THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

ROBERT F. FUTRELL 

With the assistance of 

MARTIN BLUMENSON 

OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1981 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Futrell, Robert Frank. 

The advisory years in Southeast Asia, to 1965. 

(The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia series) 

Bibliography: p. 

Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs. no.: D 301.2:5098 

I. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 - Aerial operations, 

American. 2. United States. Air Force - History - Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. 3. Asia, Southeastern - History. 

I. Blumenson, Martin, joint author. II. Title. II. Series: United 

States Air Force in Southeast Asia Series. 

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

DS558.8F87 959.074:348 80-24547 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

11 
This publication is the first of a series titled The United States Air Force in 

Southeast Asia. It tells the story of the Air Force’s involvement in the region from 

the end of the second World War until the major infusion of American troops 

into Vietnam in 1965. During these years, and most noticeably after 1961, the Air 

Force’s principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air Force 

in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of the Saigon government. 

This story includes some issues of universal applicability to the Air Force: 

the role of air power in an insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign 

ally, and how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and 

civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issues unique to the 

Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized, technological modern air 

force with a feudal, decentralized, indigenous one without overwhelming it, and 

how best to adapt fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle 

environment. 

Additional volumes in this series will tell the story of the Air Force in South 

Vietnam, in Laos, and over North Vietnam until the cessation of the Air Force’s 

direct role in 1973. 

JOHN W. HUSTON 

Major General, USAF 

Chief; Office of Air Force History 

Robert Frank Futrell’s works on Air Force history span the decades from 

the second World War to Vietnam. For the former conflict he contributed 

sections to The Army Air Forces in World War II, edited by Craven and Cate. 

His volume The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 is the official 

history of the Air Force in that action. His Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine book is a 

fundamental primer of basic thinking about air power among American military 

services from 1907 through 1964. Before his retirement in 1974, Dr. Futrell wrote 

a detailed manuscript on the early years of the USAF involvement in the 

Vietnamese war. I consider it an honor to have been called upon to prepare this 

manuscript for publication. 

I wish to thank Major General John W. Huston, Chief, Office of Air Force 

History, for a hospitable environment; Dr. Stanley L. Falk, Chief Historian, for 

invaluable counsel and support; Mr. Max Rosenberg, Deputy Chief Historian, 

Mr. Carl Berger, Chief, Histories Division, Colonel John Schlight, Chief, Special 

Histories Branch, and Mr. Jacob Van Staaveren, historian, for helpful comments; Dr. George M. Watson for responses to my requestsfor information; and 

all the members of the Office of Air Force History for making me feel at home. 

1 am responsible for any omissions or distortions in this narrative. 

Martin Blumenson 

Foreword 

Preface 

I. 

I 

VI. 

Page 

Part One: The Truman Years 

Origins of the American Commitment 

to Vietnam 

Part Two: The Eisenhower Years 

The Geneva Agreements and French Withdrawal 

U.S. Command Problems in the Pacific: Emphasis on 

Southeast Asia 

Strained Civil-Military Relations in South Vietnam, 

Part Three: The Kennedy Years 

Initial Challenges and Actions 

Opening Farm Gate 

The Taylor Mission 

U.S. Command Arrangements: 

and MACV 

Tactical Air Control, Mule Train, 

and Ranch Hand 

Air Policy: Too Cautious? 

Farm Gate and the Vietnamese Air Force 

Air Operations, 1962: Interdiction, Strikes, and 

Reconnaissance 

and Related Matters 

Air Operations, 

Collapse of the Diem Government 

93 

Part Four: The Johnson Years 

Objectives Confirmed, Methods Expanded 

The War in Vietnam, 

The Gulf of Incident 

Diffusion of Air Assets 

End of the Advisory Phase 

Appendices 

Growth of Major United States Air Force and Vietnamese 

Air Force Units to February 
Page 2 Development of a Viet Cong Antiaircraft Capability. 

1962- 1965 283 

Notes 287 

Glossary 325 

Index 357 

Bibliographic Note 347 

Vlll 
Page 

F-8F Bearcats ferried to Vietnam; C-47 and C-1 19s with French 

markings .................................................... 8 

B-26 bombers; Morane-500 Crickets; F-8F Bearcats at Dien Bien 

Phu ......................................................... 9 

USAF C-124 at Ceylon airlifting French soldiers to Vietnam; French 

paratroop drop; French Foreign Legion .......................... 20 

President Eisenhower, Gen. Paul Ely, and Adm. Arthur W. Radford; 

supplies unloaded in Indochina under the Military Defense Assistance Program ............................................... 2 I 

Refugees fleeing from North Vietnam when the country was divided at 

the 17th parallel .............................................. 32 

Richard M. Nixon, Pierre Mendes-France, and John Foster Dulles; 

Operation Wounded Warrior: USAF evacuation of French Foreign 

Legionnaires after Dien Bien Phu ............................... 33 

Gen. Nathan F. Twining; Gen. J. Lawton Collins and Premier Ngo Dinh 

Diem; MAAG Headquarters in Saigon .......................... 38 

Gen. Laurence S. Kuter; Gen. Thomas D. White .................... 45 

L-19s of the Vietnamese Air Force; Sikorsky H-19 helicopter at Tan Son 

Nhut ...................................................... 51 

W. Averell Harriman, President Kennedy, and Dean Rusk; Robert S. 

McNamara and Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer; members of the Vietnamese Self Defense Corps from Buon Enao; female members of the 

Civil Defense Guard at Hao Cain .............................. 66 

T-28 fighter-bombers; Lt. Richard A. Mathison and AIC Tri Pham 

Minh, VNAF, stand with a collection of Farm Gate aircraft; T-28 in 

foreground, B-26 in left background, A-IE in right background, and 

C-47 in distance; RF-IO1 Voodoo .............................. 77 

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Gen. Emmett O’Donnell, Jr., Adm. J. H. 

Sides, and Lt. Gen. C. A. Roberts, in Hawaii; Gen. Paul D. Harkins, 

Adm. Harry D. Felt, and Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting at Tan 

Son Nhut Airport; Gen. Curtis E. LeMay ........................ 87 
Page 

Brig. Gen. Rollen Anthis and Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert on 

tour in the Pacific 99 

Viet Cong prisoners unload rice from a C-I23 at Quang Ngai during a 

Mule Train resupply mission; supplies pushed from a C-I 23 for an 

outpost at Binh Hung; C-123s at Da Nang; aerial view of a 

government outpost 109 

C-1 23s on a defoliation mission; brass sprayers in the rear of a C-I 23; 

C-123K aircraft at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, enroute to Vietnam for 

defoliation activities I14 

C-123B on defoliation mission near Saigon; view from inside a C-I23 

as it sprays foliage; USNS Core in Saigon harbor with a cargo of 

Ranch Hand spray and equipment 1 15 

Vietnamese officers and American advisers plan an airlift of Vietnamese 

paratroopers at Tan Son Nhut; 1st Lt. Wilfred G. Narr demonstrates 

aircraft maneuvers to Vietnamese students at Moody AFB, Ga.; AI C 

H. R. Wilson and AIC R. L. Fleury install rockets into a B-26 

bomber at Bien Hoa; F-102 Delta Daggers 130 

Maj. Ivan L. Slavich briefs Gen. Earle G. Wheeler and Gen. Paul D. 

Harkins on a rocket mount of the UH-1 B helicopter; ARVN paratrooper prepares for a jump over Cu Chi; TSgt William W. Cameron 

instructs Vietnamese airmen in the operation of the gunsight on a 

T-28; Vietnamese tanks move toward the burning presidential palace 

after its bombing 164 

ARVN paratroopers leap from USAF C-123; Bird O-1E Dog FAC; 

Capt. B. D. Lassman and Capt. D. F. Schell with Vietnamese 

observer 180 

Vietnamese troops outside the presidential palace in Saigon 192 

Pres. Johnson, W. Averell Harriman; Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, Jr.; 

Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, Gen. Jacob E. Smart, with Maj. Xuan 

Vinh,VNAF 209 

Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky and Col. William E. Bethea; 

Gen. William Westmoreland; AI E aircraft; VNAF CH-34 

helicopter 222 

X 
Outposts or hamlets of South Vietnam 223 

Canberra bomber; rocket pod on F-100; Australian Caribou aircraft at 

AIC Leonard A Rowe; SSgt Harold Inman; AC-47 at Tan Son Nhut; 

Loudspeakers installed in C-47; leaflets dropped from a C-47 249 

B-57 destroyed by Viet Cong mortar attack; Brink BOQ area. following 

xi 

arts, and Graphs 

Page 

Southeast Asia facing p . 1 

Organizational Chart - Far East Air Forces 11 

Principal USAF/ VNAF Airfields in South Vietnam. to 

February 1965 51 

South Vietnam’s Provinces 57 

U.S. Command Arrangements - Vietnam, July 1962 99 

Air Operations - 1962 137 

ARVN Corps Areas (Until November 1962) 154 

ARVN Corps Tactical Zones (After November 1962) 155 

Air Operations - 1963 176 

Air Operations in South Vietnam. 1964 to February 1965 200 

USAF Support Bases Outside Vietnam 231 

Barrell Roll Campaign in Laos - December 1964 - 

January 1965 258 

Diagram of “L” or Triangular Defense System 284 

RVN Countrywide Totals - VC Antiaircraft Incidents 285 

Xlll 
50 100 Kilometers 
Part one: 

The Truman Years 

Origins of 

The American commitment 

to Vietnam 

About 700 miles west of the Philippine Islands, across the China Sea, lies the 

great lndochinese peninsula. China is to the north, Burma to the west, and 

Malaysia to the south. The western part of the peninsula holds Thailand (ancient 

Sam) while the eastern portion contains Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam 

(formerly elements of French Indochina). This area of Southeast Asia (SEA) 

attracted little American interest and attention until the closing months of World 

War II. 

American policymakers who shared President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 

anticolonial sentiments expected Indochina to be freed from French hegemony. 

Yet France reestablished control over Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which had 

been part of the French Empire since the 19th century. To some extent this 

occurred because the British government wished to resuscitate France as a 

European power to help Britain balance somewhat the growing strength of the 

Soviet Union. The United States acquiesced in this aim, and increasingly so as 

the confrontation of the postwar superpowers evolved into the cold war. It was 

the cold war that drew the United States into this region.' 

Japan had virtually occupied Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam after the fall of 

France in 1940. While allowing the French to maintain a presence and a measure 

of control, the Japanese incorporated the Indochinese economic resources into 

their system. In March 1945, with Metropolitan France liberated and a fullfledged member of the Allied coalition, the Japanese interned French civilian and 

military officials and removed the pretense of a combined occupation.2 

French police agencies and other offices of internal control having been 

eliminated, indigenous groups seeking Vietnamese independence began to 

expand their activities. The most vigorous organization was the Viet Minh. 

Dominated by the Indochinese communist party and directed by Ho Chi Minh, 

the Viet Minh launched guerrilla operations against the Japanese and soon 

claimed to control much of northern Vietnam, the Tonkin provinces. To help 

harass the Japanese and also to gather intelligence, the U.S. Office of Strategic 

Services sent several small teams to Vietnam. 

By the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Viet Minh had 

emerged as the leading nationalist group in Vietnam. Viet Minh soldiers on 

August 19 arrived in Hanoi, capital of Tonkin, and assumed de facto control. In 

Hue, capital of Annam, the central provinces, Emperor Bao Dai, last of the 

Vietnamese royal family and a puppet of both France and Japan, abdicated. In 

Saigon, capital of Cochin China in the south, a committee took power while 

3 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

recognizing the overall authority of the Hanoi regime. On December 2 in Hanoi, 

Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of 

Vietnam. 

Meanwhile, the war in Europe had closed and in July 1945 the Potsdam 

Conference convened. The American, British, and Russian representatives 

agreed to include French military forces in operations being planned in Asia, 

chiefly to liberate Indochina. The conferees also acted to regularize operational 

boundaries. The China Theater under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was 

extended southward to the 16th parallel, just below Tourane (Da Nang). The 

territory south of that line came under the Southeast Asia Command headed by 

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. This division determined who was to exercise 

control after the Japanese 

In August 1945, Chinese nationalist troops moved into Tonkin and part of 

Annam, while British troops occupied the rest of Annam and all of Cochin 

China. The British restored French authority in the south, and the French 

brought military forces into the country and ruthlessly suppressed Vietnamese 

aspirations for independence. Despite some continuing guerrilla activity, the 

French had regained their former colonial status and were well established in 

Saigon by the end of the year. 

In the north the Chinese refused to intervene in a contest between the 

well-organized Viet Minh and the small numbers of French. Concerned by the 

threat of the Chinese communists under Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese nationalists 

were reluctant to see the triumph of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. They preferred the 

return of the French if France would abandon territorial and economic rights 

formerly granted as concessions in China. This generally neutral stance fueled the 

struggle for power between the Viet Minh and the French. A guerrilla war of low 

intensity soon developed. 

When the French agreed to renounce their concessions early in 1946, 

Nationalist China recognized French sovereignty in Indochina and moved 

Chinese troops out of Vietnam. By the end of March, they were being replaced by 

French military forces. 

Ho Chi Minh had been negotiating with the French authorities for recognition of his new government and ultimate independence. The exchanges were 

futile and incidents of violence multiplied. The climax came in November 1946 

after a French patrol boat in Haiphong harbor clashed with Vietnamese militia. 

The French responded by brutally bombarding the city and killing an estimated 

6,000 civilians, whereupon Ho broke off the talks. In December he moved his 

government into the mountains of Tonkin and opened full-scale guerrilla war by 

attacking the French in Hanoi. 

American policymakers had conflicting feelings. Their sympathy for the 

Vietnamese nationalists left them reluctant to see France restore control by 

force-they wanted French authority to enjoy the support of the Vietnamese 

people. On the other hand, Americans were uneasy because Vietnamese independence might produce a communist 

4 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT 

Hoping that the Vietnamese were more nationalistic than communistic, 

U.S. government officials urged the French to end the guerrilla warfare and to 

find a political solution acceptable to both parties. If France made a bona fide 

accommodation to ultimate Vietnamese sovereignty, Ho’s strength might collapse. Continually advocating an equitable solution to the problem of conflicting 

claims to power, the United States prohibited the export of war materials to the 

French in Vietnam, although munitions sent to Metropolitan France could, of 

course, be reshipped to Southeast 

While combating Ho’s guerrilla activities, France entered into negotiations 

with anti-Ho Vietnamese parties. To give these elements a native leader, the 

French in the spring of 1949 installed Bao Dai, the former emperor, as the chief of 

state of an entity formed by the union of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China. But 

this was hardly more than a show of sovereignty, for the French retained control 

of Vietnamese foreign and military 

Troubled American officials began to accept this arrangement as the cold 

war intensified everywhere. The Greek civil war, the Berlin blockade, the coup 

d’etat in Czechoslovakia, as well as the successes of the Chinese communists 

against the nationalists, led to a heightened concern with worldwide communism 

that appeared to be monolithic. Surely, Ho Chi Minh’s communist affiliation 

was part of a growing global menace. To cope with this and to rehabilitate 

Western Europe as a force against communist encroachment, the United States 

early in 1949 helped to form and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) for mutual defense. 

The final triumph of the Chinese communists in October 1949 seemed to 

confirm the worst American fears. It spurred the Congress to pass the Mutual 

Defense Assistance Act designed to deal with the cold war. The President was 

empowered to dispense funds to various nations, including “the general area of 

China” which was extended to cover Southeast Asia and specifically Vietnam.’ 

The ongoing guerrilla war in Vietnam that weakened French support of 

NATO and the defense of Western Europe, the arrival of Chinese communist 

troops at the northern frontier of Vietnam at the beginning of 1950, the formal 

recognition of Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam by Communist 

China and the Soviet Union in January 1950-all persuaded the United States 

government to adopt the Bao Dai solution. On February 7, 1950, the United 

States extended diplomatic recognition to the State of Vietnam as well as to the 

Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos. 

Nine days later, France requested American economic and military assistance for prosecution of the war in Indochina. Unable to bear the burden without 

American aid, France was thinking of withdrawing from the region if Ho Chi 

Minh received increasing resources from China and the Soviet 

What the French needed immediately were ammunition, napalm, and 

barbed wire to help defend perimeters around Hanoi and Haiphong against Viet 

Minh attacks. Their air units in the Far East possessed only obsolete and 

5 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

miscellaneous aircraft.* Few fully trained military maintenance technicians were 

on hand because of a general shortage in Metropolitan France, where the French 

Air Force depended in large part on contract aircraft 

President Harry S. Truman regarded the emergence of Communist China 

as an extension of Soviet power and saw the growth of communist influence over 

Asia as a threat to American interests. He instructed the National Security 

Council to formulate a policy for strengthening non-communist Asian nations. 

The result was a resolve to block communist expansion by collective and bilateral 

security treaties. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had already recommended 

spending funds to support anti-communist forces in Indochina, $75 million 

allocated in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act for “the general area of China” 

was appropriately at hand. 

The French wanted a substantial and long-term American commitment. 

And in the spring of 1950, American decisionmakers all opposed what was called 

losing Southeast Asia to communism. Consequently, the United States Government during fiscal year 195 I decided to provide $164 million in military aid to 

France for use in 

Whatever doubts some American officials may have had that French 

military success, predicated on American military assistance, would necessarily 

lead to a strengthened non-communist government in Vietnam vanished in the 

face of two events. The first was intelligence confirmation of increasing aid to the 

Viet Minh by the People’s Republic of China. The second was the invasion of the 

Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, by the communist forces of the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea. 

Now the struggle seemed absolutely clear. As President Truman told Americans on June 27, the communists had “passed beyond the use of subversion to 

conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.” The 

United States, he promised, would resist aggression in Korea and at the same 

time accelerate military assistance to France and the Associated States in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Even as he spoke, eight C47 transports 

were being prepared for delivery to Metropolitan France. Because the situation 

was critical in Southeast Asia, American pilots flew these planes direct to Saigon 

and turned them over even before formal U.S. agencies were in the country to 

coordinate shipments of assistance materials. These eight aircraft were the first 

aviation aid furnished by the United States to the French in Vietnam. 

As American forces entered the war in Korea and as the French resisted Viet 

Minh attacks in Tonkin, Donald R. Heath became the U.S. Minister to the 

Associated States on July 6, 1950. The initial elements of the U.S. Military 

*French Air Force Indochina consisted of two squadrons totaling forty-six British MK-IX 

Spitfires, three squadrons of sixty-three American F-63 Kingcobras, two squadrons of thirty-five 

German JU-52 transports, and one squadron of twenty American C47s. plus some light liaison 

planes. The French Navy had a patrol squadron of eight American PBY-SA Catalinas and a 

reconnaissance squadron of nine British Sea Otters. A lack of specialized aircraft 

required the use of fighters for reconnaissance, strafing, and bombing missions. In general, however, 

bombardment was conducted by PBY patrol planes and by JU-52 transports under contract. 

6 
I 

THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT 

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) entered Saigon on August 3. Brig. Gen. 

Francis G. Brink, USA, assumed command on October 10, and Lt. Col. 

Edmund F. Freeman, the Air Attach; in Saigon, handled air assistance duties 

until the Air Force Section of MAAG-Indochina came into being on November 8 

under Col. Joseph B. 

Mr. Heath was the Chief of Mission and the senior U.S. representative in 

Saigon. General Brink, the MAAG chief, was his military advisor. MAAG 

received and reviewed requests for American aid to the ground, naval, and air 

forces, established requirements and, after coordinating with Heath, submitted 

them to the Department of Defense 

Although Americans hoped to work directly with the Vietnamese as well as 

with the French, the French termed the Bao Dai government and its military 

forces incapable of dealing with assistance matters. French troops were carrying 

the burden of the war, and the few Vietnamese units in existence had limited 

capacities except as auxiliaries. 

As a consequence, MAAG received requests from the French, transferred 

title of military assistance program materials to them, and tried to insure the 

proper use of the items supplied. On December 23, 1950, the United States, 

France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos signed the Mutual Defense Assistance 

Agreement. A provision stipulated that American goods destined for Indochina 

would pass through French 

The military assistance effort had three priorities. The first was responding 

to emergency requests to enable French forces to meet immediate threats. The 

second was improving French military capabilities. The third and least important 

was developing indigenous Vietnamese armed forces. 

With respect to aviation requirements, not until October 1950, when forty 

U.S. Navy F-6F Hellcats arrived in Saigon aboard a French carrier, could the 

United States make available fighter aircraft to replace the old MK-IX Spitfires. 

While the French requested F-63 Kingcobras primarily because of their 

37-mm cannon, the United States Air Force (USAF)* had no spare parts or 

ammunition for these obsolete aircraft and instead furnished ninety F-8F Bearcat fighters, which were ferried to Vietnam in February and March 195 1. Delays 

in installing ground equipment postponed the arrival in Vietnam of five RB-26 

reconnaissance planes until July. Twenty-four B-26 bombers were renovated and 

transported to Hawaii by carrier in December, then flown to Tourane. Nine 

others flew from Sacramento to Hawaii and on to Vietnam at the of the 

year. 

These deliveries completed the initial aviation schedules under the Mutual 

Defense Assistance Program. The planes enabled the French to expand sortie 

rates from an average of 450 a week in the summer of 1950 to 930 in the spring of 

I95 1 

* Hereafter in this work, the terms"Air Force,” ”Army,” ”Navy, "and "Marine Corps" will mean 

"U.S. Air Force,” ”U.S. Army," "U.S. Navy," and "U.S. Marine Corps." Military forces of other 

nations will be specifically designated, for example. "French Air Force." 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

(Bottom) F-8F Bearcats ferried to Vietnam. (Upper left) C-47 with French markings. (Upper right) USAF 

C-1 19s with French markings leave to drop supplies at Dien Bien Phu. 

P. 9: (Top) B-26s. (Center) Morane-500 Crickets. (Bottom) F-8F Bearcats on Dien Bien Phu Airfield. 

8 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT 

Courtesy French E C P Armees 

9 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Despite higher American priorities in Korea, U.S. materiel dispatched to 

Vietnam helped the campaigning. High Commissioner and Commander in Chief 

Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny said in January I951 that U.S. air resources, 

“especially napalm bombs, arrived in the nick of time.” Mr. Heath believed that 

“French superiority in aviation and artillery was responsible for turning back a 

Viet Minh offensive. In particular, the use of napalm . . . was a decisive factor in 

the French holding 

Further French victories in May 195 1 compelled the Viet Minh to abandon 

battles of confrontation and to retreat to lower-key guerrilla operations of 

harassment and ambush. The war assumed the characteristics of a stalemate.” 

For a variety of reasons-to gain the initiative, to respond to American 

urging for a greater Vietnamese stake in the struggle, to allow France to contribute more to the NATO defenses in Europe-the French acceded to a request 

from Bao Dai and projected an expansion of Vietnamese military forces. They 

opened an air training center at Nha Trang Airfield in June 1951 and a Vietnamese Air Force office in Saigon during .July. Furnishing for training several 

Morane-500 Cricket liaison aircraft (French-built version of the German Fieseler 

Storch), the French established the Vietnamese 3 1 2th Special Mission Squadron 

at Tan Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon. Though the first Vietnamese flyers 

received their training in Metropolitan France, French instructors at Nha Trang 

started in March 1952 to train small numbers of pilots, observers, and maintenance men. 

These efforts permitted the activation in 1953 of two Vietnamese Cricket 

observation squadrons and in 1954 of a light combat assault liaison squadron 

equipped with French Dassault M.D.-3 15 Flamants. The three squadrons were 

reorganized on July 1, 1954, into the Vietnamese 1st Liaison Group. Although 

the air training program had significance for the future, it yielded only a token 

number of Vietnamese liaison pilots and observers who had begun to fly combat 

missions under French control toward the end of 

By then the new MAAG chief, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. H. Trapnell, USA, 

and Col. Arvid E. Olson, chief of the MAAG Air Force Section, were concerned 

over the effectiveness of French Air Force Indochina. It was limited to a 

personnel ceiling of 10,000 men and still suffered from a scarcity of technicians. 

Aircraft maintenance and supply were consequently marginal. Plagued by poor 

consumption records, the French found it difficult to project future materiel 

requirements. At the same time, the Korean War imposed its own needs. 

American deliveries to Vietnam decreased, and F-8Fs and B-26s scheduled to 

meet increasing attrition remained unsent during 1952. Yet ten C-47s arriving in 

March and April 1952, and ten more in September and October bolstered the 

French. 19 

The French flew the C-47s to their limits to meet stepped-up action by the 

Viet Minh in October. The planes performed so well t hat Gen. Raoul Salan, who 

had replaced de Lattre, asked General Trapnell for additional ones. Trapnell 

passed the request to Washington and, toward the end of the year, Far East Air 

Forces (FEAF) headquarters in Tokyo received instructions to fill the order. 

10 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT 

FEAF hurriedly dispatched twenty-one (2-47s to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. There, the 24th Air Depot Wing removed USAF insignia, added paradrop 

equipment, and delivered the planes to the French at Nha Trang. To provide 

technicians for better maintenance and supply, the wing sent a temporary duty 

force to Nha Trang on January 4, 1953. This was the first USAF contingent, 

exclusive of the MAAG, to deploy to Vietnam. They remained in the country 

until French troops relieved them on August 

While the United States was funding approximately one-third of the costs of 

military operations, the French, despite limited success in northwest Tonkin, 

became increasingly disheartened by their own casualties and expenditures. 

Appropriations from Bao Dai’s government and from the French National 

Assembly for continuing military operations were difficult to obtain.21 As Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed Presidentelect Dwight D. Eisenhower in 

November 1952, the French, in Paris as well as in Vietnam, were wavering in 

their support for the war. They wanted international backing and additional 

assistance for their efforts.22 

Dealing with this problem would be one of President Eisenhower’s 

concerns. 

COMMAND (Japan) 

JUNE 1950 

Part Two: 

The Eisenhower Years 

II. Dien Bien Phu 

Early in his administration, President Eisenhower decided that three actions 

were necessary for French success in Indochina. France had to give “greater 

reality” to Vietnamese nationalistic aspirations and thereby deny the Viet Minh 

their claim of struggling for independence. With the Vietnamese people thus 

allowed a greater stake in their destiny, the French had to place more reliance on 

indigenous military forces, requiring better equipment and training facilities. 

Finally, the free world had to furnish more assistance to France, which alone was 

carrying on what appeared to be an international struggle.’ 

In March 1953 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advised French 

authorities that the United States would enlarge its fiscal support if France 

framed an acceptable plan for resolving the war.2 Before the French government 

could make a detailed response, the Viet Minh launched another offensive in 

western Tonkin in April 1953, moved into Laos, and threatened 

A NATO foreign ministers conference was in progress in Paris and French 

officials asked Dulles for the loan of C-1 19 transports to lift tanks and other 

heavy equipment into Laos. Although Eisenhower was unwilling to employ 

USAF crews on these combat missions, he agreed to lend the planes if Civil Air 

Transport contract crews from Taiwan flew them. These arrangements made, 

FEAF received the order to provide the aircraft. In May USAF crews flew six 

C-1 19s to Nha Trang where contract pilots took them to Cat Bi Airfield near 

Haiphong. The 24th Air Depot Wing sent a supporting maintenance and supply 

detachment to Cat Bi, and then to Gia Lam Airfield near Hanoi. The aircraft and 

detachment withdrew from Vietnam late in July after satisfying the 

General Henri Eugene Navarre, a new commander in chief, arrived in 

Vietnam in May 1953, with instructions to defeat the Viet Minh and bring the 

war to a close in conformance with American provisos. Navarre drew a plan to 

use mobile strike forces against main enemy units. He hoped to expand support, 

heighten cooperation among ground, naval, and air forces, secure fresh reinforcements from France, and improve Vietnamese forces. He proposed to lure 

the Viet Minh into open battle, break up their main forces by 1955, and reduce 

them to a low level of guerrilla warfare that for the most part indigenous troops 

could 

To help Navarre and incidentally to observe the local conditions, an American joint military mission headed by Army Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel and 

including Maj. Gen. Chester E. McCarty, commander of FEAF’s 315th Air 

Division (Combat Cargo), reached Saigon on June 20. O’Daniel was favorably 

impressed with Navarre’s plan. So was McCarty. Because of the personnel 

shortages in French Air Force Indochina, McCarty noted, deliveries of more 

U.S. aircraft without air and maintenance crews made little sense. Navarre 

wanted extra paratroop lift capacity, and McCarty proposed to lend the French 

C-119s. The planes could be dispatched to Cat Bi a day before a planned 

15 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

operation, flown in combat by French crews, and returned to Clark Air Base for 

The commander of French Air Force Indochina rejected the 

Instead, he requested in August to supply plus 

necessary equipment by October Pulled out of units in the United States, these 

aircraft were delivered to Vietnam in December.' 

The armistice in Korea, signed on July 1953, raised the possibility of 

greater support not only by the United States for the French but by Communist 

China for the Viet Minh as well. American officials nevertheless believed in the 

efficacy of plan. When the French government in September agreed to 

the eventual independence of Vietnam, the United States promised to make 

addition to the assistance funds already committed to the French 

and the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and million by 

the end of In March the United States would offer to boost the 

amount and to reimburse France up to million for expenditures in Indochina during calendar year 

In Vietnam, said he would keep General and 

informed of operational plans and not limit their function simply to handling 

materiel requests. Expecting to play a larger role in assisting the French, 

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in January 1954 augmented the Air 

Force Section from seven officers and eight airmen to thirty officers and thirtyfive airmen. Yet, despite public announcements in Washington of all-out American support, continued to have little influence on French activities. 

complained (as other bodies with similar missions elsewhere normally 

noted) that the French were reluctant to accept advice. They generally expected 

the United States to deliver everything requested, regardless of their ability to use 

or to maintain 

Starting his operations in the fall of General focused on the. 

plain of Located in northwest Tonkin and near the border of 

Laos, it controlled the main road between the two regions. A strongly fortified air 

and ground base at would reestablish French authority in the area 

and block Viet Minh incursions into the neighboring 

onto an airstrip at on November 

and began to fortify the area. They needed heavy equipment, including large 

quantities of barbed wire. On December started to ferry 315th Air 

Division to Cat Airfield for further flight by French military or 

civilian contract crews. At Cat a detachment of the Troop Carrier Wing, 

the Aerial Resupply Unit, and a provisional maintenance squadron of the 

Far East Air Logistics Force supported from twelve to 19s at any 

given time." 

As developed an enclave in northwestern Tonkin, he had to 

weaken the French defenses of Hanoi and In December and 

January Viet Minh attacks threatened French security in those cities. Even 

more serious was a growing Viet Minh concentration around 
DIEN BIEN PHU 

The American government noted the dangers, and Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for International Security Affairs Frank C. Nash directed the military 

services to give the highest priority to the Mutual Assistance Program without 

regard to funding. On January 16, 1954, President Eisenhower instructed 

Defense Secretary Wilson to report to him all that could be done to help the 

French without actually committing U.S. forces to combat. To permit the 

French to counter Viet Minh incursions into Laos, six long-range B-26s arrived 

in Indochina in January. When the French then requested twenty-two more, ten 

to offset attrition and twelve to augment bombing capabilities, Assistant Secretary Nash on January 29 resolved to provide them even if they had to come from 

operational USAF squadrons in the Far East. Notified of the decision, FEAF 

ferried sixteen of its planes from Japan to Clark Air Base where French markings 

were painted on, then delivered them to Tourane in mid-February. These 

aircraft remained on loan until sixteen B-26s and three RB-26s, funded by 

the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, could reach Indochina later in 

February and 

Despite talk of getting additional aviation personnel from France and of 

using Vietnamese to augment French service troops, the French air units 

remained approximately one-fourth undermanned. FEAF received instructions 

on January 3 1 to organize for duty in Vietnam several provisional C-47 and B-26 

maintenance and supply units, with a composite strength of some three hundred 

men. Brig. Gen. Albert G. Hewitt, commander of Far East Air Logistics Force, 

arrived in Saigon on February 2, 1954, and established a B-26 detachment at 

Tourane and a C-47 detachment at Do Son Airfield near Haiphong. Three days 

later, the members of this highly classified undertaking began to be airlifted in. 

President Eisenhower informed the American public that “some airplane 

mechanics . . . who would not get touched by combat” had been sent to 

Support of the French bothered Gen. Otto P. Weyland, FEAF commanding general. Because furnishing USAF personnel hampered his own combat 

readiness, he preferred the French to receive American funds for contract 

maintenance. Traveling to Vietnam early in February, General Weyland gained 

the impression that the French problems were “primarily political and psychological.” The Vietnamese disliked the French and served poorly under them. 

More serious, the Vietnamese laborers who worked at the Hanoi airfields by day 

might well be joining the Viet Minh at 

As growing communist forces gathered around Dien Bien Phu and cut the 

surface routes to the garrison, General Navarre airlifted new French and Vietnamese troops into the airhead. By mid-January 1954, air supply required twenty 

C-I 19 and fifty C-47 sorties each day. The security of this airlift seemed threatened when radio intercepts reported Viet Minh stockpiling of 37-mm rapid-fire, 

Soviet-made antiaircraft (AA) artillery ammunition nearby. At the request of the 

Army attach; in Saigon, two FEAF experts in antiaircraft warfare, Captains 

Robert M. Lloyd and Robert W. Hicks, visited Vietnam between January 16 and 

February 5. They warned that 37-mm guns sited along the limited air approaches 

17 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

to Dien Bien Phu would have “considerable success” against low-flying transports. But after studying aerial photographs, the officers concluded that the 

French had exaggerated the threat-there were no enemy 37-mm guns in the 

President Eisenhower was apprehensive that the Viet Minh would overrun 

the troops besieged in the isolated fortress at Dien Bien Phu, but Navarre 

remained optimistic. The position was attracting a large part of the Viet Minh 

military forces and if they attacked, the French would inflict heavy casualties on 

them. The report of the American antiaircraft artillery experts was reassuring. 

French Minister of Defense Rene Pleven and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. 

Gen. Paul H. R. Ely visited the site in February and were impressed with the 

strength of the defenses. General O’Daniel enthusiastically reported the land 

garrison able to withstand any attack that the Viet Minh could launch “at 

present.”The USAF directorate of intelligence decided in March 1954 that Ho 

Chi Minh would be “stupid” to attack and take heavy losses when “hit and run” 

tactics were so much more effective.” 

In talks completed on February 18, 1954, France, the United States, Great 

Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to discuss political solutions for Korea and 

Indochina at a conference to be held in Geneva on April 26. Secretary of State 

Dulles had opposed setting a specific date for further international negotiations, 

arguing that a fixed time would tempt Ho Chi Minh into a spectacular 

operation. 18 

His concern was prophetic-Ho sought an all-out victory at Dien Bien Phu. 

Chinese advisors had trained and equipped Viet Minh artillery and antiaircraft 

units. Disassembled weapons, brought in on the backs of human carriers, had 

been reassembled and placed in positions concealed under heavy vegetation in 

the hills surrounding the French garrison. Artillery pieces included 75- and 

105-mm howitzers, the latter of American manufacture that had been captured 

in Korea. Among the antiaircraft arms were Soviet-made 37-mm automatic 

weapons and 12.7-mm heavy machineguns. A 100-mile road was opened to a 

major depot on the Chinese border, and a fleet of 1,000 trucks arriving from 

China assured sufficient shells for a high rate of 

Before the Viet Minh launched their attack against Dien Bien Phu, guerrillas struck the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airfields inside the Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter. On the night of March 3, infiltrators used plastic explosives to damage or 

destroy ten civil transport aircraft at Gia Lam. Three nights later at Cat Bi, 

guerrillas destroyed one B-26 and six Morane-500 Crickets and damaged three 

parked 

The attack against Dien Bien Phu began on March 10 with shelling of the 

two airstrips. At nightfall on the 13th the Viet Minh mounted massed assaults 

against outposts. Although the French dropped two paratroop battalions into 

Dien Bien Phu on March 14 and 16, the Viet Minh clung to the surrounding hills 

and sent artillery fire plunging down upon the garrison and airstrips. Ground 

support came from all available air units of French Air Force Indochina, the 

French aircraft carrier Arromanches, and from some naval patrol airmen flying 

18 
DlEN BlEN PHU 

PB4Y-2 Privateers out of Cat Bi. Sorties during the week of March 11-17 

averaged forty-three per day. 

On the 14th communist gunners closed the principal airstrip at Dien Bien 

Phu, then destroyed seven F-8Fs, two C-47s, one C-I 19, four Crickets, and two 

H-19B helicopters on the ground. A B-26 hit by antiaircraft fire crashed upon 

landing at Cat Bi. Enemy fire the next day downed one F-6F and one F-8F. That 

same week, flak damaged three F-8Fs and one C-I 19. C-47s and smaller planes 

sneaked into the airstrip at night for two weeks to evacuate casualties. These 

missions ceased after an air ambulance was destroyed by artill :ry on March 

French fighters and light bombers giving direct and close air support to the 

ground troops had to operate from higher altitudes because of the accurate 

antiaircraft fire. The crews therefore found it harder to locate and hit dug-in and 

carefully camouflaged positions. Since napalm dropped by C47s seemed particularly potent, the French on March 18 asked to use FEAF C-I 19s for larger 

napalm drops on moonlit nights. While General Weyland thought the C-I 19s 

rather vulnerable for such work, he agreed to furnish them. One plane carrying 

4,000 gallons of drummed napalm crashed during takeoff from Cat Bi on March 

23. Nevertheless, the French flew some C-I 19 drops with satisfactory results. But 

napalm, effective in the rice paddies of the Red River Delta, was less suitable to 

the canopied and rain-soaked forest around Dien Bien Phu.22 

With the major airstrip at Dien Bien Phu closed, the 170 tons of ammunition and 32 of food required each day to sustain the garrison had to be dropped 

into ever-shrinking zones. All military air transports, including American C-I 19s, 

were committed to this resupply, even though high-altitude drops from 8,000 to 

10,000 feet dispersed much cargo into Viet Minh territory. Drops from 3,000 to 

4,000 feet were impossible because of the 37-mm antiaircraft fire. Supplies in lieu 

of aircraft and crews were sacrificed, and one-half to two-thirds of the items fell 

into enemy 

President Eisenhower seriously considered a direct U.S. military intervention. But judging adequate ground forces to be already engaged, he was reluctant 

to commit American ground troops in Southeast Asia or to employ air units 

squarely in support of the French. He was unwilling to authorize stronger U.S. 

measures unless a coalition of powers, including Britain in particular, gave moral 

meaning to such an 

Talk of using American air and naval forces to support the French 

prompted Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas D. White to direct a study on how 

best to employ the Air Force in Indochina. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Matthew B. 

Ridgway dispatched a team of officers under Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin to 

Vietnam to gather facts on a possible ground force commitment. President 

Eisenhower, noting that General Trapnell was due for rotation, directed that 

General O’Daniel, an experienced combat commander who still visited Indochina periodically, be assigned as Chief of 

In Washington on March 20, French General Ely met with President 

Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, who were gravely and sympathetically 

19 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

I 

Courtesy: USlA 

20 
DlEN BIEN PHU 

P. 20: (Top) USAF C-124 at Ceylon airlifting French soldiers to Vietnam. (Center) French paratroopers. 

(Bottom) French Foreign Legion. 

P. 21: (Top) President Eisenhower with Gen Paul Ely and Adm. Arthur W. Radford. (Below) Supplies 

unloaded in Indochina under the Military Defense Assistance Program. 

21 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

concerned about the situation. Eisenhower directed Radford to give the French 

whatever materials they requested. He was speaking of logistic assistance, but Ely 

had the impression that much more was involved in the offer. Dulles reiterated 

the position that overt U.S. participation in the war would depend on French 

willingness to expand the training of indigenous forces and to give ultimate 

independence to the Associated States. Radford was more encouraging. He 

spoke of direct U.S. intervention by sixty B-29 bombers escorted by 150 carrier 

aircraft of the Seventh Fleet against the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. 

In Paris, Ely reported Radford’s personal assurance of naval air support if 

the situation required it. The French government on March 29 then sent Col. 

Raymond Brohon to Vietnam to see if American intervention was needed to save 

Dien Bien 

In Hanoi, Brohon told General Navarre of possible American air strikes. At 

first feeling that they might trigger overt Chinese intervention, Navarre informed 

General Ely on the night of April 3 that direct American action might “have a 

decisive effect particularly if it comes before the [next] Viet-Minh assault.” The 

Viet Minh had already launched a massed attack on the evening of March 30, 

and were about to mount another on the night of April 4. They seemed to be 

taking heavy 

On the 3d of April in Paris, the French government asked the United States 

to fly two battalions of French paratroopers and some naval personnel from 

France to Vietnam. The Americans agreed and set the first airlift for the 

Alerted on April 3 to assume the mission, the United States Air Forces in Europe 

planned to use C-] 19s of the 322d Air Division (Combat Cargo). On the 6th, 

however, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru refused to permit flights over India, 

even though the troops transported would be unarmed and dressed in civilian 

clothes. Air Force headquarters accordingly directed the 62d Troop Carrier 

Wing to deploy C- 124s from Larson Air Force Base, Washington. On April 20, 

six C- 124s picked up 5 14 passengers in Paris and Tunis and traveled to Vietnam, 

with intermediate refueling stops in Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 

Ceylon, and Thailand. The planes unloaded at Tourane on the 23d. A second lift 

of five C-124s departed Marseilles with 452 passengers on May 5, followed much 

the same route, and arrived at Tourane on the 

Meanwhile, at midnight on April 4, Premier Joseph Laniel asked Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon for strikes by Navy carrier pilots against Viet Minh 

artillery around the besieged French forces. As an alternative, he requested the 

immediate loan of ten to twenty B-29s, these to be maintained by USAF 

personnel and flown by French 

Secretary Dulles had earlier spoken of the determination of the United 

States to resist Chinese aggression. In a speech to the Overseas Press Club in 

Washington on March 29, he expressed strong opposition by “whatever means” 

against the extension of communist power into Southeast 

British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wanted to be sure exactly what 

Dulles meant, for Eden thought it useless to encourage the French in an 

adventure that would succeed only with more than limited military assistance. 

22 
DlEN BlEN PHU 

Accordingly, the British Ambassador Roger M. Makins informed Dulles that his 

government believed the French situation in Indochina to be beyond salvage. It 

was therefore important, he said, to refrain from jeopardizing the negotiations to 

be held in 

Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford, and Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Roger M. Kyes on April 3 briefed a select group of congressional leaders. The 

latter made it clear that the Congress would support no unilateral U.S. intervention in Indochina unless three conditions were met: unified action by the noncommunist nations in Southeast Asia and by the United Kingdom, complete 

independence to be granted to the Associated States, and continuation by the 

French of their military effort on the same scale after other nations entered the 

conflict 

Because congressional support for U.S. air and naval assistance to France 

depended on a British alignment, President Eisenhower wrote Prime Minister 

Winston Churchill a personal letter on April 4. Churchill’s response three days 

indicated little enthusiasm for 

On April 5 Dulles had revealed in testimony before the House foreign affairs 

committee that the Chinese were “coming awfully close” to overt military 

intervention. This, he said, Eisenhower would not countenance. Yet, given the 

British position, the United States on the 6th informed France that other 

circumstances were necessary for a direct American role in 

On the same day, Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, 

recommended against lending B-29 aircraft for two reasons. The French had 

little ability to operate the planes and none to support them. Suitable targets for 

the large bombers were 

General Navarre informed Paris on April 7 that he lacked French flight 

crews to man borrowed B-29s. Furthermore, without fighter escorts, the B-29s 

might be shot down if the Chinese sent in MIG 

Convinced of Indochina’s major importance to the free world, President 

Eisenhower on the 7th explained to the press why he thought so. The surrender of 

any free people to communism, he said, was inimical to freedom everywhere. The 

loss of Vietnam would expose other nations in Southeast Asia to communist 

aggression. “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, 

and what will happen to the last one is the certainty it will go over very 

American military studies were far from optimistic about the prospect of 

employing U.S. combat forces to support the French. A FEAF staff paper 

stressed the point that the French still followed an “arrogant”colonial policy and 

had so alienated native loyalties as to make a military solution probably impossible. Besides, rigid ceilings on French military manpower and a reluctance to 

develop native forces had dashed what hope there might have been to deal with 

the Viet Minh militarily. More specifically, the French had failed to exploit their 

planes fully, for they had neither interdicted enemy supply routes nor properly 

used air strikes against the hostile concentrations ringing the 

A USAF staff study concluded that air power would contribute to the 

efforts of land forces, but several factors would seriously inhibit air effectiveness. 

23 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Cited were the character of the ground operations, the terrain, the weather, the 

absence among the indigenous population of a will to fight, the general scarcity of 

good air targets, and the want of target 

The Army fact-finding team headed by General Gavin reported that eight 

U.S. divisions plus thirty-five engineer battalions would have to fight in the 

Hanoi Delta and possibly seize Hainan Island. Because Southeast Asia had no 

good ports, airfields, and land communications, support requirements were 

tremendous. “We finally decided when we were all through,” Gavin said later, 

“that what we were talking about doing was going to war with Red China under 

conditions that were appallingly disadvantageous.” Ridgway sent the report to 

President Eisenhower who was struck by the enormity of the requirements 

Yet U.S. military commanders in the Far East tried to furnish all-out logistic 

support to the French, even drawing equipment from American units. Gen. Earle 

E. Partridge, who assumed command of Far East Air Forces on March 26,1954, 

directed “full, prompt, and effective” action. Thus, when the French High 

Commissioner asked Ambassador Heath early in April for eighteen C-47s to 

replace losses, the planes were flown from .Japan to Tourane on April 9 and 

placed on loan. When the French wanted twenty-five B-26B aircraft, these too 

were provided. Other expedited deliveries included H-19 helicopters taken from 

Marine Corps units in the Far East, L-20 liaison aircraft from the Air Force, and 

twelve F-8F replacement aircraft diverted from Thailand commitments. The 

carrier Suipan brought twenty-five F-4U Corsair fighters to Tourane to augment 

the F-6Fs aboard the Arromanches. While FEAF sent large air shipments of 

munitions, paraflares, and white-phosphorus bombs, larger deliveries of heavier 

ordnance came by surface vessels loaded in Korea and 

Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, FEAFdeputy for operations, offered the French 

on April 7 the Hail (Lazy Dog) munitions stored in Japan. These small finned 

bullets had been manufactured for antipersonnel missions during the Korean 

War but had never been used in combat. With 11,200 of the missiles packed in a 

cluster adapter about the size and weight of a 500-pound bomb, the tactic was to 

drop the clusters from 15,000 feet and burst them at 5,000 feet. This allowed the 

finned bullets to gain lethal velocity as they approached the 

Five million of these small missiles and 500 cluster adapters arrived at 

Haiphong on April 16, but the ship was delayed on berthing and did not unload 

until the 23d. When the shipment was unpacked, about half the missiles were 

corroded and many had damaged fins that affected their ballistic flight. Two 

FEAF technical experts, Lt. Col. William B. Sanders and Maj. Robert V. 

Prouty, urged the French to employ the finned bullets in a fairly large strike 

against enemy personnel. The French, however, preferred to use them against 

antiaircraft artillery emplacements. Four PB4Y-2 aircraft, each carrying 12 

cluster units, opened the attack and through May 2 dropped 227 units; B-26s 

dropped 132. 

Though Sanders and Prouty were unable to obtain concrete evaluations of 

results, the French appeared to be happy with circumstantial evidence. On April 

24 
DIEN BlEN PHU 

30 and May I the missile bombs were extensively employed in conjunction with 

air resupply missions, and on these dates C-1 19 crews reported less antiaircraft 

fire than usual. Perhaps more indicative, the Viet Minh dispersed their antiaircraft batteries. To Sanders it seemed that “the finned bullet attacks were successful but only due to volume rather than good delivery 

When Generals Partridge and Smart visited Vietnam during April 14-18, 

General Navarre asked whether B-29 operations were feasible. On his way home, 

Partridge radioed Brig. Gen. Joseph D. C. Caldara, commander of the FEAF 

Bomber Command (Provisional), to meet him at Haneda airport in Tokyo. 

There Partridge told Caldara of Navarre’s request. According to Navarre, B-29 

operations had been cleared through diplomatic channels. Partridge had 

received no such directive. In any case, Caldara was to go to Vietnam and see 

whether B-29s would be effective. If so and B-29 flights were authorized, Caldara 

would have complete operational control. Partridge wanted him to employ his 

force as a total unit under mass-strike 

Leaving Japan on the following day, Caldara flew to Saigon. After conferring with Robert McClintock, Charge d’Affaires at the American Embassy, 

and with French officials, Caldara received an intelligence briefing. He then flew 

over Dien Bien Phu. He concluded that there were “no true B-29 targets.” But if 

B-29s were “the only aircraft that can put the required tonnage on the roads and 

supply areas, we can do the job if directed.” The monsoon weather had set in, 

limiting visual bombing. Hence bombing by shoran radar or by airborne radar 

would be essential. 

Believing that B-29 operations could best be mounted from Clark Air Base 

in the Philippines, General Caldara planned to fly a maximum effort strike with 

1 / IO-second-delay-fused, 500-pound general purpose bombs. Navy fighters 

operating from carriers would escort the bombers. “The bombing raid,” Caldara 

later reminisced, “could have effectively destroyed the entire enemy force surrounding Dien Bien Phu.” 

This may have been wishful thinking. Although General Navarre repeatedly 

sought information on the ability of the B-29s to destroy antiaircraft facilities, he 

felt that the absence of ground-based radar guidance made a mass strike so close 

to the camp impossible. He preferred an American air strike against the major 

Viet Minh supply base at Tuan Giao, a road-junction town about fifty miles 

northeast of Dien Bien Phu. Caldara made a personal aerial reconnaissance of 

the enemy supply lines from Dien Bien Phu to the Chinese border and presented 

target information to the French. In Hanoi he discovered the French possessed 

more fighter-bombers and light bombers than they could use on any given day 

because of personnel and maintenance restrictions. Finally, Caldara judged a 

mass bombing by B-29s to be impractical under the conditions. He also informed 

Partridge, who directed him to return to 

Arriving in Paris on April 19, Secretary Dulles learned that the situation at 

Dien Bien Phu was “virtually hopeless.” It could be saved only through U.S. air 

intervention. Dulles suggested to the French government that Generals Navarre 

and O’Daniel hold an emergency consultation. But on the 23d when Navarre 

25 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

asked for an American B-29 air strike, Dulles told Foreign Minister Georges 

Bidault that direct U.S. intervention required a prior political basis. 

Dulles conferred with Admiral Radford when the latter reached Paris on 

the evening of April 24, and they concluded that it was too late for United States 

action. In Geneva the following evening, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made 

it quite clear that the United Kingdom opposed direct American air involvement. 

Discussions next turned toward a new policy on the basis of a French defeat in 

northwest 

With direct American intervention ruled out, the sole hope for continued 

French resistance at Dien Bien Phu rested on reinforcing the garrison. Paratroopers flown from France to Vietnam in USAF aircraft offered the prospect of 

releasing experienced paratrooper battalions in reserve at Hanoi. Nevertheless, 

the dispatch of relief was meaningful only if air transport supply was available. 

Navarre dropped small numbers of paratroopers into Dien Bien Phu on the 

nights of May 3,4, and 5, but canceled another planned drop because of scarce 

airlift. Through April and early May, French combat aircraft and transports 

operated under the most severe restrictions of adverse weather and terrain as well 

as of hostile ground 

As the defensive perimeter at Dien Bien Phu contracted, the drop zone 

diminished to a diameter of about 2,000 yards. Antiaircraft weapons sited on 

high ridges alongside the drop zone caught aircraft flying through the slot in a 

murderous crossfire. To escape flak, French C-47~ dropped parabundles from 

10,000 feet and had to make several passes over the target before they could kick 

out their complete loads. In deference to the ground fire, C-I 19s raised their drop 

altitude to 5,000 feet, and dumped their loads quickly in a single pass. Hardly safe 

from flak at that height, Civil Air Transport pilots complained that the C-47s 

dropped parabundles through their flights and that escorting flak-suppression 

aircraft were dropping bombs through flight formations. These were hazardous 

conditions for civilian crews whose contracts made no mention of flying in active 

combat areas. 

To increase drop accuracy at 8,000 to 10,000 feet, French airborne technicians devised an ingenious procedure. They used a refueling line to hobble a 

cargo parachute until it neared the ground. Then an explosive time-delay fuze cut 

the line and allowed the parachute to deploy. The device appeared to work, and a 

detachment of the U.S. Army 808 1st Quartermaster Airborne Supply and 

Packaging Company, which loaded C-I 19s at Cat Bi, adopted the parachute 

delay apparatus and used it on all C-1 19 drops during the last two weeks of the 

Dien Bien Phu 

Fragments of a 37-mm shell severely injured Civil Air Transport pilot Paul 

Holden on April 24. His fellow civilians refused to fly to Dien Bien Phu again 

without adequate combat air support, so French military pilots manned the 

C-1 19s. On the 26th, antiaircraft fire downed one F-6F and two B-26s. Flaksuppression missions (including a heavy concentration of Hail missiles), flown at 

the expense of close air support strikes and supply line interdiction, improved the 

situation. The civilian pilots returned to their planes on the 30th. Breaking a short 

26 
DIEN BIEN PHU 

period of silence, 37-mm guns on May 6 scored hits on one C-I 19 and shot down 

another flown by civilian pilot James B. 

On the 6th planes delivered 196 tons of supplies to the garrison. What was 

to be the final Viet Minh assault started that evening. At noon of the 7th, 

soldiers broke into the heart of the French defenses, and the battle ended 

several hours later. Ho Chi Minh had scored a decisive victory that coincided 

with the negotiations in Geneva. There, delegates had failed to reach political 

agreement on Korea and were about to take up the problem of restoring peace 

to 

*A legendary figure in Asia, McGovern had come to be known as "Earthquake McGoon" in 

deference to his huge size and black beard. He was a Fourteenth Air Force pilot in World War II and 

remained in the Far East with the Civil Air Transport Company. He died in the C-I 19 crash. 

21 

Victory at Dien Bien Phu allowed the Viet Minh to move troops and 

weapons toward the Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter. During the night of May 12, 

500 Vietnamese regulars at Hanoi deserted with their arms. Grave doubts about 

holding the Red River Delta arose among the French. Deciding that the safety of 

the Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam had become the prime consideration, the 

government directed the French commander to withdraw. He could retire as far 

as the 18th parallel to safeguard the southern part of Vietnam.’ 

Although President Eisenhower believed overt Chinese intervention in 

Indochina hardly likely, he permitted the military services to plan for the 

contingency. Identifying the options open to the United States may have benefited French morale. At the time, Adm. Felix B. Stump, USN, was Commander 

in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), the unified commander responsible for 

U.S. military operations in Asia south of the 30th parallel. He conceived that an 

American commander of a Southeast Asia Defense Command ought to move 

into Vietnam with U.S. naval and air forces, perhaps eight Army divisions, and 

probably exercise operational control over the French 

General Partridge, FEAF commander, promptly protested Admiral 

Stump’s concept because it would divide the unity of air command in the Pacific 

and base air units on hazardous airfields. Less than enthusiastic about B-29s with 

conventional weapons, Partridge favored using carriers. Believing the struggle to 

be basically a civil war in which long-term pacification and unification rather 

than destruction were the prime objectives, he thought that conventionally 

armed B-29s might produce favorable short-term psychological effects but no 

lasting results. Indecisive and devastating air attacks would be counterproductive 

because the real task was to build indigenous military, economic, political, and 

psychological 

Toward the end of May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to place 

large numbers of American forces in Vietnam. They wished to avoid a defensive 

Korea-type response and preferred an offensive against mainland China, including attacks against the Chinese war-making capability and “employing atomic 

weapons, whenever 

President Eisenhower sent General Trapnell, M AAG-Indochina chief, to 

Paris at the end of May to discuss cooperative planning with General Ely, who 

was preparing to go to Vietnam as Commander in Chief and High Commissioner. When Ely failed to receive positive assurance of U.S. intervention even in 

the event of an overt Chinese attack, he was unwilling to accept an overall 

American commander and was averse to having American ground troops, 

except for one or two divisions as a show of good 

29 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

After that, the prospects of American intervention diminished. Discussions 

in Geneva on Indochina commenced May between delegates from the United 

States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, the 

People’s Republic of China, the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, the State of 

Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The question was how to 

end the war between France (and its adherents) and the Viet Minh, the former 

supported by the United States and the latter by Communist China and the 

Soviet Union. The Viet Minh delegate was hardly anxious to compromise. He 

felt that the French colonials had been defeated and that all of Vietnam lay within 

Chi grasp. 

Seeing little chance of holding an enclave in the French in June 

were agreeable to a partitioning of Vietnam that would leave the southern part to 

them. By then, the Viet Minh were establishing control over the central highlands. On the in Pass, they cut off and virtually destroyed 

men of French Mobile Group that was withdrawing toward Pleiku along 

Route 

The Viet Minh continued their military successes and the Geneva negotiations dragged on. Between June in Washington, President Eisenhower and 

Prime Minister Churchill drew up a paper and offered it to the French as the 

basis for an armistice. Pledging to press for a collective defense of Southeast 

Asia, they warned that the international situation would be “seriously aggravated” if the French government refused to accept an 

The Soviet Union seemed more interested in Europe than in Southeast Asia. 

Informed speculation indicated that Foreign Minister Molotov 

proffered Premier Pierre a somewhat favorable settlement in 

Indochina if the French abstained from participating in a European Defense 

Community. At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister apparently impressed with the atomic might of the United States, hoped to demilitarize 

Indochina to deny the Americans bases 

On July in Geneva, serious discussions centered around the place where a 

dividing line could be drawn across Vietnam. The French insisted on the 18th 

parallel, while the North Vietnamese argued for the 14th. After a private discussion between and in Bern, the Viet Minh accepted 

the 17th parallel as the demarcation, and the negotiations moved rapidly to a 

conclusion on July 

Signing an agreement on Vietnam, French and Viet Minh military representatives established two states separated at the 17th parallel, a demilitarized zone 

on each side of the line, and the withdrawal of French troops from the North and 

of Viet Minh from the South. They prohibited introducing fresh troops, arms, 

and munitions, as well as building new military bases in Vietnam. International 

Control Commission teams from Canada, and Poland were to supervise 

the implementation of the armistice and to report violations that might lead to 

resumed hostilities. Finally, there were to be, by July elections throughout 

Vietnam to unify the country. Consultations between representatives of the two 
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL 

parts, North and South, were to start no later than July 20, 1955, to prepare for 

the 

The Soviet Union wished all parties to accept the Geneva accords formally, 

but the United States preferred to keep them a matter between the two principals. 

Nevertheless the American delegate, Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith, 

gave assurance that the United States would “refrain from the threat or the use of 

force to disturb” the agreements and would “view any renewal of the aggression 

in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.” The delegate from South Vietnam 

solemnly protested that his country was not bound by agreements. He objected 

that the French High Command had arrogated to itself the right to fix a date for a 

future election, a political rather than a military 

The Geneva accords led to the removal of USAF logistic support detachments, and General Partridge had started the withdrawal as early as May 13. But 

when the French need for support to hold the Red River Delta slowed the 

evacuation, Partridge directed the detachments to take necessary measures for 

their own safety and 

The C-47 detachment at Do Son Airfield departed on June 29. The C-I 19 

detachment at Cat Bi moved on May 23 to Tourane and joined the B-26 support 

On July 13 Defense Secretary Wilson ordered immediate suspension of all 

materiel shipments to Indochina. The Air Force stopped all deliveries, started to 

recover the B-26 and C-I19 aircraft on loan, and arranged to evacuate its 

personnel. Much materiel already en route to Indochina in French-controlled 

ships could not be diverted, and eventually ended up in French dumps and 

depots. The B-26 and C-I 19 logistic support detachments remained at Tourane 

on aircraft recovery missions until the last of the loaned planes returned to Clark 

Air Base on September 

The USAF units had little trouble evacuating their own people from 

Vietnam, but were hard-pressed to fulfill other personnel movements. The 

French requested assistance to repatriate wounded men from North Vietnam, 

and five C-124s moved 504 individuals. The 315th Air Division and 6481st 

Medical Air Evacuation Group handled these patients from Saigon hospitals via 

Clark Air Base to Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, where Military Air Transport 

Service (MATS) craft flew them to the United States and finally to France and 

North Africa. The Navy hospital ship Haven moved 725 men from Vietnam to 

Oran, Algeria, and to 

Air Force transports flew U.S. nationals from the Hanoi-Haiphong area; 

the Philippine Air Lines evacuated Filipino residents; Civil Air Transport planes 

took out Chinese; U.S. Navy Amphibious Group One and the Military Sea 

Transport Service lifted supplies and thousands of Vietnamese refugees to safety. 

The largest of these movements by far took place between July 10, 1954, and 

July 30, 1955. Before the Viet Minh stopped the migration, about 880,000 

Vietnamese fled from the North to the 

31 
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

Refugees fleeing from 

North Vietnam when 

the country was 

divided at the 17th 

parallel. 

Courtesy: USlA 

32 
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL 

(Right) Richard M. Nixon, Pierre 

Mendes-France, and John Foster 

DuIIes 

(Below) Operation Wounded 

Warrior: USAF evacuation of 

French Foreign Legionnaires after 

Dien Bien Phu. 

33 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Few efforts were made to evaluate the air operations of the Indochina War, 

quite possibly because of a general feeling that it was pointless to draw lessons 

from a conflict that was doomed from the start. The French had been unable to 

win the support of the people where the war was fought. 

Even so, at General Twining’s direction., General visited the region 

and prepared a detailed report. His main conclusion was that the manpower 

strength of the French Air Force had been hopelessly inadequate to support 

ground troops dispersed in many garrisons. Air operations were largely 

responses to urgent ground force requests. In consequence the French had tried 

to do too much, in far too many places, with much too 

Summarizing the reasons for this lackluster performance, noted the 

personnel shortages and the poor organization. Often more aircraft than pilots 

were available, and too few maintenance men were on hand to keep planes 

serviceable. Furthermore, tactical air planners had been unable to develop 

targets in the “monsoon mountain mass” of North Vietnam, and interdiction 

missions had been relatively ineffective against enemy supply lines, particularly 

against the flow of goods from Both General and 

assessment implied that the existing problems were correctable. But neither 

echoed an earlier estimate by Gen. French air commander, 

who suggested that the Minh tactics of concealment, dispersal, surprise, and 

psychological warfare were extremely difficult to counter with fast-flying military 

President Eisenhower welcomed the end of bloodshed in Indochina. American assistance, he said, had been unable to cure an “unsound relationship 

between the Asiatics and the French” and had therefore been “of only limited 

Two emerged. In both, most people lived in two great river deltas, 

the Red in the north and the in the south, as well as in 

between the sea and the mountains. 

North Vietnam, under Chi Minh at Hanoi, had about million people 

including a communist political elite and battle-hardened military forces. Brutal 

collectivization programs in and decreased the popularity of the 

revolutionaries. The migration of nearly a million inhabitants south during the 

year after the Geneva accords was a protest against the regime and the conditions 

of life. But the communists confidently expected the national reunification 

plebiscite in to deliver the other Vietnam peacefully to them. 

In South Vietnam, with million people, failure of the French to develop 

indigenous leaders hampered the anti-communist nationalists. During the 

absence of in France, control of the state devolved upon 

Diem, a member of the Catholic minority. He became head of the cabinet in 

Saigon on June and a few weeks later was invested as President of the 

Council of Ministers. Not widely known in the country and somewhat aloof, 

Diem depended heavily for advice on his immediate family, especially on his 

brother and political counselor, 
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL 

Ho Chi Minh made no secret of his determination to extend his control over 

all of Vietnam. Immediately after the Geneva agreements, he called for a “long 

and arduous struggle” to win the south, which he described as “territories of 

He soon sent cadres across the 17th parallel, and they became known as 

Viet Cong. They expanded the communist apparatus in the south, prepared for 

future infiltration of men from the north, and worked for eventual unification 

under Hanoi through subversion as well as open conflict. 

President Eisenhower retained the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and worked to 

strengthen the indigenous government in conjunction with the French, who had 

agreed to stay in Indochina until national forces could emerge. To compensate 

for and bolster the weak government, Secretary Dulles actively concerned 

himself with stimulating strong native military 

According to a National Security Council (NSC) paper in August 1954, the 

Viet Minh victory in Tonkin had enhanced communist military and political 

prestige in Asia. Now the Viet Minh were certain to try to extend their influence 

beyond North Vietnam by military and non-military pressures, that is, by overt 

aggression and by exploiting internal political instabilities and economic weaknesses in neighboring free countries. 

To counter this estimated course of action, the United States decided to 

pursue three principal policies: negotiate a Southeast Asia security treaty pledging members to act promptly against armed aggression; swiftly support legitimate governments requesting and requiring assistance to defeat local subversion 

and rebellion; and, more specifically, support France in assisting the South 

Vietnamese to gain and maintain the military forces and the economic conditions 

needed to meet foreign aggression and insure internal 

Moving speedily, the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New 

Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines signed the Southeast Asia 

Defense Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954. The major threats triggering the 

agreement were subversion from within and aggression from outside a country. 

Although an individual nation had primary responsibility for countersubversive 

activities, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) would act as a 

clearing house to exchange information among the members and to discuss 

common policies. It was external armed aggression against any member that was 

recognized as the main common danger, and this the members pledged to meet 

collectively. Because the Geneva agreements prevented Vietnam, Laos, and 

Cambodia from joining the organization, SEATO spread its protection to them. 

In the case of Vietnam, the United States would work through the French to 

maintain the military forces “necessary for internal security.” For all members, 

the United States would discharge its treaty obligations by deploying mobile 

forces rapidly into the area rather than by stationing units in the region. The 

treaty became effective in February 

Since SEATO was to be a shield against external aggression, Secretary 

Dulles felt that South Vietnam needed military forces for internal security only. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were hesitant to spend scarce funds in Vietnam until a 

stable government existed. They believed, however, that U.S. military assistance 

35 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

to Vietnam should afford both internal security and limited defense against 

external 

Much of the American problem stemmed from the kind of government in 

South Vietnam. The Saigon government had yet to consolidate its power, and 

there were conspiracies to unseat Diem. The Joint Chiefs wanted a reasonably 

strong civil government in control before the United States undertook a military 

training mission. Secretary Dulles understood this concern, but he thought that 

well-trained armed forces would strengthen the Vietnamese government. Under 

pressure from Dulles, the Joint Chiefs conceded that five indigenous divisions 

would permit Vietnam to maintain internal security and present a limited 

response to external attack. But it would take two or three years to train that 

force. If the United States decided to do the training, it should be assigned low 

priority so as not to impair more promising programs elsewhere.” 

Between 1945-1954 the French had built up the Vietnamese regular and 

paramilitary forces to varying degrees of effectiveness. The Vietnamese Air Force 

consisted of the 1st Liaison Group with two squadrons of Morane-500 Cricket 

liaison planes and one squadron of Dassault M.D.-315 light combat assault 

aircraft, and a training center at Nha Trang. Few Vietnamese had held high rank. 

Most were inexperienced. Enlisted desertions were frequent and 

The French had declined the offer of American help in training the Vietnamese, but they changed their minds about the time of the Geneva accords. 

Generals O’Daniel and Ely in Saigon agreed that the United States should 

assume some responsibility. The Geneva agreements fixed the maximum 

strength of the MAAG at 342 U.S. officers and men, the number in the country 

when the accords were signed. Since this group was too small to do a great deal, 

the French retained management of the programs. 

In October the Joint Chiefs ruled that the MAAG in Saigon could execute a 

training mission if this became a political necessity and if the French refrained 

from interfering. After a National Security Council meeting, the President 

ordered Ambassador Heath and General O’Daniel to “collaborate in setting in 

motion a crash program designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty 

and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces.” He instructed the Joint Chiefs 

to prepare a long-range program to reorganize and train the minimum number of 

Vietnamese forces necessary to preserve internal security. 28 

The President also wrote to Diem to ask for Vietnamese-American cooperation on developing a strong and stable state capable of resisting subversion and 

aggression. In return for U.S. assistance, Eisenhower expected Diem to reform 

his government, make it responsive to the nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese people, and shape it into a representative and democratic regime. 29 

American policy statements stressed internal security considerations, but 

public announcements indicated the intention to strengthen the nation to repel 

aggression as well as subversion. The military forces projected were modeled on 

the U.S. tri-service pattern. They were more suitable for conventional military 

operations than for internal security and counterinsurgency activities. 30 

To dramatize interest in Vietnam and to evaluate the situation. President 

36 
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL 

Eisenhower sent General J. Lawton Collins, USA, to Saigon as a special U.S. 

representative on November 3, 1954. Among other missions, Collins was to look 

into the question of insuring the loyalty of the army to the government. Shortly 

after Collins arrived, a Vietnamese general officer who had challenged Diem’s 

control departed for France. This resolved a struggle for the direction of the 

government in favor of Diem. Stability seemed 

Working within strength figures stipulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Collins at first negotiated solely with the French. After January 1, 1955, when the 

union of the Associated States with France terminated, Collins conferred directly 

with Diem’s government. He secured agreement for American support of a 

Vietnamese army numbering 94,000 men, enough for a mobile battle corps of 

three field divisions and one regimental combat team. MAAG was to assume full 

responsibility for assisting the Vietnamese government to organize and train this 

armed force. Due to the personnel ceiling on MAAG, the French would help. On 

February 12, 1955, the United States formally took over all Vietnamese military 

training. 32 

Initial Vietnamese ground operations against the Viet Cong were encouraging. To destroy communist domination in certain areas, a Vietnamese brigade 

conducted a pacification operation in the Mekong Delta in February and March. 

In April and May larger forces pacified the Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces on the coast of the South China Sea. The soldiers broke up armed bands, 

destroyed arms caches, provided local security, and resettled refugees from 

North Vietnam on vacant lands.” 

During March, Diem’s troops also put down a rebellion by the Binh Xuyen 

politico-religious sect, a revolt that spread to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects. 

Driving the dissidents out of the city, the Vietnamese army crushed their armed 

forces in a final campaign in the Rung Sat swamps southwest of Saigon in 

September and October. Occupation of the Tay Ninh Province broke the Cao 

Dai insurgency. 

The army performed well and the air force afforded moderate aid in the 

form of Cricket liaison flights that conducted surveillance, directed artillery, and 

dropped psychological warfare leaflets. These successes gave confidence to Diem 

and optimism to the Americans, who hoped that continued support would 

enable the government to “pull 

Further encouragement came when Diem formed two new local defense 

organizations. He recruited men for the Civil Guard and assigned them to work 

with provincial chiefs as a rural police. He created the Self Defense Corps whose 

members used obsolete weapons to protect their homes, villages, and hamlets 

under the district chiefs. 35 

Air Force studies suggested that the most immediate danger to Southeast 

Asia was subversion. But this was out of context with proposals to equip national 

air forces with conventional aircraft. In addition, there was need to develop 

indigenous equipment and techniques in line with U.S. doctrine, so American jet 

aircraft could function in the event of a U.S. deployment to meet a SEAT0 

emergency. On May 5, 1955, General Twining approved an Air Force Council 

37 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

(Center) Gen. J. Lawton Collins 

and Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. 

(Below) MAAG Headquarters in 

Saigon. 

Courtesy: USlA 

.e-. ..I &-- 

38 
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL 

policy that the national air forces in the Pacific-Far East should be shaped to 

cope with internal aggression, to defend to a limited degree against external 

aggression, and to furnish air base complexes suitable for USAF use if necesWhether the three were compatible remained to be seen. 

In September 1955 a program to forge indigenous countersubversive military forces seemed to demand highly mobile ground commando troops operating closely with tactical air; slow-flying conventional strike aircraft carrying 

diversified weapons and loitering over target areas for extended periods, plus 

visual and photo-reconnaissance planes, light transports, and helicopters; and a 

strong militia to overcome communist infiltration at local levels. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that a U.S. effort to defend South 

Vietnam against external aggression under SEATO procedures would be substantial, costly, and difficult to manage, especially without atomic weapons. To 

defeat a North Vietnamese invasion would call for two to four Army divisions 

besides the South Vietnamese ground forces. To invade and occupy North 

Vietnam would take eight U.S. divisions. Moreover, quite a few Air Force 

tactical fighter wings would have to be committed, and this depended on proper 

air facilities. To prepare to meet a North Vietnamese invasion in the near future, 

the Joint Chiefs suggested increasing the efficiency of the South Vietnamese 

forces and improving the air bases in the country and in neighboring 

When Ho Chi Minh called upon Diem to open negotiations for a national 

plebiscite, not only Diem but Dulles protested publicly. An honest election 

would be impossible, they said, because the totalitarian regime in Hanoi would 

direct the vote of the people it controlled in the more populous North. Diem on 

August 9 positively rejected elections as long as the communist regime refused to 

grant democratic freedoms and fundamental rights to the people of North 

Vietnam. An October vote in South Vietnam gave Diem a mandate to set up a 

republic under his presidency. On October 26, 1955, the Republic of Vietnam 

came into being, and on the same day the United States extended recognition and 

established diplomatic relations. 

Because Ho Chi Minh was building a powerful army in North Vietnam, an 

invasion of South Vietnam would overwhelm Diem’s forces that were organized 

and equipped chiefly for internal security. had therefore suggested that 

the Vietnamese army concentrate on repelling outside attack and that the United 

States concentrate on training the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Approving, the Joint Chiefs recommended that General Collins’ ceiling of 94,000 men 

for the Vietnamese military forces be raised to 150,000. This would be enough for 

4 field divisions, 6 light divisions, 13 territorial regiments; and about 4,000 air, 

4,000 navy, and 5,000 civilian 

Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, USA, was appointed the new MAAG chief in 

Saigon. Arriving on November 15, 1955, he had to deal at once with an 

impending withdrawal of French forces to meet the revolt in Under 

arrangements made by General O’Daniel, French advisors were serving with 

American personnel in a Training Relations and Instructions Mission. The 

French departure required a larger American complement. While the Interna39 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

tional Control Commission was unwilling to approve a bigger MAAG, it 

allowed the United States to sent 350 men to Vietnam as a Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission to inventory and remove surplus equipment. Stretching 

the authority granted, MAAG employed these personnel as logistical advisors to 

replace the French working with Vietnamese army units. They became the 

Combat Arms Training and Organization Division of MAAG. On April 23, 

1956, the last French commander in chief in Indochina closed his headquarters 

and left for 

According to General Williams, pacification duty left the Vietnamese army 

little time for division combat training. Scattered miscellaneous units were hard 

to organize into a cohesive field force. President Diem described the light 

divisions as relics of the French colonial belief that the Vietnamese made poor 

soldiers and therefore had to work in small units. Increasingly, Diem wished his 

army to be organized and trained for field operations in conjunction with the 

SEATO nations. When British and Canadian authorities insisted that this would 

violate the Geneva accords and provoke particular disaffection in India, the 

United States 

South Vietnam’s refusal to conduct elections to reunify the two Vietnams in 

accordance with the Geneva agreement led American officials during the winter 

of 1955-56 to expect a North Vietnamese invasion sometime after July 1956, the 

date when the elections would have taken place. Nothing happened, and two 

months later President Eisenhower decided to help South Vietnam build armed 

forces for internal security and also for limited initial resistance to North Vietnamese attack. The United States encouraged the South Vietnamese to align 

their military growth to U.S. military 

As the United States prepared the Vietnamese to combat subversion and to 

repel invasion as well, it seemed unable to decide which was the greater threat. 

The objectives for expanded national and regional defenses even the distinction between the two were vague, confused, and at times conflicting. This 

aggravated the problem American advisors faced in adapting U.S. materiel and 

procedures to a strange environment. 

40 
IV. U.S. command Problems 

Emphasis on Southeast Asia 

in the Pacific: 

Authorities in Washington had closely managed the assistance to France 

during the Indochina War, but U.S. commanders in the Pacific exercised increasing influence afterward. They looked to American military interests on a divided 

basis. The Far East and United Nations Commands existed on the one hand and 

the Pacific Command on the other. Because of budgetary constraints, the latter 

had no Air Force theater headquarters or tactical units. All USAF resources 

were assigned to Far East Air Forces, headquartered in Tokyo. Under FEAF 

were Fifth Air Force and 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) in Japan, and 

Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines.’ 

After March 26, 1954, Admiral Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific 

Command, became responsible for reviewing all military assistance programs in 

this area, which took in Southeast Asia. Since Stump found it hard to manage 

without an air headquarters, the Joint Chiefs on March 31 directed General 

Twining to create a command at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Hence Pacific Air Force 

(PAF) came into being under Maj. Gen. Sory Smith on the 1st of July. While 

Smith reported directly to Admiral Stump, he likewise answered to General 

Partridge, FEAF commander. This reflected an understanding that all USAF 

tactical air units in the Pacific and Far East would be assigned to FEAF in the 

interest of command unity throughout both theaters. Stump, who was described 

as “exceedingly if not unduly sensitive on the subject of command prerogatives,” 

found it vexing, and understandably so, that FEAF should have a say in 

CINCPAC’s area of responsibility. Yet General Partridge considered that a 

common USAF policy for the Pacific and Far East areas required him to be 

abreast of events in both places. He directed the Far East Air Logistics Force to 

have the 6410th Materiel Group support all air components in Southeast 

In February 1955, when General Partridge held a conference of air attachés 

and MAAG-Air representatives from all nations in Southeast Asia to discuss 

problems and programs, Admiral Stump reminded him of CINCPAC’s primary 

responsibility for that area. Stump wanted General Smith to help promote 

projects consistent with U.S. military and political objectives in the Pacific 

Command. Placing Thirteenth Air Force under PAF on June I facilitated his 

wish. 

Under revised directives issued by Defense Secretary Wilson in July, Admiral Stump gained more authority in carrying out the Mutual Defense Assistance 

Program. Unified commanders like him were to be in the direct line of command 

over the MAAGs in their areas. Thus Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel 

assigned to MAAGs were no longer “allocated to CINCPAC” but rather placed 

41 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

under his direct command. Stump therefore integrated the control of assistance 

programs in his headquarters. Only on technical matters did he allow MAAG 

chiefs to communicate directly with their military departments, their component 

commanders, and other service agencies. As for Stump’s component Army, 

Navy, and Air Force commanders, they were limited to advising 

The Air Force’s centralization of global logistics under the Air Materiel 

Command further diluted FEAF influence over assistance concerns. General 

Partridge insisted on controlling his logistics, but Gen. Laurence S. Kuter who 

replaced him on June 4, 1955, accepted the new concept in the interest of 

economy and efficiency. Transferred to Air Materiel Command on October 1, 

1955, Far East Air Logistics Force was redesignated Air Materiel Force Pacific 

Area. Under this organization the Northern Air Material Area Pacific handled 

support and technical assistance for Japan and Korea. The Southern Air Material Area Pacific at Clark Air Base similarly served Okinawa, Taiwan, the 

Philippines, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Guam, and 

MAAG-Air personnel now went straight to these materiel commands with 

their logistic problems, without need to go through the theater air command. In 

November 1955 Far East Air Force headquarters invited MAAG-Air representatives to a conference in Tokyo. Again CINCPAC objected that FEAF had no 

right to indoctrinate air sections with its philosophy and 

The inspection team dispatched by General Smith to Southeast Asia in 

November-December 1955 reported that the Army appeared to be dominating 

the MAAGs. To some extent, no doubt, this was in response to the desire of the 

individual countries. Still most MAAG chiefs, deputy chiefs, and chiefs of staff 

were Army officers. In Vietnam the MAAG-Air Section people were described 

as being “relegated to a minor role and treated as junior partners,” without access 

to current war plans and unable to coordinate or consult with MAAG-Air 

sections in neighboring countries. There was a “deplorable lack of definite 

relationship” between the indigenous air forces supported by mutual defense 

assistance programs and the overall strategic objectives of the United States.’ 

After remarking on the close association between the Japanese and Korean 

Air Forces and Fifth Air Force, General Kuter urged Thirteenth Air Force (now 

under PAF) to foster similar rapport with indigenous air forces in Southeast 

Asia. On February 17, 1956, Smith charged Thirteenth Air Force with monitoring and reviewing assistance programs in SEA so that national air forces were 

developed in line with U.S. strategic aims.* 

Austerely manned, Thirteenth Air Force headquarters needed twentyeight 

more manpower spaces to perform theadditional task. These slots were not to be 

had because the entire Air Force was trying to build to an authorized 137 wings 

without increasing personnel. Kuter and Smith conferred in April 1956 on how 

to improve the review and monitoring of assistance activities. In May and 

November, Air Materiel Force Pacific Area sponsored conferences of MAAGAir representatives to the same end.’ 

Air commanders were disturbed by Admiral Stump’s reliance on subordinate command organizations for local operations. As a matter of principle, 

42 
U.S. COMMAND PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC 

USAF leaders advocated centralized direction and control of air operations in 

the Pacific and Far East areas. Local control of tactical air units would restrict 

their operations to arbitrary and often meaningless geographic boundaries. 

Furthermore, air units would go under operational control of a commander who 

had little or no experience in training, equipping, and operating them. 

General Smith therefore protested the assignment of tactical air units to a 

subordinate unified command. It would, he said, partition air power to defend 

local pieces of scattered real estate. Smith, as Stump’s theater air commander, 

should manage all air operations in Pacific Command in order to use the 

available units most effectively regardless of their locations. Stump pointed out 

that his area was too vast for overall direction of local operations from Hawaii. 

The division of command responsibilities between component commanders, he 

said, had led to disaster at Pearl Harbor in 1941, and he preferred a single 

commander responsible in each operational area for all military operations there. 

Kuter called the potential commitment of USAF squadrons to local defenses in 

Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia a “further emasculation of air 

power.”“ 

When President Eisenhower, the National Security Council, and the Joint 

Chiefs directed CINCPAC in July 1956 to prepare a contingency plan for 

defending South Vietnam against overt external attack, Admiral Stump thought 

in terms of setting up a U.S.-Vietnam Defense Command. The commander was 

to receive from Fifth Air Force the operational control of earmarked air defense 

and supporting forces, and from PAF a senior Air Force officer as the air 

component commander, plus staff personnel. The Joint Chiefs accepted this 

proposal. 

While the prospective proliferation of subordinate unified commands threatened the unity of air power, other developments changed the picture. The 

consolidation of the United Nations, Far East, and Pacific Commands had come 

under study in the spring of 1955, after Secretary of Defense Wilson objected to 

the worldwide command structure that he deemed too large, unwieldy, and 

expensive. He wanted the system simplified and reduced, and the Joint Chiefs 

asked commanders for comments. General Kuter recommended a single U.S. 

unified command in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs agreed early in 1956, and 

Secretary Wilson approved discontinuing the Far East Command (FEC) in 

favor of the Pacific Command, which was to be the single unified command in 

the Pacific and Far East areas. Headquarters Pacific Air Force then became 

PACAF/ FEAF(Rear) on July 1, which foreshadowed another change, and the 

headquarters in Japan moved to Hawaii. 

General Kuter suggested in August that the Pacific Command have three 

principal component commands, namely U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Navy Pacific, 

and U.S. Air Force Pacific, and four subordinatejoint commands Hawaiian, 

Southern Pacific, Northern Pacific, and Marianas-Bonin. All forces allocated to 

CINCPAC, Kuter thought, should be assigned to the principal component 

commanders for operational control in peace and in war. The subordinate joint 

commands should have no combat responsibilities but rather should support 

43 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

ambassadors and coordinate and logistic activities, and 

perform other obligations in their areas. In a local war, a 

CINCPAC-designated task force commander selected from the military service 

predominantly involved would assume operational control of joint task forces. 

During local engagements, the Commander in Chief, Air Force Pacific, should 

have complete responsibility for air defense throughout the entire Pacific. 

In October Admiral Stump and Army Gen. Lyman 

commander in chief, recommended three component commands Pacific 

Fleet, Pacific Air Forces, and Army, Pacific, each to administer, train, support, 

and operate allocated forces. Stump and wished to retain existing 

subordinate unified commands and to establish two additional commands in the 

northwest Pacific. The plan failed to meet Secretary Wilson’s demand for 

economy. It was reworked in Washington and resubmitted to the Secretary in 

December. 

