Code. “When determining how the Election Code should be construed, we employ the same basic principles of statutory construction applicable to statutes generally.” Jackson-Hicks, 2015 IL 118929, ¶ 21, 28 N.E.3d 170. “Our primary objective is to ascertain and give 

effect to the intent of the legislature.” Id. “When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 

the statute must be applied as written without resort to aids of statutory construction [citation], 
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and the court will not read into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the legislature did not 

express [citation].” Id. “Where the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, courts may look beyond 

the statutory language and consider the purpose of the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, 

and the legislative history of the statute.” Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 217, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1022 (2008). 

¶ 16 Section 8-8 of the Election Code concerns the form of nomination petitions for 

members of the General Assembly. 10 ILCS 5/8-8 (West 2014). It provides that each petition 

must include “a statement of candidacy,” stating “that the candidate is a qualified primary voter 

of the party to which the petition relates.” Id. Relevant to this appeal, section 8-8 also provides 

that “[a] ‘qualified primary elector’ of a party may not sign petitions for or be a candidate in the 

primary of more than one party.” Id. 

¶ 17 Here, Moeller signed nominating petitions of Democratic candidates and a Republican candidate. She also submitted nomination papers to run as a Democratic candidate in 

the primary election. Moeller’s conduct clearly violated the restriction set forth in section 8-8 

against signing petitions or being a candidate in the primary of more than one party. However, 

the Election Code is silent as to the consequences for such a violation. Schmidt asserts that, because Moeller signed a petition for a Republican Party candidate, she was prohibited from running for office as a Democratic Party candidate and her nomination papers must be held invalid.

Conversely, Moeller argues that since she first affiliated herself with the Democratic Party by 

signing her own nominating petition, her nomination papers were valid and she was entitled to 

run for office as a Democratic Party candidate. For the reasons that follow, we agree with 

Moeller. 
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¶ 18 Both Moeller and the Board relied on the First District’s decision in Watkins, 122 

Ill. App. 3d 499, 461 N.E.2d 625, to support the validity of Moeller’s nomination papers. There, 

the court held “that where an otherwise qualified voter has signed the nominating petitions of 

more than one party, the signature appearing on the petition first signed is valid and all subsequent signatures appearing on the nominating petitions of other parties are invalid.” Id. at 502, 

461 N.E.2d at 627. The underlying facts in that case showed the plaintiff filed objections to the 

nominating petitions of the defendant, a candidate for Democratic ward committeeman. Id. at 

500, 461 N.E.2d at 626. He asserted the petitions violated a provision of the Election Code similar to the one at issue in the case at bar, which prohibited any person from signing petitions or 

being a candidate in the primary of more than one party. Id. Specifically, in that case, the plaintiff alleged that 382 voter names that appeared on the defendant’s petitions also appeared on the 

nominating petitions of a Republican Party candidate. Id. The Board rejected the plaintiff’s objections, concluding “that if the voters in question had signed [the defendant’s] nominating petitions for Democratic ward committeeman before signing the Republican nominating petitions,

then the signatures on [the defendant’s] petitions were valid.” Id. at 501, 461 N.E.2d at 626. The 

plaintiff appealed, arguing, in part, that “voters who sign[ed] the nominating petitions of more 

than one party should have their names stricken from a nominating petition irrespective of the 

order of signing.” Id. 

¶ 19 On review, the First District agreed with the Board and stated as follows: 

“The construction urged by [the] plaintiff would automatically curtail the right of an otherwise qualified voter to participate in the 

primary electoral process by signing a nominating petition if the 
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voter even inadvertently signed the nominating petitions of more 

than one party. [The] [p]laintiff argues that under these circumstances a voter’s signature would be per se invalid and that the 

name should be stricken from the nominating petitions of both political parties. We do not believe that this draconian sanction represents the reasoned intent of our legislature, nor does the language 

of the above cited statute mandate such a drastic result.” Id. at 501-

02, 461 N.E.2d at 627. 

The court went on to find its resolution to be “less restrictive” and “consistent with the legislative 

intent evinced in *** the Election Code that a person signing a nominating petition be qualified 

at the time of signing as well as with the laudable public policy of protecting the right of the electorate to participate in the primary electoral process.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 502, 461 

N.E.2d at 627. 

¶ 20 Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate Moeller first signed her own nominating 

petition as a Democratic candidate for Representative and thereafter signed the nominating petition of a Republican candidate for a different office. Under Watkins, Moeller’s signature on her 

own petition was valid and her signature on the petition of the Republican candidate was invalid.

After signing the nominating petitions at issue, Moeller filed her nomination papers, which included a signed statement of candidacy, asserting she was a qualified primary voter of the Democratic Party. Given the rule set forth in Watkins, Moeller’s statement of candidacy was accurate 

and her nomination papers were valid. 

