alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
33825.

#### HYNES v. HYNES.

Undercofler, Presiding Justice.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to decide the single issue whether the parties intended to waive their statutory right to modification in their 1973 divorce settlement. The husband brought this modification petition, which the wife defended by raising the waiver *321issue in a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion and we granted her application for interlocutory appeal. We affirm.

Argued July 12, 1978

Decided October 4, 1978.

*Alston, Miller & Gaines, Frank J. Beltran, Robert G. Edge,*for appellant.

*Garland, Nuckolls, Radish, Cook & Weisensee, Mark*
      *322
      *J. Kadish, Rhonda A. Brofman,*for appellee.

*321The wife relies in the main on two paragraphs in their decree. "This agreement is a complete and final settlement of any and all rights either of the parties hereto have against the other *which could appropriately be settled in this case.”*(Emphasis supplied.) And also that "both parties agree that this Agreement be made a part of the Judgment and Decree in the above stated case *or in any other proceeding which may hereafter be instituted by either party one against the other.”*(Emphasis supplied.) She claims these paragraphs read together manifest a clear intent to waive modification. Wé disagree.

The second quoted paragraph, that the agreement be made a part of any future proceeding, has not been violated here. The agreement will certainly be the stepping stone from which the modification action proceeds. However, its future language is not found in, and cannot be incorporated in, the other paragraph. *Kitfield v.*Kitfield, 237 Ga. 184 (227 SE2d 9) (1976). Where that language, as in *Fech v. Fech,*241 Ga. 613 (1978) "is couched in the present tense, without reference to the future, there is no waiver of the right to modify.” Accord, *McLoughlin v. McLoughlin,*234 Ga. 259 (214 SE2d 925) (1975).

By such a ruling, there is no interference with the freedom of contract, but merely a requirement by the courts that if the parties do contract, that the contract be clear and unambiguous. The language of this contract does not meet this test. In the future, this issue will be controlled by *Varn v. Varn,*242 Ga. 309 (1978).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Bowles, J., who dissents.*
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v KENNETH E. WIERMANN, Private E-2, U. S. Army, Appellant

8 USCMA 609, 25 CMR 113

No. 10,471

Decided January 17, 1958

*First Lieutenant Edivin E. Allen*argued the cause for Appellant, Accused. With him on the brief was *Major Edward Fenig.*

*First Lieutenant Jay D. Fischer*argued the cause for Appellee, United States. With him on the brief was *Lieutenant Colonel John G. Lee.*

Opinion of the Court

HomeR FERGUSON, Judge:

We granted review in this case to consider the appellant’s claim of error both in the law officer’s instructions and the staff judge advocate’s post-trial review. Conviction of desertion resulted from the accused’s unauthorized absence terminated by apprehension. He had pleaded not guilty to the principal offense charged, but guilty of the lesser offense of absence without leave. The law officer, instructing the court on the question of intent, advised as follows:

> “. . . an intent on the part of the accused to remain permanently absent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. That is, evidence of facts and circumstances from which according to the common experience of mankind such an intent may reasonably be inferred, such as evidence of' a much-prolonged period of absence without authority for which there is no satisfactory explanation. . . .

In United States v Soccio, 8 USCMA 477, 24 CMR 287, we condemned a similar instruction. The result must be the same here. In view of our holding, it would serve no useful purpose to discuss the remaining issues which deal exclusively with matter contained in the post-trial review. The decision of the board of review is reversed and the record returned to The Judge Advocate General of the Army for resubmission to a board of review. The board, in its discretion, may approve the lesser included offense of absence without leave and reassess the sentence or it may order a rehearing on the desertion charge.

Chief Judge Quinn concurs.

LatimeR, Judge

(dissenting):

I dissent for the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in United States v Soccio, 8 USCMA 477, 24 CMR 287.
#### Leslie RUSSELL, et al. v. Charles NOULLET, Jr., et al. Juanita Slack Miller, Wife of/and Frederick C. MILLER, Jr., et al. v. Charles NOULLET, Jr., et al.

No. 98-C-0816.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 15, 1998.

In re New Orleans, City of;—Defendant(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “K”, Nos. 87-15253, 88-16166; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 97CA-0085, 97CA-0086.