Reorganization as approved early in made the Pacific Command the 

single unified command directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the 

Navy serving as executive agent. Under CINCPAC were three major component 

commands: United States Army, Pacific United States Pacific 

Fleet and Pacific Air Forces each headed by a commander in chief. According to CINCPAC instructions, and 

were to perform air tasks on a mutually supporting basis. Only three subordinate 

unified commands remained. The Commander, Fifth Air Force, assumed 

responsibility as Commander, United States Forces, Japan, and received a joint 

staff but had no unified operational responsibilities. The Commanding General, 

Eighth Army, headed United States Forces in Korea and also served as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. The Taiwan Defense Command 

continued unchanged. In the Philippines, and 

CINCPAC representatives coordinated matters. In countries where no U.S. 

operating forces were located, the M chief was the CINCPAC representative. All were directly responsible to CINCPAC. 16 

On the 1st of June, General opened his Headquarters Pacific Air 

Forces at AFB, consolidating for the first time USAF tactical forces in 

the Pacific and Far East areas under a single commander. Unity of command of 

all theater air power was nonetheless missing. Not only did and 

have to cooperate on air tasks, but Admiral Stump -not -had 

the responsibility to develop indigenous air forces. could just advise Stump 

whether assistance programs squared with U.S. policies and objectives. In 

view, indigenous air forces in Southeast Asia were hardly being helped to 

grow in harmony with USAF objectives. That is, the forces were not prepared to 

cope with internal subversion, to give limited defense against overt external 

aggression, and perhaps most important --to offer suitable bases for U.S. air 

units that might be committed operationally. National air forces were being 

equipped with slow, conventional aircraft for combating insurgency. Air facilities that USAF jet aircraft could use in time of emergency were generally 

lacking. 
U.S. COMMAND PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC 

(Left) Gen. Laurence S. Kuter 

(Above) Gen. Thomas D. White 

Kuter instructed the commanders of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces in 

August 1957 to act as “rallying points” for informal discussion with indigenous 

air leaders. In November he invited air and MAAG-Air representatives 

to a conference in Hawaii, and urged them to work together to create a common 

purpose in the “packets of democratic air power” forming in Southeast Asia. 

Improving air facilities ranked high on his agenda. 

Planning for the possible deployment of U.S. forces during the early months 

of 1958, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, conceived of the mobile 

strike force. It would depart its home base within 24 hours after receiving an 

execution order, and engage in 15 days of self-supporting combat in Southeast 

Asia. 19 Since General Kuter wanted Thirteenth Air Force to have a dominant 

role in SEA air activities, he charged Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman (who 

became Thirteenth’s commander on March 4) to take command of the PACAF 

Mobile Strike Force when it deployed through Clark Air Base. The force 

included three troop carrier squadrons and one combat airlift support unit from 

the 3 15th Air Division (Combat Cargo); a fighter squadron, a bomber squadron, 

a reconnaissance task unit with photo processing cell, and half of an air refueling 

squadron from Fifth Air Force; one fighter squadron from Thirteenth Air Force; 

and a search and rescue detachment from the 3 1st Air Rescue Squadron of Air 

Rescue Service (Pacific). Clark Air Base was to furnish logistic support, and 

Thirteenth Air Force was empowered to draw on PACAF resources to establish 

detachments at forward air bases. 

45 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Because commitment of this mobile strike force would reduce the general 

war deterrent elsewhere, Tactical Air Command (TAC) began to alert in the 

United States a composite air strike force for rapid global deployment, mainly to 

back up an immediate response by PACAF to aggression. 

During April 1958 the PACAF mobile strike force concept was tested in a 

SEATO exercise in Thailand against a simulated land aggressor force. For the 

first time in a SEATO exercise, nuclear weapons were inserted into the scenario. 

One observer, Lt. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr., Fifth Air Force commander, 

believed it vital to interdict an enemy land force by air. Upon returning to Japan, 

he directed a staff study on the use of nuclear weapons if the Chinese invaded 

Southeast Asia. contrast, CINCPAC regarded forward defense in the Pacific 

as resting upon the twin pillars of strong mobile U.S. forces and of allied ones 

strengthened by American military assistance programs. 

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 markedly broadened CINCPAC’s authority as a unified commander. Army, Navy, and Air 

Force units previously allocated to him were now under his “full operational 

command.” The roles of the military departments and of the component commanders were confined to the administration and support of Army, Navy, or Air 

Force units assigned to the unified commanders. A new CINCPAC, Adm. Harry 

D. Felt - an experienced naval aviator whose exceptionally long tenure was to 

last from July 31, 1958, through June 1964 - would exercise operational 

command through his component commanders or through the commanders of 

subordinate unified commands. 

Responsible for the immense area of the Pacific and its islands -excluding 

the Aleutians and the Bering Sea, but including Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, 

and the eastern part of the Indian Ocean -- Admiral Felt as CINCPAC was 

comparable to a theater commander in World War II. All the U.S. armed forces 

in that region were under him, and Vietnam was one of his obligations. Headquartered at Pearl Harbor, he also had at Hawaii the major subordinate commands of USARPAC, PACFLT, and PACAF, each headed by a component 

commander. Logistic and support forces, subordinate unified or triservice commanders, area representatives, and military assistance advisory groups like the 

one in Vietnam were also under him. His mission was to defend the United States 

against attack and “to support and advance United States policy and interests in 

the Pacific Command 

An advocate of the twin-pillar strategy, Admiral Felt perceived the separation between U.S. strategic planning and military assistance programs. The 

remedy involved, on the one hand, completing a ClNCPAC contingency concept for Southeast Asia as a whole and, on the other hand, relating each country 

program to the entire strategy. A joint U.S. task force, he believed, should 

respond to aggression in Southeast Asia. He accordingly arranged for Marine 

forces on Okinawa to become the nucleus of a permanent CINCPAC Joint Task 

Force (JTF) 116. Since Marines would be airlifted to meet an emergency, the 

initial commander of this force was to be a Marine officer. When Army reinforcements arrived by air and sea, command was to pass to an Army officer. 

46 
U.S. COMMAND PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC 

PACAF designated the Thirteenth Air Force commander to head the air component of JTF I16 in order to establish his authority over affairs in Southeast 

Asia. 

During the autumn of 1958, Admiral Felt began to show the MAAGs how 

to relate their programs to regional as well as to country PACAF’s 

major task was to build air facilities and an air operating environment in 

Southeast Asia. General Kuter and Lt. Gen. William F. McKee, vicecommander 

of Air Materiel Command, felt that aviation projects of the Military Assistance 

Program (MAP) and of the International Cooperation Administration, Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA), were oriented to individual countries. They saw no 

reason why these projects could not be loosely connected to regional defense as a 

whole. Better relations between PACAF and MAAG-Air personnel, they 

believed, would ensure that petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), ammunition, 

ground-to-air communications, fire trucks, refueling vehicles, and other essentials would be in place. Maintained by indigenous air forces, these services would 

be available for USAF use if necessary. June 1959 the MAAGs received from 

CINCPAC the first of a series of lists setting forth the priorities for accomplishing projects of this 

But coordination between CINCPAC contingency planning against an 

overt aggression and individual country assistance programs continued to be 

inadequate. For example, the latter were not designed or funded to build facilities 

that could be used by USAF units. These projects were the responsibility of the 

Department of Defense The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs, which reviewed assistance programs, was often 

compelled to delete projects for indigenous military forces in Southeast Asia that 

could not be justified according to the law. The MAAGs also hesitated to 

recommend projects warranted only by U.S. interest. In Laos, for instance, it was 

“extremely difficult to explain why you need an 8,000-foot heavy duty runway, 

flat concrete, and sweepers to go with it in a country that uses Gooney Birds.”” 

Another set of programs sprang from the Army orientation of the MAAGs. 

For example, aviation equipment obtainable through military assistance programs was relatively high-priced and competed with projects desired by the 

Army. After visiting Pacific areas in 1959, Maj. Gen. Donald R. Hutchinson, 

USAF assistant for mutual security, found that Army officers held 15 of 23 

worldwide MAAG chief positions. This, he suggested, resulted in unbalanced 

recommendations from the field. The Air Force sought a more equitable manning ratio, but it would take several years to bring about changes..” 

Despite these difficulties, General White (who had replaced General Twining as Chief of Staff) wished PACAF to exert a strong influence on air matters 

throughout the Pacific, to include assistance programs. Soon after Gen. Emmett 

O’Donnell became Commander in Chief, PACAF, on August 1, 1959, MAAGAir representatives were allowed to deal directly with the Air Materiel Force 

Pacific Area. Amendments to USAF manuals in September and November 1959 

permitted PACAF to administer contracted technical services for the military 

assistance program. In February 1960 a change in a USAF regulation directed all 

47 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

communications on air logistic matters to be routed through and a 

revision of a directive on military assistance instructed unified commanders to draw upon the advice of component commanders. What this meant, White 

reminded on March was growing role in the air 

aspects of military assistance. “To an increasing degree,” White wrote, “the 

capability of forces must be oriented toward complementing the USAF 

war effort, and your active participation in MAP planning toward that end is 

urged. 

By spring of General had gained some informal influence 

in military assistance matters, but no more than advisory authority. His advice 

was not regularly sought after nor was it always accepted when volunteered. 

Essentially, could have little impact on military assistance programs 

because it had no official part in starting, programming, and carrying out 

country projects. Through communications to the M sections, which 

were authorized to give technical support, views could be inserted into 

assistance deliberations. All proposals, however, required chief approval 

before submission to CINCPAC. The commander in chief as advisor 

could submit assistance proposals direct to CINCPAC, but these were invariably 

referred to the chief for comment. Though Air Force headquarters 

looked to for information on military assistance programs, he was 

outside the relevant command channel. A case in point was the construction 

programs handled for CINCPAC by the Navy’s Bureau of Pacific Docks. 

Responsible Air Force officers in the field found it hard to get specific facts about 

the exact status of these projects. 

As matters stood in the Southeast Asia Mutual Defense Assistance 

Program activities in progress since had failed to fulfill emerging requirements for internal country defense or for cooperative regional defense. On the 

whole, little stress had been given to developing indigenous air capabilities 

despite the rather large allocation of efforts, funds, and manpower to indigenous 

ground forces. The country air forces in Southeast Asia remained small and 

lacked sufficient personnel with basic skills to achieve rapid expansion. None had 

well-organized systems for operations and training, supply and maintenance, 

intelligence and communications-electronics, or civil engineering. But organizational arrangements were in process of change. 
President Diem visited Washington in May 1957. Among other matters, he 

wished American support for an army of 170,000 men and ten divisions. 

Although Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador to Vietnam, believed that a military 

establishment this large would be a drain on the Vietnamese economy, President 

Eisenhower seemed to give tacit approval when he and Diem issued a joint 

communiqué. The two countries would continue to work for a peaceful unification of Vietnam, and the United States would support South Vietnam against 

communist encroachment. 

By 1958 the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was a force of 150,000 men 

organized into seven infantry divisions, one small brigade, and five territorial 

regiments. Diem had released the army from internal security duties to permit 

intensive field training. General Williams, the M AAG chief, was confident that 

these troops could deter North Vietnam from orthodox military attack. They 

could delay an invasion for fifteen days before falling back to Da Nang, where 

they could hold out for thirty days more. Presumably, outside assistance would 

have arrived by then to launch a counteroffensive or to defend the SaigonMekong Delta area.’ 

But whether the Vietnamese ground forces could eliminate subversion and 

insurgency had yet to be seen. 

While extraordinary priority was given to developing the army, only passing 

attention was accorded the Vietnamese Air Force, for it was regarded as incapable of playing a substantial role in larger SEATO operations. Instead, it was to 

deal with minor operations, mainly to give tactical support to ground activity in 

the country through airlift, paradrops, visual and photo reconnaissance, and 

medical evacuation. 2 

Planning for the Vietnamese Air Force had begun in January 1955, when 

General Collins, focusing chiefly on the Vietnamese army, explained that South 

Vietnam would rely for the most part on SEATO air support. The Vietnamese 

Air Force was to have an initial strength of 3,000 men organized in two liaison 

squadrons and one air transport squadron - “ a small Air Force that will be used 

for liaison purposes, observation, and adjustment of fire, that kind of thing.” 

Later, another transport squadron and a fighter squadron were to be added. 3 

Few MAAG spaces were allocated to USAF advisors, for the French were 

to organize and train the Vietnamese Air Force. U.S. aircraft deliveries to 

Vietnam in August 1955 under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program 

equipped the Vietnamese Air Force with aircraft and materiel released by the 

French -twenty-eight F-8F fighter-bombers, thirty-five C-47 transports, and 

49 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

sixty planes. When the French returned excess helicopters to American custody, they were transferred to Vietnam for airlift and air rescue 

Because French officers had commanded Vietnamese air units, Vietnamese 

pilots gained little command experience. Vietnamese army officers were therefore permitted to transfer to high-level air force posts. Despite difficulties in 

securing sufficient qualified personnel, units were created. The Air 

Transport Squadron came into being at Tan Son Nhut on July I, with 

C-47s. It was organized a year later as the Air Transport Group consisting of 

the and 2nd Air Transport Squadrons and thirty-two The Vietnamese 

took over the training center on July and using formed 

the and 2nd Liaison Squadrons. The French conducted an transition 

course at Cap Saint Jacques Tau) Airfield, and on June the 

Fighter Squadron was born at and assigned twenty-five Apart 

from these aircraft afforded by military assistance funds, the Vietnamese Air 

Force operated a special air mission squadron at Tan Son Nhut having one 

Aero Commander light transport, three and three Beechcraft 

Created without helicopters at Tan Son Nhut on June I, the Helicopter 

Squadron flew with the French unit that served the International Control 

Commission. When the French left in April they gave their ten excess 

to the Vietnamese.’ 

While the French presence officially ended in April the Vietnamese 

government continued to contract with France for Air Force training. This 

arrangement left the USAF officers assigned to with few duties. They 

advised when requested to do so, tried to stay abreast of programs, and underwent some special training in the United States. When the French turned over the 

depot at to the Vietnamese and suddenly withdrew their supply 

advisors, Air Force personnel informally filled the vacuum. In November 

the French agreed to relinquish their training functions to USAF advisors, and 

after Diem refrained from renewing training contracts with France. On 

June complete responsibility for Vietnamese aviation assistance passed 

to the United States. 

American advisors discovered that Vietnamese air officers were fairly good 

pilots, yet young and relatively inexperienced. Very few appeared to have 

mastered basic concepts of how to employ aircraft against any enemy. Consequently the Vietnamese army dominated the Joint General Staff and frequently 

President Diem himself directed air missions. Diem preferred airborne operations over air strikes, for the latter often endangered innocent people. Above all, 

he favored ground operations.’ 

Weak in command and staff experience, the Vietnamese Air Force suffered 

especially in logistic support. Teams from the Southern Air Materiel Area 

Pacific, based in the Philippines during converted French systems to 

USAF procedures. Still the old Navy fighters worn out when the 

French transferred them presented insoluble problems. The Vietnamese 

possessed limited maintenance skills, and spare parts were short supply. In 

October when word came that armed trainers would replace the 
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1957-1960 

I 

PRINCIPAL USAFNNAF 

AIRFIELDS IN SOUTH VIRNAM 

TO FEBRUARY 1965 

L-19s of the 

Vietnamese Air Force. 

A USAF Sikorsky H-19 helicopter 

at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

F-8Fs, the Vietnamese were disappointed. They wanted jet aircraft because the 

Thais, Filipinos, and Chinese Nationalists had them. But the Geneva accords 

prohibited the introduction of jets and, on the ground of maintenance alone, 

MAAG felt that the Vietnamese establishment was not sophisticated enough to 

handle them. 

By mid-1956 American aid built a 7,200-foot runway at Tan Son Nhut, 

South Vietnam’s international airport. The U.S. International Cooperation 

Administration next started work on another concrete runway, this one 10,000 

feet long. Though the French in 1953-54 had laid a NATO-standard 7,800-foot 

asphalt runway at Da Nang, there were no runway lights or maintenance 

buildings. The depot at Bien Hoa featured permanent warehouses and hangars, 

but its pierced-steel runways could not be greatly expanded. The French had also 

operated a 5,900-foot pierced-steel runway at Cap Saint Jacques. Even so, the 

airfield was stripped of necessary facilities at the time F-8F transition training 

ended. At all of these airfields, the Vietnamese Air Force looked to the Vietnamese army for air base maintenance, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and 

other specialized 

Yet all seemed to be going smoothly enough. Secretary of State Dulles could 

say in 1958 that the communist process “of trying to pick up one country after 

another has been pretty well brought to a stop by our collective defense treaties 

around the world which give notice that the Soviets cannot attack one without 

everybody coming to its defense.” In other words, the American threat of massive 

retaliation and the collective free world defensive alliances were preserving the 

peace in Southeast Asia. 

In South Vietnam there was incipient trouble. Certain conditions enhanced 

enemy efforts to disrupt life. The abolition of elected village councils in June 

1956, the use of a compulsory labor as a tax in kind, experiments in forced 

resettlement, maladroit attempts to turn peasants into landholders, and other 

measures promoted discontent in the countryside. The absence of police in many 

rural areas, a scarcity of civil servants on local levels, and the inability of new and 

hastily organized paramilitary forces to substitute for an effective constabulary 

badly handicapped the Saigon government in dealing with guerrillas who exploited dissatisfactions of one sort or another. By 1958 many persons wedded to the 

unification of Vietnam under control of the North were ready “to launch 

immediately an armed struggle” to sustain the communist movement and to 

secure its forces in the south.” 

In September 1958 North Vietnam proposed to South Vietnam an understanding on peaceful relations. The Diem government declined the offer because 

communist guerrillas in South Vietnam had kidnapped 236 persons and assassinated 193 that year. Political killings in the south would continue to mount, and 

the local communists or Viet Cong would step up attacks on South Vietnamese 

armed forces. 

The Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam convened 

in May 1959. It decided “to continue the national democratic revolution in South 

Vietnam” and “to use force to overthrow the feudalist imperialist regime in order 

52 
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1957-1960 

to establish a revolutionary democratic situation and create the conditions for 

the peaceful reunification of the 

This signaled the beginning of warfare in South Vietnam and the resumption of warfare in Laos, both of which coincided with Chinese probes across the 

border of India. l4 The People’s Army of Vietnam, commonly referred to as the 

North Vietnamese army, sent several combat units to drive the Laotian military 

from the border between Laos and South Vietnam. In their wake came transportation units to set up relay stations for a buildup and infiltration into the two 

countries. 

The .Viet Cong opened guerrilla war in September 1959, when they 

ambushed two Vietnamese army companies in the marshy Plain of Reeds 

southwest of Saigon. In October they attacked a small force in Kien Phong 

Province. In Viet Cong words, “the armed struggle was launched.”“ Hanoi’s 

policy directives, the growth of North Vietnamese army activities, and a marked 

increase in confirmed infiltrations into South Vietnam made clear Hanoi’s 

declaration of war on the Republic of Vietnam and the commitment of its 

political and military apparatus to that end. 17 

To American authorities in Saigon, optimistic assessments obscured the full 

dimension of the threat. While his government was apparently stimulating 

economic growth and internal stability, President Diem closely controlled its 

intelligence activities, often for his own political purposes. He had little knowledge of Viet Cong leadership, tactics, organization, logistics, and plans. As a 

result, U.S. assistance programs in 1959 and 1960 were oriented less toward 

internal threat in South Vietnam than toward the overt threat presented by 

communist activities in Laos and particularly in the sparsely populated central 

highlands of Vietnam adjacent to the Laotian border. 

Diem had been interested in the latter area since 1957, when he conceived a 

program for building “agrovilles” or “new communities” around Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot. Without American assistance funds, Diem settled 

farmers there on new agricultural lands so as to strengthen security. By February 

1959 he had established twenty-eight outposts, and on July 7 he announced an 

expanded program to create more “prosperity and density centers” in exposed 

rural areas. l9 

In February 1960 the Government of Vietnam wanted trailwatchers and 

commandos along the border to protect these new settlements. 

Accordingly, the Vietnamese ranger training center was organized at Da 

Nang. At this time the Viet Cong were thought to number 3,000-5,000 full-time 

elite and regular troops, plus intelligence agents, recruiters, terrorists, service 

troops, and part-time guerrillas. Because the authority to keep in South Vietnam 

personnel of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission who augmented the 

MAAG was expiring, the United States decided in May to double the MAAG 

component to 685 men. This was done in spite of North Vietnam’s protest to the 

International Control Commission. Several U.S. Army Special Forces teams 

arrived during the month, and Diem formed a Vietnamese ranger force with a 

projected strength of 10,000 

53 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

By then the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the senior American officials 

in Saigon and CINCPAC to draw up a broad counterinsurgency plan as a guide 

to the Diem government and to the small in South Vietnam. 

PAC’s plan contained among its key provisions a Vietnamese command and 

control system to integrate military and civil counterinsurgency operations. A 

fide military field command might end President Diem’s meddling in 

operational affairs. Also needed was first-rate, centrally controlled intelligence 

and counterintelligence within the Vietnamese government. Ambassador 

brow believed these to be all-important. The problem was to persuade Diem to 

approve and implement them. 

Other proposed measures included better use of the Vietnamese forces to 

fight guerrillas without lessening their ability to meet an overt attack; improved 

governmental financial procedures; border and coastal patrols to stop infiltration and outside support of the anti-government guerrillas; better communications nets; more attention to civil affairs and psychological warfare; closer 

planning for economic growth and political stability; and moving the Vietnamese 

Civil Guard from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense. 

Army Lt. Gen. Lionel C. became the chief on August 

He and Ambassador elaborated the broad plan and worked with 

Vietnamese officials during the autumn and winter of In October General 

recommended and Admiral Felt concurred in enlarging the Vietnamese 

army from to men. objected. A bigger army, he 

thought, would bring economic hardship to the country. He also desired to use 

the prospect of a greater military force as pressure on Diem for political reforms. 

To ease counterinsurgency operations, Diem transferred the Civil Guard to 

the Ministry of Defense in November, and in the following month took 

responsibility for training and equipping it. Shortages in military assistance 

funds limited support to instead of the planned Civil Guard 

members. 

To USAF officers the measures for Vietnamese stability were, as Maj. Gen. 

Theodore Milton, Thirteenth Air Force commander said, “entirely dominated by classic ground-force The Vietnamese Air Force had 

obsolescent aircraft and lacked trained pilots and technically qualified support 

personnel. Diem had worsened the tight personnel situation in August by 

terminating contracts with French air crews and service technicians who operated the Air Vietnam commercial airline. He replaced them with military flight 

crews and mechanics. 

After a mysterious crash in August, President Diem grounded all the 

obsolete of the Fighter Squadron, then in September asked to 

replace them. He pointed to the U.S. jets given to Thailand and the Philippines. 

Sympathetic, Admiral Felt had two trainers and four photo-recon 

aircraft added in the military assistance program funding for fiscal year 

These would be the beginning of as well as a reconnaissance force. But 

the planes, while remaining pledged, were not delivered because the Geneva 

accords prohibited introducing jets into the country. To replace the the 
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 1957-1960 

first notion was to make AD4 available from Navy stocks. The Navy, however, 

could not forecast continued supplies for these obsolete planes. Thus, the program was amended early in 1960 to include AD-6 aircraft still operational in the 

U.S. Fleet. The first six arrived in Vietnam in September 1960, and twenty-five 

more were delivered in May 

When in late 1960 some Vietnamese army rangers were ready for field 

operations, the H-19B helicopters handed down by the French to the 1st Helicopter Squadron were worn out. MAAG secured approval for a hurried shipment of eleven H-34Cs from the Army. They were airlifted to Saigon without 

renovation, four in December and the others soon afterward.” 

The AD-6s and H-34s had no immediate impact on operations. The high 

aircraft out-of-commission rates stemmed from poor maintenance and supply at 

Bien Hoa. Also to blame was the long pipeline time for processing spare parts 

requisitions through USAF logistic channels to Army and Navy sources. Yet 

between August and October 1960, the 1st Fighter Squadron flew twenty combat 

sorties, the L- I9 liaison planes logged 9 17 combat hours, the helicopters accumulated 166 hours on operational missions, and C-47s of the 1st Air Transport 

Group flew thirty-two 

Only five airfields were usable for AD-6 operations; no communications 

network served dispersed airfields; and President Diem believed that air units 

could not operate effectively from dispersed locations distant from depot supplies. The Vietnamese Air Force was oriented to the support of the Vietnamese 

army operations, but the ground troops gave little attention to spotting targets 

suitable for air strikes. About ninety percent of the ground targets were located 

by Vietnamese Air Force observers who flew in L- 19s, based at the same fields as 

the fighters. 

Approval for aircraft to strike ground targets was required from province 

chief, regional commander, the Joint General Staff, and sometimes Diem himself. As a final guaranty against bombing mistakes that might hurt the government’s image, politically cleared and technically competent observers had to 

mark approved targets before air strikes could be launched against them -a rule 

of engagement reportedly directed by Diem. 

A USAF team visiting South Vietnam reported, “The high level approval 

required for on-call fighter strikes, along with poor communications and/ or 

procedures for requesting strikes, builds in excessive delays for efficient use of 

tactical air effort. This is particularly true in view of the hit-and-run guerrilla 

tactics of the Viet 

Internal subversion in Southeast Asia still seemed minor in 1960. In comparison, China appeared to be threatening stability and peace. To counter this, 

the United States continued to rely on the presence of SEATO and on the 

credibility of its own treaty commitments in the area to discourage Chinese 

adventurism. 

While the Chinese cited Nikolai Lenin to prove that war was useful for 

extending communism, Premier Nikita Khrushchev spoke to the United Nations 

General Assembly in September on “the grave danger of colonial wars growing 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

into a new world war.” Sino-Soviet doctrinal divergencies came under debate in 

November 1960 in Moscow. The apparent outcome was a compromise 

announced on January 6, 1961, when Khrushchev noted that “world wars” and 

“local wars that would grow into a world thermonuclear war” were to be avoided 

while “national liberation wars” through which colonial peoples could attain 

independence were “not only admissible but inevitable” and merited full communist support. 

Meanwhile, the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi had announced on September 

10, 1960, the formation in South Vietnam of “a broad national united front” of 

workers, peasants, and soldiers dedicated to overthrowing the Diem government. Thereafter, the tempo of Viet Cong infiltration and insurgency quickened. 

Viet Cong units of 100-300 men began to mount raids around Saigon. Even more 

serious, Diem charged in October that attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area 

involved regular North Vietnamese military units operating out of Laos. This 

was aggression in the formal sense. 

The inability of the Diem government to deal with the Viet Cong sparked 

dissatisfaction within the Vietnamese army and led to an attempted coup on 

November I 1. A paratroop force seized government centers in Saigon, prepared 

to attack the presidential palace, and called for Diem’s resignation on the 

grounds of his autocratic rule, his nepotism, and his ineffective fight against 

communism. The chief of staff of the Joint General Staff led loyal troops into the 

capital and subdued the rebels on the following day.’’ 

Although Diem’s brother and political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, announced 

the introduction of some reforms, Diem remained reluctant to decentralize his 

authoritarian controls. Instead of delegating authority to military commanders 

as Admiral Felt and General McGarr had recommended, Diem sought to 

enhance his position by fragmenting and dividing the military hierarchy. Diem 

made army regional commanders (later corps tactical zone commanders) independent of one another but each responsible to him. Since he appointed and 

removed province chiefs, many of whom were military officers, Diem frequently 

gave them command over army units operating within their provinces. Hence the 

field commanders looked to two superiors, their next higher military commander 

in the chain of command and the politico-military province chief. These tangled 

lines checked the quick movement and close control of units and reserves, 

including the employment of Vietnamese Air Force units. But Diem insisted on 

tight control of operations, chiefly those of the air force, because he feared a 

revolt or a coup against his government. 

There was also evidence that the Viet Cong benefited from security leaks at 

high levels. At times Viet Cong fed false information into the intelligence system 

to prompt bombardment of innocent targets. Now and then a province chief 

requested air strikes for his own private purpose, for example, in another 

province whose chief he disliked. Within this climate of suspicion, local officials 

had to go on record as approving air strikes flown in their areas of authority. All 

this spawned complexities, hesitations, and delays. 

56 
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

SOUTH VIETNAM’S PROVINCES 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Apparently viewing the November coup attempt as proof of massive discontent within the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, Hanoi swiftly set up a 

shadow government in the south. The National Front for Liberation of South 

Vietnam (NFLSVN) was formally established on December 20, 1960. Even 

though it embraced a broad range of non-communist and nationalist opposition 

to President Diem, the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam ordered its 

operations. 

In Saigon, Diem and Nhu felt that American officials had favored the 

November coup, and relations with Ambassador Durbrow grew more and more 

strained. There was also persistent discontent in the Vietnamese armed forces, for 

Diem’s promise to liberalize the government had built up hope among officers. 

His refusal to do so produced deep disappointment. 

By this time, warfare had erupted within neighboring Laos. On December 

14, 1960, CINCPAC declared an alert for all units to comprise Joint Task Force 

116 if the United States decided to intervene. Thailand was willing to transfer ten 

T-6 aircraft to Laos in exchange for more modern T-37 jets from the United 

States. President Eisenhower favored a SEATO reaction in Laos and Admiral 

Felt suggested offensive air action, but the SEATO allies were less than enthusiastic. Upon direction from Washington, Felt declared a higher alert for JTF 116 

on December 31, and he requested a C-I30 transportation squadron from the 

United States. With the arrival of the 773d Troop Carrier Squadron at Clark on 

the 2d of January: the task force was fully prepared to assist the Laotian 

government. 

Three days later, President Charles De Gaulle made clear France’s refusal to 

take part in a SEATO intervention. As instructed from Washington, CINCPAC 

reduced the alert on January 6. The State Department said on the 7th that the 

United States would work with other free nations to pursue “whatever measures 

seem most promising.”” 

Dispatches from Southeast Asia in 1959 and 1960 competed for attention 

with louder signals from regions traditionally more vital to the United States. In 

January 1959 Fidel Castro and his guerrillas became the Government of Cuba. 

As the months passed, Castro’s orientation and outlook grew ever more Marxist, 

a development that evoked the whole complex of policies and emotions arising 

out of the Monroe Doctrine. At the same time, Premier Khrushchev repeatedly 

drew attention to the precarious status of West Berlin, a small island in the sea of 

Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. 

In Southeast Asia, along the northwestern frontier of the Republic of 

Vietnam and along the entire western frontier of North Vietnam was the Kingdom of Laos. This geographically vulnerable, largely unadministered, politically 

fragile country was an obvious avenue of approach for infiltrators from North 

Vietnam to the northern provinces and central highlands of South Vietnam. 

Given the difficulties of the Laotian government in making its will effective, a 

neutral Laos seemed to many U.S. officials only somewhat less a danger to 

Diem’s government than did a communist Laos. 

58 
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1957-1960 

All of these problems were weighed by officials who were very much aware 

that President Eisenhower’s tenure would end in January 1961. As President 

Eisenhower later explained, he wanted to make no major commitment in the 

closing weeks of his administration that would obligate his successor to a 

predetermined course of action. Briefing President-elect John F. Kennedy on the 

19th of January, Eisenhower emphasized that Laos as the key to all of Southeast 

Asia must be defended. If the allies failed to do so, he said, “our unilateral 

intervention would be OUT last desperate What happened in Laos, of 

course, had meaning for Vietnam. 

59 

art Three: 

ennedy Years 

and Actions 

President Kennedy took office two weeks after Premier Khrushchev 

announced Soviet support for what he termed “wars of national liberation.” 

These were neither the nuclear exchanges that had preoccupied American military thinkers nor limited wars like Korea. Rather, a war of national liberation 

consisted of subversion and guerrilla actions at a level far below that likely to 

trigger nuclear retaliation. Such a war could nevertheless erode the will and 

power of the target state until it was helpless. 

The President tried to determine the real import of the Khrushchev doctrine 

and the exact nature of the communist threat to Southeast Asia. Realizing that 

the United States had few troops specially trained and equipped for counterinsurgency warfare, he directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on 

February I, 1961, to increase them. On March 28 Kennedy asked the Congress 

to give him the means to deal with “small externally supported bands of men.” 

Pointing to nonnuclear, limited, guerrilla warfare as the most constant threat to 

free world security since 1945, the President wanted to be able to respond to this 

kind of aggression with nonnuclear weapons and to “help train local forces to be 

equally effective” against their enemies. The main burden of defense against 

overt attack, subversion, and guerrilla warfare had to rest on local populations 

and their military forces. Still, the United States needed strong and highly 

mobile units ready to combat the so-called lesser forms of conflict.’ 

Pursuing this aim in June, President Kennedy specified that the Joint 

Chiefs’ “responsibility for the defense of the nation in the cold war [was] similar 

to that which they have in conventional hostilities.” Air Force officials assumed 

that the new technique was to rank in importance with “preparation for conventional warfare.” This belief seemed justified in July when the President transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of Defense the 

responsibility for preparing and mounting large paramilitary operations, 

wholly or partially covert, requiring many militarily trained personnel and the 

type of equipment or military experience peculiar to the armed forces.2 

Spurring these actions was the worsening situation in Laos. Fighting there 

between the government forces and the pro-communist Pathet Lao intensified. 

Both sides had outside support, alternating victories and defeats, and several 

coups d’etat had taken place. American concern centered not only on Laos but 

on the possible adverse consequences in Vietnam. During the first two months of 

his administration, President Kennedy “probably spent more time on Laos than 

on anything 

Events in Cuba, climaxing at the Bay of Pigs in April, shaped the President’s 

thinking. Urged to at least commit U.S. air power in Laos, Kennedy replied, “I 

just don’t think we ought to be involved in Laos, particularly where we might find 

63 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

ourselves fighting millions of Chinese troops in the jungles. In any event, 1 don’t 

see how we can make any move in Laos, which is 5,000 miles away, if we don’t 

make a move in Cuba, which is only 90 miles 

The Soviets had called on April 4 for a cease-fire in Laos and an international conference to resolve the problems. The Joint Chiefs were troubled. 

Diplomatic negotiations would probably result in a neutralized Laos, perhaps 

eventually a communist Laos, because SEATO had failed to curb the obvious 

aggression there. Laos behind the Iron Curtain would expose Thailand and 

South Vietnam to further communist infiltration. Most of the 12,000 Viet Cong 

guerrillas in South Vietnam had come through the Laotian panhandle or the 

thinly populated northeastern corner of Cambodia. 

So serious did affairs appear that Kennedy on April 20 changed the advisory 

military body in Laos to a Military Assistance Advisory Group. He ordered the 

MAAG members to put on their uniforms and work closely with the demoralized Laotian troops. At Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Joint Task Force 1 16(it and 

its air component redesignated SEATO Field Forces) readied for action. Open 

U.S. commitment in Laos looked imminent until Great Britainjoined the Soviet 

Union on the 24th in appealing for a cease-fire and an international conference in 

Geneva.‘ 

The conference opened at Geneva in May, a time when retired General of 

the Army Douglas MacArthur advised President Kennedy against putting 

American ground forces on the mainland of Asia. If the United States intervened 

in Southeast Asia, he said, it must be ready to use nuclear weapons to meet a 

Chinese entry into the conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff categorically informed 

Defense Secretary McNamara that 

any intervention with United States forces in Laos, either unilaterally or under 

SEATO auspices, should be taken only after firm U.S. governmental decision to the 

effect that the United States is thereby prepared and committed to succeed in its 

military intervention regardless of the extent of possible consequent Communist 

escalation; this is an unequivocal position which is fundamental to United States 

military actions.’ 

TO Secretary McNamara it seemed clear that the United States must soon 

decide whether or not to stand up and fight. Yet according to Army Chief of Staff 

Gen. George H. Decker, the United States could hardly hope to win a conventional war in Southeast Asia. General Decker suggested moving American 

troops into Thailand and South Vietnam to see if that would produce a cease-fire 

in Laos. But if the United States went into Laos, “we should go in to win, and that 

means Hanoi, China, and maybe even using nuclear bombs.” Lacking enthusiasm for a ground war in Laos, Decker said later that 

this is the last place in the world I would like to see.. .[U.S. forces]committed unless 

absolutely necessary. . . . If it were only the Pathet Lao that was involved, there would 

be no problem. But undoubtedly North Vietnamese would come in and probably the 

Chinese Communists and when they do, it is hard to predict where our commitment 

would 

General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, was dubious of U.S. 

policy on Laos, but he believed a cease-fire impossible without American military 

64 
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS 

action. That meant nuclear weapons if the Chinese entered the conflict. General 

at estimated that his air forces could prosecute a “small war” 

in Laos with conventional weapons. He envisioned an enlarged conflict including 

North Vietnam or China as requiring a “truly massive U.S. ground 

and air forces.’ 

President Kennedy deferred sending U.S. troops into Laos, tried to salvage 

as much as possible from a cease-fire, and offered reassurances to Thailand and 

South Vietnam. The Geneva negotiations produced no solution, but at a summit 

meeting in Vienna on June agreed with Kennedy’s proposal 

all get out of have “a neutral and independent Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians.” But as late as April the State Department 

would find it “very hard to prophesy what is going to happen in 

Part of the difficulties in dealing with a possible use of force, General 

believed, was due to President Kennedy’s procedural habits and tendencies. The 

President seemed to depend on ad hoc committees in lieu of the Joint Chiefs, 

leading to vetoes, stalling, lengthy discussions, and too many people “in the act 

and making decisions in areas where they weren’t competent.” This approach to 

policy, believed, failed to recognize that “going to war is a very serious 

business and once you make that decision that you’re going to do that, then you 

ought to be prepared to do just that.”” 

General uneasiness with President Kennedy’s methods came at a 

time when other international crises clamored for attention. The Soviets were 

again threatening allied rights of access to West Berlin, so Kennedy requested 

and the Congress authorized the call to active duty of more than Army, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel. Included were thirty-six squadrons and members of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. 

On September the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium of several 

years by exploding megatonic nuclear bombs in the atmosphere. The President 

instructed Defense Secretary to resume American nuclear tests. 

Though Laos overshadowed South Vietnam in SEA affairs during the first 

months of President Kennedy’s administration, the fates of the two countries 

were intertwined. Soon after taking office the President considered plans to 

combat the insurgency in Vietnam. He agreed to enlarge the Republic of 

Vietnam Armed Forces by men and to expand military training for the 

Civil Guard. In February he directed Ambassador to secure President 

Diem’s cooperation on these and other matters. 

In November President Eisenhower had strengthened the role of 

American Ambassadors in all countries. Each had “affirmative responsibility” 

for all U.S. activities, including military assistance. The Ambassador was to be 

informed on all that took place and to report “promptly to the President” 

whenever necessary. In May President Kennedy reiterated this instruction. 

However, he exempted American military forces in the field from the Ambassador’s direct authority they were responsible through military channels. In 

Southeast Asia CINCPAC, an area commander, reported to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. While the Ambassador was 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

I 

Courtesy: Courtesy John F. Kennedy Library Courtesy: U.S. Nav 

(Upper left) W. Averell Harriman, Pres. 

Kennedy, and Dean Rusk. 

(Above) Robert S. McNamara and 

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer. 

(Left) Members of the Vietnamese Self 

Defense Corps from Buon Enao 

(Below) Female members of the Civil 

Defense Guard at Hao Cain. 

66 
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS 

outside this line, he was the Chief of Mission. He worked hand in glove with the 

military commander in the mutual exchange of information, the coordination of 

programs, and the formulation of policy. 14 

In early 1961, six Vietnamese Air Force squadrons were combat-ready 

-one AD-6 fighter, two C-47 transport, two L-19 liaison, and one H-19 helicopter. The fighter unit by March had upped its monthly sortie rate 200 percent, 

from 40 to 120. 15 

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam comprised seven infantry divisions, 

one airborne group, and nineteen separate battalions. Their limited combat 

readiness reflected “inexperienced leadership above the battalion level, inadequate logistical and technical service development, and other deficiencies of an 

organizational nature.” The enduring need to divert troops to internal security 

missions interrupted training. 

Complementing the army were several paramilitary forces. The 68,000 men 

of the Civil Guard (later called Regional Forces) had been organized in 1955 and 

were controlled by the province chiefs. Since October 1960 under the Ministry of 

Defense, the Civil Guard could neither arrest nor investigate. Members had the 

mission of patrolling. The Self Defense Force of 40,000 men constituted a 

full-time home guard defending its members’ villages, and it was under the 

district chiefs. The United States moved quickly in 1961 to arm and train these 

two forces so as to free the army from static defense missions. 

Against these forces and the general population, the Viet Cong had 

redoubled their campaign of terror during the first part of 1961, perhaps to 

disrupt presidential elections scheduled for April 9. The number of Viet Cong in 

South Vietnam swelled to around 14,000. By March the North Vietnamese army 

units in southern Laos seemed strong enough to push across the border and set 

up a “popular” government in the central highlands. If this took place, the 

Sino-Soviet bloc might pursue the technique used in Laos recognize the 

shadow regime as the legitimate government of South Vietnam and furnish 

assistance. But what impressed President Kennedy above all were the assassinations. Sustained by North Vietnam, well-disciplined Viet Cong guerrillas in 1960 

had killed over 4,000 civil officers, 2,000 state employees, and 2,000 police in 

South Vietnam.” 

The elections in April were reasonably orderly, and President Diem received 

an overwhelming vote. With Diem’s position as head of state thereby confirmed 

and apparently secure, President Kennedy sent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff General Lemnitzer and Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman to 

Saigon to support Ambassador Durbrow who was pressing Diem to make 

certain reforms. Calling on Diem, they urged him in particular to form a military 

field command and a central intelligence organization. Inasmuch as these creations might nurture potential political rivals, Diem found the decision hard to 

make. He did agree to try to upgrade the paramilitary forces, get better intelligence, start a junk navy to stop enemy infiltration by sea, establish internal 

security councils, decentralize his government, and undertake fiscal reforms. 19 

61 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Afterwards Diem reactivated the National Internal Security Council, 

founded a National Intelligence Agency, and appointed a commander of the 

Army Field Forces who was to work closely with General the 

chief, on counterinsurgency. Abolishing the military regional headquarters, 

Diem divided the country into three tactical zones and a special tactical zone for 

Saigon, the capital. The commanders were responsible to the Army Field Forces 

commander, and they were to conduct all antiguerrilla military operations. The 

tactical zones could be further segmented into coinciding for the most 

part with provincial boundaries. In them the military chief might also be a 

provincial chief and therefore would be in both civil and military chains of 

On April in Washington one day after the Bay of Pigs invasion 

of Cuba collapsed President Kennedy asked Deputy Secretary of Defense 

to draw up a comprehensive program. It was to cover 

military, social, and political actions, and be tailored to prevent a communist 

takeover South Vietnam. The deputy Defense secretary swiftly organized an 

interagency committee and wrote a first-draft plan in about a week. His preface 

set the tone of the paper, “Come what may, the U.S. intends to win this battle.” 

military recommendations apparently aimed to hearten national 

policy after the Bay of Pigs and to affirm explicitly American resolve to pay the 

cost of commitments in Southeast Asia. The recommendations included the 

installation of radar surveillance in South Vietnam, which would involve the 

U.S. Air Force; increasing the so it could train and support more 

Vietnamese soldiers, thus building the army to 170,000; supplying arms and 

training to the paramilitary forces; and furnishing equipment for a small naval 

force. 

At a National Security Council meeting on the Kennedy approved 

several measures: establishing a combat development and test center Vietnam, 

expanding civic action and economic development programs, augmenting the 

685-man by approximately advisors, and adding to the Military 

Assistance Program for I96 I a heavy radar facility to be sited near 

to observe and report Soviet flights across the Laotian border.” 

Meeting on May with Senator William chairman of the 

foreign relations committee, Kennedy discussed the possibility of sending U.S. 

combat forces into South Vietnam. result talk, the President 

told newsmen the next day that U.S. intervention would be inappropriate 

without prior discussions with Vietnamese leaders. The Air Force plans division 

informed General that the President’s statement was “the first example of 

the type of over-all plan that the Air Force has advocated for some time.” The 

division advised strong support. By May 10 however, the plans division was 

opposing premature commitment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam because it 

might “reduce pressure on Vietnam for initiative and forceful action,” provoke 

the Chinese communists into intervening, and have a bad effect on American 
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS 

In contrast, JCS Chairman General Lemnitzer felt a sense of urgency. He 

frequently spoke of the possible “loss of Vietnam,” termed the military threat 

extremely serious, and deplored the tendency of the U.S. government to waste 

time in quibbling over 

At Secretary McNamara’s request to consider the commitment of American forces, the Joint Chiefs on May 10 favored an immediate deployment to 

provide a visible and “significant” deterrent to North Vietnamese and Chinese 

intervention. They believed it would release Vietnamese armed forces from static 

missions and enable active counterinsurgency operations, help train Vietnamese 

forces, be a nucleus for a U.S. buildup in the case of allied SEAT0 operations, 

and show the firm intent of American policy in Southeast Asia. The JCS leaned 

toward dispatching two reinforced infantry battalions to the central highlands to 

set up and operate two division training centers for the Vietnamese army. Having 

U.S. combat forces in the country was bound to bolster Vietnamese morale. 

Asked to estimate U.S. force requirements, Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, 

discussed the matter with his component commanders on May 11. To General 

O’Donnell, South Vietnam was so deficient in airfields and ground facilities that 

only a few turnaround B-57s and F-102s could operate from Tan Son Nhut for 

short periods. 

Admiral Felt recommended the dispatch to Vietnam of one Army infantry 

division with supporting troops; eight B-57s for border surveillance, close support, and anti-Viet Cong operations; four F-102s for air defense; and possibly 

two or three jet reconnaissance aircraft. If American forces were committed, Felt 

suggested that the M AAG chief be designated Commander, United States 

Forces, Vietnam, and be charged with control, under CINCPAC direction, of all 

U.S. forces 

By then President Kennedy had decided against an open and substantial 

commitment of conventional U.S. combat troops. On May I I he directed the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs to continue 

studying potential U.S. task force structures for Vietnam and to assess the value 

and the cost of increasing the Vietnamese armed forces from 170,000 to 200,000 

men. These actions were to signify “an intensified endeavor to win the struggle 

against communism and to further the social and economic advance of Vietnam” 

in cooperation with President Diem. The rationale, provided by the National 

Security Council, was “to prevent Communist domination in South Vietnam; to 

create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, and to 

initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a 

military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designed to 

achieve this 

On the same day, the President committed an Army Special Forces group of 

400 men to Vietnam. Its task was to organize the Tribal Area Development 

Program to clear and hold certain Viet Cong-controlled areas, mainly along the 

land border. This was the beginning of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, 

initially supervised by the Central Intelligence Agency. Raising, training, leading, 

69 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

and supporting irregular forces would hardly be possible without airlift, medical 

evacuation, and close air support. The Air Force would soon be 

Also on May I I, the President sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to 

Saigon to demonstrate continuing U.S. support for Diem. Johnson’s visit was 

designed to strengthen Diem’s position at home, to make him feel safe enough to 

delegate power to subordinates (chiefly to a functioning field force command), to 

encourage accelerated Vietnamese and American actions, and to give Diem 

confidence in the United States. Johnson carried a letter from Kennedy promising more U.S. assistance if Diem promoted the economic and political development of his 

Johnson and Diem discussed the question of committing U.S. forces to 

South Vietnam, and Johnson had the impression that “Asian leaders - at this 

time- do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on 

training missions.” The Embassy confirmed this point of view. Diem would 

welcome American combat forces solely in the case of overt 

When Johnson asked Diem what he thought his country’s military needs 

were, Diem said he would give a detailed answer later. He observed dryly that the 

Vietnamese were not “accustomed to being asked for our own views on our 

A communique issued on May 13 at the conclusion of their talks made 

no mention of committing U.S. forces. 

Upon his return to Washington, the Vice President said he saw no need for 

American troops in Vietnam except to help the Vietnamese train their forces. The 

nations of Southeast Asia had to make decided efforts, with stronger American 

support, to develop their economic and political systems and to provide for their 

own defense. He passed on Diem’s concern that the communists would employ 

the same strategy they had used in Laos -- infiltration, aerial resupply, and 

establishment of a recognizable government. “Any help,” Johnson said,, “economic as well as military, we give less developed nations to secure and maintain 

their freedom must be part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by 

the United States alone. To the extent the southeast Asian nations are prepared 

to take the necessary measures to make our assistance effective, we can be -and 

must be - unstinting in our 

Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric’s Committee .on Vietnam consisted of 

members of the State and Defense Departments. On May 19 it proposed these 

objectives for American forces that might be deployed to Vietnam: deter the 

North Vietnamese and Chinese, release Vietnamese forces for fuller use in 

operations, train local troops, form a nucleus for future U.S. buildup, and 

demonstrate American firmness. The committee favored the founding of two 

training centers, each to be run by a reinforced U.S. infantry battalion, and the 

sending of minimal air and naval forces to stop infiltration and act against the 

insurgents. The Army urged deploying an infantry division plus special forces. 

The Air Force was reluctant to place combat units in a country where the major 

threat appeared to be insurgency and where the Vietnamese Air Force could 

afford the limited air support required by that threat..” 

70 
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS 

Hoping to help the people of South Vietnam help themselves, President 

Kennedy sent to Admiral Felt and to Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr. (who 

had replaced Durbrow) thirty separate actions he wished carried out. The 

program encompassed: political activities to buttress Diem’s confidence in the 

United States, to heighten his popular support at home, and to improve Vietnam’s relations with its neighbors, chiefly Cambodia; economic measures to let 

Vietnam support larger military forces; and military proposals including the 

installation of a radar surveillance system, a 20,000-man expansion of the 

Vietnamese armed forces, more support for the Civil Guard and Self Defense 

Corps, and an augmented MAAG. The President also desired a stop to infiltration into South Vietnam and a facility to test new techniques against insurgency. 32 

Diem issued decrees to carry out the counterinsurgency measures proposed 

by the Americans, but the extent of his implementation was far from clear. He 

went on using command and intelligence agencies for political ends, mostly to 

maintain a balance among several local Vietnamese factions and their senior 

officers of the armed forces competing for favor and power. 33 

It soon became evident to Americans that the threat to Vietnam was more 

severe than had been suspected. At the summit in Vienna early in June 1961, 

Kennedy found Khrushchev willing to accept a neutralization of Laos but not of 

Vietnam. Reflecting upon this refusal, Secretary of State Dean Rusk later 

suggested that the United States should have said quite simply, “You can’t have 

South Vietnam.” Perhaps that would have prevented misunderstanding within 

the communist world of the American position on Southeast 

Although the Joint Chiefs and CINCPAC advocated deploying U.S. forces 

for combat in South Vietnam to counter the Viet Cong, the President put faith in 

his program of helping the Vietnamese. Yet there were warnings in June 1961 

that “the prospects for stability and progress are not too bright,” due to intensified communist warfare and “a lack of real popular support for Diem’s 

government 

In that month President Diem asked the United States to support a Vietnamese army of 270,000(one airborne and fourteen infantry divisions). An expanded 

MAAG to operate training centers, he said, “would serve the dual purpose of 

providing an expression of the United States’ determination to halt the tide of 

Communist aggression and of preparing our forces in the minimum of time.”” 

In response the Joint Chiefs on June 2 1 recommended building the Vietnamese armed forces to 200,000 men and adding “two division equivalents, including 

necessary Navy and Air Force augmentation.” Gilpatric counseled deferral of 

this action until the earlier 20,000-man increase had been 

assimilated. 37 

To see if the South Vietnamese economy could sustain enlarged military 

forces, Kennedy sent a financial survey group headed by Dr. Eugene Staley to 

Saigon. Reporting in July, Staley favored further aid for Vietnam but warned 

against expecting military operations to achieve lasting results without economic 

71 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

progress. A free society and a self-sustaining economy in Vietnam gave the best 

basis of hope for the future.” 

Military planners in Washington came to the same conclusion in July and 

August Adding to the Vietnamese armed forces or deploying two reinforced American battalions would hardly solve the problems. Preventing the 

communist domination of South had to come through a series of 

mutually supporting political, military, economic, psychological, and covert 

actions. 

Cool to Diem’s request for more soldiers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 

August decided that a nine-division force of Vietnamese was sufficient. 

They thought priority should go to training the 20,000-man increase, the Civil 

Guard, and the Self Defense Corps, as well as to retraining existing forces. On 

August I President Kennedy approved U.S. support for a Vietnamese military 

establishment of men. As Secretary of Defense told his 

principal subordinates a week later, internal security was the first priority, 

although military operations would give no lasting results without “continued 

and accelerated” economic and social But in September the 

intensified the conflict, occupying towns, cutting roads, slowing the flow of 

rice to market, and impeding other commercial traffic. They also assassinated 

about people each month, mainly intermediate government officials. 

Although the Vietnamese army had mauled several large guerrilla units in the 

Delta during June, it was able to do so because the foe stood and fought 

in the open. This was an ominous sign, since strength in combat units 

was now an estimated men. The evaluation division of the Air 

Staff in Washington felt that “the communists are making a determined bid to 

take over that nation, and perhaps all of Southeast Asia, in the very near 

FUTURE 

Infiltrators in and had been chiefly administrators, propagandists, and logisticians. In combat soldiers-mostly trained veterans of the 

war against France and many of them born in South Vietnam-arrived and 

formed main force battalions and combat support companies. They had pushed 

south along two routes. The primary one was a corridor along the border. The 

other, kilometers to the east, was called Chi Minh Trail by the Americans, a name they later gave the whole system. 

These small determined men moved beneath the forest canopy, brushed 

away their tracks when necessary, preserved rigid march discipline, and kept 

their movements secret. They traveled in groups of several hundred, an estimated 

in I, in Their presence was mirrored in the rise of incidents 

involving the assassination of officials, the destruction of government outposts, 

and the eagerness of guerrillas to fight in the 

There were reported battles in the country during August but 

September. A telling action took place on the 18th of September. Around 

guerrillas overran the capital of Province. They 

publicly beheaded the province chief, held the town most of the day, and left 

before the Vietnamese troops arrived. President Diem was alarmed by the 

I 
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS 

infiltrators streaming from North Vietnam through Laos and by the Viet Cong’s 

ability to assemble large units, to operate in battalions, to use extensive radio 

command nets, and to raid key provincial cities. On September 29 Diem asked 

Ambassador Nolting for a bilateral defense treaty with the United States. He 

pressed Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, for a “large increase in advisors of all types” 

and for American tactical air squadrons to help break up big communist units 

massing for attack. Diem’s apprehension colored his address before the National 

Assembly on October 2: “It is no longer a guerrilla war. It is a war waged by an 

enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped and who 

seeks a strategic decision in Southeast Asia in conformity with the order of the 

Communist 

Controlling infiltration into the country was virtually impossible. South 

Vietnam’s land border stretched 900 miles along neighboring Cambodia, Laos, 

and North Vietnam. Three-quarters of this distance consisted of rugged mountains, the rest of swamps and jungles. Portions of the frontier had never been 

precisely delineated. MAAG suggested using helicopters to patrol the border, but 

maintenance facilities were in short supply or entirely lacking. Surveillance by 

high-performance aircraft was hardly enough. Requesting SEAT0 forces to 

exercise border control would only place these units in a vulnerable position, 

grossly complicate communications and logistical support, and reduce but certainly not stop Viet Cong crossings. 

The best technique came into being about the time of the Laotian crisis in 

May. The Vietnamese set up patrol bases and primitive airfields along the 

border. Manned by regular army troops, rangers, Civil Guard companies, and 

Montagnard scouts, these facilities were home for the roving patrols that located, 

harassed, and ambushed infiltrators. The landing strips made air resupply by 

C-47s possible. The ranger training center, which had been moved from Da Nang 

to Nha Trang, recruited and instructed Montagnard scouts. But the core of the 

system was the group of 400 Special Forces troops committed by President 

Kennedy. They brought direction and substance to the border-control 

To fulfill President Kennedy’s desire for developing counterinsurgency 

methods, Defense Secretary McNamara directed the Defense Department’s 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to create a Combat Development 

and Test Center in Vietnam. When its functions appeared to overlap and conflict 

with the MAAG’s, Vietnamese and American officials agreed on June 29 to 

locate a small center within the Vietnamese armed forces headquarters in Saigon, 

to work with the Joint General Staff. With direct channels to ARPA and 

CINCPAC, the center served as a focal point for technical contract analysts 

dispatched to the country by ARPA and by the director of Defense research and 

engineering. By the 5th of August, the center was searching for a chemical agent 

to kill the tapioca plant (a food source for guerrillas), probing the use of patrol 

dogs, and considering the employment of chemical defoliants to deprive the Viet 

Cong of assembly and ambush 

13 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Installing surveillance radar to record Soviet overflights in clandestine 

supply and intelligence missions-as President Kennedy wished-was not easy. 

The Vietnamese armed forces were without aircraft control and warning. At Tan 

Son Nhut their 1st Radar Squadron owned two light TPS-1 D search radars and 

two TPS-1 OD height finders. This equipment was stored from I954 to 1958, then 

the Vietnamese Air Force utilized it merely for training. The 1st Squadron had 

never actually controlled aircraft, and many of its U.S.-trained technicians were 

assigned elsewhere, often in unrelated 

Military Assistance Program funds covered the installation of two heavy 

combination FPS-20/-6 radars at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang, but delivery was 

impossible before September 1962. To fill the gap and to speed refresher training 

of Vietnamese technicians, Admiral Felt requested and Air Force headquarters 

directed on September 1 I, 1961, the deployment of a mobile combat reporting 

post to Vietnam. It came from the 507th Tactical Control Group at Shaw Air 

Force Base, South Carolina. 

The combat reporting post comprised 67 men plus MPS-I I search and 

MPS- 16 height-finder radars. This secret movement (all identification markings 

on boxed equipment were painted out) was airlifted to Vietnam during September 26-October 3. The installation started operating at Tan Son Nhut on the 

5th of October and eventually received 3 14 more USAF personnel. A center was 

organized to control and report flights, and training of Vietnamese technicians 

commenced. 

As the first USAF unit to arrive in Vietnam on a permanent duty status, the 

combat reporting post formed the nucleus of a tactical air control system. The 

personnel supervised construction of a tent city, met incoming aircraft, and in 

general eased the arrival of other officers and airmen ordered to Vietnam. They 

began “a radar capability to support interceptor and other combat activities in 

the event that U.S. or other allied forces must at some point be deployed to the 

country in an 

Other USAF resources soon arrived to bolster photo reconnaissance. A 

single RT-33 had reconnoitered Laos until May 1961, but the United States 

suspended the mission to respect the cease-fire and the Geneva conference on 

Laos. The flights resumed on October 4. Shortly after the Saigon government 

asked for more photo reconnaissance to assist intelligence gathering, Fifth Air 

Force was ordered to move a detachment of its 15th Tactical Reconnaissance 

Squadron from Okinawa to Saigon. Thedetachment got to Tan Son Nhut on the 

morning of October 18, just after the Mekong River had overflowed its banks. 

The severe flooding spread to the greater part of three delta provinces, left 

320,000 people homeless, and destroyed 1,000 kilometers of roads and 10 million 

acres of crops. 

The four RF-101 aircraft, six flight crews, a photo processing unit, and 

support personnel were all known as Pipe Stem. Flights got under way on 

October 20, photographing the Mekong floods as well as areas controlled by the 

Viet Cong. During a month of operations. Pipe Stem flew sixty-seven photo 

sorties within the country, along the border, and to the Tchepone area of Laos. 

74 
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS 

Another detachment of four Fifth Air Force flight crews, photo 

processing unit, and support personnel reached Don Thailand, on 

November Nicknamed Able it took over the reconnaissance missions 

on the 10TH leaving the to transport film to a processing center at Tan Son 

Nhut or Clark. Filling the needs of the in Laos and Vietnam, the first 

flights were mostly over Laos. But before long the pilots were flying seventy-five 

percent of their sorties over South 

Despite the buildup of American assistance, signs in Vietnam were mixed. 

President Diem had formed a Central Intelligence Organization, was improving 

the Civil Guard, was adding men to the army, and had created a ranger 

force. American advisors were working down to company level, and small, 

helicopter-borne, quick-reaction units were being organized. Yet Diem’s 

National Internal Security Council did a of supervising the execution of 

military, political, and economic measures. Military units had scant time for rest 

and retraining. Province chiefs paid slight attention to the chain of command. 

Vietnamese forces diverted aircraft from troop lift to administrative purposes. 

Perhaps most disheartening, several Vietnamese military leaders asked U.S. 

officials what American reaction might be to a coup against President 

Diem. 

Inefficiency abounded. A typical example took place in autumn 

Several Vietnamese AD-6s got orders to strike troops gathered on the 

side of a river dividing that province from By the time 

the fighters came, the guerrillas had crossed the river. While the planes orbited 

for three hours, the Province chief could not be found to approve 

the strike.4~ 

The Vietnamese Air Force was rated combat ready. Plans to expand it 

gained Military Assistance Program backing for second fighter and helicopter 

squadrons, one photo reconnaissance unit, and a third liaison squadron. 

Even though the Geneva accords forbade introducing jet aircraft into the country, there was some talk in American circles during of giving the Vietnamese 

surplus jets. This, it was said, would merely match the many communist 

violations since 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff frankly suggested that jets be delivered 

to the Vietnamese for reconnaissance. Even a few jet planes would impel the 

Vietnamese to expand and upgrade ground facilities-extremely valuable 

actions in light of possible future commitment of U.S. air units. Admiral Felt, 

CINCPAC, favored turning over several photo jets to the Vietnamese. The 

USAF planners in Washington warned, “immediate and serious degradation in 

the military effectiveness of the Vietnamese could the absence 

The State Department stood solidly against the idea and in October Ambassador 

stopped trying to equip the Vietnamese with jet planes. Secretary 

told the Navy to send thirty piston-engine fighters to Saigon. 

The Air Force handled the transportation of these aircraft from the west coast to 

Vietnam. The first fifteen were in place by 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

All this was-in retrospect at least-a prelude to two decisions made by 

President Kennedy on October 1 I, I96 I. The President perused Diem’s address 

of October 2 to the National Assembly that termed hostilities in Vietnam as 

changed and extremely serious. He also noted the stream of threat and vituperation flowing from Hanoi. Then Kennedy on the morning of the I 1th ordered a 

USAF combat detachment to Vietnam. In the afternoon he sent his military 

adviser, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, to Saigon to find out how best to help the 

Diem government. 

76 
lNlTlAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS 

(Left) T-28 fighter-bombers. 

(Center) Lt. Richard A. Mathison and 

A1C Tri Pham Minh, VNAF, stand with 

a collection of Farm Gate aircraft 

T-28 in foreground, a B-26 in left 

background, A-1 E in right background 

and a C-47 in distance. 

(Bottom) RF-101 Voodoo. 

I I 

77 

VII. opening Farm Gate 

The USAF combat detachment that President Kennedy ordered to Vietnam on October 1 I, 1961, had its roots in a small, secret organization created in 

the late 1950s when General LeMay was Vice Chief of Staff. In March 1961 

LeMay responded to the President’s instructions for the armed services to 

examine how each could best contribute to counterinsurgency. When there was 

no doubt about communist aggression, LeMay personally favored a direct and 

open American response with the necessary strength. He defined “necessary” as 

“more than is actually necessary to do the job,” hitting “with overwhelming 

weight”to avoid “stretching things out over a period of time.” LeMay, soon to be 

Chief of Staff, was very much aware that the military services had to abide by 

different rules. Tactical Air Command was therefore directed to form a small, 

elite, volunteer unit around the organization. Its mission would be 

air operations in support of ground forces to be flown in older conventional 

aircraft. 

The 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (nicknamed Jungle Jim) 

came into being at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, on April 14, I96 I. Commanded 

by Col. Benjamin H. King, the unit had 124 officers and 228 airmen, sixteen 

C-47s, eight B-26s, and eight T-28s. Equal numbers of the same types of aircraft 

were in temporary storage. The squadron’s mission of training indigenous air 

forces in counterinsurgency would combine with a mission of air operations.’ 

Officers and airmen of the 4400th-at times called air commandos-were 

volunteers, above average in physique, hardiness, and sense of adventure. Each 

was closely interviewed and approved by Colonel King. Next came psychiatric 

screening at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and survival indoctrination at 

Stead Air Force Base, Nevada. Those completing the program were certified to 

be emotionally mature, highly motivated, and stable. Unfortunately, not all were 

mentally attuned to teaching members of other cultures or in fact to perform a 

training mission-they were combat-oriented. Later, several men would prove 

unable to work with Asian officers. As volunteers dwindled, the rigorous standards were eventually lowered. The picturesque air commando uniform, personally picked by General LeMay, featured an Australian-type bush hat (with 

turned-up brim), fatigues, and combat 

Two of the three types of Jungle Jimaircraft were extensively modified. The 

T-28 received armorplate and carried about 1,500 pounds of bombs and rockets, 

plus two SO-caliber machineguns with 350 rounds per gun. Loaded, the aircraft 

could speed at 160 knots to a target 200 miles distant then return to base. The 

C-47 (redesignated SC-47 after modification) boasted twice the normal fuel load, 

a stronger landing gear suited to dirt strips, and jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) racks 

for operations from short fields. The B-26 twin-engine attack bomber needed no 

modification, carrying 6,000 pounds of bombs and rockets, plus machineguns. 

79 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

When fully loaded, it had a combat radius of 400 miles at a normal speed of 200 

knots and could loiter 30 to 45 minutes. The B-26 was designed for a glide 

bomb-delivery pattern, not for dive-bombing with rolling pullouts nor for 

landing with external ordnance in place after an aborted mission.3 

To halt communist infiltration into South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs on 

August 24 suggested to Secretary McNamara air interdiction of the inland trails 

over which the Viet Cong secured supplies. If the United States had no desire to 

commit American forces openly, why not institute unconventional, guerrillatype 

The President had mentioned several times to the Secretary of Defense the 

benefits of testing counterinsurgency techniques in Vietnam. On September 5 

McNamara informed the three service secretaries that he intended to establish an 

experimental command under MAAG as a laboratory for refining organizational and operational procedures. General LeMay at this point invited Secretary 

of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert’s attention to the 4400th Combat Crew 

Training Squadron. Sending an element of the unit to Vietnam would be an ideal 

way to devise and evaluate special warfare methods. On September 19 Secretary 

Zuckert recommended this to Secretary McNamara. A detachment of the 4400th 

had just become operationally ready. If moved to Vietnam, it would acquire 

counterinsurgency experience and at the same time train the 

McNamara liked the proposal, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, 

and on October 5 had their recommendation to place a detachment of Jungle Jim 

with MAAG in Vietnam. The Secretary next made the idea known to the 

President Kennedy weighed the burgeoning Viet Cong strength, the more 

frequent reference in planning papers to U.S. covert operations, the desire of the 

Joint Chiefs to make a reassuring commitment of air strength to Vietnam, and 

President Diem’s change of heart on acceptance of American combat units in his 

country. On the morning of October 1 I, 1961, the Commander in Chief authorized the deployment of the Jungle Jim squadron to Vietnam “to serve under the 

MAAG as a training mission and not for combat at the present time.”’ 

But the 4400th was not specifically a training unit-it was “designed to 

fight.” It had been “singled out” for deployment because its combat capacity and 

involvement would shore up “South Vietnamese sagging 

The President’s decision five months earlier to send an Army Special Forces 

group to Vietnam now enunciated a new mission statement for Jungle Jim. It was 

to train indigenous airmen while working with and supporting the Special 

Forces, rangers, and irregular forces along the border. In this light, General 

LeMay saw the USAF unit as a regular part of the triservice team. Essentially, 

however, Jungle Jim was an experiment and one of its purposes was to forge 

counterinsurgency tactics. It could use sod runways and operate austerely in 

remote areas; carry out strike, reconnaissance, and airlift missions; fly close 

support for ground troops; drop small forces up to company-size; deliver supplies; and perform medical 

80 
OPENING FARM GATE 

Thus it was that Air Force officers and airmen, volunteers to support 

friendly guerrillas, flying eight extemporized fighter-bombers, four light bombers 

of World War II vintage, and four twin-engine transports designed prior to the 

second World War, learned that they would go to Vietnam to support the 

government of President Diem. Exactly how was in some 

On the 13th of October, Colonel King and two of his officers visited Hawaii 

to coordinate Jungle Jim’s movement with Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, who 

“enthusiastically supported the approved deployment.” In Saigon the three 

officers briefed Ambassador who was happy to have Jungle Jim to train 

Vietnamese, develop tactics and techniques, and conduct other operations “as 

directed by the Ambassador.” He asked that all aircraft arrive with Vietnamese 

insignia.” 

Returning to Hawaii, King was assured by officers that no major 

problems existed. A tent camp would be ready for the detachment’s arrival at 

Airfield and support arrangements were underway. On October 

Felt asked that the detachment be sent forward at once, without waiting for the 

Air Force to procure some Super Courier light aircraft and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for the At Eglin the task force designated 

for Vietnam received the formal name of Detachment 4400th Combat Crew 

Training Squadron, and the code name of Farm 

Meantime, members of the 6009th Tactical Support Group under Col. 

Claude entered Vietnam with the utmost secrecy during late 

October. These officers and airmen deployed on temporary duty from 

Air Base, Japan, to Clark, then to where they prepared the 

base facility for Farm Gate. Additional detachments came from Thirteenth Air 

Force and (chiefly from the 6010th Tactical Support Group) to service 

and support the beginnings of an expanded USAF presence in Vietnam and 

elsewhere in Southeast Asia. All were formed into numbered temporary duty 

detachments on November and at Tan Son Nhut, at and 

at Don Thailand. Detachment was a headquarters staff; operated the 

“prime set-up” for an air operations and a combat reporting center, as well as a 

photo processing cell; while and 10 maintained and serviced 

Farm Gate departed Florida on the 5th of November. Four flew to 

Clark Air Base. Eight were disassembled in California and, together with 

officers and airmen, were ferried to Clark by MATS. After reassembly, 

Colonel King led two flights of to Tan Son Nhut. The detachment became 

operationally ready on the though a week passed before the last of the 

SC-47s and arrived. Farm Gate accepted four previously sent to the 

Far East. These hardnosed, strafing-model, light bombers reached 

near the close of 

At the Farm Gate detachment found a rundown French air base 

with a flight surface consisting of a single pierced-steel-plank runway by 

feet. Tear-outs the steel tie strips demanded constant attention of welding 

crews, and the 15th Air Division C-130s bringing in communications equipment for a tactical air control system further tore up the runway. About 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Vietnamese soldiers defended the airfield, because heavy vegetation and swampy 

terrain nearby afforded good cover for Viet Cong troops surrounding the air 

base. Farm Gate at once contacted the two USAF mobile reporting posts at Tan 

Son Nhut, and set about to organize a tactical air control system of sorts and to 

establish communications and supply 

The members of Farm Gate thought they were to conduct combat operations while training the Vietnamese. That was how General LeMay had briefed 

Colonel King, and King was more than willing to make his unit combat capable 

and responsive to Ambassador Nolting and to American military authorities. In 

early familiarization flights, T-28 crews trailed Vietnamese AD-6s to targets, 

observed their attack procedures, and, when authorized, fired on targets. The 155 

men were highly motivated and eager to 

Nevertheless, on November 16 Admiral Felt tasked Farm Gate with conducting tactical training and pilot upgrading for the Vietnamese. President 

Kennedy was advised that the unit was “training Vietnamese aircrews and 

supporting Vietnamese operations against the Viet 

Uncertainties of mission and the absence of combat lowered morale from 

the start. The pilots expected to carry an air offensive to the Viet Cong. Instead, 

they trained and supplemented the Vietnamese Air Force, seeking to evolve 

techniques for what McNamara described to the press as “not full-scale warfare 

but guerrilla warfare.” Without clearcut agreement at higher levels on Farm 

Gate’s mission, the early operations tended to be improvised and experimental 

rather than systematic. 19 

Farm Gate’s first regular employment was to reconnoiter and count the 

junk and sampan traffic in Vietnam coastal waters, a tedious job lasting from 

December 6 through 22, 1961. C-47s and pairs of T-28s flew four-hour search 

patterns and recorded sightings. Thirty-seven sorties turned up 6,294 vessels, but 

the aircrews had no way to tell how many were enemy. MAAG was equally at a 

loss to interpret the findings. The long uneventful flight patterns were a physical 

hardship for the T-28 crews. They were not allowed to crack their canopies in 

flight, even though weakened by thecockpit heat from the tropical sun. A second 

series flown during February 5-7, 1962, furnished no meaningful 

Farm Gate likewise also acquired the mission of supporting the Army 

Special Forces and their Civilian Irregular Defense Group. The C-47s operated 

under an ad hoc system free of MAAG and Vietnamese army control, to keep 

materiel, transportation, and funds in U.S. hands. The aircraft delivered locally 

procured items and emergency ones flown in from the United States. (Formal 

supply accountability was discarded.) These operations were small, Farm Gate 

flying just 205 sorties in the first six months of 

While valuable, these missions were outside of what Farm Gate wanted to 

do. When Admiral Felt on December 4, 1961, directed General O’Donnell at 

PACAF to ready plans for operations, O’Donnell at once permitted Farm Gate 

to fly combat missions “with at least one South Vietnamese national aboard any 

aircraft so committed.” Secretary McNamara, meeting with the Joint Chiefs that 

day, approved combat with mixed crews. On December 6 the Joint Chiefs 

82 
OPENING FARM GATE 

granted formal authority for Farm Gate aircraft to fly combat if Vietnamese were 

aboard for 

On the 6th submitted to CINCPAC the same concept for operations. Actually, U.S. aircraft and personnel would support Vietnamese armed 

forces and help them deny the Viet supply routes and concentration areas, 

fly armed patrols of South Vietnam’s land and sea borders, and seek out and 

destroy Viet headquarters as well as communist airlift into South 

Viet 

Together, Vietnamese and Americans were to destroy Viet lifelines 

and support bases. From Tan Son Nhut, and combat air bases to be 

developed at and Pleiku, air operations were to stress photo reconnaissance, surveillance, interdiction, and close support of ground 

Needed at once were a tactical air control system and a jointly manned 

American-Vietnamese air operations center. When Admiral Felt approved a 

limited tactical air control system on December it appeared that operations 

would get under way. Thirteenth Air Force issued a draft plan on the and 

distinguished between combat actions performed in support of the Vietnamese 

within South Vietnam and advisory and training actions. On the Ambassador directed that no combat mission of any description be undertaken 

without his 

The next day, General suggested that Farm Gate should not wait 

for “tailor-made jobs” but should center on training. Secretary 

repeated his approval of combat missions if the planes had Vietnamese aboard. 

However, he wanted all such flights to be confined to South Vietnam owing to 

the experimental nature of the program. Stressing the difference between “riding 

double” combat training missions and operational missions, he charged CINCPAC with the latter. He wanted Admiral Felt to use combat missions solely for 

“important jobs” and to monitor them closely. In other words, according to 

“Jungle Jim is to be used for training and operational missions 

South Vietnam with Vietnamese riding rear 

On December the Joint Chiefs sent a message “to insure no misunderstanding in the authority granted for the use of Jungle Jim aircraft.” Farm Gate’s 

principal purpose was training Vietnamese Air Force personnel. On the following day, Admiral Felt made known his conviction that Farm Gate, besides 

training Vietnamese, could carry out “all kinds of conventional combat and 

combat support flights” if a Vietnamese was to receive 

Admiral Felt’s conviction sparked a reexamination of American policy in 

Washington. The National Security Council inclined toward authorizing U.S. 

uniformed personnel in Vietnam for “instruction in and execution of air-ground 

support techniques.” That appeared broad enough to embrace all U.S. air 

actions. Yet the State Department view, later voiced by 

held that the statement hardly covered interdiction air strikes far from friendly 

ground troops. General forwarded detailed clarifying instructions to 

Admiral Felt and General on December He wanted Farm Gate to 

conduct combat missions only when the Vietnamese Air Force could not. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Combined crews on combat missions would fulfill the purpose of training-to 

allow Vietnamese to fly these missions alone as soon as possible. 

When General Lemnitzer’s directive reached Farm Gate on the afternoon of 

the 26th a strike mission was in the air. Two Farm Gate T-28s were escorting two 

Vietnamese AD-6s to hit Viet Cong houses and rice fields about fifty miles north 

of Saigon. Despite recall efforts, the strike went on. But thereafter, the possibility 

of an independent American combat role came to an 

Determining Farm Gate’s mission and its place in the organizational and 

command structure would be the subject of continuing discussion and controversy. Meanwhile General Maxwell Taylor had visited Vietnam and had 

reported his observations to the President, thereby shaping and refining the 

purpose and direction of national policy. 

84 
Several hours after announcing on October I 1, 1961, the dispatch of Farm 

Gate to Vietnam, President Kennedy disclosed that he was sending his military 

adviser General Taylor to Saigon. Taylor was to make an “educated military 

guess” of the situation in the country and to find “ways in which we can perhaps 

better assist the Government of Vietnam in meeting this threat to its independence.” In his letter of instructions to the general, Kennedy said, “the initial 

responsibility for the effective maintenance of the independence of South Vietnam rests with the people and government of that country.” Concerned with 

political, social, and economic matters in addition to military problems, the 

President appointed Walt W. Rostow as Taylor’s deputy. Actually, Taylor was 

to advise the President whether to deploy U.S. combat forces for a direct role in 

Vietnam, or to continue U.S. training and support functions only.’ 

Public knowledge of Taylor’s mission produced an immediate reaction 

from the communists. On October 12 Premier Chou En-lai warned that China 

could scarcely “be indifferent to the increasingly grave situation caused by United 

States imperialism in South Vietnam.” Ho Chi Minh went to Peking for discussions. The Soviet Union linked the Taylor mission with flagging diplomatic 

discussions at Geneva and charged the United States with planning to send 

troops to Vietnam to bring pressure to bear on the situation in Laos. On October 

14 North Vietnam protested to the International Control Commission that the 

Taylor mission was meant to “intensify United States intervention in South 

Vietnam and prepare the way for introducing United States 

What was the exact state of affairs in South Vietnam? Increases in Viet 

Cong numbers, aggressiveness, and incidents constantly surprised the Vietnamese National Intelligence Agency. United States intelligence estimates placed 

the strength of Viet Cong main forces at 17,000 men, eighty to ninety percent of 

whom were recruited President Diem was complaining to the International Control Commission of the international threat to his government, 

Hanoi’s determination to “liberate the south,” the massive infiltration of communist agents, the ruthless strategy of terror waged against the South Vietnamese 

people, and the endeavors to establish “liberated territory”in the central reaches 

of the Republic, susceptible of gaining recognition and support from the communist powers. CINCPAC intelligence assessments identified enemy goals as 

consolidating control over the richer agricultural areas of the country, isolating 

Saigon and the Diem government from the people, and keeping the infiltration 

approaches into South Vietnam 

What military assistance did the South Vietnamese want? As the Vietnamese defense minister told Ambassador Nolting on October 13, Diem wished 

American combat units or “combat training units” to be stationed near the 17th 

parallel to make a show of force and also to free Vietnamese units for antiguerrilla action.’ 

85 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

En route to Saigon, Taylor and Rostow stopped off in Hawaii for a briefing 

by Admiral Felt. The admiral stressed that the Vietnamese required prompt U.S. 

assistance. He pinpointed two serious Vietnamese weaknesses-the tendency of 

province chiefs to meddle in military matters, and the penchant of military 

commanders to stay in static defensive positions. Felt indorsed the Farm Gate 

commitment, but saw no present need for other American combat forces to take 

a direct part in the war. He recommended continuing USAF reconnaissance 

flights, accelerating the delivery of T-28s, and refining military communications. 

He wanted the primitive airstrip at Pleiku enlarged and stores of ammunition, 

equipment, and war consumables positioned at bases for a possible introduction 

of SEAT0 

The Taylor-Rostow mission arrived at Tan Son Nhut on October 18, spent 

six days in Vietnam, and departed for Baguio in the Philippines,where the group 

sent President Kennedy an interim report. By November 3 the members drew up 

a lengthy final report. 

General Taylor defined the situation in South Vietnam as “an acute crisis of 

confidence” at every social level-doubt on the seriousness of the U.S. commitment, concern over Viet Cong successes, and discouragement over recent floods 

that burdened an “already strained state.” The military crisis mirrored political 

weakness. Diem was “an old fashioned Asian ruler, seeking to maintain all the 

strings of power in his own hands, while fragmenting power beneath him.” The 

military suffered from skimpy intelligence, scant command control, and sparse 

mobility. A “lack of target intelligence and a frustrating structure” hampered the 

“small but capable” Vietnamese Air Force. It had made no significant contribution to the struggle, because there had been little photo reconnaissance before the 

USAF Able Mable missions. “While the very nature of guerrilla war makes good 

targets hard to find,” Taylor noted, “sophisticated aerial photography should 

find such good targets as there are.” Finally, the general saw “none of the 

controlling structure necessary for effective tactical operations.” 

There were less than 800 American military personnel and even fewer 

civilians in the country. None worked inside Vietnamese ministries, and few were 

in the field, for Diem preferred Americans to remain in Saigon. Some U.S. 

officials apparently thought it improper to report anything critical of the Diem 

government. As a result, it was not easy to secure a thorough estimate of the 

situation. Still the unsettled Laotian situation had probably lessened Vietnamese 

confidence in the United States, and a more visible U.S. military presence might 

restore Vietnamese morale. 

General Taylor’s recommendations included continuing USAF reconnaissance flights in Vietnam, setting up a U.S. tactical air-ground system run partially 

as a training program, giving Farm Gate a liberal rather than a restrictive 

mission, and improving Vietnamese air facilities. He saw no reason to commit 

U.S. combat forces in a direct role for the moment. He envisioned success as 

hinging on Diem’s willingness to undertake political and social reforms.’ 

With a clear impression that “a U.S. military presence of some kind” was 

greatly desired, General Taylor reported that he leaned toward bolstering Ameri86 
THE TAYLOR MISSION 

D. Taylor, Gen Emmett 

J H. Sides, and Lt Gen C. A 

(Center) Gen. Paul D Harkins, Adm Harry D Felt, and 

Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting at Tan Son Nhut 

(Bottom) Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. 

87 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

can military aid and advisory support for a broadly conceived counterguerrilla 

campaign. Central to his concept was making MAAG an operational headquarters for a theater of war, with 8,000 military advisors to quicken Vietnamese 

training, upgrade intelligence and communications, enrich research and development, and give quick military and economic support to Vietnamese offensive 

operations. An alternative was to deploy perhaps 10,000 U.S. ground troops for 

defense, to release the Vietnamese army for active counterinsurgency. 

Though Taylor and his colleagues believed American support for counterinsurgency inside Vietnam to be basic, they warned against sending more U.S. 

reinforcements until the nature of any final settlement in Laos and the way in 

which Hanoi adjusted to it were clear. If Hanoi persisted in its guerrilla infiltration, the United States would be forced “to attack the source of guerrilla 

aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the Hanoi government a price for 

participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage inflicted 

on its neighbors to the 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not care for the interim and final TaylorRostow reports. They wanted a positive American commitment to the clear 

objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam, even if that meant U.S. military 

forces must fight. The loss of South Vietnam would lead to communist control 

over neighboring nations, and the chiefs favored an immediate deployment of 

strong American combat forces instead of a gradual entry of combat support 

units. They proposed to warn Hanoi of punitive action unless Viet Cong aggression ceased. There was little chance of staving off the fall of South Vietnam 

without U.S. forces “on a substantial scale.” The United States could persuade 

North Vietnam of its serious intent solely by a “clear commitment” to keep South 

Vietnam out of the communist camp, plus a diplomatic warning to Hanoi that its 

continued support of the Viet Cong would bring American retaliation. A long 

war and perhaps the intervention of the People’s Republic of China might ensue. 

If it did, the United States would have to put at least 205,000 military men into 

the 

Secretary McNamara discussed the matter with the Joint Chiefs. On 

November 8 he informed President Kennedy of his and their support of the 

Taylor-Rostow recommendations as “first steps” toward realizing the American 

aim-averting the fall of South Vietnam. Defending Southeast Asia would take 

no more than six U.S. divisions, about 205,000 men. The United States, however, 

should introduce major U.S. units into Vietnam only if it was willing to make an 

unalterable espousal of that 

McNamara and the Joint Chiefs were candid in saying that success would 

turn upon many factors “not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem 

himself and other leaders in the area.” They were uneasy about American 

domestic political problems, but expected Congress to “respond better to a firm 

initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in 

the meantime are sure to involve casualties.”The key, of course, was the firmness 

of American intent. Without that, there was no point to deploy sizable units.” 

88 
THE TAYLOR MISSION 

As chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council, Walt 

Rostow argued for a contingency policy of retaliation against North Vietnam, a 

program graduated to match the intensity of Hanoi’s support of the Viet Cong. 