¶ 21 Schmidt asserts Watkins is factually distinguishable from the present case because 
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it involved only the validity of voter signatures and not, like the present case, a candidate for office. Alternatively, she challenges that decision on the basis that it “craft[s] an exception to the 

prohibition in [s]ection 8-8 that does not exist in the statute,” i.e., a “sequence of signing exception.” 

¶ 22 To support her arguments, Schmidt has relied on the First District’s more recent 

decision in Rosenzweig v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 409 Ill. App. 3d 176, 946 N.E.2d 

1113 (2011). There, the respondent, Hebda, signed a nominating petition for a Democratic Party 

candidate for the office of Representative for the 59th Representative District. Id. at 177, 946 

N.E.2d at 1114. The following month, she decided to run for the same office as a Republican 

Party candidate and signed her own nominating petition and statement of candidacy. Id. at 177, 

946 N.E.2d at 1114-15. 

¶ 23 On review, the First District initially noted Hebda violated section 8-8 because 

she signed a nominating petition for a Democratic candidate and subsequently signed her own 

nominating petition to run as a Republican candidate. Id. at 180, 946 N.E.2d at 1117. It cited 

Watkins for the proposition that “[w]here a person signs nominating petitions for more than one 

party, the first signature is valid and all subsequent signatures are invalid.” Id. However, the 

court concluded its analysis did not end there because, “[w]hile Hebda violated the restriction by 

signing nominating petitions for more than one party, [the court] must also determine whether 

her candidacy itself was a violation of the remaining restriction in section 8-8.” Id. It addressed 

the rationale behind the restrictions, stating as follows: 

 “The Seventh Circuit explained the reasoning behind a parallel provision in the Election Code that prohibits circulators from 
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soliciting signatures for nominating petitions on behalf of more 

than one political party in a single election cycle. [Citation.] The 

court explained that such restrictions prevent political maneuvers 

that could affect the quality of the candidates who will be on the 

ballot. [Citation.] If one party determines that a certain opponent 

will be a weaker candidate in the general election, that party could 

circulate petitions on behalf of the weaker candidate for the primary election in the hope that votes will be drawn away from an opposition candidate the party deems to propose a greater threat to its 

chances of prevailing in the general election.” Id. at 181, 946 

N.E.2d at 1117 (citing Citizens for John W. Moore Party v. Board 

of Election Commissioners, 794 F.2d 1254, 1261 (7th Cir. 1986)). 

The court found that what Hebda did was “an even more egregious example of the type of political maneuvering that the restriction intend[ed] to prevent because she signed the nominating petition of a candidate for the very office for which she intended to run, in effect, supporting the 

nomination of her own opponent.” Id. The court then held “section 8-8 of the Election Code prohibit[ed] signing a nominating petition for a candidate from one political party and then running 

as a candidate for another political party in the same election cycle.” Id. at 181, 946 N.E.2d at 

1117-18. 

¶ 24 Schmidt argues Rosenzweig did not depend on the sequencing of signatures and 

supports her position that Moeller could not run as a candidate for the Democratic Party when 

she also signed the petition of a Republican Party candidate. First, to the extent Schmidt asserts 
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Rosenzweig stands for the proposition that the sequencing of signatures is irrelevant, we disagree. We note that given the factual circumstances in Rosenzweig, it is wholly consistent with 

Watkins. Specifically, because the respondent in Rosenzweig first signed the petition of a Democratic candidate, she could not later run as a Republican candidate. Second, in Rosenzweig, the 

First District relied heavily on its finding that the respondent engaged in an “egregious” from of 

political maneuvering, noting she signed the petition of a Democratic candidate and then ran for 

the same office as a Republican. The present case is factually distinguishable, in that Moeller did 

not sign the nominating petition of her opponent but of a Republican candidate running for a 

completely separate office. Additionally, the record fails to suggest that she was engaging in any 

type of political maneuvering or that she did anything more than inadvertently sign petitions for 

more than one party. 

¶ 25 Next, to the extent Schmidt challenges Watkins as wrongly decided, we disagree.

Contrary to Schmidt’s assertions, Watkins did not craft a “sequence of signing exception” into 

the Election Code. Rather, it determined the consequences for a violation of a restriction in the 

Election Code where the statute was otherwise silent and ambiguous. Additionally, we note that 

“[w]here *** the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial construction, it will be 

presumed that the legislature acquiesced in the court’s statement of legislative intent.” Nelson v. 

Artley, 2015 IL 118058, ¶ 23, 40 N.E.3d 27. In this instance, Watkins was decided in 1984. Given the legislature’s failure to amend the relevant statutory language, we find the First District’s 

interpretation of that language in Watkins is consistent with legislative intent. Further, although 

Watkins involved the validity of only voter signatures, we find no reason to hold it inapplicable 

to the signatures of a candidate for office. 
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¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment affirming the 

Board’s decision. 

¶ 28 Affirmed.