Granted.

LEMMON, J., not on panel.
**Exhibit32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with TheSheridan Group, Inc. (the “Company”) Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscalyear ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, John A. Saxton, President andChief Executive Officer of the Company, and Robert M. Jakobe, Vice Presidentand Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that, to the best of our knowledge:

 

(1)           The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,as amended; and

 

(2)           The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 
| Date:  | March 30, 2006 | By:    | /s/ John A. Saxton                         |   |
|--------|----------------|--------|--------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |           |   | John A. Saxton                             |
|   |           |   | President and Chief Executive Officer      |
|   |           |   |                                       |
| Date:  | March 30, 2006 | By:    | /s/ Robert M. Jakobe                       |   |
|   |           |   | Robert M. Jakobe                           |
|   |           |   | Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, orother document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting thesignature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company andwill be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

----
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 98-4874 TIMOTHY ROMERO BENTON, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (CR-98-36) Submitted: June 22, 1999 Decided: July 12, 1999 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL B. Thomas Reed, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Darryl J. Mitchell, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________OPINION PER CURIAM: Appellant Timothy Benton appeals his conviction and 147 monthsentence for one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); one count of armed bank robbery by force and intimidation in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2113(a), (d) (West Supp. 1999); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999). On appeal, Benton contends that: (1) the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for an evaluation to determine his mental competency and (2) the court erred in finding that Benton obstructed justice by perjuring himself at trial. We have reviewed the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, and affirm. Although the district court characterized Benton's motion as one made under "42 U.S.C. 4244(a)" when in actuality, the motion sought an evaluation to determine mental competency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1994), the court made findings as to Benton's competency and determined, based upon the record as a whole, that there was no evidence indicating a competency hearing was warranted. See United States v. Mason , 52 F.3d 1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995). B ecause the lower court's determination made it clear that the court considered all factors appropriate to a consideration of a motion made under 28 U.S.C. § 4241 and would not have granted Benton's motion under the standard applicable to that statute, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Furthermore, the court did not err in finding Benton obstructed justice by perjuring himself at trial and in enhancing Benton's offense level based upon those findings. See U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1997). Accordingly, we affirm Benton's conviction and sentence. We grant Benton's unopposed motion to submit the case on briefs because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
2
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
     I, Julianne M. Biagini, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Endwave Corporation; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe period covered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
 (a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (c)  disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 (a)  all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and  (b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.   Date: May 13, 2005 /s/ JULIANNE M. BIAGINI   Julianne M. Biagini Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
No. 74-830.

#### Anderson *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 49454.

#### Protests 985923-G, etc., of Aoki Taiseido Book Co. (San Francisco).

*324Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

It was stipulated that certain of the books in question are the same in all material respects as those passed upon in *Aoki Taiseido Book Co.*v. *United States*(10 Cust. Ct. 217, C. D. 757). The protests were therefore sustained to that extent.
Exhibit 31.1

I, E.J. Holm, the principal executive officer of Iroquois Gas Transmission
System, L.P., certify that:

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of Iroquois Gas
Transmission System, L.P.;

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;

The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any changes in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

DATE: JUNE 22, 2005

/S/ E.J. HOLM
--------------------
E.J. HOLM PRESIDENT
(Reap. Dec. 8449)

Entry No. 712832.

#### American Express Co. *v.*United States

(Decided June 8, 1955)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*Warren E. Burger,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

When this appeal for a reappraisement was called for hearing, there was no appearance on behalf of the appealing party.

Rule 5 of the rules of this court provides that—

> * * * Where the plaintiff, petitioner, or appellant, or his attorney, in a case does not appear when the same is called, and after the opposite party has had opportunity to present evidence on the issues, it shall be deemed submitted and shall be decided by the court on the record as it appears therein.

*517In accordance with the provisions of said rule, I have examined the record in the appeal presently before the court and find nothing therein which tends in any way to overcome the presumption of correctness which attaches to the decision of the appraiser. Therefore, I find and hold that the proper values of the merchandise are the values returned by the appraiser.

Judgment will issue accordingly.
No. 96-7887.