Upon his request, PACAF furnished Rostow with two lists of aerial targets in 

North 

Admiral Felt clung to his earlier opinion. The United States should not send 

large combat forces until the lesser measures, suggested by him and substantially 

approved by General Taylor, were 

President Kennedy was loath to approve an extensive open-ended commitment. “They want a force of American troops,” he told an aide, and he likened 

that force to the units sent to Germany earlier in the year. 

They say it’s necessary in order restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be 

just like Berlin. The troops will march in; the bands will play; the crowds will cheer; 

and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told we have to send in 

more troops. It’s like taking a drink. The effect wears off. and you have to take 

another. 

According to Kennedy, the war could be won only so long as it remained 

Vietnam’s war. Otherwise, the Americans would lose like the 

On November 8 Secretary of Defense McNamara, together with the Joint 

Chiefs, had been “inclined” to recommend a firm commitment to preclude the 

takeover of South Vietnam even if it meant direct military action. Three days 

later, McNamara joined with Secretary of State Rusk in proposing a more 

moderate stance in line with President Kennedy’s thinking. The Defense secretary urged the instant dispatch of modest support units and further study before 

resolving to send large organized units for actual or potential 

The National Security Council and State and Defense representatives 

weighed on November 11 American military options in Vietnam. On the 13th a 

State-Defense memorandum generally followed the Rusk-McNamara view. 

There was to be no swift overt commitment of U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. A 

unilateral employment independent of SEATO action might trigger a military 

escalation, provoke apathy and perhaps hostility among South Vietnamese, 

jeopardize the chances for a political settlement in Laos, and promote domestic 

political repercussions in the United 

Also on November 13 Kennedy approved the lesser measures-more airlift 

(helicopters, light planes, and transports) for the Diem forces, along with the 

USAF personnel and planes for reconnaissance and defoliation. Nine days later 

the President advised Diem of American willingness to expand aid, men, and 

equipment for a combined undertaking to speed Vietnamese training and to help 

fashion better communications and intelligence. In return, Diem would have to 

put South Vietnam on a firm war footing, mobilize his resources, give his 

government adequate authority, and overhaul the military establishment and 

command structure. Meanwhile, uniformed U.S. military personnel in the country would furnish airlift for Vietnamese forces, air reconnaissance, photography, 

instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and special 

intelligence. 

89 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

There was neither a statement of American national objectives nor a 

provision for stronger U.S. military actions should these first-phase measures 

prove insufficient. The Air Staff regarded this as a much “watered down”policy. 

It differed mainly from the Joint Chiefs’ position by adding the quid pro quo 

approach to the Republic of Vietnam. That is, American commitments would 

grow solely in response to positive Vietnamese actions.18 

At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 5, General LeMay 

expressed his grave concern. He labeled what Rusk and McNamara had proposed and what the President had approved as inadequate. The greater U.S. 

assistance was still insufficient to defeat the Viet Cong. Southeast Asia was the 

best place for a showdown between the United States and the communists. This 

was not because of the local terrain or political situation. It was because “U.S. 

military intervention in Southeast Asia, including the use of nuclear weapons, 

could be followed by many layers of escalation before the ultimate confrontation 

would occur.” In contrast, the Secretaries of State and Defense had apparently 

tried to “obscure, play-down, or delay the determined and decisive action 

required to effectively combat” the communist threat.19 

LeMay urged the Joint Chiefs to suggest that President Kennedy deploy 

sizable American forces to Vietnam. He wanted them to “press for high-level 

accord” on a “clear statement of U.S. objectives in the area,” and to tell 

McNamara that “timely, positive military actions are He desired at 

least a definite contingency commitment to insert U.S. forces into Vietnam for 

open operations when required. What the Air Force chief thought were suitable 

forces for the commitment would be an Army brigade task force; a Marine 

division and its complementary air wing; plus a tactical fighter squadron, a 

tactical bomber squadron, and a tactical reconnaissance task These units 

would free the bulk of Diem’s forces to root out the guerrillas and to secure South 

Vietnam’s borders. They would also “bolster Diem’s political position and insure 

his regime and tenure in office.” LeMay envisaged no open engagement with the 

enemy but could not rule it out. “Enemy military actions,” he said, “would not 

alter the political objective, but such actions may compel military responses 

which would not necessarily be confined to South Vietnam.” But there was “no 

feasible military alternative of lesser magnitude” that would prevent the “loss of 

South Vietnam and ultimately of Southeast 

The Joint Chiefs referred LeMay’s proposal to the Joint Strategic Survey 

Council, a group of senior officers freed from day-to-day matters so they could 

take a detached view of broad military and political questions. Asked to examine 

the rationale for deploying U.S. troops to South Vietnam, they replied on 

December 7. “The recently authorized measures, even when implemented,” they 

said, “will prove to be inadequate.” The council called attention to “the deteriorating military situation and the tenuous character of the South Vietnam 

government,”which made it “imperative that the United States government take 

the initiative.” To “reassure President Diem that the United States will support 

his government and will discourage and oppose any internal factions which seek 

to overthrow him,” U.S. combat forces and those of its Asian allies should go to 

90 
THE TAYLOR MISSION 

South Vietnam strong enough “to assure the South Vietnamese of our determination to support their government and to defeat communist 

should be “a military command and modus operandi in South Vietnam which 

will assure loyalty and maximum combat effectiveness in the campaign against 

the 

Secretary was not convinced. As he afterwards told the President, I am not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had 

more experience with our present program in South Vietnam.” Kennedy 

General clearly doubted if the administration actually had a firm 

and definite Vietnam policy. In his opinion, he later observed, none of the 

American military chiefs “really believed”that the United States was undertaking 

“anything except [having] some diplomatic fiddling around with a little more aid 

program 

Part of this feeling might have flowed from frustration over major 

constraints hindering the Air Force’s influence in SEA-too few and too junior 

USAF officers in the restricted voice in Vietnamese affairs, 

the inability of the indigenous air forces to cope with the insurgency, and 

“inadequate ground environment for employment of USAF air power on a large 

scale.” Moreover, Secretary kept a tight rein on the military services. 

In mid-November, for example, the movement of three liaison 

aircraft to Vietnam required his permission. Little wonder that USAF leadership 

felt cramped and 

Maybe it was no coincidence that on December 5-the day General 

voiced his concern to the Felt dispatched a warning to the Joint 

Chiefs. He reported that General chief in Saigon, and Sir 

Robert Thompson,* head of a British advisory mission to Saigon, were 

both uneasy because the situation in South Vietnam was “more than serious. It is 

critical, with the peak of the crisis possible at any 

Robert had figured prominently in subduing the guerrillas in Malaysia. 

Arrangements. 

Acceptance of the Taylor-Rostow recommendations of November 3, 1961, 

marked a shift in American policy “from advice to limited partnership and 

working collaboration” with the Vietnamese. More material assistance would 

accompany increased American participation in the war. American advisors, “as 

friends and partners,” were to show the Vietnamese “how the job might be 

done-not tell them or do it for them.”’ 

By November 13, using such expressions as “proceed urgently” and “with all 

possible speed,” Defense Secretary McNamara had authorized a host of measures. Among them were increased airlift, including sixteen C-I23s, for the 

Vietnamese armed forces; help with aerial reconnaissance, photography, airground support, and installing a tactical air control system; small naval craft with 

advisors and crews to cut enemy waterborne infiltration and resupply; training 

and equipment for the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps to free Vietnamese 

army units for offensive operations; personnel and equipment to enhance 

military-political intelligence at all levels; more economic support to afford better 

military pay, food, and medicine; relief and rehabilitation in the flooded areas; 

“individual administrators and advisors for insertion into the governmental 

machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the 

two governments”; and surveys in all provinces to discover how best to deal with 

the insurgency.* 

Assuming that Diem would formally agree later, the Defense secretary 

instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed. McNamara personally monitored 

the aid program, requiring a progress report every Monday. He wanted men and 

materiel for a tactical air control system to go to Vietnam as soon as possible. He 

wanted thirty T-28s rushed out to give the Vietnamese a second fighter squadron. 

And he wanted more U.S. advisors in place. By June 30, 1962, there would be 

6,419 Americans in South Vietnam.’ 

As McNamara informed Admiral Felt and General McGarr: 

Political uncertainty of Diem’s position and doubt as to his willingness to take steps to 

make his government more effective must not prevent us from going ahead full blast 

(without publicity, until political discussions are completed) on all possible actions 

short of large scale introduction of US combat forces . . . . Fundamentally, we must 

adjust ourselves to a perennially unclear political framework and to a policy that for 

overall national reasons sets limits on military 

Early in December, President Diem made an affirmative but hedged 

response to the Kennedy program. His memorandum distinguished between 

domestic and military matters and clearly defined the latter. For example, 

93 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

American helicopter and naval units were to be under exclusive U.S. command. 

Diem’s government would take no decisions or actions entailing combined 

operations “without full prior consultation with the qualified U.S. agencies.” 

Although doubting that Diem’s reply would be fully acceptable, Ambassador 

Nolting radioed the State Department, “I nevertheless think memorandum 

represents U.S. moving confidently 

The new Kennedy program dictated that the MAAG in Saigon be reorganized and augmented. Then it could better help subdue the subversion and 

insurgency, and as ‘‘an advanced party” command forces sent to Vietnam to 

oppose aggression in SEATO terms. In the latter case, Task Force 116 was the 

ready force. Admiral Felt had said in May 1961 that, if large-scale U.S. combat 

forces entered Vietnam, he would name the MAAG chief as the Commander, 

United States Forces, Vietnam. This commander would function under 

CINCPAC control. 

Now there was talk of appointing a four-star general to command U.S. 

forces in Vietnam. As early as November I, the State Department was skeptical 

about the necessity. Secretary Rusk said, “While attaching greatest possible 

importance to security in Southeast Asia, I would be reluctant to see” the United 

States further commit “American prestige to a losing horse.” Ambassador John 

K. Galbraith in India pointed to Diem as “a wasting asset” who was “losing, not 

gaining, popularity.”The United States, he thought, should refrain from putting 

American ground troops into Vietnam and from 

On November 22 the Joint Chiefs recommended to the Secretary of Defense 

a new subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. It would be designated 

as United States Forces, Vietnam, and organized in Saigon with Army, Navy, 

and Air Force component commands. The commander in Vietnam was to have 

four stars and be coequal with the Ambassador. He would draw together all 

American military activities in the country related to counterinsurgency, including intelligence, MAAG, and whatever economic assistance had military implications. A four-star commander would signal a considerable commitment of 

American prestige and a major endorsement of Diem’s government. Consequently the Joint Chiefs wished, before altering the command structure, to have 

the United States clearly spell out its objectives in Vietnam and extract a pledge 

for a suitable military program from Diem. McNamara approved on 

November 

The proposed command ran counter to CINCPAC contingency planning 

fora possible deployment of JTF I 16. Admiral Felt nonetheless admitted that it 

was justified in light of an enlarged MAAG, PACAF units deployed into 

Vietnam, and the arrival of Army helicopter companies. Drawing up a detailed 

table of distribution, Felt suggested an Army general as the commander and a 

small joint staff with USAF officers as chief of staff, J-2 (Intelligence), and J-5 

(Plans). The new command, the CINCPAC thought, might well give Diem the 

assurance of American support that he appeared to need before carrying out his 

own 

94 
2d ADVON AND MACV 

United States Army, Pacific (in Hawaii) favored a separate theater of 

operations for Vietnam removed from CINCPAC control, but acquiesced in 

“double hatting” the MAAG chief as commander of U.S. forces. On that basis, 

General McGarr took operational control of Farm Gate. Admiral Felt accepted 

this for Farm Gate’s training mission, but PACAF pointed out that the detachment had a second mission of combat operations. By law MAAGs could not 

command operational forces. Foreseeing widespread air activities in Vietnam 

and other parts of Southeast Asia, PACAF wanted to establish an advanced 

echelon of Thirteenth Air Force in Saigon to command USAF units in 

Admiral Felt agreed. The MAAG chief, working with his Air Force Section 

chief, would handle Farm Gate’s training missions, while CINCPAC through 

PACAF and an advanced echelon of Thirteenth Air Force, would take care of 

any combat operations. The MAAG Air Force Section chief and the commander 

of the advanced echelon could be the same officer. Assigned to MAAG, he would 

have dual responsibilities to MAAG and to PACAF. Above all, there was to be 

no appearance of a new American command moving into 

To fill the two hats, General O’Donnell of PACAF nominated Brig. Gen. 

Rollen H. Anthis, an outstanding officer serving as Thirteenth Air Force vice 

commander. Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, approved the choice. General Anthis 

assumed command of 2d Advanced Echelon and, needing personnel for the organization, took control of the four small temporary duty detachments (7,8,9, and 10.) Detachment 7 at Saigon became in effect the 2d ADVON 

On November 20 Anthis settled 2d ADVON at the Brink Hotel in downtown Saigon, sharing space with the MAAG Air Force Section. The new 

commander realized after a few days that he was too far from his operating units.’ 

Whereupon, he moved 2d ADVON to Tan Son Nhut and into a building near 

Vietnamese Air Force headquarters. His Vietnamese neighbors were puzzled by 

Anthis’ presence. 

When Ambassador Nolting first found out about 2d ADVON on the 24th, 

he was not only puzzled but surprised. General Anthis told him that 2d ADVON 

controlled USAF operating units in Vietnam but not the training units. Nolting 

found it “incomprehensible” for American authorities to form a new U.S. 

military headquarters without consulting him and the Vietnamese government. 

The Ambassador instructed the 2d ADVON commander to delay further organizational activities until Nolting received clarification of the relationship of the 

headquarters to the Embassy. He solicited from Anthis “a precise understanding 

that any combat operation in Viet Nam carried out by elements of this command 

will be cleared in advance with me [Nolting].” 

Apprised of the Ambassador’s reaction, Admiral Felt advised Anthis to 

avoid creating a new headquarters. He was to locate in General McGarr’s 

M AAG headquarters and “conduct his advance echelon business through 

Detrachment] 7 in Saigon.” After fresh study, Felt termed 2d ADVON neither a 

command nor a headquarters. Since its purpose was to administer, control, and 

support units, it was simply a “facility” for coordination. Nolting might have 

95 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

thought this a distinction without a difference, but he learned that the Diem 

government had no objection. He accepted as needed to administer 

and control elements that might be deployed to Southeast Asia in 

coordination with 

Thirteenth Air Force specified that execute with the Vietnamese Air Force “sustained offensive, defense, and reconnaissance air operations aimed at the destruction or neutralization of forces, resources, 

and communications within the borders of South Anthis was 

to “set the pattern for Vietnamese Air Force In short, he was to act 

as the commander of a tactical air force. 

But the peculiarly ad hoc nature of the organization led to problems. For 

example, what control did unit commanders have over their logistic support‘? In 

the standard USAF command, such questions had been carefully worked out 

through the years, but for they needed to be rethought. Furthermore, General Anthis faced a somewhat more complex chain of command. He 

reported to CINCPAC through on operational matters, but he went 

direct to Thirteenth Air Force on strictly USAF operational, logistic, and 

administrative 

Colonel King, the Farm Gate commander, was also confused. When 

Detachment at tried to take operational control of his 

unit, King protested this as inconsistent with General instructions. He 

understood that Detachment was limited to furnishing base logistic support. 

King prevailed in this matter, but proved less successful in clarifying his own 

operational mission. He visited Saigon and was unable to see General Anthis. 

But the operations officer speculated that it was highly unlikely for 

Farm Gate even to be cleared for daylight combat. King’s officers then borrowed 

several aerial flares from the Vietnamese, pressed an into service for 

improvised flaredrops, and under the illumination made strike passes with their 

Colonel King went back to Saigon and reported that his unit could make 

night attacks. 

As King later recalled, dispatched a C-47 and some on at 

least two night attacks later in November. Against an enemy position the 

jungle south of the pilots never saw an exact target under the 

flarelight, and merely placed their ordnance into the trees. Flying to the aid of a 

fort in the delta under attack, the crews found the air strike request to be 

several days old. When they arrived on the scene, there were no targets. Another 

mission in late November responded to a report of intention to cut the 

railroad between and Bearing flares in addition to their 

guns, four reconnoitered the rail line. They illuminated and inspected 

possible ambush sites but saw no sign of the 

While the Departments of State and Defense discussed organizing the 

American command in Vietnam, was “over its head operations and 

intelligence planning to the neglect of its primary duty, the training and advisory 

Authorized a strength of persons in May at the end of 

the year had Military Assistance Program spaces and 
2d ADVON AND MACV 

A compromise worked out by Secretaries McNamara and Rusk in 

December envisioned a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) under 

CINCPAC, roughly modeled on the United States Taiwan Defense Command. 

To highlight the “positive impact of change” in American policy, McNamara 

desired the MACV commander to be a four-star Army general. He suggested Lt. 

Gen. Paul D. Harkins to the President as “an imaginative officer, fully qualified 

to fill what I consider to be the most difficult job in the U.S. 

Commander of United States Army, Pacific, and a protege of Generals 

George S. Patton, Jr., and Maxwell D. Taylor, Harkins was summoned to 

Florida in January 1962. There in a brief interview, President Kennedy said he 

was pleased that the general spoke French, told him to assist Diem and the South 

Vietnamese people, and wished him well. 

With Diem’s blessing, CINCPAC created the new command in Saigon on 

February 8,1962. Harkins became commander with a promotion to full general. 

On the 10th PACAF designated General Anthis, 2d ADVON commander, to be 

the air component commander and to further serve as Thirteenth Air Force and 

PACAF air commander for all USAF matters in Southeast 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended status for General Harkins 

“Co-equal” with Ambassador Nolting, but the term was absent from the MACV 

mission statement. Harkins nonetheless owned broader than normal authority. 

He was to assist and support the Government of Vietnam in its quest for security 

through defeating communist insurgency and resisting overt aggression. He was 

charged with all American military policy, operations, and aid in South Vietnam. 

On U.S. and Vietnamese military operations, he could go straight to President 

Diem and other governmental leaders. He had direct access to CINCPAC and 

through him to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. He was to consult with the 

Ambassador on political affairs and keep him abreast of military matters. As 

CINCPAC’s single spokesman in South Vietnam, Harkins exercised operational 

command of all U.S forces and military agencies assigned or attached to MACV, 

including the Military Assistance Advisory 

For MACV’s joint staff, Admiral Felt had recommended USAF officers as 

chief of staff, J-2 (Intelligence), and J-5 (Plans). Even so, General Harkins picked 

a Marine officer, Maj. Gen. Richard G. Weede, to be his chief of staff and 

advocated Air Force officers for J-3 (Operations), J-2, and J-5. Secretary 

McNamara wanted the Army to have the J-3 billet, but Felt believed this would 

unbalance the staff. He proposed upgrading J-5 to a brigadier general slot and 

allocating it to the Air Force, while the deputy J-3 would be a USAF colonel. 

General LeMay tried in vain to persuade McNamara to change his mind on the 

chief of staff and J-3 positions. The MACV manning authority was approved by 

the Defense Secretary on March 2. It gave the Air Force none of the key 

operational spots and only one of the five general officer billets-J-5, filled by 

Brig. Gen. John A. Dunning. Of the 105 officer spaces, the Army got 54 

compared to 29 for the Navy and Marines and 22 for the Air 

General Harkins shifted MAAG’s operations and intelligence functions to 

MACV. He appointed Maj. Gen. Charles J. Timmes, USA, to be MAAG chief 

91 
THE ADVlSORY YEARS 

(Timmes had been McGarr’s deputy). The MAAG was split into Army, Navy, 

and Air Force Sections. Each handled military assistance, plans and programs, 

training and logistic advice to the Vietnamese, and administration of American 

field advisory 

Yet the separation of functions between MACV and MAAG remained 

fuzzy. General Harkins opposed Anthis’ serving as both the MACV air component commander and chief of the MAAG Air Force Section. He suggested and 

Admiral Felt directed on May 12, 1962, that General Anthis be relieved as 

MAAG chief of Air Force Section and replaced by the USAF colonel who was 

the deputy. 

General LeMay saw the change as a complication, for the USAF liaison 

officers with Vietnamese army divisions, who should have been under Anthis’ 

command, were instead assigned to the MAAG. LeMay also protested the 

proposed reduction in rank of the MAAG chief of Air Force Section. General 

Anthis held his two jobs a while longer. 

Felt and Harkins agreed in October to accept Brig. Gen. Robert R. 

Rowland as MAAG chief of Air Force Section. On December 1, 1962, Rowland 

relieved Anthis of his MAAG duty. Although Anthis and Rowland worked well 

together, some MAAG-Air officers wondered how far they might go in advising 

and training before entering into operational 

Believing that he was “responsible for all that U.S. military do or fail to do in 

South Vietnam,” General Harkins argued for full operational command over all 

American military resources in the country, to include projected covert operations. Admiral Felt thought otherwise. On April 20, 1962, he placed under 

MACV operational command those units having the primary mission of advising and assisting the training of Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces. 

Other units were to remain under CINCPAC component commanders. General 

Anthis deemed this interpretation important because the Air Force was meagerly 

represented on the MACV 

The United States Army, Pacific-unlike the Air Force-elected to give 

MACV operational command over the Army helicopter companies in Vietnam. 

Created as the MACV component Army command, the United States Army 

Support Group, Vietnam, furnished administrative and logistic support to Army 

units in the country. General Harkins exercised direct operational command 

over U.S. Army helicopter companies through the MAAG senior Army advisor 

at each Vietnamese corps headquarters. 

This arrangement appeared contrary to the principle restraining a unified 

commander from personally commanding a component force. Moreover, the 

MACV joint staff had to handle peculiarly Army matters that might have been 

more properly the work of an Army component command staff. The extra 

workload was often cited as a compelling reason for so many Army personnel on 

the MACV 

Since MACV’s birth on February 8, 1962, had been publicized, Lt. Gen. 

Thomas S. Moorman, vice commander in chief of PACAF, saw no reason why 

2d ADVON should stay a paper organization. On February 20 General Moor98 
2d ADVON AND MACV 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAR 

U.S. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS 

VIETNAM JULY 1962 

CINCPAC 

CINCPACAF 

I 

CINCUSARPAC 

Brig. Gen. Rollen Anthis and Air Force Secretary 

Eugene Zuckert on tour in the Pacific. 

CINCPAC 

99 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

man asked Admiral Felt to accept a reorganization of to make it a 

standard division. This meaningful designation would clear up the Air 

Force organization in Southeast 

Timing of the proposal was inopportune. The International Control Commission was examining MACV to see if its presence in the country violated the 

Geneva agreements. Under Secretary of State George Ball urged the United 

States to go along with the commission and “play the game partly their way.” In 

response to questions from the press, President Kennedy insisted that no U.S. 

combat forces were in Vietnam. He did admit that training units were authorized 

to fire in self-protection if fired upon. Consequently, Felt and Harkins considered impolitic to reorganize into an air division at this time. Doing 

so could be misconstrued as the introduction of a large operational 

Visiting Vietnam in April General decided that something had 

to be done about and its nondescript detachments. On some bases 

there were as many as nine separate air detachments, and no one person or 

organization was in charge. The Chief of Staff called for an air division to replace 

and for an air base structure at each major operating location. Air 

Force headquarters prepared to replace with a regularly constituted 

unit to which other units and personnel could be legitimately 

Two events hastened acceptance of this action. When American forces were 

deployed to Thailand on May General Harkins was additionally designated 

commander of United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand. And on 

June the International Control Commission labeled North Vietnamese activities as aggression and the establishment of MACV as a 

Meanwhile the decision had been made to reveal the USAF role in Vietnam. 

Speaking in Angeles on April General announced that the Farm 

Gate air commandos had the code name of Jungle Jim and were instructing allied 

crews in all phases of air operations. “This is a realistic training program,” the 

Chief of Staff concluded. “Those people, the Vietnamese, are at war. Our 

instructors occasionally accompany them on combat missions. Our pilots are 

armed. They will protect themselves if fired 

The New Times remarked that the Air Force, besides stressing massive 

retaliation with nuclear weapons, was as much involved “in the guerrilla-warfare 

training” and in counterinsurgency as the other armed SERVICES. Radio Hanoi 

broadcast that U.S. officers served in combat while instructing Vietnamese, 

adding: “American pilots are often at the controls in air strikes.” Radio Peking 

depicted Farm Gate doings with considerable The reaction of the 

Farm Gate personnel-or air commandos, as they might now be styled-was 

that speech legitimized their EXISTENCE 

Under Secretary of State George Ball spoke in Detroit on May I, 

stressing that no American combat forces were in Vietnam and that the United 

States was neither fighting nor running the The press reported Farm 

Gate’s activities as follows: “None of these men are designated combat troopsper 

but some will be fighting, just as their counterparts are today. Sometimes 

an American instructor pilot has been at the controls in a strafing pass at jungle 
2d ADVON AND MACV 

targets or on a bomb Again: “Americans are also flying on bombing and 

strafing missions. . . . U.S. Air Force pilots fly B-26 bombers and T-28 fighterbombers in air strikes against the Viet Cong and in support of ground 

Still the Air Force was generally hidden behind the name Farm Gate, even 

though newspapers covered Army and Marine helicopter operations and the 

work of the Special Forces. If the air commandos and the USAF echelons above 

them were denied the recognition they wished, there was nevertheless a movement toward the conventional. On May 20 PACAF suggested and Air Force 

headquarters later approved redesignating the supporting detachments in South 

Vietnam. The 6220th, 6221st, 6222d, and 6223d Air Base Squadrons were 

formed respectively at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, and Nha Trang. All 

four units were assigned to 2d ADVON on June 7. Detachment 7 became 

Headquarters 2d Advanced Echelon, Thirteenth Air Force, and Detachment 10 

became Headquarters 60 10th Tactical Group. 

Converting 2d ADVON to an air division was eased on July 19, when 

Ambassador Nolting no longer opposed the redesignation if it could be done 

without publicity. With the discontinuance of Headquarters 2d ADVON on 

October 8, the 2d Air Division was organized at Tan Son Nhut under General 

Anthis and assigned to Thirteenth Air This regularization of USAF unit 

organization indicated a movement away from counterinsurgency concepts and 

toward the conventional. 

General Anthis served as the air component commander both in South 

Vietnam and Thailand, under General Harkins as commander of MACV and of 

Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Anthis was also responsible for U.S. 

air counterinsurgency in PACAF saw that 2d Air Division, a forward 

echelon of Thirteenth Air Force and an operating headquarters in a forward 

area, could not do air planning for Southeast Asia as a whole. Since Thirteenth 

Air Force and PACAF afforded administrative and logistic support for air 

activities and plans, the MACV staff (though composed chiefly of Army officers) 

became the air planning agency. Although Thirteenth Air Force sent temporary 

duty officers to augment 2d Air Division planning, the command arrangement 

was awkward and hindered air actions. 

Generals LeMay and O’Donnell wanted the MACV commander to have 

more and closer day-to-day associations with senior USAF officers. During his 

visit to Saigon in April 1962, LeMay had tried to persuade General Harkins to 

put more Air Force officers on the MACV staff. Harkins was unsympathetic but 

agreed to consider it if Anthis or Dunning could make a convincing case. 

Upon returning to Washington, the Chief of Staff was critical of the MACV 

commander, believing air activities to be “depreciated in South Vietnam rather 

than appreciated.” At a JCS meeting attended by Defense Secretary McNamara, 

General LeMay charged that air planning was often omitted from field operations, that General Anthis had difficulty seeing General Harkins, and that neither 

Harkins nor his chief of staff, General Weede, understood air operations. 

Asked to comment, Anthis said he had direct access to General Harkins and 

had never been reluctant to give his views. Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, confirmed 

101 
THE ADVISORY YEARS ! 

Anthis’ ability to speak with the MACV commander at any time. He further 

certified that Harkins and Weede were superior officers and fully experienced in 

air-ground tactics. Harkins was angered by what he described as General 

LeMay’s “preferring charges” against him in Washington. He explained that the 

Air Force chief seemed to be thinking of command and control of large numbers 

of aircraft as in World War II, whereas there were essentially limited tactical 

opportunities for relatively few USAF aircraft in 

Throughout 1962 the MACV staff deficiencies were clear to Air Force 

officers who sought to unite air and ground power in utmost cooperation against 

the insurgency. But the defects were scarcely understood by those who believed 

that counterinsurgency was chiefly an Army mission and that USAF contributions could be but secondary. Secretary McNamara for one argued that the 

Army must be in the driver’s seat. “If you have two or three men engaged in an 

operation.” he explained, “one has to be primary. The Army has to be primary in 

land war. The Air Force is there to serve the Army in the airlift role and the close 

support role, and the Air Force must tailor its activities to the 

As CINCPAC divorced PACAF from operational considerations and 

confined its authority to logistic support of 2d ADVON and, of late, to the 2d Air 

Division, General Anthis found it hard to secure a prompt hearing at MACV for 

his proposals. He discovered that several of his written communications were 

slow to reach General Harkins. The MACV commander’s duties often took him 

from Saigon, and his staff carried on much of the business of command. Harkins 

followed Army practice in using his J-3 (Operations) for daily operational 

planning. Hence his J-5 (Plans), General Dunning, was frequently outside the 

routine MACV activity, especially since the J-5 division was situated in another 

part of Saigon away from the major MACV staff 

I02 
The Viet Cong thought in November 196 I that victory was virtually in their 

grasp. Completing the first phase of insurgency, they had surrounded Saigon and 

other urban centers and blocked many highways. For the second phase, they set 

up subversive apparatus and were mounting overt attacks by guerrillas, many of 

whom had been trained in the north. During each of the first four months of 

1962, an estimated 1,000 communists entered South Vietnam. Soviet aircraft 

stood ready to support two North Vietnamese regiments, poised in the Laotian 

panhandle for a possible thrust across the border. Either the North Vietnamese 

meant to move through the central highlands to cut South Vietnam in half, or 

they were forging an infantry division for attacks on Saigon. Both seemed likely 

alternatives. 

To hide its control over the insurgency, Hanoi in late 1961 renamed the 

southern branch of the Lao Dong Party the “People’s Revolutionary Party.”On 

December 7 the Provincial Committee of the Lao Dong Party in South Vietnam’s Ba Xuyen Province declared: 

The People’s Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam. unified from 

North to South, under the direction of the Central Executive Committee of the Party, 

the Chief of which is President Ho. 

Securing a copy of this statement, President Diem sent it to President Kennedy 

with the comment, “Here at last is a public admission of what has always been 

clear-the Viet Cong campaign against my people is led by communists.”2 

There was nothing new in this-the point was, how to combat it? The 

actions of President Diem’s government in November and December 1961 did 

nothing to reassure American observers. The apparent response to American 

demands for reforms appeared in a series of newspaper articles. Presumably 

prepared in the presidential palace, these pieces denounced the United States for 

imperialism. Still fearing a coup, Diem resisted forming an unbroken military 

command chain and giving confidence and authority to the chief of the Field 

Command. Diem was not alone in feeling that the United States was pushing too 

hard. At times several Vietnamese officers referred to counterinsurgency measures as the “American plan.” They were far from convinced that U.S. ideas and 

methods would work in their country. In consequence Diem continued to 

approve every U.S. military advisor, explaining that he “didn’t want to give the 

monopoly on nationalism to Ho Chi Minh.”3 

Having commenced resettlement projects, President Diem was drawn to the 

ideas of Sir Robert G. K. Thompson (former secretary of defense of the Federa103 
I 

THE ADVISORY YEARS 

tion of Malaya). Sir Robert arrived in Saigon during September 1961 as head of 

a British advisory mission. He suggested a program of strategic and defended 

hamlets to clear communists from the Mekong Delta. That same month, Diem 

started the Strategic Hamlet Program under the sponsorship of his brother, Ngo 

Dinh Nhu. It would take more than military activity to subdue the guerrillas, 

Diemjudged, and permanent victory rested on restoring the faith of the people in 

the government. Resettlement, he felt, would 

In contrast, American officials pinned their hopes on a centralized nationwide counterinsurgency strategy to secure Saigon, other major centers, and lines 

of communications. It would also keep the Viet Cong off-balance with searchand-destroy operations to clear, seize, and hold what were becoming sizable Viet 

Cong base areas known as zones. The strategy further sought to seal off the 

border against 

In January and February 1962, Diem gradually conceded the need for a 

national concept of action, and he seemed to tilt toward a master plan by 

approving a series of separate projects in various places. The Vietnamese president desired that his and Farm Gate’s aircraft attack Viet Cong supply routes. He 

appeared willing to authorize saturation air attacks against communist zones 

without exact targeting. Because his troops could not enter these areas, he 

deemed them solidly hostile. 

In comparison, Generals O’Donnell and McGarr believed indiscriminate 

bombing might well disturb pacification efforts. Sir Robert Thompson also 

thought that innocent casualties would alienate potentially friendly people. At 

least two influential men in the State Department, W. Averell Harriman and 

Roger Hilsman, shared Thompson’s 

American officials devised strategic guidelines for a massive counterinsurgency operation. Due to internal political reasons, Diem refused to accept an 

overall Vietnamese military commander. He opted for each corps tactical zone 

commander’s having a “forward command post.” More to Diem’s liking was his 

decree of February 3 that designated an Inter-Ministry Committee for Strategic 

Hamlets to draw up a national plan. Besides the 784 defended hamlets completed 

and the 453 being built, he planned 6,066 more in 1962. 

Failing to convince the Vietnamese to accept all-out military counterinsurgency, Defense Secretary McNamara acceded to a concept of smaller clear-andhold operations. CINCPAC wished them to begin in Binh Duong Province 

where large communist groups threatened Saigon and Bien Hoa. But Thompson 

pointed out that a cleared Binh Duong would be hard to hold without pouring in 

thousands of troops. Diem okayed the Binh Duong mission, which got under 

way in March as the publicized beginning of the countrywide Strategic Hamlet 

Program. As he told Thompson, “It makes the Americans happy, and it does not 

worry either me or the Viet Cong.” Decentralized clear-and-hold operations and 

the Strategic Hamlet Program comprised the major ventures against the Viet 

Having repeatedly ordered the U.S. military services to come up with special 

measures for the insurgency, President Kennedy remained dissatisI04 
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND 

with results. Urged by the Joint Chiefs and CIA to create a single authority 

Washington to fuse all efforts, he formed on January the Special Group 

(Counterinsurgency) chaired by General The group worked on the 

premise that subversive insurgency was a valid form of politico-military conflict, 

equal in status to conventional warfare. That perception was to be properly 

reflected in the organization and doctrine of all American programs. The group 

was to judge how well U.S. resources and actions dealt with subversion in South 

Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. To coordinate with the group, the joint staff of the 

gained a new office-the Special Assistant to the Director for Counterinsurgency and Special ACTIVITIES 

in autumn I96 I over American advisors engaging in combat now 

vanished. The special group pinpointed the particular character of counterinsurgency. Subtly but perhaps not always clearly, the group pushed for less American 

and more Vietnamese involvement in the war. This point of view clashed with 

President Kennedy’s intent to have U.S. armed services use Vietnam as a 

laboratory for studying and testing counterinsurgency techniques and equipment. The President encouraged civil and military agencies to send senior 

officials on temporary duty to Vietnam for orientation and .learning. 

By November the Joint Chiefs of Staff mirrored the new outlook. The 

“scale of United States involvement and the level of said, “should be 

limited” and merely supplement that of indigenous forces. Where guerrilla 

warfare flared, American military men were to give “operational assistance” to 

show U.S. resolve. They were to extend material aid and planning guidance, and 

to furnish intelligence, operational, and communications facilities that could be 

further expanded should the United States enter the war. American representatives were to “bring the combat conditions under control and reestablish 

stability” by using Vietnamese forces in “well coordinated, integrated, and 

adequately supported operations.” Yet the United States might have to act 

“outside the host country” to deny safe havens to insurgents spilling across 

country borders. Somewhat contrary to the prevailing emphasis on training 

Vietnamese armed forces, the U.S. military services were expressly directed to 

refine their own doctrine, tactics, procedures, organization, and 

A wide assortment of schemes was tried amid a lingering uncertainty about 

the thrust of American policy and strategy. Nevertheless, President Kennedy’s 

and Secretary program of expanded American assistance sparked 

some noteworthy achievements. 

For the United States Air Force in Vietnam, “the most pressing requirement” was a strong countrywide tactical air control system. The system would 

enable “effective and responsive Vietnamese Air Force tactical air operations,” 

and squeeze the most from scarce Vietnamese and American air power. If 

President Diem saw how well central control worked, he might scrap the divided 

control of military and provincial chiefs. Since the Vietnamese could not run a 

control system, it would be “US manned and 

A tactical air control system had proved its worth in World War II and the 

Korean War both for air defense and close support. An air operations center 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

afforded centralized planning, direction, and control of air operations in a 

combat theater. Supporting it was a reporting center for radar and other warning 

services. In each major ground command area were subordinate air support 

operations centers and warning posts. 

PACAF and Thirteenth Air Force planned such a system for Vietnam in 

December 1961. Tied in with a combat operations center manned by U.S. and 

Vietnamese personnel for the Joint General Staff, an air operations center for 

overall control at Tan Son Nhut would also support the III Corps Tactical Zone 

headquarters. Two subordinate air support operations centers at Da and Nang 

Pleiku would serve the I and II Corps headquarters. Secretary McNamara 

rejected the idea of phasing in this system. He directed General O’Donnell to set it 

up at once from PACAF assets. 

Transports from the 3 15th Air Division airlifted men and equipment into 

South Vietnam from January 2 to 14, 1962. The USAF 5th Tactical Control 

Group worked at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang, while Vietnamese operated at 

Pleiku. The Air Force ran a communications center at Tan Son Nhut, and sent 

high-frequency radio teletype circuits to Da Nang, Bien Hoa, Pleiku, and Nha 

Trang. 12 

The initial system began operating on January 13, 1962. To avoid innocent 

targets, air strikes needed President Diem’s prior personal approval. General 

Anthis briefed Diem and stressed how the system’s instant information on enemy 

and friendly air activities led to quick response. Persuaded, he permitted the joint 

operations center to authorize air strikes. 

This austere system brimmed with problems. Corps commanders reserved 

specific strike and transport aircraft for their own purposes, thereby taking them 

out of central control. Additional duties of officers at the center consumed part of 

their time. Vietnamese personnel were accustomed to afternoon siestas precisely 

during the hours when plans were readied and warning orders issued for the next 

day. Several Americans had no background for their jobs. Many grew impatient 

because work took longer when Vietnamese were involved. Quite a few of them 

were highly competent, but the air operations center was certainly not a Vietnamese “directed and operated facility” as eventually intended. It was rather “a 

USAF facility with some Vietnamese Air Force participation.” Still the workers 

at Da Nang and Pleiku skipped siestas and performed well, due to insistence by 

their USAF counterparts that the Vietnamese themselves plan and monitor 

A number of junior Vietnamese officers acted as forward air controllers and 

as air liaison officers with the ground forces. They were as hesitant to control 

strikes or to give advice as the ground commanders were to accept their services. 

Lacking authority and seemingly uninformed, these young officers appeared 

merely to transmit requests for information to their headquarters over communications nets not always secure. 

Five USAF forward air controllers came to the country on February 15, 

1962. They were pilots who were highly qualified to direct strike aircraft to 

targets by talking with them from observation planes in the area. The initial Air 

I06 
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND 

Force liaison officers to advise and assist Vietnamese ground commanders got to 

Vietnam in April. 

At first the USAF controllers were attached to Vietnamese ground forces 

likely to’clash with the enemy. President Diem wished only rated Vietnamese 

observers to control strikes, so the Americans worked mainly as assistant air 

liaison officers. They also flew the L-19 for the Vietnamese observer-forward air 

controller and would help him. And they served as duty officers in the air 

operations 

Crippling the tactical air control system were the limited and failure-prone 

communications between the centers and the airfields. Through the early breakin period, numerous communications equipment failures took place. PACAF 

had obtained newly developed AN/ TSC- 15 high-frequency single-sideband 

radios for long-distance voice and teletype channels. The sets reached Clark on 

December 30, 1961, for field installation by the 1st Mobile Communications 

Group. Problems arose at once. Operators in the small mobile vans sweltered as 

temperatures often soared to 130 degrees Fahrenheit. Atmospheric conditions 

caused poor transmission and extensive use jammed the bands. 

Mr. McNamara in January 1962 approved a JCS request for a civilian 

contractor to install an M RC-85 tropospheric scatter communications system. 

Page Communications Engineers, Inc., set about supplying many main link 

channels that joined Saigon, Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Da Nang. One channel 

linked Pleiku with Ubon, Thailand. Not until Page wound up its work in 

September I962 were there rapid, positive, and dependable communications for 

central control over air 

The air control system in being sufficed for a few forces, but an entirely 

integrated countrywide structure would enhance air power and train Vietnamese. It would in addition be a framework, under American command and 

control, for directing Farm Gate and USAF operational units later deployed to 

Vietnam. 

Yet General McGarr, the MAAG chief, undermined the concept of a 

centralized tactical air control system by his handling of the two Army H-21 

helicopter transport companies deployed to Vietnam in November 1961 He 

assigned them to senior Army advisors of corps, then urged the Joint General 

Staff to reorganize the three Vietnamese L-19 liaison squadrons and the one 

H-34 helicopter squadron into four composite groups. He wanted three of the 

groups located at the three corps field headquarters and the fourth held in general 

support. That would give each Vietnamese army corps the helicopters and planes 

to conduct reconnaissance, move platoon- or company-size combat patrols, 

transport critical supplies, evacuate casualties, and perform staff and command 

liaison. When McGarr asked for Army CV-2 Caribou light transports, L-20 and 

L-I8 liaison aircraft, and UH-1 (formerly HU-1) Iroquois helicopters for better 

support of the MAAG Army field advisors, he planned to place this air fleet 

under local rather than central 

Some Vietnamese questioned this parceling out of pilots and technicians of 

the Vietnamese Air Force, for it seemed to point to an “army air force.”The main 

107 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

hope for expanding tactical fighter strength lay in upgrading and C-47 

pilots. This would be impossible if the liaison squadrons passed to army control. 

Beyond that, maintenance and repair facilities at the corps headquarters for 

helicopters and liaison craft were 

Impetus for centralized airlift control came from the arrival in January 

of Mule Train, a temporary duty detachment designed to give logistic support to 

Vietnamese and American forces. Mule Train drew its aircraft and personnel 

from Tactical Air Command’s 346th Troop Carrier Squadron (Assault) at Pope 

Air Force Base, North Carolina. Sixteen C-I23 Providers arrived overseas in 

January, the first four touching down at Tan Son Nhut on the Mule Train 

had officers and airmen and was complete with its own maintenance, air base 

personnel, medical detachment, and loadmasters. The commander was Lt. Col. 

Floyd 

In March permanent duty personnel from the 776th Troop Carrier Squadron started to replace the original Mule Train. The transfer was finished in June. 

Of the sixteen Mule Train C-I four were at Clark in the Philippines, ten 

at Tan Son Nhut, and two at Operational control rested with 

CINCPAC through Thirteenth Air Force, and A joint 

aircraft allocation board in the (Logistics) represented interested 

agencies and commands, set movement priorities, and designated space requirements. The airlift branch of the joint operations center, part of the tactical air 

control system, directed flights. Specialists on temporary duty from 

15th Air Division (Combat Cargo) joined Vietnamese Air Force officers in the 

airlift branch to control Mule Train. And they often helped the Vietnamese work 

the Transport 

In the initial seven weeks, Mule Train flew more than sorties of 

flying hours, moved tons of cargo and over passengers, and kept an 

operational readiness rate of eighty-five percent. Every C-I was scheduled for 

flying hours monthly, leaving time for training, testing, and flight to Clark for 

maintenance. The number of sorties rose steadily, from in January to in 

In February alone, Mule Train conveyed passengers and tons of 

cargo, dropped tons of resupply to outposts, and transported troops 

for airborne training. Frequently employed in long hauls with light loads, the 

C-123s operated at about ninety percent of capacity. They were supposed to 

support tactical operations, but made mostly routine cargo and passenger flights 

through The airlift system was not very 

Management of the Vietnamese C-47s was worse. The airlift branch could 

not consistently obtain firm priorities, and sudden shifts in daily orders stirred 

confusion at the operating and air terminal levels. Many times USAF personnel 

scheduling C-I 23s accepted Vietnamese requests based on sketchy mission 

reports. While crew shortages prevented peak operations, the Transportation Group devoted about twenty-five percent of its effort to transporting very 

important persons 
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN. AND RANCH HAND 

(Upper left) prisoners unload 

rice from a C-I23 at during a 

Mule Train resupply mission. 

(Above) Supplies pushed from a C-I23 for 

an outpost at Binh Hung. 

(Left) C-123s at 

(Below) Aerial view of a government 

outpost. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Upgrading Vietnamese C-47 pilots to fill T-28 cockpits stripped the transport group, and Secretary McNamara authorized thirty USAF pilots to augment 

the unit. The pilots reached Tan Son Nhut in March and April. At once their 

relations with the Vietnamese pilots become prickly. Tension built until August 

when the commander, Lt. Col. Nguyen Cao Ky, assembled them all and asked 

that they work together. The meeting cleared the air, cemented close cordial 

relations, and boosted the sortie 

To meet Army needs, the Air Force had developed the C-I 23 as an assault 

transport capable of carrying eight tons. In the late 1950s, however, the Army 

procured the CV-2 Caribou transport featuring a 21⁄2-ton capacity and good 

short-takeoff-and-landing characteristics. By March I962 Army leaders were 

pressuring Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, to approve a Caribou company for Vietnam. Late that month, General Harkins put in for a Caribou company and one 

squadron of C-123s. He intended that the Caribous concentrate on delivering 

supplies (chiefly food) to American advisors and isolated troops at remote spots. 

Of the I82 airfields in Vietnam, Harkins pointed out that 162 could accommodate CV-2s while only I 15 could handle C-123s. To avoid additional overcrowding at Tan Son Nhut, he planned to base the Caribous at the unoccupied airfield 

of Vung 

To check General Harkins’ evaluation of airfields, the 2d ADVON surveyed 

operating conditions. Aerial photographs disclosed fewer fields than listed, for 

some had been duplicated under French and Vietnamese names. Many small 

ones were unfit for either C-123s or CV-2s due to low load-bearing capacity, 

vegetation, or danger from the Viet Cong. At first 83 airfields seemed possible for 

C-123s, but another survey showed that 145 of the current I53 fields were suitable 

in dry 

Admiral Felt was out of sympathy with General Harkins’ desire for extra 

airlift. The Army’s 18th Fixed Wing Aviation Company at Da Nang already 

owned sixteen U- I Otters for corps support. A light utility plane, the Otter could 

haul one ton of small bulk cargo or seven to eight passengers. Additional aircraft, 

Felt believed, would overload the few facilities in South Vietnam. He favored 

better use of the C-123s and C-47s on 

Like Felt, General LeMay and his party visiting Vietnam in April 1962 

thought more transports, whether C-1 23s or CV-2s to be unnecessary. To attain 

better airlift, they suggested assigning an experienced officer to establish tighter 

control. Col. George M. Foster, formerly PACAF director of transportation, 

reported to General Anthis for duty on May I. Later in the month, Tactical Air 

Force Transport Squadron Provisional-I was formed at Tan Son Nhut to bring 

the management of Mule Train and other C-I 23s under a single 

General Harkins was still bent on securing CV-2 Caribous. He suggested 

using C-1 23 Providers to handle the main-line, long-haul airlift to thirty-nine 

airheads. At the same time, Caribous would take care of short-haul, feeder air 

transport to fifty-four locations. (The CV-2 could manage items too bulky and 

heavy for the U-1 Otters and UH-1 helicopters.) Once more the MACV commander requested an additional C-123 squadron and an Army CV-2 company. 

1 10 
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND 

Five of the C-I 23s were earmarked for Mule Train, five for airstrip alert, two for 

training, and four for maintenance and reserve. Two of the CV-2s were tagged 

for each corps to directly support advisors, four for the air transport system, two 

for MACV staff support, and four for maintenance and 

Admiral Felt acceded but told General Harkins that daily air supply to 

fifty-four points through thirty-nine airheads meant “many of your customers 

are eating too high on the hog.” The Army’s 1st Aviation Company of CV-2 

Caribous went to Thailand with Joint Task Force 116, mainly for testing under 

field conditions. From Thailand the Army sent six CV-2s to Vietnam for 

dispersal in pairs to the corps advisors. American activities in Thailand tapered 

off during December, and General Harkins reassembled the whole Caribou 

company in Vietnam. He gave as his reasons the increased need for airlift and the 

desire for further field 

When the JCS ordered Tactical Air Command to deploy a second C-123 

unit to Vietnam, the 777th Troop Carrier Squadron at Pope furnished sixteen 

aircraft. These C-I 23s staged through Clark, four of them flying on to Thailand. 

The other twelve arrived at Da Nang on June 15, 1962, going under the Tactical 

Air Force Transport Squadron 

General Moorman, PACAF vice commander in chief, had proposed that 

the 3 15th Air Division (Combat Cargo) form a lower headquarters in Vietnam to 

control the C-I 23s. General Milton, Thirteenth Air Force commander, protested 

the proposal. He said it would add another air headquarters in Vietnam independent of 2d ADVON, thereby tangling relations with MACV. Moorman next 

asked Milton to set up a combat cargo group in Vietnam under the operational 

control of General Anthis, the MACV air component commander. In addition 

to the airlift units assigned or attached to 2d ADVON, Anthis would control all 

USAF air terminal facilities in Southeast Asia. Moorman thought a Southeast 

Asia Airlift System complete with a combat cargo group to be “the damnedest 

exercise in overstaffing a proposal that I have ever heard of.” Milton accepted the 

idea because it achieved professional supervision “without creating another little 

General Moorman asked Admiral Felt to approve the plan for centralized 

control of regional airlift, and he requested General Harkins to establish an airlift 

allocations board. The board would require fifty more people in Thailand and 

Vietnam along with small movement control sections at Tan Son Nhut and Da 

Nang and in Thailand. Moorman also wanted an aerial port squadron in 

Vietnam. The overall concept appealed to Harkins, but he thought that the 

MACV J-4 could discharge the duties of the airlift allocation board. He agreed to 

let the system take in all Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force airlift save 

helicopters. Felt then directed the MACV commander to form a joint airlift 

allocation board within his J-4, and told Moorman to create a combat cargo 

group as planned. At Tan Son Nhut PACAF organized the 6492d Combat 

Cargo Group (Troop Carrier) and its 6493d Aerial Port Squadron. Both provisional units were replaced in December 1962 by the 315th Troop Carrier Group 

(Assault) and the 8th Aerial Port 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

General Harkins directed the Joint Airlift Allocations Board in 5-4 to 

approve all C-123 missions in Southeast Asia. But his chief of staff, General 

Weede, deviated from CINCPAC guidance. Weede neither defined General 

Anthis' responsibilities in the airlift system as the air component commander, nor 

made clear the combat cargo group's functions in running the air terminals. 

Nevertheless, the Southeast Asia Airlift System was broad enough to encompass 

Army Caribous, Marine R-4Ds, Vietnamese'and Air Force C-47s, and USAF 

C-I 23s. 

Airlift specialists were interested in a clean and straight-line organization. 

At the same time, General Anthis expected the C-123s also to fly tactical airlift 

generated through the air operations center of the tactical air control system. The 

arrival of the additional C-123s in June 1962 allowed the creation of a fire 

brigade, quick reaction force. Placed on a thirty-minute alert for emergency 

employment twenty-four hours a day, this composite force consisted of five 

C-I23s, five (later six) C-47s, one L-19, and five hundred Vietnamese airborne 

troops. 

The planes dropped all the paratroopers during a demonstration on June 5. 

Impressed, the Joint General Staff and the 2d Air Division planned to locate 

paratroop battalions and transport aircraft together at eight dispersed locations. 

The concept was never completely carried out, and despite its intrinsic merit the 

fire brigade idea fell into disuse. Tying down C-47s and C-123s to alert status 

turned out to be a waste of 

Between June and December 1962, the C-123s for the most part flew cargo 

and passenger missions instead of the tactical airlift for which they had been 

intended. This was due chiefly to the country's surface transportation being 

vulnerable to Viet Cong 

Along with Mule Train had come six C-123s equipped for defoliation 

operations and known as Ranch Hand. These planes plus sixty-nine men selected 

from the Special Aerial Spray Flight at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and the 

464th Troop Carrier Wing at Pope made up the Tactical Air Force Transport 

Squadron Provisional- I. With Capt. Carl W. Marshall as officer-in-charge, the 

unit reached Clark on December 6, 1961, and there awaited policy decisions. It 

was assigned to PACAF and 2d ADVON but MAAG handled the planning and 

coord i nat 

The Advanced Research Projects Agency had been conducting small-scale 

defoliant tests in South Vietnam since August 1961. Pleased with the results, 

President Diem became an ardent advocate of the use of herbicides both to 

destroy crops and to strip away foliage concealing enemy activities. The MAAG 

readied a plan to try defoliant chemicals against border areas, Viet Cong crops, 

and Viet Cong base areas in Zone D. The JCS endorsed this plan on November 3, 

and Defense Secretary McNamara on the 7th ordered the Air Force to send 

planes, crews, and chemicals to South Vietnam. On November 30 President 

Kennedy approved the defoliation guidelines suggested by the Departments of 

State and 

112 
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND 

The approvals were cautious. They called for carefully controlled defoliation flights along key roads and railways before undertaking food denial. There 

was to be no spraying in Zone D or along the border “until there are realistic 

possibilities of immediate military exploitation.” In other words, spraying for the 

sake of spraying was out-it had to be linked with ground tactical operations. In 

theory the Vietnamese government was managing the operations and the United 

States was simply supplying the means and serving as a consultant. 

United States planners saw the technique as an excellent measure to counter 

ambush, the classic guerrilla tactic mastered by the foe. Killing foliage would 

deny him hiding along roads and railways. The outcome of wiping out his crops 

was less But into the summer of General and Ambassador continued to harbor reservations on the untried chemicals. The 

State Department remained apprehensive that the common nontoxic herbicides 

would provoke communist charges of chemical warfare. In the meantime, 

however, Secretary was eager to continue defoliation activities. 

Since the Viet had already gathered their seasonal crops when the 

spray planes entered the country, the initial plan was to defoliate along miles 

of strategic roads north and northeast of Saigon. President Kennedy severely 

pared this proposal on January He authorized experimental spraying 

against separate targets that comprised merely of the nearly miles between 

and Tau on Route 

The State Department wanted no advance notice aside from local and 

low-key warnings. Still, the Vietnamese government on January 

“announced plans to conduct an experiment to rid certain key communications 

routes of thick tropical vegetation. U.S. assistance has been sought to aid 

Vietnamese personnel in this undertaking.” Because the C-I spray planes 

had no armorplating, General voiced concern that advance notice of 

flights would expose them to Viet ground fire. The consequently scheduled fighter cover from Farm 

According to the rules then in force, a Vietnamese needed to be aboard each 

spray plane. The planes were to stay clear of areas where food crops were 

growing. Province chiefs had to be alerted three days in advance of flights so they 

could explain the nontoxic spraying to their citizens. 

Three each fitted with an internal 1,000-gallon chemical tank and 

removable spray bars attached under the wings, departed Clark and arrived at 

Tan Son Nhut on January After poring over aerial photos, the crews flew 

two familiarization sweeps along Highway before embarking on their first 

full-scale mission on the 13th. For three days the planes sprayed a 200-meterwide swath on both sides of selected segments of Route Complete defoliation 

in ten days was counted on. However the leaves turned brown slowly, the 

vegetation remained alive, and few immediate military advantages resulted. 

Several tries at burning the sprayed areas fizzled. 

The Viet turned the spraying into a propaganda advantage. They 

claimed that the spray was chemical warfare and led the peasants to believe it was 

to blame for all dying plants. A Vietnamese government board established to 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

I I 
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND 

114: (Top) C-I23 on a defoliation mission. 

(Center) Brass sprayers in the rear of a C-123. 

(Bottom) aircraft at AFB, Hawaii, 

en route to Vietnam for defoliation activities. 

115: (Right) on defoliation mission near 

Saigon. 

(Center) View from inside a as it sprays foliage. 

(Bottom) Core in Saigon harbor with a cargo of 

-Ranch Hand spray and equipment. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

evaluate claims for accidental destruction angered those people whose suits were 

denied. 

On February a C-123 on a low-level training mission was lost. The 

cause of the crash was not clear. Enemy ground fire or sabotage was suspected, 

but the exact reason was never officially The three crewmen were the 

first USAF fatalities in South Vietnam. 

By February several U.S. officials concluded that the spray project was 

badly managed. General termed it “a blooper from start to 

sought to discontinue the program, reconvert the C-123s to standard transports, 

and give them to Mule Train. He told Secretary that the spray 

operations were a waste of aircraft, and he recommended removal of the tanks 

and spray plumbing. General joined in calling the project 

militarily ineffective, and the State Department labeled it “too reminiscent of gas 

warfare.” In the face of this opposition, went for continued herbicide 

experiments. He decided to press to make the spray work, sending a 

scientific team to Vietnam in April for a technical assessment. Brig. Gen. Fred 

USA, commanding general of the Chemical Corps Research and 

Development Command, headed the 

General what had gone wrong with the Ranch 

Hand defoliant missions. Most of the plants had been dormant, and the herbicide was a growth-regulating chemical that worked only on actively growing 

plants. Furthermore, the spray system had dispensed too light a dose of chemicals. The system required readjustment and modifications. 

These findings reassured President Diem. He was willing to begin herbicide 

operations against Viet crops in the central highlands, where guerrillas 

were seizing food from the tribal people. Relocating the 

nards to strategic hamlets and destroying the crops would cause the Viet to 

go HUNGRY 

Secretary agreed to seek approval for the use of herbicides 

against Viet crops. Ambassador and General Harkins in July 

forwarded a specific proposal to allow the South Vietnamese to spray 

in Yen PROVINCE 

Following the Viet killing of two Vietnamese perimeter guards near 

the Airfield, Admiral Felt suggested spraying the areas around airstrips. Approval came in late June from Washington for defoliating the forest 

area north of the runway. Vietnamese helicopters made these 

flights in July. 

General Harkins next urged that Ranch Hand 23s treat some acres 

(around fourteen square miles) of mangrove forests bordering the rivers and 

canals of the Peninsula to deprive the communists of ambush cover. 

After approval, two C-123s started the spray operations on September 

Another sprayequipped C-123 sent from the United States joined in later. 

Finished on October I, the flights killed ninety to ninety-five percent of the 

vegetation along the waterway. It was estimated that the view from the air was 

five to seven times better than before. 

I16 
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND 

This success spurred the Vietnamese armed forces on December to seek 

widespread defoliation of around acres alongside Vietnam’s main highways. The State and Defense Departments let Harkins and approve 

operations to clear roadsides, powerlines, railroads, and areas adjacent to depots, 

airfields, and other field installations. Other targets took presidential approval. 

Inasmuch as the Vietnamese now wanted to spray on their own, 

wondered aloud why Diem did not buy weed-killing chemicals on the open 

market and go 

propaganda scoring defoliation handed Diem’s government an 

unforeseen advantage. The who had been impressed with Chi 

victory over the French, came to believe that the power to kill trees would 

bring victory to the Republic of Vietnam. Many of them left the highlands for 

resettlement in strategic hamlets. This migration reduced the food 

supply, and guerrillas had to switch from fighting to 

In Washington on September the Vietnamese Deputy Minister of 

Defense pressed President Kennedy to authorize the use of chemicals to destroy 

crops. Kennedy agreed a few days later, and the State and Defense Departments 

authorized Harkins and to proceed with limited test crop destruction 

operations as long as they took precautions to prevent damage to innocent 

people and to feed refugees from sprayed areas. State insisted on approving every 

crop-destruction target, HOWEVER 

The rice crop in Yen Province had matured by this time and appeared 

to be no longer a valid target. The State Department approved an alternate area 

in Long Province and, on November and five Vietnamese 

helicopters treated about acres of rice, potatoes, manioc, beans, and peanuts. 

This operation destroyed food sufficient to feed communists for over a 

year. During February, May, and June Vietnamese ground troops sprayed 

portions of Province by 

In general the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored further spraying, but President 

Kennedy withheld blanket authority. He did not wish it to appear that Americans were making war upon Vietnamese 

I 

Too Cautious? 

During a conversation with President Kennedy in November 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara had “volunteered to look after”the Vietnam War. To 

do this he set up monthly conferences in Hawaii or Saigon.’ There, he and a Joint 

Chiefs of Staff member (usually the chairman) met with the Commander in 

Chief, Pacific Command, the Ambassador to Vietnam, and various component 

and unified commanders. The conferees discussed problems, courses of action, 

and progress. They traded views, reports, and briefings, and kept each other 

current on events in Southeast Asia and in Washington. Secretary McNamara 

often settled things on the spot, accepting or rejecting subordinates’ suggestions. 

A case in point was the first Secretary of Defense Conference held on 

December 16, 1961, in Hawaii. Mr. McNamara opened themeeting by stressing 

that the President did not desire to introduce American combat troops openly 

into Vietnam at that time. The Secretary conveyed his concern over the danger of 

alienating the Vietnamese people by careless bombing. The Army “has a particularly important role to play,”he said. “While naval and air support operations are 

desirable, they won’t be too effective, and we should not think they will win the 

war.” McNamara wanted the C-I 23s in Vietnam used not for taxi service but for 

tactical airlift in support of the combat effort, to include drops of materiel and of 

Vietnamese troops. His one objective in Vietnam was “to win this 

A chief order of business was the CINCPAC plan “to guide”the Vietnamese 

armed forces in a field campaign against the insurgents. The operations projected 

were in terms of task forces. Three or four battalions of infantry with supporting 

artillery and logistic units would attack Viet Cong bases, cut lines of communication, and clear and hold ground gained. No one knew what resources President 

Diem would give to this program. If Diem refused to take American advice, JCS 

Chairman Lemnitzer pointed out, the United States would be “in a bad fix.” Mr. 

McNamara brushed this aside and brusquely told his followers to get on with 

their jobs.’ 

General O’Donnell, PACAF commander in chief, was impressed with 

McNamara’s extremely strong statements of American determination to keep 

Vietnam from falling to the communists. But it soon became evident to him that 

strong talk did not necessarily mean strong action. The United States had chosen 

a prudent perhaps too prudent course and was accenting ground rather 

than air action. O’Donnell said that he personally deplored “overcontrol from 

the Washington level”but“as a soldier would comply with the spirit of the policy 

to be ultra cautious.” Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, likewise believed that policies 

curbing air power were scarcely in the best American interest. General LeMay, 

Air Force chief, was also impatient with “our own military rules to handicap 

ourselves.” He later reminisced: “If Khrushchev had been running it [the war], he 

I I9 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

couldn’t have done any better, as far as handicapping us, by what we did to 

ourselves all through the thing from start to 

In January 1962 USAF planners felt sure they had solved the problem of 

creating a “clear, realistic, jointly agreed concept for the elimination of Viet Cong 

influence.” Their idea called for a quick reaction force of Vietnamese airborne 

troops, supported by U.S. or Vietnamese transport and strike aircraft. 

All would respond to radio calls from villages under communist attack, thus 

supplying the “missing ingredient of truly effective action in South Vietnam.” 

This simple and direct reaction to overt enemy assaults on villages would entail 

nine Vietnamese battalions of paratroopers, ten C-I 23s, forty T-28s, and eighty 

H-34 helicopters. Split among several locations, the force would be on twentyfour-hour alert - quick to react to calls for help from communications teams in 

villages. 

Since Farm Gate was to take part in the program, precise targeting was a 

must. Guerrilla warfare blurred distinctions. The insurgents disguised themselves 

as civilians, found shelter among the populace, and depended on innocent 

inhabitants for food and other items. President Diem emphatically insisted that 

his airmen exercise utmost care to avoid angering the people by injuring innocents. Carelessness during an air strike could lead to a prison sentence.‘ 

Thirteenth Air Force asked PACAF to lay down rules of engagement for 

Farm Gate, and the request was referred to CINCPAC for resolution. Admiral 

Felt stressed caution. The French Foreign Legion in Indochina had tried to work 

free of restraints hamstringing operations, on the basis that the native people 

knew that innocent and guility would suffer alike if they harbored Viet Minh 

members. The French command had rejected this view, and “more temperate 

policies for using air power prevailed - although many tragic errors in target 

designation continued to be made until the end of the war.” According to Felt, a 

realistic policy pivoted on good air-ground communications and on being “as 

careful as possible when shooting things up around friendly forces.”’ 

Farm Gate bombs hit a Cambodian village by accident on January 21, 1962. 

killing several civilians. The incident raised at the “highest level” of the U.S. 

government the question of how to select targets without imperiling innocent 

people. To guide the discussion expected at the next conference attended by the 

Secretary of Defense, PACAF offered: 

We must exercise the greatest possible control and discretion to assure that we achieve 

our objectives without undue or unnecessary alienation of the civilian populace. If we 

are to avoid the imposition of highly limiting controls on the application of Farm 

Gate. we must make every effort to avoid another incident and in addition, demonstrate the effectiveness of our control and ability to discriminate in the selection and 

designation of targets as well as in the conduct of air 

At the February conference, General Anthis depicted targeting and control 

of air strikes as oriented to protect the lives and property of friendly civilians. He 

said that all ground force requests for close air support or interdiction were 

carefully verified as justifiable before being met. Air Force personnel scrutinized 

every strike request and had recently denied two. Once a daylight strike was 

I20 
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS? 

approved, a Vietnamese forward air controller directed it. Anthis knew of no 

attacks on friendly people. 

Defense Secretary McNamara answered the 2d ADVON commander by 

spelling out guidelines. Air Force personnel were not to engage in strikes on 

Cambodian territory. They were to balance risk against gain. For example, a 

mission was probably unacceptable if eight Americans were training a single 

Vietnamese, or if there was a chance of killing innocent people to get a few Viet 

Cong. 

By reason of this policy, more than half of the T-28s flying strike missions in 

1962 returned to base with unused ordnance. One USAF forward air controller 

had seen Vietnamese troops after an engagement “put 60 artillery rounds into a 

village for no apparent reason and kill women and children.” Yet he knew of no 

instance when “we indiscriminately went into any area and just for the heck of it 

bombed and strafed.” In contrast, armed helicopters seemed almost free of the 

rules of engagement. These craft had no rigid target selection, no radar control 

for target location, and no forward air controllers to monitor their 

During the night of March 1, 1962, the Viet Cong stormed an outpost about 

thirty miles north of Saigon. The call for help flashed to the air operations center 

thence to Farm Gate. An SC-47 flareship and two T-28s (carrying napalm, 

rockets, and .50-cal machineguns) scrambled, with radar at Tan Son Nhut 

vectoring them to the scene. Under the light of the blossoming flares, the T-28s 

pummeled the enemy. He broke off the assault and the outpost held. Five 

communist bodies were found the following day, along with evidence that more 

had been wounded. 10 

On March 3, II Corps asked for an immediate strike on a Viet Cong meeting 

near a village 105 miles northeast of Saigon. After clearance by Field Command, 

the air operations center sent one B-26 and two AD-6s, loaded with napalm, 

fragmentation bombs, rockets, .50-cal machineguns, and .20-mm cannon. The 

aircraft arrived to find the Viet Cong in the midst of a training exercise. The strike 

killed twelve. 11 

At times coordination failures hurt operations. On March 2, for example, 

eleven U.S. Army helicopters lifted and landed four ranger companies, a reconnaissance company, and a platoon of 105-mm howitzers in the Vinh Binh area to 

encircle a Viet Cong village. The Vietnamese and Farm Gate gave air cover with 

two T-28s and two L-19s. But the ground units were in the wrong places, and 

air-ground communications were absent. Although the two strike aircraft and 

the two liaison planes were overhead and available, they could deliver no 

supporting fire. The ground troops killed one Viet Cong and captured thirtythree suspects. ’’ 

While lapses in coordination and communications marred some operations, 

results in general infused mild optimism. On March 4 a Vietnamese L-19 serving 

with an army task force spied a company of Viet Cong (fifty to seventy men). 

They were situated near the bend of a river about thirty miles northeast of Tan 

Son Nhut. Vietnamese AD-6s scrambled within fifteen minutes, armed solely 

with 20-mm cannon since the planes were forbidden to carry bombs. Asked to 

121 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

assist, Farm Gate flew a series of strikes. Vietnamese reports the next day claimed 

fifty to sixty Viet Cong dead. A U.S. advisor put the figure at twenty-five. 13 

As MAAG told Defense Secretary McNamara on February 19, 1962: 

“South Vietnam had earlier been described as a country going down a steep slope 

to disaster. We can’t say that the direction has been reversed, but for the moment 

the slope has leveled out a 

For Farm Gate personnel the slope still seemed to be downhill. Their tasks 

were largely routine, and morale sagged. Being specially chosen, highly motivated survivors of rigorous training and selection, they expected to work with 

friendly guerrillas fighting behind enemy lines. But apart from a few challenging 

Special Forces missions, they performed close air support, airlift, medical evacuation, and psychological warfare - not at all what they had volunteered to do. 

The rules of engagement stymied these men - carry Vietnamese insignia and a 

Vietnamese airman, and do nothing that the Vietnamese Air Force can do itself. l5 

A chance to tackle something more exacting in psychological warfare had 

arisen in December 1961. Because certain areas controlled by the Viet Cong were 

open only to counterpropaganda by air, 2d ADVON turned to Farm Gate for 

testing loudspeaker and leaflet operations. Targets embraced the town of Ban 

Me Thuot, Pleiku, and Kontum, along with thevillages of Polei Klengand Polei 

Krong. Farm’Gate planes carried out the broadcast and leaflet flights. To stave 

off starvation in Polei Krong, the aircraft further dropped rice and salt. 16 

Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF counterinsurgency specialist, questioned the rationale of the tests. He suggested that unless technical experts knew 

precisely what they wished to achieve, probably nothing could be accomplished. 17 

On January 30, 1962,2d ADVON put in for three officers, two specialists, 

and one clerk, all well-versed in “military-political-economic-psychological 

aspects” of this type of warfare. They would develop, test, and conduct operations in the “ideal environment” of South Vietnam. Missions suggested were 

dropping leaflets, food, and clothing. Unfortunately, no psychological warfare 

specialists were on hand. There had been several hundred trained officers in the 

early 1950s, but the Air Force had inactivated psychological warfare units in 

1958. 

Farm Gate nonetheless flew seven missions from December 14, 1961, to 

February I 1, 1962, dropping leaflets and making aerial broadcasts. The initial 

flights impressed Vietnamese villagers, but speaker quality was marginal. For the 

messages to be heard from the speakers in the belly of the SC47, the run over the 

target needed to be at 600 feet at an airspeed of 100 knots or less. Even then, the 

message could not exceed sixty seconds. The speakers were later mounted on a 

rack in the plane’s door. This let the aircraft circle an area while a crewman aimed 

the speakers at a specific spot. Still, the run had to be at a dangerously low 500 

feet. 

On February 11 an SC47 took off in good weather for a routine leaflet 

mission south of Da Lat. The aircraft crashed for reasons unknown, killing eight 

Americans (six Air Force and two Army) plus one Vietnamese. This flight was 

I22 
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS? 

portrayed without success as an attempt to train the lone Vietnamese aboard. 

Press and congressional reports characterized as “fiction” the labeling of American missions as “solely in the transportation and training of Vietnamese units.”” 

During the third Secretary of Defense Conference in Hawaii in February, 

Mr. said he wanted the Vietnamese to take over psychological 

warfare operations as soon as they could equip their with speakers. 

Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, remarked that, although U.S. personnel “engaged in combat” from time to time, this was purely incidental to their training 

missions. He deemed these combat ventures as nothing more than support 

operations, and said “this should be fixed in the minds of the pilots and other 

U.S. personnel.” then ordered action “to eliminate references to U.S. 

activities as combat operations; they are to be spoken of and reported as training 

or support activities regardless of the fact that incidental combat may be 

inquiries from the press, office underscored the U.S. 

role as limited to advice, logistics, and training. 

United Press International published the essence of the Farm Gate combat 

story on March reporting that U.S. airmen for two months had taken a 

direct part in attacks, and that Vietnamese had acted as copilots on these flights. 

According to the official explanation, the story added, this was an emergency 

measure until the Vietnamese Air Force could be trained. General 

commander, commented on the story’s origin: “Due to the joint 

status of Farm Gate and the large number of people of both 

nationalities involved, it is extremely difficult to maintain strict secrecy concerning this 

This situation bred difficulties regarding the amenities of life in the field for 

Americans. The first USAF arrivals had been hurried to South Vietnam to 

operate under wartime conditions. They and their successors over several years 

were bound by peacetime directives and procedures. These strictures were rendered more onerous by Secretary centralizing decision-making at 

the highest Defense levels. Freshly arrived officers and airmen had their earliest 

brush with Vietnam at an airfield that was not a USAF base. At a military or civil 

Vietnamese base, the Air Force was a tenant because the U.S. government 

adhered to Article of the Geneva agreement forbidding new military installations in South Vietnam. 

The physical layout of Vietnamese bases was crude. At some the main roads 

crossed runways, and at others the roads sliced through next to the 

runways. Many fields wanted fences. Not until were there revetments to 

shelter aircraft. 

Tan Son Nhut, the Saigon airfield, was an international facility run by the 

Vietnamese Department of Civil Aviation. The Vietnamese Air Force was a 

tenant located in the southwest part of the field. The U.S. Air Force was 

supposed to approach the Department of Civil Aviation through the Vietnamese 

ment civilian aviation personnel who could give help and support. The Air Force 

borrowed one side of a hangar and an officer for the flight line. An arbitrary 

Air Force. In practice. however. the Americans made contacts with the govern- 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

announcement solved flight control -any USAF aircraft operating at Tan Son 

Nhut would be under 2d ADVON authority and would file its flight plan with 

base operations. The Army and MAAG cooperated in filing flight plans and 

juggling parking space. Space was so scarce that the alert pad blocked the flow of 

planes taxiing for takeoff. But the civilian authorities were understanding and 

helpful. 24 

Bien Hoa was about ten miles from the outskirts of Saigon. This airfield's 

chief problem, aside from limited runways, was security. The field was garrisoned 

by a battalion of regular infantry, reinforced by a rifle company, two mortar 

companies, four armored cars, and two 105-mm howitzers. A company of 

rangers provided distant patrols, and a sixty-man Vietnamese Air Force police 

detachment gave interior security. Farm Gate formed twelve fifteen-man combat 

teams, each with at least one Browning automatic rifle, and fused them into base 

defense plans. The flight-line area was the final defensive position. 23 

In general USAF personnel coped with the poor facilities, but the supply 

picture was bleak. Paperwork was sketchy on the stocks prepositioned in South 

Vietnam before the Air Force buildup. Most POL came through the port of 

Saigon and was distributed commercially, a system vulnerable to interruption 

and blackmail. There were no on-hand reserves of electric generators, portable 

buildings, bulldozers, crash firefighting equipment, graders, or construction 

equipment. Due to the distance, expendable items trickled in from the United 

States through Clark. Large items coming by ship took sixty days. 26 

The supply problems had a number of offshoots. In late February 1962, for 

example, 2d ADVON requested the removal of grass and the renovation of 

fencing and lighting at the transmitter site. There was no action until a grass fire 

nearly destroyed antennas, cables, and the building itself. The grass was bulldozed the next day, but nothing was done to fix the fences and lights. Thirteenth 

Air Force refused a March request for six hundred dollars to shelter the TSC-15 

vans, in which the daytime temperatures of the working areas rose to 130 degrees 

Fahrenheit. Thirteenth suggested that the workers be moved to tents. 

Men departing the United States for Vietnam duty in many cases did not 

know their destination in advance. Unable to bring useful items with them, they 

often went to the nearest town and bought minor things out of their own pockets. 

MAAG was generous and shared its meager stocks informally. Scrounging was 

frequently resorted to. Short supplies, particularly of paper, affected billeting, 

mess, pay, and mail. 27 

In the early days, the cramped quarters were lean-to tents or quickly built 

Vietnamese-style hutments. Numerous rats and insects made it difficult to sleep. 

There was no hot water even after USAF personnel had been in the country for a 

year. Offices were crowded and desks, chairs, and tables often improvised. 28 

After adjusting to their quarters, the new arrivals faced hazards in the mess. 

Baked goods and ices were sources of infection. Unsanitary practices in local 

baking firms finally ended local procurement. There was too little refrigeration 

space under U.S. control, and ice freezers for the field were not to be had. Locally 

I24 
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS? 

hired employees at snack bars in officers’ and service clubs were poorly supervised. The outcome was a high sick 

No wonder that General during his Vietnam visit in April 

found USAF aircraft to be 

Lowered vitality and loss of energy among the men grew out of chronic 

low-level fevers, dysentery attacks, and too few fresh fruits and vegetables. 

Medical detachments of the U.S. Army gave local area medical support. Hospitalization became available on April when its 8th Field Hospital opened 

at 

Pay was erratic. Checks regularly arrived late and at times never. Men could 

not meet mess bills and travel expenses. Emergency casual payments often 

resulted in overpayments. 32 

Mail service was primitive. Units outside of Saigon received no regular 

deliveries, and no arrangements existed to buy stamps, cash money orders, or 

dispatch classified mail. Mail came through Clark on Mondays, Wednesdays, 

and Fridays. The U.S. Army post office in Saigon was closed on Saturdays and 

Sundays. Recipients of classified or registered mail were notified informally and 

needed to make their own delivery arrangements. 33 

Aggravating these problems were austere maintenance procedures, 

unconventional organization, adherence in Washington to peacetime 

practices in procurement and purchase, and the general inability to forecast the 

number of Americans committed to South Vietnam. Ironically, USAF personnel were not in the jungle with guerrillas but were for the most part in or near 

metropolitan Saigon, a seaport and industrial center of almost two million 

people in There, the Air Force engaged in routine tasks and trained the 

Vietnamese Air Force, which began to expand and to fly more operational 

missions. 

I25 
I 
Gate and the 

Farm Gate, Detachments through and miscellaneous units contained 

USAF personnel by the end of Together these units made up a modest 

strike, photo-reconnaissance, and airlift force. But far more significant, they were 

the nucleus of a rapidly expanding American effort. Since the rules of engagement confined USAF planes to missions the Vietnamese were unable to perform, 

strengthening the Vietnamese Air Force was all-important. 

The Fighter Squadron at owned twenty each capable 

of flying one operational sortie per day. The Fighter Squadron at 

was being readied for combat. Because it was to receive thirty and 

fourteen the pilots would require transition training in gunnery, bombing, and rocketry. The and Liaison Squadrons had fifteen apiece 

and needed more pilots. Hence additional officers would undergo flight training 

in the United States. 

The AD-6 pilots were proficient in daytime flight, but their former carrier 

aircraft lacked landing lights. This and the frequently inoperable flight instruments prevented pilots from gaining experience in night and all-weather flying. 

They showed slight interest in flying night combat, even though the 

operated mostly during the hours of darkness. 

To secure combat missions, Colonel King had proved that and 

could fly night missions under flarelight furnished by But when saddled 

with training the Vietnamese, the Farm Gate commander was surprised and 

disappointed. He continued to discuss with General Anthis, commander, whether training was the cover for combat or the primary mission. As 

King later frankly admitted, he “resisted” Anthis’ instructions. 

Grudgingly, Farm Gate commenced the training. Vietnamese AD-6 pilots 

served as crewmembers on and but disliked flying in the rear 

seats. Yet, they could not take over the front seat on combat missions until they 

were qualified in every respect. At that point no need existed for a Farm Gate 

instructor in the rear seat. Backseat combat training was more political than 

practical. 

The basing of Farm Gate and the Vietnamese AD-6s at might 

have eased combined missions, but the air operations center went on issuing 

separate orders. Colonel King nevertheless promoted training and demonstrated 

that air detachments could operate from remote locations a long while. This 

success eventually moved the Fighter Squadron to stage two AD-6s each to 

Pleiku and King also sent four pilots to to give 

Vietnamese instructors flight training. 

More to Farm Gate’s liking was the mission of January Alerted to 

sampans drawn up under camouflage south of Saigon, Colonel King 

I27 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

and Lt. Col. Robert L. Gleason made an afternoon flight and took photographs 

of the exact spot. Shortly after dark, King led a bomb and rocket strike. The 

SC47 flareship approached the target area with the T-28s in trail and about 

2,000 feet higher. After the flares ignited, the strike aircraft swooped down and 

demolished the enemy boats. Photos revealed that one 500-pound bomb, 

dropped by Capt. William E. Dougherty, scored a perfect strike in the middle of 

the sampans.’ 

Such rapid reaction induced the joint operations center to place an SC-47 

on strip alert, ready to join T-28s and B-26s in night action. While these tactics 

failed to wipe out enemy units, they forced the Viet Cong to break off attacks and 

fade into the jungle. Meanwhile, Vietnamese C-47 crews were sufficiently trained 

by February 1962 to fly night missions with Farm Gate. 

Farm Gate experience in the first months of 1962 dictated a change in 

ordnance loads. The detachment sharply cut back on general purpose bombs, 

and shifted from the 250-pound bomb to the M-IA2 cluster of six 20-pound 

bombs. By June, Farm Gate upped its use of rockets, napalm, and strafing. 

Sometimes more than one canister of napalm was required to burn a hole in the 

ground cover. 

Strike aircraft inhibited the Viet Cong from firing. If the aircrews spied the 

source, they quickly opened up with formidable firepower. The T-28 packed two 

.50-caliber machineguns, the B-26 eight. Both planes carried bombs and 

The white smoke of the M-19 marker dissipated too swiftly, while the 

aircrews rarely saw the red smoke of the M-18 through thejunglecanopy. Smoke 

bombs in general were unreliable, and the method of dropping them on poorly 

defined targets was “most 

The first combined American-Vietnamese air operation occurred near the 

end of December 1961. Two U.S. Army helicopter companies whisked 360 

Vietnamese troops to five landing zones in the Viet Cong-dominated Zone D, 

then several days later brought inadditional troops. A Vietnamese L-19 forward 

air controller and two AD-6 bombers orbited the area but saw no targets. The 

troops failed in their main mission -capture of a radio transmitter - but killed 

two Viet Cong, wounded one. and captured forty-six suspects. 

A larger operation took place on January 5, 1962, to rescue prisoners in a 

Viet Cong camp near Saigon. A Vietnamese forward air controller directed 

AD-6s, T-28s, and B-26s to fly preparatory strikes. Under this cover, thirty-one 

helicopters shuttled in 1,000 Vietnamese troops. These efforts went for 

naught - the information about the prison camp proved to be erroneous.‘ 

A number of the problems in search-and-destroy operations stemmed from 

three factors: preliminary air reconnaissance tended to destroy surprise, plans on 

occasion were too complex for the fledgling Vietnamese Air Force to carry 

through, and coordination between ground and air units was weak. 

The air defense system likewise left much to be desired. Since the Soviet 

Union had transport aircraft at Hanoi, a key aim of the American presence was 

to deter this airlift from extending to Laos and from affording air support to the 

Viet Cong. Rumors in early 1962 told of Viet Cong in the central highlands 

I28 
FARM GATE AND THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE 

receiving secret air resupply drops. Time and again the air warning radars at Tan 

Son Nhut and Da Nang together with the light radar at Pleiku picked up 

unidentified tracks. At times these turned out to be tricks of the atmosphere, but 

often were U.S. Army aircraft on flights the reporting center knew nothing of. On 

the other hand, the Da Nang radar could not detect planes flying at low and 

middle levels because the terrain to the west screened them. Furthermore, the 

AD-6s, T-28s, and B-26s were unsuitable for intercepting communist aircraft 

penetrating South Vietnamese airspace. In February I962 General O’Donnell 

called for unified air action. To establish “law and order in the air,”he suggested 

that the air operations center control and coordinate all air operations, including 

helicopter combat support. 

Two mutinous Vietnamese flyers first tested the air defense system, designed 

to signal communist intrusion. On the morning of February 26, 1962, the two 

diverted their AD-6s from a planned strike in the delta, and zeroed in on 

President Diem’s palace. The 1st Fighter Squadron scrambled two flights of 

AD-6s to intercept the rebels, but the planes merely gathered hits from smallarms fire. Farm Gate aircraft took to the air to elude possible destruction on the 

ground. Antiaircraft fire downed one of the two attacking planes, and its pilot 

was captured. The other escaped to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where he emerged 

unscathed from a crash landing. Interrogation of the captured flyer confirmed 

that the two pilots were engaged in a vendetta against Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh 

Nhu. 

Although there appeared to be no general plot against the government, 

Diem grounded the Vietnamese Air Force temporarily. Later he permitted the 

Vietnamese strike planes to carry only 20-mm ammunition. Still later he ostensibly authorized the planes a full array of ordnance, but the Joint General Staff 

restricted bombloads for missions in 11 and III Corps. Ambassador Nolting 

secured permission from Washington for Farm Gate aircraft to support ground 

operations. To dispel the impression that the United States was taking over the 

fighting, AD-6s had to accompany American planes.’ 

In March 1962 a total of 1,861 incidents (attacks, acts of terrorism, sabotage, and subversion) stirred apprehension that the communists were about to 

step up the war. 10 Pleiku radar on theevening ofthe 19th showed seven unknown 

flight tracks over the central highlands. Farm Gate scrambled a B-26 from Bien 

Hoa, and when it reached the area, radar control placed the aircraft directly over 

one of the tracks. The crew saw nothing. The next day, reconnaissance pilots 

noticed some bundles in the trees. On the night of the 20th, Tan Son Nhut radar 

detected unknown tracks leading out of Cambodia. Two Farm Gate T-28s were 

scrambled but the tracks faded. Soon after these T-28s were recalled, Pleiku 

reported ten to fifteen low-altitude tracks emerging from Cambodia. One SC-47 

and two RB-26s were dispatched from Bien Hoa. The SC47 dispensed flares 

while the RB-26s searched in vain. 11 

Upset over the sharp rise in Viet Cong incidents, President Diem asked for 

U.S. jet interceptors to deal with enemy overflights. Ambassador Nolting quickly 

cleared the request with Washington. On March 22 the 405th Tactical Fighter 

I29 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

(Above) Vietnamese officers and American 

advisors plan an airlift of Vietnamese 

paratroopers at Tan Son Nhut. 

(Top right) 1st Lt. Wilfred 

demonstrates airlift maneuvers with model 

of a aircraft as two Vietnamese 

students look on at Moody AFB, 

(Right) Wilson and 

install rockets into a bomber at 

(Below) Delta Daggers. 
FARM GATE AND THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE 

Wing deployed a detachment of the 509th Fighter Interceptor Squadron from 

Clark Air Base to Tan Son Nhut. The detachment’s aircraft consisted of three 

single-seat F-102s and one TF-102 with side-by-side seating. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff authorized Americans to engage and destroy hostile aircraft encountered 

over South Vietnam. 12 

The speedy arrival of the F-102s pleased the Vietnamese government. l3 Still 

the air defense system was far from perfect. In training exercises, the F-102s flew 

much too fast to intercept the slow liaison planes that acted as enemy intruders. 

Experience also taught that two pilots in a TF-102 had a better chance to 

intercept than one pilot in an F-102. Further TF-102s were therefore drawn from 

the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. On July 21 Admiral Felt ordered three Navy 

AD-SQ interceptors from Cubi Point, Philippines, to relieve the F-102s. From 

then on, F-102s and Navy interceptors alternated six-week tours of air defense 

duty. l4 

As air defense and traffic control improved, the unknown radar tracks 

diminished. To help radar tell friendly from enemy planes, MACV on August 22 

ordered every American military aircraft to emit Identification Friend or Foe 

impulses if equipped to do so. When months passed without enemy air activity, 

General Harkins said it was certain there was “no air battle in Vietnam, and there 

are no indications that one will 

The sudden jump in Viet Cong incidents during March 1962 led USAF 

officers to raise the question of enlarging Farm Gate with four B-26s now in the 

Far East and with four T-28s. They reasoned that B-26s were the best tactical 

aircraft for counterinsurgency, T-28s were needed for detachments at smaller 

airfields, and Vietnamese forces were still learning how to use air power with 

ground operations. General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting backed the proposal. Defense Secretary McNamara, however, noted that the Vietnamese 2d 

Fighter Squadron was becoming operational. He asked how much longer American pilots had to fly with the Vietnamese. General Anthis replied that Farm Gate 

would have to serve as a demonstration force and to check the state of Vietnamese training and standardization for quite a while. McNamara okayed the request 

but delivery of the planes to Farm Gate was delayed due to the Vietnamese Air 

Force buildup. 

During General LeMay’s Vietnam visit in April 1962, the initial expansion 

of Vietnamese strike aircraft neared its end. The thirty USAF C-47 pilots 

assigned to the I st Transportation Group had released seasoned Vietnamese 

pilots to fighter cockpits. Moreoever, twenty-five T-28 pilots were combat-ready 

for the 2d Fighter Squadron. With thirty flying hours a month planned for T-28s 

and twenty-five for AD-6s, the Vietnamese could complete 140 T-28 and fiftyfive AD-6 sorties each week. Since the training of T-28 pilots was drawing to a 

close, Farm Gate found it harder to get Vietnamese crewmen for its flights. 

Though LeMay noticed marked improvement among the Vietnamese, he 

doubted they could meet all their operational demands for some time to come. 

Because Farm Gate was flying less than it could, LeMay wanted the crews to log 

more missions. This would allow American airmen rotating through Vietnam to 

131 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

attain valued experience that might well be needed elsewhere. He suggested 

relaxing the restrictions calling for a Vietnamese crewman to be aboard Farm 

Gate planes and confining Farm Gate to offensive missions beyond the competence of the Vietnamese. 17 

General LeMay won little support for these proposals in Washington. 

Secretary McNamara sought to shave American participation in Vietnam, so as 

to attain an all-out Vietnamese military effort. Counterinsurgency doctrine 

required indigenous forces to fight their own war. McNamara was thus interested 

in having the Vietnamese take over the Farm Gate planes as soon as possible. 

Hampered by the original rules and restrictions and the scarcity of Vietnamese trainees, General Anthis secured the assignment of eleven Vietnamese aviation cadets to Farm Gate. Until they could attend flight training in the United 

States, the cadets served as the Vietnamese member of every Farm Gate crew. 19 

Based at Nha Trang but with a detachment of six T-28s at Da Nang, the 2d 

Fighter Squadron became fully operational in mid-1962. This afforded muchneeded air power in the central and northern areas of Vietnam, freeing the 1st 

Fighter Squadron and Farm Gate for operations in the south. As a result, 

Vietnamese and Farm Gate sorties multiplied, mainly for interdiction and close 

support. Still the Vietnamese asked for too few air missions. They neglected to 

have aircraft cover convoys and trains, to escort helicopter assault operations, 

and to fly even more interdiction and close support strikes. 

But augmenting the Vietnamese Air Force seemed to have been successful. 

Secretary McNamara was so pleased with the progress that he told General 

Harkins to firm up a program for phaseout of major U.S. combat, advisory, and 

logistic activities within three years. 

The Secretary was unaware of the glaring deficiencies that impeded the 

Vietnamese. Pilots continued in short supply and many of those flying needed 

more training. The two fighter squadrons had fewer than a dozen qualified flight 

leaders, and ground personnel were generally inefficient. The T-28s lacked ample 

firepower and would someday have to be replaced, calling for more pilot 

training. A lack of proficiency in night and all-weather flying diluted efficiency. 

Rather than the average of one hour or less, Vietnamese turnaround time 

between missions averaged between two and three hours. The fastest scramble 

time for a Vietnamese C47 flareship was forty minutes, and over an hour was 

normal. The Vietnamese were cleared to operate with a full array of ordnance, 

but their strike aircraft were armed solely with napalm, rockets, small fragmentation bombs, and cannons. They were reluctant to move aircraft to advanced 

locations because of poor housing and messing at Da Nang and Pleiku, and the 

low pay for temporary duty. 

General Anthis estimated that the two Vietnamese fighter squadrons, with 

twenty-seven T-28s and twenty-two AD-6s, should generate 1,470 operational 

sorties a month seventy percent for combat and thirty percent for training and 

maintenance. Actually an average of seven AD-6s, eleven T-28s, eleven L-19s, 

and eight C-47s were available each day to the tactical air control system. 

I 

132 
FARM GATE AND THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE 

Since the number of Vietnamese combat sorties fell short of meeting the 

rising demands for air missions, Farm Gate operations reached new high levels. 

By August it was clear that Farm Gate had to have fresh aircraft and crews. The 

coming of two new U.S. Army helicopter companies in September meant even 

greater requirements for escort and supply sorties by strike aircraft. This clashed 

with Secretary desire to phase out American units. 

General Anthis, had foreseen that mission demands would compel Farm 

Gate planes to stretch beyond monthly programmed flying hours. He suggested 

that additional USAF units be allocated to Vietnam, chiefly to allow air strike 

teams to be kept permanently on station at Thirteenth Air 

Force in mid-August sent Farm Gate four from Far East assets. 

Farm Gate continued to fly too many hours, and in September Anthis asked 

for ten more five and two General Harkins made no reply, 

but recommended that the Air Staff put the proposal on the agenda of 

the October Secretary of Defense Conference. Gen. Walter C. Sweeney, 

commander of Tactical Air Command, and Brig. Gen. Gilbert 

Special Air Warfare Center commander, agreed that the Air Force could furnish 

the planes and crews. However, they cautioned Anthis to “go adding to 

Farm Gate until he was completely convinced that the Vietnamese were doing as 

much as they could. Sweeney did not want Farm Gate “to become a crutch to 

compromise progressive and objective development of indigenous 

Allegedly to confuse the the Vietnamese renumbered their 

squadrons in With the new designations went an emphasis on the 

organizational unity of the Vietnamese Air Force. Perhaps the structure was 

partly inspired by the proposal of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George 

Decker, to transfer Vietnamese helicopter and liaison squadrons to the Vietnamese army. 

Securing the go-ahead from the Air Staff in October to give additional 

aircraft to Farm Gate, suggested this action to CINCPAC. Briefed on 

October in Hawaii, Defense Secretary was still bent on building a 

wholly adequate Vietnamese Air Force. He said there should not be but 

or more Vietnamese officers taking flight training in the United States. Since no 

Vietnamese pilots were in training to fly the Secretary asked Admiral Felt 

to explore the prospect of procuring thirty Chinese Nationalists for the Vietnamese This would release thirty transport pilots for transitional training. 

As for Farm Gate expansion, said, if General Harkins needed a 

bigger program, he should present his case to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He himself 

was “cool” to the idea, for it was contrary to the President’s desire to build 

indigenous forces. Farm Gate ought to train Vietnamese rather than to operate. 

Farm Gate operations in August had soared to sixty-five percent over those 

in July. But in September they had to be pruned to thirty-seven percent of the 

July totals, owing chiefly to the one-crew-per-aircraft manning ratio not 

enough to sustain the high rate of missions. The Vietnamese wanted the eleven 

aviation cadets returned for language training before going on to the United 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

States to become pilots. To furnish the crewmen required on Farm Gate planes, 

the Vietnarnese Air Force sent fifteen noncommissioned officers to Farm Gate. 

This plugged the gap but was a subterfuge, because the enlisted Vietnamese were 

uninterested in flight training. When General Moorman, Thirteenth Air Force 

commander, heard of the arrangement, he urged Anthis to do his best to meet 

McNamara’s wishes. 27 

Admiral Felt visited Vietnam in late October and talked with Anthis. He 

said Vietnamese opposition had scuttled the prospect of using Chinese pilots to 

fly Vietnamese transports. Any Farm Gate growth would have to be small and 

piecemeal. 28 

Acting on Anthis’ suggestion to shore up Farm Gate, General Harkins in 

November asked for five T-28s, ten B-26s, and two C-47s More, he said, would 

likely be required in the future. Admiral Felt routed the request to the Joint 

Chiefs, adding that he saw no other way to secure the urgently needed combat air 

power. 29 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff well knew that President Kennedy wished the 

Americans to prepare the Vietnamese to fight their own war. Hence in November 

and December the chiefs carefully weighed the question of bolstering Farm Gate. 

They likewise plumbed the oft-stated position that counterinsurgency was for the 

most part a ground war, with air forces accounting for maybe ten percent of the 

effort. Some USAF officers viewed counting Viet Cong casualties as an 

“unpleasant task”and “not necessarily the military objective.” Even so, statistics 

on the number of enemy killed, wounded, and captured were important. In all 

known cases where ground forces entered areas struck by air, their actual body 

count exceeded aircrew claims. (Of the estimated number of enemy casualties in 

1962, twenty-eight percent were due to Vietnamese and American air power.) Yet 

air operations did more. They shrunk the enemy’s options, crimped his movements and attacks, flew in men and supplies to assault him, protected surface 

convoys and trains as well as heliborne assaults, and thwarted the foe from 

massing large forces in the field. Air power had proved - at least to USAF 

officers - that it held equal rank with ground operations in any counterinsurgency venture. 30 

This assessment was not altogether shared in Washington. Following a visit 

to Southeast Asia in December 1962, Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of 

State for Far Eastern Affairs, and the President’s Special Assistant for Far 

Eastern Affairs, Michael V. Forrestal, reported: 

On the use of air power and the danger of adverse political effects, our impression is 

that the controls on air strikes and the procedures for checking intelligence against all 

sources are excellent. In spite of this, however. it is difficult to be sure that air power is 

being used in a way that minimizes the adverse political effects , . . and the use of air 

power is going up enormously.3’ 

In December the Joint Chiefs recommended expanding Farm Gate, so it 

could keep abreast of the burgeoning requests for air support. The Secretary of 

Defense concurred, the State Department agreed, and on the last day of the year 

the President approved the requested increase in Farm Gate aircraft. 32 

I34 
In World War II and the Korean conflict, interdiction had slowed the flow 

of enemy forces, supplies, and equipment into and within battle areas. In 

Vietnam, according to General “the most lucrative targets” were 

training areas, troop concentrations, supply depots, and sampans. Admiral Felt and General had the same impression. Interdiction air attacks 

against Viet base areas held a special attraction because the Vietnamese 

ground forces seldom penetrated to them. 

Yet air interdiction was very complex. The Viet rarely wore distinctive 

uniforms, and they mingled freely with civilians. To tell them from the general 

populace called for timely intelligence and reliable aerial reconnaissance. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese Air Force owned but two rigged with cameras for 

day photography. The single air photo intelligence center and its twelve photo 

observers were situated in the division of the Joint General Staff. The 

observers could do visual reconnaissance, but the best of them were being shifted 

to tactical fighters. 

Able operated out of Don Airport near Bangkok, 

Thailand. They sustained a daily sortie rate of flights, and photographed 

high-priority areas of interest to MACV and the Vietnamese. When over South 

Vietnam, these planes as a rule staged through Tan Son Nhut, where they turned 

over their film to the small USAF photo processing cell for interpretation. 

Although the was good for general reconnaissance of clearly fixed 

targets, it was not suited to spotting an enemy who hid under heavy foliage by 

day and moved at night. Furthermore, processing and interpreting the photography in Saigon, then delivering it to requesting units by U.S. Army courier 

plane, usually took several days. Some ground commanders complained that the 

interval between a request and a delivery was at times thirty to forty-five days. 

Intelligence from members of the enemy forces was needed, and was 

scarce. Starting in December U.S. intelligence advisors did their best to 

teach their methods to Vietnamese. Besides the specialists in MACV 

(Intelligence), Americans worked with Vietnamese units in the field. Unproductive from the USAF point of view, MACV intelligence was oriented toward 

ground operations. 

Normally, Vietnamese interrogations of prisoners should have yielded significant information. But the law authorized the military to hold prisoners only 

two days before handing them over to provincial authorities for a court hearing. 

This was not time enough to learn about enemy activities vulnerable to air 

interdiction. 

I35 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Vietnamese army units in the field, provincial officials, and covert agents 

could request Saigon for specific strikes. If Saigon approved, Vietnamese pilots 

were free to attack these targets, usually marked by air observers. While USAF 

officers were not empowered to question an approved strike, General Anthis 

asked for “positive control” by radar or forward air controllers when Farm Gate 

aircraft took part. Targets were often described in vague terms like “groups of 

huts,” “troop concentrations,” or strong points,” and were frequently 

hidden under jungle cover. 

In spite of precautions air strikes were dangerous, particularly in heavily 

populated and poorly mapped regions. In January for example, Vietnamese officers wanted an air strike at dawn on the Viet village of 

in the Parrot’s Beak close to the Cambodian border in War Zone C. Because the 

Vietnamese could not handle predawn takeoffs, Farm Gate was asked to fly the 

mission. At first Colonel Farm Gate commander, thought the target 

too close to Cambodia, but accepted the task when the Vietnamese labeled 

crucial. 

Radar at Tan Son Nhut monitored the flight, warning the planes as they 

neared the canal that supposedly was the border. The aircraft failed to receive the 

message, but an SC-47 that had performed weather was flying 

back and forth over the canal to mark it. From another SC47 positioned along 

the border, Colonel led and an airborne coordinator directed the strike. 

As eight and three bombed, rocketed, napalmed, and strafed, the 

Minister of Defense and the III Corps commander watched from a 

The Farm Gate commander felt sure no one had made a mistake. Yet a few 

days later, the Cambodian government charged with having crossed the 

frontier, killed a villager, and injured three others. The Vietnamese defense 

minister shrugged off the protest, saying that the whole area was a hot bed.” 

The State Department, however, wished to prevent disruption of VietnameseCambodian relations. At American insistence Saigon apologized and awarded 

compensation. General Anthis, commander, forbade Farm Gate to 

strike within five miles of the border during daylight and ten miles at night. 

Moreover a forward air controller, airborne or on the ground, had to mark the 

targets. These restrictions might have afforded the Viet complete sanctuary 

along the border, but the rules did not apply to Vietnamese pilots who could 

operate more 

Toward the end of January, all available Vietnamese and Farm Gate planes 

at Pleiku, and simultaneously attacked fourteen carefully 

pinpointed targets in five areas. After-action reports revealed good results. The 

defense minister said the strikes were so timely and accurate that the 

suspected spies in their midst. All the same, top American officials had nagging 

doubts about the validity of the targets selected by the Vietnamese. They stressed 

to the Joint General Staff the value of intelligence, proper controls, and serious 

poststrike assessments. 

Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, knew the problems of bombing areas where 

friendly and hostile people intermingled. Impressed by Vietnamese officers who I 

I36 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962 

wanted to avoid using weapons against innocent persons, he sponsored better 

air-ground communications for close air support. 

At the Secretary of Defense Conference on February 19, 1962, General 

Anthis showed how air interdiction hurt the Viet Cong. Defense Secretary 

McNamara evinced interest in using flares for strikes to relieve outposts under 

night assault. He ordered CINCPAC and MACV to furnish hamlets cheap but 

efficient short-range VHF-FM voice radios, so they could call for help when 

attacked. The Secretary warned that U.S. advisors were to do nothing that the 

Vietnamese could do for themselves, and were to risk hazards only when 

inescapable. 

Well-managed interdiction based on hard intelligence worked remarkably 

well. On March 2 the II Corps commander requested an immediate strike against 

a group of Viet Cong holding a meeting in the village of Hung Nhon. The air 

operations center validated the request and dispatched two Vietnamese AD-6s 

and a Farm Gate B-26. They killed at least twelve. 10 

Even so, the issue of haphazard air attacks lived on. Two U.S. Army 

advisors informed Army Brig. Gen. Harvey J. Jablonsky, the MACV J-4 

(Logistics), that the Viet Cong were exploiting strafing and bombing attacks for 

propaganda purposes. By removingjust the killed and wounded males, they gave 

the villagers the idea that the women and children left behind were the targets and 

victims of air strikes. Jablonsky passed this information on to Ambassador 

Nolting, who on March 3 met with Generals Harkins, Timmes, Jablonsky, and 

137 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Anthis. Nolting at first thought of curtailing air activity, but Jablonsky would 

not cite instances of air attack. Harkins then pointed out that tighter curbs would 

benefit merely the Viet Cong. 

General Jablonsky in Hawaii repeated the charge he had made in Saigon, 

and the question was reexamined at the Secretary of Defense Conference of 

March 21. Ambassador Nolting urged close scrutiny to prevent killing innocent 

people, and Defense Secretary McNamara agreed to allow air operations to go 

on under strict controls and stringent intelligence criteria. Roger Hilsman, 

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, later defined this decision as 

the worst of two worlds military men disturbed by air restrictions and 

diplomats fretting about propaganda benefits to the enemy. 

To assist the Vietnamese in gathering better intelligence of air force interest, 

Admiral Felt authorized and the Air Force sent a detachment of the 6499th 

Support Group to Saigon. Six officer and six enlisted intelligence specialists 

arrived in March, but two officers were unqualified and removed. Denied direct 

access to enemy prisoners, the others could ask questions only through Vietnamese interrogators. 13 

An additional obstacle was the lengthy procedure in processing a request for 

a preplanned interdiction strike. The 2d ADVON intelligence directorate could 

propose a target, and the Joint General Staff‘s air photo intelligence center 

researched and prepared data sheets and folders. One copy went to the province 

chief for checking, a second to the air operations center for preliminary planning. 

Field Command next decided if the target was susceptible to ground action, 

which took precedence over air. These steps could consume several days or 

several weeks. Actually, most intelligence rose from the ground force division 

and province chief levels. These authorities often suggested targets to the corps 

commander who routed the requests to the operations center. Yet no matter how 

intelligence generated strikes, the province chief was the key. He alone determined whether bombing a target would imperil his people. 14 

To pinpoint Viet Cong radio transmitters for air intelligence, the Air Force 

delivered a C-54 to Vietnam in March 1962. The transport featured infrared 

detectors, cameras, and a high-frequency direction finder. About the same 

time, the U.S. Army Security Agency put airborne radio homing units in three 

Army L-20s. During their first operational flight on the 12th of April, the C-54 

and L-20s came upon far more Viet Cong radio transmitters than expected. 

However. the direction finding equipment could not give a precise fix on the 

radio sites. The Viet Cong radios were short-range, low-power sets, and they 

operated in periodic short bursts. Though the American eqipment was not 

advanced enough to place the signals accurately, the C-54 flew 102 special 

missions in ten months. The cameras worked fine for ordinary photography, but 

the infrared and the direction finder did poorly. 

The USAF pilots could return fire against “a known source” in self-defense, 

but needed to be very careful for they rarely knew a source’s exact location. In the 

daytime, Farm Gate planes could not fire unless under positive control of a 

Vietnamese forward air controller, and cooperation with Vietnamese L- 19 conI38 
AIR OPERATIONS, 

trollers was frequently difficult. In addition the elaborate reconnaissance and the 

target marking no doubt alerted the Viet to impending strikes. This 

impeded action against an already elusive foe. 

the spring of interdiction focused on small groups of guerrillas and 

sampans near Vietnamese army positions. Then late in May, the Joint General 

Staff and MACV targeted the Do War Zone headquarters area of Interzone 

With utmost care they identified, authenticated, and pinpointed nineteen 

targets spread over an area of square miles. As a final validation, a plane flew 

a Viet defector over the area. 

Vietnamese and American aircraft eleven eleven and six 

took off on May Bad weather obscured five of the targets, but the 

planes made repeated strikes on the other fourteen. Regardless of the careful 

preparations, a pounded the friendly village of Dak killing four persons 

and demolishing a dozen buildings. The strike pilots saw no Viet on any of 

their runs, but bomb damage assessment photography showed a command post 

wiped out, fourteen other structures burned and destroyed, and thirty damaged. 

The Vietnamese field commanders hailed the attacks as a “total success,” and 

(President Diem’s brother) reported about four hundred enemy 

killed. Some Viet defectors later credited their change of heart to the 

bombings. 

Both and were willing to accept the mission of 

disrupting Viet security in base areas beyond the reach of ground forces. 

The American Embassy in Saigon nonetheless questioned the wisdom of the 

attacks. Some U.S. observers were positive that air power at Dak KET had killed 

no more than fifty of the enemy. The commander of Interzone V had escaped. 

Innocents had been killed. Consequently, General ordered Farm Gate no 

longer to fly free-area missions without a forward air controller. 

As spring wore on, a more extreme belief nudged aside assertions of how air 

interdiction hurt pacification because it endangered guiltless people. On April I5 

MACV published the first extensive Viet order of battle, listing 

battalions, seventy-nine companies, and platoons. The overall strength was 

put at less than the estimated by the Vietnamese. But backing up 

the regular troops were paramilitary organizations of around part-time 

guerrillas. And over the first two weeks of May, to more Viet 

had stolen into Zone D from Laos to form a new battalion. After weighing this 

information, MACV J-2 (Intelligence) concluded that air interdiction had no 

military effect on the Viet 

What then could isolate the Viet from the populace who furnished 

them food and other supplies? Or from their logistic routes that brought them 

weapons, ammunition, medical materials, and fresh troops? There was no other 

way than by air interdiction and ground thrusts into enemy base areas. Admiral 

Felt desired these missions continued. He especially wanted Vietnamese rangers 

and regular units to fight guerrilla-style in the Viet war zones. “It is, of 

course, basic to our side,” Felt told General “that the initiative be denied 

the Our concept is to harass them, push them down and extend them far 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

beyond the capabilities of their logistics support, thus destroying them.” On the 

other hand, Harkins deemed nearly all of the ground commanders too inexperienced for large-scale efforts, and the rangers lacked leaders for extended field 

operations. 21 

Unlike the army, the Vietnamese Air Force could carry the war into the 

jungle areas held by the Viet Cong. What the pilots needed was valid target 

intelligence. In August Col. Ralph A. Newman, air liaison officer with Vietnamese Air Force Field Command, instructed liaison officers to work closely with the 

ground forces at division and regimental levels. The aim was to identify targets 

for interdiction, chiefly for Vietnamese planes returning from sorties with unused 

ordnance. Most crews hesitated to land with bombs and rockets hanging outside 

the aircraft, and since 1958 had jettisoned them on vacant land near the airfields. 

Aware of this waste, General Anthis proposed assigning preplanned targets, 

preferably in Zone D, so at least the munitions would fall on Viet Cong territory. 

Anthis and the air liaison officers pressured I and II Corps to accept this 

proposal. They stressed that a backlog of such targets would ease scheduling, 

distribution, and use of aircraft, as well as keep the Viet Cong off-balance. By 

September 1962, however, the suggestion was still hanging 

Admiral Felt asked General Harkins, MACV commander, whether “area 

denial” methods might make Zone D too hot for the Viet Cong. Felt advised: 

Entire extent of techniques and devices available for such purpose should be used. We 

have in mind. for example. scatter bombing with butterfly bombs, proven lethal in 

Korea. and other type AF mines. We also visualize use of chemical irritants and 

defoliants to expose targets for air strikes. . , . In other words we want to destroy or 

drive sick, starved. blistered. and blasted Viet Cong from Zone D so that we can scoop 

them up outside of their nest or prevent them from setting foot in the area 

Thus spurred, MACV and the Joint General Staff started to target War 

Zones D and X (headquarters of Viet Cong Interzone V) for an intensive air 

campaign. On October 3 the 5th Division submitted 129 specific targets. President Diem next ordered a five-day bombing attack in Zone D to begin on 

November 1, followed by a Special Forces ground penetration. He also called for 

the I and II Corps to cooperate in a similar bombing and to follow up penetration 

into War Zone X which lay in the mountains dividing the two corps. Gradually, 

the corps commanders and Field Command obtained many more targets 

through military channels. Provincial chiefs designated free areas for air attack. 

Vietnamese crews could strike these areas without a forward air controller, but 

Farm Gate had to have targets marked by a Vietnamese 

Review of the free areas came when Vietnam’s strained relations with 

Cambodia worsened. Feeling threatened by both South Vietnam and Thailand, 

Cambodia on August 20, 1962, had appealed to President Kennedy for a neutral 

status like that of Laos. President Diem resented the implication that South 

Vietnam was an aggressor. He said there was little question that Viet Cong 

redoubts drew support from across the border. Vietnamese troops who carried 

out sporadic raids into Cambodia had captured communist weapons and 

ammunition destined for the Viet Cong. Undeterred, Prince Norodom Siha140 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962 

nouk, Cambodian Chief of State, charged on September 10 that Vietnamese 

amphibious craft under air cover had violated his country’s soil. Any more such 

aggressive acts, he threatened, would lead to severed diplomatic relations, recognition of North Vietnam, and closer ties with China. Five weeks later, Vietnamese naval forces moved against the island of Phu Quoc near the Cambodian 

coast. They seized seventeen tons of ingredients for making 

Sihanouk’s threat to invite Chinese assistance startled the State Department. Ambassador Nolting met with President Diem and stressed there must be 

no military action that might bring Chinese Communist forces onto Vietnam’s 

flank. In compliance the Joint General Staff banned ground and air operations 

within ten kilometers of the Cambodian border. If a river, road, or other physical 

feature clearly marked the border, Vietnamese forces could pursue the enemy to 

within two and one-half kilometers. Otherwise the chase would cease at eight 

kilometers. Vietnamese pilots could open fire on a hostile aircraft ten kilometers 

inside South Vietnam, if certain that the plane would fall inside Vietnamese 

territory if shot 

Though the border restrictions did not sit well with Vietnamese officials, 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wondered whether 

the restraints went far enough. “Militarily,” Rusk cabled Nolting, 

there is general agreement that success lies not in drawing tight cordon sanitaire in 

Maginot manner along vaguely defined frontier but primarily in working outwards 

from rural areas won . . . and, secondarily, through strikes against VC strongholds. 

Usefulness of latter. when carried out near frontier, must be considered less important 

than political-diplomatic problem. 

The Joint Chiefs suggested a new name be found for “free areas.” Admiral 

Felt did not object, and 2d Air Division (formerly 2d ADVON) commenced to 

call them “approved interdiction 

To General Anthis, sponsorship of “area denial” by Admiral Felt “smacked 

of indiscriminate bombing.”Even in Zone D it was impossible to know positively 

that all victims were Viet Cong. When Felt proposed having C-123s drop ten 

thousand pounds of napalm on marked targets during a ground offensive into 

Zone D, Secretary Rusk objected. He wanted napalm confined to high-priority 

targets that were clearly Viet Cong installations. Moreover, the State Department retained the right to pass on all plans meaning to use napalm in large 

amounts. 

In the end, General Harkins withheld USAF aircraft from delivering 

napalm in Zone D and allowed the Vietnamese to do so. Ambassador Nolting 

supported this decision. The curbs put on Americans made it hard to carry the 

war to the heart of the enemy sanctuaries. The best that General Anthis could do 

was to allow F-102s to fly across Zone D at night, breaking the sound barrier and 

causing sonic booms. “It may not destroy anything,” Anthis said, “but I can say 

positively there has been considerable VC sleep lost in the last few 

Scarcely less important than interdiction was USAF support of Vietnamese 

ground operations. Air Force officers constantly offered air support to ground 

commanders through the tactical air control system. To sell this support, steps 

141 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

were taken to strengthen the air operations center at Tan Son Nhut and the radar 

facilities at Da Nang and Pleiku, procure and employ American air liaison 

officers and forward air controllers, and persuade locally powerful army commanders to coordinate with air forces. In general these commanders were jealous 

of their authority, secretive about their plans, and inexperienced in applying 

tactical air support. Inasmuch as the air operations center depended on day-today knowledge of Vietnamese ground operations, U.S. Army and Vietnamese 

liaison officers were assigned to the center in February 1962. The idea was to 

inject tactical air into operational planning at the 

If Vietnamese ground commanders had but an inkling of how the support 

system was supposed to work, U.S. Army advisors had not the air experience to 

qualify them as air liaison officers. They refused to accept the tactical air control 

system outright, and from the USAF view were “quick to criticize, slow to 

help.”” 

Bolstering of the joint operations center was one of the benefits accruing 

from the April 1962 visit of General LeMay. He ordered several USAF officers 

assigned to the center, Lt. Col. Charles J. Bowers assuming the duties of deputy 

director. These officers monitored and encouraged the submission of daily 

requirements for air support, and allocated sorties on the basis of available 

aircraft. 

Quite a few things weakened centralized control of tactical aircraft. Inexperienced personnel and unreliable equipment bred problems. In April, for example, communications between Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang remained out for 

three days. Moving aircraft from rotational duty at Da Nang and Pleiku 

demanded special approval from Vietnamese Air Force headquarters. Consequently, the air operations center could not route these planes rapidly to areas of 

greater need. Also, the center was heavily committed to operations requested by 

Field Command and III Corps. This led I Corps at Da Nang and II Corps at 

Pleiku to look upon the AD-6s at these fields as theirs to use without telling the 

center. Likewise, the fighter squadron at Nha Trang now and then flew T-28 

strikes in response to local requests without the center’s knowledge. When 

General Anthis made staff visits to corps, division, regimental, and battalion 

headquarters, he found little understanding of how the tactical air control 

system was meant to 

Attempts to bring helicopter activities under the air operations center did 

not go well. General Harkins in April directed armed tactical aircraft to accompany helicopter assault missions. He was therefore certain that the center was 

wholly aware of all U.S. Army flight operations in the country. Yet Army ground 

liaison officers readily admitted that the MACV order for escort planes was 

observed only about ten percent of the 

The figure of ten percent was misleading, seeing that these ground operations mostly involved small forces of company or platoon size in very brief 

firefights. Since the air operations center was unable to coordinate all air 

operations, it could not wholly exploit available air support. Data on ground 

operations being planned was often not to be had. The commanders were 

I42 
AIR OPERATIONS, 

sensitive to espionage, and personally drew up and launched actions 

with scant notice even to their own staffs. A few commanders went so far as to 

suspect the center to be a source of information and with reason. 

The Vietnamese Air Force dispatched fragmentary operations orders from Tan 

Son Nhut to its squadrons in the clear. Because the teletype circuits were possibly 

insecure, there were inevitable 

U.S. Army officers disliked the tactical air control system, deeming it too 

rigid. Accordingly, there was no realistic policy governing the relationship 

between fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. In June MACV gave General 

“coordinating all air operations. In July General 

ordered helicopter support missions to have proper air escort, unless the helicopter unit commander judged it unnecessary. In August Admiral Felt considered it 

essential to have every type of air operation coordinated by the air operations 

center, and to have air cover from fixed-wing aircraft for each helicopter operation. Not until December did the latter requirement go into 

Air strikes close to friendly troops called for close cooperation between air 

missions and the movement and fire of ground units. As in Korea, tactical air 

control parties came to be used. The Air Force supplied a seasoned fighter pilot 

to serve as the air liaison member of the control party. The Army furnished the 

vehicles and mechanics, radio gear and operators. The ground 

mobile radio jeep carried the air liaison officer and Army members of the control 

party. The vehicle’s radios linked with the forward air controller and the strike 

pilots above, and with ground and air units. The control party’s work was 

thwarted whenever the jeep was slowed or stopped by cut and mired roads, 

ambush parties, and jungles and swamps. 

A further frustration was the meager experience of Vietnamese in coordinating air-ground operations. The shortage of pilots prevented the assignment 

of air liaison officers to ground units. The foremost need was to secure sufficient 

two-man crews (pilot and observer) to place AD-6 strike aircraft on the 

target. So in lieu of an air liaison officer, the Vietnamese Air Force sometimes 

designated an crew to serve as forward air controller for a ground unit 

during a single operation. The pilot and observer repaired to the unit, received 

briefings on the planning action, and tried to become familiar with the procedures and terrain. The crew then returned home to conduct other air control and 

reconnaissance missions. On the day of the operation, however, the crew 

flew back and controlled air strikes for the ground unit. 

Unable to operate at night, crews in daytime usually flew at to 

feet, far too high for good surveillance and target marking. The air observer 

marked targets for fighters by radio direction or hand-thrown smoke grenade, 

commonly by both methods. Criticism and penalty awaited an crew if 

ground fire damaged the plane. The observer was subject to severe punishment if 

he erred in marking a target and friendly casualties resulted.” 

To communicate with regular troops, the Civil Guard, and the Self Defense 

Corps units, carried AN/ Army radios lashed to their backseats. 

Because the plane could power only its own radios or the the crew could 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

not converse with strike aircraft and ground forces at the same time. The PRC-10 

lash-up was a poor makeshift, and ground units wanted man-pack radios that 

could mesh with existing UHF/ VHF airborne sets. No such radios were obtainable in 1962. The U.S. Agency for International Development was giving large 

numbers of radios to provincial paramilitary forces. These sets were the commercially procured HT-1 and TR-20 with characteristics similar to those of the 

PRC-10. An an interim measure, MAAG refitted U.S. Army helicopters and 

Vietnamese and Farm Gate aircraft with the AN/ARC-44 Army radio. This set 

could tie in with the PRC-10, HT-1, and TR-20. 

Complications of this sort paled beside the general insufficiency of the 

L-19s. They were often simply unavailable. In April, for example, Farm Gate 

pilots arrived over the target and could see a firefight on the ground. But the 

Vietnamese controller never showed up. 

Toward the end of 1962. Farm Gate received two L-28As (later known as 

U-10As) for forward air controller duty. They were too costly for such use. 

Moreover, Farm Gate still had to have Vietnamese air observers or air guides on 

the ground to mark targets for strikes. 

Three U.S. Army helicopter companies, each attached to a corps, enabled 

troops to move swiftly against the Viet Cong. On the way to the target areas, the 

chopper pilots liked to fly at 700 feet and hug the terrain. Their success led 

Secretary of Defense McNamara to deploy a Marine squadron of twenty-four 

UH-34D helicopters to Vietnam. Afterwards he moved two more Army H-21 

companies to the country, plus a company of fifteen armed UH-1 A and UH-1 B 

helicopters from Okinawa and Thailand. Manned by Americans, these gunships 

were to deliver “suppressive fire,” now deemed to be self-defense. In September 

1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered all helicopter gunships bearing U.S. 

markings to carry a Vietnamese observer. 

In July 1962, strike aircraft flew I39 combat sorties in support of helicopters. Farm Gate (now commanded by Lt. Col. Eugene H. Mueller, Jr.) perfected 

tactics whereby two T-28s supported each helicopter flight. One T-28 swooped 

down to 200 feet, flew slightly ahead of the leading helicopter, and made slow 

turns to search for the enemy. The second T-28 stayed above the formation, set to 

make a firing pass on a target. As the helicopters approached in trail for landing, 

the strike aircraft flew on each side and strafed the flanks to suppress enemy 

Despite Admiral Felt’s belief that transport helicopters constantly required 

fighter escort, General Harkins authorized helicopter gunships to operate alone 

if need be. Bad weather now and then grounded strike aircraft but not necessarily 

helicopters. In addition, escorts were hard put to fly slowly enough to stay with 

the helicopters. Seeking to put U.S. Army air operations under the tactical air 

control system, General Anthis warned Harkins against fighting two distinct air 

wars. On the other hand, Army officers tended to see armed helicopters best used 

when under a ground commander’s control and carrying out local operations. In 

August, MACV gave the tactical air control system supremacy solely over air 

traffic 

144 
AIR OPERATIONS. 

The Viet ambushed road convoys during the first seven months of 

most of them in III Corps north of Saigon and near Zone On the 

morning of June some four to five hundred Viet took up ambush 

positions along the road to about five kilometers south of Ben Cat. 

Opening fire on the convoy in mid-morning, the communists killed two American advisors and twenty-three Vietnamese. The column requested air support, 

and three hours elapsed before the strike units at got orders to take off. 

By that time, the enemy was withdrawing toward Zone Even so, a and 

two AD-6s under I9 control killed fifty enemy and enabled pursuing Vietnamese troops to recover nearly all the equipment and weapons stolen from the 

convoy. Air Force officers pointed out to Vietnamese commanders that a single 

over the convoy would probably have sighted and reported the enemy, and 

no doubt would have prevented the 

On July a Viet battalion ambushed a convoy en route from Saigon 

to Long, killing twenty-five persons (including a U.S. Army advisor) and 

wounding twenty-nine others. The convoy had not asked for air cover. In fact, 

neither III Corps nor Field Command had known that the column was on the 

road. The request for air support came one and one-half hours after the fighting 

erupted. By then the guerrillas had long been 

General emphasized to MACV the advantages of air cover for 

convoys and rail movements. Not only would tactical air enhance security, it 

would also absorb Vietnamese and Farm Gate sorties currently unused. At 

General suggestion, President Diem in August directed his army commanders to call on the Vietnamese Air Force to protect trains and convoys 

conveying arms, ammunition, and other critical cargo. 

The simple presence of the unarmed often broke up an ambush. On 

August two spied guerrillas lying in wait between and 

an ammunition train headed north. When the planes appeared, the 

Viet fled. Later that month, an stopped the first vehicle of a convoy 

just short of an explosive CHARGE 

In contrast to the requests for convoy escort from January to July 

there were between August and October. Doing most of the train and truck 

convoy escort, flew ahead of the movement and searched for signs of 

ambush. They radioed for ground or air reinforcement as required. Except for 

the compulsory combat air cover for high-priority cargoes, tactical aircraft 

selected to escort usually stayed on ground alert. The combination of planes 

devoted to this duty constituted about ten percent of the total tactical air effort. 

Convoys would have incurred less damage, had they kept travel to days and 

hours when aircraft were on hand to afford cover and protection. The technique 

was effective. From July on, no train or convoy escorted by air ran into ambush 

for several 

Helicopter assault operations proved more complex than train or convoy 

escort. On August I Corps mounted an air-ground operation fifty-five miles 

south of Plans envisioned ten Vietnamese and twelve U.S. 

Army I to lift two hundred rangers and two hundred Special Forces troops 

I45 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

to the battle area. Four T-28s would fly helicopter escort while four AD-6s, four 

T-28s, and one B-26 readied the landing zone. A CV-2 Caribou out of Da Nang 

was to be the airborne command post. The I Corps air liaison officer, Lt. Col. 

Byron R. Kalin, pointed out in vain that the Caribou lacked the fuel capacity for 

orbiting during the whole operation. The plane would have to return to Da Nang 

for refueling. 

Early on D-day, six (2-123s ferried two hundred Vietnamese troops from Da 

Nang to Quang Ngai to join the others. The Caribou command post checked the 

weather in the battle area and signaled for the first heli-lift of two hundred troops. 

The strike planes made their prelanding attacks but, by the time the helicopters 

came, fog had rolled into some of the landing areas. The Caribou sent the 

helicopters back to Quang Ngai. When the fog lifted, the Caribou called for the 

mission to continue. Although the four T-28s escorting the helicopters completed 

another prelanding strike, the Viet Cong opened up on the choppers with sharp 

fire. A damaged H-2 I escaped to an emergency landing area. After the crew was 

rescued, a T-28 destroyed the craft to avert its capture. 

Subsequent to the safe landing of a second wave of helicopters, the Caribou 

needed to go to Da Nang for refueling. While it was away for over an hour, 

orbiting fighters relayed messages to the commander. But he was out of direct 

contact with his troops. 

The fighting on the ground was inconclusive, and in mid-afternoon helicopters began extracting the forces. As the last chopper left the scene, the Viet Cong 

opened fire, downing another H-2 I. The wounded crewmen were rescued, and a 

T-28 shattered the copter on the 

Why were the T-28s unable to suppress the Viet Cong fire? The Caribou's 

limited communications for directing fighters and ground troops were frequently 

interrupted for one reason or other. Target marking was poor. An American 

forward air controller flew an L-I9 over the area for three hours at 2,000 feet. His 

Vietnamese observer marked just one target, the smoke bomb missing by 3,000 

feet. Lastly, the delay between the prelanding strikes and the first helicopter 

landing had likely alerted the Viet 

At Da Nang on September 22, the 2d Division commander planned a 

heliborne attack to begin on the 24th. The six Vietnamese T-28s on station could 

not muster the firepower for the air support required. Delayed until fresh aircraft 

arrived, the operation went on September 26. By then, the Viet Cong had slipped 

The growing accuracy of Viet Cong ground fire against aircraft caused 

concern among USAF officers. The toll of Farm Gate planes shot down 

mounted -- a T-28 on August 28, 1962, a U-10 on October 17, and a low-flying 

B-26 on November 5. Other aircraft were damaged. Following a night napalm 

strike, Lt. Col. Miles M. Doyle nursed his B-26 home after losing an engine to 

.30-caliber rounds. To silence enemy gunners, the Farm Gate commander 

ordered his pilots to strafe while delivering ordnance at low 

Army pilots of armed helicopters were optimistic about the defensive 

abilities of the UH-1. The chopper carried two eight-tube 2.75-inch rocket 

I46 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962 

pods and two .30-caliber machineguns (each mounted on a landing skid). 

General Anthis continued to plead for the UH-1 and other U.S. Army aircraft 

to go under the tactical air control system. Meanwhile, the Army used the 

gunships for firepower formerly furnished by artillery, explaining that the 

UH 1 s supplemented rather than replaced strike aircraft.” 

A vital adjunct to interdiction and close support was air reconnaissance, and 

MAAG in April 1962 had projected a program for the Vietnamese. Its centerpiece was the transfer to them of four RT-33 photo jets. Since the State 

Department did not at first object to the transfer, Thirteenth Air Force made 

ready to train pilots for the planes. Next, MAAG formally asked for the RT-33s 

together with three RC-47s and fourteen RT-28s. The RC-47s would get photo 

coverage under way at once, and small Vietnamese photo processing cells at 

Pleiku and Da Nang could supplement the American facility at Tan Son Nhut. 

Examining the proposal in June, CINCPAC recommended that three 

camera-equipped C-47s be secured, one for each corps; two Able Mable RF-10 Is 

be completely committed to missions in Vietnam; a Vietnamese photo processing 

cell be opened at Tan Son Nhut; and an austere USAF reconnaissance technical 

squadron be set up in Saigon for detailed photo interpretation and target 

production for all of Southeast 

At the Secretary of Defense Conference in Hawaii on July 23, 1962, 

Admiral Felt spoke out strongly for giving the Vietnamese RT-33 photojets. Mr. 

McNamara was negative because of the Geneva accords, and he questioned the 

superiority of the RT-33 over conventional aircraft. General Harkins favored the 

photo jets but suggested a compromise -bring two USAF RF-101s to Vietnam 

and furnish the Vietnamese RC-47s and RT-28Bs. Two weeks later, Admiral Felt 

urged the Joint Chiefs to approve the RT-33s as superior reconnaissance planes 

needed for intelligence. He noted that the Army had sent some jet turbinepowered UH-1 A helicopters to Vietnam. The admiral opposed RC-47s because 

in Laos they were vulnerable to ground fire. He thought it difficult and expensive 

to modify the RT-28 into a camera plane that at best would have moderate 

performance. 53 

The State Department now strenuously opposed jet photo planes for the 

Vietnamese on political grounds. And Secretary McNamara remained unconvinced that Admiral Felt had made his case. Although the RT-33s stayed in the 

Military Assistance Program, three camera-equipped RC-47s and eighteen RT28s arrived to buttress reconnaissance. At Tan Son Nhut the Vietnamese activated the 7 16th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron. It accepted two C-45 

photo aircraft, one having a six-inch and the other a twelve-inch vertical camera. 

While awaiting more planes, pilots of the 716th Squadron flew strike missions in 

T-28s. Not until mid-1964 would the Vietnamese attain a fully operational 

reconnaissance program. Meantime, the Air Force’s 13th Reconnaisance Technical Squadron (thirteen officers and eighty-four airmen) would be formed at 

Tan Son 

Until the Vietnamese could do their own air reconnaissance, Able Mable 

RF-101s were fora while deployed to Saigon. In July I962 the Geneva agreement 

I47 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

suspended aerial reconnaissance over Laos, and by October Able Mable was 

flying about eighty-eight percent of its sorties over Vietnam. This sparked the 

move in December of all four RF-101s to Tan Son Nhut, where they continued to 

fly 2.8 sorties a day. Flying from Vietnam rather than Thailand widely expanded 

the total photo coverage per sortie.” 

Detecting the Viet Cong from the air demanded night and infrared photography, side-looking airborne radar, and infrared “snooper scope” techniques. 

Most of these methods were still in development. In April 1962 MACV had 

secured two RB-26C night photo aircraft for Farm Gate, the planes reaching 

Bien Hoa in During the last half of 1962, they gave good service in the 

face of obstacles. Flash-illuminant cartridges were in short supply. Reflections 

from flooded rice paddies blurred night photos. A ground accident on October 

20 put one RB-26C permanently out of action.” 

The coming of the Army’s 23d Special Air Warfare Detachment to Nha 

Trang in September 1962 reinforced reconnaissance. The detachment had six 

OV-1 Mohawk turboprop observation aircraft, rigged with cameras and .50- 

caliber machineguns. It further featured two portable laboratories to process 

photographs at division headquarters and at remote locations. Split into teams of 

two, the OV-1s assumed direct support of Vietnamese ground units. The 

Mohawks flew mostly visual and photo reconnaissance, but carried Vietnamese 

observers who could approve targets. 

General Anthis still felt it foolish to give aircraft to ground unit commanders. When he protested to General Harkins, the reply was, “We must all be 

objective.” A USAF forward air controller with the 23d Division at Ban Me 

Thuot noted in November that the Mohawk detachment could make a nine-hour 

delivery on photo requests, compared to the normal USAF time of seven days. 

Apprised of this, Anthis could only hope that the U.S. Air Force might not lose 

assigned roles and missions because of a failure to provide resources to perform 

them. Even with RF-101s flying from Tan Son Nhut and the photo processing 

cell working at peak efficiency, photo delivery took from three and one-half to 

more than five hours. The local Mohawks could deliver emergency photo 

requests within two to three 

Admiral Felt pondered the status of the OV-1s Was their local employment 

an economical use of force? Or did their presence ignore the basic U.S. policy of 

having Americans train the Vietnamese instead of fighting their war for them? 

Yet General Harkins cited the excellent results chalked up by Mohawks, and on 

December 14 asked for four more. Like the helicopter gunships, Harkins 

explained, the OV-1s complemented but did not compete with USAF air 

Nevertheless, by December 1962 the Army had 199 aircraft in Vietnam, the 

Air Force 61; there were eight Army generals, three Air Force. As the USAF 

director of plans noted: 

It may be improper to say we are at war with the Army. However, we believe that if the 

Army efforts are successful, they may have a long term adverse effect in the U.S. 

military posture that could be more important than the battle presently being waged 

with the Viet 

148 
AIR OPERATIONS, 

Both Army and Vietnamese Air Force aircraft remained outside the 

tactical air control system. As early as May Brig. Gen. Stephen 

Thirteenth Air Force vice commander, commented on the situation to 

General Anthis. Air Force flew combat while Vietnamese were on 

the ground. Army helicopters made combat lifts while Vietnamese were 

unused, unreported, or transporting passengers. In response, Anthis acknowledged this said, “can only be measured in small 

units” meaning 

A team from the Royal Australian Air Force noticed the same condition. 

The Vietnamese Air Force (along with the navy) did not perform up to its full 

potential. Perhaps this was due to the absence of proper representation at senior 

military levels. Hence there was no joint planning as practiced in more sophisticated armed services, and air force “views and requirements receive little 

consideration.”“ 

In June the forty-nine Vietnamese strike aircraft flew but of the 

sorties of which they were capable. Too few flight leaders, no desire to fly 

combat, and scarce targets were the causes. Flying fell off markedly during 

weekends, siesta hours, nights, and bad weather. At any rate, the picture was not 

entirely dismal the sorties in June were a decided improvement over the 

in 

The signs were mixed as I962 closed. But it was unmistakably clear that the 

Republic of Vietnam, so shaky at the start of the year, had not collapsed. Even 

more encouraging was the attitude of the National Liberation Front, Hanoi’s 

political structure in South Vietnam. Its press release in July called for the 

creation of a neutral state much like Laos. Was Hanoi thinking of abandoning 

the effort to unify Vietnam by force? And what was the meaning of Chi 

quoted statement praising Diem’s patriotism? In had predicted 

the defeat of South Vietnam in a year. In September he began saying that 

victory might take fifteen to twenty years. Was he concerned that the Americans 

might bomb North 

The war against the President Diem informed the National 

Assembly on October had taken an “incontestable the better. Later 

that month, Admiral Felt and Ambassador bolstered Diem by assuring 

him that the American resolve to resist communism in Vietnam would not 

Obviously, then, the step-up in U.S. support for Vietnam that had started 

late in seemed to be working. 

I 

American support arrested many adverse trends in Vietnam, and by May 

Secretary of Defense was looking ahead to the end of the 

counterinsurgency. As he said at his conference in Honolulu, the Military 

Assistance Program for Vietnam would then be somewhere between million 

and million a was hoping to phase out the war in Vietnam 

and in the near future to send home major U.S. combat, advisory, and logistic 

activities. No doubt heartened by the signing of a new agreement on Laos, he 

directed General Harkins, MACV commander, to draw up a program. The plan 

would prepare Vietnamese armed forces to fight and win the war themselves, so 

that a systematic withdrawal of American forces could to the headway 

made. 

“Six months ago,” said the Defense secretary, “we had practically nothing 

and we have made tremendous progress to date. However, we have been 

concentrating on short term crash-type actions and now must look ahead to a 

carefully conceived long-range program.” He then asked how long it would take 

to eliminate the as a “disturbing force.” General Harkins replied, 

“About one year from the time that we are able to get [the Vietnamese] fully 

operational and really pressing the in all areas.” 

Assuming that it would take about three years to bring the “under 

control,”the Secretary directed Harkins to plan on this basis. Besides training the 

Vietnamese to manage the war themselves, Harkins was to arrange a turnover of 

materiel to them. “The objective,” said, “is to give an adequate 

military capability without the need for special U.S. military 

The size of the American contributions was substantial. By mid-August 

there would be I I U.S. personnel in Air Force, Army, 

Navy, and Marine Corps. Of the S767 million in materiel programmed 

since more than S600 million had been delivered. Airfields refurbished, or 

set to be, included Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, Qui 

Ban Me Hue, and A like upgrading of land and naval 

facilities was underway. The Military Assistance Program, subject to congressional approval, called for I77 million in fiscal year and million the 

next year. Over and above these totals, the United States had given Vietnam over 

I billion for roads, railways, electric lines, water, communications, hospitals, 

and 

U.S. advisors operated from Joint General Staff to battalion level, and some 

worked with province chiefs and training centers. Farm Gate had trained and 

certified sufficient Vietnamese crews to man a second fighter squadron that flew 

missions out of The Air Staff had approved sending four to 

Farm Gate for forward air controller duty. Two more glass-nosed were on 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

hand for reconnaissance. Mule Train was supplied a second C-I23 squadron to 

achieve the quick reaction General LeMay 

Ignoring these hopeful signs, LeMay remained skeptical. The Air Force 

chief’s disagreement with the war strategy was widely known among the top U.S. 

leaders, and Admiral Felt alluded to it at the May Secretary of Defense Conference. General O’Donnell, PACAF commander in chief, was disappointed with 

the emphasis on politics and economics at the conference. So many civilians were 

there that he could not make his points. Instead of preparing for victory in three 

years, he wanted to urge actions at once-“better utilization of available air in 

South Vietnam, improved air lift management, and .[a] three-star slot for the 

Air Force deputy” to 

General Anthis told the conferees that the basic stumbling block to expanding the Vietnamese Air Force-a precondition to removing USAF elementswas the shortage of pilots. There was no debate on 

What mattered was that McNamara had set 1965 as the planning date for 

ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Harkins needed to make it possible. 

By September MACV prepared a National Campaign Plan as a guide. 

After briefing Mr. McNamara in October, General Harkins presented the plan to 

the Joint General Staff and the Vietnamese president. Diem informally approved 

the blueprint in principle, and on November 26 did so formally. No immediate 

implementation followed, but rather a discussion of when execution should 

begin. Not really a series of maneuvers, the plan was more an organizational and 

conceptual framework, a setting for the process of rooting out the guerrillas. A 

key provision was the restructuring of the Vietnamese armed forces. This would 

deprive provincial chiefs of control over paramilitary forces in their areas, and of 

their freedom to appeal directly to Diem. Placing the paramilitary forces 

squarely in the military chain of command would do away with the provincial 

chiefs’ private armies. 

CINCPAC harbored reservations as to the costs and the ability of the 

Vietnamese to train sufficient personnel in time, and MACV revised the plan in 

December 1962 and again in early 1963. The plan’s intelligence annex contained 

merely territorial data and a map of what MACV thought were the Viet Cong 

tactical zones and secret bases. Missing was an enemy order of battle. The Joint 

Chiefs nevertheless approved the plan on March 4, 1963. They recognized that 

success hinged on the “parallel development of many mutual supporting” programs, meant to lead ninety percent of the native population to identify with the 

Diem government. The trouble was that many programs lay outside the military 

sphere. Civilian agencies were to work on political, economic, and social problems, and much would rest on additional deficit spending by the Vietnamese 

government. There were no doubts expressed on Diem’s administration or the 

course of the war. The Air Staff, however, wondered where the government 

could find enough trainees to fill the pilot 

These seemed to be mere details. More to the point was Admiral Felt’s 

comment that Diem had “finally delegated operational authority” to his military 

i 

I52 
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS 

The National Campaign Plan called for nine regular divisions plus other 

Vietnamese units-a total ground combat force of about fifty-one divisions. 

Operating under four autonomous corps tactical zone field commanders, these 

troops were to decimate local Viet Cong elements, cut off replacements, and 

destroy supply, communications, control, and support facilities. The communists would first be hemmed into specific areas. Next would ‘come a general 

offensive to annihilate them by simultaneous “explosion” operations in the four 

corps zones. This explosion of effort was supposed to drive the Viet Cong out of 

the country within a year. 

“Sounds reminiscent of Korea, of course,” someone said, referring to 

General McArthur’s famous communique, “out of the trenches by Christmas.” 

General Weede, MACV chief of staff, estimated that the “military effort to at 

least drive VC underground should be concluded in one to two years. It would 

then be up to GVN [Government of Vietnam] to take over to win minds of 

people, improve economy, conduct civic action, etc.” According to General 

Harkins, the plan could eliminate the Viet Congas early as 1963. President Diem 

apparently believed so too, but later would feel that the strategic hamlet program 

first had to be completed. This could not be done before the spring of 

Diem reorganized the military. Inactivating the central Field Command, he 

divided Vietnam into four corps tactical zones, created the new 1V Corps in the 

Mekong Delta with headquarters at Can Tho, and established the Capital 

Military District around Saigon. The corps tactical zone commanders would be 

given greater responsibilities. They were to exercise operational control not only 

over their ground forces but over supporting Vietnamese Air Force elements as 

Exactly what control the 2d Air Division commander was to have over air 

operations was unstated, but General Anthis protested placing air power in the 

hands of the corps commanders. He wanted as always a strong tactical air 

control system.” 

A related issue was how to compute the air requirements for the ‘‘explosion’’ 

ground operations. Preliminary estimates showed a doubled strike sortie rate 

along with an upturn in calls for reconnaissance, target spotting and identification, and aerial resupply. How much and how fast the Vietnamese Air Force 

could be expanded was the central 

General Rowland, chief of the MAAG Air Force Section, outlined an 

ambitious program. Besides a second AD-6 fighter squadron in fiscal year 1964, 

he projected two more fighter squadrons in fiscal year 1966. Both would be 

equipped with the Northrop N-156 light jet fighter (later designated the F-5 

Freedom Fighter). Rowland envisioned the replacement of the T-28s in one 

squadron and the A-1 Hs in another with F-5s sometime between 1966 and 1968. 

He called for a total of nine L-19 liaison squadrons (one for each regular ground 

division) and four helicopter squadrons. He visualized air reconnaissance 

handled by a squadron of four RT-33s and eighteen RT-28s. Air transport would 

be performed by a single squadron of C-47s during fiscal year 1965 and by two 

I53 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

C-I23 squadrons, one each in 1965 and 1968. This program was eventually 

trimmed. The nine liaison squadrons, for example, were cut to 

Rowland also pointed out the advantages of pilot training in Vietnam. In 

October a detachment of the Air Training Command was scheduled for movement, to open an H-19 helicopter pilot training program at Tan Son Nhut. Two 

months later, a second detachment was dispatched to give liaison pilot training at 

Nha 

To meet the rise in air requirements envisaged by the National Campaign 

Plan, General Anthis in October and November 1962 asked for these new 

squadrons: one T-28 (25 aircraft), one B-26 (25 planes), a third C-I23 (at least), 

two RF-101, two RB-26, and three liaison. Anthis justified the liaison units on 

several grounds. General Rowland’s program had been whittled down, a current 

shortage of forward air control craft had delayed or deferred many strike 

missions, and a step-up in visual reconnaissance and convoy cover could be 

The MACV J-4 set forth airlift requirements in support of the National 

Campaign Plan. His ideas of “wholesale” and “retail” operations resembled 

Army thinking. He specified sealift to five port areas, then C-I23 lift to various 

airfields where U-1 Otters, CV-2 Caribous, and helicopters working with the 

corps were to pick up the cargo for ultimate delivery. He estimated having to 

move 36,000 short tons per month by air (4.3 million ton miles of airlift). This was 

almost twice the capacity of the two C-I23 squadrons and the CV-2 company 

I54 
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS 

ODA NANG 

PLEIKU 

II CTZ 

CORPS TACTICAL ZONES 

(AFTER NOVEMBER 1962) 

already in Vietnam. In December General Harkins requested two more C-123 

squadrons (thirty-two aircraft) and an additional CV-2 company (sixteen planes) 

for arrival in the first three months of 

At first the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program was managed out of 

the American Embassy by the CIA. Later the program went under MACV and 

the U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional), formed at Nha Trang on September 

15, 1962. Working through the tactical air control system and the air operations 

center, Farm Gate had serviced these units. While General Anthis wished to 

continue the practice, General Harkins preferred to give the Special Forces their 

own organic airlift and fire support-a miniature tactical air force. Harkins was 

thinking of setting aside four L-20s or L-28s for liaison, four CV-2 Caribous for 

airlift, and twelve UH-1 armed helicopters and four OV-1 Mohawks for strikes. 

These craft were to be controlled by the Special Forces commander at Nha 

Trang. 

General Anthis dissented on the ground that the twenty-four aircraft would 

displace the Vietnamese planes at Nha Trang. He remarked that every ground 

unit could not have “its own separate air force.” Admiral Felt ruled in favor of 

central control of air support. He expressly said that he would allow no assignment of air power direct to the Vietnamese irregulars or to the U.S. Special 

Forces. Harkins next proposed to use Air America contract airlift for this 

purpose. In the end, a compromise was arranged. The Mohawks and Caribous 

disappeared from the proposal. With Defense Secretary McNamara’s approval, 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force sent twelve nonorganic helicopters 

and four liaison planes to Vietnam for the Special Forces, to enable team chiefs 

to visit remote and otherwise inaccessible posts. Harkins agreed to use the other 

craft within the tactical air control system. But in December and over Felt’s 

objections, he withdrew the four Army Caribou transports from the Southeast 

Asia Military Airlift System and committed them to direct support of the Special 

Forces.” 

Preliminary “explosion” operations got under way in late October 1962. 

Ranger forces gathered for a penetration into Viet Cong Zone Din Phuoc Long, 

Binh Long, and Phuoc Thanh Provinces (called a Special Tactical Zone). In spite 

of poor weather and deficient target marking, AD-6s on November 20 conducted 

prelanding bombardment. Five Mule Train C-1 23s and twelve Vietnamese C-47s 

dropped five hundred paratroopers at a site selected as a base camp on the 

eastern edge of Zone D. On December 19 troops moved into Zone D, where 

double tree-canopy-cover towered to eighty feet. Planes flew eight interdiction 

strikes and also close support missions. On the 23d a B-26 dropped napalm, and 

on January I, 1963, a B-26 and two T-28s attacked with general purpose bombs. 

Results in this thickly forested but fairly dry terrain turned out better than 

expected. An Army advisor who visited four interdiction targets found proof of a 

hasty enemy retreat. Rockets and SO-caliber rounds had pierced the jungle 

canopy, and 500-pound bombs had smashed trees to scatter lethal wood fragments. There were ten fresh Viet Cong graves. In three weeks the rangers killed 

sixty-two Viet Cong and took ten prisoners, at a cost of twelve killed and 

sixty-eight 

When a report revealed a large Viet Cong assembly east of the city of Tay 

Ninh in northern Tay Ninh Province, III Corps hurriedly launched a three-day 

heliborne assault by the 5th Division on December 19. The size of the enemy 

force was overstated but the troops caught three Viet Cong. The prisoners gave 

the locations, functions, and staffing of twelve headquarters of the National 

Liberation Front. After special agents verified this information, Ill Corps asked 

the Joint General Staff to authorize a three-day strike against the headquarters. 

Most of the twelve lay within ten miles of the Cambodian border, too close in the 

opinion of Americans. The Joint General Staff disapproved the air attacks, but 

President Diem considered the chance too attractive. He set the operation for 

January 2, 1963. 

The operation was planned to kick off with a heavy hour-long air attack 

against nine targets most distant from the border. Some delayed-action bombs 

would be used. Next was to be a drop of 1,250 paratroops and a helicopter 

landing of a ranger battalion, covered by “light strafing attacks.” The fighters 

would fly airborne alert from daybreak to dark, with C-47s helping out through 

the night. President Diem wanted American pilots to keep an eye on Vietnamese 

troops, and prevent them from straying across the border into Cambodia. So 

that advance reconnaissance flights would not warn the enemy, key commanders 

flew over the terrain in a C-123. 

156 
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS 

The entire force of twenty-six Vietnamese AD-6s and Farm Gate’s sixteen 

B-26s and twenty-four T-28s at Bien Hoa engaged in the operation. Their 

day-long support was called “splendid.” The paratroopers and rangers suffered 

nine casualties but killed seventy-six Viet Cong and captured individual weapons 

and documents. Early assessments based on prisoner of war interrogations and 

on an intercepted Viet Cong radio message credited the air strikes with killing 

about four hundred persons. Later information coming from Cambodia raised 

the number to between eight hundred and one thousand. American observers 

praised the operation as the most successful ever undertaken in III Corps, 

terming it an intelligent use of tactical air 

Overshadowing these encouraging successes was the failure near the village 

of Ap Bac in IV Corps. Ap Bac involved the 7th Division, reputed to have killed 

more Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta than any other division. So well had the 7th 

performed in the important Plain of Reeds that it appeared to have wrested 

control from the communists. The enemy leaders seemed on the point of pulling 

back their regular units to sanctuary bases. 

Late in December 1962, intelligence pinpointed a Viet Cong radio in a 

relatively out-of-reach area near Ap Bac. The village was situated in a complex of 

hamlets thirty-five miles southwest of Saigon and around fifteen miles northwest 

of the 7th Division command post at My Tho, capital of Dinh Tuong Province. 

In this rice-growing delta region, canals, dikes, and dirt roads channeled movement. Villages and tree lines offered cover and concealment to defenders. Soft 

fertile earth made digging foxholes easy, and paddies gave good fields of fire. 

Nearly a company of Viet Cong troops was suspected to be in position to protect 

the radio, which was supposed to transmit for the Viet Cong Central Office for 

South Vietnam. On December 29 the newly appointed 7th Division commander 

decided to knock out this prize. 

He selected two battalions from different regiments, a company of mechanized infantry in M-1 13 amphibious armored personnel carriers, a ranger 

company, and three battalions of artillery (two of 105-mm and one of 155-mm 

howitzers). A paramilitary provincial force of three battalions would help out. 

The division commander planned heliborne landings north and west of Ap Bac, 

these troops to sweep south and meet the M-113s rolling north. Lt. Col. John P. 

Vann, senior U.S. Army advisor, wished to start the operation at once to avert 

intelligence leaks. He suggested December 31 at the latest, but helicopters were 

not to be had before January 2, 1963. 

Maj. Herbert L. Prevost, a USAF air liaison officer first learned of the 

operation on December 30. He readied a plan for strike aircraft support, but 

discovered on the 31st that all available aircraft would be supporting the operation in northern Tay Ninh Province. The U.S. Army 93d Helicopter Company 

nonetheless agreed to go ahead with the helicopter landings. It furnished ten 

transport helicopters plus one UH-1B and four HU-1A helicopter gunships 

(armed with rockets and machineguns) to fly cover and fire-support missions. At 

the final briefing on January 1 Major Prevost accented the absence of fighter 

I57 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

support. Perhaps, he suggested, the air operations center would respond to 

emergency strike requests. He alerted the center to the possibility. 

The provincial troops deployed at on the of January, and the 

operation commenced shortly thereafter. Instead of meeting a Viet company near 7th Division ran into a battalion. Armed with heavy machineguns, automatic rifles, and 60-mm mortars, the foe was dug in under the tree lines 

bordering the helicopter landing zones. The first three helicopter lifts from Tan 

airfield landed safely, but during the landing of the fourth an was 

downed by enemy fire. The gunships sought in vain to suppress the ground 

fire. They used up rounds of and 7.62-mm machinegun ammunition along with one hundred 2.75-inch rockets. An trying to rescue the 

crew of the downed helicopter was shot out of the sky, and a UH-1 B was disabled 

and it crashed. Two other damaged made it back to Tan 

At a Vietnamese over radioed the air operations center 

for help. The center diverted two AD-6s armed for strafing and they arrived at 

Afterwards the center kept and also armed for strafing, 

continuously active in the area. These planes failed to quiet the enemy 

guns. Not until the arrival of a Farm Gate at I540 did things look up. This 

aircraft’s repeated runs with napalm, bombs, rockets, and guns broke the Viet 

defensive position near the village. 

By then the communists had won the battle. They pinned down the 

borne forces, and put the armored company out of action by focusing fire on the 

gunners of the personnel carriers. (The gunners were exposed from the waist up.) 

The Corps commander and the senior U.S. Army advisor, Col. Daniel 

Porter, had reached Tan at noon. They suggested a paratrooper drop 

east of to block Viet escape routes. The division commander and 

Colonel agreed, and that afternoon the Joint General Staff chose three 

paratrooper companies from nearby Tan Son Nhut. Boarding six 

troops floated down close to at I8 Because their drop zone placed 

them west rather than east of the village, they were in no position to stem the 

enemy retreat. 

During the night separate Vietnamese units engaged in firefights with one 

another while the Viet battalion escaped with its wounded and all but four 

of its dead. As regular troops moved cautiously into the next day, 

advance elements came under the fire of friendly mortars. Five men were killed 

and fourteen wounded. 

The final reckoning was sixty-five Vietnamese and three Americans killed, 

one hundred Vietnamese and six U.S. advisors wounded; fourteen helicopters hit 

by enemy fire and five shot down. The Vietnamese captured two Viet 

found four bodies, and killed an estimated one hundred enemy. Afterwards the 

Viet admitted eighteen killed, thirty-three WOUNDED three missing, plus 

twenty-nine civilians killed. Clearly the had been poorly managed and 

poorly fought. The Vietnamese and Americans lost in in reputation 

for power. Colonel subsequently suggested that several Vietnamese officers 

I58 
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS 

should be relieved of command. He spoke bitterly to newsmen of wrong decisions during the 

On General Harkin’s orders, the Vietnamese Joint Operations Evaluaton 

Group came up with the reasons for the Ap Bac defeat. There had been no prior 

air-ground planning and no fighter escort for cover. When Vietnamese Air Force 

and Farm Gate strike aircraft were diverted to Ap Bac, the crews did not know 

the local situation. Communications between friendly forces had been deficient 

and no fire support coordination center existed. Armed H-2 Is had tried to rescue 

downed crews before Viet Cong fire was silenced. Paratroopers dropped shortly 

before nightfall had been improperly loaded and briefed. They had fought 

friendly troops. Without waiting for the formal report, Harkins asked the 

Vietnamese to relieve two commanders.21 

To Admiral Felt the unescorted helicopter operation at Ap Bac was wrong. 

Visiting Vietnam, he spoke with Diem and senior Vietnamese and American 

officials. He told Harkins, “Experience has taught us that the VC are not 

surprised by helicopter landings and are able to ambush helicopters.” Felt could 

“not understand” how commanders could ignore “the fundamentals of warfare” 

by failing to prepare the landing area. He could not conceive how they could have 

decided to conduct a key operation when available air support was busy elsewhere. It was time that everyone learned that armed “helicopters were no 

adequate substitute” forighter support. All helicopter lifts needed strikeaircraft. 

When Felt questioned whether MACV was downgrading air activities, General 

Harkins explained that there were too few tactical aircraft in Vietnam to cover 

every heliborne mission. As a matter of fact, he said, twenty-four operations in 

the preceding month had been without air cover.22 

General Anthis proposed exact procedures to make certain that Vietnamese 

ground commanders and U.S. Army helicopter companies coordinated helicopter assault actions. Only the air operations center could assure that fighters 

preceded and protected every heliborne landing. The Vietnamese Air Force 

could furnish corps commanders with strafing, close air support, reconnaissance, 

photography, and airlift. But centralized control over all air power guaranteed 

fast emergency 

That each corps commander wielded virtually absolute control over air 

power within his boundaries led to peculiar situations. In January 1963, for 

example, air interdiction was out of the question in IV Corps. The corps 

commander simply refused such missions to avoid political repercussions if 

noncombatants were accidentally killed or wounded. On the 2d of January the I 

Corps commander ordered no strikes to be flown without his personal approval. 

Inasmuch as he was often away from his headquarters at Da Nang, it was usually 

impossible to fill requests from the field for immediate help. Later that year, a 

new I Corps commander used the Vietnamese C47 flareships as his personal 

transports. He assigned helicopters and liaison planes to divisions and task forces 

permanently rather than in line with mission needs. The Joint General Staff 

required no advance notice from corps on operations being planned and executed, unless the commander wanted more aircraft from Saigon. Given these 

159 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

conditions, a well-coordinated countrywide air campaign against the Viet Cong 

was 

Also impeding well-integrated air operations was the U.S. Army practice of 

making aviation units an integral part of the ground forces. The bitterness of the 

roles-and-missions argumenl. spilled over when General Anthis several months 

later pinned the failure at Ap Bac on the Army’s air concepts. He dubbed the 

Army “a customer that is also a competitor.” Seeing “the spectre of more Ap 

Bac’s to come,” he said that 

in some ways it would be better if the Army suffered a few relatively minor reverses at 

this time. Certainly it would be better if their concept of close air support were 

discredited now in a relatively inexpensive way than to wait for the ultimate catastrophe their concept must lead us to at a time and place where we will not have the 

elasticity we presently 

Admiral Felt also believed that the air operations center and the airlift 

coordinating board had to be “fully exploited” for combined and joint ground 

and air operations. He judged this the way to make best use of limited air 

resources and facilities. “Until the Army air effort joins the club,” General 

O’Donnell stated, “with the intent to cooperate wholeheartedly in the achievement of valid operational objectives, there will not be unity in the air 

The USAF element of Strike Command, a joint readiness force in the 

United States, proposed a return to World War II organizational procedures. 

That is, the Air Force would own and man air request communications down to 

Army battalion level. To expand communications for air liaison officers and 

forward air controllers, the Air Staff furnished 2d Air Division with twenty 

contingency teams. Each consisted of an airman operator and a commercial 

KWM-2A single-sideband “suitcase”radio. Although messages were speeded to 

the air operations center, there were too few teams to go around. General Anthis 

eventually suggested setting up an air request net within the Vietnamese ground 

General O’Donnell felt sure that the tactical air control system had proved 

its worth in the battle for Ap Bac. After all it had diverted planes to aid 

Vietnamese troops at a critical time. With an air request net, he suggested, the 

system would be flexible enough to support the decentralized National Campaign Plan. General Harkins disagreed. He said geography and imperfect communications ruled out direct centralized control of the total air effort. Better, he 

thought, to commit teams of Vietnamese and USAF strike aircraft to the corps 

tactical zones and under their control. Harkins said the main function of the joint 

operations center was to redistribute planes among the several zones according to 

the tempo of local 

These and other factors induced MACV in March to form a Flight Service 

Center and Network at Tan Son Nhut to which every military flight would 

report. General Harkins sought by this action to satisfy in part Admiral Felt’s 

wish for General Anthis, the MACV air component commander, to possess 

complete “coordinating authority” over air operations in Vietnam. 

160 
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS 

Seeking to settle the matter once and for all, Admiral Felt compromised. He 

asked Harkins to operate USAF aircraft in Vietnam under the tactical air control 

system. The air operations center was to assign or allocate aircraft to the control 

of the tactical corps for fixed periods. Felt also requested Harkins to bring U.S. 

Army aviation units under the control system. Placing air operations under 

centralized control would prevent mutual interference, facilitate flight following, 

simplify air defense identification problems, and upgrade combat 

General Harkins responded that the tactical air control system had not the 

communications for precise coordination. In July he gave the MACV J-3 Army 

air operations section general supervision over U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. 

Army aviation. He designated the Marine Corps headquarters in I Corps and the 

Army aviation battalion headquarters in the other corps zones to direct their air 

operations. General Anthis protested the arrangement, saying it would create 

two and perhaps five separate air control systems-and separate air warswithin Vietnam. Harkins replied, “Let’s give these things a three or four month 

trial.” He promised to change the setup if it failed to 

The controversy reflected an overall decentralization. After Michael V. 

Forrestal of the White House staff and Roger Hilsman of the State Department 

visited Vietnam in December 1962, they criticized the “elaborate, set-piece” 

military operations and the use of air power. Too many people, they informed 

President Kennedy, were managing the American effort. There was no overall 

direction. They recommended a single strong executive-possibly a general, 

preferably a civilian (an ambassador)-to dominate all departments and agencies in the country and to give a single thrust to the multiple 

The USAF directorate of plans drafted a position paper for possible use by 

General LeMay at the Joint Chiefs meeting of January 7,1963. According to the 

paper, the situation was of the “greatest concern,” even though many U.S. 

programs enjoyed a long leadtime. “But when I see the Viet Cong continue to 

grow in strength, I can only assume that WEARE NOT WINNING.” Army and 

Air Force doctrinal disputes ought to be taken out of Vietnam. CINCPAC’s 

requests should receive prompt attention. Harkins was in need of the “best 

possible advice” through an Air Force deputy, and Anthis should manage all air 

operations. The major political obstacle of the war was Diem’s failure to secure 

the real support and backing of his people. The major military obstacle was 

trying to erase the guerrillas in the face of a seemingly endless stream of 

replacements. Needed were greater U.S. air power until the Vietnamese Air 

Force could go it alone, in-country pilot training of Vietnamese, and destruction 

of Viet Cong food crops. “We should consider now the application of selected, 

measured sanctions against the North Vietnamese.” Actions would range from 

infiltrating agents through air bombardment to 

Whatever was said at the January 7 meeting, the chiefs chose to send Gen. 

Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, and a team of senior officers from the 

military services to Vietnam. The group’s mission was “to form a military 

judgment as to the prospects for a successful conclusion of the conflict within a 

reasonable period of 

161 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

The team spent January in Vietnam, soon after the battle at 

The members examined the National Campaign Plan and endorsed the concept 

of “many small operations with decentralized control,” undertaken “at an 

pace by each corps, division, and sector commander in his own area.” 

They noted with approval that the tempo of small actions was quickening to 

per month. and they looked for an upsurge in the future. The group was pleased 

with what appeared to be adequate coordination of political, economic, and 

military 

Paying little attention to the battle of the team heard General 

announce satisfaction with the air organization. His staff needed no 

stronger Air Force representation. The Mohawks could do more than 

reconnaissance. Could they be armed with rockets? Could the rule prohibiting 

armed helicopters from returning fire except in self-defense be 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff swiftly authorized U.S. Army helicopters “to 

engage clearly identified elements which are considered to be a threat 

to the safety of the helicopters and their passengers.” Admiral Felt then permitted 

arming the Mohawks with 2.75-inch rockets.” 

While the Wheeler team was sympathetic toward augmenting Air Force 

units, the civilian leadership in Washington was more concerned with turning the 

conflict over to the Vietnamese. On February Hanoi called upon the International Control Commission to eject from Vietnam the USAF units that were 

“playing a key role” and causing widespread damage. Secretary of State Rusk 

was disturbed. He could hardly prevent American reporters from observing and 

writing about U.S. operations. However, he wanted the MACV to 

release no information on American combat air actions. The United States, 

Rusk said, ought not to hand the communists an excuse to escalate 

The U.S. newspapers publicized the authorization for American helicopters 

to fire on the enemy. Secretary refused to comment except to say that 

American military personnel were under instructions to fire their weapons only 

when their own safety was at stake, Secretary Rusk reiterated, “Our policy 

remains that the American role in Vietnam be strictly limited to advisory, 

logistic, and training 

General Wheeler’s assessment in January rang with optimism. 

The situation in Vietnam, Wheeler said, had been “reoriented, in the space of a 

year and a half, from a circumstance of near desperation to a condition where 

victory is now a hopeful prospect.” A heartening sign was the steep rise in 

American advisory strength from nine hundred at the start of 1962 to more than 

three thousand. At first there had been no advisors with battalions, but now there 

were over four hundred. In a year the number of advisors helping province chiefs 

had grown from two to one hundred or more. Though “we have not given 

Chi Minh any evidence that we are prepared to call him to account for helping 

keep the insurgency alive,” Wheeler said, “we are winning slowly in the present 

thrust.” There was compelling reason to 

Air Force officers on the team did not quite agree with General Wheeler’s 

evaluation. They believed sizable and long-lasting U.S. help a must. The war 

I 

I62 
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS 

could not be won quickly, nor could it be won finally until the Vietnamese people 

got behind the government. This demanded military, political, and economic 

actions - “U.S. assistance is vitally engaged in building a country, not in 

defending a weak country against superior 

MACV intelligence estimates showed that the number of full-time Viet 

Cong guerrillas had risen through infiltration and local recruitment to between 

twenty-two thousand and twenty-five thousand. Each month about five hundred 

stole into Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia. Late in January 1963 a 

meeting was reportedly held in the Chinese Embassy at Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Representatives of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and the Soviets 

agreed to add twelve battalions to the Viet Cong. Eight were to be transferred 

from Laos and four recruited in 

To the Viet Cong the battle of Ap Bac was apparently a major turning point 

in the war. It instilled confidence in their ability to fight American helicopters and 

armored vehicles. Enemy leaders took credit for a new tactic - the deliberately 

invited battle, described as “wipe-out-enemy-posts-and-annihilate-enemy reinforcements.” They would often resort to this tactic in the Mekong Delta, almost 

always to good 

On the Vietnamese side, there was a lull in military action after Ap Bac. 

Admiral Felt believed the calm to have “both visible and hidden meaning.” The 

Vietnamese seemed to be in no hurry to launch operations. General Harkins in 

February 1963 wrote President Diem. urging him to swiftly exploit the initiative 

that his forces seemed to have seized from the foe. “Time and weather,” Harkins 

said, “are either for us or against us.” The communists, he added, “must not be 

allowed to regroup or rest. We must attack and destroy them. We must hurt them 

so badly that they will be forced to apply all their remaining resources merely to 

survive.” Otherwise the Viet Cong might “neutralize much of the gain we won at 

great cost and 

But the Ap Bac engagement and American press coverage had damaged 

relations with the Diem government. Newspaper accounts of the battle aroused 

serious resentment in Vietnamese officials, particularly David Halberstam’s 

criticism in the New York Times of Vietnamese performance. Newsmen spread 

their belief that U.S. advisors had died while trying to lead Vietnamese troops 

who would neither follow nor fight. Embittered Vietnamese leaders complained 

that correspondents were interested merely in splashing sensational news on the 

front pages when Americans were hurt. Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu recalled the 

presidential palace bombing, when she and her children were in grave danger. 

She said that U.S. reports revealed solely an “ill-concealed regret that the 

bombing had failed in its objective.” The Wheeler report commented on the 

“mutual dislike and distrust” between the Vietnamese government and the 

American press. Embarrassed by t he news reports of Vietnamese battlefield 

misconduct, President Kennedy strove to repair the eroding trust between the 

two governments. In his State of the Union Message to Congress on January 14, 

he declared that the spearhead of aggression had been blunted in 

I63 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

I 

(Top left) Maj. Ivan L. Slavich briefs Gen. Earle G. Wheeler (center) and Gen. Paul D. Harkins on a rocket 

mount of the UH-1 B helicopter. 

(Top right) An' ARVN paratrooper prepares for a jump over Cu 

(Center) TSgt. William W. Cameron instructs Vietnamese airmen in the operation 

of the gunsight on a T-28. 

(Below) Vietnamese tanks move toward the burning presidential palace after its bombing. 

I 

164 
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS 

Signs of dissension and mistrust were all too obvious. Back in November 

1962, reports had reached Admiral Felt that Diem was withdrawing more into 

seclusion and leaving many decisions to his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Both 

sometimes regarded the numerous American advisors as an encroachment on 

Vietnamese sovereignty. They feared that the cautious U.S. policy in Laos 

mirrored a weakening interest in Vietnam. They were upset by Senate Majority 

Leader Mike Mansfield’s report in February 1963. It said that after seven years 

and four billion dollars of American aid, “the same difficulties remain, if, indeed, 

they have not been compounded.” Vietnam was less stable and “more removed 

from . . . popularly responsible and responsive government.” Did this foreshadow dwindling U.S. support? 