#### Gonzalez *v.*Kuhlmann, Superintendent, Sullivan Correctional Facility.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
# C_2012243EN.01001802.xml

| 11.8.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 243/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 243/18

---

Judgment of the General Court of (Fifth Chamber) of 4 July 2012 — Laboratoires CTRS v Commission

(Case T-12/12) (1)

1

(Medicinal products for human use - Marketing authorisation for the medicinal product Orphacol - Letter informing the applicant of the Commission’s intention to refuse authorisation - Application for a declaration of failure to act - Definition of position by the Commission - Inadmissibility - Application for annulment - Adoption of a new decision - No need to adjudicate)

2012/C 243/35

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Laboratoires CTRS (Boulogne-Billancourt, France) (represented by: K. Bacon, Barrister, M. Utges Manley and M. Barnden, Solicitors)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: E. White and L. Banciella, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Interveners in support of the applicant: Czech Republic (represented by: M. Smolek and D. Hadroušek, acting as Agents), French Republic (represented by: G. de Bergues, acting as Agent), and by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (represented: initially by E. Jenkinson and S. Ossowski, and subsequently by E. Jenkinson and H. Walker, acting as Agents, and by J. Holmes, Barrister)

Interveners in support of the applicant:

Re:

Re:

Application for a declaration that the Commission failed to act in unlawfully failing to adopt a final decision in relation to the applicant’s application for a marketing authorisation for the medicinal product Orphacol, and, in the alternative, for annulment of the decision, allegedly contained in the Commission’s letter of 5 December 2011, not to grant that authorisation to the applicant

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the application for a declaration of failure to act as inadmissible; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the application for a declaration of failure to act as inadmissible;

| 2. | Rules that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for annulment submitted in the alternative; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rules that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for annulment submitted in the alternative;

| 3. | Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Laboratoires CTRS; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Laboratoires CTRS;

| 4. | Orders the Czech Republic, the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear their own respective costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders the Czech Republic, the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear their own respective costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 58, 25.2.2012.

1

---
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    Exhibit 12.1
 
                                Ziff-Davis Inc.
 
               Computation of Ratios of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                       (Amounts in thousands of dollars)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                              ZDI (the Predecessor)                 Ziff-Davis Inc.
                          ------------------------------- -------------------------------------
                             Year ended       Two month
                            December 31,     period ended       Year ended December 31,
                          -----------------  February 28, -------------------------------------
                            1994     1995        1996      1995     1996      1997      1998
                          -------- --------  ------------ ------- --------  --------  ---------
<S>                       <C>      <C>       <C>          <C>     <C>       <C>       <C>
Pre-tax income (loss)
from continuing
operations..............  $ 73,207 $(40,250)   $(6,995)   $22,869 $(27,124) $(72,491) $(104,236)
Less: Income (loss) from
equity investments......     4,443    3,391        235        --       526    (2,030)    (7,483)
                          -------- --------    -------    ------- --------  --------  ---------
                            77,650  (36,859)    (6,760)    22,869  (26,598)  (74,521)  (111,719)
                          -------- --------    -------    ------- --------  --------  ---------
Interest expense........    17,887   92,609     14,030     44,005  120,646   190,445    143,547
Interest portion of rent
expense.................     7,292    7,633      1,340        831    7,672     9,998      8,232
                          -------- --------    -------    ------- --------  --------  ---------
Total fixed charges.....    25,179  100,242     15,370     44,836  128,318   200,443    151,779
                          -------- --------    -------    ------- --------  --------  ---------
Earnings before income
taxes and fixed
charges.................  $102,829 $ 63,383    $ 8,610    $67,705 $101,720  $125,922  $  40,060
                          ======== ========    =======    ======= ========  ========  =========
Ratio of earnings to
fixed charges...........       4.1      (a)        (a)        1.5      (a)       (a)        (a)
                          ======== ========    =======    ======= ========  ========  =========
</TABLE>
----
(a) ZDI's (the predecessor) earnings for the year ended December 31, 1995 and
    for the two months ended February 28, 1996 were insufficient to cover fixed
    charges by $36,859 and $6,760, respectively. Ziff-Davis Inc's earnings for
    the year ended December 31, 1996, 1997 and 1998 were insufficient to cover
    fixed charges by $26,598, $74,521 and $111,719, respectively.
 
                                       1