The defense minister scored American allegations of hit-or-miss Vietnamese 

bombing as a “corrosive influence” on the military effort. American attempts to 

help the Government of Vietnam create an intelligence capability were probably 

seen by Diem as a threat to his regime. The Minister of Interior resented the 

involvement of Americans in the country as a danger to the republic’s internal 

politics. President Diem labeled the Special Forces rural aid advisors and the 

sector advisors as “particularly irritating.” Even though U.S. economic assistance financed nearly all of the counterinsurgency, Diem objected to American 

controls over matching counterpart funds. He called them degrading to Vietnam’s 

In a series of private and public statements during April 1963, Ngo Dinh 

Nhu dwelt upon U.S. “infringements” of Vietnamese sovereignty. Aid came, he 

said, with too many strings attached. He told CIA Chief John H. Richardson 

that it would help if the American presence were reduced anywhere from five 

hundred to three or four thousand men. Richardson got the impression that Nhu 

feared an emerging U.S. protectorate. Diem, Nhu said, had received many 

complaints from subordinates about their American counterparts. Publicly, Nhu 

was quoted as demanding the withdrawal of over two thousand U.S. advisors at 

lower unit levels. Obviously referring to Ap Bac, he said that some American 

casualties had occurred because the advisors were “daredevils” who exposed 

themselves needlessly to enemy fire. Taking this statement as a forerunner of 

things to come, the Vietnamese Air Force commander alerted his key personnel 

to the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces. He warned them to conserve reserves, 

prepare to go it alone, and get ready for hard days 

The Vietnamese government did not officially request a reduction of American personnel, but Nhu’s statements induced a review of U.S. troop levels. 

Evidence seemed to favor a lesser commitment of forces. Sir Robert Thompson 

in March had reported the government as “beginning to win the shooting war 

against the Viet Cong,”due chiefly to the American helicopters. He proposed a 

psychological ploy that Admiral Felt passed to the Joint Chiefs by message. “If 

things go right by end of 1963,” Felt said, “we should take one thousand military 

personnel out of RVN at one time, make big proclamation out of this and 

publicize widely. This would show (I) RVN is winning; (2) take steam out of 

anti-Diemites; and (3) dramatically illustrate honesty of U.S. intentions.” 

I65 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

In April a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate perceived improvement in the 

situation, despite the absence of persuasive signs that the Viet had been 

hurt.” Ambassador in May depicted relations between 

Washington and Saigon as “delicate,” but the political and socioeconomic 

conditions were promising. An excellent rice crop brightened the economic 

outlook. Completion of about fifty percent of the strategic hamlet program 

extended shelter to sixty percent of the people in defended areas. During April 

the Vietnamese armed forces took part in nine hundred offensive 

These hopeful signs encouraged Secretary at his conference in 

Hawaii in May. He said he would remove one thousand Americans from 

Vietnam by the end of the year to show that things were going well. He would try 

to pull out units in lieu of individuals, and upon departure their equipment would 

be turned over the the Vietnamese. The conflict was “not a U.S. war,” and the 

United States did not intend to fight 

Since more Americans were still arriving in Vietnam, units and individuals 

then en route were to continue their travel. There would be no personnel 

increases, however, either temporary or permanent. Each of the armed services 

was to take a comparable cut. hurt operations the least, most of the returnees 

would come from logistic units. In November and December, Air Division 

would lose 

Maybe action impressed the Vietnamese. In June the Joint 

General Staff ordered all ground forces to operate a minimum of twenty days 

every month. starting July I. was to be a “total general offensive” to attain 

“complete annihilation of the enemy” and “complete Vietnamese 

General was enthusiastic. The all-out campaign was soon to begin 

in earnest. He knew the strategy-“saturate the small and large 

military actions-was correct. It would fragment and destroy the Viet 

Unfortunately, the Viet had embarked on their own general offensive. 

I 
Although some U.S. units were scheduled to leave Vietnam by the end of 

1963, the JCS earlier that year had suggested and Secretary McNamara 

approved an additional C-I23 Provider squadron for Da Nang. Arrival of the 

777th Troop Carrier Squadron in April 1963 with sixteen C-I 23s augmented the 

airlift of the twenty-nine C-I 23s at Tan Son Nhut. Crew manning permitted each 

Provider to fly sixty hours per month. In addition eight U-1 Otters, sixteen 0-1 A 

Bird Dog observation planes, ten UH-1B Iroquois helicopters, and a second 

CV-2 Caribou company reached Vietnam to support the corps tactical zones and 

Special Forces.’ 

General Harkins, MACV commander, had agreed to place the CV-2s under 

the coordinated airlift system. However, Army headquarters in Hawaii urged 

Admiral Felt to recognize the special features of the Caribou. The Army had 

purchased the planes for short-takeoff-and-landing, which rendered them 

instantly responsive to ground commanders in combat zones. While centralized 

control of airlift was more efficient for cargo deliveries, swift reaction to a field 

commander’s needs came first. In this context Harkins assigned the two Caribou 

companies to centralized airlift control, but one of these had the further mission 

of immediate support to the senior corps advisors.* 

The Southeast Asia Airlift System managed the forty-eight Air Force 

C-I 23s, thirty-two Vietnamese C47s, and thirty-two Army CV-2s. Though the 

C-123s normally made deliveries to four major depots and twenty-nine other 

distribution points, they actually operated at ninety-five different airfields and 

sixty-five drop zones. Carrying a lighter load than the C-123, the CV-2 could use 

shorter runways. But reversible propellers let the Provider land on wet surfaces in 

distances impossible for the Caribou, not yet so equipped.) 

The 8th Aerial Port Squadron expanded in May by creating Detachments 6 

and 7 at Qui Nhon and Can Tho. Temporary duty personnel served 120-day duty 

tours at the new 

Much of the Southeast Asia Airlift System’s work dealt with tactical 

operations. About thirty percent of the troop carrier flights were paradrop 

resupply, paratrooper drops, and assault air landings. Resolute efforts to support 

remote stations drew grateful praise from the ground troops. They deemed the 

system reliable and 

Uncertain surface travel, the conservative bent of logistic planners, and the 

use of scaled U.S. planning factors tended to inflate requirements. In October the 

airlift system’s excess capacity prompted plans for reduction. In December 

MACV strength was pared by one thousand. Released were personnel of the 

Army’s 1st Aviation Company (Caribou), the thirty USAF C47 pilots flying 

with the Vietnamese Air Force, and half of the 8th Aerial Port Squadron’s 

people. The 61 st Aviation Company (Caribou) with twenty-five CV-2s stayed 

behind to support senior corps advisors. Some of these Caribous became spares 

I67 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

to insure a certain number of operational aircraft at every corps tactical 

The Air Force’s 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron was activated at Bien 

Hoa in July 1963 and assigned to PACAF. The new unit’s aircraft and crews 

trickled in. Four 0-1s and twenty-two crews were on board by July, and the 

remaining eighteen planes arrived on the USS Curdin August. Since Americans 

were forbidden to direct air strikes, eleven seasoned Vietnamese observers were 

integrated into the squadron to do so. Operational in September, the unit 

furnished more and more forward air controllers and air liaison officers for the 

National Campaign Plan. Its primary mission was to train Vietnamese liaison 

pilots in forward air control, visual reconnaissance, combat support, and 

observer procedures. The aim was to replace those pilots drained off to fill fighter 

cockpits. The squadron was to remain in Vietnam no more than a year, then turn 

its 0-1s over to the Vietnamese. 

Preparations to open a training center at Nha Trang were delayed because 

American pilots needed proficiency in the U.S Army L-19 (0-1) aircraft. General 

LeMay had ordered this plane sent in lieu of depleting the few L-28s in USAF 

stocks. As his Director of Plans, Maj. Gen. John W. Carpenter, III, said, “The 

Chief clearly expressed his desires toward getting on with the war against the 

communists in Vietnam as opposed to worrying about the source of light 

aircraft.” After twenty-five officers and sixty-nine airmen underwent factory 

training in July and August, they opened the Nha Trang center in September. 

Trainees took one month of preflight instruction and three months of primary 

flight training that included eighty hours of actual flying. Vietnamese liaison 

pilots in reasonable numbers were ready for combat in early 

Twelve Air Force officers and forty-seven airmen reached Tan Son Nhut in 

January 1963 to train Vietnamese helicopter pilots. By June they graduated 

fifteen student pilots who were qualified to fly H-19s. The training went on 

throughout the 

Admiral Felt hoped that the Vietnamese could have the four RT-33 jets 

authorized by the Military Assistance Program. In February, however, Secretary 

of State Rusk announced that “over-riding political considerations” and “international risks” ruled out their delivery. Shortly thereafter, the Joint Chiefs 

approved a boost in USAF reconnaissance aircraft, including four RB-26s and 

two more RF-101s for Farm Gate. The RB-26s reached Tan Son Nhut in March 

from Fort Worth, Tex. Two of them were equipped for night photography, and 

the other two were experimental RB-26Ls specially outfitted with night photo 

and Reconofax 1V infrared sensing devices. In May, Fifth Air Force’s 6091st 

Reconnaissance Squadron flew two RB-57s to a temporary duty site at Tan Son 

Nhut. These jets featured advanced and improved day-and-night K-52 panoramic cameras and Reconofax VI infrared 

Airborne high-frequency direction finders had difficulty locating Viet Cong 

radio transmitters. More than two hundred enemy sets were active, but it was 

impossible to fix their exact sites. General Anthis and other officials thought it 

might be better to listen to the traffic instead of disrupting or destroying it. In any 

event, knowing where the radios were operating was deemed 

I68 
AIR OPERATIONS, 

Infrared devices were meant to detect thermal radiation emitted by campfires, vehicles, structures, and traffic on trails and streams. In theory the sensors 

could pinpoint activities hidden from normal photography. But the Reconofax 

infrared photo equipment on the broke down, and the technical 

representative in Vietnam could not make the system (originally designed for 

work. Climatic conditions, chiefly dust and dampness, fouled the sensors. 

Heat from the photoflare cartridge ejectors forward of the infrared system 

saturated the infrared detector and ruined the film. 

As for the infrared sensors, integral components were missing. 

The plane’s panoramic cameras provided very clear horizon-to-horizon pictures 

even at high speed and low altitude. Having both horizons in the shot enhanced 

the perspective of the photo interpreter, but he had to learn how to compensate 

for distortion in the wide lateral coverage.” 

When equipment worked, the intelligence apparatus was often unable to 

exploit the information gathered. The zonal concept of ground operations 

worked against a centralized air reconnaissance network. Separating intelligence 

data by corps tactical zone was not easy because planes flew across corps 

boundaries. Moreover, there were no courier aircraft to deliver reconnaissance 

film rapidly throughout Vietnam before the coming of two from the United 

States in May. Army Mohawks attached to Vietnamese ground divisions 

reacted quickly to shifting situations. However, the intelligence they collected 

was not fed into the national intelligence-reconnaissance setup. General 

still labeled the Mohawks as “complementary” rather than “competitive” to 

USAF and Vietnamese tactical air reconnaissance. He saw no need to coordinate 

them with the standard activities, saying they were “outside the specialized 

capabilities of other photo 

Air Force planes flew nearly all the reconnaissance in yet the flights 

failed to glean a great deal of intelligence. By reason of weather, jungle, and 

forested terrain, finding and photographing the small and fleeting enemy targets 

was a stiff 

Air defense radar control centers were situated at Tan Son Nhut, 

and Pleiku. These and the radar at Thailand, gave high-altitude surveillance. The interceptor fleet consisted of Air Force and Navy EA-IF 

(AD-SQ) all-weather fighters rotated to Saigon. Mountain screening cluttered 

radar coverage below feet. The performed marginally in low-level 

interceptions, while the EA-I lacked the speed to intercept aircraft intruding in 

areas distant from Saigon. To stretch the coverage and especially to scan much of 

south-central Vietnam, the Vietnamese Air Force moved a training 

radar from Tan Son Nhut to Ban Me in February 

From February to an unusual number of low-level, slow-flying radar 

tracks appeared before midnight near Pleiku and then disappeared 

before dawn. Air Force and Navy interceptors investigated, using flares and 

other techniques. They found nothing, the tracks vanishing from ground and air 

radars as the planes approached. Around on February a Navy 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

aircraft intercepted a flight of ducks. Consequently officials concluded that 

migrating waterfowl had caused the unknown 

Convinced that no air battles would be fought in Vietnam, General Harkins 

nevertheless sensed the need for flight following. Since November 1961, Mule 

Train transport squadrons had used their network of high-frequency radios. 

Farm Gate crews reported their inflight positions to the nearest radar control 

center every thirty minutes. On January 10, 1963, an Army OV-I was lost during 

an unreporfed flight out of Qui Nhon, and it took over two hundred fifty search 

sorties to find the plane. In March the Flight Service Center and Network was 

born at Tan Son 

The reduced likelihood of communist air intrusions and the birth of the 

Flight Service Center and Network threw into question the need for the F-102s 

and EA-IFs at Tan Son Nhut. Safety considerations alone seemed to warrant 

their removal, for 233 military aircraft of all sorts used the airfield, along with 

commercial planes. General Anthis wanted to clear the 10,000-foot runway by 

moving out some of the helicopters, but PACAFsuggested keeping the interceptors on call in the Philippines. These planes withdrew in May. The supersonic 

F-102s could return to Tan Son Nhut within twelve hours, the EA-I Fs within 

forty-eight. There was no call for them in 1963 

Triggered by President Kennedy’s approval on December 31, 1962, to 

augment Farm Gate, the Air Force in 1963 acted to regularize the status of its 

units in Vietnam. Admiral Felt furnished the impetus when he spurned the 

principle hitherto held that USAF personnel sent to the country had to have 

prior training in counterinsurgency. Farm Gate, he said, was flying conventional 

missions. Airmen could accordingly be assigned on a routine permanent change 

of station basis. This would clear the way for doubling the number of aircrews 

and maintenance men, and could raise the sortie rate by twenty-five or thirty 

percent. Felt in addition wished to boost the number of liaison aircraft and 

forward air controllers by a full two squadrons, to furnish visual reconnaissance 

beyond anything already on hand. This, he said, would be the key to a successful 

National Campaign 

Genera! LeMay in early February pressed for putting U.S. markings on 

Farm Gate aircraft. He said that “current classification restrictions on Farm Gate 

are considered unnecessary. Actual operation is well known through SVN and 

classification has become an administrative burden.” The State Department 

queried Ambassador Nolting on a series of articles in the press on U.S. combat 

air activities, particularly those of American-piloted aircraft. In his reply Nolting 

pointed out the rather “gradual (and inevitable) uncovering of facts by U.S. 

journalists.”That Americans flew combat aircraft was common knowledge. This 

was expressly true after the deaths of Capts. John P. Bartley and John F. 

Shaughnessy, Jr., in an RB-26 downed by Viet Cong fire on February 3, and the 

loss of Maj. James E. O’Neill in a crash three days Secretary of State 

Rusk, however, continued to accent the American role as “strictly limited to 

advisory, logistic, and training 

170 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963 

General LeMay in March again asked for permission to declassify Farm 

Gate but Ambassador Nolting said, “We are winning without such overt U.S. 

action. 1 

By June 1963 MACV had 16,652 people, 4,790 of them Air Force. On the 

28th. Secretary of Defense McNamara froze MACV strength. To clear up the 

confusing array of USAF units, PACAF formed new ones without expanding 

manpower On July 8 Farm Gate at Bien Hoa became the 1st 

Air Commando Squadron (Composite), a regular PACAF organization. 

Although PACAF wanted the code name Farm Gate dropped, Air Force 

headquarters disapproved because various logistic facilities supporting Farm 

Gate were thoroughly familiar with the name and all it implied. As 1st Air 

Commando Squadron, Farm Gate contained two strike sections. The first 

consisted of ten B-26s with twenty-three crews (pilot and navigator) and two 

RB-26s. The second had thirteen T-28s with two crewmembers per plane. In 

addition there were two support sections, one of four psychological warfare 

U-10s and the other of six C-47s. The remaining eight B-26s were in detachments 

at Pleiku and Soc 

Likewise on July 8 the 33d and 34th Tactical Groups came into being. Based 

at Tan Son Nhut and under the 33d Tactical Group were the 33d Air Base 

Squadron, the 33d Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (CAM RON), 

and Detachment 1 (a ,reconnaissance element). The 33d Group also had detachments at Can Tho and Nha Trang. 

At Bien Hoa the 34th Tactical Group consisted of the 19th Tactical Air 

Support Squadron, the 34th Air Base Squadron, and the 34th CAMRON. 

Detachments of the 34th Group were at Pleiku and Soc Trang. 

Directly under 2d Air Division was the 23d Air Base Group, activated at Da 

Nang with its 23d CAMRON. A detachment of the group at Qui Nhon was 

previously the 6222d Air Base Squadron. 

General Anthis wanted a single control point for the packets of reconnaissance detachments called Able Mable, Black Watch, Patricia Lynn, and Sweet 

Sue. He therefore requested a tactical air reconnaissance squadron for his 2d Air 

Division, but the Air Staff could not create the unit within the authorized force 

structure. In consequence the commander of Detachment I, 33d Tactical Group, 

exercised a loose central direction over the reconnaissance operations. 

The Mule Train C-I23 units became troop carrier squadrons the 309th 

and 310th at Tan Son Nhut and the 31 Ith at Da Nang. They were part of the 

3 15th Troop Carrier Group (Assault), attached to 2d Air Division but assigned 

to PACAF’s 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) headquartered in Japan. 

The upshot of this sweeping reorganization was to free General Anthis from 

dealing directly with twelve or more major subordinate 

Farm Gate gained fresh aircraft in January 1963 five T-28s, ten B-26s, 

and two C-47s and by February boasted forty-two planes and 275 men. 

General Anthis fashioned an air strike team of six B-26s and one C-47 at Pleiku, 

which had been revamped to take B-26s. He formed another of five T-28s and 

171 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

one C-47 at Soc Trang, where the unimproved 3,200-foot runway admitted. only 

T-28 operations. 25 

Until General Harkins in midyear gave the Vietnamese border control 

troops some aircraft of their own, Farm Gate flew combat support for them. 

These forces embraced about five thousand Vietnamese army, rangers, and 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel, accompanied by U.S. Special Forces advisors. They manned 103 outposts along Vietnam’s 900-mile land border to 

cut down on Viet Cong infiltration. Varying in size from platoon to battalion, 

they further carried out covert penetrations across the frontier. State Department pressure prompted the Joint General Staff to forbid ground and air 

operations within ten kilometers of the border without prior approval. MACV 

termed the restriction “completely incongruous,” for this strip of de facto demilitarized territory afforded the Viet Cong safe haven. 26 

Over the last days of March 1963, U.S. Special Forces mounted an operation in the Seven Mountains of southwestern Vietnam. Farm Gate bombing 

before the assault killed about one hundred fifty enemy and let the ground troops 

move into the hills. Capt. John Sercel, the 2d Air Division forward air controller 

assigned to the operation, went with the troops on foot and directed air strikes 

with a PRC-10 radio. Even though the attack brought Vietnamese territory 

under government control, the IV Corps commander protested the intrusion into 

his zone. The Joint General Staff then ruled that Special Forces teams had to 

request air support through Vietnamese 

Ten days later the Joint General Staff removed earlier curbs on border 

operations. Vietnamese ground forces could now operate to the border wherever 

a geographical feature such as a river or road clearly marked it. Elsewhere they 

could go to within one thousand meters of the border, except along the northern 

part where a strip of ten thousand meters applied. Vietnamese aircraft could 

operate to the border where it was clearly visible, elsewhere to two thousand 

meters if a forward air controller was at hand, and to five thousand meters 

without air control. Corps headquarters rather than the Joint General Staff had 

to approve all actions along the 

The State Department ordered Ambassador Nolting to press for suspension 

of the new procedures since they could inflame Cambodia, North Vietnam, and 

China. Nolting was sympathetic to the new rules because of the considerable 

supplies coming across the borders to the Viet Cong. All the same, he and 

General Harkins talked with Vietnamese officials about how border violations 

seriously disturbed the common interests of Vietnam and the United States. 

Admiral Felt knew border incidents could be disruptive, but thought that 

trimming infiltration was worth the risk. General O’Donnell proposed having 

U.S. aircraft survey the border to correct map errors. His proposal was shelved 

for fear of breaching the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laotian 

At the Secretary of Defense Conference in Hawaii on May 6, the participants agreed that the troops stationed along the border must do their utmost to 

slow down enemy movements. But they believed putting pressure on Hanoi to be 

a better way to end infiltration. In April the Joint Chiefs had identified eight 

I72 
AIR OPERATIONS. 

targets in North Vietnam that were vulnerable to attack from American carrierand Thailand-based aircraft. Among them were the Dong and airfields, several highway bridges, POL storage, the thermal powerplant, 

a rolling mill, and a chemical plant. Bombing would be a warning to Chi 

Minh but risked bringing Chinese air assistance to North Vietnam. 

Mr. now recommended to theconferees that CINCPAC embody 

air strikes against North Vietnam for planning options. Perhaps the State 

Department fetters on covert operations into North Vietnam could be 

loosened. 

Roger of the State Department informed the group that he was 

optimistic about the border control exercised by the Special Forces and 

Strategic hamlets combined with operations were making dramatic gains. He predicted, “You have circles; in the center of each circle is 

a Special Forces team. These circles are getting bigger. When they close up, 

think you will see a noticeable choking down of the use of the infiltration 

groups.”“ 

Admiral Felt said he also expected solid progress from the air strikes against 

Viet war zones and bases. He scored these power centers as the “nuclei of 

the ‘governmental’ structure,” giving “protective sanctuaries” for offensive 

enemy operations, and providing “little arsenals and installations.” Unfortunately, all-out interdiction clashed with the individual interests of the largely 

independent corps commanders. While USAF liaison officers called for interdiction, air attacks not tied directly to ground operations began to decline. 

Vietnamese probes into Viet Zone D during February and March 

made good use of air interdiction strikes. Rangers swept into the area 

later and burnt enemy headquarters and camps along the Ma River. They 

discovered deep, log-covered bunkers built by the communists to protect against 

air attacks. Inasmuch as fighters usually circled before striking, there was enough 

time for everybody to take cover. 

In March the Air Force and Army advisors in that area got the go-ahead for 

a prolonged low-priority interdiction bombing program. Planes returning to 

base with unused ordnance could attack targets under thedirection of a Vietnamese forward air controller. Strikes got under way on April and went on almost 

every day. It was difficult to assess results due to the jungle cover. On April 

fighters surprised a gathering of Viet and attacked. Inspecting the area the 

next day, the Province chief estimated that over one hundred 

enemy had been killed. Viet deserters confirmed that the strikes inflicted 

casualties, damaged morale, and kept everyone on the move, but said the attacks 

were no serious threat to their existence. The communists kept a firm grip on 

Zone continuing to collect road taxes and to exact tribute from plantation 

owners. 

Between April and May the Corps commander spearheaded a drive 

into the Do War Zone headquarters area of Viet Interzone in the 

mountains on the borders of and Tin Provinces. 

His five regiments of ground troops and two battalions of Vietnamese marines 
I 

THE ADVISORY YEARS 

totaled about ten thousand men, assisted by an air support operations center. 

The three days of preliminary interdiction generated thirty-six A-I H, fourteen 

T-28, and t hirty-four B-26 sorties. Throughout the month-long operation, pilots 

flew I 15 A-I H, 108 T-28, and seventy-four B-26 sorties. Besides killing five Viet 

Cong, these timely and potent air strikes destroyed 238 structures and damaged 

77. The badly scattered enemy would need several months to return and reestablish Viet Cong Region 5 which, like the old Interzone V, guarded infiltration 

routes to base areas. 35 

Air Force and Vietnamese pilots faithfully followed the rule that air strikes 

had to be handled by a Vietnamese forward air controller. Although the procedure precluded armed reconnaissance aircraft from attacking targets of opportunity, it was a sound precaution against indiscriminate bombing. Crews staging 

to and from forward airfields were encouraged to fly low and seek out the enemy. 

Before they could attack, however, they needed an airborne forward air controller. Army OV-I crews enjoyed less stringent rules of engagement. They 

frequently flew as low as fifty feet, enticing the Viet Cong to open fire so they 

could shoot 

Lt. Col. David S. Mellish, Ill Corps air liaison officer, secured authority in 

September to start an air interdiction program. Vietnamese province chiefs 

certified certain areas free of friendly people. The air operations center scheduled 

air strikes under forward air controllers into these regions. Provincial officials 

This interdiction paid off in Tay Ninh and Phuoc Thanh Provinces during 

October, though, the Viet Cong learned to disperse and take cover as soon as the 

L-19 dropped smoke grenades to mark targets for the strike planes. Mellish 

persistently urged armed reconnaissance in wholly Viet Cong sections. “Vietnamese pilots,”he said, “should sweep these areas and shoot VC on sight. At present, 

we are ineffective because our politically inspired target-marking is the best 

possible air raid warning the VC could hope to have.” 

Col. Donald H. Ross, 2d Air Division director of operations, reminded his 

associates that the Vietnamese - not the Americans - were waging the war. 

Forward air controllers were vital to protect friendly people. 37 

Carefully targeted and controlled interdiction strikes on Viet Cong base 

camps, assembly areas, and logistic installations were designed to help ground 

troops clear and hold Vietnam. But the overriding air mission was support, 

preparation and cover for heliborne landings, night hamlet defense, and escort 

for convoys and trains. 38 

Over the first half of 1963, Vietnamese L- 19s usually escorted truck convoys 

and trains but strike aircraft covered those transporting high-priority cargoes. 

Vietnamese and USAF platies flew close to one thousand sorties in these 

missions. The Viet Cong ambushed no surface movement having air cover, yet 

were quick to pounce on motor columns and trains wanting aerial 

Developed from original Farm Gate tactics, night flare/strike missions in 

defense of outposts and hamlets under attack remained effective. One Vietnamese C-47 flareship stayed on night ground alert at Pleiku, a second stood similar 

.. . - reviewed each target belt weekly. 

I74 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963 

duty at Da Nang, and a third flew airborne alert every night over III and IV 

Corps. Yet the commander of the 514th Fighter Squadron refused to accept 

orders for A-I H night-strike crews alerted at Bien Hoa and Pleiku. He argued 

that his pilots were not ready to fly at night, but yielded to American pressure and 

accepted about half of the missions requested. Fighters working with a flareship 

could commonly dispense with a forward air controller during strikes in defense 

of an installation. However, for close air support of friendly troops under attack 

at night, a controller was required to mark targets. 

Success of flare/strike defensive missions depended upon the speed with 

which those under attack could report to an air support operations center. By 

May 1963 most villages had radios, and the time lapse between attack and report 

averaged about forty-eight minutes. The delay stemmed chiefly from the short 

ranges of the provincial radio transmitters that demanded retransmission of 

messages, often at district, sector, and division levels. Viet Cong attacks on 

hamlets and outposts from January through April were few, and an average of 

thirty-three C47 sorties was flown each month. The enemy customarily broke 

off an attack when a flare plane came on the 

In the far northern I Corps, the 1st and 2d Divisions controlled the coastal 

plain to the mountains. The Viet Cong owned the mountains aside from Special 

Forces camps along the Laotian border and in the A Shau Valley corridor 

toward Da Nang. In mid-January 1963 the U.S. Marine Corps helicopter 

squadron H M M-162 became operational at Da Nang, with staging areas at Hue 

and at a point midway between Da Nang and Quang Ngai. This unit’s H-34s 

supported the border outposts with resupply and troop-exchange missions that 

normally needed no strike aircraft support. But air mobile troops assault operations took careful advance planning for fighter escort, landing-zone preparation, 

and air cover. In these operations the H-34s flew in three-ship elements, one 

minute apart, en route to the landing zone. The helicopter commanders ran the 

whole affair, calling for strike aircraft to neutralize enemy fire. Even though the 

Marine Corps helicopter commanders evaluated the Vietnamese A-I H pilots as 

“outstanding,” they favored USAF fighters because there was no communications language problem. When a platoon of Army UH-1 helicopters at Da Nang 

was attainable in April, these gunships protected landing zones. 

The I Corps commander had to approve all requests for air strikes. 

Members of 2d Air Division who visited the air operations center there had the 

impression that U.S. Army advisors dominated the scene. For example, the 

advisors funneled many air support requests to the two armed OV-1 Mohawks 

stationed at Da 

In the II Corps eight USAF B-26s joined the four Vietnamese A-I Hs at 

Pleiku. At once air support sorties rose, probably because Vietnamese ground 

officers could see the aircraft on hand. But communications with the division 

command posts at Qui Nhon and Quang Ngai were regularly unreliable. And 

bad weather in the moutains east and northeast of Pleiku repeatedly impeded 

flights to the coastal provinces. 42 

175 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

AIR OPERATIONS 

CAI 

To shake weather restrictions, MACV shifted two Pleiku to 

Since the Vietnamese pilots were unable or unwilling to operate out of Qui 

and aircraft from Pleiku or supported the 9th and 

25th Divisions. The division commanders complained that they had to divulge 

their operational plans before they wanted to. Also for a short while, the 

Liaison Squadron commander declined to send to He 

resented the time a ground force officer had “usurped the a Vietnamese air 

observer artillery. The dispatched to Qui and 

were regularly late for planned operations, despite two days advance notice. This 

deprived at least one operation of air cover. “When we speak of 

immediate air strikes in this division,” wrote Lt. Col. Henry C. 9th 

Division air liaison officer, ARVN only laugh and I can hardly blame 

Vietnamese aircrews executed well in the II Corps attack on the Do 

headquarters area during April 24-May Their performance was below 

par in June, when the 9th Division triggered a 800-man attack around 

An Khe. The chosen to work the landing zone was late, only one of the four 

prestrike A-I properly delivered napalm, and the helicopters had to 

circle and wait for the air preparations. Two days later, a Vietnamese forward air 

controller brought prestrike A-I to a landing zone ten minutes early. On five 

separate occasions in the course of the action, pilots and observers were 
AIR OPERATIONS. 1963 

unable to accept strike aircraft at assigned rendezvous points. Air Force L-19s 

with American pilots and Vietnamese observers solved the problems. 45 

Poor performance by Vietnamese aircrews imperiled several ground operations in the I1 Corps. Operations nonetheless made marked gains around Saigon, 

disrupting a key Viet Cong base and defending strategic hamlets in Quang Ngai 

Province against severe communist attacks. More and more local residents came 

forth with information on Viet Cong movements, and the Popular Forces 

defending the hamlets killed 383 enemy while losing 33 of their 

In the III Corps north of Saigon, Vietnamese forces were busy. Rangers 

probed into Zone D, the 5th Division engaged the enemy in Zone C of Tay Ninh 

Province, and the 23d Division attacked Viet Cong bands and protected hamlets 

in the Ban Me Thuot area. Not one of these operations received enough tactical 

air support. The L-19s of the 112th Liaison Squadron at Tan Son Nhut worked 

both III and IV Corps, and thus were often unavailable to one or the other. Poor 

communications between III Corps headquarters and Ban Me Thuot led to 

authorizing the 23d Division eight T-28 sorties each day from Nha Trang. As the 

division pushed deeper into Tay Ninh Province and outran dependable landline 

communications, radio equipment troubles increasingly impeded air support. 

The use of U.S. Army armed helicopters for fire support came to be 

The IV Corps employed the 7th and 21st Divisions in the generally flat and 

water-sodden terrain of the densely populated Mekong Delta, where transportation was mostly by canal but some by road. The ground favored the guerrillas 

who massed at places and times of their choosing. Skimpy landline communications made for heavy radio traffic. At Soc Trang the five USAF T-28s, together 

with a detachment of L-19s from the 122d Liaison Squadron at Can Tho, 

afforded air strikes and forward air control. Like all other airfields in the delta, 

SOC Trang needed development. Its unlighted 3,300-foot runway was suited 

solely to daytime T-28 operations. The glide slope was too steep for a T-28 to 

touch down safely in wet weather. Though a T-28 could take off at night or in bad 

weather to land after a mission it had to go to Saigon. MACV proposed 

constructing an airfield at Can Tho to replace SOC Trang. Even so, building a 

6,000-foot runway would take nearly $4.5 million in Military Assistance Program funds and about two years to complete. The project continued under study 

in 

The 7th Division was distinctly less aggressive following the battle of Ap 

Bac. The division commander, believing that the Viet Cong were monitoring his 

radio, directed unit commanders to handcarry requests for air support to the 

division headquarters. The 2 1st Division engaged extensively in heliborne operations through February and March. Plans were usually too ambitious for the 

troops committed, and the enemy was never where he was supposed to be. 

Postponements and no-notice changes in plans complicated the air scheduling of 

escort and strike planes. After three visiting Americans were pinned down by 

enemy fire for an hour while strike aircraft were circling overhead and no 

forward air controller was to be had, three USAF pilots were assigned to the 

Vietnamese L- 19 detachment at Can 

I77 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

In April a daring scenario called for Division troops to go to the town 

of by motor convoy and to feint away from the objective the Viet 

regional headquarters in western Province between Seven 

Mountains and the Cambodian border. On the following day, helicopters would 

land troops to storm the headquarters and to cut off probable escape routes to 

the mountains. Aircraft were to fly cover and support. The plan may have been 

compromised, for the Viet withdrew from their sites several days before the 

assault. Then a classic demonstration of order, counterorder, and disorder took 

place. The division altered all helicopter radio frequencies and some participants 

failed to receive notice. Several strike crews orbited target areas waiting for 

helicopters that never appeared. The ground troops did not clash with the foe, 

but his fire hit two and seven helicopters. Interdiction bombing in 

Seven Mountains by U.S. and Vietnamese strike pilots was said to have killed 

fleeing Viet 

To prevent “whimsical uncoordinated changes in planned helicopter operations directly affecting the escort,” General Anthis asked the MACV Joint 

Frequency Coordinating Board to set up standard radio frequencies for 

borne operations and to insist on their use. The Air Division assigned one of 

its radios and an operator to the Division. This gave the U.S. air 

liaison officer a rapid communications link to cope with sudden changes in air 

support needs. An Air-Ground Operations School orientation team from the 

United States promoted understanding among Division personnel of the 

procedures for air support at battalion and company levels. escort, 

and air cover were required items in Division 

On the 14th and 15th of June in Province, and 

cover and escort helped the Division kill enemy (2 by air) and 

capture thirty. In An Province late in June, communists were killed 

(55 by air), seventy-two prisoners taken, and many arms and munitions captured. 

“Air support coordination,” it was reported, “was absolutely OUTSTANDING 

In contrast was the clear neglect of air support by the 7th Division early in 

July. The division commander aimed a thrust at a Viet force 

Province, relying on the firepower of four gunships. These 

helicopters could not knock out the guns dug in at the tree line adjacent to the 

landing zone. Before the afternoon was over, ground fire hit eleven helicopters 

and wounded three U.S. Army crewmen. Called to the scene, two six 

and two tangled with the communists. The Viet retreated at 

nightfall, leaving behind the twenty-four men killed by air 

The loss to enemy ground fire of two in February and a June 

spurred a boost in air strike firepower. With two in lieu of one and four 

rather than two, the crews COULD cover each other during low-level passes. 

Unfortunately, bigger flights meant fewer missions. General Anthis accented the 

importance of good defensive flying, mutual cover, suppression of hostile fire by 

strafing, evasive maneuvers, and avoiding needless exposure to ground 

Stationing Vietnamese air units at small outlying airfields closer to the 

ground action was well-nigh impossible. Acute shortages existed in 

I78 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963 

electrical specialists, armorers, and other skilled men. There was also a dearth of 

specialist tools, test sets, as well as bomb-handling trailers and other groundhandling equipment. In consequence the Vietnamese aircraft at forward fields 

were quickly out of Yet Col. Harvey E. Henderson, deputy 

commander of 2d Air Division, could say, “In my six months here, I have been 

amazed at the rapidity with which the VNAF have learned and improved their 

Belying the progress was the resurgence of Viet Cong attacks. In July the 

communists successfully struck hamlets south of Ban Me Thuot, and ambushed 

the roads leading into the area. They cowed the Montagnards, who became less 

helpful intelligence sources. In a ten-minute attack just before midnight on July 

16, twenty to thirty 60-mm mortar rounds slammed into troop housing at Can 

Tho Airfield and wounded seventeen Vietnamese and U.S. Special Forces 

troops. The guerrillas slipped away without 

Statistics revealed a rising trend in Viet Congattacks and other incidents but 

a drop in the number of communist casualties, weapon losses, and defections. 

Even though General Harkins was pleased with the fifteen thousand Vietnamese 

operations per month in July and August, the National Campaign Plan needed a 

shot in the arm. Many offensive forays failed to find the foe. There were too 

many one-day-only operations, too few night ones. The Vietnamese did not 

patrol deep within Viet Congareas, pursue enemy troops that broke contact, and 

capitalize on air 

Beginning in September, the Viet Cong swept over exposed hamlets in the 

area south of Ban Me Thuot. In the better-defended hamlets of Quang Ngai 

Province, enemy “activity teams” of three to five men achieved some gains. 

Vietnamese intelligence identified a large-scale, well-planned communist offensive in the Mekong 

Visiting Vietnam during the last week of September, Secretary McNamara 

and General Taylor deemed the military situation good but political conditions 

explosive. A week later in Saigon, General Harkins told members of the House 

foreign affairs Far East subcommittee that the military effort was going well 

despite the shaky political scene. A significant JCS assessment supported this 

The faster tempo of Viet Cong attacks created new air support needs as 

Vietnamese and USAF air power diminished. Vietnamese Air Force units 

appeared to be more interested in training than in combat. The 516th Fighter 

Squadron commander trimmed the T-28s in his detachment at Da Nang from 

eight to four. He based his action on the desire to release some T-28 pilots for 

upgrade training to A-I Hs. In September the 5 14th Fighter Squadron commander gave on the average just nine of his twenty-six A-I Hs to the air operations center for daily strike missions, saying he had to divert flying hours to A-I H 

pilot upgrading. For reasons unclear to Americans, he regularly ignored requests 

for napalm strikes. This happened principally in the III and IV Corps during the 

rainy season, even though incendiaries worked better than explosives in the 

I79 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

I80 

(Top) ARVN paratroopers leap from USAF 

C-123 Providers in a combat training 

exercise near Saigon. 

(Center) O-1 E Bird Dog FAC on a visual 

reconnaissance mission in S. Vietnam. 

(Bottom) After flying convoy escort in their 

Bird Dog, Capt. B. D. Lassman (left) and 

Capt. D. F. Schell (right) confer with 

Vietnamese observer. 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963 

water-soaked terrain. Crews deployed for a while away from home bases seemed 

to be unmotivated, uneager, and 

Under the rules of engagement, Farm Gate continued to fly those combat 

missions that the Vietnamese could not. Though given more people, Farm Gate 

failed to increase its sortie rate. The unit had been permitted to scale down 

normal maintenance because of the field operating conditions. Moreover, the 

planes were being overworked, and by autumn they were becoming less safe to 

fly. The operational readiness rate reached only fifty to sixty percent, due chiefly 

to spare parts shortages. lnflight mechanical failures and enemy action likewise 

took their toll. 

A major cause of B-26 fatigue not yet identified in the field was the 

eight 750-pound bombs hung on specially designed racks under the aircraft’s 

wings. When the B-26 was airborne, this weight did not overstress the wings. But 

taxiing the heavily armed plane for many months over rough runways and ramps 

imposed excessive “negative G-force” that brought the wings to their fatigue 

limit. A B-26 lost a wing in flight during a combat mission on August 16, killing 

two Americans and a Vietnamese. September was no better. Twenty-three 

aircraft suffered battle damage. Another B-26 and a T-28 crashed because of 

mechanical failures. On the 23d, three Viet Cong guerrillas cut through the 

perimeter fence at Nha Trang and with package explosives blew up two 

General Anthis hoped to keep the B-26s going by having the crews fly them 

cautiously and use soft approach and recovery tactics. In any event, every B-26 

was set for rotation through depot maintenance contracted with Air Asia in 

Taiwan. Anthis urged replacing the battle weary B-26s with dual-control Navy 

A-I E fighters or with “On Mark” B-26Ks being refurbished in the United States 

by the On Mark Engineering Company. In August and September the 1st Air 

Commando Squadron was down to an average of nine T-28s and nine to twelve 

B-26s. Still, Farm Gate was supposed to up its sortie rate by twenty percent to 

support planned Vietnamese ground 

Although Farm Gate owned fewer planes after October 1963, standard 

USAF maintenance procedures by the 34th CAMRON at Bien Hoa lifted the 

operationally ready rate to around seventy-eight percent. Past Farm Gate practices required thirty to forty-five minutes to refuel, rearm, and turn around a flight 

of two T-28s. New safety checklists made two-hour turnarounds for T-28s and 

three-hour ones for B-26s the norm. Too few aircraft and a cutback in flying 

dampened morale in the overmanned 1st Air Commando Squadron. Depressed 

crews waited for days to fly a strike 

A dearth of L-19s (0-1s) and crews for forward air control also sharply 

curtailed combat operations. Between May and August, 43 1 air support requests 

had to be turned down. The arrival of the Army’s 73d Aviation Company and the 

activation of the Air Force’s 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron did not cure the 

trouble. Instead of placing the twenty-two 0-1s of the 73d Aviation Company 

under the tactical air control system, MACV assigned them to support Army 

advisors. The Vietnamese promptly withdrew their L-19s from the ground 

divisions because they felt that their craft were no longer needed. Army 0-1s flew 
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

the local visual reconnaissance and convoy escort previously flown by the 

Vietnamese liaison planes. However, removal of the deprived forward air 

controllers and air liaison officers of transportation, unless they could borrow 

from the Army advisors. 

As for the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron, it was fully operational 

September The unit, commanded by Lt. Col. John kept sixteen 

Is at and six at Can Tho. By year’s end they flew sorties, chiefly 

forward air control. I visual reconnaissance, and combat support 

liaison. The and can-do attitude” of the crews bred a huge 

demand for their services. The Americans met with slight success in trying to 

augment rather than supplant Vietnamese liaison 

A few USAF pilots who flew with Vietnamese forward air controllers 

realized that these men had been doing a boring and fairly thanklessjob for many 

years with no end in sight. Since the average Vietnamese pilot saw the law of 

averages working against him, he was reluctant to fly below two thousand feet. If 

he directed an attack on friendly people, criminal prosecution awaited him. 

Nonetheless, the prevailing American view pictured Vietnamese crews as unaggressive and unreliable. By October this disapproval was being expressed by the 

overwhelming sentiment that “we must run 

As sorties swelled to meet attacks, premission briefings were 

seldom practical. Responding to requests, Vietnamese forward air controllers 

frequently flew many miles to an unfamiliar area. They radioed the ground unit 

to find out the locations of friendly and enemy troops, then marked targets for 

the strike crews. Air Force officers repeatedly urged the Vietnamese to attach air 

liaison officers and forward air controllers to divisions, so they could get to know 

the local conditions. The Vietnamese Air Force said no, citing the scarcity of 

qualified officers, the failure of the young ones to work well when removed from 

close supervision, and the discord between air and ground 

Divisions tended to rely upon helicopter firepower. For example, in numerous small operations in Ban Me area throughout September, the 

Division requested fighter air support only once. The lone C47 flareship standfor the Saigon area could not cope with the burgeoning night attacks in 

the and Corps. Moreover, when the struck the 

outpost on the Peninsula during the night of August the province 

commander’s indecision delayed that C-47. In the one hour and forty-five 

minutes before it came, the communists overran the outpost. A few days later, 

the enemy sacked the Ben strategic hamlet that had been founded a year 

before with much fanfare. Using flareships to light the way for helicopter airlifts 

of company-size forces into besieged hamlets proved impractical. This was due TO 

the great number of hamlets (some twelve hundred in the III Corps) and the slow 

reaction time of reinforcement units flying in the 

The Air Division wrestled with the problems. alerted A-I H 

loaded strike ordnance and two flares, the latter for use if flareships were not to 

be had. For additional flare missions, the best bet appeared to be the C-I which 

carried a spare Vietnamese However, when this I 

I82 
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963 

crewman hand-dropped the Mark V and VI flares, they often hit the sides of the 

aircraft and were swept back into the open rear cargo door. To prevent this, local 

shops devised a flarebox that dispensed flares from the C-I 23's rear cargo ramp. 

This device let the C-123s at Tan Son Nhut join the Vietnamese C-47s, and in 

September I72 flare and I32 strike sorties were flown against Viet Cong night 

attacks. Fewer communist forays in October resulted in 60 flare and 94 strike 

sorties. But the pace accelerated, and up to three flareships each night were kept 

in the air over the 1V Corps. At least one of these planes could reach any point in 

the delta within twenty to thirty minutes. The Viet Cong captured no outpost or 

hamlet after a flare/strike team arrived. Even so, the hamlet program was so 

overextended that in many cases the defenders could not hold off the attackers 

until air support got 

The vulnerable Mekong Delta induced the Viet Cong to escalate the war 

from simple guerrilla tactics to sustained field operations. A five-day battle 

erupted in the wee hours of September 10 as 81-mm mortar rounds arced onto 

SOC Trang Airfield. Inside of five minutes, four Farm Gate pilots scramhled two 

T-28s, called for flareship and more fighters, and strafed the mortar muzzle 

flashes. This swift air support along with Vietnamese mortar fire drove off the 

communists, foiling their bid to neutralize and destroy the American fighters and 

helicopters on the airstrip. The aggressive action of the pilots was "commendable." All the same, they had broken the rules of engagement by attacking without 

Vietnamese crewmen and without target assistance from a forward air controller 

or 

At about the same time, Viet Cong battalions pounded the district headquarters town of Dam Doi and Cai Nuoc near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula. 

Swarming over Cai Nuoc, they set up roadblocks and laid mines on the sole 

surfaced road between Bac Lieu and Ca Mau. Right after daybreak, T-28s out of 

SOC Trang escorted heliborne Vietnamese marines to Dam Doi and carried out 

prelanding strikes. Most landings went well, but that afternoon a T-28 crashed 

from fire received during a third pass over an enemy machinegun. A UH-1 

gunship rescued the crew, and the T-28 was destroyed to keep its machinegun out 

of communist hands. While marines encircled Dam Doi, ten C-47s and seven 

C-123s flew 498 paratroopers of the 21st Division to the scene. 

The battle cost the enemy 122 killed (30 by air strikes) and huge stores of 

munitions. Around Cai Nuoc the paratroopers killed 50 communists, captured 

eight, and seized weapons. The sortie rate for September 10 exceeded all past IV 

Corps records for a single day. Over September 10-14 the sortie total ran to 

seventy-two air cover, ten escort, eighteen prelanding, and twenty-two forward 

air control. The government troops won a victory but the Viet Cong reduced the 

towns to rubble and left 153 civilians killed or 

The most critical shortcoming was too few strike aircraft to support the 

bitter war in the delta. Only one B-26 could be spared to cover heliborne 

operations in the 2d Division area. The five USAF T-28s at SOC Trang were 

invaluable for quick reaction but the primitive airstrip hampered them, and 

their guns were too light to silence ground fire. Heavier-armed A-I Hs or B-26s at 

I83 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Bien Hoa had to make a thirty-minute flight to Can Tho or a one-hour one to the 

deep delta. Aware of this lag, the Viet Cong usually attacked in mid-afternoon to 

make it difficult for aircraft to get into the area, to swing into position, and to 

strike during the few remaining hours of In January 1964 CINCPAC 

approved the construction of a new airfield at Can Tho, to be ready a year 

Planning a helicopter assault into three landing zones in mid-October, the 

21st Division asked for strong tactical air support. Five USAF T-28s, two 

A-I Hs, and one B-26 were available for cover, escort and prelanding strikes. On 

the morning of October 19, T-28s supported the first helicopter lift of troops 

which met with light ground fire at the landing zone. The Viet Cong put stiffer 

fire on the second heli-lift and pinned down the troops that landed. They also hit 

and damaged a B-26 and a T-28, forcing the planes to leave their covering 

stations. The third heli-lift overshot its landing zone, and enemy fire downed an 

H-2 I, injuring two of the four Americans aboard. With troops in the second and 

third heli-lifts nailed down, Vietnamese forward air controllers diverted all of 

their air cover to close air support strikes. 

In response to the division commander’s call for more air support, the 

planes returned and renewed their strikes that afternoon. Army advisors praised 

the aggressiveness of the support, chiefly that of the B-26. It pursued the attack 

with other ordnance after its guns quit, even though under fire from six to eight 

automatic weapons. The Viet Cong held firm in their trenches and fired doggedly 

at attacking aircraft. When they withdrew at nightfall under cover of rain, pursuit 

by flareship and fighters was out of the question because locations of government 

forces were uncertain. During the battle, Vietnamese flew six A-1 H and eight T-28 

sorties while USAF crews flew sixteen T-28 and two B-26 sorties. Ground fire 

struck two Vietnamese T-28s, four USAF T-28s, and two USAF B-26s. Friendly 

losses included forty-one killed, eighty-four wounded, (twenty-three Americans) 

and one H-21 shot down. Thirty-two of the enemy were killed and in addition 

fifty-nine freshly dug graves were 

Early on the morning of November 7, some two hundred Viet Cong 

attacked a pagoda and then holed up in a mud-walled fishing settlement about 

twenty miles from Soc Trang. In late afternoon, regular ground forces and Civil 

Guard troops located and surrounded them. Although no friendly people were in 

the village, the government troops made no assault. Instead, they let four T-28s 

from Soc Trang conduct repeated strikes. The next day, blood marks within the 

enclosure suggested that the aircraft had killed about forty Viet 

By the end of I963 the government military offensive was collapsing, despite 

occasional and isolated successes. The Viet Cong were seizing the initiative nearly 

everywhere. The limited number of USAF and Vietnamese aircraft in Vietnam 

had nevertheless scored some tactical gains in the face of severe handicaps. 

184 
XVI. Collapse of the 

Diem Government 

At the Secretary of Defense Conference in Honolulu on May 6, 1963, the 

participants discussed the tensions between the American and Vietnamese 

governments. Ambassador Nolting labeled American-Vietnamese relations as 

“somewhat less than good.” President Diem was intimating that the United 

States was infringing on Vietnamese sovereignty. Nhu, his brother and counselor, was suggesting that the American advisory effort was “appearing to tamper 

with Diem’s political base.” Both were suspicious of the strength of the American 

commitment and the thrust of U.S. policy. Nevertheless, Nolting said, Nhu was 

“efficient and continues to accumulate power.” Despite causes for concern, “the 

Country Team is of the unanimous opinion that the current leadership is the best 

the U.S. can get. It is sincere, albeit not particularly adept, but it is better than 

most in Southeast Asia.”’ 

Two days later in Saigon, demonstrators celebrating Buddha’s birthday 

paraded with religious flags, banners, and devotional images. The procession 

violated the 1950 ordinance forbidding the flying of any flag in public without the 

national emblem beside it. A monk delivered a sermon protesting the Diem 

government’s discrimination against Buddhists. When Civil Guard troops 

moved to break up the rally, an explosion killed several persons including 

children. In a communiqué to the press, Buddhist leaders demanded that the 

government admit responsibility for the loss of life, rescind the flag regulation, 

and give Buddhists equality with Catholics.2 

Some eight million Vietnamese were Buddhists, as compared with one and 

one-half million Christians. Diem, Nhu, and their families had connections with 

French missionaries who represented the old order. 3 

When a Washington newspaper published an anti-American statement 

attributed to Ngo Dinh Nhu, Representative Otto Passman, chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Appropriations vented his indignation to Defense Secretary 

McNamara. “Certainly,” Passman said, “the Diem government ought to be 

made to understand that the American people have no interest in propping up an 

unpopular regime if it is more concerned with the pursuit of personal aims than 

with the protection of the country from communism.” An embarrassed President 

Kennedy told newsmen that he hoped to withdraw some Americans by the end of 

the year. 

Diem meanwhile offered no redress to a Buddhist delegation but promised 

to investigate the parade incident, which he believed had political rather than 

religious roots. Dissatisfied, Buddhists demonstrated early in June in Hue. 

Several deaths resulted, and disorders spread to Quang Tri and Nha Trang. 

While the Defense Department ordered U.S. aircraft not to transport Vietnamese troops on anti-Buddhist missions, and while General Harkins instructed 

185 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Americans to stand aloof from the controversy, Diem acknowledged various 

errors by his officials. 

In Saigon on June 1 I, an aged Buddhist monk burned himself alive in 

public. Three days later, a New York newspaper carried a Washington correspondent’s story that the United States would condemn Diem if he failed to settle 

the Buddhist grievances. The Vietnamese foreign minister told William C. 

Truehart, in charge of the Embassy during Nolting’s temporary absence, that he 

was “deeply distressed and angry”over the news report. Truehart then asked and 

received permission to publicly reaffirm U.S. support of Diem. Within a few 

days, the government acceded to most of the Buddhist demands but refused to 

accept responsibility for the deaths in 

Buddhists demonstrated again on July 16. Crowds of monks and nuns 

milled in front of Nolting’s residence in Saigon, calling on the United States to 

compel the Diem government to keep its promises. Violence erupted on the 

following day. 

The U.S. air attache in Saigon, Lt. Col. Robert L. F. Tyrrell, informed the 

Defense Intelligence Agency that the Buddhist situation was “causing continuing 

animosity between the government and the armed forces and is spreading to all 

segments of the population. It is now common to hear Vietnamese discuss the 

possible overthrow of the present government.” At a dinner party on July 17, 

Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, Diem’s military adviser, stated that “the present 

government cannot continue.” There was speculation that Minh or Maj. Gen. 

Tran Van Don, chief of staff of the Joint General Staff, might head a coup. “We 

cannot determine if a coup is imminent,” Tyrrell concluded, “[but] all of the 

elements are present and it appears to us to be only a matter of timing.”‘ 

A radio address by Diem on July 19 seemed cold to American observers, 

and Madame Nhu was said to have termed the Buddhist suicide a “barbeque.” 

Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, estimated, “In view of the widespread distrust and 

hatred of the Nhus, man and wife, far overshadowing the popular consensus to 

Diem himself, it seems most likely that the Nhus would be a primary target for 

any serious coup group.” The government’s “failure or unwillingness to handle 

properly” the Buddhist demonstrations made a coup “more likely if the Diem 

government fails to accomplish reasonable and acceptable concessions to the 

Buddhists or if the Buddhist contagion, fanned by political opportunists and the 

VC, spreads into the countryside to the extent that it adversely affects the 

progress of the war.”’ 

President Kennedy had meanwhile announced on June 27 that Henry 

Cabot Lodge, a major political figure, would succeed Ambassador Nolting, a 

career civil servant. Preparing for his new post, Lodge had a long talk in 

Washington with a “distinguished Vietnamese” who said that “unless they left the 

country, no power on earth could prevent the assassination of Mr. Diem, his 

brother Mr. Nhu, and Mr. Nhu’s wife. their deaths were 

Over August 14-1 6 several more immolations took place as expressions of 

discontent. Madam Nhu favored ignoring the burnings and charged the U.S. 

Embassy with pressuring the Diem government to silence her.’ 

186 
COLLAPSE OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT 

To General Anthis, 2d Air Division commander, Diem was “fairly well 

liked” by his people, even though he had not developed all the reforms they 

desired and the United States wished. In contrast, Anthis deemed the Nhus “not 

too 

Informed people in Saigon expected sweeping changes from Ambassador 

Lodge, who appeared to be proconsul for President Kennedy. Perhaps to clear 

the decks before Lodge’s arrival, Diem held an emergency meeting with the Joint 

General Staff on August 20. He appointed Tran Van Don the armed forces chief 

of staff, and Nhu invited the senior generals to sign a paper calling upon the 

government to seize and silence the Buddhist leaders. At midnight Diem declared 

martial law and a state of siege. Under nominal army authority the Vietnamese 

Special Forces and police stormed Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and Hue before 

dawn. They rounded up monks, nuns, and students, but the Buddhist leaders 

escaped and took refuge in the U.S. Embassy. The pagoda raids strengthened 

those officials in Washington who had always questioned the fitness of Diem and 

his family to govern. On August 21 Under Secretary of State George W. Ball 

released an official statement that the United Stated deplored the repressive 

actions against the Buddhists. 11 

Ambassador Lodge reached Saigon on August 22. He found Embassy 

officials thinking that the Vietnamese generals could depose Diem, but General 

Don told General Harkins that they were too weak to do so. The generals wanted 

to end martial law quickly, to have the United States support Diem while forcing 

him to clean house and showing him how to delegate authority, and possibly to 

create an interim cabinet of officers and civilians. 12 

On August 24 Ball, Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal drafted and cleared 

with the President by phone a message of instructions to Lodge. The United 

States could no longer tolerate the systematic suppression of the Buddhists or 

Nhu’s domination of the government. “We wish to give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhus, but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to 

accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem.” Lodge was 

to tell the Vietnamese generals that the United States would renounce Diem 

unless he righted the Buddhist wrongs and formed a more responsive and 

representative government. The United States would take no part in any ouster, 

but would recognize an interim anti-communist military regime as the successor 

to the Diem government. 13 

On the 26th a Voice of America broadcast in Vietnamese said that high 

American officials blamed Nhu for the pagoda attacks and the mass arrests of 

monks and students. The United States, it continued, might sharply curtail aid 

unless President Diem rid himelf of certain associates. The Joint General Staff 

refuted the broadcast on the following day. Responsible military commanders, 

the press communique announced, had unanimously proposed martial law and 

related measures to Diem. l4 

Ambassador Lodge became convinced during his first week in Saigon that 

the Diem government was dying, the abuse of police power having caused deep 

resentments among the Vietnamese. The Buddhist immolations had also turned 

I87 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

the American people and government against Diem, Secretary of State Rusk 

told when he returned to Washington. “We can’t stand any more 

burning,” Rusk said.” 

At a National Security Council discussion, made the point that 

refusal to support Diem and would renege on past commitments. Ball 

argued that continued support for them risked losing the war against the 

moreover, Diem and had massively violated their promises. 

man felt that had been profoundly wrong for quite some time. 

Replying to the cabled instructions, Ambassador Lodge suggested telling 

the generals hostile to Diem that the United States had grave reservations about 

the The State Department approved on August and commented that 

the would have to go and “a coup will be responded on the 

“We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning 

back: the overthrow of the Diem government.” President Kennedy weighed this 

appraisal then ordered Lodge and Harkins to support a coup if it had a good 

chance of success but to avoid any direct American involvement. He authorized 

them to suspend U.S. air support to the Diem government whenever they wished. 

Also on the Secretary of State Rusk permitted Lodge to explore 

Harkins’ suggestion that a threat to withdraw U.S. assistance might well force 

Diem to drop the This seemed to Lodge to cancel the earlier instrumentations to “make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem’s replacenow understood the President to want him “not to coup, not 

to help plan a coup, but rather to keep in close touch with plotters so he could let 

Kennedy know of developments that might need American decisions. Looking 

for the imminent overthrow government, Lodge stopped seeing Diem and 

17 

By August CINCPAC alerted two Marine Corps battalions for possible 

commitment, and moved naval task forces and air transports to within supporting distance. Plans were set for the air evacuation from Saigon of U.S. 

dependents, I, I03 civilian employees, I U.S.-sponsored aliens, twenty-five 

tourists, and seventeen alien dependents, and from Hue another 

Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with Vietnam on August citing 

border violations and ill-treatment of Buddhists. Two days later, Charles de 

offered his good offices to restore peace and harmony in Indochina by 

reunifying North and South Vietnam in “independence and neutrality.” At the 

request of Asian and African members, U United Nations Secretary 

General, wrote on August I to ask Diem to insure “the exercise of fundamental 

human rights to all sections of the population.” On that day KAI-SHEK 

talked at length Gen. Jacob E. Smart, commander. said it 

was essential to win the war because Asian states were closely watching the 

United States in Vietnam. In Thailand influential figures told Smart that some 

officials doubted if the United States could be depended upon in a crisis. 

In a national television address on September Kennedy said that the 

Government of Vietnam could win the war only if it had popular support. In his 

opinion the government was out of touch with the people. The Buddhist 

I88 
COLLAPSE OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT 

sions had been unwise. Could the government regain the affection of the people? 

“With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel,” the President said, “I think 

it can. If it doesn’t make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning 

would not be very 

De Gaulle’s scheme to unify and neutralize Vietnam led Ngo Dinh Nhu to 

admit having contacted Viet Cong leaders of the National Liberation Front of 

South Vietnam. Apparently he was also in touch with Hanoi. On September 2 he 

told Lodge of his talk with the Polish member of the International Control 

Commission. The Pole had sought Nhu’s reaction to De Gaulle’s proposal, so 

that he could forward it to the North Vietnamese foreign minister.’’ Many 

top-level Vietnamese officers were convinced that Nhu would make a deal with 

Hanoi if he felt it to be in his best 

Diem answered U Thant’s letter on September 5. He stressed his government’s actions to free the Buddhist hierarchy from political agitation and propaganda, which benefited foreign interests and harmed the Buddhist religion and 

the Vietnamese state. He invited U Thant to send a fact-finding mission to 

Vietnam. When a United Nations group visited, it reached no conclusions. 

Nevertheless, the Costa Rican member said that he personally had found no 

religious discrimination or persecution. He believed that the troubles were 

political and involved but a small part of the Buddhist 

On 8 September General Smart radioed General LeMay: 

My own feeling is that if we intend to remain committed in Viet Nam and I 

believe that it is strongly in the national interest that we do so -then we must support 

Diem. Whether we like him or his family is not germane., My conclusion is that we 

must stick with Diem and that we must quickly demonstrate this by positive action 

even though we may have to pay some price in terms of embarrassment. We are 

probably going to have to swallow the fact that Diem will not exile his brother.. and 

from my discussions I am not at all convinced that this should be our objective. I get 

distinct impression from Vietnamese that he isvaluable and important to Diem, just as 

Diem is important to the 

Unlike Nolting who had used the country team to secure policy consensus, 

Lodge was ordered by Kennedy to guard closely the cables they exchanged. 

Keeping even Harkins in the dark, he thus appeared to be running the U.S. 

Mission as “a one-man operation, conducted in total secrecy.” General Smart 

noted, “The American team left me with the impression of a divided house 

and divergent directions.” Opinions about Diem, as observed by Smart, ranged 

from the view held by John H. Richardson, CIA station chief, that Diem could 

be supported and Nhu was useful, to theview that the Diem government must go 

no matter what took its Reports to Washington from the Embassy, 

MACV, and the air attache differed markedly. Joseph A. Mendenhall of the 

State Department and Maj. Gen. Victor H. Krulak of the Marine Corps visited 

the country together to determine Vietnamese attitudes toward Diem’s government. After hearing their disparate findings, President Kennedy asked whether 

they had visited the same country.” 

Suspending U.S. aid to pressure Diem, as Lodge now suggested, seemed to 

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to threaten the war effort. President Kennedy 

I89 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

inclined to agree. On September 2 1 he again sent McNamara and General Taylor 

(JCS Chairman since October 1962) to gather information and to encourage 

Diem to solve his problems. Lodge in his briefing was pessimistic about the 

survival of the Diem regime. Hut other observations led McNamara and Taylor 

to conclude that the Diem government was consolidating its control throughout 

the country, and that the military effort still had momentum. Some military men 

were hostile toward the government but they were more hostile toward the Viet 

Cong. Reluctant to cut off economic aid, McNamara wanted more potent 

military action against the insurgents. More dangerous than the political ferment 

in Vietnam was the rising dissent among Americans at home. A need existed to 

build a case to be put to the people and Congress, to cement their confidence in 

the Kennedy administration and its handling of the war. Consequently, 

McNamara emphasized to Diem that he must conduct his military and political 

affairs in a way that would win the support of the American people. Finally, 

McNamara and Taylor were convinced that the war could be favorably ended in 

1965, with the insurgency then shrinking to sporadic banditry in outlying areas. 

They accordingly announced that as scheduled there would be one thousand 

fewer U.S. military advisors by the close of 

On October 2, subsequent to a National Security Council discussion of the 

McNamara-Taylor report and Lodge’s recommendations, President Kennedy 

approved the following policy statement: Since the military program in Vietnam 

was sound in principle and progressing, the United States would go on working 

with the Vietnamese people and their government. The goal would be to deny the 

country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported 

Viet Cong insurgency. Furthermore, the “United States had made clear its 

continued opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such 

actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in 

the 

Events in Saigon were far from reassuring. On October 3 Vietnamese 

plainclothesmen assaulted American newsmen, and Lodge protested. The next 

day a Buddhist monk burned himself, the sixth and most publicized case. On 

October I6 the Senate foreign relations committee approved an amendment to 

the foreign aid authorization bill. It empowered the President to extend to 

Vietnam assistancedesigned purely “to further the objectives of victory in the war 

against communism and the return to their homeland of Americans involved in 

the struggle.” Nhu on the 17th declared to the press that he failed to understand 

why the United States had “initiated a process of disintegration in Vietnam.” He 

accused the CIA of inciting a coup against the government. Five days later, the 

United States announced the end of support to the Vietnamese forces unless they 

were shifted from police duties to field operations or related training programs. 29 

At this point, a major plot against Diem was hatching under the leadership 

of Generals Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, and Le Van Kim. They represented a coalition of older men who wanted a neutralist solution to the war, and 

of younger men who sought a military victory and felt sure they could secure it. 

With the promise of cooperation from the I, II and III Corps commanders, the 

I90 
COLLAPSE OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT 

coalition resolved to remove the IV Corps commander who was also military 

governor of Saigon and loyal to Diem. 

Although American officials took care to avoid any part in the coup, some 

U.S. military circles received persistent reports that a conspiracy was afoot. On 

October 28 the Joint Chiefs directed CINCPAC to sail a naval task force to 

positions off Vietnam, and that same day three USAF F-102 Jet interceptors flew 

to Tan Son Nhut. General Harkins was taken aback when told of these moves. 

He had no idea that Diem’s overthrow was near. 

On the morning of November 1 the conspirators gathered in the Joint 

General Staff compound, and began to bring troops into Saigon. General Don 

announced that a coup had begun, and in the afternoon American CIA personnel were informed. Troops with red neckerchiefs poured into Saigon from the 

north. By midafternoon they captured and imprisoned all Vietnamese Special 

Forces in the city who were loyal to Nhu. 

The rebellion ran with precision. Troops took over key installations and 

surrounded Diem and Nhu in the palace. Four A-1 Hs and two T-28s made gun 

and rocket strikes against the presidential compound. Efforts of the IV Corps 

commander to march troops to the capital fizzled. That evening Diem and Nhu 

escaped from the palace through an underground passage. On the following day 

they surrendered. They were assassinated while being taken to the Joint General 

Staff complex. 

As the fighting in Saigon ceased on November 2, a Military Revolutionary 

Council of twenty-four generals and colonels under Generals Duong Van Minh 

and Tran Van Don became the provisional government. Besides dissolving the 

National Assembly, it suspended the 1956 constitution and decreed an interim 

one. The United States recognized the new government on November 8.” 

Judging that the council was united and set on stepping up the war, 

Ambassador Lodge proposed that the United States not press for instant political reforms. The generals had agreed to pursue the strategic hamlet program 

(now called “fortified hamlets”) and to consolidate and upgrade their defenses. 

They spoke of massing all military, paramilitary, and civil forces for an all-out 

campaign against the communist threat. In addition they recognized the Joint 

General Staff. 

Despite their designs, major tasks remained stalled. Wholesale purges and 

transfers sowed concern. There was little military movement. 

North Vietnam exploited at once the confusion created by the coup. Viet 

Cong attacks rose. Because the Vietnamese Air Force was temporarily on “coup” 

duty, USAF crews shouldered the bulk of the operational load. On the night of 

November I, for example, the mere appearance of flareships caused the Viet 

Cong to break off attacks on eight outposts. Over the following week the 

guerrillas assaulted seventy-one outposts and hamlets. Enemy pressure prompted a total of 284 flare and 298 strike sorties in November. The insurgents 

nevertheless inflicted about twenty-eight hundred casualties that month, demoralizing the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Though Viet Cong losses were 

191 
I 

THE ADVISORY YEARS 

put at twenty-nine hundred for the period, government forces lost nearly three 

weapons for every one they captured. 

President Kennedy on November announced that Rusk and 

were going to Honolulu for a meeting on the 20th. Its purpose was to size up the 

situation and to find out how to intensify the struggle and to end the American 

involvement. “Now.” the President said, “this is our objective, to bring Americans home, permit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and 

independent country, and permit democratic forces within the country to 

operate. 

Among the impressive group at the meeting in Honolulu were Secretaries 

Rusk and Ambassador Lodge, presidential aide 

CIA Director John A. Chairman Taylor, Admiral Felt, and 

Generals Smart, and Secretary remarked that 

certain set in since the coup, but actually “the Generals head a very 

fragile government.” Rusk asked whether “an increase in dollars would make a 

difference in shortening the war.” Lodge said he thought the Vietnamese had 

enough dollars; what they needed was “greater motivation.” argued 

that more funds would help. 

Despite continuing difficulties the conferees resolved to adhere to present 

plans. The United States would hurry the growth of Vietnamese military power 

and pare U.S. personnel in Vietnam. The much publicized withdrawal of one 

thousand Americans would therefore proceed as scheduled. The first three 

hundred departed on December the rest ten days later. 

But the assassination of President Kennedy in November signaled the 

end of an era, and the accession of Lyndon Johnson to the presidency marked 

the beginning of another. 

Vietnamese troops outside the presidential palace in Saigon. 

I92 
The Johnson 

Four days after taking office, President Johnson reaffirmed past American 

objectives in Vietnam. The United States was to help the republic win the war 

against the externally directed and sustained communist conspiracy, assist the 

government in developing public support, and keep U.S. military and economic 

aid at the same level. “This is a Vietnamese war,” the President said, “and the 

country and the war must in the end be run solely by the Vietnamese.” He 

reiterated the October pledge to withdraw some Americans from the 

country. Yet at the same time he instructed the State Department to prepare a 

white paper, documenting Hanoi’s control of the and its supply of 

them through Laos. He further solicited plans for stepped-up clandestine 

warfare on North Vietnam and for cross-border incursions into Laos to check 

infiltration.’ 

Informing General Taylor on December that Vietnam was the 

“most critical military area” for the United States, President Johnson asked the 

chairman to have the Joint Chiefs assign the best available officers to 

-“blue-ribbon men” at every level. He also sent Secretary to visit 

Vietnam 

During December in Vietnam, the Defense secretary found General 

government “fragile”and “indecisive and drifting.” Unless current trends 

were reversed in the next two or three months, they would lead “to neutralization 

at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.” The dilemma for 

American policymakers was that pouring in personnel and other resources to 

prosecute the war would hinder rather than help the Vietnamese stand on their 

own feet. 

Unable to resolve the basic problem, the secretary listened to CINCPAC 

plans for covert actions against North Vietnam. Vietnamese troops were to carry 

out a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations to pressure the 

insurgents with minimum risk. As for extensive forays envisioned along the 

Laotian border, doubted if they would be politically acceptable or 

militarily effective. But he approved having high-altitude photo planes in 

Vietnam to obtain better information on enemy infiltration routes.’ 

At suggestion, the President on December assured Minh of 

lasting American support. He gave final approval to clandestine actions against 

North Vietnam and to the flights. The movement of Strategic Air Command’s to proceeded so swiftly that knew of it when 

the planes entered the traffic pattern at The high-level photography 

later revealed extensive logistic networks in North Vietnam and Laos, supply 

routes capable of infiltrating large numbers of trucks, men, and material into 

South 

I95 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

General Harkins felt hopeful that the Viet Cong attacks had peaked immediately after the coup. His optimism was short-lived. Government ground 

actions that had decreased after Diem's downfall sprang back to between five 

hundred and six hundred a day by November 20, but they were blunted by 

mismanagement and defeat. A new commander spurred the lethargic 7th Division south of Saigon, but he was relieved before the month was up. Neither of 

two battalions conducting clearing operations in Long An Province knew that 

the other was there, and they fired on each other. The clash killed two men and 

wounded twenty, exerting a "demoralizing effect on both 

Before dawn on November 24, the aggressive 21st Division fell victim to a 

carefully planned and executed ambush in An Xuyen Province. After the Viet 

Cong struck the Cha La outpost and a strategic hamlet near the tip of the Ca 

Mau Peninsula, the division hurried four heli-lifts of troops into two landing 

zones, with tactical aircraft flying prestrike, escort, and air cover. Enemy fire 

downed an H-21 and damaged ten H-21s and UH-1s. While the ground troops 

took cover, USAF and Vietnamese A-I Hs, B-26s, and T-28s made repeated 

attacks in which valor at times outweighed discretion. C-47s and C-123s paradropped a battalion to pinch off the foe's withdrawal route. The guerrillas 

escaped because the C-I 23s put most of the troops on the far side of the Cai Nuoc 

River. Three bodies were discovered and there were signs that at least one 

hundred fifty insurgents had been carried away in sampans. 

Brig. Gen. Robert H. York, USA, who saw the entire operation, commended the fine work of tactical air. The operation was nevertheless costly to the 

aircrews, most damage coming from .50-caliber fire. Aircraft losses included an 

H-2 1, a B-26 shot down with loss of the crew. and the crash landings after battle 

damages of two Vietnamese A-I Hs and one T-28. Ground fire hit twenty-five 

planes. The helicopter force had consisted of twelve H-21s and thirteen UH-1s. 

Its support came from four T-28s for prestrike missions, two B-26s for escort, 

and three B-26s, eight A-I Hs, and twelve T-28s for cover. It was the largest 

one-day close air support operation to date.' 

In an otherwise cheerless month Capt. Richard W. Von Hake, air liaison 

officer, engineered one small air victory against the guerrillas along the Dong Nai 

River. The Viet Cong habitually fired at aircraft but slipped through a sweep of 

the area by a government battalion. On December 8 Von Hake persuaded the 

province chief tojoin him on an L-19 flight over that ground. Since the battalion 

had just finished its sweep, the chief felt sure he was wasting time. To his great 

surprise, he saw more than fifty people as the L-19 drew brisk fire. 

Von Hake drafted an air strike plan and on the 9th and 12th dropped leaflets 

to warn that persons working with the Viet Cong were in danger. Because the 

area was bordered by strategic hamlets, the hamlet chiefs blocked egress from 

dawn to noon on December 14. On that morning Von Hake and a Vietnamese 

observer flew into the area, discreetly trailed by three T-28s and two B-26s. When 

the L-19 was fired upon, the observer marked the target and the strike planes 

swept in. Twenty-three enemy were killed and others wounded.' This modest 

victory showed that armed reconnaisance could succeed in Vietnam. 

I96 
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED 

Twice in December, guerrillas in Zone D ambushed little convoys lacking 

air escort. The Viet Cong waylaid one in Binh Long Province on the 23d, 

resulting in fourteen men killed, seven wounded, and five missing. 

Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force planes flew seventy-three helicopter escort 

sorties in November and eighty-three in December, a decrease from earlier in the 

year. In part the decline mirrored the slowing of Vietnamese ground operations. 

It also stemmed from the growing practice of letting U.S. Army helicopter 

gunships take the place of strike aircraft - this despite MACV directives 

requiring the use of Vietnamese aircraft before bringing in American planes. 

In III Corps the 5th Division’s penchant for helicopter gunships contributed 

to a major defeat on the afternoon of December 3 I. A ranger battalion ran into 

about two battalions of Viet Cong ten miles west of Ben Cat and eight miles 

southeast of Dau Tieng. The outnumbered rangers formed a defensive perimeter 

and fought bravely, but they needed help. The 5th Division had several battalions 

at Ben Cat and Dau Tieng, close enough to the scene of action and sufficiently 

strong to smash the insurgents. An L-19 forward air controller and at least two 

A-I Hs were constantly on station over the encircled rangers. Besides the twelve 

100-pound bombs and eight hundred rounds of 20-mm ammunition carried by 

each A-I H, more strike aircraft were available at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut. 

Capt. Ken C. Spears, Jr., air liaison officer, time and again asked that the 

A- I Hs be allowed to strike what were clearly enemy positions. But his calls fell on 

deaf ears. The orbiting relays of A-I Hs returned to Bien Hoa without firing a 

shot. The sole air strikes came from three flights of armed UH-Is and failed to 

uproot the guerrillas. Rescue battalions arrived at noon on January I, 1964, long 

after the rangers had scattered. Ranger losses totaled six killed, twelve wounded, 

and thirty-one missing. An engagement that might have been a victory ended in 

another disheartening defeat. 

Col. Harvey E. Henderson, acting 2d Air Division commander, considered 

the failure to capitalize on strike aircraft firepower “to border on being criminal.” 

Ambassador Lodge cabled the same conclusion to Washington, citing “Vietnamese failures to take advantage of superiority of firepower which can be obtained 

by rapid reaction to VC troop concentrations.” Admiral Felt bluntly told General Harkins that A-I H firepower was quite superior to that of the UH-1. “It 

appears to me,”Felt said, “that [our] education program on the use of air power 

is unsatisfactory.”” 

The Vietnamese A-I H and T-28 squadrons boosted their strike sorties in 

November and December 1963. Still, they could not compensate for the fewer 

serviceable USAF B-26s and T-28s that were further diminished by battle 

damage. Moreover, the work of the Vietnamese forward air controllers left a lot 

to be desired. On December 6, for example, an L-19 and two T-28s responded to 

a request for an immediate strike on a Viet Cong battalion. When just ten 

minutes from the target, the controller pleaded the need to refuel his half-full 

tanks. He and the fighter pilots touched down at Tay Ninh airport, lunched 

during the refueling, and went on their way. By then the enemy battalion had 

vanished. 

197 
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

! 

Assessments of the political and military conditions in Vietnam at the close 

of I963 were decidedly pessimistic. Severing relations with South Vietnam and 

the United States, Cambodia sought closer relations with China. Although 

communist support of the Viet Cong stealing into the delta through Cambodia 

had already proved “very worrisome,” prospects swiftly worsened. The general 

situation in Vietnam had also eroded since the assassination of Diem, and would 

continue to be bad in 

During January-May 1964 Hanoi sent an estimated forty-seven hundred 

troops into South Vietnam. Formerly most of the infiltrators were ethnic southerners. Now there were growing numbers of native northerners, many of them 

drafted into the North Vietnamese Army. The Viet Cong had earlier relied on 

French and American weapons, chiefly from stockpiles captured before 1954 in 

Indochina and Korea. Currently most of the weapons were Chinese, brought by 

land and sea from North Vietnam. 13 

On January 22, 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to President 

Johnson’s November 1963 request by presenting a ten-point program of “bolder 

actions to arrest SVN’s military/ political decline.” This proposed a virtual 

takeover of the war from the Saigon government by overt and covert bombing of 

North Vietnam, large-scale commando raids, mining the sea approaches, ground 

operations into Laos, and extended reconnaissance over both Laos and Cambodia. The plan also called for committing more U.S. forces to support combat in 

Vietnam and against North Vietnam. 14 

At Da Nang, where he commanded the I Corps, thirty-seven-year-old Maj. 

Gen. Nguyen Khanh kept close watch on the new government. He believed that 

some members of General Minh’s 12-man Executive Committee were plotting to 

arrest Minh and other officers, including him, and declare for Vietnamese 

neutralism. After notifying General Harkins of his intentions, Khanh flew to 

Saigon and on January 30 headed a coalition of younger generals who managed 

a relatively bloodless coup. He told Harkins the next day that the coup was 

pro-American, pro-Western, and anti-neutralist. The new government would 

step up the war at once. Harkins termed Khanh the “strongest military character 

in the country” even though he lacked political appeal and complete control over 

the armed forces. Ambassador Lodge thought the United States was “beginning 

to make real progress” with the Minh government, but Khanh’s one-man rule 

might be more effective. President Johnson then sent Khanh a personal note of 

support. 15 

A few days later, JCS Chairman Taylor readied a plan to revitalize the 

counterinsurgency. The key points embraced improved intelligence; a stabilized 

Khanh government through reforms of land tenure; liquidation of land debts, 

and other measures; the prospect of no more coups; a quickened campaign 

tempo; bolder actions against North Vietnam, maybe by Vietnamese bombing; 

and U.S. warnings to Hanoi to stop its aid to the Viet Cong. The CIA warned 

that the government and armed forces of South Vietnam must show definite 

improvement. If not, there was an even chance at best that Khanh’s administration would not survive during the following few months.” 

198 
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED 

The new government could not immediately turn the tide. About twelve 

miles south of Tay Ninh City lay the village of Ben Cau, a cluster of six strategic 

hamlets housing some six thousand people. Before dawn on February 6, nearly 

one thousand guerrillas drove the Vietnamese militia out of Ben Cau. While 

waiting for the government forces to appear, the Viet Cong forced the villagers to 

dig firing positions and shelters. Although USAF officers thought that precise air 

attacks would dislodge the insurgents with least danger to civilians, the III Corps 

commander authorized firing into the village by artillery, strike aircraft, and 

helicopter gunships. Pairs of A-IHs, B-26s, and T-28s struck as directed by 

Vietnamese forward air controllers. 

The insurgents fled after dark, leaving eleven of their dead behind. Civilian 

casualties numbered forty-six killed, sixty wounded, and 670 burned in varying 

degrees. The bombardment demolished 670 houses and damaged two hundred 

others, depriving two thousand people of shelter. Though American relief supplies soon came, the survivors were more grateful to the enemy who made them 

dig for cover. Vietnamese officers said there would be no complaint about the 

civilian casualties. Yet the USAF counterinsurgency expert, Maj. Gen. Edward 

G. Lansdale, pointed out that the government forces had violated a cardinal rule 

by not protecting people under Viet Cong attack. 

Cambodia posed a prickly problem to the Khanh regime. Prince Sihanouk 

charged on February 1 1 that two Vietnamese aircraft had attacked a Cambodian 

village and killed five people. He held the United States partly to blame because it 

had “overarmed” Vietnam and “torpedoed” plans for an international conference to establish Cambodia’s neutrality. Later border incidents impelled 

Sihanouk to accept arms from China and the Soviet Union. During Vietnamese 

border actions on March 19, Cambodian T-28s shot down a USAF O-1. The 

American pilot, Capt. Uwe-Thorsten Scobel, and the Vietnamese observer were 

In the interim, intelligence estimates in Washington highlighted Hanoi’s 

intent to expand support for the Viet Cong. South Vietnam’s situation was seen 

as extremely serious. On February 20 President Johnson ordered Secretary 

McNamara to have the Joint Chiefs study the question of how to decrease 

Hanoi’s activities. McNamara sent the President’s directive to JCS Chairman 

Taylor on the 21st, adding that among alternatives being considered was “a 

carefully planned program designed to exert increasing military pressures” on 

North 

Johnson said publicly on February 21 that those directing and supplying the 

Viet Cong were playing “a deeply dangerous game.” He also formed the Vietnam 

Coordinating Committee to run the Washington side of the war. The chairman 

was Mr. William H. Sullivan, a Foreign Service officer and the United Nations 

adviser to the State Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Members 

represented the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House. The President told 

Sullivan to find a way to speed operations against North Vietnam and to 

examine how to make Hanoi desist from its hostile 

199 

e 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

NHON 

As the war seemed about to enter a new phase, there was talk in Washington, Hawaii, and Saigon of voluntary repatriation of U.S. dependents from 

Vietnam. But the hope of keeping Khanh in power led to the decision not to 

move dependents out of the country.22 

General Khanh on February 22 published the National Pacification Plan 

that MACV had desired since Diem’s overthrow. The concept called for local 

“spreading oil stain”or “oil spot” operations. These were military clear-and-hold 

actions starting in safe areas and rolling back the Viet Cong. Within pacified 

regions a new “life development program”wou1d enhance the civilian standard of 

living. These pacification measures were to be completed in I and II Corps by 

January I, 1965, and in III and IV Corps a year 

Corps commanders were to write their own plans for pursuing the overall 

goal. In the III Corps, for example, a program commencing in June was expected 

to push outward in concentric circles until the adjacent provinces of Gia Dinh, 

Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, and Phuoc Tuy were firmly under 

government 

General Harkins concluded that the offensive would work “if there are no 

more coups and Khanh stays And the Joint Chiefs accepted the oil spot 

idea as part of “an integrated political, socio-economic, and psychological 

offensive to support more fully the military effort.” The chiefs endorsed giving jet 

aircraft to the Vietnamese Air Force and to the Farm Gate 1st Air Commando 

200 
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED 

Squadron. They likewise urged studies of how to escalate operations against 

North 

To PACAF, the papers and studies flowing out of Washington and Hawaii 

mirrored “the uneasiness with which U.S. authorities view the possibility of 

engaging U.S. ground forces with Communist forces anywhere.” There was 

another way, however. Strictly USAF operations “with initial non-nuclear 

strikes” would hand the Air Force strong arguments for building its tactical 

forces. At the same time the United States would be able to react rapidly to 

threats, to control operations carefully, and to pull out at once if need 

General LeMay as usual had little confidence in the “very limited” actions 

and studies recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “We are swatting flies,” he 

said, “when we ought to be going after the manure pile.” He wanted “more 

positive and bolder actions” to include bombing targets in North Vietnam ‘‘now.” 

The Air Force Chief favored expanded interdiction, crop destruction, attacks on 

guerrillas in Laos, destroying dams and dikes in Northern Vietnam to flood croplands, disrupting power sources, bombing North Vietnamese military centers, 

and mining ports. He advocated sending more aircraft including jets to enlarge 

airdropped and airlanded operations, greater bombing of targets beyond the 

reach of ground forces, and heavier escort and cover. He wished to relax the 

barriers to cross-border actions. To keep the United States from getting bogged 

down in a ground war on the Asian mainland, the only hope was massive air 

operations. 

Prodded by General LeMay and pursuing the President’s expressed views, 

the Joint Chiefs in early March proposed overt military actions against North 

Vietnam. The initial phase would witness low-level reconnaissance over Laos 

and North Vietnam. Air strikes, amphibious raids, sabotage, and harassment of 

shipping were to follow. Then would come destruction of highway bridges, 

airfields, POL dumps, and other supply targets. The climax would be full-scale 

air and naval air operations against North Vietnam. 

Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the Policy Planning Council at the Department of State, thought North Vietnam vulnerable to bombing. After all, Ho Chi 

Minh was no longer a guerrilla with nothing to lose-he had an industrial 

complex to protect. W. Averell Harriman and Roger Hilsman of the State 

Department opposed escalated measures against North Vietnam, since the Laotian infiltration routes seemed to be used but 

On March 6 Khanh fired three corps commanders and five of the nine 

division commanders. Soon a wholesale removal of twenty-three province chiefs 

ensued. The disruption of leadership shook the confidence of the armed forces 

and of the people. Military desertions soared. Meanwhile the prestige of the Viet 

Cong 

Weakness at Saigon and decentralized military command let the corps 

commanders store up power. Rancor between ground commanders and province and district chiefs bred confusion and disagreement. Air Force officers 

sensed that uncoordinated air strikes might permit some party to make the 

Americans a scapegoat for a tragic 

20 I 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Before making up his mind on the options at hand, President Johnson sent 

Secretary and General Taylor to Vietnam. During March they 

accompanied General on his speechmaking visits to Can Tho, Lieu, 

the area, Hue, and Saigon. On the platform, and Taylor 

stood on either side of and lifted his hands in the air as a visible sign of 

U.S. 

In private talks, and Taylor gained the impression that the 

military situation had gone downhill. Nearly forty percent of the countryside was 

under influence and control, including the critical provinces around 

Saigon. In eight of the forty-three provinces the insurgents held seventy-five to 

ninety percent of the land. was sure that his government troops could 

clear the country but doubted if they could keep it. He preferred covert actions 

against North Vietnam until “rear-area set up. No one was optimistic about limited covert operations although clandestine activities could be 

expanded by easing curbs on bombardment. “Men, money, and materiel were no 

object,” said. The United States had to press on. After discussing the 

aerial mining of North Vietnamese waters, the Defense secretary directed that 

mine-laying training for Vietnamese pilots begin at once. 

Ambassador Lodge objected to “massive destruction” before trying a “carrot and stick” approach. The United States could offer North Vietnam advantages for ceasing aggression, while at the same time confronting Hanoi with 

covert actions such as unacknowledged air strikes. Photos by reconnaissance planes revealed active: bases right across the border in Cambodia. But hot pursuit across the frontier was ruled out, in light of American 

negotiations to keep Cambodia from giving up neutrality and winding up in the 

Hanoi and Peking camp. The political would far outweigh any military 

worth. 

Secretary asked if it was better to shore up the Vietnamese Air 

Force or to send more USAF aircraft. He learned that Americans had to “fill in 

the gaps caused by lack of motivation” on the part of the Vietnamese Air Force, 

inability to produce fast reaction strikes, and its reluctance to fly at night and 

on 

After a round of talks in Hawaii, and Taylor flew back to 

Washington. The Defense secretary proposed twelve steps to President Johnson 

for changing the course of the war. Though stressing actions within the country, 

the secretary suggested that plans be laid for border-control actions inside Laos 

and Cambodia on seventy-two hours notice. These would be “tit-for-tat” bomb 

strikes and commando raids by Vietnamese forces on such North Vietnamese 

targets as communications centers, training camps, and infiltration routes. For 

the present, resisted border-control or graduated military pressure 

operations. He nevertheless thought there ought to be standby plans for gradually tightening the screws on North Vietnam. The plans would be triggered on 

thirty days notice and involve air attacks on military and possibly industrial 
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED 

The Joint Chiefs judged the Defense secretary’s program to be too 

sparse unless quick decisive action against North Vietnam was added. John A. 

McCone. CIA director, labeled McNamara’s proposals “too little, too late.” He 

urged swift operations in the south to match intensive air and naval moves on the 

north. General LeMay spoke to the point. He did not think that the “military 

tools and concepts” were “generally sound and adequate.” He deplored the 

shackling of sound military activities with artificial political bonds that events 

had long made obsolete. 

The National Security Council concurred in the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendations but warned, “The United States should commit itself to the 

clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-nam to Communism.” Otherwise the result would “destroy SEATO.” President Johnson harbored doubts but 

approved the proposals, preferring the secretary’s approach to that of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. The political and military base in South Vietnam seemed too 

fragile to invite expanded enemy hostilities. Furthermore, striking North Vietnam might bring the Chinese and Soviets into the war. The President asked all 

agencies to support energetically the actions called 

Shortly afterwards the Joint Chiefs answered a question put by Johnson on 

March 4: Had all possible support been given American and Vietnamese units 

since he had become President? The chiefs said they had hoped for stronger U.S. 

action to encompass air reconnaissance in Laos and Cambodia, clandestine 

intelligence operations in Cambodia, hot pursuit by ground troops, inspection of 

Cambodian shipping in the Mekong Delta, and jet fighters for South Vietnam. 

But all had been turned down due to national 

In a major address on March 26, 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara 

explained the four options open to the President. The United States could 

withdraw from Vietnam but this was completely untenable. Vietnam could be 

neutralized, risking an eventual communist takeover. Military actions could be 

spread into North Vietnam, a choice being carefully studied. Or the United States 

could focus on helping the Vietnamese win, the option already approved by 

Johnson. Even if fighting beyond South Vietnam was needed, it would supplement rather than substitute for general progress and stability in the country. 

The decision to center on the battle inside Vietnam underscored thedemand 

to relax the rules of engagement for air operations. On March 27 MACV 

authorized strike aircraft to operate to the border if it was a river or road. 

Elsewhere they could fly as close as two thousand meters when directed by a 

forward air controller, five thousand meters when not. Aircraft were forbidden to 

fire across or violate the frontier without diplomatic clearance. 

The State Department sympathized with the JCS stand for hot pursuit into 

Cambodia under certain conditions but contested any easing of the curbs. This 

position governed in 1964 and was reiterated firmly by MACV in October and 

November after aircraft flew over the border by 

Following a SEATO Council meeting in Manila on April 15, Secretary 

Rusk and General Wheeler went to Saigon. With Ambassador Lodge they 

weighed the chances of squeezing North Vietnam by Vietnamese covert opera203 
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

by covert U.S. support for Vietnamese aerial mining and strikes, and lastly 

by covert American-Vietnamese naval displays, bombardments, and air attacks. 

Rusk felt that the limited resources given Vietnam inhibited U.S. officials from 

daring new efforts. He wondered whether enough Americans were aiding civil 

administrative services in cleared areas that had to be held. On April the 

President therefore suggested to Lodge that “two or three hundred” troops be 

replaced by civilian advisors to shift the emphasis toward “the art of 

Hanoi meanwhile became more belligerent. On April Chi Minh 

declared that if the United States carried the war to North Vietnam, he had 

“powerful friends ready to help”him. In the Laotian panhandle, North Vietnamese construction crews, signalmen, and truckdrivers improved infiltration routes. 

Also in April a North Vietnamese regiment was recalled from Laos and given 

special military and political training for operations in Vietnam. Hanoi began 

form new regiments for dispatch SOUTHWARD 

Having probed Laotian government forces since November 

Lao and North Vietnamese troops on April launched heavy attacks on the 

of Jars After boasting that they could take any district headquarters in 

the Delta, the Viet on the night of April overran the district 

capital of Long on the Peninsula. In the ensuing air-ground battle, 

the enemy lost at least fifty-five men killed including the commander. Yet 

Vietnamese and Americans were casualties, the capital was in ruins, and some 

two hundred civilians were killed or wounded. On May a underwater demolition team sank the U.S. aircraft ferry Curd while it was berthed in 

the Saigon River and delivering helicopters. 

Stung by these successes, General told Lodge on May that he 

wanted to declare war on North Vietnam. He wished to have ten thousand 

Special Forces troops “to cover the whole Cambodian-Laotian border. Would 

the United States start bombing beyond the confines of South 

On this question there was a serious split between American policymakers 

and even within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. and Gen. Wallace 

had urged low-level reconnaissance and air strikes against 

the north by U.S. aircraft. In a shift of opinion the other membersChairman Taylor, Gen. Harold Johnson, USA, and David 

McDonald, that heavy pressure was not warranted, at least for 

the present. 

In its study of how to tighten the screws on North Vietnam, Sullivan’s 

Vietnam Coordinating Committee noted that North Vietnam’s economy was 

chiefly agrarian. There were relatively few industrial targets that if wiped out 

would have an immediate military impact. Still a steady in air power, 

from psychological applications to selective strikes, could hurt Hanoi and slow 

its support to the Viet CINCPAC meantime firmed up plans for the 

United States to take part in military operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North 

Vietnam if the authorities in Washington so 

Communist in the Laotian panhandle prompted the Joint Chiefs to 

plan with the Government of Vietnam for airlifting Vietnamese intelligence 

I 
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED. METHODS EXPANDED 

teams into the area around Tchepone. When Secretary McNamara and General 

Taylor visited Saigon during May 12-13, McNamara let Khanh know that 

bombing North Vietnam would be no substitute for clearing the Viet Cong out of 

South Vietnam. The two found Harkins optimistic, Westmoreland less so, and 

Lodge satisfied with the size and composition of U.S. efforts. “Further large scale 

contributions.” he said, “are not 

The collapse of government defenses on the Plain of Jars on May 17 

demanded rapid reaction within Laos and a second look at the merits of exerting 

pressure on North Vietnam. A National Security Council working group, 

chaired by Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, prepared a thirty-day 

scenario of political actions leading to air strikes against North Vietnamese 

targets and a call for an international conference on Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs 

J-3 (Operations) listed targets in these categories of ascending importance: to 

convince Hanoi that it was too risky to back the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao, to 

deter Hanoi from escalating the conflict, and to destroy the North Vietnamese 

industrial 

In meetings on May 24 and 25, the executive committee of the National 

Security Council put forward selected portions of the scenario. President 

Johnson then enjoined his senior advisers to hold a major strategy conference in 

Hawaii on June I and 

The Soviet Union early in 1964 had advocated new meetings of the Geneva 

powers on Vietnam and Cambodia, and on May 27 a Polish diplomatic initiative 

called for a conference on Laos. After hearing charges of border violations, the 

United Nations Security Council suggested that observers be placed along the 

Cambodian frontier to ease tensions. The United States and South Vietnam 

welcomed the proposal, but the Viet Cong and Cambodia spurned 

As acting chairman, LeMay advised the Joint Chiefs on May 28 that the 

United States was “losing Southeast Asia chiefs, he argued, ought to 

present at the upcoming Honolulu military conference a clear record on how to 

“start winning.” He said the only way to end Hanoi’s support of the insurgency in 

Vietnam and Laos would be to destroy its means to do so. Air attacks should be 

made on infiltration points at Dien Bien Phu and Vinh to show the sharp change 

in American outlook and resolve. On the 30th the Joint Chiefs accepted LeMay’s 

views and passed them to McNamara. Upon his return, Chairman Taylor 

disagreed with these views and sent his own to the Defense secretary, initially 

proposing more limited actions against targets less risky than Vinh and Dien 

Bien Phu. The purpose, he stated, would be to impress upon Hanoi U.S. 

readiness to take more drastic action should North Vietnam enlarge its support 

for the Viet 

Present at the Secretary of Defense Conference on June l and 2 were 

Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Lodge, General Taylor, Admiral Felt, and Mr. 

Sullivan of the President’s Vietnam Coordinating Committee. General Harkins, 

whose relations with Lodge had soured, did not attend. The atmosphere was 

gloomy. The talk focused on getting congressional approval for wider action in 

Southeast Asia. Envisioned were commitment of American divisions, a partial 

205 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

U.S. mobilization, and air attacks on North Vietnam. Lodge favored a careful 

bombing campaign. He believed it would bolster the shaky Khanh government 

and impart a feeling of unity to the war-weary South Vietnamese. At the end the 

consensus was to wait and see what 

Mr. James B. Seaborn, the Canadian member of the International Control 

Commission, visited North Vietnam and apprised the government of American 

thoughts on a negotiated peace based on concessions by both sides. If Hanoi 

would stop sending men and arms south. Washington would respond with 

economic aid. Denying any attempt to threaten, the United States was well aware 

of Hanoi’s strings on the Viet Cong. If the war heated up, thegreatest devastation 

would be loosed upon North Vietnam. Seaborn stressed President Johnson’s 

desire for a settlement based on Hanoi’s promise to abide by the Geneva 

agreements of 1954 and 1962. North Vietnamese officials were unimpressed. 

They wanted the United States to withdraw totally from Vietnam. This would be 

followed by a “neutral” regime in Saigon, with the National Liberation Front 

charting the future of the country. Seaborn during a second trip in August 

conveyed the warning that American patience was wearing thin. Hanoi’s reply 

was hardly encouraging for 

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor had asked the JCS and 

CINCPAC to forge a three-phase air strike plan against North Vietnam. If set in 

motion it would signal American readiness to attack all major military targets in 

the country. On July I 1 the planners settled on ninety-four air strike objectives in 

North Vietnam-eighty-two targets and twelve armed reconnaissance routes. 

They next set about drafting detailed plans for this massive air 

CINCPAC rather than MACV was to have overall direction of operations 

against North Vietnam, through the PACAF and PACFLT commanders. But 

the principal thrust of American policy continued to be countering the insurgency within the borders of South Vietnam. To that end the MACV commander 

was to devote his full 

206 
Once asked why the United States should not have command over the 

Vietnamese armed forces, General Harkins replied that this would be contrary to 

U.S. national policy. More to the point, the Vietnamese government would not 

agree to the arrangement, since it jealously guarded its sovereign right to accept 

or reject American advice.' Although this question and this position were never 

officially challenged, certain other command problems continued to vex the 

carrying out of the counterinsurgency. Among them were the tie-in of MACV 

and MAAG; the role and influence of the U.S. Air Force in directing policy in the 

country, chiefly in the controversy over the single management of aircraft; and 

the organization of the Vietnamese Air Force. These received attention in 1964. 

In the USAF view, the principal command problem in Vietnam since 1962 

was the absence of experienced high-ranking air officers on the MACV joint staff 

to explain what air power could and could not do. The MACV staff was 

dominated by Army officers rather than really jointly manned. No component 

Army and Navy units existed under MACV with the equivalent status of the 2d 

Air Division. 

Admiral Felt was sympathetic to having a senior USAF officer in the 

mainstream of MACV current operations. In September 1963 he had proposed 

filling the MACV chief of staff slot with a USAF officer when it became vacant in 

mid-1964. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved but the Secretary of Defense did 

not. After talking with Harkins during his December 1963 visit to Saigon, the 

Defense secretary was set on making changes along lines suggested by the Army. 

Early in 1964 he created the new position of Deputy Commander, MACV, and 

named Army Lt. Gen. William C. Westmoreland to it. He placed Brig. Gen. Ben 

Sternberg, USA, in the J-1 (Personnel) niche. He downgraded the USAF colonel 

serving as J-2 (Intelligence) to Deputy J-2 and put a Marine Corps brigadier 

general over him. He directed Harkins to reorganize MACV and the subsequent 

alterations shrunk the USAF allocation of J-staff jobs to the post of J-5 (Plans) 

held by Maj. Gen. Milton B. Adams. McNamara nevertheless believed the Air 

Force to be well-represented. He pointed to the 2d Air Division commander and 

the MAAG Air Force Section chief who were both general officers and present in 

Saigon.2 

Admiral Felt and Gen. Jacob E. Smart, PACAF commander, questioned 

the wisdom of revamping MACV while the Vietnamese government was trying 

to recover from the shock of two coups. They had not concurred in a Joint Chiefs 

suggestion on February 15 to merge MAAG and MACV. But a study by General 

Sternberg addressed the broader question. The existence of the two headquarters 

had surely led to duplication of effort, occasional lapses in coordination, and a 

needlessly complicated advisory program. If the functions were fused under 

207 
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

MACV, Sternberg favored MACV as a “specified army command” in lieu of a 

“subordinate joint command.”3 

That would enhance the Army’s role at the expense of the Navy and Air 

Force. While General Smart assented to the need for a large Army share in the 

advisory assistance effort, he failed to understand the logic of Army predominance. When McNamara and Taylor came to Hawaii in March, Smart argued 

for placing senior USAF officers in decisionmaking positions in the reorganized 

headquarters so that air power could be best employed. The secretary said he 

knew of no operation that had suffered from want of air support. Taylor had 

heard of such instances but blamed poor communications instead of faulty 

organization or unsound policy. Admiral Felt asserted that at times Army 

advisors neglected to pass along air support requests, because they wanted to use 

Army aircraft to further Army doctrinal concepts. McNamara refused to change 

his 

General Westmoreland, former commander of the XVlIl Airborne Corps, 

became the deputy commander of MACV on January 27, 1964. Maj. Gen. 

Joseph H. Moore-a close friend of Westmoreland since boyhood-replaced 

General Anthis as 2d Air Division commander on the 3 1st. Air Force officials 

hoped that Moore’s close ties with Westmoreland would help brighten the image, 

expand the influence, and enlarge the number of senior staff personnel of the Air 

Force, as well as clear up air problems. General Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, 

ordered Westmoreland “to get the air missions straightened out.” He said he 

would not tolerate a fight for “hide bound doctrinal concepts.” If Army doctrine 

got in the way of the war effort, Wheeler could and would change doctrine with a 

stroke of his 

Besides 104 aircraft, the 2d Air Division had about forty-six hundred people 

in January 1964-nearly sixty on the MACV staff, four hundred in MAAG, and 

more than four thousand in USAF Yet hope for a bigger Air Force part in 

counterinsurgency soon vanished. The MACV J-3 complained that his USAF 

deputy, who was highly regarded by the 2d Air Division, was unable to “look at 

J-3 matters except through USAF-tinted glasses,” knew nothing about ground 

operations, and was of little use. The deputy was succeeded by an Army officer.’ 

General Moore pressed for the assignment of a USAF officer as MACV chief of 

staff when General Weede of the Marine Corps wound up his tour in May. 

Instead, Maj. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell moved from J-3 to chief of staff and 

another Army officer, Brig. Gen. William E. DePuy, took over the J-3 

Perhaps foreshadowing the end of the advisory era, MAAG was closed out 

on May 15, 1964. Its functions went to an expanded MACV headquarters, and 

the Army corps advisory groups fell directly under MACV. The MAAG Air 

Force Section became the Air Force Advisory Group, assigned to MACV but 

with operational control vested in General Moore as the USAF component 

commander. Moore also came to be the senior advisor to the Vietnamese Air 

Force. General Rowland, chief of the Air Force Advisory Group, acted as 

Moore’s deputy for the Vietnamese Air Force military assistance 

I 

208 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1964 

(Top left) President Johnson and W. Averell Harriman. 

(Top right) Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Jr. 

(Bottom) Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore and Gen. Jacob E. Smart discuss air tactics with Maj. Xuan Vinh, 

commander of the 23d Air Support Group, VNAF. 

Courtesy: U.S. Park Service Courtesy US Navy 

209 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

To General Smart the new setup did little to extend air knowledge and 

experience at MACV. Rather than trimming the headquarters, the change 

triggered a request to raise staff spaces by 3 10 (283 U.S. Army, 24 Navy/ Marine 

Corps, and 3 USAF). Smart recommended at least 38 more USAF officers as 

directorate and branch chiefs.’” Disregarding his desires, MACV in September 

asked for 71 new USAF spaces mostly for field advisory 

General Westmoreland rose to MACV commander when General Harkins 

reached retirement age on June 20. Ambassador Lodge resigned on the 23d to 

join in the national elections at home, and President Johnson selected General 

Taylor for the post. On July IS Admiral Felt retired and Adm. Ulysses S. Grant 

Sharp, Jr., became CINCPAC. A whole new leadership emerged. 

Should an Air Force officer be named as Westmoreland’s deputy? Westmoreland had said in early June that he needed no deputy. But General LeMay 

argued in JCS discussions that a deputy from another service was a must to 

preserve the unified nature of MACV. Because of broadening air operations he 

thought the deputy should be a USAF general. The Navy and Marine Corps 

thought so too. General Wheeler, Army chief, suggested that the 2d Air Division 

commander be designated Deputy Commander for Air as an additional duty if 

air operations grew. Chairman Taylor was for giving the deputy position to an 

officer who could afford across-the-board assistance to Westmoreland. Owing to 

the nature of operations, he wished to see a two- or three-star Army general in the 

job. Taylor queried Westmoreland who then said he wanted an Army general. 

After McNamara’s approval on June 18. Lt. Gen. John L. Throckmorton was 

assigned. 

General LeMay reiterated the need for USAF expertise on the MACV staff. 

In September Westmoreland proposed to give the 2d Air Division commander 

the second hat of Deputy Commander for Air Operations, MACV. The Air Staff 

and PACAF opposed this action because it offered the MACV staff no real 

additional help. Westmoreland nonetheless went ahead with the proposal. On 

November 12 CINCPAC bowed to the “political climate” and put it forward to 

the Joint Chiefs.12 Not until seven months later was the new title approved. 

Still the reshuffling of May 15 bestowed some benefits. Tucking the Air 

Force Advisory Group under 2d Air Division was long overdue and fostered 

unity and control. 13 The harmony between Westmoreland and Moore nurtured 

better working relations between MACV and 2d Air 

Yet General Westmoreland continued to command U.S. Army components, violating the principle that commanders of unified activities must be 

divorced from service operations. In effect the MACV air component commander answered to the Army component commander. 

Moreover, the sparse service expertise on the MACV staff made it hard to 

pursue joint matters properly. A case in point was the MACV airlift allocation 

board run by one overworked USAF officer in Army officers so ruled the 

MACV Joint Research and Test Activity that the Air Force hesitated to test 

combined concepts for combinations of Just eight of the forty-five 

210 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 

AUTHORIZED officer spaces in were Air Force. Only one was a colonel's slot, the 

newly created Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for 

for the most part entrusted air matters to the Air Division staff, but 

more and more assumed control of day-to-day air operations. This was done at 

first through an American MACV staff element in the Vietnamese armed forces 

joint operations center. Later an Army air operations section was formed with 

personnel, to allocate Army aircraft to the corps and to control other Army 

aviation resources. To coordinate Army and Air Force infrared reconnaissance, 

the MACV Target Research and Analysis Center was founded in December 

This function took care of centralized targeting 

The tactical air control system survived and outwardly appeared to meet 

doctrinal needs. Still it was soon evident that the status of the tactical air 

commander was severely eroded-the Air Division commander had no 

command authority, no direct operating duties, and no staff support. Senior 

USAF officers perceived that the local situation in Vietnam dictated several 

deviations from proven tactical air doctrine. But they cautioned against adopting 

the MACV air control system as a model for worldwide air command and 

control 

The performance of the Vietnamese Air Force also stirred concern. Central 

to the Vietnamese military concept was the parceling out of resources among the 

four corps commanders who governed all ground, air, naval, and paramilitary 

forces within their areas. Air Force officers, notably General Smart, protested 

splintering the meager Vietnamese air power. Even so, many Army officers 

believed this grouping was required in what they saw as largely a ground 

Col. had won command of the Vietnamese Air Force for 

his part in the Minh coup, and polished his prestige by supporting the 

coup. He assured Generals Moore and that he did not intend to 

relinquish centralized control over air power. New wings, said, were to be 

assigned to geographical corps areas rather than to corps commanders. On 

March Vietnamese tactical wing headquarters were transferred to the corps 

areas and located at Pleiku, and Another was projected for 

Can Tho when the new airfield was finished. A composite airlift and reconnaissance wing continued to operate under the air operations The proposal 

to place liaison and helicopter squadrons under the corps came up in April. 

dissented and MACV sided with him. The transfer was not carried 

General Moore worked to keep the tactical air control system intact, 

including the air support operations centers. Since the Vietnamese wing commanders at and Pleiku advised and planned with corps commanders, 

the role of the and Corps air support operations centers declined. The 

sub-operations center at was shut DOWN On the whole, Moore 

considered the Vietnamese Air Force organization a deviation but close enough 

to classical air concepts to be acceptable. Maj. Gen. Sam Thirteenth Air Force commander, decided not to dwell on the 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

By retaining the integrity of his command, Ky could deploy his units as a 

national counter-coup force. Yet American influence over Vietnamese air operations diminished. For example, the 4 1st Tactical Wing and I Corps staffs planned 

for March 30 a night medium-level bombing raid against a Viet Cong training 

center. Army and Air Force advisors first learned of the attack when planning 

was well underway and white-phosphorus bombs were requested from American stocks. Twelve T-28s and four A-I Hs participated. Colonel Ky, who rode in 

one of the T-28s, depicted the strike as a highly successful demonstration of a 

“new night bombing capability.” Vietnamese army photo interpreters gave a 

glowing account of damages to the Viet Cong, but U.S. Army interpreters failed 

to find the samc 

“The word for the Air Force in Vietnam,” General Anthis had written in 

November 1963, “is austerity,” having both American and Vietnamese components in mind. War-weary air commando aircraft, a fledgling Vietnamese Air 

Force, and a slow air request net made it difficult to seize combat 

The USAF 34th Tactical Group was scheduled to phase out of Vietnam. 

Withdrawal would begin in mid-1964 with thedeparture ofthe 19th Tactical Air 

Support Squadron which furnished forward air controllers. The 1st Air Commando Squadron, due to receive in June 1964 the first two of eighteen rebuilt On 

Mark B-26Ks, was to leave in mid-1965. Farm Gate’s B-26s were nearly worn out 

but the 2d Air Division expected them to survive with careful flying, if the Viet 

Cong introduced no heavy weapons with antiaircraft sighting devices. The new 

Vietnamese 5 18th Fighter Squadron was to get A-1 Hs in March 1964. Also that 

month the 7 16th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron was programmed to 

have its eighteen RT-28s and three RC-47s During the second quarter of 1964, 

USAF T-28s were to be replaced on a one-for-one basis with dual-piloted 

By 1964 Vietnamese and American aircraft were furnishing but one-half of 

the support asked for. The reasons lay in air request net troubles and the rising 

damage to planes from Viet Cong ground defenses. 

On February I 1, after the wing of a B-26at Eglin Air Force Base broke off in 

flight, all B-26s in Vietnam were taken out of combat. They could fly only 

straight and level with the lightest of ordnance 

The uncertain combat worthiness of the old B-26s led PACAF to suggest 

deploying a squadron of the 3d Bombardment Wing’s lightjet B-57s from Japan 

to Bien Hoa. These planes were being withdrawn from the wing, but they were 

admirable for the war. Their jet speed spelled swift response to air support 

The MACV commander and CINCPAC voiced grave concern over the loss 

of the B-26s, which General Westmoreland called his “Sunday punch.” Both 

headquarters proposed a squadron of B-57s with Vietnamese markings and 

mixed crews to operate out of Bien Hoa under Farm Gate rules. On March 2 the 

Joint Chiefs made the same suggestion to Defense Secretary 

At March conferences in Saigon, McNamara questioned General Moore 

regarding Vietnamese Air Force needs. The secretary judged it cheaper to give 

A-I 

212 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1964 

the Vietnamese further aircraft than to bring in fresh USAF planes. He settled on 

equipping all Vietnamese fighter units with A-I Hs, twenty-five tagged for the 

514th Fighter Squadron in the III Corps area to replace the T-28s. In addition he 

earmarked thirty for the 1st Air Command Squadron to take over from the 

wornout B-26s and 

General Smart told McNamara in Hawaii that tactical airchalked up more 

than thirty percent of the enemy casualties in South Vietnam-14,944 out of 

49,100 in 1962 and 1963. If a few obsolete aircraft could do this damage, think of 

what new and better planes could achieve. McNamara replied that he appreciated why B-57s were desired. First, however, the United States should exploit 

the easier method of sending in more nonjet planes to help win the war. What 

interested him was the possible use of B-57s in covert operations against North 

Vietnam. The Defense secretary’s recommendations, approved by President 

Johnson, embodied equipping the Vietnamese with twenty-five A-I Hs in 

exchange for T-28s. At the close of March, forty-eight B-57s and crews flew from 

Yokota Air Base in Japan to Clark Air Base in the 

Col. Benjamin S. Preston, Jr., commander of the 34th Tactical Group at 

Bien Hoa, went all out to keep his B-26s in the air. But clearly they could not be 

saved-every plane had cracked stress plates and loose rivets throughout its 

wings. On April 8 the last of the B-26s and RB-26s were to be ferried to Clark Air 

Base for 

So long as the T-28s faced no heavy ground fire, they did the job despite 

their fairly slow speed and small armament load. As Viet Cong firing heated up, 

however, they became vulnerable. On February 18 a T-28 took a hit while flying 

interdiction, but the crew fortunately escaped serious injury in the crash-landing. 

The next day a second T-28 was shot down while strafing in support of a ground 

operation, and the crewmen were killed. Three Vietnamese A-I Hs shared a like 

fate in 

Since the T-28s had outlived their safe employment in Vietnam, replacement A-I Skyraiders came in. On March 18 the newly formed Vietnamese 518th 

Fighter Squadron, with ten of twenty-five authorized began to fly 

combat from Bien 

Col. George 1. Ruddell, deputy to the MACV J-3, surveyed the ground-fire 

threat. He thought that a return to the Air Force’s standard four-aircraft fighter 

flights was in order, with each echelon of two protecting the other during 

low-level passes. This called for more planes, so Ruddell recommended that the 

34th Tactical Group get two squadrons each of twenty-five in lieu of a 

single squadron of thirty. Harkins, Smart, and Felt approved and passed the 

proposal to the Joint Chiefs of 

Compelled to stand down the combat-worn B-26s, Colonel Preston wondered how he could keep the 1st Air Commando Squadron going. On March 24 

a T-28B lost a wing and crashed while on a bomb run near Soc Trang, killing the 

pilot, Capt. Edwin G. Shank, Jr., and the Vietnamese crewman. All T-28s had 

been closely inspected and aircraft maintenance was excellent. Even so, the loss 

213 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

of the so soon after the wing failures impaired pilot morale. By April 

the Air Division was “practically flat out of business.” 

On April a crew was completing a third strafing pass over a 

well-defended target when the wing snapped off and the plane crashed. Two 

specialists from the North American Aviation, Inc., flew to and ran 

inspections. They said that the could not take the “slam-bang type flying” 

because it was a trainer-not a properly stressed fighter-bomber. At their 

suggestion, Colonel Preston retired the five remaining Gate that had 

been in combat since He borrowed nine newer from the 

Vietnamese, bringing the I Air Commando Squadron’s combat-ready aircraft 

to fifteen. He warned pilots about cautioned them not to land if 

carrying external ordnance, and placed limits on loading the wing stations of 

To cut damages from small-arms fire, Preston set a minimum 

altitude of feet for attack runs. The stayed in operation until A-I 

took their PLACE 

At least air strike requests were received in the first three months of 

Of the not honored, were due to a shortage of planes. These figures 

did not present a true picture, for ground commanders and forward air controllers disliked to file new requests after being turned 

Air-ground operations yielded slight results. Between January 16and the 

Division in An Province was supported by the most tactical air 

sorties yet flown in the division area-forty-four on the first day. However, the 

troops came to grips with no sizable enemy forces on the 

During January the 7th Division mounted a massive search-and-clear 

and water invasion into District of Province. 

Artillery fire and strikes by and supported the operation. 

Still, the enemy poured withering ground fire into the first waves of helicopters, 

peppering all thirty-two craft and downing one, a gunship. On the 18th 

another armed U was hit and plunged into the water. Only the copilot and a 

crewman were rescued. Even with constant air cover, friendly losses totaled 

twenty dead, twenty-five wounded, and destroyed. The 

lost forty-six killed and ninety-seven CAPTURED 

The main problem probably lay in the lack of directives on aerial coordination and command over a landing area. The sole person actually 

allowed to tell tactical air what to do was the Vietnamese forward air controller. 

And he had neither the rank nor the experience to be an air COMMANDER 

Problems also pervaded the smaller air operations for provincial forces. In 

the 5th Division area of III Corps, for example, the USAF liaison officer pointed 

that the kindled cooking fires at dusk. They could take this risk 

because Vietnamese strike pilots were not routinely ready to fly at night. An 

exception occurred on January when a Vietnamese: flareship and four 

A-I struck an assembly point in Province. Most night air requests 

were not honored. As for day pinpoint strikes, just fourteen of sixty-seven 

requested interdiction targets were attacked in February. Pilots of the 514th 

I 

I 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1964 

Fighter Squadron said they were “sick and tired of expending their ordnance on 

nothing but empty fields, trees and 

This frustration stemmed from the drawn-out air request handling required 

by the 5th Division commander-all immediate sightings of the enemy vanished 

before being targeted. There were, however, some good results from strikes 

against enemy-held areas that provincial troops could not enter. These were the 

“remote locations” in the east coast provinces of III Corps. The Phuoc Tuy 

forward air controller had good rapport with the province chief, who knew the 

enemy’s movements and could and would approve targets for air action. Elsewhere, air strikes were hindered by controllers unfamiliar with the area, and by 

Popular Forces commanders who feared close fire support by artillery, armed 

helicopters, or 

In light of the lag in strike aircraft response, Army advisors in III and IV 

Corps accented the importance of helicopter assaults. The Vietnamese as a rule 

needed thirty minutes to scramble fighters, while processing a request commonly 

consumed one hour. Colonel Mellish, air liaison officer of III Corps, urged the 

forward staging of aircraft to shave this delay. Three T-28s were sent on ground 

alert to Phan Thiet, where Viet Cong attacks were foreseen. When the foe failed 

to appear, the little-used T-28s remained exposed to the hazards of a primitive 

The number of tactical air sorties available to the III Corps on a busy day 

was around 30. This contrasted sharply with the average of 275 sorties a day 

flown by U.S. Army planes in support of III Corps. The Army aviation assigned 

to the corps was sizable-seventeen utility UH-Is, eleven UH-I gunships, two 

CV-2 transports, four U- I utility transports, two OV- I armed reconnaissance 

planes, and eight L-19 liaison 

Lesser operations in the difficult IV Corps entailed up to four or five 

heliborne missions every day in the 7th and 21st Division areas. Five USAF 

T-28s at SOC Trang could react swiftly, but it took 1 1/2 hours to get ground alert 

aircraft from Bien Hoa. Though the Vietnamese 1 12th Liaison Squadron kept a 

detachment of five O-1s at Can Tho, the planes were confined to forward air 

control and target-marking duty. The USAF liaison officers hitched rides on 

Army liaison aircraft when they could. Most of the time, however, they were 

grounded at the division command post. Hence their sole knowledge of the air 

situation at a target area came from an Army liaison communication-relay plane 

that flew cover over heliborne landing 

During March barely 7 I of 126 air support requests from the 7th Division 

could be satisfied in the IV Corps, and in April merely 84 of 148 requests were 

approved. The air liaison officer and forward air controller spent a lot of their 

time in keeping ground officers from becoming discouraged with the sparse air 

support. According to Lt. Col. Clarence R. Osborne, Jr., instant air support 

from armed UH-I helicopters often “saved the 

On April 12 the Viet Cong destroyed the district town of Kien Long in 

Chuong Thien Province. The Vietnamese Air Force turned in a splendid performance, featuring an A-IH hit on a 105-mm howitzer before dawn and a 

215 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

steady stream of air support strikes throughout the day. The tactical air support 

system squeezed thirty to forty-five sorties out of the aircraft at Bien Hoa, but this 

was not enough to stave off a serious government 

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs asked if two separate air control systems 

operated in Vietnam and if Vietnamese commanders were getting conflicting 

advice from U.S. Army and USAF advisors. MACV replied that one system 

directed Air Force aircraft, while the other was a separate aviation headquarters 

that managed Army and Marine Corps air units. Since these units afforded 

special assistance and had “no role in the development of the Vietnamese air 

structure, I have been free to employ them as I see fit to [the] maximum support 

of the ground 

The U.S. Army senior advisor at III Corps, a colonel, was an extreme 

partisan of Army aviation who slighted tactical air support. He never invited the 

corps USAF liaison officer to planning conferences, and as a matter of fact was 

not on speaking terms with him. The senior advisor prepared pacification plans 

that made no mention of tactical air support. When General Moore offered help, 

he was turned down. Moore told General Westmoreland of this, and MACV 

directed that province pacification plans contain an air operations annex drawn 

by USAF advisors. From then on, the colonel called the air liaison officer to all 

briefings and planning 

Air advisors were few among the ground units. The 2d Air Division had 

authority for seventeen lieutenant colonels as air liaison officers with corps and 

divisions, and Army advisors outranked them. There were thirty-two captains 

and lieutenants as air-advisor forward air controllers with regiments. In comparison Army advisors numbered up to five hundred in a corps, with assignments 

going down to company level. General Moore had kept the rank of air advisors 

low to avoid dwarfing relatively junior Vietnamese counterparts. General 

Maddux, Thirteenth Air Force commander, wanted a senior USAF colonel to 

be assigned to the Joint General Staff. He further wished corps air liaison officers 

to be colonels, thus giving them equal prestige with Army senior corps 

General Westmoreland was dead-set against raising the corps air liaison 

officers to the rank of colonel. He regarded the Army senior advisors as MACV 

senior advisors, responsible for all military matters to include the use of air 

power. Corps air liaison officers were supposed to advise the senior advisors, and 

Westmoreland assured General Moore that they would be listened to. When 

Moore learned that Vietnamese wing commanders would be the chief air advisors to the corps commanders. he acceded to the MACV commander’s point of 

Indeed, the 2d Air Division commander felt that conflict between the two 

distinct control systems was overdrawn. Confident of cooperation he said, “The 

Army is just as strongly opposed to Air Force control of its aircraft as we are for 

the Army to control Even so, Moore desired to enlarge the tactical air 

control system by adding an air request communications net, manned and 

operated by the Air Force. It would resemble the U.S. Strike Command-Tactical 

Air Command system worked out during maneuvers in the United States. He 

216 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1964 

hoped to do away with the long delays in passing air requests up through 

channels over Vietnamese army 

General Moore’s proposed net for handling Vietnamese air requests would 

enhance USAF advice at lower ground echelons. An Air Force pilot (forward air 

controller) and two radio operators were to man tactical air control parties at all 

levels down to battalion. They would process air support requests, provide 

advice, and direct close air support strikes. To man this countrywide setup, the 2d 

Air Division was to draw pilots from the USAF 19th Tactical Air Support 

Squadron. Moore envisioned a continuing need for Vietnamese controllers to 

mark remote and hard-to-find interdiction targets. However he saw no reason 

why Air Force controllers, Army liaison pilots, and Army and Vietnamese 

forward air guides could not mesh their efforts to designate targets for air 

Moore counted on speeding up the reaction of the Vietnamese Air Force by 

training and assigning Vietnamese down to battalion level, first as counterparts 

and eventually to replace USAF personnel. He also wanted an Air Force liaison 

officer appointed to the Joint General Staff and more Vietnamese working in its 

operations center. General Westmoreland added a USAF colonel as advisor to 

the Joint General Staff, and he authorized Moore to use PACAF resources to 

establish the air request net in the III Corps area. In Washington, JCS Chairman 

Wheeler secured McNamara’s assent for the air request net. The Defense secretary let the Air Force deploy combat-ready tactical air control parties from the 

Tactical Air Command. They were to serve on temporary duty in Vietnam 

pending the procurement of personnel and equipment for the 2d Air 

With plans for the new air request net nearing fruition, with the B-26s 

already retired, with the T-28s in stress trouble, with McNamara against having a 

B-57 squadron in South Vietnam, General Moore wrote to General LeMay in 

April asking for an expansion from two to three A-I E squadrons of twenty-five 

planes each. Two of these units at Bien Hoa would permit standard four-ship 

fighter formations and provide for the predicted upturn in air strikes created by 

the air request system. The third squadron was to be based at the new Can Tho 

airfield being built in the Mekong Delta and slated for completion in early 1965. 

Without disparaging Vietnamese progress, Moore stressed that a third USAF 

A-IE squadron would enable planes to respond quickly to oncall air support 

missions. This would set a proper example for Vietnamese airmen, whose morale 

tended to be 

Richard T. Sandborn, 2d Air Division operations analyst, showed that fifty 

A-I Es and seventy-five A-I Hs would generate 3,038 sorties per month, with ten 

percent for training. Considering the rise in air support requests and the demand 

for larger aircraft flights, Sandborn computed combat sorties at 4,476 by August 

1964. He foresaw further rises in the 

General Maddux, Thirteenth Air Force commander, pointed out that a 

third A-I E squadron might end retention of the B-57s at Clark. But he saw no 

reason for making an issue of the new unit so soon, since it could not be 

accommodated at Can Tho until 1965. However Gen. William H. Blanchard, Air 

217 
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

Force Vice Chief of Staff, stated that the Air Force was planning for the third 

squadron to be fully equipped at Can Tho by March 1965. General Wheeler 

justified the A-I E expansion because of low Vietnamese performance. Nevertheless, the additional USAF planes would delay Vietnamese self-sufficiency and 

undermine the principle that Americans were to help rather than to 

Two events revealed that the rule restricting USAF advisors from engaging 

in battle was being strained if not entirely broken. The first took place on March 

8 when Col. Thomas M. Hergert, deputy chief of the MAAG Air Force Section, 

was killed. He was flying an A-I H as wingman to a Vietnamese flight leader on 

an interdiction mission. Both had made a dozen passes to deliver ordnance when 

Hergert’s plane crashed. Smoke was seen billowing from the right-wing root just 

before the right wing 

Investigation disclosed that eighty-nine USAF pilots were flying Vietnamese aircraft. But no advisor could lead a flight. be the first to expend 

ordnance, or continue a mission if the Vietnamese flight leader aborted. Colonel 

Hergert was the twentyeighth USAF combat fatality in Vietnam since January 

The second event concerned Captain Shank who had died in a T-28 crash 

on March 24. On April 21 U.S. Congressmen and the press were furnished 

several letters Shank had written home. He had criticized the airworthiness of 

U.S. aircraft and told of 1st Air Commando pilots flying combat missions with 

Vietnamese basic airmen, popularly called “sandbags.”The airmen went along as 

the required Vietnamese crewmen, for to obtain qualified crewmembers meant 

diverting fifty to seventy-five Vietnamese pilots from their own planes. Seeing 

that these pilots were assigned on the basis of 1.5 for each cockpit, this would 

severely hamper Vietnamese air power. If legitimate Vietnamese observers flew 

with Americans, the liaison and forward air controller programs would be 

bankrupt. Consequently, General Moore suggested that the arbitrary requirement for a Vietnamese aboard a U.S. strike aircraft be lifted. Nonrated airmen 

scarcely contributed to the missions normally flown to augment Vietnamese 

On April 29 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that the number of USAF 

A-IEs in Vietnam be upped at once to fifty (two squadrons) and to a third 

squadron later. Secretary of Defense McNamara consented to the immediate 

increase to two squadrons, which was in line with Admiral Felt’s hope for a third 

squadron in 1965. McNamara also accepted General Smart’s suggestion to hold 

the B-57s at Clark as an “ace in the hole” for a 

Visiting Saigon in May. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor were 

cool toward a third A-I E squadron. Taylor said it would not sell in Washington. 

McNamara reiterated that U.S. forces were not to take part in combat. The 

secretary directed General Moore to get the Vietnamese trained so that they 

could do everything themselves. He ordered the Vietnamese pilot ratio raised 

from 1.5 to 2 per plane and the Vietnamese 716th Composite Reconnaissance 

Squadron fitted out with twenty-five A-I Hs by October I and converted to a 

218 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 

fourth fighter squadron. This would take the place of a third U.S. 

Upon return to Washington, the Defense secretary in a news interview 

emphasized that USAF personnel were in Vietnam to train the Vietnamese to 

fight an war.” Within the Defense establishment he made known 

his intention to phase down the strike operations of the Air Commando 

Squadron and his goal to have that unit out of Vietnam in 

A few days later, Taylor reaffirmed the policy that U.S. military personnel 

were not to join in combat. Farm Gate aircraft could only “fly fide 

operational training missions against hostile targets to prepare the participating 

personnel for eventual replacement of U.S. pilots.” U.S. helicopter 

missions would keep on introducing Americans into combat situations, but 

are for use as transport.” Their weapons were for self-protection. 

“Armed helicopters will not be used as a substitute for close air support strikes.” 

On June Smart asked Felt and Westmoreland to clarify the directive66 

that forbade Farm Gate from entering into combat but let Americans fly 

operational training missions against hostile targets. They replied that Farm 

Gate was to fly combat but to be more circumspect. Farm Gate was to further 

insure that Vietnamese personnel aboard American aircraft were pilot aspirants 

or undergoing flight training. Westmoreland thought that MACV could live 

with the directive and keep Farm Gate fighting. Its effect, he said, would “not be 

appreciable” on the Air Division and on U.S. helicopters. 

Toward the close of April, seventeen Vietnamese were combatloaded and deployed from to The unannounced mission 

turned out to be the start of a seven-battalion search-and-clear sweep in 

the Corps. During April 27-May the sorties flown by the Vietnamese Air 

Force totaled and and and The 

helicopters did psychological warfare, medical evacuation, resupply, and crop 

destruction. A daily average of ten A-I were on tap at and the 16th 

Fighter Squadron kept five at the airfield for immediate air 

support. 

The operation apparently caught the by surprise. Not only were 

many automatic weapons captured and destroyed, but enemy installations were 

broken up. Yet when the fighting was over, it was impossible to leave three 

irregular companies behind as planned because the foe had been scattered but 

not wiped out. Nonetheless, this example of well-coordinated combat aviation 

gave Smart confidence that Vietnamese air power was clearly on the 

Despite this burnishing of Vietnamese Air Force prestige, the month-long 

operation consumed almost one-half of all Vietnamese combat sorties in May. 

Besides, Vietnamese and USAF aircraft conversions were cutting into Vietnamese aircraft. The Air Commando Squadron had borrowed fifteen 

from the 516th Fighter Squadron, which sent pilots to for A-I 

transition training given by the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Naval Air Squadron VA-152. 

The A-I H was bigger than the and twisted about more from the propeller 

torque. It had a tailwheel rather than the tricycle landing gear that the pilots were 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

used to. Hence several A-1 Hs suffered damage in ground accidents. When ten 

A-I Hs arrived in May, they sat on the ramps at Da Nang. Since the Vietnamese 

41st CAM RON was unfamiliar with the aircraft, the incommission rate averaged 

merely four or five a day and at times dipped to 

At Bien Hoa the 1st Air Commando Squadron stayed operational with the 

borrowed T-28s. One was lost in a takeoff accident and six were transferred on 

May 20 to combat in Laos. This left only 

Due chiefly to fewer T-28s, combat sorties dwindled in May even as requests 

for air support climbed. In mid-month USAF personnel followed McNamara’s 

guidance to the letter. They worked to lift the Vietnamese fighter pilot ratio to 

two per plane. They pushed the enlargement of the fighter force to four A-I H 

squadrons so that the 1st Air Commando Squadron could be withdrawn. The 

Defense secretary wanted the tactical reconnaissance squadron converted to the 

fourth fighter squadron by October. And he authorized air transport and other 

Vietnamese pilots to fly fighters. 

As the crash plan for the secretary’s program neared completion, the JCS 

directive banning U.S planes from combat without giving bona fide training to 

Vietnamese crewmembers foreshadowed a decline in USAF combat sorties. This 

came at the time when there were too few aircraft to meet requirements and the 

Vietnamese were building two new A-I H squadrons. Recognizing the emergency, MACV ruled that the 1 st Air Commando Squadron could continue to fly 

its eight T-28s carrying Vietnamese crewmen who were not potential pilots. As 

soon as A-1 Es replaced T-28s, however, A-I E combat operations would be held 

strictly to genuine 

On May 28 MACV decided to equip the present three Vietnamese fighter 

squadrons to attain two pilots per plane by October I. It likewise intended to 

form three more fighter squadrons as soon as aircraft became available, by 

February 15, 1965, if all went well. Only Vietnamese pilots were to attend the 

intensive A-I H pilot training program. The 34th Tactical Group would present 

the initial two-week indoctrination, Naval Air Squadron VA-I52 was to furnish 

the five-week transition course, and the 34th would administer the final 

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs on June 8, Secretary McNamara directed that 

the first four Vietnamese fighter squadrons receive primary attention, the two 

others secondary. On June 17 Admiral Felt accepted a PACAF evaluation and 

reported to the chiefs that MACV was trying to do too much too fast. He 

suggested that the 5 16th Fighter Squadron be brought to full strength in September and that the 520th Fighter Squadron be made operational at Can Tho by 

the end of the year. He judged that the Vietnamese could man four fighter 

squadrons without inactivating their two C-47 transport units. On July 24 the 

JCS agreed to the four-squadron 

On May 30 Lt. Col. John M. Porter, commander of the 1st Air Commando 

Squadron, had led the original flight of six A-IEs from the Philippines to Bien 

Hoa. Colonel Preston noted that his 34th Tactical Group had “moved up into the 

big league . . . with a first-line aircraft.”On the 3 1st the A-I Es flew their maiden 

220 
T H E W A R IN VIETNAM. 1964 

strike sorties. Col. William E. Bethea, who assumed command of the 34th Group 

in June, was impressed by the plane’s large and varied ordnance, takeoff from a 

4,000-foot runway fully loaded, extremely long range, and good loitering. Still 

the A-IE’s normal cruising speed of 155 knots retarded rapid response to air 

support requests, chiefly in the far reaches of the Mekong Delta. And the aircraft 

could barely defend itself in aerial combat. With twelve A-I Es on site by June 30, 

the T-28s were retired. The 34th Tactical Group set about giving transition 

training to Vietnamese 

Air support requests totaled 1,546 during January-March 1964 and 2,040 

from April through June. Lack of aircraft accounted for 68 of the 807 requests 

that could not be honored in the second 

Generally, USAF communications were deemed better than those of the 

U.S. Army. General Westmoreland therefore ordered the Army aviation battalion control center, situated in the joint operations center of the Joint General 

Staff, to relocate within the USAF-Vietnamese air operations center. General 

Moore expected the move, which commenced on May 18, to enhance coordination among Army, Air Force, and Vietnamese air activities. This did not 

The single-sideband PRC-47 and KWM-2A radios were the backbone of the 

Vietnamese air request net. But the sets did not always work properly due to the 

tropical climate and inexperienced operators. In addition ground commanders 

were unwilling to allow the air request system to function as designed. The Joint 

General Staff issued no directive and the ground commanders refused to be 

bypassed on strike firepower. In consequence the air request net served merely to 

provide information. All official requests continued to travel the tortuous route 

over the old Vietnamese army air request 

Nor did the Joint General Staff relax its ban on strike aircraft releasing 

ordnance close to ground forces except at the direction of a Vietnamese forward 

air controller. On April 23, USAF T-28s were over Vietnamese rangers who 

were trapped near Trung Lap. Although the planes had voice communications 

with a U.S. Army L-19 and with wounded American advisors on the ground, 

they were not permitted to attack. Armed Army helicopters arrived, were fired 

upon, and returned the fire. But the T-28s jettisoned their unused ordnance and 

returned to 

There were other problems. Unless Vietnamese pilots could speak English, 

USAF controllers were unable to communicate with them. Air liaison officer 

and forward air controller duties were clearly unpopular among Vietnamese. 

And the manning ratio of two pilots to each fighter aircraft sharply curtailed the 

number and caliber of Vietnamese pilots who could be spared for such duties. 

Finally, the human and natural environment worked against ground tactical air 

control parties. Their heavy bulky radio gear was hard to lug through thejungle. 

Sometimes it was out of the question to direct an air strike safely from the 

ground, because of the presence of civilians who could be seen solely from the air. 

Mountains and heavy vegetation hampered the ground view and the flat ground 

of the delta pffered no elevations to help determine range. Numerous tree lines 

and canal ridges also obstructed the view. 79 

22 1 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

! 

222 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1964 

P 222 (Top left) Air Commodore 

Nguyen Cao Ky and Col William E 

Bethea 

(Top right) Gen William 

Westmoreland 

(Center) A1 E aircraft. 

(Bottom) A VNAF Sikorsky CH-34 

helicopter at Tan Son Nhut. 

P. 223: Outposts or hamlets of S 

Vietnam. 

223 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

In mid- it was generally agreed that ground tactical air control parties 

could not take THE place of airborne control. Yet potent air support demanded 

something better than the plodding Vietnamese and their often indifferent 

observers. Strong pleas to prevent the demise of the 19th Tactical Air Support 

Squadron proved futile. The unit remained under orders to transfer its aircraft to 

the 

Like the building of the Vietnamese air strike force, the Vietnamese air 

strike system held promise for the future. However, neither Vietnamese air power 

nor control procedures were able to withstand Viet attacks. Over theearlier 

months of C-47 and C--I23 flare support for outposts and villages more 

than doubled and night sorties But on the night of July when the Viet 

assaulted the Dong Special Forces camp near the demilitarized zone, 

a flareship orbited overhead and dropped flares till dawn. Not until first light did 

two A-I and an forward air controller arrive over the target. Then they 

were unable to strike because the controller could not make radio contact with 

the besieged forces to verify the target. The insurgents partially overran the camp, 

killed fifty-five South Vietnamese, two U.S. Special Forces soldiers, and an 

Australian advisor. The delay in A-I H reaction stemmed from the Fighter 

Squadron pilots being unable to fly at night. A further factor was the operating 

rule that barred the from making a target close to friendly forces without 

positive 

A more grievous failure ensued on July I in Province. Viet 

stormed the Cut outpost before dawn and set ambush positions 

along the road to be taken by relief forces. Within the one hour needed to get a 

Vietnamese controller to the scene, the ambush decimated the friendly troops 

forty-one and wounding fifty-six. Two Vietnamese A-I on ground 

alert came one and one-half hours after the air support mission was requested.” 

On the morning of July the Viet hit two hamlets and a post 

immediately north of Ben Cat in Binh Province. A battalion responded, 

lost a lead tank to 57-mm recoilless rifle fire, and broke apart under assault. In an 

initial air support strike, four USAF accepted targets from a U.S. Army 

I pilot. But the Vietnamese A-I H pilots next on station refused to act without a 

Vietnamese air controller, even though the Army liaison pilot and Vietnamese 

ground observer marked enemy positions with smoke rockets. By the time a 

Vietnamese controller got there, the guerrillas had faded into the jungle. 

The policy of defining counterinsurgency as something distinctly different 

from other states of armed conflict resulted in not developing enough air 

firepower to defeat the Viet Occasional two-plane air strikes on wellknown enemy base areas did little more than harass. One proposed solution was 

to ask the civilians to leave Viet havens. Then large-scale bombing of these 

havens could be carried out by USAF tactical aircraft from bases in Thailand, 

and the Philippines. With refueling, the planes need not ever 

land in South 

In mid- I964 General Westmoreland was “deeply concerned” with the surge 

in successful Viet hamlet and outpost attacks and ambushes of troop units 
THE WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964 

and convoys. His basic approach lay in sending more U.S. forces into the 

provinces at the district level. Their presence spurred Vietnamese paramilitary 

and lower-level units to speed up pacification.“ Concluding that the air reaction 

time to night attacks was too slow, Westmoreland directed Army advisors to 

keep armed helicopters (some flare-equipped) on night alert at provincial headquarter~.~’ He requested more Army Special Forces troops. And he asked for 

one helicopter company in direct support of each Vietnamese division, plus 

additional armed helicopter companies and platoons. 88 

In addition the MACV commander instructed General Moore and Brig. 

Gen. Delk M. Oden, commander of the United States Army Support Command, 

Vietnam, to shore up all American air support of troop movements, convoys, 

and reaction forces. Moore and Oden issued a formal agreement that Westmoreland placed in a MACV directive dated September 7. To refine coordination, 

Army and Marine Corps aviation was to be collocated as would Air Force and 

Vietnamese control agencies. Ground reaction forces would not normally move 

without air support. In many cases, armed helicopters would engage and pinpoint the enemy until more heavily armed fighters arrived. If too few fighters 

were to be had, extra armed helicopters would be 

The Moore-Oden agreement was perhaps useful as an interim measure 

required by conditions in South Vietnam. Still it differed in important respects 

from proven tactical air doctrine. The agreement perpetuated two separate air 

control systems (Air Force and Army-Marine Corps), which made it possible for 

a ground commander to receive conflicting advice. Time and again General 

LeMay protested the presence of armed helicopters in Vietnam, because tactical 

fighters performed better. Even so, the Moore-Oden agreement recognized 

complementary needs for both types of aircraft. 

Some USAF officers believed that the 2d Air Division was being “hoodwinked” in the roles and missions agreement, but theory had to give way to 

practicality. With the absence of enemy air power, armed helicopters proved 

useful. Their instant reply to ground fire offset their inaccurate and rather light 

firepower. But the Viet Cong’s introduction of more .50-cal and 40-mm weapons 

trimmed the helicopters’ advantages. 

The Air Force concept of centralized control of all air resources remained 

“fundamental and sound” in the words of Col. Allison C. Brooks, General 

Moore’s deputy. However, since the fairly slow A-I aircraft in Vietnam could not 

be moved rapidly from one base to another, Brooks agreed they should be 

dispersed into the areas where the battles occurred. So long as there was no 

deviation from the principle of centralized control, the planes could be shifted as 

required without fragmenting the 

225 

President Johnson had intimated shortly after taking office that he was 

inclining toward expanded covert operations against North Vietnam. With the 

least risk he wanted to put pressure on Hanoi, to force lessened support for the 

The President early in January approved additional resources 

for covert actions, including beach landings and airdrops of Vietnamese intelligence and commando teams. Closely managing this work were the Office of the 

Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (headed by General now in Washington) and the MACV 

Special Operations Group in Saigon.’ 

As in other international waters, U.S. Navy patrols were routinely operating 

in the Gulf of to monitor various North Vietnamese activities by visual 

and electronic In February aircraft from Strategic Air Command 

resumed their reconnaissance missions. Averaging one or two sorties a day, they 

photographed the border areas of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.’ In 

March more naval patrolling was deemed necessary. Done by air as well as by 

sea, it focused on naval movements.’ By April the sum of this intelligence 

suggested that Hanoi was readying forces to invade South Vietnam through 

Laos. So General repeated announcements to the Joint Chiefs seemed 

to be sound -there could be no satisfactory solution to the situations in Laos 

and South Vietnam without military action against North 

At the end of June the President selected General Taylor to succeed Henry 

Lodge as Ambassador to Vietnam. In recognition of Taylor’s prior role as 

one of the major architects of the war, Johnson entrusted the entire military 

effort to his hands. He authorized the new ambassador to wield whatever 

command control he thought proper. If Taylor acted independently of CINCPAC, he would infringe on the command prerogatives of Admiral Sharp, the 

newly installed commander in chief. He might also split the unity of air power 

into three packages operations in Vietnam and in Laos plus those planned 

against North Vietnam. Gen. Hunter Harris, picked to head on 

August I, would find that possibility frustrating. After talking with Admiral 

Sharp in Hawaii, Ambassador Taylor reached Saigon on July He told General 

Westmoreland that he would not interfere with to day BUSINESS 

To Taylor the government seemed weak. As he later wrote, “We 

lived dangerously in this period, never sure from night to night when a new 

might overthrow another feeble government or when we might some 

important town to a surprise attack or a military base to mortar fire.”‘ 

The weakness of the Saigon government, heavy deliveries of modern weapons by North Vietnam to the and infiltration of North Vietnamese 

Army units into the south called for greater American effort. Since January the 
I 

THE ADVISORY YEARS 

JCS had been advocating a shift from advisory assistance to more direct aid. 

Now in May they proposed assigning U.S. Special Forces teams to provinces and 

districts as advisors to Regional and Popular Forces. General Westmoreland 

opposed flooding the country with American servicemen. He believed the key to 

success was honing the cutting edge of the small fighting units. Hence on June 25 

and again on July 16, he recommended that U.S. military strength in Vietnam be 

expanded by about forty-two hundred men to work as advisors at the district 

level. Admiral Sharp agreed. 7 

On July I8 General Khanh delivered an emotional address at a rally to mark 

Vietnam’s “day of shame,” the anniversary of the country’s division in 1954. He 

asserted that his government was unwilling to remain indifferent in the face of the 

firm determination of the people who wanted a “push northward” as “an 

appropriate means to fulfill our national history.” The next day a government 

statement declared, “If Communist China and Communist Vietnam obstinately 

continue their way of aggression, the government and entire people of Vietnam 

will step up the war with determination until total victory liberates the whole of 

our national 

One week earlier a detachment of C-130s from the USAF 6091st Reconnaissance Squadron, recently moved from Japan to Don Muang near Bangkok, 

had begun flying communication intercept missions off the North Vietnamese 

coast. On the 28th a Navy DeSoto patrol, consisting solely of the destroyer 

Muddox, also commenced sailing close to the coast to collect radar and communications intelligence and to make a “show of 

Hanoi broadcasts revealed that the North Vietnamese knew of the burgeoning covert activity. In a talk with newsmen in July, Air Commodore Nguyen Cao 

Ky admitted that troops were being parachuted into North Vietnam. He said 

training was in progress for bigger special missions, entailing ground attacks and 

airborne operations beyond the confines of South Vietnam. 10 

Conferring with Ambassador Taylor on July 23, General Khanh insisted 

that the war had entered a new phase - South Vietnam needed to be on the 

offensive. But the next day he asked Taylor whether he should resign. In a cable 

to the State Department, the Ambassador said that if the United States opposed 

a march to the north, the Vietnamese might break with American policy. A single 

“maverick pilot taking off for Hanoi with a load of bombs” could touch off an 

unwarranted extension of hostilities. This would cloud the chances for internal 

pacification in Vietnam. The chief need, Taylor felt, was a stable Vietnamese 

government and that required time. To gain this time, he suggested that the 

Vietnamese military make contingency plans for heightened actions against 

North Vietnam. 11 

But the Vietnamese chafed for action. Four of their patrol boats, operating 

under U.S. guidance, left Da Nang on July 30 and sailed north. That night they 

shelled a radar station on Hon Me Island and a radio transmitter on Hon Ngu 

Island. Both installations were off the North Vietnamese coast near Vinh, and 

both were deeply involved in Hanoi’s sea infiltration. 12 

228 
THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT 

During late afternoon on August 2, three high-speed North Vietnamese 

Swatow patrol boats fired on the destroyer Maddox, which was in international 

waters twenty-eight miles off the enemy’s coast. The Maddox and planes from 

the carrier Ticonderoga returned the fire. 

At first Defense Secretary McNamara thought that the attack was either a 

miscalculation by the government or an impulsive act of a local commander. In 

any event, President Johnson immediately dispatched a note of protest to Hanoi. 

He made public his orders that the Navy continue patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin 

and add a second destroyer. On August 3 the Maddox, now accompanied by the 

C. Turner Joy, reentered the gulf. Air patrols from the Ticonderoga covered both 

destroyers by day. That night, South Vietnamese forces raided a radar station on 

Cape Vinh Son and a security station near Cua Ron. After dark and in bad 

weather on the 4th, the Maddox reported that it was being fired upon. 

Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC, asked the JCS for a new rule of engagement 

allowing U.S. aircraft to pursue planes into hostile airspace instead of stopping at 

a three-mile line off the North Vietnamese coast. He also sought authority to 

launch instant punitive air strikes on North Vietnam as retaliation for the attacks 

on the Maddox, 14 

President Johnson shared this reaction -the United States had to show it 

meant business. He stressed in a radio and television address to the American 

people that the U.S. response to the hostile action would be “limited and fitting.” 

Even so, he directed the Pacific Fleet on August 5 to make a single all-out assault 

on the North Vietnamese Swatow boat bases and their supporting POL storage 

at Vinh. 

Together with the reprisal attack, the President approved and the JCS 

ordered emergency actions to move additional forces to the Pacific, especially 

into Southeast Asia. Saigon had previously agreed to positioning more USAF 

units in the country, and on August 5 planes began to arrive. 

Six F-102 jet interceptors of the 509th Fighter Squadron flew from Clark 

Air Base to Da Nang. Six others from the 16th Fighter Squadron at Naha Air 

Base, Okinawa, touched down at Tan Son Nhut. Eight F-100s of the 615th 

Tactical Fighter Squadron, still on rotational deployment at Clark, went to Da 

Nang. On the evening of August 5, thirty-six B-57s of the 8th and 13th Bomber 

Squadrons had trouble getting into Bien Hoa. The rain obscured the pilots’ view 

and made the runway slick. One plane during approach crashed in Viet Cong 

territory, and two suffered damage upon landing. Six RF-101s out of Kadena 

and Misawa Air Base, Japan, augmented the Able Mable reconnaissance planes 

at Tan Son Nhut. The 405th Tactical Wing sent ten F-100s from Clark to Takhli, 

Thailand. Eight KB-50s from PACAF’s 421st Air Refueling Squadron moved 

from Yokota to Tan Son Nhut and Takhli. Eight F-105 jet fighters of the 36th 

Tactical Fighter Squadron flew from Yokota to Clark, then to Korat in Thailand 

on August 9. 

Under JCS direction the Commander in Chief, United States Strike Command, deployed a TAC composite air strike force. F-100s of the 522d and 614th 

Tactical Fighter Squadrons landed at Clark on August 8-9. Six RF-101s of the 

229 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

363d Composite Reconnaissance Unit reached Kadena on the 13th. Forty-eight 

C-I30 transports from the 314th, 463d, and 516th Troop Carrier Wings arrived 

at Clark and Kadena between the 9th and 21st of August. For inflight refueling 

the Strategic Air Command furnished forty-eight KC-135 jet tankers that operated mainly from Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii and Andersen Air Force 

Base on Guam. SAC further formed a task force of eight KC-135s at Clark. 

General Moore on August 6 created a 2d Air Division command post at 

Tan Son Nhut, separate from the combined Vietnamese-USAF air operations 

center. Using just the U.S. side of the tactical air control system, he began to tie 

together all the USAF units in the area.“ 

On August 5 General Westmoreland had met with General Khanh and 

Vietnamese commanders to outline the purpose for the retaliatory strike on the 

Swatow boat bases and oil storage sites. Westmoreland advised and Khanh 

agreed to place the Vietnamese on maximum alert against Viet Cong reprisals. 

The MACV commander added that if the North Vietnamese or Chinese attacked 

South Vietnam, he would loose air strikes on targets of his choice without 

requiring “a green light from Washington.” Ambassador Taylor afterwards 

called on Khanh. He handed him a letter from President Johnson underlining the 

need for the closest bilateral consultation. Khanh asured Taylor that he fully 

understood and accepted this requirement. 

The U.S. retaliatory attack on August 6 involved sixty-four aircraft, 

launched in two waves from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation. The 

strikes on five boat bases and the Vinh oil storage destroyed eight boats and 

damaged twenty-one, put the oil reservoirs ninety percent out of commission, 

and lost two planes to antiaircraft fire. 

Shortly thereafter, at the request of the United States, the Canadian 

member of the International Control Commission visited the North Vietnamese 

premier in Hanoi. The Canadian said that the United States viewed Hanoi’s role 

in Laos and South Vietnam as critical and threatening. He warned that if North 

Vietnam persisted in its aggression, it would expect to suffer the consequences. 

The premier was “utterly unintimidated” and “calmly resolved” to pursue his 

course. 

His indifference might have reflected a recent increase in air strength. North 

Vietnamese aircraft had included thirty trainers, fifty transports, and four light 

helicopters. But on August 7, aerial photos of Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi 

showed thirty-nine MIG-I fighters apparently just flown in from China. 

More of these jets were on Hainan Island and South China bases. 

General Harris, PACAF commander, saw that the MIGs on Phuc Yen 

posed a direct threat to his forces in Southeast Asia. He proposed to Admiral 

Sharp that destroying the communist jet aircraft would be a “sharp lesson” to 

China, and would deter any fresh enemy plans for attack. The USAF F-105s at 

Korat could conduct the operation, but the F-100s on alert at Da Nang were 

closer to the target. With cluster bomb unit (CBU-2A) munitions, the planes 

could prosecute a low-level, high-speed, surprise attack on the parked aircraft. 

Then using missiles as well as rockets, flak-suppression missions and 

230 
THE GULF OF INCIDENT 

China 

Courtesy: U.S. Navy 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

strikes against individual surviving aircraft could be carried out. 19 But Sharp 

needed the go-ahead from higher authority, and it was not given. 

On August 7 General Westmoreland suggested that MACV and the Vietnamese government make General Moore the combined air commander. With a 

Vietnamese deputy, Moore could exercise operational control over U.S.- 

Vietnamese air power for all missions. These would encompass air strikes into 

North Vietnam and Laos, defensive actions in South Vietnam, and air support of 

mobile ground forces in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Assisted by 

MACV, the Vietnamese armed forces were to have the primary task of controlling the counterinsurgency inside the country. 

Admiral Sharp made it clear that he as CINCPAC would manage the air 

activities against North Vietnam through PACAFand the Pacific Fleet. PACAF 

would work through Thirteenth Air Force and 2d Air Division. Since the latter 

reported to both MACV and PACAF, coordination would be easy. As for the 

MACV commander, he was to center on purging the Viet Cong and pacifying the 

country. Although events in Laos disturbed policymakers during the summer of 

1964, intelligence officers looked for the most serious escalation of the conflict to 

occur in Vietnam. Peking and Hanoi evidently felt there was a better chance to 

gain power by dint of a collapse of the Saigon government. 

Ambassador Taylor estimated the chance of such a collapse at about fifty 

percent. The Khanh government had been unable to rebuild the political control 

structure between Saigon and the hamlets, which had disappeared following the 

overthrow and death of Diem in November 1963. Morale had plummeted, 

assisted in its drop by the constant threat of assassination or another coup. To 

Taylor the most valid and realistic objectives were to bolster Saigon, press the 

campaign against the Viet Cong, and be prepared to act against North Vietnam 

by January I, 1965. 

At President Johnson's request, the Senate and House on August 10 

enacted a joint resolution giving him authority to prosecute military operations 

as he saw fit. Tied to the North Vietnamese attacks on the destroyer Maddox in 

the Gulf of Tonkin, the resolution read in part: 

Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the CHarter of the United 

Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective 

Defense Treaty, the United States is.. prepared. as the President determines, to take 

all necessary steps, including the use of armed force. to assist any member or protocol 

state requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. 

Yet there was a nagging doubt as to whether the Maddox had actually been 

attacked on the night of August 4. High-speed naval operations at night made 

precise observation and rapid and accurate reporting difficult. In September 

Hanoi would publish a lengthy white paper to justify the August 2 attack as 

proper defense against a covert operation. Rut it declared that none of its naval 

craft was in the area two nights later. 22 

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was 

impressed by Ambassador Taylor's assessment of the Khanh government's 

weakness. He therefore drafted a policy memorandum for the National Security 

I 

232 
THE GULF OF INCIDENT 

Council entitled “Next Courses of Actions in Southeast was to be an 

initial short “holding phase” for the remainder of August to avoid actions that 

might intensify the war. Then would come a “limited pressure” phase lasting 

through the rest of the year, to maintain the morale of the government 

without risking escalation. This phase would witness covert operations against 

North Vietnam, training of Vietnamese pilots to aircraft, moves across the 

border into the Laotian panhandle, reinstatement of naval patrols in the Gulf of 

Tonkin, and “tit for tat”reprisals. Finally, more serious pressures were to start on 

January I, For example, initial measures to destroy enemy infiltration 

routes and facilities would progress to the bombardment of military targets in 

North Vietnam.” 

Exactly how unstable the government was became clear on the 16th 

of August. The Military Revolutionary Council elected president and 

made Gen. Van Minh supreme adviser. Student and Buddhist demonstrations instantly erupted. 

In Hawaii, far from the turmoil in Saigon, Admiral Sharp thought that the 

United States could not afford to lose the momentum that the Tonkin Gulf 

response had created. He wanted to exert more pressure against the communists 

Laos, both on the Plain of Jars and in the panhandle. He also wanted to 

expand and continue covert operations and naval patrols. Because the USAF 

units at and Tan Son Nhut were vulnerable to 

attack, he suggested that U.S. ground troops be brought to Vietnam to defend 

the bases. He further advocated that the United States set up a major base at 

to show that Americans meant to stay in Southeast Asia until American 

aims were attained. 

In the midst of the rioting in Saigon, Ambassador Taylor recommended 

that the United States try to gain time for the government. He opposed 

involved with North Vietnam and possibly China. Like he 

thought that Hanoi should be checked in its infiltration by limited pressure until 

January Then such measures as covert operations, extensive patrolling, 

flights over North Vietnam, air and ground strikes in Laos, and bombing of 

the north should be stepped up. 

On August Ambassador Taylor chaired a long session of the mission 

council he had formed to include General Westmoreland. The members discussed alternative options in Vietnam, but found it difficult to define an incident 

that warranted American reprisal. 

On the same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reviewing a list of ninety-four 

possible bombing targets in North Vietnam, compiled in June and July. The 

targets fell into five categories airfields, lines of communication, military 

installations. industrial facilities, and armed reconnaissance routes.” 

President resigned on the 25th of August. Two days later, the 

Military Revolutionary Council named a triumvirate of provincial leaders as an 

interim ruling body.” 

Undeterred by these developments, the sent the list of bombing targets 

to directed that strike plans bedevised for four patterns of attack 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

an ascending order of severity. The Joint Chiefs informed Secretary 

of their disagreement with Ambassador Taylor’s position. They considered 

much stronger military pressures on North ‘Vietnam to be needed, in particular 

provide a psychological boost to the Saigon government. The chiefs urged 

bombing the listed targets in North Vietnam at once.” 

Secretary on August asked the Joint Chiefs to answer three 

questions about the ninety-four targets. After a full-scale assault on the targets, 

would enough ordnance and POL be left to defend Southeast Asia from Chinese 

attack’? What would be the effects of each of the four patterns of attack on the 

North Vietnamese economy, on its capacity to support the Lao and the 

and on its ability to enlarge North Vietnamese military forces 

South Vietnam and Laos? And finally, if the destruction of the ninety-four 

targets failed to stifle Hanoi’s will to wage war, what course of action was 

feasible‘? These were tough questions indeed.” 

In Saigon on September a fifteen-man leadership committee replaced the 

ruling triumvirate and picked as acting premier and Minh as chairman. 

A short time later, Ambassador Taylor, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary 

of Defense and Chairman Wheeler gathered to weigh courses 

of action for the United States. The group sharply revised prior outline 

of graduated pressures. The members agreed that the Saigon government would 

be too weak for two or three months for the United States to take any major and 

deliberate action risking escalation. The communists were not likely to provoke 

the United States. But Saigon should be assisted to show that the United States 

was serious in its aims, while keeping risks low and under control. American 

naval patrols in the Gulf of suspended after the could be 

resumed. The patrols ought to stay outside the twelve-mile limit and be clearly 

divorced from the South Vietnamese covert operations, which should concentrate on maritime raids. South Vietnamese air and ground operations, linked to 

air strikes by Laotian pilots in the panhandle, should begin. Lastly, the United 

States should be alert to answer an attack upon American personnel or a special 

enemy action against Vietnam. Yet it should not deliberately provoke an incident 

to justify a retaliation.” 

These proposals went to the President and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 

September General told the chiefs that the courses of action did not 

convey a clear and positive signal to Hanoi of U.S. resolution. Gen. Wallace 

Marine Corps Commandant, sided with for he also thought 

that the ninety-four targets should be bombed. The next day, and 

Wheeler talked about the Joint They saw the danger to be drastic 

American action triggering, a strong reaction that the Saigon regime could not 

meet. 

President Johnson accepted the more cautious course on September IO. He 

ordered U.S. naval patrols to be resumed, covert operations to be reviewed, and 

talks with the Laotian government to be opened on limited air and ground 

operations in the panhandle. But the first order of business was shoring up the 

Saigon government. 

I 
THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT 

American attempts to do so met with slight success. On September 13 the IV 

Corps commander started a coup. Proclaiming that Khanh had capitulated to 

Buddhist and student demands, he led armored elements into Saigon, occupied 

public buildings, and disarmed the national police. The Vietnamese Air Force 

stayed loyal to Khanh and made a show of force against the coup. The U.S. State 

Department announced firm support for Khanh. The rebellious forces then 

withdrew. Khanh carried out sweeping changes among his military commanders, 

and appointed a High National Council of seventeen civilians to draft a constitution and designate a civil chief of state. Outwardly, this seemed a step toward 

stabilizing the government. By October I, however, American intelligence estimated scant improvement. Meanwhile, pacification efforts virtually collapsed 

because the paralyzed military staff in Saigon could not reach decisions. 34 

As President Johnson desired, U.S. destroyers Morton and Edwards 

entered the Gulf of Tonkin on patrol. During the night of September 17, 

however, the ships reported and fired on radar contacts. At Joint Chiefs direction, CINCPAC called for sizable reprisal air attacks on North Vietnam. 

Targets and weapons were changed several times, and the 2d Air Division 

command post was swamped with orders and counter orders. In the end, the air 

attacks were canceled because the Navy could not be absolutely sure that North 

Vietnamese action had actually occurred. The Joint Chiefs next enjoined 

CINCPAC to be ready to execute immediate air strikes against preselected 

targets when naval patrols were in the gulf. CINCPAC dictated that U.S. jets at 

Da Nang and Bien Hoa be alerted for attacking Phuc Yen airfield. When a 

SAC RB-47 was committed to weekly electronic intelligence flights over the 

Gulf of Tonkin, the naval patrols were 

It began to appear that unless the United States assumed a more direct role 

in the struggle, the situation would go out of control. 

235 
xx of ASSETS 

General Moore, the Air Division commander, counted General Westas the biggest “booster” of tactical air support in Vietnam.’ But 

Westmoreland’s requests for more air resources in mid-1964 hewed to Army 

aviation doctrine. He asked for a fourth C- I23 squadron (sixteen planes) to take 

care of “wholesale” supply under the Southeast Asia Military Airlift System, a 

second Army Caribou company to handle “retail” deliveries within the 

corps areas, two new Army helicopter companies numbering seventy 

(some for command use, others for gunships), and two additional airmobile 

platoons with twenty Among the forty-eight hundred personnel in the 

package were forty air liaison officer and forward air controller teams. 

understood and agreed to the need for the C-I squadron, in light 

of Viet success in attacking surface transportation. But an extra Caribou 

company seemed unnecessary, if the already in Vietnam were put under 

central control of the airlift system for common use. General the 

position of “complementary” needs for armed helicopters and 

tactical air. He objected strongly to helicopter gunships. Despite the Air Force 

chief‘s contention that strike aircraft gave more firepower, Secretary of Defense 

on August approved Westmoreland’s list of requirements.’ 

Three days later, a Royal Australian Air Force detachment of six Caribous 

arrived at Tan Son Nhut and went under control oftheairlift system. But the new 

Army Caribou company reaching Vietnam in September remained outside 

systematic control. The Air Force Reserve furnished the fresh squadron of 

the planes flown to Tan Son Nhut in mid-September by rotating 

replacement crews. In early October the 19th Air Commando Squadron (Troop 

Carrier) was formed and assigned to the 15th Troop Carrier Group. 

In August the Joint Chiefs of Staff had forwarded General question on the comparative merits of tactical air and armed helicopters. General 

Westmoreland, MACV commander, responded and asserted that the latter had 

numerous advantages over strike aircraft support. General Moore took exception and argued that many of the alleged benefits were invalid. Continuing 

discussions consumed a lot of staff energy that might better have gone to the 

combat 

Westmoreland did not neglect tactical aviation, even though he heartily 

endorsed armed helicopters. For the first time, MACV critiques of Vietnamese 

ground operations pointed out missed opportunities for tactical air support. For 

example, in Yen Province on August three battalions attacked about five 

hundred without once calling for strike aircraft. This, MACV commented, was “the major fault” of the 

Past counterinsurgency experts had viewed air strikes as impeding pacification. Then Leon an analyst with The RAND Corporation, interviewed 

prisoners and concluded that the adverse effects were far less than 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

assumed. He further found that since the Viet Cong were on the lookout for 

strike aircraft, they feared even liaison planes.‘ 

Yet MACV desired more helicopters because strike aircraft and liaison 

planes were too few, a shortage seen by General Moore as the most important 

limiting factor in the USAF effort.’ Due to training demands, only eight of the 

twenty-nine A-I Es of the 1st Air Commando Squadron were on hand for twelve 

combat sorties a day. An average of just thirty Vietnamese A-I Hs were available 

for thirty-five to forty-five combat Eight aircraft of the 1st Air Commando Squadron crashed, at least two due to enemy ground fire. These A-I Es 

were shot down on the night of September 23, when silhouetted by flares while 

making a low-level napalm pass.’ 

General Moore had proposed in August that the Vietnamese be given a fifth 

and a sixth A-I H squadron, and he asked that the B-57 and F-100 jets at Bien 

Hoa and Da Nang be used within the country. MACV and the JCS concurred. 

When the Joint Chiefs took up in September the matter of lagging tactical air 

support, they suggested using jets but President Johnson was unwilling t o d o so. 

To up USAF sorties, Ambassador Taylor advocated deleting the need for a bona 

fide Vietnamese trainee pilot aboard an A-I E during a combat mission. Perhaps, 

the Joint Chiefs said, USAF A-I Es could fly combat while carrying a Vietnamese 

observer if a pilot was not on hand. Although at first “entirely negative,” 

Secretary McNamara on September 25 agreed to permit A-I E combat operations with a Vietnamese observer or student pilot aboard. 

The JCS tried again to allow USAF crews to respond to immediate and 

emergency air requests. But Ambassador Taylor still resisted opening the door to 

wider use of American crews, and McNamara agreed. In mid-October the Joint 

Chiefs authorized A-1Es to engage in combat with a Vietnamese pilot or 

observer aboard. For the Vietnamese Air Force they recommended a fifth A-I H 

squadron in May 1965 and a sixth in October 1965. Until then, two USAF A-I E 

units were required in the country. 10 

During October-December 1964 the 34th Tactical Group and the Vietnamese Air Force slightly expanded their strike aircraft. Organized under the 34th 

Group on October 12, the USAF 602d Fighter Commando Squadron began to 

build in both personnel and planes. The 520th or fourth Vietnamese fighter 

squadron, formed at Bien Hoa in October, prepared to move to the new Can Tho 

airfield. 

In December the 34th Group flew about fifty A-I sorties a day, seventeen of 

them available for combat. The planes performed admirably on strike missions 

but proved hard to maintain, chiefly due to in flight engine failures. The Americans nonetheless kept eighty percent of the aircraft operational. In contrast, the 

Vietnamese could muster only fiftyeight percent. For example, the 5 16th Fighter 

Squadron at Da Nang ha’d fifteenaircraft but its sortie rate was about six per day. 

The 520th Fighter Squadron flew a few missions in December, but construction lagged at Can Tho (later called Binh Thuy) and the field was insecure at 

night. Beginning December 20 the squadron daily deployed a detachment of five 

237 
I 

THE ADVISORY YEARS 

(Top) Canberra bomber. 

(Center) A rocket pod attached to 

wing pylon of an Super 

the 

at 

(Bottom) Australian Caribou aircraft ai 

Tan Son Nhut, on hand to aid in 

aircraft support missions, August 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

to Binh The pilots were on call for missions until they returned to 

just before nightfall. 

The expansion of the Vietnamese Air Force was supported by adequate 

aircraft delivery and aircrew training. It suffered from troubles in training 

maintenance men, owing in part to shortages of ground support and handling 

equipment. The Vietnamese borrowed a few dollies, loading hoists, and other 

equipment from the 34th Tactical Group. Only main bases like owned 

these items, which hardly helped the situation at forward bases. 

On August at the height of the Gulf crisis, issued orders 

inactivating the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron as had earlier been 

planned. General Westmoreland expressed surprise to Admiral Sharp and 

asked to retain the unit. In lieu of giving liaison planes to the Vietnamese 

Liaison Squadron as contemplated, Westmoreland proposed the purchase 

of aircraft to equip that unit. On September Defense Secretary 

approved. 

The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron was reactivated at on 

October MACV recommended thirty more planes for it and each of the four 

Vietnamese liaison units as 

The reversal of the earlier phaseout decision left the squadron in limbo. 

Until pipeline support could be restored, the 34th Tactical Group possessed 

twenty-four and twelve liaison pilots, three of whom were about to complete 

their tours. A detachment of stayed at to train newly graduated 

Vietnamese pilots arriving from Ten with liaison officers and 

forward controllers, went under the air support operations centers. 

The with the 14th Regiment at was Capt. Lloyd 

E. Lewis. When he received an and a Vietnamese observer in September, he 

began to fly day-long surveillance missions coordinated with the Binh 

province commander. The result was an appreciable decline 

activity. Friendly ground action became more productive as did interdiction 

targeting and air strikes. 

In September William Graham and Aaron of RAND studied the 

use of USAF liaison officers and forward air controllers on constant visual 

reconnaissance and strike control. The two analysts gathered data for a new 

concept they called the “Single Integrated Attack idea was presented 

in Saigon, Hawaii, and Washington in October and next in a RAND report. The 

theory favored and closely coordinated air and ground strike forces as the 

best counterinsurgency weapon. crews were to carry out continuous and 

extensive airborne surveillance and strike control. They would work with Special 

Forces ground teams of about eighty men, who were to hold the Viet 

groups long enough for strike aircraft to sweep in. Unfortunately, the concept 

was better-suited to an insurgency in its initial stages than to the field warfare the 

were starting to wage. 

Meanwhile, General had embarked on a general following 

the abortive coup against him in September. His sweeping personnel changes in 

the Joint General Staff and among the field commanders produced officers 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

unfamiliar with the air request system. To explain the system's features, a team 

from the USAF Air-Ground Operations School completed a countrywide circuit 

in October and November. But all attempts to persuade the Vietnamese to assign 

sufficient workers to the request net, to disperse 0- I As to forward locations, and 

to let others besides Vietnamese air observers mark targets were fruitless. The 

field commanders refused to be bypassed in requests for air strikes. Neither the 

Vietnamese Air Force nor ground commanders were willing to assume responsibility under civil law for mistakes that the other might make in marking targets. 

Strike pilots refrained from accepting targets unless a Vietnamese air observer 

designated them. And deploying 0- I As to forward and remote airstrips meant 

danger from guerrillas, logistic difficulties, and loss of command control. 

Despite these drawbacks, Secretary McNamara in November approved a 

fifth and sixth fighter squadron for the Vietnamese Air Force. He authorized 

building the Vietnamese liaison squadrons to thirty aircraft each, by deliveries of 

sixty-eight 0-1 As and U-17As from March through May 1965. He said he would 

probably go along with General Westmoreland's request to give the 19th Tactical 

Air Support Squadron thirty 0-1Fs. However, he wanted to postpone his 

decision until the political climate in Saigon improved. 19 

The continuous surveillance concept could not be properly set in motion 

during the winter of 1964-65, due to the dearth of USAF and Vietnamese aircraft 

and forward air controllers. By December the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron was down to seven airmen and nine pilots, when it received eight singleengine pilots who needed to be checked out in 0-1s. The Vietnamese liaison 

squadrons owned only sixty of 120 authorized 0-1As and U-17As. In the II 

Corps there were just four 0-1 controllers on hand. 20 

In compensation USAF research and development had turned out some 

new weapons that TAC's Special Air Warfare Center had tested. A munitions 

survey team visiting Vietnam thought that these weapons and new techniques 

ought to replace older munitions and methods.*' 

The hazards of Viet Cong ground fire to low-flying aircraft, particularly 

those on napalm runs, demanded a different approach to hamlet defense. 

Fragmentation clusters replaced napalm on night flare-assisted missions. Fighters delivered the clusters from a dive to shave the time they were silhouetted by 

The 1st Combat Application Group at Eglin Air Force base had devised and 

tested a three-gun side-firing installation in a C-47. The Air Staff called for 

operational testing of these rapid-fire 7.62-mm Gatling guns (miniguns), either 

affixed to the racks of an A-I or mounted and fired from the side cargo doors of 

an orbiting C-47. In September Mk-44 Lazy Dog free-falling finned bullets were 

approved for use in Vietnam. The Lazy Dog worked well at first but not in terrain 

covered with heavy growth. The fins of the small projectiles easily bent out of 

shape when loaded into the dispensers from which they were dropped. This 

caused the missiles to tumble and lose their impact. Moreover, the size and shape 

of the pattern of the falling projectiles were erratic. Clearly, Lazy Dog was no 

240 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

substitute for napalm when enemy and friendly troops were fairly each 

Other new weapons also proved not entirely 

Tests by the 1st Combat Application Group verified that it was desirable to 

modify the C-47 with lateral-firing miniguns. Still PACAF and TAC were 

reluctant to employ the minigun-equipped plane in combat. They deemed it 

obsolete, vulnerable to ground fire, and unable to perform as well as strike 

aircraft. 

To Gen. John P. McConnell, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (who would 

succeed General LeMay as Chief on February 1965) an armed C-47 was a 

highly specialized weapon for use solely in areas of light ground fire. The aircraft 

could fly long night alert missions and react swiftly to surprise attacks. Circling 

above small-arms range, it could pin down the enemy until fighters got there. The 

armed C-47 would help offset the shortage of strike aircraft and the inefficiency 

of night fighter airborne alerts. 

Following a November 2 briefing on the armed C-47, General LeMay 

ordered a combat evaluation that got under way in early December. A test team 

led by Maj. Ronald W. Terry fitted two C-47s of the 34th Tactical Group with 

miniguns. These aircraft were an instant success against enemy troops in the 

open. Using an improvised gunsight and putting the plane’s wing down in a 

“plyon 8”turn, the pilot could direct fire from the three miniguns mounted in the 

left-hand cargo door. When fired together, they spewed 18,000 rounds-perminute into a space about the size of a football field. An aerial gunner cleared 

jams and reloaded the weapons in flight. While the small-caliber bullets were 

easily deflected in wooded stretches, the AC-47 gunships were outstanding for 

night fort and hamlet defense. Awed by the stream of tracers, the Viet Cong 

spoke of the new “ray gun” turned upon 

Integrated air reconnaissance fully responsive to users’ needs did not 

develop in 1964. And the absence of a coordinated reconnaissance-intelligencetarget system was a serious defect. The main stumbling block was the splintering 

of air reconnaissance in and out of the country. Many elements were involved, 

but the stateside USAF Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center placed most of the 

blame on the shortage of keen and influential senior Air Force officers in 

By early 1964 the reconnaissance assets of 2d Air Division had consisted of 

six Able Mable RF-101s, two experimental infrared RB-57s, two experimental 

infrared FB-26s, and two night photo RB-26Cs, plus the 13th Reconnaissance 

Technical Squadron (formerly a photo processing cell). All operated under 

Detachment 33d Tactical Group, but supported the 2d Air Division director of 

Time and again Col. Harvey E. Henderson, 2d Air Division deputy commander, had suggested that all these resources be brought into a tactical reconnaissance squadron. To do so, however, would have exceeded the Air Force’s 

authorized unit force levels. Mirroring the talk of out the American 

forces from Vietnam, planners programmed a decline in U.S. reconnaissance. 

Furthermore the Vietnamese 716th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

(Upper right) A1C Leonard A. 

boresights a caliber nose gun on a 

(Lower right) Harold inspects 

the links on 50-caliber ammunition belt for 

a 

(Center) An aircraft at Tan Son 

Nhut 

(Bottom) A mounted in an 

a 

i 

I 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

with three RC-47s and eighteen RT-28s, together with photo processing cells in 

the corps tactical zones was becoming operational. Except for problems in 

camera installation, this squadron was making solid progress. As the 7 16th 

reached its projected goal in early 1964 of 374 sorties a month, the Able Mable 

RF-101s were to depart along with six Army Mohawk armed photo-reconnaissance 

Unforeseen events buffeted the projections. The U-2 aircraft from Bien Hoa 

flew very high altitude photo missions over Southeast Asia. Film from these 

flights swamped the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, which had to call 

upon other PACAF, SAC, and Navy facilities in the Philippines and Japan.. 

Unfortunately the U-2 photography, needed for national strategic planning, had 

slight value for tactical Moreover, the wing-stress weakness of the B-26 

led to the removal of the RB-26s from Vietnam at the close of March 1964, 

diminishing night photo coverage. At the same time, the Vietnamese reconnaissance program ran into technical snags. The improved RC-47 infrared photo 

systems were operational in April and could locate the enemy by heat-source 

imagery. But MACV intelligence could not use this information because procedures had not been worked out to exploit the infrared 

Two things were to alter sharply the whole reconnaissance program the 

U.S. decision in May to begin air reconnaissance over Laos, and Secretary 

McNamara's orders to retrain Vietnamese RT-28 pilots for a fourth A-1H 

squadron. Six more USAF RF-101s arrived to augment the six Able Mable 

aircraft. All RT-28s were removed from the Vietnamese 7 16th Squadron, and 

three RC-47s were assigned to the Vietnamese 43d Transport After a 

few transport missions, the RC-47s were restored to photo duty in the III and IV 

Corps. 

In midyear the RF-101s commenced flying out of Tan Son Nhut over Laos. 

Yet authorized occasional night photography and infrared reconnaissance were 

out of the question. The two RC-47s for this work had no self-contained 

navigation systems (chiefly terrain clearance radar), and mountains and uncertain weather made the flights too hazardous. The Air Force set up delivery of two 

more RC47s with doppler navigation and inflight readout infrared sensors. 

These planes could not be modified and in place until December 

General Harris, PACAF commander, pressed for low-level reconnaissance 

to secure more detailed coverage for tactical air operations. Admiral Sharp had 

no hope of obtaining blanket approval for these flights, due to their danger to 

low-flying planes. CINCPAC needed to justify each mission to officials in 

Washington on a case-by-case basis. 35 

As the photo-reconnaissance workload grew in South Vietnam, PACAF 

sent six more RF-101s to Tan Son Nhut. Another six RF-101s that had been 

dispatched to Kadena in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf crisis also assisted. The 

Vietnamese RC-47s continued their coverage in the III and IV Corps, two 

Vietnamese aircrews being permanently assigned to reconnaissance. Requests 

for photography forwarded straight to air support operations centers markedly 

increased. 

243 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Since photo reconnaissance could not capture rapidly shifting guerrilla 

operations. interest in other air reconnaissance techniques quickened. Airborne 

radio direction finding held promise, and the Army’s Radio Research Unit 

operated three assorted aircraft. These planes furnished important intelligence of 

the Viet order of battle, but they could not make precise-enough fixes of 

enemy radio transmitters to permit air targeting. 

In the United States the Air Force tested a C-47 (later an that could 

plot the location of a ten-watt radio transmitter within one degree at a range of 

twenty-five nautical miles. In January requested seven C-47s fitted 

with more sensitive and accurate radio direction finders. However, the Air Force 

delayed approval until the experimental plane could be tested in Vietnam. 

Conducted during February-June the tests showed the tactical advantage 

of equipment that gave lines of position to an enemy transmitter regardless 

aircraft’s heading. The plane could fly past a transmitter without revealing 

interest in it. whereas Army gear required a series of head bearings on the 

transmitter. Yet as the testing bore out, the direction finder was not 

sufficiently sensitive to plot the very low-power, short-range radios used by the 

insurgents. 

A better way to pinpoint enemy actions seemed to be infrared reconnaissance sensors. In mid-1964, while two USAF waited for tactical work, 

MACV requested two Army infrared-equipped to help carry out visual 

and photographic night surveillance. General Moore asked why the Mohawks 

were needed when the were there. MACV was surprised that an infrared 

capability was already on but proceeded to justify a requirement for four 

These were to feature side-looking airborne radar and infrared sensors 

that could be “read out” in flight. The two had older infrared sets, 

requiring film to be developed and interpreted on the ground after the mission. In 

December the Air Force provided two extra with infrared 

readout. The older were retrofitted with newer equipment and returned 

to service. 

Word of the Mohawks authorized to MACV reached General He 

wanted them put under the operational control of the Air Division as part of a 

joint counterinsurgency reconnaissance task force. General Moore hoped to get 

authority to coordinate all infrared reconnaissance for MACV, but General 

Westmoreland favored a quite different control arrangement. 

In mid-I964 USAF air liaison officers and forward air controllers easily 

observed Viet activity. Their liaison planes flew over enemy-held areas 

during the day and even more at night, when the guerrillas kindled fires to cook 

their food. The infrared sensor aircraft had the mission of collecting heatradiating intelligence. Experimental night flights of the produced 

infrared photos with “hot spots.” These, when correlated with ground intelligence, confirmed the positions of Viet camps in Zones C and The 

infrared section of the Reconnaissance Technical Squadron processed the 

results of each night’s infrared mission. From October on, enemy locations 

(usually the coordinates of the cooking-fire sites) were phoned at once to the 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

corps tactical operations center. After collation with other intelligence, infrared 

material was useful for artillery and air strikes. 39 

While the RB-57s were in test during July, 29 infrared targets were requested 

and 21 were completed. With one more RB-57 in use in December, there were 

261 requests for infrared and 228 executed. Most infrared coverage was in the III 

Corps. To exploit both visual and infrared sightings, the 2d Air Division proposed target centers for the other 

These centers were to funnel information and needs to the air operations 

center, which would coordinate strike aircraft. On December 20, 1964, however, 

MACV formed the Central Target Analysis and Research Center at Tan Son 

Nhut as a unit of MACV J-2 (Intelligence). Its main mission was to coordinate 

Army and Air Force infrared reconnaissance. The center set up units at the corps 

headquarters, and they were responsive to MACV J-2 Flights by RB-57s and 

OV-1Cs proved invaluable. By January 1965 the new setup was absorbing the 

entire infrared capability in Vietnam. In February there were so many requests 

for RF-101 coverage that the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron was 

again unable to handle the processing load. Chiefly through correlation of 

infrared sensor indications with other intelligence, the center identified 250 

possible enemy targets in two months. Included were Viet Cong battalion camps 

in Phuoc Tuy Province that would eventually be struck by B-57 Jet 

Although the Air Force supported the MACV program to improve intelligence, the system removed control of infrared sorties and much of the RF-101 

effort from the air operations MACV enjoyed several intelligence 

sources that by law could not be disclosed to Vietnamese agencies. Consequently, 

the Vietnamese delayed and in some cases refused to allow strikes against targets 

so generated. The Central Target Analysis and Research Center worked at 

cross-purposes with the 2d Air Division's desire to develop close relations with 

province chiefs for intelligence and quick air 

Had the MACV system been staffed with more USAF targeting, interpretation, and reconnaissance officers, they might have produced more air strikes. But 

General Westmoreland regarded all air operations as support for ground troops 

and of necessity responsive to ground commanders. He even included interdiction, a normal USAF responsibility. Hence the MACV J-2 had the principal say 

on how air reconnaissance and surveillance resources were to be used. This left 

the 2d Air Division commander, working through the air operations center, with 

only nominal operational control over reconnaissance forces. These, like the 

aircraft flying close support and interdiction in South Vietnam, became chiefly 

geared to ground 

So too the airlift. Although General LeMay preferred to have C-I23 assault 

transports used in tactical operations rather than as logistic carriers, the insecure 

rail and road net imposed great stress on air. At times U.S. commanders joked 

that the Vietnamese army refused to travel on the ground and to keep roads and 

rails open because the Air Force moved everything for them. The adding of air 

escort for trains and convoys did little to restrain requests for air 

245 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

The 315th Troop Carrier Group at Tan Son Nhut operated the Southeast 

Asia Airlift System. Its transport control office in the air operations center 

managed common-use airlift in South Vietnam and Thailand. Assigned to the 

3 15th Air Division at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, the group came under MACV 

operational control exercised by the 2d Air Division. 

American and Vietnamese forces projected monthly airlift requirements 

and sent them to the Joint Airlift Allocation Board in MACV J-4 (Logistics). 

The board in fact consisted of one officer in the J-4 movements branch. He 

screened and processed the requests, set priorities, and with the Joint General 

Staff levied the requirements on the airlift units by monthly increments. 

The 3 I 5th Group commander also served as director of air transportation 

for the Southeast Asia Airlift System. In theory he could call upon the forty-eight 

USAF C-123s of his three squadrons, three C-47s of the 1st Air Commando 

Squadron, two of sixteen U.S. Army CV-2B Caribou transports, several Vietnamese C-47s, and two Bristol Type 170 transports of the Royal New Zealand 

Air Force operating in Thailand. Actually, three C-I 23s and three air commando 

C-47s were kept on station at Nha Trang to support U.S. Army Special Forces at 

remote spots. A “Fire Brigade” of three C-123s at Tan Son Nhut and one at Da 

Nang stood alert, ready to respond on fifteen-minute notice to the need for a 

paratroop drop or equivalent emergency. Besides, two C-I 23s were regularly 

allocated for service in Thailand. And the Vietnamese C-47s were usually flying 

other 

Col. David T. Fleming, commander of the 315th Troop Carrier Group, 

depicted the airlift system as a hodgepodge of badly tacked-together elements, 

saturated with requirements. The sole officer on the Joint Airlift Allocation 

Board could not possibly screen requests for validity. Cargo that should have 

gone by surface transportation was airlifted, and cargo for airlift was often late or 

absent at air terminals. Communications for keeping track of transport flights 

were unreliable. Aircraft frequently left bases empty or partially 

The great demands constantly pushed the C- 123s above their programmed 

sixty hours of flying time a month per aircraft. They were wearing out, stressed 

by landings and takeoffs on rough fields. By May I964 skin wrinkles appeared on 

the top sides of two planes. Further inspection at Tan Son Nhut disclosed visible 

damage on all thirty-seven C-123s that had been in Vietnam for nearly three 

years. Eleven required extensive repairs. Those at Da Nang in the theater for a 

year had minor damage. Airlift further declined when three C-123s went to 

Thailand in July to join the two on station there. That same month, two U.S. 

Army Caribous were lost in crashes. 

The debut in August of six CV-2B Caribous of the Royal Australian Air 

Force helped redress the balance. They contributed six hundred tons of shortrange airlift a month, proving that all the Caribous could be scheduled and used 

within a centralized 

The system did well despite its shortcomings. Over the first half of 1964, the 

C-123s bore the bulk of the airlift load. They airdropped 1,270 tons of supplies, 

moved 1,252 paratroopers and I I5 tons of materiel in assault missions, and flew 

I 

! 

246 

I 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

night flare sorties (dispensing flares times). The air commando 

airdropped tons of cargo and flew airlanded resupply missions (2,010 

passengers and tons of supplies). As a rule the two U.S. Army Caribous 

made short hauls. They flew airlanded sorties passengers and 

tons of 

The three USAF C-123s and the three air commando C-47s at 

delivered about tons a month throughout to the scattered fortified 

outposts at remote sites held by Army Special Forces. Cargo loads varied from 

neatly packed bundles to bulky and unwieldy rolls of concertina wire, sandbags, 

and steel stakes frequently a mixture of all. Landing strips at the forward 

locations were rough and drop zones hard to find, especially in marginal weather. 

Enemy ground fire made low-altitude approaches dangerous. During I964 more 

C- were hit by ground fire than any other type of fixed-wing aircraft. Lt. Col. 

Victor Curtis, USAF air liaison officer at spoke of the and 

C-I crews as “some of the most professional and dedicated had ever 

known. The Special Forces likewise appreciated the air supply. They lent a hand 

in rigging AN/ radios aboard the transports for communications with 

the camps. But the aircraft commanders commonly relied on smoke signals to 

direct landings and drops. The crews manhandled their airdrop cargo in a 

manner reminiscent of World War 

Through the autumn of the C-123s and supporting the Special 

Forces ran serious risks. A C-I23 on October tried to resupply an outpost in 

western Duc Province but could not make radio contact. The plane 

wandered over the Cambodian border and was shot down with the loss of all 

eight crewmen. In December half of the 310th Troop Carrier Squadron and 

seven of its C-123s went to to replace the which were withdrawn. The seven C- an Australian and three Army supported 

the Special 

The new U.S. field advisors that General Westmoreland had asked for 

in June and July would need an average of tons of airlift each month. 

Colonel Fleming therefore requested a C-I23 squadron to bring his total to four. 

Until that unit arrived, committed eleven C-I 30s from the 15th Air 

Division to the airlift in South Vietnam. These planes worked off the backlog of 

air cargo at the major terminals. The Gulf of crisis in August had 

triggered a hurried deployment of USAF units into South Vietnam and Thailand. The 15th Division, aided by three TAC C-I squadrons of the Composite 

Air Strike Force, handled these movements. The division’s Detachment at 

Clark Air Base functioned as the movement control 

In Ranch Hand C-123s had flown a series of defoliation missions in 

South Vietnam. (See Chapter The results led the Joint Chiefs to conclude in 

April I963 that aerial spraying of herbicides had military value to kill the foliage 

concealing the enemy and to destroy his crops. The Kennedy administration 

authority to the U.S. Ambassador and MACV to order defoliation 

spraying. But it cleared no U.S. crews and aircraft for spray missions against 

crops. Specific approval for each crop-destruction target had to come from 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Washington. The chemicals worked best in the wet season when the vegetation 

was actively growing. Ranch Hand therefore waited until June and July 1963 

before clearing growth from the Saigon to Da Lat powerline and canals in the Ca 

Mau Peninsula. This and other spraying over the year improved the view and 

reduced cover for hostile ambush operations. There were eighty-seven square 

kilometers defoliated throughout 1963, compared to twenty in 

In January 1964 the U.S. Army division advisors were allowed to make 

wider use of aerial spray around depots, airfields, and outposts. They could also 

approve hand-spray operations against enemy crops. Warnings had to go out to 

the civilian population before spraying. In consequence the Ranch Hand C-123s, 

flying at 150 feet, were exposed to enemy ground fire. In 1962 and 1963 the 

average number of hits on each spray plane per mission was four small-arms 

bullets. The risk rose in 1964 as spray flights treated areas totally dominated by 

the Viet Cong. On April 30 a Ranch Hand aircraft ran into .50-caliber fire that 

wounded the copilot and tore forty holes in the plane. Fighters regularly escorted 

spray missions and struck the areas from which the C-123s took ground fire. 

The Ranch Hand C-123s staged to Da Nang in May and June 1964. They 

set about spraying the elephant grass and other vegetation that sheltered the 

enemy along the roads in the A Shau-A Luoi valley and other areas near the 

Laotian border. Completed quickly before the Viet Cong could fully react, these 

flights sustained just four hits in the course of twenty-six sorties. On five spray 

missions in III Corps during May, C-123s were struck fifteen times by ground 

fire. On two occasions MACV suspended operations where heavy firing 

Ranch Hand functioned on temporary duty until July 1964, supported by 

the Tactical Air Command. Then the three spray C-I23 s and their specialized 

crews became Detachment I of the 315th Troop Carrier Group, permanently 

assigned to PACAF. Though Vietnamese helicopters and ground troops had 

sprayed crops in 1962 and 1963, no American aircraft or personnel had been 

permitted to take part in crop destruction prior to 1964. 

On July 29, 1964, Ambassador Taylor received the authority to approve 

crop-destruction operations without first referring them to Washington. In May 

VNAF helicopters had resumed crop destruction but were unable to spray crops 

in certain areas. Taylor therefore directed Ranch Hand to spray some crop 

targets, beginning on October 30. The Ranch Hand planes had to operate under 

the Farm Gate concept when spraying crops. That is, they carried temporary 

South Vietnamese markings and were under the ostensible control of a South 

Vietnamese “aircraft commander” who was also on board. To cut exposure to 

ground fire, the three Ranch Hand aircraft in August were given modified spray 

systems. Now they could dispense herbicides at the rate of three gallons per acre 

(double the old rate), and finish a mission in a single pass. Their first nineteen 

crop-spraying sorties lasted ten days in October, directed against rice, corn, 

manioc, bananas, and pineapples near War Zone D. While fighters escorted all 

flights, enemy ground fire scored forty hits on the C-123s. 

I 

248 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

(Top) Loudspeakers installed in a 

C-47. 

(Bottom) Leaflets dropped from a 

C-47 Skytrain. 

Broadcasts and leaflet drops over 

areas of South Vietnam 

were part of the “Open Arms” 

program to persuade insurgents to 

surrender. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

In November and December Ranch hand sprayed enemy rice near War 

Zone AN intelligence source quoted the provincial 

committee as reporting that the destroyed rice would have fed their troops the 

area for years. During these flights ground fire shot out an engine on a Cand the plane barely made it back to A fourth C-I23 was added in 

December. By the end of the year the detachment had flown seventy-two survey 

flights and spray sorties, defoliated square kilometers of vegetation, and 

destroyed acres of crops. This contrasted with the acres of 

crops sprayed by the Vietnamese in and the acres in 

Concern of Washington officials over strengthening the government 

focused fresh attention on psychological operations during the spring of 

Psychological warfare had been conducted since I but with uneven results. In 

November Farm Gate had first used four SC-47s for leaflet drops and 

loudspeaker broadcasts. The SC-47, however, was not well-suited to remote-area 

work. Farm Gate wanted a plane that could land at a forward site, pick up local 

officials or defectors, and let them speak from the air to people who 

would recognize their voices. To do this the Super Courier (later 

designated seemed ideal. The aircraft, specially configured for the CIA, 

featured short-takeoff-and-landing and other admirable characteristics. Farm 

Gate requested eight and authority to create a psychological warfare 

branch of three qualified officers and two technicians, to forge “a sophisticated 

psychological warfare 

These efforts were abruptly dampened. On February I, a low-flying 

dropping leaflets near crashed and killed eight Americans and one 

Vietnamese. Embarrassed by the loss of so many Americans on a flight that was 

supposed to train Vietnamese, Secretary ordered leaflet and speaker 

missions turned over to the Vietnamese. The Joint Chiefs directed that U.S. 

aircraft refrain from such operations “except in unusual CIRCUMSTANCES In 

June the Vietnamese equipped a C-47 with speakers for airborne 

The Air Staff and wanted Farm Gate to train Vietnamese Air 

Force personnel for psychological warfare. But by April the Air Division 

director of operations, Col. Winston Anderson, judged the Vietnamese to 

have little recognition of its importance. From June through January 

the Vietnamese speaker-equipped C-47 had a total of twenty-two flightsfourteen loudspeaker and eight psychological warfare. Now and then the standard dispensed leaflets, and the OF THE liaison squadrons participated 

in a small program of civic action, troop information, and enemy leaflet 

t ON 

In September Farm Gate received two of four authorized 

Super Couriers, one being rigged with speakers. Between December 

and May Farm Gate made a number of flights in the to evaluate it 

as a psychological warfare And in May, Mr. approved the 

use of American planes to supplement Vietnamese psychological operations, 

provided minimum U.S. personnel were 
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS 

The mission was then divided between the Vietnamese Air Force and the 2d 

Air Division, with neither of them given authority to coordinate the overall 

psychological warfare The 2d Air Division favored the Helio Super 

Courier. While the C-47 carried a navigator and was better for night flights, the 

U-10 was more maneuverable, not as noisy, and less susceptible to ground fire 

since it was smaller. The weight of the U-10’s laminated fiberglass armor diminished aircraft performance, but protected the crew against light-caliber fire. 

After speakers and other equipment were installed in two more U-10s, the 

2d Air Division had three planes for speaker and leaflet missions. Their flights 

stepped up after May 1963. By October 22, 2d Air Division aircraft had flown 

386 psychological warfare 

In the spring of 1964, aerial psychological operations were often the sole 

swift means of communication between the government and remote rural 

peoples. Since part of President Khanh’s weakness stemmed from loss of contact 

with the hinterland, it was proposed to expand the training of Vietnamese in 

psychological operations. While visiting Saigon, Carl T. Rowan, director of the 

U.S. Information Agency, was impressed with the potential of these activities. He 

supported the proposal to enlarge them, which President Johnson approved on 

April 

To support the Vietnamese armed forces in “political warfare,” the Vietnamese Air Force set up a general political warfare directorate with headquarters 

at Tan Son Nhut and officers at each wing. Ten single-engine utility aircraft (six 

U-6As and four were delivered to the Vietnamese Air Force for modification to psychological warfare duty. 

Also over the summer of 1964, the 2d Air Division worked with the United 

States Army Support Command, Saigon, to test a public address system. It 

consisted of eight 125-watt speakers installed in a Vietnamese H-34 helicopter. 

Messages could be heard on the ground as the chopper flew at a fairly safe 

altitude of three thousand feet, but the rotor blades distorted the sound. The 2d 

Air Division abandoned the project, while the Army continued to maintain seven 

UH-1B copters fitted with the public address 

American and Vietnamese aircraft in August 1964 reached a new high of 

132 psychological warfare sorties. The Vietnamese were nevertheless more concerned with internal “personnel services” to the soldiers and airmen. Caught up in 

the conversion to fighter aircraft, the Vietnamese paid scant attention to psychological warfare. Four U-17s were used in and around Saigon, yet only one U-6 

was modified due to the complications in installing 

The U-10 section of the 1st Air Commando Squadron was authorized four 

aircraft and six pilots. An accident claimed one plane in September, and the 

absence of a planned flow of replacement pilots proved even more serious. In 

November the U-10 section was down to two pilots, each averaging more than 

one hundred flying hours during the month. 

Psychological warfare sorties by USAF and Vietnamese aircraft totaled 106 

in September, 109 in October, 69 in November, and 102 in December 1964. 

Although four USAF replacement pilots finally joined the U-10 section, the 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

impression was current that “we are piddling with” psychological operations 

“and not getting 

That impression applied also to the broader canvas of events in Vietnam. 

252 I 
End of 

Phase 

Viet Cong night outpost and hamlet attacks doubled in intensity during the 

last half of 1964. They were especially severe in the Ill and IV Corps Tactical 

Zones. In October the enemy scored marked successes in the II Corps, which had 

been almost pacified a few months earlier.' 

General Moore thought it just a matter of time before the Viet Cong tried to 

spring a psychologically damaging surprise raid or a mortar bombardment on a 

major air base. Although the Vietnamese were responsible for interior security 

and perimeter defense, the 2d Air Division had its own force of one officer and 

280 airmen as additional guards. 

Proper aircraft dispersal was virtually impossible at the overloaded airfields, 

thus inviting sabotage or attack. This prompted PACAF to ask CINCPAC in 

August 1964 to allow one of the two B-57 squadrons to move from Bien Hoa to 

Takhli. Action was put off until October, when General Harris spoke personally 

with Admiral Sharp. The latter then permitted half of each squadron to return to 

Clark Air Base for training. This trimmed the number of B-57s on alert at Bien 

Hoa to eighteen, but the field remained overcrowded and poorly defended. 

How insecure Bien Hoa was became clear on the night of November 1, when 

a Viet Cong mortar squadron penetrated the Vietnamese perimeter defenses. The 

ensuing thirty-minute barrage killed four and wounded seventy-two, destroyed 

five B-57s and one H-43 helicopter, and damaged thirteen B-57s and three H-43s. 

Vietnamese losses totaled two killed, five wounded, three A- I Hs destroyed, and 

three A-I Hs and two C-47s damaged. Some houses, a mess hall, vehicles, and 

fuel tanks were also destroyed or damaged.2 

The attack provoked discussions on countermeasures at the highest levels of 

government in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had previously agreed on 

positive action against North Vietnam, but differed on the severity, timing, and 

location of that action. The major point of indecision stemmed from the stand of 

Ambassador Taylor. He held that the United States could start no strong move 

against North Vietnam until a stable government existed in Saigon. Consequently, planning for an air campaign had continued on a contingency basis. At 

the end of his first year in office, President Johnson remarked that his principal 

advisers had made no unanimous recommendation for air activity against North 

Vietnam. 

As noted earlier, Secretary of Defense McNamara put hard questions to the 

Joint Chiefs regarding the effects of bombing the ninety-four strategic air targets 

identified in North Vietnam. In their reply the chiefs accepted CINCPAC 

assurances. The targets could be attacked without depleting fuel and ordnance 

needed to meet a Chinese intervention. CINCPAC had already prepared a plan 

to attack all the targets in twenty days. Since there was no doubt that Hanoi was 

253 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

administering and sustaining the war, General LeMay pushed for Air Force and 

Navy air strikes on North Vietnam’s source of supply. He felt that interdiction 

would be far more expensive and much less efficient than closing North Vietnam’s ports and destroying the supplies by strategic bombing before they started 

south. 

General Greene, the Marine Corps Commandant, had backed LeMay but 

the other chiefs supported Ambassador Taylor’s view. LeMay countered that 

there could be no sound Saigon government without morale-building offensive 

operations. The Vietnamese military establishment was the sole stabilizing force. 

If that collapsed, the United States might well have to fight to get its military 

advisors and their dependents out of the country. 

Now, the Bien Hoa attack spurred the Joint Chiefs toward a strong reprisal. 

On November 1 they verbally recommended to Secretary McNamara immediate 

U.S. air strikes against infiltration targets in the Laotian panhandle; airlifting 

U.S. Army and Marine Corps units to defend Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, and Bien 

Hoa; and assembling USAF units within sixty to seventy-two hours for air 

operations against North Vietnam. The air campaign would consist of an initial 

B-52 night strike flown from Guam against Phuc Yen airfield, first-light naval air 

strikes on other airfields and the Hanoi-Haiphong oil storage areas, and rapidly 

progressing attacks against the entire ninety-four targets listed. 

Angered by the Bien Hoa affair, Ambassador Taylor favored limited 

retaliation against selected North Vietnamese targets by American and Vietnamese aircraft, coupled with a policy statement warning of a similar U.S. 

response to future incidents. President Johnson’s civilian advisers, chiefly Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, counseled patience. The President listened. He was 

concerned about the upcoming election and about possible Viet Cong action 

against American dependents in Saigon. 

Ruling out an instant response, the President ordered quick replacement of 

the destroyed and seriously damaged B-57s at Bien Hoa. He further directed a 

National Security Council working group, chaired by William P. Bundy, to 

outline political and military options available against North Vietnam. In its 

early deliberations the Bundy group leaned toward restrained action. In contrast, 

the Joint Chiefs on December 18 recommended, first, a hard-hitting, fast, 

“full-squeeze’’ air campaign against North Vietnam completed in twenty days. 

Secondly, as a fall-back position, they proposed tightly controlled and gradually 

increasing air pressure over a two-month period.3 

Meanwhile on the night of November 6, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky 

led thirty-two Vietnamese A-1Hs against a Viet Cong camp in Zone D. The 

mission was a widely announced reprisal for the Bien Hoa incident. According to 

South Vietnamese intelligence reports, the attack caused five hundred enemy 

casualties. 

On the 16th the Viet Cong troops in Zone D forayed out and battled 

Vietnamese forces for six hours near Ben Cat. General Khanh personally 

directed a massive operation in response. One hundred fifteen U.S. Army and 

I 

254 
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE 

Vietnamese helicopters lifted twelve battalions of ground troops to the fringe of 

Zone D near Ben Suc. They killed I63 guerrillas (83 by air) and captured 

These and other sizable Vietnamese assaults did not deter the insurgents 

surrounding Saigon. Severe floods from typhoons in November, together with 

resurgent communist activity, virtually collapsed governmental authority in the 

ten central provinces. As the floods receded, the Viet Cong moved in to take 

almost complete control of the countryside in the populous Quang Ngai and 

Binh Dinh Provinces. The enemy confined the government’s presence to district 

towns and provincial capital cities. 

Vietnamese ground forces could open a road briefly by committing four to 

six battalions of troops. But as soon as they withdrew, the guerrillas moved in. 

Constant Viet Cong actions kept the army units off-balance and cost them dearly 

in men, equipment, and morale. The enemy seemed to easily recruit replacements 

for his losses. And the National Liberation Front stood ready as a shadow 

government to seize power when the Saigon regime 

During a press interview in Saigon on November 2 1, Ambassador Taylor 

depicted the principal problem in Vietnam as the dual inability to form a solid 

national government and to stop Viet Cong reinforcement. The Ambassador 

realized the military value of air strikes against Laotian infiltration routes and 

North Vietnamese infiltrator-training areas. He suggested a few selective bombings, but clung to the belief that a sound government in Saigon was the first 

priority. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs more and more accepted the USAF 

position. Stopping Hanoi’s support of the insurgency was a prerequisite for a 

stable Saigon 

William Bundy’s National Security Council working group outlined three 

possible courses of action for the United States. One envisioned reprisal attacks, 

intensified covert operations, resumption of offshore naval patrols, and steppedup Laotian T-28 attacks. Another called for the “fast/full squeeze” bombing of 

North Vietnam favored by the Joint Chiefs, which Bundy termed “almost 

reckless,” an invitation to Chinese intervention. The last specified a “slow 

squeeze” of air attacks on infiltration targets in North Vietnam. All three would 

give an impression of steady and deliberate pressure-building while permitting 

the United States to halt at any time. Bundy and Assistant Secretary of Defense 

John T. McNaughton liked the last option.’ 

Ambassador Taylor arrived in Washington on November 26 to join conferences on strategy. He advocated U.S. actions to restore adequate government in 

Saigon, refine the counterinsurgency campaign, and convince or compel Hanoi 

to cease helping the Viet Cong. Taylor set out a three-phase program. The first 

phase was to consist of heightened covert actions, anti-infiltration attacks in 

Laos, and reprisal bombing-all to stiffen South Vietnamese morale. The second 

would afford more air attacks on infiltration objectives in North Vietnam. The 

third was to ultimately destroy all important fixed targets in North Vietnam. He 

thought (much like Bundy) that the first phase should start at once. 

The Ambassador believed that U.S. aircraft ought to take part in the air 

operations over Laos (the initial phase of the stepped-up action). This would 

255 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

demonstrate American willingness to share in the risks of acting against North 

Vietnam. Armed reconnaissance strikes on infiltration routes in the Laotian 

panhandle would signal a deeper U.S. involvement in the conflict and a resolve to 

back the governments of both South Vietnam and Laos. 

Briefed on December 1, President Johnson accepted the premise that a 

stable South Vietnamese government was the first essential to end the insurgency. On the 2d he approved the first-phase military actions. He said that 

subsequent ones would project progressive air bombardment to the north rather 

than by functional target systems. At first the heavier Laotian T-28 and USAF 

strikes along Laotian infiltration routes, as well as special covert maritime 

operations, would be psychological warnings to Hanoi. After an unspecified 

transitional period, air attacks on North Vietnam would begin against infiltration objectives just beyond the demilitarized zone. Then moving northward to 

the 19th parallel, the strikes were to eventually hit the Hanoi airfields and POL 

storage, while naval forces mined and blockaded North Vietnam’s 

Upon his return to Saigon on December 7, Ambassador Taylor stressed to 

Vietnamese leaders that Washington wanted political stability above 

In line with the President’s decision, a joint State-Defense message on 

December 8 instructed the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane to seek approval for 

American air strikes on hostile communications in Laos. The go-ahead was given 

on the 10th and Secretary of Defense McNamara authorized two missions a 

week, each consisting of four aircraft. This very restricted bombing was nicknamed Barrel Roll. 

Weekly, a National Security Council committee was to designate two 

segments of the line of communications for armed reconnaissance as well as a 

fixed target for ordnance remaining at the end of the route sweep. Both USAF 

and USN planes were to playa part, with MACV acting as the local coordinating 

authority. Publicity was forbidden as were attacks on the Laotian people. 

Targets of opportunity had to be “unmistakingly military activity of a transient 

or mobile nature.” Fixed installations could be hit only during attacks on clearly 

identified military convoys and personnel, or as secondary targets. No mission 

could be launched from Thai bases or carry napalm. Secretary McNamara’s 

explicit and detailed orders left little room for combat commanders to specify 

tactics, ordnance, routing, and like 

Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC, was impressed with the high-level national 

interest in the armed reconnaissance program. He gave the maiden mission to the 

F-105 Thunderchiefs of PACAF’s 80th Tactical Squadron at Korat, Thailand. 

Sharp selected a section of Route 8 for the armed sweep and the Nape road 

bridge as the target for unused ordnance. The fifteen-plane force took off from 

Da Nang on December 14. Three RF-101s served as pathfinders and damageassessment craft. Eight F-100s flew combat air patrol to guard against MIG 

interference. Four F-1 05s carried 750-pound bombs, 2.75-inch rockets, and 

20-mm ammunition. The mission achieved slim results because the heavy ordnance load led to miscalculation of time and distance. Short of fuel, the F-105s 

made a hurried attack on the bridge and missed it. 

i 

256 
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE 

Navy planes flew on December 17. Four A-I Hs escorted by eight F-4Bs 

conducted armed reconnaissance of Routes 12 I and 12, with the Ban Boung Bau 

road bridge as the fixed alternative. The aircraft failed to damage the bridge but 

destroyed eight buildings at one end. 

The next mission sent four F-100s of the 428th Tactical Fighter Squadron 

along Route 8 on December 21. Lightly armed with CBU-2As and 2.75-inch 

rockets, the fighters became disoriented after receiving heavy flak, ran low on 

fuel, and found no secondary target. 

Reports on the first two USAF missions disturbed General LeMay. He sent 

word to General Moore that heexpected higher professionalism, even though he 

recognized that the tight curbs complicated air operations. 

To prepare for the fourth mission, PACAF's 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron deployed six F- 105s from Okinawa to Da Nang. Four of them reconnoitered 

Route 23 on December 25, with a strike against the military barracks at 

Tchepone. The operation went well, though the dive-bombing at Tchepone was 

inaccurate. During the fifth mission on December 30, four Navy A-I Hs struck 

the military camp.11 

Planners for a mission on January 13 chose the Ban Ken bridge, the most 

important potential checkpoint on Route 7. Aerial photos showed thirty-four 

antiaircraft guns (37-mm and 57-mm) in place, with up to seventy more firing 

positions built but not occupied. The planners scheduled an RF-101 as pathfinder and another for bomb damage assessment, eight F-100s carrying CBU2As for flak suppression, and sixteen F-105s from the 44th and 67th Tactical 

Fighter Squadrons as strike aircraft. The two flights of F-100s were to fly 

low-level and abreast across the gunsites to knock them out with cluster bombs. 

Immediately thereafter the F-105s would attack the bridge. Each of the first eight 

F-105s were to drop eight 750-pound bombs. This would be followed by eight 

F-105s loaded with six bombs and two AGM-12B Bullpup air-to-ground missiles. An Air America C-I23 was to serve as airborne control for rescue 

helicopters. 

The F-100s pummeled the gun positions but some firing continued. The first 

wave of F-105s cut the bridge with their sixty-four bombs. The F-100s and the 

second wave of F-105s made multiple runs on the gunsites, the mixed ordnance 

of the F-105s requiring at least three passes to expend. Moreover, the Thunderchiefs had to descend into flak range to control their missiles, and one plane was 

downed. An F-100 on its fifth pass was also shot down. Four other aircraft were 

damaged. 

General Moore said that poor judgment was displayed in the attack. To 

escape the losses, the planes should have broken off the engagement after 

knocking out the bridge.12 

While it seemed impossible for ground transportation to bypass the Ban 

Ken bridge, the communists within three days converted the top of a dam just 

upriver into a traffic route. Press reports of the two lost aircraft prompted 

Senator Wayne L. Morse to charge that the air operation violated the 1962 

Geneva agreements on Laos.13 

251 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

258 
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE 

Armed reconnaissance sweeps by Seventh Fleet aircraft on January 2 and 

10, 1965, detected no enemy. On the 15th, as six A-I Hs reconnoitered Route 23 

at night, the flight leader became separated from the flare plane and wandered 

west of the road. He sighted and attacked moving trucks and also adjacent 

buildings that turned out to be the friendly village of Ban Tang Vai. No further 

secondary targets were assigned for night 

Admiral Sharp near the end of January took a close look at this relatively 

small interdiction campaign, conducted at least risk and under tight control from 

Washington. He concluded that the program could be better managed from 

Laos. He insisted that militarily effective interdiction had to be constantly and 

completely responsive to the tactical situation. General Harris, the PACAF 

commander, agreed that the missions were too few to sway Hanoi. Still, they may 

have imparted political strength to the Laotian government at a critical juncture. 

In late January and early February, an armed coup was 

Meanwhile in South Vietnam, General Khanh and several associates had 

seized power from the provisional civil government on December 20, 1964. 

Ambassador Taylor strongly protested and after that the relations between him 

and Khanh were strained. Taylor was apparently concerned that the feeble 

Saigon government might yield to elements clamoring for a cease-fire and 

coalition with the National Liberation Front. He may therefore have hinted that 

U.S. advisors were about to take command of the Vietnamese armed forces. In 

any event, the unstable conditions in the country encouraged the Viet Cong. 

They increasingly turned from hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to more conventional 

mobile warfare by regular units. This pushed the United States into stronger 

support of the 

Secretary of Defense McNamara had already made clear that the conflict 

was chiefly a ground war in which aviation could make only secondary contributions. While this strategy precluded the full use of tactical air the rather 

small Vietnamese and U.S. air operations were central to saving the Vietnamese 

ground forces from piecemeal defeat. On December 9, for example, A- I Hs from 

the Vietnamese 516th Fighter Squadron struck a Viet Cong force and left 

thirty-three enemy dead. The force on December 7 had attacked the An Lao 

district headquarters in Binh Dinh Province and ambushed government relief 

troops. In the three-day battle the foe inflicted battle losses of twenty-eight killed, 

fifty wounded, and twenty-two missing. 

Also on December 9 a Viet Cong battalion assaulted and overran a government battalion command post and 105-mm howitzer platoon near Tam Ky in 

Quang Tin Province. A USAF captain joined the eighteen strike sorties flown by 

the 5 16th Fighter Squadron against the hill position. All the strikes were directed 

by an 0-1A pilot and Vietnamese observer who were in the air for ten hours. 

Direct hits on the artillery site exploded ammunition and killed enemy gunners. 

The last flight of four A-I Hs landed at Da Nang after sunset when the ceiling was 

under five hundred feet and visibility less than a mile. Government troops retook 

the ground and confirmed 162 Viet Cong killed (85 by air). Friendly losses 

totaled 26 killed and thirty-three 

259 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

During the night of December 10, two Viet Cong battalions struck outposts 

at Long My in Chuong Thien Province and ambushed relief forces. A U.S. Army 

L-19 and located the ambush and put four covering on the 

camouflaged foxholes. U.S. Army helicopters from Soc Trang held the enemy 

until Vietnamese in arrived and delivered ordnance in the face of intense 

ground fire. One A-I H was downed, and five helicopters damaged. 

By fine teamwork and armed helicopters killed about four hundred of 

the fifteen hundred enemy troops, and probably saved a government battalion 

and a regional force company from being 

Viet Cong night attacks on hamlets and outposts soared to a new high. A 

total of ninety-six incidents took place over the last ten days of December, 

drawing flare and strike aircraft. The planes forced the foe to break off the assault 

in ninety-four of the cases. Still under test, AC-47 gunships joined the air alerts 

and performed well. On the night of December 24, for example, an AC-47 used 

its miniguns to blast guerrillas off the wall of a fort under 

At night on December 27, two North Vietnamese regiments raided the 

hamlet of Binh Gia The next morning a reinforced ranger battalion, aided by 

three armed helicopters, tried without success to relieve the hamlet. That evening 

the Viet Cong hit the rangers at the nearby town of Ngai Giao but were driven off. 

On the 29th, twenty-four U.S. Army protected by fifteen armed 

lifted two other ranger companies to a landing area near Binh Gia 

Small-arms and machinegun fire claimed three of the helicopters. One ranger 

company fought its way out, the second was overrun. 

The defeat seemed to have stemmed from the absence of preplanned 

coordination of tactical air support for the heliborne operation. Another factor 

was the late request for fighters, made only after the loss of the three helicopters. 

Eight A-I E sorties covered the downed Four Vietnamese H-34 helicopters carried ammunition into the area and evacuated wounded. A C-47 flareship 

lighted the scene through the night. 

Escorted by fifteenarmed twenty-six 2d and 4th 

Marine Battalions into the zone. Eight helicopters were hit and one exploded, 

killing the crew. Finally on the afternoon of December 30, four and five 

A-I responded to requests. The strike aircraft blasted two spots in the rubber 

forests around Binh Gia that reportedly sheltered two Viet Cong battalions. At 

the same time, H-34s evacuated thirty-four killed and forty-nine wounded men. 

A C-47, four and one AC-47 furnished night illumination and fire 

support.21 

The 4th Marine Battalion battled its way into the rubber forest on 

December 31, and was soon surrounded by the enemy (identified from captured 

documents as the 48th Main Force Viet Cong Regiment). The Marine commander radioed the USAF forward air controller overhead for air support. Four 

responded and hit enemy positions with napalm and general. purpose 

bombs. In the afternoon, eight were scrambled and sent to the scene. But 

the senior ground commander ordered them returned to Bien Hoa, because air 

support had not been requested through Vietnamese army channels. 

i 

I 

260 
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE 

Armed helicopters tried to launch strikes later that day. However, they 

learned from U.S. Marine Corps advisors with the surrounded battalion that the 

thick branches of the rubber trees absorbed the rockets and machinegun fire 

from the air. Attacking at dusk and using massed automatic weapons, the Viet 

Cong overpowered the 4th Marine Battalion. All through the night of the 31st, 

three C-47s, two C-123s, one AC47, and four A-IHs supplied flare/fire support. Even so, just 232 of the 532 men of the 4th Marine Battalion managed to 

straggle back to Binh Gia.22 

General Khanh took personal charge of a large operation set afoot in Phuoc 

Tuy Province on January I, 1965. C-1 23s flew the 1st and 3d Airborne Battalions 

from Tan Son Nhut to Vung Tau, then helicopters whisked them to the battle 

area. On January 2 helicopters transported the 7th Airborne Battalion directly 

from Bien Hoa. Tactical fighters supported continuing operations with cover 

and escort, landing-zone preparations, and strikes on enemy positions. 

On the 5th of January, eight A-1Es were each loaded with one Lazy Dog 

XM-44 cannister and normal high-explosive ordnance. The aircraft employed 

the Lazy Dog missiles against Viet Cong troops firing at U.S. Army helicopter 

observers. Government troops kept clear of the Lazy Dogzones, but U.S. Army 

air observers reported that after the drops they no longer received ground fire. An 

intelligence report stated that the Viet Cong carried away from the strike areas 

fifteen oxcart loads of dead and wounded.23 

At General Khanh’s order, government battalions with tanks and armored 

vehicles continued to swing through the safer areas of Phuoc Tuy Province. 

From January 10 through February 15, a small air support operations center 

managed the flights aiding the massive sweeps. The operations achieved little, for 

the Viet Cong evaded ground 

Analysis of the Binh Cia defeat revealed a failure to use available fixed-wing 

air support properly. Armed helicopters were unable to provide the needed 

firepower. As the MACV J-3 reported, “the armed UH-1 B did not possess heavy 

enough ordnance to destroy the VC in prepared positions or deter their assault, 

since they were concealed under a dense canopy of 

Meanwhile, an incident in downtown Saigon brought the United States to 

the verge of direct all-out action. On Christmas Eve 1964 a 300-pound charge 

exploded in the Brink Hotel (bachelor officers’quarters for U.S. advisors), killing 

two Americans while injuring sixty-four Americans and forty-three Vietnamese. 

Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs recommended an immediate reprisal. On 

December 29 President Johnson ruled against it. 

The Brink Hotel explosion, a direct attack against and an open challenge to 

the United States, was ominous, but the battle at Binh Gia was potentially 

disastrous. To U.S. officials in Saigon it was a “highly visible” defeat of serious 

proportions. On December 3 I Ambassador Taylor reversed his thinking. Bolstered by Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and General Westmoreland, 

he sent a joint message to Washington. It advocated American air action against 

North Vietnam despite the persistent weakness of the Saigon 

26 I 
THE ADVlSORY YEARS 

Courtesy: U.S. Army 

Courtesy: U.S. Army 

262 
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE 

Attention then turned to the air strike aircraft on hand. Attack planes in 

Vietnam numbered forty-eight USAF A-1Es and ninety-two A-1Hs of the 

Vietnamese Air Force. This combined force could fly about sixty combat and 

thirty training sorties a day. Air Vice Marshal Ky’s need to have an elite “Palace 

Guard” flight of standby A-1Hs at Tan Son Nhut constrained Vietnamese 

combat sorties. These planes were piloted by highly trained, screened, and 

politically dependable personnel who routinely flew strike missions in the III and 

IV Corps areas. However, assignments to thwart coups and to control dissidence 

often diverted them from action against the Viet Cong. 

Although individual Vietnamese strike crews performed valiantly, the growing independence of unit commanders diluted the control of the air operations 

centers. Typically, fifty percent of the aircraft were held on five-hour ground 

alert. A squadron deciding to fly would call for a target about an hour before the 

end of its ground alert and receive a set of coordinates for attack, usually in a 

“free-strike” zone. Hence it was difficult to scramble or to redirect aircraft to meet 

emergencies. 

Early in January 1965 the Vietnamese 62d Tactical Wing and a detachment 

of the 516th Fighter Squadron’s A-1Hs deployed from Pleiku to Nha Trang, 

where work was to start on a new runway in February. The move stationed these 

strike aircraft too far away to properly support the critical highland provinces, 

including Pleiku and 

Ambassador Taylor now wanted to use the USAF B-57s at Bien Hoa in 

combat. He also wished to put off indefinitely the plan to form a fifth and sixth 

Vietnamese fighter squadron, so that the Vietnamese could focus on operations 

in lieu of PACAF on January 12, 1965, suggested that heavier air 

demands argued for greater air assets. It asked for thirteen tactical strike squadrons in Vietnam (seven to be USAF jet units), extra USAF air liaison officers and 

tactical air control parties to extend direct air support nets to province and sector 

levels, and at least 175 USAF and Vietnamese 0-Is-more if continuous air 

reconnaissance was 

Defending the role of U.S. Army helicopter gunships, General Westmoreland said that they had “performed magnificently” at Binh Gia. At a briefing on 

January 13, he asked if stepping up air firepower made sense in Vietnam. In other 

words, were there significant and vulnerable targets in Viet Cong sanctuary areas 

and how could they be brought under attack? General DePuy, the MACV J-3, 

addressed the question in a paper that was largely the work of USAF Col. Alan 

C. Edmunds, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J-3 for Air. 

Targets were available, the study said, and lifting the curbs on using USAF 

aircraft in the country would expand air power. This could best be done by 

drawing on Guam-based B-52 bombers as well as USN carrier aircraft on South 

Vietnamese offshore stations, for air facilities in Vietnam were scarce and 

overcrowded. The Vietnamese ground forces were apparently unable to give a 

high degree of security against Viet Cong attack of air bases. And it was hard to 

haul ordnance and aviation fuel to Vietnamese 

263 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Air analysts agreed with part of the study. Calling on aircraft outside 

the country would indeed alleviate the airfield security problem. As early as 

December General had suggested sending U.S. ground combat 

units into Vietnam for air base defense. The Navy and Marine Corps had 

demurred, saying that it was contrary to national policy. The Army had objected 

on the ground that four divisions would be needed to defend eighteen operating 

sites. As for the supply system, there was no doubt that conveying POL and 

ordnance was cumbersome, slow, and risky. This was especially true when done 

by barges, lighters, and trucks requiring security guards. 

On the other side of the coin, using aircraft located outside the country 

could hamper attempts to improve air base security and Vietnamese air facilities. 

Both were long overdue. Although the bombers were unmatched in allweather, heavy saturation attacks, the long flights from Guam would be expensive. Furthermore, using these strategic bombers would reduce worldwide 

deterrent posture. While the interest of General Westmoreland in tactical air was 

encouraging, he failed to understand Air Division and hopes for 

building a well-rounded air command, coordination, and control structure in 

On January General Moore advised General Westmoreland that 

the fastest way to bolster air power was to full use of the USAF resources 

now in the country. Moore believed that the most compelling needs were to let 

fly missions in South Vietnam, do away with the requirement to carry 

a Vietnamese observer or trainee on operational missions, and remove helicopters from air bases to allow an expansion of 

Some optimistic signs emerged from the lingering debate on air demands. A 

measure of political stability in Saigon seemed to give the Vietnamese armed 

forces confidence and initiative. A MACV press release told of air attacks killing 

about twenty-five hundred in November and December Given 

these indications, were more strike planes really 

Vietnamese and USAF A-Is flew combat sorties in January 

filling every request for close air support. The combined air forces flew a total of 

sorties, yet could not meet fifty percent of the requests for all types of air 

activity. Estimates showed that all of them could have been met, had there been 

no operational 

In a saturation test during January Vietnamese and USAF A-Is 

dropped eight hundred tons of bombs on targets in the 

woods of Zone Ranch Hand C-123s then began a massive defoliation 

program in to cover forty-eight square miles of dense forest hiding a key 

base. The operation tied up many of the combined strike aircraft. On 

January in a separate action, government battalions surrounded an 

enemy battalion near Helicopter gunship and strikes accounted for 

half of the estimated four hundred fifty insurgents killed that 

Late in January the Joint Chiefs secured approval for using USAF jet 

aircraft in a strike role within South Vietnam-if Ambassador Taylor agreed in 

advance to each mission, and if these strikes could not be carried out by 

I 

I 
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE 

Vietnamese A-Is. According to this formula, Taylor could authorize jet air 

strikes solely to save American lives or to spoil huge Viet attacks like the 

one at Binh He could do this only if the air support operations center 

certified that conventional aircraft were unavailable, and if a corps tactical zone 

commander, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and MACV all thought the 

action 

As for air strikes on North Vietnam, President Johnson rejected them in 

January despite his growing conviction that the feeble Saigon government 

needed help of some sort to Trials and tribulations, including militant 

Buddhist opposition, prompted CIA Director to expect to fall 

from power and a serious political crisis to 

On January in a speech interpreted by some observers as a bid for 

negotiations, William suggested a diplomatic meeting similar to the 

Geneva accords as “the answer” for a secure and independent South 

Vietnam. Five days later, Presidential Assistant informed 

President Johnson that he and Secretary were “pretty well convinced 

that our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat.” The preferred 

alternatives were to “use our military power in the Far East and to force a change 

of Communist policy,” or to “deploy all our resources” along “a track of 

negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved with no major 

addition to our present military risks.” Secretary of State Rusk opposed both 

options. “The consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad,“ he 

said, “that we simply must find a way of making our present policy work.” 

Not sure whether to support Saigon more vigorously or to disengage from a 

losing proposition, the President on February sent a fact-finding party headed 

by to Saigon. The party’s arrival coincided with a visit to 

Hanoi by Soviet Premier Since departure 

from power in October had tried to restore closer Russian ties with 

Hanoi. He and a sizable Moscow delegation that included top Soviet air force 

officials reached Hanoi on February 

According to the Chinese, hoped to persuade Hanoi to halt 

military aid to the Viet Congas a precondition to negotiations (as William 

seemed to have suggested). But in opinion, sensed an imminent Viet victory and wanted the Soviet Union to share in it. 

would probably offer more economic and military aid and encourage stepped-up 

warfare in South Vietnam. Consequently, proposed that the United 

States start air attacks on targets in North Vietnam. These would commence at 

the 17th parallel and work progressively 

Conflicting signals stopped on Sunday morning, February Viet 

mortar squads and demolition teams attacked the small U.S. advisory 

detachment in II Corps, four and one-half miles north of Pleiku. In addition they 

struck Camp headquarters of the U.S. Army Aviation Battalion, 

also near Pleiku. The joint assaults killed eight Americans and wounded 

destroyed five Army B helicopters and two transports, three USAF 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

0-1Fs, and one Vietnamese 0-IF. Moreover the teams damaged the main 

building of the advisory 

Bundy, Westmoreland, and Taylor jointly sent from Saigon their recommendation for a reprisal strike and President Johnson ordered an instant air 

response. That afternoon USN aircraft, and on the 8th Vietnamese and USAF 

planes, hit enemy military barracks near Dong Hoi in an operation called 

Flaming Dart. At the same time, PACAF air transports commenced to lift U.S. 

Marine Corps light antiaircraft missile units from Okinawa to Da Nang and to 

evacuate U.S. dependents from South 

The Viet Cong struck on the 10th near Qui Nhon, taking twenty-three 

American and seven South Vietnamese lives. On the following day, USAF, 

USN, and VNAF aircraft (in Flaming Dart II) pounded troop barracks in the 

North Vietnamese panhandle. The Joint Chiefs quickly ordered the deployment 

to South Vietnam and Thailand of four and one-half USAF tactical squadrons 

from bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, and the movement of thirty 

B-52s to 

South Vietnamese control deteriorated in all of the corps tactical zones as 

Viet Cong action exploded. On February 8 a major enemy force crossed Route 

19 between Pleiku and Qui Nhon. The crossing occurred, even though four 

A-1Es dropped Lazy Dogs and killed about one hundred of the enemy. The 

attackers then enveloped and damaged two battalions of the 40th Regiment and 

a troop of M-115 armored personnel carriers in Vinh Binh Province. That night 

an AC-47 poured 20,500 7.62-mm rounds into the area, killing around 250 enemy 

soldiers. 

To shore up the II Corps defense, General Moore ordered eight A-I Es to 

Qui Nhon where conditions were “unsafe in every respect.” Staying close to the 

scene of action, each pilot flew at least three strike sorties a day and significantly 

helped to blunt the enemy 

On February 13 President Johnson gave the green light to measured and 

limited air attacks on North Vietnam. Called Rolling Thunder and planned for 

swift execution, the strikes were delayed for two weeks by political and military 

turmoil in Saigon and by bad weather. 

The capital was directly and immediately threatened by the Viet Cong 9th 

Division, which had no less than two well-armed regiments under forest cover in 

Phuoc Tuy Province. The mystery of how these troops were getting modern 

weapons was solved on February 16. A U.S. Army helicopter pilot discovered, 

and Vietnamese A-I Hs sank, a steel-hulled vessel at Vung Ro Bay. An investigation turned up one hundred tons of arms and ammunition in a nearby cove at 

Cap Varella. The U.S. Seventh Fleet at once started naval patrols to stop these 

deliveries. 

General Westmoreland wanted to send B-57 light bombers against the Viet 

Cong 9th Division base camps in Phuoc Tuy Province, which had been pinpointed by infrared reconnaissance. Securing emergency authority on February 

17, he planned to launch the planes on the 19th. 

I 

266 

I 
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE 

On that day, dissident military leaders revolted against General Khanh. 

Their troops seized Saigon, and took part of Tan Son Nhut to ground Ky’s 

anticoup air force. But Ky got his planes in the air, as C-47s brought loyal troops 

from the I Corps to clear Saigon of the rebels. The Armed Forces Council then 

removed Khanh and exiled him. 

At the height of the coup crisis in Saigon on the afternoon of February 19, 

four B-57s from Bien Hoa flew the first open USAF mission in South Vietnam as 

they bombed Viet Cong base camps in Phuoc Tuv. The aircraft struck again 

during February 2 1-24, while Ky kept most of the VNAF A-1 Hs on countercoup 

alert and out of 

Judging on February 21 that the United States was not “fully committed to 

winning the war in Vietnam,” General Westmoreland was ready to change the 

nature of the American involvement. He would make more use of jet aircraft 

within South Vietnam, restore U.S. markings to American-manned A-I Es, and 

abolish the requirement for Vietnamese observers in American planes. 

Enemy action on February 24 involved the elite communist battalion that 

had apparently just arrived in the central highlands. The battalion surrounded a 

ranger company and a Civilian Irregular Defense Group company on Route 19 

in the An Khe valley near the Mang Yang pass (where the Viet Minh had wiped 

out a French mobile group in 1954). General Westmoreland used his emergency 

authority to commit USAF jet aircraft in an all-American relief effort. F-100s, 

B-57s, and A-lEs covered and supported U.S. Army UH-IBs that rescued the 

surrounding men. The covering attacks by the 61 3th Tactical Fighter Squadron 

F-100s, 405th Tactical Wing B-57s, and 602d Fighter Commando Squadron 

A-I Es cost the enemy I50 men killed. They also allowed the helicopters to land 

three times in the area without a single casualty. The copters evacuated the 220 

officers and men who, according to Col. Theodore C. Mataxis, U.S. Army II 

Corps advisor, would otherwise have been 

The employment of B-57 and F-100 jets marked the end of the long U.S. 

combat advisory phase and the beginning of direct and open American action in 

the Vietnam War. On March I the new commander in chief of the Vietnamese 

armed forces, Maj. Gen. Tran Van Minh, established the Vietnamese Air Force 

air request net as the primary means to obtain immediate air support for all 

regular and paramilitary operations. He further removed the restriction that only 

a Vietnamese forward air controller could mark targets for air 

After approval by higher headquarters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 9 

directed that U.S. aircraft could be used for combat operations in South Vietnam. No strikes were permitted from Thai airfields, and American aircraft were 

not to accept missions that the Vietnamese Air Force could carry out. But the 

planes now boldly displayed U.S. insignia, and a Vietnamese airman was no 

longer required to be aboard in 

The United States Air Force advisory effort spanned the decade between 

1955 and early 1965, from the time the United States formally took over the 

training of the Vietnamese from the French until American aircraft first openly 

engaged in combat. During this interval the Vietnamese Air Force expanded 

261 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

from a few hundred to over ten thousand men. Its five squadrons of obsolete 

French and American planes at two air bases swelled to fourteensquadrons and 

almost three hundred more modern aircraft at five major air bases. In addition 

the Vietnamese Air Force forged a chain of command mirroring that of its 

American advisors. Most of these changes took place through the final three 

years of the period when the threat from north grew ever more serious. 

The U.S. Air Force experienced parallel growth in Southeast Asia during 

the decade. In the late 1950s there were airmen stationed in Vietnam and in 

Thailand. From on, these numbers gradually rose and on the eve of 

Americanization of the war stood at and respectively. By February 

the Air Force had planes in South Vietnam and in Thailand. Seventy 

percent of those in South Vietnam were clustered around the Saigon area, 

operating from Tan Son Nhut or Air Base. The remainder were up 

north, primarily at One-third of all these aircraft were C-123 transports, operating for the most part out of Tan Son Nhut. Reconnaissance 

missions also originated from Tan Son Nhut, flown by and on 

temporary assignment. This Saigon base further housed a handful of for 

air defense. The attack fleet of for in-country strikes was 

positioned at nearby also the headquarters for the forward air control 

mission performed by twenty-two From the Air Force operated 

one transport squadron and one temporary duty squadron of for missions in Laos. A sprinkling of support aircraft rounded out the total. 

The USAF presence in Thailand was still small at the start of Air 

defense of the country was provided by four from Don Airport 

outside Bangkok. Farther up-country, a squadron of at Royal 

Thai Air Force Base and another at flew against the 

infiltration routes in the Laotian panhandle. At just south of the 

Laotian capital, twenty worked to stem the Lao tide in northern 

Laos. These were supported by eight air rescue helicopters from the same base. 

None of these aircraft took part in operations in Vietnam. 

Despite this sizable swelling of personnel and aircraft between and 

the U.S. advisory mission failed to end Hanoi’s support insurgency in 

South Vietnam and Laos. The decision early in to replace advisors with 

combat troops recognized two facts that had come clear in late 1964: infiltration 

from north into South Vietnam was growing rather than tapering off. and the 

government of South Vietnam unstable since the assassination of Diem) 

could not cope with the situation. U.S. policymakers saw theconfluence 

two factors spelling defeat for the South unless a new approach was taken. Thus 

the purely advisory function was abandoned in favor of direct U.S. air and 

ground in theconflict. The USAF units in placeearly in would 

form the nucleus for the coming buildup. 

I 
Appendices 
I 
Growth of Major United States Air Force and 

Vietnamese Air Force Units to February 

I. VIETNAM 

USAF 

Hoa Air Base 

June 

June 

November Farm Gate arrives. Designated 

Detachment 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron. 

Made up of four four 

eight and 

men on temporary duty. 

Detachment Air Force. established tosupport 

its here. 

April Farm Gate renamed Detachment 

Commando Group 

(TAC). 

May Two Project Blackwatch 

June Detachment Air Force, rejoin Farm Gate. 

placed by Air Base 

Squadron. 

January Farm Gate increased to nineteen 

thirteen six 

and four plus 

men. Some aircraft deployed 

to Pleiku and 

July 34th Tactical Group organized. 

Air Base Squadron renamed 34th Air Base Squadron and placed under 34th 

Tactical Group. 

July 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron activated under 34th Tactical Group. By August has 

twenty-two Six of these 

go to Can Tho. 

Air Force Depot transferred here 

from Hanoi. 

Fighter Squadron organized. 

consisting of twenty-five 

Bearcats. 

514th Fighter 

replaces Fighter Squadron 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

USAF VNAF 

Farm Gate renamed 1st Air Commando Squadron and assigned to 34th Tactical Group. 

October 

1964 May-June Farm Gate T-28s and B-26s replaced with A-IEs. 

June 

518th Fighter Squadron (A-I Hs) 

activated. 

23d 'Tactical Wingformed. Incorporates 514th. 518th. 520th 

(newlyformed) Fighter Squadrons, and the 112th Liaison 

Squadron. 

August Thirty-six B-57s arrive from Clark 

Air Base. Eighteen return to 

Clark in October. 

October A second Farm Gate squadron 

(602d Fighter Commando Squaddron) organized and assigned 

to the 34th Tactical Group. 

Same type of aircraft (A-IEs) 

and missions as the 1st Air 

Commando Squadron. 

520th Fighter Squadron activated. 

Detachment 4. Pacific Air Rescue Service. established with 

three H43Fs. 

Can Tho Airfield 

1962 June Detachment 3, 6220th Air Base 

Squadron. established. 

1963 July Detachment 2.33d Tactical Group, 

replaces Detachment 3,6220th 

Air Base Squadron. 

1964 January 

field. 

April 

trol Squadron (5th Tactical 

Control Group) organized. 

74th Tactical Wing organized. 

December 520th Fighter Squadron flies five 

A-IHs from here during the 

day, and returns to Bien Hoa 

at night. 

Da Nang Air Base 

1955 November 1st Liaison Squadron moves 

here from Hue. 

1957 November Air Force Support Base 4 activated. 

272 
USAF 

1961 October . . . . . . 

December . . . . . 

1962 January 

June . 

. . . . . I Air Suport Operations Center 

formed. A Combat Reporting 

Post radar installed (Detachment 3, 5th Tactical Control 

Squadron). 

Detachment 11, 13th Air Force, 

organized. 

Two Mule Train C-123s detached here from Tan Son 

Nhut. 

. . . . . . Second Mule Train squadron 

(777th) established here with 

sixteen C-123s under Tactical 

Air Force Transport Squadron 

Provisional-2(Tan Son Nhut). 

Twelve aircraft remain here, 

and four go to Don Muang, 

Thailand. 

Detachment I I, 13th Air Force, 

renamed 6222d Air Base 

Squadron. 

December . . . . . Detachment 2, 8th Aerial 

Squadron organized. 

1963 January . . . . . 

VNAF 

2d Helicopter Squadron activated 

3d Liaison Squadron activated. 

213th Helicopter Squadron replaces 2d Helicopter Squadron. 

110th Liaison Squadron replaces 

1st Liaison Squadron. 

114th Liaison Squadron replaces 

3d Liaison Squadron (moves 

to Pleiku later in this year). 

Air Base 41 replaces Air Force 

Support Base 4 to support 

VNAF units. 

July.. . . . . . . . 6222d Air Base Squadron becomes the 23d Air Base Group 

(2d Air Division). 

777th Troop Carrier Squadron redesignated as 311th Troop 

Carrier Squadron with permanent station here. 

273 
THE YEARS 

USAF 

January 

February 

April Detachment I, 619th Tactical 

Control Squadron, organized. 

May 

Tactical wing established. incorporating all squadrons here. 

516th Fighter Squadron moves 

here from 

7th Helicopter Squadron established. Moves to Tan San 

Nhut in July and to Binh 

in December 

June on IO-day deployment for 

air defense. 

July on temporary assignment from Clark Air Base. 

August Six here from Clark Air 

Base for air defense. 

August-December from the 27th Tactical 

Fighter Wing (Cannon Air 

Force Base) and the and 

405th Tactical Fighter Wings 

(England Air Force Base) rotate in and out in response to 

the Gulf of incident. 

December Six arrive from 

Detachment 18th Tactical 

Fighter Wing. established. 

Twelve of the Tactical Fighter Wing fly from here 

in attacks on Chap Le Barracks and in Flaming Dart. 

February 

Air Base 

June Air Training Center established. 

July 

October 

December 

February Detachment 13th Air Force. 

organized. 

Liaison Squadron transferred 

from French to Vietnamese. 

Liaison Squadron moves to 

Tan Son Nhut. 

Fighter Squadron 

I 
USAF VNAF 

June Detachment 12, 13th Air Force. 

becomes 6223d Air Base 

Squadron. 

September 

December Detachment 4. 8th Aerial Port 

Squadron, organized. 

1963 January 

12th Air Base Squadron organized. 

2d Fighter Squadron renamed 

5 16th Fighter Squadron. 

July 37th Air Base Squadron (33d Tactical Group) replaces 6223d 

Air Base Squadron. 

1964 February Three C-123s and three C-47s 516th Fighter Squadron moves 

here to support Army Special 

Forces. 

to Da Nang. 

June 

1965 January 

116th Liaison Squadron activated (0-1s). 

62d Tactical Wing moves here 

from Pleiku. 

Pleiku Air Base 

1962 March II Air Support Operations Center fully operational. 

June Detachment I. 6220th Air Base 

Squadron, formed. 

December Detachment 3. 8th Aerial Port Air Base 62 activated. 

Squadron, activated. 

1964 March 

1965 January 

Tan Son Nhut Air 

Base 

1955 July 

September 

1956 February 

Air Base 62 becomes 62d Tactical Wing. 

62d Tactical Wing moves to Nha 

Trang. 

1st Transportation Squadron 

(C-47s) organized. 

Air Force Communications Section formed. 

Air Traffic and Weather Section 

formed. 

2d Transportation Squadron 

(C-47s) organized. 

June 

215 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

USAF 

1957 June 

1959 October 

1961 October Detachment 2. 507th Tactical 

Control Group, establishes a 

mobile Control and Reporting 

Post to train Vietnamese in the 

Tactical Air Control System. 

Pipe Stem reconnaissance operations start with four RF-101s and 

a Photo Processing Cell. 

Detachments 7 and 8, 13th .4ir 

Force, organized to support 

USAF units. 

November 

1962 January Mule Train arrives. Twelve 

C- 123s and 243 people on temporary duty to provide airlift. 

Two aircraft sent to Da Nang. 

Unit becomes permanent in 

June as the 776th Troop Carrier Squadron. 

Ranch Hand arrives. Three 

C-I 23s for defoliation. 

Joint Operations Center set up 

consisting of a permanent 

Combat Reporting Center to 

monitor air traffic and deploy 

fighters. Subordinate Air Support Operations Centers established at Da Nang and Pleiku. 

Pipe Stem F-101s depart, leaving 

Photo Processing Cell (now 

designated as Detachment I, 

15th Technical Reconnaissance Squadron). 

February 

VNAF 

Headquarters Vietnamese Air 

Force opens here. 

1st Helicopter Squadron (H-19s) 

organized. 

2d Liaison Squadron (L-19s) 

moves here from Nha Trang. 

Air Force Communications Section renamed Air Force Communications Squadron. 

March Hilo Hattie arrives. a C-54 fitted 

with infrared equipment for reconnaissance. Remains here 

until February 1963. 

216 
USAF VNAF 

Four F-102s deployed here for 

air defense. Later, F-102s alternate with Navy AD-5Qs in 6- 

week tours of air defense duty. 

Operation moved to Clark Air 

Base in May 1963. 

April . . . . . . . . Detachment 3. Pacific Air Rescue Center. established. 

May . . . . . . . . Mule Train and Ranch Hand 

C-123s consolidated under 

Tactical Air Force Transport 

Squadron Provisional-2. 

Two RB-57s on temporary duty 

from Japan. 

June . . . . . . . . Detachment 7. 13th Air Force, renamed Headquarters 2d Advanced Echelon. 

September . . . . Headquarters 6492d Combat 

Cargo Group (Troop Carrier) 

organized and attached to the 

315th Air Division (Japan). 

October . . . . . . 2d Air Division replaces 2d Advanced Echelon. 

December . . . . . Headquarters 315th Troop Carrier Group (Assault) replaces 

6492d Combat Cargo Group. 

Able Mable Reconnaissance 

Task Force moves its four 

RF-101s here from Don 

Muang, Thailand. 

1963 January . . . . . . 

February . . . . . Brave Bull C-97 replaces C-54for 

reconnaissance. 

March . . . . . . . Two RF-101s added to Able 

Mable. 

293d Helicopter Squadron activated. 

413th Air Transport Squadron replaces 1st Transport Squadron. 

415th Air Transport Squadron replaces 2d Transport Squadron. 

21 1 th Helicopter Squadron 

(H-34s) replaces 1st Helicopter 

Squadron. 

112th Liaison Squadron (L-19s) 

replaces 2d Liaison Squadron. 

Moves to Bien Hoa in June 

1964. 

277 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

USAF 

April 13th Reconnaissance Technical 

Squadron activated. 

July Tactical Group organized. 

Detachment I consolidates all 

reconnaissance units under its 

control. 

309th and (old 776th Troop 

Carrier Squadron) Troop Carrier Squadrons activated under the 315th Troop Carrier 

Group. Tactical Air Force 

Transport Squadron Provisional-2 discontinued. 

December 

January 

April Able contingent increased 

to ten 

619th Tactical Control Squadron 

organized. 

June Detachment Air Refueling Squadron, arrives from 

for Yankee Team 

operations. 

August Air Division Command Post 

established. 

Six deploy here from 

Six Able 

19th Air Commando Squadron 

(Troop Carrier) activated under the 315th Troop Carrier 

Group. Assigned C-123s. 

October 

December gunship used in combat 

for the first time. 

6th Composite Reconnaissance 

Squadron formed. and 

assigned. 

Tactical Incorporates all of the above squadrons. 

716th Reconnaissance Squadron 

inactivated. Pilots retrain for 

new 520th Fighter Squadron 

Mission assumed 

by Air Division. 

Helicopter Squadron inactivated. 

! 
II. THAlLAND 

Don Muang Airport 

(Thailand) 

1961 April .Control and Reporting Center 

and a Control and Reporting 

Post set up. 

Bell Tone Detachment (four F102s) of the 509th Fighter Interceptor Squadron moved 

here for indefinite duration. 

November Able Mable Reconnaissance 

Task Force formed, consisting 

of four RF-101s and a Photo 

Processing Cell. 

Detachment 10, 13th Air Force, 

established to support USAF 

units. 

Detachment I, 5th Tactical Control Group. organized. 

1962 June Four C-123s arrive here from Da 

Nang's 777th Troop Carrier 

Squadron. 

Air Force Component Command of Joint Task Force I16 

deploys here. 

July Detachment 10, 13th Air Force, 

replaced by 6010th Tactical 

Group (13th Air Force). 

November Able Mable discontinues Laos 

flights. Continues coverage in 

South Vietnam. 

December Joint Task Force I16 inactivated. 

Detachment I, 8th Aerial Port 

Squadron, organized. 

Able Mable moves to Tan Son 

Nhut. 

1963 July 6010th Tactical Group redesignated 35th Tactical Group. 

Bell Tone Detachment redesignated Detachment 4, 405th 

Fighter Wing. 

35th Air Base Squadron (35th 

Tactical Group) organized. 

219 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

1964 July Detachment of Reconnaissance- Squadron (C-130s) 

arrives. 

1965 January 35th Tactical Group relieved of 

responsibility for air defense. 

It goes to Udorn Royal Thai 

Air Force Base. 

Korat Royal Thai Air 

Force Base 

1963 July Detachment I. 6010th Tactical 

Group (Don Muang) organized. 

1964 August F-105s from McConnell Air 

Force Base begin rotational 

temporary duty here. 

October F-100s deployed here temporarily. 

Takhli Royal Thai Air 

Force Base 

1962 May F-100s from Cannon and England 

Air Force Bases begin rotational temporary duty here. 

July 6011th Air Base Squadron 

organized. 

1963 July 331st Air Base Squadron (35th 

Tactical Group) replaces 

Air Base Squadron. 

1964 August Detachment I. 421st Air Refueling Squadron, organized. 

Udorn Royal Thai 

Air Force Base 

1964 April Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Wing, established with four 

T-28s to train the Royal Laotian Air Force. 

June Detachment 2, 35th Tactical 

Group (Don Muang), organized. 

July. A Control and Reporting Post 

and an Air Support Operations Center established. 

August Deputy Commander. 2d Air Divi280 
assumes control of all 

USAF operations in Thailand 

and Laos. 

October Detachment 35th Tactical 

Group. becomes Air 

Base Squadron. 

January 

assumes responsibility 

for Thai air defense from Don 
I 
Development of a Viet Antiaircraft Capability 

By Ronald Cole 

During the first three years of the war, the Viet grew accustomed to 

their reputation for superior mobility over forces. In the fall of 

however, the Vietnamese Air Force introduced and close air support 

operations that temporarily jarred Viet complacency. The effectiveness of 

the South air strikes resulted in the Viet sagging morale, 

rising fear, and suspicion of spies in their midst. Defections occurred and the Viet 

had to recruit arduously among the peasants to maintain their forces. Steps 

to counter the air threat intensified at once. As a stopgap, the Viet 

instructed their soldiers to shoot directly at the fuselage of the enemy aircraft with 

any gun at hand or hurl a “flying 

Among the Viet only those and North Vietnamese Army 

cadres who had infiltrated south after had any semblance of antiaircraft 

training. Thus, the visceral reaction of Viet officers and noncommissioned 

officers to South Vietnamese air operations in September was to order their 

men “to shoot aircraft flying straight’ and to fire “liberally and with all available 

means.” The training of gunners and the drafting of field manuals took time. 

Nonetheless, during the winter of Hanoi worked feverishly to develop 

antiaircraft tactics for infantry weapons that could be instantly used by men in 

the field. Programs to train inexperienced soldiers in the basics of antiaircraft 

warfare were also BEGUN Still, it was not until the end of that the Viet 

had an effective antiaircraft capability. 

In October Viet provincial committees distributed to district and 

village troops the first detailed antiaircraft directive. The document depicted the 

vulnerable points on South Vietnamese fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and 

helicopters. It further outlined procedures for organizing antiaircraft personnel 

and firing commands, and methods of shooting at aircraft with infantry 

weapons. 

In a section entitled “Nature of an Objective in the Air,” the directive 

explained how to gauge the target size of an aircraft by its shape and angle of 

approach. For example, “At we only see the aircraft nose. Target size At 

30” we can see the wing and the fuselage, equal in size. Target size At 50” the 

wings seem longer than the fuselage. Target size At we see the entire 

aircraft, or target size directive described the average fighter plane used 

*Ronald Cole. “People’s Army Phase manuscript. September Chapter IO. 

A “flying bomb” was a modified shell OR a U.S. aircraft rocket, filled with napalm and hurled at 

Office of Air Force History files, based primarily on USAF intelligence materials. 

enemy planes by means of a slingshot utilizing two bamboo trees. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

by the South Vietnamese in late 1962 as about I3 meters long, and flying at 200 

kilometers-per-hour at an altitude of 150 to 200 meters. Since the aircraft was 

therefore vulnerable to rifle and machinegun fire, a formula was devised for 

computing a firing lead. 

The Viet Cong taught their trainees both “passive” and “active” antiaircraft 

tactics. Passive tactics consisted of camouflage, spiked landing zones, and “sentinel chambers.” For camouflage the Viet Cong used dirty brown netting, natural 

cover, and concealment. To spike a possible landing zone they planted pointed 

bamboo shafts, 2 to 4 inches in diameter and 6 to 15 feet high, very close together 

in areas as large as 100 by 800 meters. The Viet Cong dug conical holes 5 feet into 

the ground with their walls slanted down at 50° for sentinel chambers. These 

echo chambers permitted a sentinel to hear an aircraft approaching from a great 

distance and to determine its direction of approach. 

Active antiaircraft tactics included mortar assaults on landing zones, infantry charges against unloading helicopters, and the “three-man cell tecniques.” In 

the latter method riflemen formed three 3-man cells arrayed in an L-shaped 

configuration with three machinegun teams. The machinegunners positioned 

themselves at the two ends and at the junction of the “L.” (See Chart.) The 

riflemen and machinegunners practiced synchronized firing in this formation, 

which was specially designed to down fixed-wing aircraft. By December 1964 

U.S. and South Vietnamese pilots had not yet assessed the success of this 

formidable-looking technique, since the number of Viet Cong antiaircraft 

attacks fluctuated monthly from 20 to 100. 

DIAGRAM OF OW TRIANGULAR DEFENSE SYSTEM 

CELL 

and RIFLES 

* FIRES ARE COORDINATED ON COMMAND OF TEAM LEADER. 

ONE CELL MAY BE DESIGNATED AS DECOY TO DRAW AIRCRAFT 

FIRE AND ALLOW AA GUN CREW TO DISENGAGE. 

284 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

The Viet Cong constructed their first antiaircraft weapons training center in 

Quang Ngai Province. Aerial reconnaissance revealed that this site probably 

offered instruction in aircraft recognition, techniques of fire, calculation of firing 

leads, preparation of antiaircraft sites, drills in the use of these sites, and basic 

tactical formations for use against South Vietnamese heliborne operations. One 

major difficulty persisted - the scarcity of antiaircraft weaponry. 

The Viet Cong began to receive more sophisticated antiaircraft weapons 

from Hanoi in the fall of 1963. Infiltrators brought with them 12.7-mm (Soviet 

DSHK) and .50-caliber machineguns. In addition reports reached Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, of 20-mm cannon and 13.2-mm machineguns in 

War Zone D, and of a 35-mm antiaircraft gun in Kien Phong Province. 

Moreover, in April 1964 MACV J-2 (Intelligence) anticipated the early arrival of 

two new antiaircraft weapons from Hanoi, the 37-mm gun weighing 4,600 

pounds and the 40-mm gun weighing 10,000. Within months the impact of this 

influx in weapons was felt. 

Records of antiaircraft attacks commenced in January 1963. Monthly 

incidents remained low throughout 1963, rose to about 100 in January 1964, and 

tapered off to only 50 in March 1964. The number then climbed to more than I80 

for April 1964, and the average over the next six months was at least 180 - the 

greatest number for any one month being nearly 400 in September 1964. After 

April 1964 the correlation of increased antiaircraft attacks and the quantity of 

antiaircraft weapons available to Viet Cong gunners is obvious. (See Graph.) 

400 

50 

300 

50 

200 

50 

100 

50 

0 

RVN COUNTRYWIDE TOTALS 

VC ANTIAIRCRAFT INCIDENTS 

JAW FEB MAR APR MAY JUW JUL AUG SEP OCT WOW DEC JAW FEB MAR API MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT 

1963 1964 

285 
I 
tes 

Chapter I 

Origins of the American Commitment to Vietnam 

I. Grateful acknowledgement is made of the 

help furnished by Mr. Charles B. MacDonald of 

the Army’s Center of Military History on the 

background of the American involvement in 

Vietnam. The literature on the roots of the 

American commitment to Southeast Asia is 

extensive, but see especially Cordell Hull, The 

Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948). II, 

1596-77; The Public Papers and Addresses of 

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Victory and the Threshold of Peace (New York. 1950). pp562-63; Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services 

and the Committee on Foreign Relations, US 

Senate, Military Situation in the Far East. 82d 

Cong. Ist sess (Washington. 1951).pt 4,pp 1890- 

92; US Dept of State. The Conference at Malta 

and Yalta (Washington, 1955). p 770. See also 

John L. Gaddis. The United States and the 

Origins of the Cold War, 1941-45 (New York, 

1972). 

2. Ellen Hammer. The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, 1954). and Joseph Buttinger, 

Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York, 

1967). are especially helpful on the events in 

Southeast Asia during World War II and after. 

3. Hull, Memoirs. II, 1598; Terminal Conf 

Papers and Minutes of Meetings, July 1945, pp 

217-26. 252-53, and 305; Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French U.S. Army in World War II 

(Washington, 1957). pp 396-99; Supreme Allied 

Commander Southeast Asia, Dispatch, pt IV-A, 

pp 520-28; Charles de Gaulle. The War Memoirs 

of Charles de Gaulle (New York. 1960). III, 

242-43. 

4. See msg, Dean Acheson to charge in 

China, October 5. 1947. in Department of 

Defense The Pentagon Papers), United StatesVietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington, 

1971), Bk 8:49 [hereafter cited as DOD Pentagon Papers]. 

5. Ibid., pp 144-49; William C. Bullitt, “The 

Saddest War.” Life, Dec 29, 1947, pp 64-69; 

Allan B. Cole, ed, Conflicts in Indo-China and 

International Repercussions: A Documentary 

History, 1945-1955 (Ithaca, 1956). pp 83-84. 

6. Military Assistance Command Vietnam 

Historical Monograph, Military Assistance io 

the Republic of South Vietnam, 1960-1963, p 2. 

7. 63 Statutes 714, Oct 6. 1949 Hearings 

Held in Executive Session before the Committee 

on Foreign Relations. US Senate, Economic 

Assistance to China and Korea: 1949-50 

(Washington, 1974). p 194. 

8. US Dept of State. American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955 (Washington, 1957). pp 2364-65; 

DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk I: II, A-17, A-35, 

A-36; see also Dean Acheson, Present at the 

Creation: My Years in the State Department 

(New York. 1967), pp 671-78. 

9. HQ USAF, Air Order of Battle, Apr I, 

1950; USAF Air Intelligence Digest, Apr 52. p4. 

10, Memo, Gen. Omar N. Bradley to SECDEF, Apr 10, 1950; msg. Acheson to AmEmb 

London. May 3, 1950; Dept of State Press 

Release 485, Aid to Southeast Asia, May II. 

1950; all in DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 8: 308- 

13.321, and 327. 

I I. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S 

Truman. 1950 (Washington, 1965). p 492. 

12. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed 

Services. US Senate. Mutual Security Act of 

1951.82d Cong, 1st sess (Washington. 1951). pp 

563-64; Edgar O’Ballance. The Indochina War, 

1945-1954: A Study in Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1964). p 114; hist, 1020th USAF Special 

Activities Wg, Apr-Jun 52. 

13. Study Submitted by the Subcommittee 

on National Security Staffing and Operations. 

The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination, 88th Cong, 1st sess (Senate Document 36) 

(Washington. 1963). pp 12. 14-15. and 53-58. 

14. U.S. Dept of State, U.S. Treaties and 

Other International Agreemenis (Washington, 

1952). III, pt 2, 2756-99. 

15. USAF Air Intelligence Digest, Apr52,pp 

6-7, Maurer Maurer. History of USAF Activities in Support of the Mutual Defense Assisitance Program (Wright-Patterson AFB: AMC 

Hist Office. I95 I). pt I, pp 52-53, pt 2, pp 64-65. 

80-8 1, and pt 3.. pp 138-39. 

16. Ibid., pt 3, p 261: US Senate, Mutual 

Security Act of 1951. 82d Cong. 1st sess, p 564. 

17. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S 

Truman, 1951 (Washington. 1965). p 267. 

18. USA F Air lntelligence Digest. Jun 54. pp 

14-17: Presentation of Lt Col R. E. Edwards, 

Chief Materiel Branch, MAAG Vietnam, in 

Rprt Asian-MAP Logistic Conference, Dec 58. 

pp 154-60 Capt Mack D. Second. “The Viet 

Nam Air Force,” Air University Review, NovDec 63, pp 60-61; Maj Oakah L. Jones, Jr.. 

Organization, Mission and Growth of the Vietnamese Air Force, 1949-68 (HQ PACAF. Proj 

19. Ltr. Brig Gen T. J. H. Trapnell. Chief. 

MAAG-Indochina. to Gen J. Lawton Collins. 

CSA. Dec 20. 1952, in DOD Pentagon Papers, 

CHECO. Oct 8, 1968). pp 1-3. 

287 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 

9: 24th Air Depot 

p and 7; 

Digest. p I. 

24th Air Depot 

and 

Intel Sum, 

Harry Truman, Memoirs: of 

Hope (Garden City. 1956). p 

Chapter I1 

I. Dwight Eisenhower, The White House 

Years: for Change, (Garden 

City. 337-38; U.S. of State, 

American Foreign Policy, p 

Report of Senator Mike on a 

Study Mission to the Associated States of Indochina, 

(Washington, 1943). p 4: 

Paris, Mar in Pentagon 

Papers. 9: 

USAF Air Intelligence 

MR by Douglas 

in DOD Pentagon Papers. 9: 38: US 

of State. American Foreign Policy, 

2369-70; hist, 24th Air Depot Janand 8: History of Project 

Swivel Chair. In response to a request made by 

the Thai Ambassador to in May, emergency air shipments of ammunition and other 

urgently needed items were rushed to Bangkok. 

U.S. of State, American Foreign Policy. 

de 

(Paris, 

Hist. USAF. 

Lt Gen John to 

CINCPAC), in DOD Pentagon papers. 9: 69-96; hist, 315th Air 

(Combat Cargo), 

Hist, Asst for Mutual Security, USAF. 

45-46: USAF Statistical Summary p 

of State. American Foreign POLICY 

2370-72; Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, The Mutual Security Act of 

(Washington, 1954). 6-7; Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, 

US Senate, Mutual Security Appropriations for 

84th (Washington, p 

67; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p 338; 

memo. Bradley for I I, in 

DOD Pentagon Papers. 9: 

to 1953; hist, 

Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, p 

and Brig Gen 

Albert Vice Far East Air 

Logistics Force, to 

10. de 

I I. 315th Air French Indo-China Participation. hist. Plans. USAF. JanI?. Intel Roundup. 

Hist, Asst for Mutual Security, USAF. 

25-26; note by the Executive 

Secretary the National Security Council. Jan 

and memo by Brig Gen C. BonesIII Jan in DOD 

Pentagon Papers. 9: I8 and 240-44; 

to 10. 1954; Col Robert 

LILES to Hist 

1954: Staff Section Monthly Hist 

Feb 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe established an 

accelerated training program for French 

crews and mechanics in France, and in June, the 

French would allocate an additional technicians to Vietnam. to 

1954; hist, Plans. USAF. 

hist. Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, 

p 145; Liles to Hist 

1954: HQ 6424th Air Depot 

Support to the French Air Force, Feb 

1954; Public Papers of the Presidents; 

Dwight Eisenhower, (Washington, 

1960). p 

"Interview with Gen Otto 

Can Air Power Win 'Little Wars?". U.S. 

World Report, 54-61; flight 

with by Ken 

Capt Robert Hickey and 

Robert Floyd to Mar 

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change. 339; 

de 

and 217: to Feb in 

DOD Pentagon papers, 9: 248; USAF Air 

Intelligence Digest, Mar p I I. 

John Robinson John Foster 

(New 204-06: U.S. 

State, American Foreign policy, 
Notes to Pages 18-26 

1955, pp 2372-73. See also Khrushchev Remembers (Boston, 1970). pp 481-82, for an assessment that Ho was acting in desperation early in 

1954 because China was too weak to help him. 

19. Navarre, L‘Agonie de I’lndochine, p 218; 

Dep/ Intel, 13th AF. IR-29-54, Jul 19, 1954; Air 

Attache Saigon. IR-142-54, Jul 9, 1954; Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

House of Representatives, The Mutual Security 

Act of 1954. 83d Cong, 2d sess (Washington, 

1954). pp 9, 15. 18, 20. 

20. Hist, 483d TC Wg, Jan-Jun 54, p 36; see 

also FEAF Intel Roundup, Jun 54, p 40. 

21. Air Attache Saigon. IR-56-54. Mar 23, 

1954; Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: 

Insurgency in Indochina, 1946-1963. 3d rev ed 

(Harrisburg, 1963). p 317. 

22. Rprt, Lt Col William B. Sanders, Combat Ops Div. FEAF, to Dep, Ops, FEAF, Jun 

14, 1954; msg, Chief MAAG Saigon to Comdr 

FEAF. MG-650-D-I, Mar 18. 1954; msg, 

Comdr FEAF to Chief MAAG Saigon. n.d.; 

315th Air Div (Combat Cargo), French IndoChina Participation. pp 17-18. 

23. Hist. 315th Air Div (Combat Cargo), 

Jan-Jun 54, pp 2627; Dep/Intel, 13th AF, 1R29-54, Jul 19, 1954. The expenditure of parachutes and other drop equipment nearly depleted USAF stocks in Japan, and emergency 

shipments had to come from the United States. 

24. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p 341. 

25.Ibid.; Jules Roy, The Battle of Dienbienphu (New York, 1965). p 155; hist, Dir/Plans, 

USAF, Jan-Jun 54, pp 90-92; Gen M. B. Ridgway, Soldier (New York, 1956), p 276. 

26. Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu, pp 194-95, 

and 198, Eisenhower, Mandare for Change, p 345. 

27. Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu, pp 214-15; 

Navarre, LYgonie de I‘lndochine. p 244; Fall. 

Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien 

Bien Phu (Philadelphia, 1967), p 299; FEAF 

Intel Roundup, Apr-May 54, pp 22 and 24. 

28. Msg, Air Dep SHAPE to ClNCUSAFE. 

RL-I 172, Apr 3, 1954; msg, ClNCUSAFE to 

Comdr 17AF,etal., ECINC-1616-C,Apr3.1954. 

29. Hist, USAFE, Jan-Jun 54,III, App VI1B; 

hist, 62d TC Wg. Jan-Jun 54; hist. Asst for 

Mutual Security, USAF. Jan-Jun 54. p 148. 

30. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place. p 302; 

Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu, pp 22 1-22, 

3 I. Dept of State, Vital Speeches of the Day. 

Apr 15. 1954. p 387. 

32. Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony 

Eden Full Circle (Boston, 1960). pp 102-03. 

33. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p 347; 

Beal. John Foster Dulles, pp 20648. 

34. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change, p 347. 

35. House of Representatives, The Mutual 

Security Act of I954.83d Cong, 2d sess, pp 9. 15, 

18, and 20; Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu. p 224. 

36. Hist. Dir/Ops, USAF, Jan-Jun 54. 

37. Fall, Hellina Very Small Place, pp 303-04. 

38. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p 347; 

Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, 1960) pp 382-83. 

39. Stf study, FEAF, To Recommend a Feasible Military Course of Action to Achieve U.S. 

Objectives in Indo-China, Apr 13, 1954. 

40. Study, Apr 19, 1954, in Hist, Dir/Plans. 

USAF, Jan-Jun 54. pp 90-92. 

41. Ridgway, Soldier, pp 176-277; Gavin, 

“Letter to Editors.” Harpers Magazine. Feb 66, 

pp 16-21; Hearings before the Committee on 

Foreign Relations, US Senate, Supplemental 

Foreign Assistance Fiscal Year 1966 - Vietnam. 89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1966). pt 

42. Hist, Asst for Mutual Security. Jan-Jun 

54, pp 14243. and 146; Itr, Liles for Historian 

FEALOGFOR. Jul 15, 1954; Itr, Vice Adm 

Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret), Dir/Naval Hist. 

to Brig Gen B. S. Gunderson. Ch/Af Hist. Dec 

20, 1972; Hist. Summary, Armament Div. Dep 

for Materiel, FEAF, Apr 54. 

43. Hist, Dir/ Rqmts, FEAF, Apr 54, Tab C: 

Standard Operational Procedures for Use of 

Lazy Dog. 

44. Msg, FEAF to Chief MAAG Saigon. 

ADO-RQMTS-3551, Apr 7, 1954 msg, FEAF 

to Chief MAAG Saigon, ADO-CO&T-3768, 

Apr 15, 1954 rprt, Sanders to Dep/Ops, FEAF, 

Jun 14, 1954. Survivors of the campaign later 

reported that their Viet Minh captors had questioned them closely about the missiles. and one 

repatriated French officer stated that the “cigar 

shaped pellets” had been very effective. Dep/ 

Intel. 13AF. IR-29-54, Jul 19, 1954. 

45. Caldara had available for combat thirtytwo B-29s of the 98th Bombardment Wing at 

Yokota Air Base, Japan, and sixty-seven B-26s 

of the 307th Bombardment Wing at Kadena Air 

Base Okinawa. 

46. Ltr. Partridge to Navarre. Apr 19. 1954; 

MR by Maj Gen Joseph D. Caldara (USAF-Ret), 

Mar 8, 1966; Caldara to Gen Curtis E. LeMay. 

Apr 30 and May 3. 1954 Navarre, L’Agonie de 

I’lndochine. p 244. 

47. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change. pp 

349-50; Eden, Memoirs, p 116; msg. Geneva 

(Dulles) to State. DULTE-5, Apr 25, 1954. in 

DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 9: 388-89. 

48. Early in May, the American detachment 

of the 483d Troop Carrier Wing that maintained 

the C-I 19s at Cat Bi secured a Ground Control 

Approach radar, but it was not installed, and 

operations in the Hanoi area continued to be 

hazardous. Rprt, Sanders to Dep/Ops, FEAF. 

Jun 14. 1954. 

49. Rprt. Hewitt to SECDEF, Apr 6. 1954 

pp 44-45. 

I, pp 226, 234-35. 

289 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 26-34 

FEAF Intel Roundup. Aug 54, p 8; L. S. Waddell. 

“Phase Out for Charlie-One-One-Nine,” Pegasus, Oct 55. p 4; Itr, Maj Edward S. Ash, et a/, to 

Comdr 315th Air Div. subj: High Altitude 

Delayed Parabundle Drops, n.d. C-I 19 crews 

claimed they could put cargo pallets into a 330- 

yard square from 10,000 feet. but on April 27 

only one-third of the dropped supplies could be 

retrieved. French and American cargo-dropping 

aircrews agreed that escorting flak suppression 

flights operated too high to be effectiveand were 

frequently absent when needed. In April the 483d 

Troop Carrier Wing had flak damage to nineteen C-I 19s while flying 477 sorties to deliver 

supplies to Dien Bien Phu. Hist, 483d TC Wg. 

Place, pp 328.336-37.373-74; Corey Ford.”The 

Flying Tigers Carry On.” Saturday Evening 

Post, Feb pp 24 ff. and Feb 12. 1955. pp 

30 ff. 

Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place, pp 374- 

431-32.487. 

CHAPTER III 

The Geneva Agreements and French Withdrawal 

I. Navarre, L’Agonie de I’lndochine. pp 268- 

69; Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La 

Fin d’une Guerre, Indochine 1954 (Paris, 1960), 

pp 162-63; msg. Comdr FEAF to Comdr 

FEALOGFOR, ca. May 13, 1954, quoting msg 

from USAIRA Saigon, May 13, 1954. 

2. Msg. C l N C P A C t o C O M S E A D E F C O M , 

Apr 28. 1954; CINCPAC OPlan 56-54, Apr 29, 

1954. 

3. Msgs, Comdr FEAF to CSAF. May 4, 

1954. May 20, 1954, and Jun 7, 1954. 

4. Memos. Radford for SECDEF. May 20, 

May 21. and May 26, 1954, in DOD Pentagon 

Papers, Bk IO: 477-82 and 487-93. 

5. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p 361. 

6. Fall. Street Without Joy, pp 169-230 

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p 368; Eden 

Memoirs. p 149; Public Papers of the Presidents: 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp 599-600. 

7. Lacouture and Devillers, La Fin d’Une 

Guerre, pp 252-68; Amry Vandenbosch and 

Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia among the 

World Powers (Lexington, 1957). pp 295-97; 

Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America 

in Vietnam(NewYork, 1970),pp90-91. See also 

Robert P. Randle. Geneva 1954: The Settlement 

of the Indochinese War (Princeton. 1969). pp 

371-85. 

8. Lacouture and Devillers, La Fin d’Une 

Guerre, pp 252-68; Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. United States Policy Toward Asia, 

89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1966). pt 2, pp 

398-99. In its final form, the Geneva agreements 

comprised separate military accords for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, an unsigned final 

declaration of the nations represented at Geneva, 

and several unilateral national declarations, 

9. Peter V. Curl, ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955). 

pp 283-310; Lacouture and Devillers, La Fin 

d’Une Guerre. pp 276-82. 

IO. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp 

370-71; Curl, Documents. pp 315-17. 

I I. Msg, Comdr FEAF to Comdr 

FEALOGFOR. et al, V-DOO-238. ca. May 13. 

1954. 

12. Dir/Hist Services, FEAF. Far East Air 

Forces Support of French Indo-China Operations. Jul I. 1952-Sep 30, 1954, pp 162-71. 294- 

302. Guerrillas o n J u n e 14 captured five enlisted 

men who were illicitly beyond the airfield 

perimeter and held them prisoner until 

August 

Security, USAF, Jul-Dec 54. pp 23-24; FEAF 

Staff Section Monthly Hist Rprts. Dep/Ops, 

Jul-Dec 54; hist. Curr Ops Div, Aug and Sep 54; 

Div(Combat Cargo). Jul-Dec 54, 

pp 32-47. 

14. Far East Forces Support of French IndoChina Operations, pp 239-48; Itr, Hooper to 

Gunderson, Dec 20, 1972. 

15. Far East Air Forces Support of French 

Indo-China Operations, pp 248-51. 270-74; US 

Dept of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950- 

1955. p 2399. 

16. Rprt, Hewitt to SECDEF. Apr 6, 1954. 

17. FEAF Intel Roundup, Aug 54. pp 

18. Gen G. J. M. Chassin. “Lessons of the 

War in Indochina,”Interavia. VI I ( 1952). 670-75. 

19. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change. pp 

372-73; Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1954. p 168. 

20. Lacoutre and Devillers, La Fin d’Une 

Guerre, pp 298-99; USAF Air Intelligence 

Digest, Feb 55, pp 36-37; David Halberstam, 

The Making of a Quagmire (New York, 1965). 

pp 38-39. 

290 
Notes to Pages 35-40 

view with Gen J. Lawton Collins: What We're 

Doing in Indo-China," U.S. News & World 

Report, Mar 4. 1955, pp 82-88; USA FAir Intelligence Digest. Feb 55. p 38. . 32. Hist, Asst for Mutual Security. USAF. 

Jan-Jun 55. pp 146-50; MACV. Military Assistance, pp 2-5; DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: 

IV.A.4.. 6. 

33. Memo. Col Edward G. Lansdale for SEA 

Subcommittee of the Draper Committee. Mar 

13. 1959: US Air Force Academy Oral History 

Program, intvw with Maj Gen Edward Lansdale. 

Apr25, 1971; Edward G. Lansdale. In the Midst 

of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast 

Asia (New York. 1972). 

34. IR-163-55. AIRA Saigon, Oct 21. 1955; 

US Dept of State, American Foreign Policy. 

Current Documents, 1956 (Washington, 1959). 

pp 859-63; Hearings before the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 

Mutual Security Act of 1955.84th Cong. I st sess 

(Washington, 1955). pp 190-9 I. 

35. HQ CINCPAC. Record, Second 

SECDEF Conference, Jan 15. 1962. Item 5; 

DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: IV.A.4.. 22-23. 

36. Dep/Ops. PAF. A Pacijic Air Force 

Staff/ Study on MDA P Air Force Objectives for 

Title III Countries in the Pacific Command. 

Sep 55. 

37. [bid. 

38. Memo, Twining for SECDEF, Sep 9. 

1955, in DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 10: 1002-15. 

39. Dept of State, American Foreign Policy): 

1950-1955, p 2404; Cole, Conflict in Indo-China. 

40. Hist, Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec 55. 

41. Ibid.: DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: 

IV.A.4., 20. 

42. Hist. Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec 55, 

pp 81-84; "Why the US is Losing in VietnamAn Inside Story, Interview with Former Chief 

US Military Advisor, Lt Gen Samuel T. 

Williams (Ret)." U.S. News & World Report. 

43. Ibid.; Hearings before a Subcommittee of 

the Committee on Government Operations. 

House of Representatives, Foreign Aid Conslruction Projects. 85th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1958). pp 872-73. 

44. U.S. News & World Report, Nov 9, 1964, 

pp 63-64; memo. Capt B. A. Robbins. Jr.. USN. 

May 10. 1957, in DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 10: 

1 106-07; USAF Journal of Mutual Security, X 

(Jul I. 1957). 128. and XI (Nov I. 1957). 117. 

45. Memo. SECDEF for SA. et al, Jul 16, 

1956. and Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy in 

Mainland Southeast Asia, Sep 5. 1956. in DOD 

Pentagon Papers, Bk 10: 1064. 1082-95. 

pp 226-27. 

pp 81-84. 

NOV 9. 1964. pp 62-63. 

21. Ho."Appeal Made."Jul22. 1954,quoted 

in Bernard B. Fall. ed. Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York. 1967). p 272. 

22. Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1954. p 168; Dept. of State. American 

Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, pp 2400-0 I. 

23. Statement of Policy by the National 

Security Council on Review of U.S. Policy in the 

Far East. Aug 20, 1954. in DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 731-41. 

24. Curl. Documents, 1954. pp 319-23; Dept 

of State. American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. 

pp 2334-37; FEAF Intel Roundup, Jan 66. pp 

12-13, and Apr 55, p 25; hists. Dir/ Plans, 

USAF. Jul-Dec 54, pp 57-59. and Jul-Dec 56, pp 

138-39; Dep/Ops. Pacific AF. A Pacific Air 

Force Staff Study, Sep 55. in hist PAF, Jul-Dec 

55. pt II, Doc 21: Statement of Policy by the 

National Security Council on Review of U.S. 

Policy in the Far East, Aug 20, 1954. 

25. Ltrs. Dulles to Charles E. Wilson. 

SECDEF, Aug 18 and Oct II. 1954; memos. 

Twining for SECDEF. Aug 4. 1954, and Radford for SECDEF, Sep 22. 1954, and Oct 19. 

1954, in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 70 1-02, 

728-30. 756-58. 768-89. and 771-74. 

26. MACV, Military Assistance. pp 2-5; hist. 

Dir/ Plans. USAF, Jul-Dec 54, pp 62-65; memo, 

Radford for SECDEF. Sep 22, 1954, in DOD 

Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 756-58. 

27. Ltr. Dulles to Wilson, Aug 18, 1954. in 

DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 728-30: MACV, 

Military Assistance to the Republic of South 

Vietnam. pp 2-5; Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and 

Public Affairs of the Committee on Foreign 

Relations. US Senate, Situation in Viernam. 

86th Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1959). pt I. 

p 49; Robert Scigliano. South Vietnam: Nation 

under Stress (Boston, 1964). pp 162-67. 

28. Hist, Dir/Plans. USAF. Jul-Dec 54, 

pp 62-25; memo, Radford for SECDEF. Oct 19, 

1954, in DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 768-74; 

see also DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk I: IV.A.4.. 

29. Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1954, pp 948-49; R. Frank Futrell. 

"Chronology of Significant Airpower Events in 

Southeast Asia. 1954-1967," Aerospace Studies 

Institute. Air University; Journal of Military 

Assistance, 1954, 

30. Statement of Policy by the National 

Security Council on Current U.S. Policy in the 

Far East, Dec 22, 1954, in DOD Pentagon 

Papers. Bk IO: 835-52; Public Papers of the 

Presidents: Eisenhower, 1954. pp 948-49; Dept 

of State, American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. 

p 2403; hists, FEAF Dep/Intel. Jan 55. w/incl. 

and Feb 55, w/incl. 

3 I. Curl, Documents, 1954. pp 237-38; "lnter3-6. 

29 I 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 

Chapter 

U.S. Command Problems in the PACIFIC Emphasis on Southeast Asia 

Gen. and Control 

in Asia-Pacific Area.” Lecture to Air War College. Mar 

Hist, USAF. p 

and 32-33: hist. 

to 

hist. I. Doc 

10 to I I. 

Hist. III. Hist 

and Policy. Feb 55; hist. Janand 

MAP Logistics 

Hist. chap I: 

AM I. 

to 

Hist, 

Doc 25: hist 

Doc Feb 

Hist. 35: hist. 

Rear. III Doc 10 

Title Logistic 

Jan 7-May IO. and 

10. “Command and Control in AsiaPacific Area.” 

I. IBID hist. PACAF/FEAF Rear, 

96-97; hist. Plans. USAF. JanDir/Plans, USAF. 

and and p 10 

hist. PACAF/FEAF Rear, II, 

“Command and Control in the 

Asia-Pacific Area”: to 

I I. in Hist. II, 

Chap Docs and 4: hist. Plans. USAF, 

and 56: hist, 

(Rear). I, I. 

Study 1956) in 

File. Theater Reorganization. Component 

Commanders’ Recommendations. 

(Rear). 

II, and USAF, 

CINCPAC 1957; 

Final (Air Attache Air AttacheI-C-6 and 

Slightly different from the others and 

later introduced into Vietnam was the model in 

Taiwan. On March the headquarters of 

the Taiwan Defense Command and of the 

on April I. Maj. 

Gen. Fred took command of Air Task 

Force He also became Chief. Air Force Section. Taiwan Defense Command and Military 

Advisory Group. Thus theadvisory functions of 

the Air Force Section and the operational functions of Air Task Force came under a single 

though separate command channels were preserved for the two functions. Jacob 

Van Air Operartions in the Taiwan 

Crisis USAF Historical Division Liaison Office. I I I3 

and p and 

13th 

Hist. (Rear). 

I. I; “The Pacific Air Forces.” Air 

Force 57). p hist. USAF. 

p to I I. 

1955: hist, III 522-27: 

Smith to CINCPAC. The 

Air Link Exercise held at Bangkok in May 

of systems to meet requirements. and the exercise went poorly. Memo, Lt 

Col. A. Clark. of Staff Visit. 

in Hist, 5th III 99; hist, 

Air (Combat Cargo). 57: 

Asian-MAP Logistic 

Command Relations Concepts of 

in Hist. 

II: Final Air AttacheIntroduction. 

Hist, Dir/Plans. USAF. 

Robert Ideas, Concepts. DocTRINE A History of Basic THINKING in the United 

STATES Air Force, (Air University: 

Aerospace Studies Institute, I), I, 

Hist, Fifth 

Remarks of Lt Gen Smith, May 

in 101A; see also 

I, 146-51; Fifth Atomic 

Weapons in Limited Wars in Southeast Asia. 

1958; Smith. “Nuclear Weapons and 

Limited War,” Air QUARTERLY Review, 

XI I (Spring 

Hearings before the Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Appropriations, Representatives. Security Appropriations for 

(and Related Agencies), 86th 

(Washington, 1960). p 

Annual Report of the Secretary of 

Defense. to 

p 
Notes to Pages 46-53 

ton. 1960). pp 35-46: hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 58. 

I. Pt I. 172-75. 

25. CINCPAC hist. 1964. pp I and 3. 

26. Msg. PACAF to CSAF. PFCCS-61-7-3. 

Jul 12. 1961: hist. 315th Air Div (Combat 

Cargo). Jan-Jun 62. pp 53-54; George F. 

Lemmer. The Laos Crisis of 1959 (Office of Air 

Force History. 1961). pp 39-49. 

27. US Senate. Mutual Security Act of 1959. 

86th Cong. 1st sess, pt 1, pp 5. 10-1 I, and 19-20. 

28. NAMAP, Asian-MAP Logistics Conf, 

Dec 58. pp 45 1-53, 

29. NAMAP, 5th Asian-MAP Logistics 

Conf. Nov 59. pp 67-7 1. 

30. Ibid.. pp 69-71; NAMAP Asian-MAP 

Logistic Conf. Dec 58, pp 456-58; Lemmer, The 

Laos Crisis of 1959. pp 39-49: rprt. Air Vice 

Marshal Kamol Thejatunga. RTAF. and Maj 

Gen Thomas S. Moorman. USAF, to Ch/ 

SEATO Mil Plng Ofc. Mar 23. 1959. p 2. 

31. NAMAP. rprt of 5th Asian-MAP. Logistic Conf, Nov 59, p 353: hist. Asst for Mutual 

Security. USAF. Jan-Jun 60, n.p.. and Jan-Jun 

62. pp 35-36. 

32. Hist, AMFPA, Jul I, 1959-Mar 31, 1960. 

11, App 18. Dec 9. 1959: hist. PACAF, Jan-Jun 

60. Ill; PFMLP hists, Apr 60. w/atch, Apr 17. 

1960, and May 60. w/atch; Lt Col William G. 

Beno. “How to Improve the USAF Portion of 

the Military Assistance Program in Southeast 

Asia,” (Thesis. USAWC, Apr 60). 

33. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF 

Conf, Tab 15F: Country Force Imbalance: 

NAMAP. rprt of 5th Asian-MAP Logistic 

Conf, Nov 59. pp 53-58 and 61-62. 

34. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF 

Conf. Tab 15F: Country Force Imbalance; 

NAMAP. rprt of 5th Asian-MAP Logistic 

Conf. Nov 59, p 353. 

CHAPTER V 

Strained Civil-Military Relations in South Vietnam. 1957-1960 

I. DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2: IV.A.4.. 24- 

31; U.S. News & World Report, Nov 9. 1964, 

p 63: OASD-ISA, MAP. FY 1962-66. Sep I. 

1960. 

2. NAMAP. Asian-MAP Logistic Conf. Dec 

3. Hist. Dir/Plans. USAF. Jul-Dec 55, 

pp 62-65; hist, Asst for Mutual Security. USAF, 

Jan-Jun 55, pp 146-50; MACV, Military Assistance. pp 2-5: rprt. Collins for SECSTATE. Jan 

20, 1955, in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 865- 

84; U.S. News & World Report, Mar 4, 1955, 

4. Hists. Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, 

Jan-Jun 55. p 146. Jul-Dec 55. pp 33-34. JanJun 58. n.p.: DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 3: 

IV.B.3.. 125; AMFPA. Title III MDAP Logistic 

Conf. May 7-10, 1956, p 303: hist, PAF, JanJun 56. Ill. 527. 

5. IR-223-54. AlRA Saigon. Dec 15. 1954: 

IR-149-55. AlRA Saigon, Sep 15. 1955: VNAF. 

Welcome to Vietnam. pp 5-8; Secord. “The 

Viet-Nam Air Force, pp 60-61: FEAF Intel 

Roundup. Apr 55, pp 21-24; AMFPA Area Ill 

MAP Logistic Conf May 7-10. 1956.p 303, and 

Nov 14-19. 1956, p 314; rprt of Dep/Ops R&R 

Team to Comdr PAF. Jan 3. 1956: hist. Asst for 

Mutual Security. USAF, Jan-Jun 58, n.p. 

6. AMFPA. Area Ill MAP. Logistic Conf. 

Nov 14-19. 1956, p 312; NAMAP. Asian-MAP 

Logistic Conf, Dec 58, p 154; Itr. Maj Gen Sory 

58. pp 154-60. 

pp 82-88. 

Smith, Comdr PAF. to CINCPAC, Nov 27, 

1956: Robbins memo, May 15. 1957; hist, 

PACAF/FEAF Rear, Jan-Jun 57.11: Hist Sum, 

Dir/Plans and Policy. Apr 57; hist Asst for 

Mutual Security. USAF. Jan-Jun 57, App; 

USAF Journal of Mutual Security. X (Jul I, 

1957). 106. and (Aug I, 1957). 131. 

7. Background Paper on Vietnam. prepared 

by Maj William L. Nicholson, III, HQ PACAF. 

ca. Jan 62; Robbins memo. May 15. 1957. 

8. USAF Journal of Mutual Security. XI 

(Nov I. 1957). 131; NAMAP. Asian-MAP 

Logsitic Conf. Dec 58, pp 154-60: hist. Asst for 

Mutual Security. USAF. Jul-Dec 58. n.p.: 

PACAF Curr Intel Sum. Oct 23. 1959. p 9. 

9. USAF Summary of MDAP and Progress. 

No. 42, Dec 31, 1955. p 99; PACAF Base Development Plan, Jul 15. 1964, App 2, Tab G: rprt of 

Dep/Ops P&R Team to Comdr PAF. Jan 2. 

1956: USAF Journal of Mutual Security. VIII 

(Sep I. 1956), I37, and lX (Dec I. 1956). 104 and 

126. 

10. See Dept of State. American Foreign Policy, Current Documents. 1958. pp 120-1 2 l. 

I I. Cong Rec, May 9. 1968. pp 12615-16. 

12. Futrell”Chron”; rad, ClNCPAC to DIA. 

Mar 63; DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2: 24.43. 

13. Ibid., pp 68-70. 

14. Lemmer. The Laos Crisis of 1959, p 40; 

memo, JCS for Dep Asst SECDEF for NSC 

Affairs and Plans. Jul 14. 1959. in DOD 

293 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 53-59 

Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: I2 15; Hearings before 

the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, 

Mutual Serurity Appropriations for 1960 (and 

Related Agencies), 86th Cong. 1st sess (Washington, 1959). p 5 I 1. 

15. HQ MACV. “Infiltration Study,” Folder 

Vietnam. Nov 1-30. 1965, 69A-3853. box 34. 

16. Halberstam. Making. of a Quagmire. 

pp 63-64; msg, AmEmb Saigon to DA. 278. 

Mar 7, 1960. in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 

1260 Cong Rec. May 9, 1968, p 12616. 

17. Ibid. 

18. HQ MACV, Sum of Highlights, Feb 8, 

1962-Feb 7. 1963. p 21. 

19. Memo, Lansdale for Draper Committee, 

Mar 13, 1959; Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: 

Nation Under Stress (Boston, 1964). p 179; 

Williams “Interview”; CINCPAC Rcrd. Second 

SECDEF Conf. Jan 15, 1962, item 5A. 

20. MACV hist monograph, Military Assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam, pp 6-7, 

9-1 1. MACV, Sum of Highlights. Feb 8, 1962- 

Feb 7. 1963. pp 46-49; DOD Pentagon Papers. 

Bk 3: IV.B.3., 125. 

21. Msg. Lemnitzer to JCS, May 8. 1961; 

Journal of Mutual Assistance, Jun 61, 

22. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF 

Conf, Tab 6A; CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961. 

pp 172 and 174-75; Scigliano, South Vietnam, 

pp 164-65; USAF Journal of Mutual Serurity 

XIII (Dec 60). 149. See also msg. AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 276, Jan 4. 1961, in DOD 

Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 1357-59. 

23. Maj Gen Theodore R. Milton. “Air 

Power: Equalizer in Southeast Asia.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 63, p 4. 

24. USAF Journal of Mutual Security, XII 

(Sep 59). 164-55. 

25. PACAF Curr Intel Sum. Oct 23. 1959. 

pp 9-10 hist. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF, 

Jan-Jun 60, n.p.; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 60. III, 

Wkly Activities Rprts. PFMLP. May22-26and 

Oct 10-14. 1960; msg, CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 

13. 1963; PACAF Reference Book for Oct 8. 

1962, SECDEF Conf. Vietnam Sec. Tab 4. 

26. Hist. Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, 

Jul-Dec 60, n.p.; hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 61. III, 

Wkly Activities Rprt. PFMLP, Feb 27-Mar 3, 

1961. 

27. Rprt of USAF Asian MAP Logistics 

Confs, Nov 1-3. 1960, pp 254-55. hist. PACAF, 

Jul-Dec61. Ill; Wkly Activities Rprts. PFMLP. 

Jul 24-28 and Sep 18-22, 1961; rprt, Col Edwin 

A. Schneider, Asst for MAP, PACAF, to 

CINCPACAF, Oct 25, 1961. 

28.Ibid.; intvw w/Capt Donald V. MacKellar 

by J. W. Grainger. Aug 29. 1963; msg. 2d 

ADVON to PACAF. Jan 13. 1962: telephone 

conversation. Futrell and Col Harvey Brown. 

USAF (Ret), Sep 28. 1972. 

29. US Senate. Mutual Security Appropriations for 1960, 86th Cong, 1st sess, p 516: see 

also Operations Coordinating Board. Rprt on 

Southeast Asia, Aug 12, 1959, and 68-2- 

59, The Situation in Laos. Sep 18. 1959, in DOD 

Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 1238-39, 1242-47. 

30. “Declaration on Granting Independence 

to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” Khrushchev 

in New York (New York, 1961). p 90; Hearing 

before the Subcommittee to Investigate the 

Administration of the Internal Security Act and 

Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the 

Judiciary, US Senate, Analysis of the 

Khrushchev Speech of January 6. 1961, 87th 

Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1961). pp 64-65, 

77-78. 

31. Cong Rec, May9. 1968,p 12617; MACV 

hist monograph. Military Assistance to the 

Republic of South Vietnam, pp 9-1 I; Douglas 

Pike. Vier Cong: The Organization and Techniques of National Liberation Front of South 

Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). p 79. 

32. USAF Journal of Mutual Assistance. 

Xlll (Dec 60). 149; Buttinger, Vietnam, II, 990. 

33. Arthur F. Schlesinger. Jr.. A Thousand 

Days (Boston, 1965). p 450; Robert Shaplen. 

The Lost Revolution (New York, 1965), p 149; 

Maj William L. Nicholson. III, Background 

Paper on Vietnam, ca. Jan 62; Schneider rprt: 

Presentation by Gen Moorman before Congressional Committee. 1. 1-1 I; hist, 13th AF, Jul-Dec 

61. I. 107-09; Intelligence Estimate. SVN. ca. Oct 

I. 1961. in Hist. 2d ADVON. Nov61-0ct 62, 1. 

Doc 15. 

34. Cong Rec, May 9, 1968. pp 12617-18: 

Pike, Vier Cong. passim: Douglas Pike, War, 

Peace. and the Vier Cong (Cambridge. Mass.. 

35. Presentation by Gen Moorman before 

Cong Committee. 1. Maj William L. 

Nicholson, III, Background Paper on Vietnam. 

ca. Jan 62; Schneider rprt. 

36. Arthur L. Dommen. Conflict in Laos: 

The Politics of Neutralization (New York. 1964). 

p 175; Fifth AF Wkly Intel Brief. Jan I I. 1961. 

37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House 

Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City. 

1965). p 612; Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage 

Point (New York. 1971). p 51; Schlesinger. 

Thousand Days. pp 163-64. 

38. Memo, Clark Clifford for the President. 

subj: Conf on Jan 19. 1961, dated Sep 29. 1967, 

in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 1360-64. 

1969). pp 1-18. 

294 
Notes to Pages 

Chapter VI 

Initial Challenges and Actions 

I. Special Message to the Congress on the 

Defense Budget. Mar in Public Papers 

of the Presidents: John Kennedy, 

(Washington, 

Book of Actions in SEA. 

No. Charles USAF 

Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities. 

(USAF Hist Liaison Feb 

64). Presentation to the 

Advisory Board on the Subject of Counterinsurgency by Brig Gen Williams. 

1962; US of State Bulletin 

Maxwell Taylor. and Plowshares (New 1972). and 220; 

Richard "Cuba. and 

John Kennedy." Reader's Digest. 

CONFLICT in Laos. 

hist, Dir/Plans. USAF, 78-81; 

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 

Relations. US Senate. International DevelopMENT AND SECURITY 87TH Washington, 682; 5th Intel Brief, 

and 

Hist. Ill. Hist 

A-2. 61: hist. 315th Air (Combat 

Cargo). CINCPAC 

Hist. 89-90; Thousand Days. 336; Richard Stebbins. Documents on American Foreign RELATIONS, 

(New 1962). ConFLICT in Laos. 

US Senate. International Development 

and Security. 87th 649; 

Thousand Days. 

CINCPAC Hist. p 93; hist, 

Dir/Plans. USAF. 

of State, Memo of Conversation on 

Laos. in Pentagon Papers. 

I I: 62-66: Hearings before the Subcommittee 

of the Committee on Appropriations. House of 

Representatives. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ApproPRIATIONS FOR 87th (Washington, 1962). 

of State. Memo of Conversation on 

Laos. cited above: to 

1961.in hist. 

10. Theodore C. (New 

1965). Thousand 

DAYS Pentagon Papers. 2: 

Taylor, 220; 

Public Papers of Presidents: 

Kennedy, Hearings before the 

Committee on Appropriations. US Senate. Foreign ASSISTANCE and TED Agencies Appro87th (Washington. 1961). and 135-37: Henry 

on Times 

Magazine. Mar Background, China and U.S. Far East POLICY 

104; Stebbins. DOCUMENTS 1-18; 

in Laos. hist. 

13-18; hist. 

USAF. 184-88; 5th 

Brief. 5.1961; Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. US Senate. Foreign 

Assistance Act 87th 

(Washington. 1962). and 

I I. Hist. USAF, 

with 

Public Papers OF the Presidents; KenNEDY and 656; Annual Report 

of the of Defense. Fiscal Year 

Jacob Van USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam. (USAF 

Hist Liaison 65). CINCPAC 

Hist. 174-74: memo. Pres 

Kennedy for and Jan 

to Saigon, 

Penragon Papers. 

I I: 13-16: rad. CINCPAC to Feb 

Federal REGISTER 10 

3; of State Bulletin 

USAF Journal OF Mutual Security. Mar 

If Vietnamese pilots were sometimes less 

than enthusiastic about flying or fighting. it was 

because they lacked the protection of insurance. 

death benefits, and disability pensions. They 

might hope that their families or clans would 

protect their survivors if they were killed or 

injured, but even so. a loss of life or a crippling 

injury had consequences beyond those an American might imagine on the basis of his own situation. Vietnamese pilots and aircrews in 

combat exposed their FAMILIES to hazards of a 

most sobering variety. Kenneth History 

of The Second Air Division. Ill. 

USA F Journal Mutual Security. Mar 

Pentagon Papers. 2: 30: National Intelligence Estimate. May 59: Research 

Analysis Corp., "U.S. Army Special Forces 

Operations under the Civilian Irregular Defense 

Groups Program in Vietnam. 

1966). 26; History. 

The police consisted of approximately 

seventy-five hundred Bureau of Investigation 

and ten thousand five hundred municipal police- 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 67-73 

tive. Memo for the Record. May22. 196l.inclto 

JCS 1992/Y94; msg. AFXOD to PACAF. May 

19. 1961. 

32. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. pp 172-74. 

33. DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: 16. 

34..-Graff. "Teach-In .on Vietnam.': p 131. 

Rusk had recommended on May 5. 1961. that 

the United States refrain From placing combat 

forces in South Vietnam. See Levy Memo for 

Record. May5.1961.in DOD Pentagon Papers. 

35. Status Rprt on Covert Actions in Viet36. The Kennedy Commitments and Pro37. Hist. Dir/Plans. USAF. Jan-Jun 61. pp 

38. Joint Action Program by the Viet NamUnited States Special Financial Group. in DOD 

Pentagon Papers. Bk I I: 182-226. 

39. Note by Secys to JCS on Presidential 

Program. 2343/ 12. Aug 15. 1961. p 42. Folder 

"Policy-Vietnam." Sec 3 64A2436. #25. Covert 

actions are "small military type actions taken in 

the national interest that. if detected by friendly 

or unfriendly powers. can be plausibly denied by 

the U.S. Government. Equipment and/or personnel used in these operations are selected and 

prepared so as to offer the highest probability 

that they cannot legally be traced to the U.S. 

Government." Clandestine operations, in contrast. are those in which emphasis is placed on 

concealing the fact of the operation. 1-tr, Lt Gen 

John K. Gerhard, USAF. DCS/ Plans and Programs. to the Asst to SECDEF. Mar 28. 1962. 

40. Folder. "Policy-Vietnam.'' Rl. (61) 38-9 

(Jun I-Aug 1961): Van Staavcren. USAF Plans 

und Policies in South Vietnain. pp X-9: msg. 

CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 13. 1963: memo. 

SECDEF to Service Sccys, CJCS. ASD; ISA, 

Aug IX. 1961. 

4 I. Journal of Milirary Assistance, Sept 6 I. 

42. MACV J-2, lnfiltration Study, Folder 

Vietnam 1-30, Nov 64, RAND Corp Study, 

Infiltration of Personnel from North Vietnam, 

43. Hist, 5th AF, Jul-Dec 61, I, 107-09; 

PACAF Ref Book for Dec 61 SECDEF Conf, 

Tab B-2; The Pentagon Papers as Published by 

the New York Times, ed N. Sheehan, et al(New 

York, 1971), pp 95-96. 

44. CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961, pp 182-83; 

MACV, Sum of Highlights, Feb 8, 1962-Feb 7, 

1963, p 41'; AFXOPJ Book on Actions in SEA, 

1961-64, Item IV-C; hist, Dir/ Plans, USAF, JulDec 61, pp 4445; CINCPAC Rcrd of 2d SECDEF Conf, Jan 15, 1962, Item 13. 

45. CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961, p 183; hist, 

Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, Jan-Jun 61, 

Elk I I: 67-68. 

nam. Jun 61. p 158, 

gram. 1961. pp 5841. 

44. 169-70. 

pp 152-53. 

1959-67, Oct 68. 

men who were in the cities and not available to 

deal with insurrection in rural areas. A CIA 

survey in December 196 reported that the security forces in the fourteen provinces needed training in professional fundamentals. The following 

January. the Bureau of Investigation and the 

police- were combined. JCS History. 1954-59. p 

96; DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2: 23; R W? 

Komer. "The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect." The RAND Corp. 1972. p 38: Status 

Rprt on Covert Actions in Vietnam. Dec 28. 

1961; Status Rprt on Instructions to Nolting. 

Jan I I. 1962. 

18. MACV hist monograph. Military Assistance io the Republic of South Vietnam. pp 9- I I; 

Fifth AF Wkly Intel Brief, Mar22. 1961; Public 

Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy. 1961. pp 3 I I. 

340. 

19. A Program of Action. Apr 26. 1961. 

20. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. pp 169-70: 

5th AF Wkly Brief. May I I. 1961; PACAF Ref 

Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF Conf, Tab B-7-B; rad, 

UK 70272, May8, 1961; USAF Journal of Military Security, Jun 6 I. 

21. Schlesinger. Thousand Days. p 541; 

CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. p 175; hist. Asst 

for Mutual Security. USAF. Jan-Jun 61. n.p.; 

Van Staaveren. USAF Plans and Policies in 

South Viemum, 1961-1963, p 7. 

22. Talking Paper on Program of Action for 

Vietnam, Folder "Policy-Vietnam," RL- (61) 

38-9, (Jan I-May 31, 1961), Sec I, 64-A-2436 

memo, AFXOD-PY to CSAF, May 10, 1961, 

ibid. 

23. See rad. UK 70272. May 8. 1961. 

24. Scigliano. South Vietnum. p 160: Public 

Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy, 1961, p. 356; 

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64, 

Item IV-A; CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961, pp 

184-75; Itr. O'Donnell to Felt. May 17. 1961; 

Johnson. Vantage Point. p 53. 

25. DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: 19-45. 

26. Kennedy Program and Commitments, 

I96 I, pp 44-45; RAC-1477, p 26. 

27. Folder. "Policy-Vietnam. RL (61) 38-9 

(Jan I-May 31. 1961). Sec I." 

28. DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: 55; Rprt. 

J-3 2434/41 to the JCS. Aug 5. 1961, quoting 

AmEmb Saigon 1743. May 15. 1961. 

29. The Kennedy Commitmencs and Programs. 1961. pp 58-61. 

30. Van Staaveren. USAF Plans and Policies 

in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. p 8; Dept of State 

Bulletin 45, 956-57; Schlesinger, Thousand 

Days p 543: Public Papers of the Presidents: 

Lyndon B. Juhnson. 1965 (Washington. 1966). 

1.404;NSAM52, May I I. 1961:rprc. Lyndon B. 

Johnson to the President, May 23. 1961. in 

DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk I I: 136-37. 159-66. 

3 I. Col R. M. Levy, USAF, JCS representa296 
Notes to Pages 74-82 

Monthly Hist Rprt. Oct 61; hist. PACAF. JulLog, Pipe Stem 

Det, Oct 18-21. 1961. 

49. Journal of Military Assistance. Sep 61. p 

153; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p 450; 

Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p 149; Maj William 

L. Nicholson, III, Background Paper on Vietnam. ca. Jan 62; Schneider rprt; Presentation by 

Gen Moorman before Congressional Committee. 1,. 1-1 I; hist 13th AF. Jul-Dec 61. I. 107-09; 

Intel Est, ca.Oct I, 1961. in hist, 2d ADVON. 

50. Hist. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF. 

Jan-Jun 61. np. and Jul-Dec 61, pp 28-29. 

51. JCSM-700-61, Jet Aircraft for SVN, Oct 

7. 1961; hist, Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec 61, p 

262; AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961- 

64. Item VII-A; CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961. p 

186; HQ USAF Memo (OPS 50-61). Sep 20, 

1961; hist, Asst for Mutual Security. Jul-Dec61. 

n.p.; hist, PACAF. Jul-Dec61,III, Wkly Activities Rprt, PFMLP. Dec 11-15, 1961. 

Nov 61-0ct 62. 1. DOC 15. 

n.p.; Rprt of CSAF Visit to SVN. Apr 62. 

46. SVN Radar Environment Survey. Jul61, 

Jul-Dec61. AppXXV. 

47. Memo, Phillip F. Hilbert for Dir/ Plans. 

Jun 8. 1961; CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961, pp 

33-34; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 61, Ill, Hist Rprt 

of C-E Opns. Elec Systems Div. Aug 61; hist. 

PFOCO. Dec 61; Itr. Brig Gen R. M. Anthis to 

13th AF, n.d.; Schneider rprt; Joseph W. Grainger and TSgt George P. Day. Hist of the 2d 

ADVON. Nov 15, 1961-Oct 8. 1962; Itr, Lt Gen 

Earle E. Wheeler, Dir Jt Stf, to CJCS, Nov 14. 

1961. 

48. Kennedy Program and Commitments, 

1961; Futrell, “Chron”; hist, 13th AF. Jul-Dec 

5; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 61, I. pt 2. 18-32, III, 

A-2 Monthly Hist Rprt, Oct 61; msg, CINCPAC to JCS. Nov 11, 1961; Rprt on Able 

Mable, ca. Feb I. 1962, in hist. 2d ADVON, Nov 

15. 1961-Oct 8, 1962. Doc 72; DOD Pentagon 

Papers, Bk 2: IV.B.1.. 91; hist, 19th TFW, JulDec 61. p 62; hist, PACAF, Jul-Dec 61, Ill, A-2 

Chapter VII 

Opening Farm Gate 

I. Ltr, Col Robert L. Gleason to Col Ray 

Bowers, Ofc/AF Hist. Dec 30. 1971; Book of 

Actions in SEA, p 6; SO G-4. TAC. Langley 

AFB. Va.. Apr 10, 1961; memo, Dir/Ops, 

USAF. Apr 27. 1961, incl 7. Vol 2; TSgt Robert 

J. O’Neill. History of Special Air Warfare Center, Apr-Dec 62, Air Archives; intvw with Lt Col 

M. M. Doyle, Bien Hoa, Feb 16. 1963; hist. 2d 

2. Ltr, Gleason to Bowers; Doyle intvw, Feb 

16. 1963. 

3. Hist, 2d ADVON. Nov 61-Oct-62. p 8: 

hist. 2d Air Division. Jan-Jun 64, p 4: John 

W. R. Taylor. ed, Combat Aircraft of the World 

(New York 1961). pp 491-92; Tactical Air Support Handbook,Oct 62, Sec IX; MR, Detailson 

Modification and IRAN’S Perf on T-28 and B26 Acft, n.d.. Binder COIN ops 774-64, box 12, 

68A-4994. 

4. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961- 

64, Item IV-B. 

5. Ibid., Item Ill-B, pp 21-22. 

6. CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961, p 187. 

7. Kennedy Program and Commitments, 

1961. p 84. 

8. Hist, Dir/Plans. USAF, Jul 1-Dec 31. 

1961. Vol 22, 78. 

9. Book of Actions in SEA, p 2 and Item II; 

hist. SAWC, Apr 27-Dec 31, 1962, pp 1-10; 

ADVON, NOV 61-Oct 62. 

intvw with Lt Col Charles E. Trumbo. Jr.. by 

J. W. Grainger.Jul 13, 1963; LeMay comments. 

intvw by Thomas G. Belden, Mar 29. 1972; see 

also Proj Corona Harvest Oral Hist intvw with 

Brig Gen Benjamin H. King. Sep 4, 1962. pp 1-5. 

IO. Rcrd. Second SECDEF Conf, Jan 15, 

1962. p 111-2; intvw. J. Grainger with Lt Col 

M. M. Doyle, Feb 16. 1963. in App D. Hist, 2d 

ADVON, Nov 61-Oct 62. 

I I. MR, Dir/Plans. USAF,subj: CINCPAC 

Briefing on Jungle Jim, Oct 16, 1961. 

12. Msg, US Amb Saigon to State, Oct 13. 

196 I. in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp 

140-41; see also Taylor, Swordsand Plowshares, 

Hist, 1961,pp 187- 

91, Proj Corona Harvest Oral Hist intvw with 

Col King. pp 15-21. 

13. Detachment I was spending several 

weeks in Mali. the Republic of West Africa, 

training paratroopers. 

14. Progress Rprt. 6009th TSG. ca. Dec 5, 

1961, in Hist, 2d ADVON, Nov61-0ct 62, and 

Doc 6: hist, 5th AF, Jul-Dec 61. I, 53-56; msg, 

PACAF to 13th AF. Nov 17, 1961. 

15. Hist, SAWC, Apr-Dec 62. pp 12-13. 

16. Msg. Det 9.2d ADVON to PACAF. Nov 

21. 1961; Intel Rprt, Debriefing of the Commander and Intelligence Officer. Det 2. 4400th 

I, 1962; Briefingby 

291 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 82-88 

Asia, 1962-67 (Research Analysis Corp. Jun 69). 

22. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, Dec 6, 1961; 

CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961, pp 190-91; 

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64, 

Item VII-B. 

23. Msg. PACAF to CINCPAC, Dec 6. 

1961; PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF 

Conf. Action Tab H. 

24. ClNCPACComd Hist. 1961.p 171;msg. 

CINCPAC to Chief MAAG VN. Dec 6. 1961: 

CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEFConf. Dec 16. 1961. 

Item 4. 

25. Msgs, PACAF to CINCPAC, Dec 8. 

1961. 13th AF to PACAF, Dec 10. 1961; 

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64, 

Item Ill-C: CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. p 188. 

26. CINCPAC Rcrd, SECDEF Conf. Dec 

16. 1961, Item 8A; msg. PACAF to CSAF. Dec 

17. 1961. 

27. Msg. CINCPAC to PACAF. Dec 20, 

1961. 

28. lntvw with Anthis by Gausche and 

Grainger, Aug 30. 1963; msgs. 13th AF to 

PACAF, Dec 28, 1961. CSAF to PACAF. Mar 

23. 1963. JCS to CINCPAC, Dec 26. 1961; 

PACAF Ref Bk for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. 

p 117. 

Capt M. K. Palmer, Jan 16. 1962. in Hist, 5th. 

AF, Jan-Juri 62. II. Doc 144. 

17. Hist, 2d ADVON, pp 8-9; 4400th CCTG 

Intel Rprt. Apr I. 1962; msg, CSAF to CINCPAC. Nov 9, 1961; msg, CINCPAC to JCS. 

Nov 15, I961: CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEFConf. 

Dec 16. 1961, msg. Item 8A: AFCHO Oral Hist 

lntvw with LeMay, Jun 8, 1972; telephone conversation. Futrell with Col Robert L. Gleason, 

Lt Col John Pattee. and Lt Col William E. 

Doughterty, Jul 72; Victor B. Anthony, The Air 

Force in Southeast Asia: Tactics and Techniques of Night Operations. 1961-1970. (Ofc/ 

AF Hist, Mar 73). 

18. Msg, CINCPAC to Chief MAAG VN, 

Nov 16. 1961; rprt, SAF to Pres, Feb 6, 1962. 

Binder Vietnam 11-62, 

19. Msg. CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 13, 1963; 

New York Times. Feb 20. 1962. p 3: PACAF 

Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5. 

20. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF 

Conf, Tab 3B. Mar 62 SECDEF Conf, Item 5; 

Futrell's conversation with Gleason. Jul 72. 

21. Paul S. Ella, Richard P. Joyce, Robert H. 

Williams. and William Woodworth, U.S. Army 

Special Forces and Similar Internal Defense 

Advisory Operations in Mainland Southeast 

Chapter VIII 

The Taylor Mission 

I. The President also asked the State Department to solicit comments on this question from 

allied nations. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in 

SEA. Item Ill-B; Van Staaveren. USAF Plans 

and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963; MR, 

Roswell Gilpatric, Oct 1 I. 1961. and NSAM 

104. Oct 13. 1961, in DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 

I I: 322-38: Public Papers of the Presidents: 

Kennedy. 1961. pp 656. 660: Taylor. Swords 

and Plowshares. pp 225-26. 

2. CQ Background, China and U.S. Far East 

Policy, 1945-1967. p 108; see also Cooper, Lost 

Crusade, pp 193-94. 

3. MACV hist monograph. Military Assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam. 1960- 

1963. p I I; Itr, Diem to Kennedy. n.d., in Public 

Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy, 1961, pp 

801-02: PACAF Reference Book for Dec 61 

SECDEF Conf, Tab B-I; Intel Estimate SVN, 

ca. Oct I, 1961. in Hist, 2d ADVON. I. Doc 15. 

4. PACAF Reference Book for Dec 61 

SECDEF Conf. 

5. Msg. USAmb Saigon to State, Oct 13, 

196 I. in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp 

140-41. 

298 

6. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. pp 187-91. 

7. Ltr. Taylor to the President (Taylor Rprt). 

Nov 3, 1961; Kennedy Program and Commitments. pp 98-99. 

8. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares. pp 241- 

44; New York Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 141- 

48; DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: IV.B.1.. 100- 

08; Van Staveren, USAF Plans and Policies in 

South Vietnam. 1961-1963. pp 10-1 I; Schlesinger. 

Thousand Days. pp 546-47; Roger Hilsman, To 

Mow a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in 

the Administration of John F. Kennedy 

(Garden City, 1967). pp 422-23; George W. Ball. 

The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern 

World Structure (Boston. 1968). p 334; Dept of 

State Bulletin 56. 514. 

9. Covering note, sgd William P. Bundy with 

draft memo, SECDEF for President, Nov 6. 

1961; Background Paper on CINCPAC OPlan 

32-59: Kennedy Program and Commitments. 

1961, pp 122-23; SM-1212-61. Recommended 

Change to the Proposed Memo for the Pres, 

Nov 6. 1961; hist. Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec 61. 

10. Van Staaveren. USAF Plans and Policies 

pp 176-78. 
Notes to Pages 

Talking Paper on Determination of Effective U.S. Policy toward South Vietnam, 

for the on 

5.1961; Book on Actions in SEA. 

Jan 

In Penragon Papers, 12: 

Background Paper on 

to 

draft memo for thinking 

was consistent with that of the Army at least. On 

November Army had embarked a brigade 

task force in the Pacific Command, plus some 

thirty-five thousand combat and logistical support units from the United States, for deployment. Memo with Lt Gen Earl Wheeler, 

to 

Memo, to Pres. Jan 

with Mar 

See Summary Sheet, USAF. 

1961; memo with in to 

CINCPAC to 

to 

in South Vietnam, p I I: memo, 

for the Pres. 

Pentagon papers, I : 

I I. Kennedy Program and Commitments, 

122-23; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 

Thousand p 547; 

Monthly 

CINCPAC to 

and 1961; Pentagon Papers, 

A-2, 

THOUSAND DAYS p 

memo, for the Pres, 

I I. in Pentagon Papers, I: 

359-66; Taylor. Swords and Plowshares. 

Hist, Dir/Plans, USAF, 

Van USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam. p 12; 

Penragon Papers, 2: 

I I I. First Phase of 

Program, 

Memo, to Col 

Frank Pancake). 

Chapter 

U.S. Command Arrangements: AD and MACV 

I. Pentagon Papers. 2: I 

108: Ref 

Tab 

The Kennedy Program and Commitments. 129-30; memo, to 

Note to Control 

Note by the the 

Rear to 

Felt and 

Saigon to 

I96 I. 

Pentagon Papers. 

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 

Relations. US Senate, Foreign Assistance. 

89th (Washington. 1966). 

263; New to Pres. 

Pentagon Papers. II: 

USAF Plans and Policies in Vietnam, 

CINCPAC to 

I I 

IO. Book of 

CINCPAC to 

and Chief 

I I. a controland reporting center 

of the Thirteenth Air Force had been at Don 

Thailand. since April under a 

command element known as Thirteenth Air 

Force (abbreviation for Advanced 

Echelon). This was the first that in 

Vietnam became the second. 

to I I, 

Feb to 

1962.TO 1961; 

SO C-85. 1963; 5th 

I, 

to State. 

CINCPAC to and 

Saigon to 

CINCPAC to Chief 

and 1961; hr. to CINCPAC, 

1961; with by 

13th 10. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 96-102 

to CINCPACFLT. et al, May 22. 1962. Felt 

believed that no requirement existed for a 

MACV Navy component command. Yet on 

July I. 1962. Headquarters Support Activity 

Saigon, a naval organization. came into being to 

provide common administrative and logistic 

support, including construction. commissary. exchange, and housekeeping services. to MAAG 

and MACV units. 

27. Msg, PACAF to 13th AF and 2d 

ADVON, Feb 20. 1962. 

28. Martin and Clever. II. 17-18: The Public 

Papers of' the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962 

(Washington, 1963). p 137: msgs. PACAF to 

13th A F a n d 2d ADVON, Feb 20. 1962, CINCPAC to MACV. Feb 25. 1962. MACV to 

CINCPAC, Mar I. 1962. and 2d ADVON to 

13th AF. Mar 9, 1962. 

29. Hetherington Rprt, Apr 25. 1972: msg. 

PACAF to 13th AF. May 24. 1962. 

30. Dept of State. American Foreign Policy: 

Current Documents. 1962 (Washington. 1966). 

pp 

31. NY Herald Tribune. Apr 28, 1962. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Brig Gen Thomas R. Phillips, USA (Ret). 

in St. Louis Post-Dispatch. May 6, 1962. 

34. Intvw, Grainger with Lt Col M. M. 

Doyle. Feb 16. 1963; Martin and Clever, App 2. 

COIN Intvws, Tab M. 

35. New York Times, May I. 1962. 

36. Chicago Tribune. May 6. 1962. 

37. A. Rose. "Our Undeclared War in Vietnam." Reporter. May IO. 1962. 

38. Msg. PACAF to 13th AF. May 24. 1962: 

hist. 2d ADVON. Nov 61-0ct 62. pp 21-31, 34; 

msgs. C l N C P A C t o MACV. Jul 7and 28. 1962. 

MACV to CINCPAC, Jul 19. 1962: PACAF 

SO G-87. Sep 24. 1962; hist. 13th AF. Jan-Jun 

63. p 20. 

39. Hist. 2d ADVON. Nov 61-0ct 62. p 42: 

msg. PACAF to 13th AF. Nov 10, 1962. 

40. Msgs, 2d ADVON to 13th AF. Apr 21 

and 25. 1962: Van Staaveren, USAF Plansand 

Policies in South Vietnam. 1961-1963. pp 46-47; 

AFCHO Oral Hist intvw with Harkins. Feb 23. 

1972. 

41. Hearings before the Committee on 

Armed Services, House of Representatives. Military Posture. 89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington. 

1966), pp 7609-10. 

42. Van Staaveren. USAF Plansand Policies 

in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. p 47: memo, Col 

Winston P. Anderson. Dir/Ops. 2d AD. for 

Anthis. Feb 23. 1963; msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. 

Jan 27, 1963. and Sep 29, 1963. 

16. This technique wasevaluated as being less 

satisfactory than cooperative C-47 flareship/ 

strike aircraft operations mainly because of the 

limited number of flares that a T-28 could load 

on its wing stations and the consequent reduction of ordnance that it could Msg. 

PACAF to CSAF. Dec 17. 1961: Project 

Oral Hist intvw with King, pp 

51-56. 

17. See msg. MACV to CINCPAC, Sep 17. 

1962. 

18. Of the former, 2.066 were allocated to the 

Army. 6 to the Marine Corps, 135 to the Navy, 

and 187 (68 officers and I19 men) to the Air 

Force. CINCPACComd Hists. 1961.p 175. and 

1962. p 155; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dee 61, Ill; 

PFMLP Wkly Activities Rprt, Dec 22-29. 1961; 

PACAF Ref Bk for Dee 61 SECDEF Conf, 

Action Tab F. 

19. Memo, SECDEF to Pres. Dec 22. 1961: 

Van Staaveren. USAF Plans and Policies in 

South Vietnam, 1961-1963. p 15. 

20. Msg. PACAF to 13th AF and 2d 

ADVON. Feb 20, 1962. 

21. AFCHO Oral Hist lntvw 522, with Gen 

Paul D. Harkins, Feb 23, 1972: mg, CINCPAC 

to DEPCINCUSARPAC. Feb 8. 1962. 

22. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, Jan 31 and 

Mar 2. 1962. to MACV, Apr 7. 1962. C S A F t o 

PACAF. Feb 21. 1962: Martin and Clever. IV. 

38-39; Van Staaveren. USAF Plansand Policies 

in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. pp 16-17. Later. 

Brig Gen Milton B. Adams was Assistant Chief 

of Staff J-5 (Plans). 

23. Msg. MACV to CINCPAC. Sep 17, 

1962: Itr. Anthis to Eugene C. Zuckert. SAF, 

Jan 9. 1963: Brig Gen Frank A. Osmanski, 

MACV J-4. Rprt on Vietnam. Sep 26, 1963, pp 

24. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Mar I, 

1962. 2d ADVON to PACAF, May 7. 1962. 

CINCPAC to MACV, May 12, 1962, 2d 

ADVON to 13th AF. May 16. 1962. CSAF to 

Chief MAAG. Jun 21. 1962. and CINCPAC to 

CSAF.Oct 31,1962: DAF SO AA-2164,Nov 9, 

1962; Itr. Anthis to Zuckert. Jan 9. 1963. 

25. Msgs, CINCPAC to MACV, Feb 25, 

1962. MACV to CINCPAC, Mar I. 1962. Apr 

6. 1962. Apr 7. 1962, May 6. 1962. PACAF to 

13th AF and 2d ADVON. Apr 27. 1962. 2d 

ADVON to PACAF. May 5, 1962, PACAF to 

CSAF. May 12. 1962. CINCPAC to MACV, 

Sep 30. 1963. 

Zuckert. Jan 9. 1963; msg. CNO/CSA/CSAF 

i 

300 

I 
Notes to Pages 103-107 

Chapter X 

Tactical Air Control, Mule Train, and Ranch Hand 

I. Wilfred G. Burchett. Vietnam: Inside 

Storyofthe Guerrilla War(New York. 1965),pp 

88-89; PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 22-24, 1962. 

SECDEF Conf. Item B; MACV hist monograph. Military Assistance to the Republic of 

South Vietnam, 1960-63. pp I 1-12. 

2. Cong Rec. May 9, 1968.pp 12617-18: Pike. 

Viet Cong, passim, and War, Peace, and the Viet 

Cong, pp 1-18. 

3. Msg. USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Nov 28. 

1961: PACAF Reference Book for Jan 1962, 

SECDEF Conf. Tab 13; CINCPAC Rcrd, 

Second SECDEF Conf, Jan 15. 1962, Item 13, 

and Dec 16. 1961. Item 2. 

4. CINCPAC Rcrd, Second SECDEF Conf. 

Jan 15, 1962. Item 5A: HQ MACV, Summary 

of Highlights. Feb 8, 1962-Feb 7. 1963, p 97; Itr, 

R. K. G. Thompson to Diem. Nov I I. 1961. in 

DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk I I: 345-58. 

5. CINCPAC Rcrd. Third SECDEF Conf. 

Feb 19. 1962. Items 2 and 4. 

6. Msg. MACV to CINCPAC. Apr 14. 1962; 

CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEF Conf, Dec 16,1961, 

Item 2, and 3d SECDEF Conf. Feb 19. 1962, 

Items 3 and 5; memo, Moorman to PFDALand 

PFDOP. Feb 23. 1962: Hilsman. To Move a 

Nation. pp 44 1-44, 

7. CINCPAC Rcrd. 2d SECDEF Conf. Jan 

15. 1962. Items 5.5A. and 14. and 3d SECDEF 

Conf. Feb 19. 1962. Item 4: Sir Robert Thompson. Defeating Communist Insurgency': The 

Lassons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York. 

1966). pp 129-39. 

8. The members were Robert Kennedy, U. 

Alexis Johnson. Roswell L. Gilpatric, General 

Lemnitzer. John A. McCone. McGeorge 

Bundy. Edward R. Murrow.and Fowler Hamilton. 

9. Taylor. Swords and Plowshares, pp 20 1-3; 

NSAM 124. Jan 18, 1962. in DOD Pentagon 

Papers, Bk 12: 442-44: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives. Department of 

Defense Appropriationsfor 1965.88th Cong. 2d 

sess (Washington. 1964). pt 2. p 612. 

10. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares. pp 201- 

03; NSAM 162. Jun 19. 1962. and NSAM 182. 

Aug 24. 1962. in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 12: 

48 1-86; US Overseas Internal Defense Policy. 

Aug I. 1962; JCSM. Nov 20, 1962. 

I I. AFXOPJ Book of Actionsin SEA. 1961- 

64, p 23. 

12. Hists. 13th AF, Jul-Dec 61. 1. 73-74. and 

1962. I. 72-74; 13th AF OPlan 226-61, Dec 30. 

1961: hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec 61. Ill: AFXOPJ 

Book of Actions in SEA. 1961-64. Item Ill-C; 

hist, 315th AD. Jan-Jun 62. pp 44-45; CINCPAC Rcrd. 2d SECDEF Conf. Item 3. 

13. Hist, 2d ADVON. pp XVII-XX: Chief, 

AF Sec. MAAGV. Agenda Book for Feb 62 

SECDEF Conf. Item 3 (a)A: rprt, Brig Gen 

Travis M. Hetherington, DCS/ Plans and Ops. 

PACAF. Apr 25. 1962; rprt. Lt Col Charles D. 

Easley. ca. Aug 5. 1962: Itr, Easley to 2 ODC. ca. 

Jul I. 1962; Proj Corona Harvest Oral Hist 

intvw w/Anthis, pp 64-68: PACAF Ref Bk for 

Jan 62 SECDEF Conf. Tab 3: MACV Summary of Highlights. Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7. 1963. p 

135; msg. USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Mar 21. 

1962. 

14. Ralph A. Rowley, USAF FAC Operations in Southeast Asia. 1961-65 (Ofc/AF Hist. 

Jan 1972). pp 15. 18. 24-25: hist. 2d ADVON. p 

97; Draft presentation. Anthis for Mar 62 

SECDEF Conf, Hist. 2d ADVON: rad, 

USAIRA Bangkok to PACAF; Jan 31. 1962. 

15. PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF 

Conf. Action Tab I. for Jan 62 SECDEF Conf. 

Tab 9, for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 9; 

CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEF Conf. Dec 16. 1961, 

Item 8-1; Rprt of CSAF's Visit to South Vietnam, Item I I; Hetherington rprt, Apr 25. 1962: 

Easley End of Tour Rprt, ca. Aug 5. 1962. 

16. The 8th and 57th Transport Helicopter 

Companies arrived as identifiable units at Saigon aboard an aircraft carrier on December l l. 

1962. and were so reported in the New York 

Times. The International Control Commission 

promptly recorded this violation of the Geneva 

accords. The companies were based at Tan Son 

Nhut and Qui Nhon under the U.S. Army senior 

advisors to the II and Ill Corps. On January26, 

1962. the U.S. Army's 93d Helicopter Company 

arrived at Da Nang and was placed under the 

U.S. Army senior advisor to the I Corps. The 

companies flew combat support missions and 

trained the Vietnamese army in air mobility tactics. U.S. Army's 18th Fixed Wing Aviation 

Company. with sixteen U-l Otter aircraft. 

reached Nha Trang on February 7. 1962, and 

these liaison aircraft (able to transport two thousand pounds of cargo or eight passengers) supported the U.S. Army field advisors. The 339th 

Transportation Company (Maintenance) arrived on February II, 1962. Chief, AF Sec, 

MAAGV, Agenda Bk for Feb 62. SECDEF 

Conf. Item 3 (3); CINCPAC Rcrd, 2d SECDEF 

Conf. Jan 16. 1962. Item 3; CINCPAC Comd 

Hist, 1961. p 194. 

17. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. p 189; msg. 

30 I 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 108-1 16 

USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Nov 28. 1961; 

CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEFConf. Dec 19.1961. 

Item 7: Martin and Clever. IV. 31-34. 

18. Ltr. O’Donnell to CINCPAC. Dec 12. 

1961: msg, USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Nov 28. 

1961; PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF 

Conf. Tab B-1. 

19. Hist. 315th TC Gp (Assault). 1962. p 16: 

intvw with Lt Col E. W. Strong by Grainger. 

Nov 7.1962: AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 

196 1-64. p 25; Jane AIl the World Aircraft. 

1955-56. ed Leonard Bridgeman (New York. 

n.d.), p 259; CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d SECDEF 

Conf. Feb 19, 1962: PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 

SECDEF Conf. Tab A-5 and Action Tab A: 

msgs. CINCPAC to 13th AF. Dec 9. 1961. 

PACAF to 13th AF. Dec 13. 1961. 

20. Talking Paper on USAF Ops in VN. 

3. Folder Policy-Vietnam. Jan 1-31. 1964. 

21. Moorman presentation to Congressional 

Committee. ca. Feb 63, I, 38; Itrs, Anthis to 

Maj Gen W. Martin. Sep 2. 1963, and Moorman 

to Anthis. ca. Feb 28. 1962: msgs. MACV to 

CINCPAC, Mar 12. 1962. and 13th AF to 2d 

ADVON. Mar 18.1962; Rprt of CSAF‘s Visit to 

SVN. Apr 62. Ops Sec. 

22. MACV Summary of Highlights. Feb 8. 

1962-Feb 7, 1963. p 69; Itr. Lt Col Floyd K. 

Shafner, May 12. 1962. 

23. 2d ADVON. Agenda and Info Bk for 

Mar 62 SECDEFConf. Item 17; hist. 13th AF, 

24. Msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF. Mar 9. 

1962. Mar 12, 19.and 26. 

1962. 

25. Anthis presentation at May 62 SECDEF 

Conf: msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF, Mar 27, 

1962. CINCPAC to JCS. Mar 30. 1962. and 2d 

AD to 13th AF. Nov 20, 1962. 

26. Msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF, Mar 27. 

1962. MACV to CINCPAC, Apr 9. 1962. and 

May 22, 1962. PACAF to CSAF, May 12,1962. 

and CINCPAC to MACV. Aug 13. 1962: 

Hetherington rprt. Apr 25. 1962; hist. 315th TC 

Gp (Assault), 1962, p 27; rprt. Lt Col Howard P. 

Reaves. Aug 2, 1962. 

27. Ibid.; Rprt of CSAFs Visit to SVN. Apr 

62: PACAF Status Rprt. May 2 to 9. 1962; msg. 

CINCPAC to JCS. May 8, 1962. 

28. Msg, MACV to CINCPAC, May 22, 

1962. 

29. JTF 116, AAR, Dec 8, 1962: msgs, 2d AD 

to 13th AF. Jul28 and CINCPAC 

to JCS. May 25,1962. to MACV, May 25.1962; 

PACAF Summary of Actions, Gen Wheeler’s 

Party, Jan 63. 

30. One plane was lost without crew fatalities 

in a major accident on July 15. Hist, PACAF. 

Jan-Jun 62. III. May and 

Gp (Assault), 1962. pp 27-28: Reaves End of 

1962, pp 103-05. 

Tour Rprt. Aug 2. 1962. 

31. Ltr. Moorman to Anthis. Sep 25. 1962; 

msgs, 13th AF to PACAF, May 26. 1962, 

PACAF to 13th AF. May 29. 1962. and AFCC 

JTF I16 to PACAF, May 29, 1962. 

32. Ltrs. Moorman to CINCPAC. Jul 6. 

1962. and to Anthis. Sep25. 1962: PACAFSOs 

C-85 and G-92. Sep 19 and Oct 19. 1962: msgs, 

CINCPAC to MACV. Jul 18. 1962, MACV to 

CINCPAC. Aug 23. 1962. 

33. PACAF Summary of Actions, Gen 

Wheeler’s Party. Sec II. Tab C; Itrs. Anthis to 

Moorman. ca. Apr 16, 1962. and Bowers to 

Mann. ca. Jun 62 and Jul 25. 1962: Reaves End 

of Tour Rprt. Aug 2. 1962: JCS/2d ADVON Jt 

OPlan 62-2. Oct 17. 1962; Moorman presentation. ca. Feb 63. 1. 38; msg, 2d AD to PACAF. 

Apr 5. 1962. 

34. PACAF Summary of Actions. Gen 

Wheeler’s Party. Sec II. Tab C. 

35. Msgs. PACAF to 13. 

1961. 

36. Doris Krudener. formerly of the Office of 

Air Force History. kindly supplied this documentation: Memos, JCS for McNamara. Nov 3. 

1961. and William P. Bundy for Rusk and 

McNamara, Nov 14 and 30. 1961. 

37. NSAM 115, Nov 30. 1961: Marvin E. 

Hintz. History of the Thirteenth Air Force, Jan 

I-June 30. 1963. pp 75-76: msg. CHMAAGV to 

CINCPAC. Dec 23. 1961, in ISA files. 

38. JCSM-2-62(U), Jan 2. 1962; msg. CINCPAC to CHMAAGVN. Dec 28, 1961: memo. 

SECDEF to the President. Feb 2. 1962: and see 

msg. CHMAAGV to CINCPAC Jan 17. 1962; 

and PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF Conf. 

Tab 16A. 

39. Msg. SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon, 

Jan 4. 1962: and msg. CHMAAGV to CINCPAC. Jan 12. 1962. 

40. Capt George T. Adams. TAC Aerial 

Spray Flight Operations in Southeast Asia, 

1961-1964 (TAC/SASF. n.d.). p 8. 

41. Hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 62. III. 

PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF Conf. Tab 

Items 3 

and 4: Chief, AF Sec. MAAGV, Agenda Bk for 

Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 3( I); CINCPAC 

Rcrd. 3d SECDEF Conf. Feb 19. 1962. Item 3. 

and 4th SECDEF Conf. Mar 21. 1962. Item I: 

msg. PACAF to CSAF. Feb 20. 1962; Moorman memo, Feb 23. 1962. In April, when Tactical Air Command moved two spray planes to 

the Middle East to work against locust infestations and to save food crops. it added two standard C-1 23s to the Mule Train airlift detachment. 

42. 3d ADVON Agenda Bk for SECDEF 

May 62 Conf. Item 3: CINCPAC Rcrd, 4th 

SECDEF Conf, Mar 21, 1962. Item 1. hist, 

PACAF. Jan-Jun 62. III. Apr 62. 

302 
Notes to Pages 

MACV 4th May 

I, Item 

See CINCPAC 6th 

I. 

Memo, Col William Brooks. for 

MACV Summary of Highlights, Feb 

1962-Feb 59-61; CINCPAC to 

Saigon to 

STATE. 

CINCPAC Actions 

7th paras and 9; 

MACV Summary of Highlights. 210; 

to 

hist. USAF, 

and To Move a Nation, 

Chapter XI 

Air Policy: Too Cautious? 

I. Quoted in Henry Tuesday 

Cabinet: Deliberations and Decision on Peace 

and War under Lyndon Johnson 

Cliffs, 1970). p 

to 

CINCPAC 

13th to 

to Mar and to 

CINCPAC. Ref for 

Feb by 

Mar 1972; with Anthis by 

and 

Memo. USAF, for 

Mar I, 1962; Report 

of Visit to p 

USAF Operations. p 

for Jan Jan 

Tab CINCPAC to 

Feb 

to Feb 

Maj Thomas Hickam with Capt 

Rhein, Tan Son Nhut, Jan 1963; 

Martin and Clever, COIN Tab 

Feb 4-5; 

End of Tour Reports. Lt Col Doyle, 

John Gilbert. Feb 

10. Draft presentation, Anthis for Mar 

hist. 

I I. 

Lessons Learned U.S. Army 

I I, 

draft presentation. 

Anthis for Mar in Hist. 

Feb 

Hist. p 9; 

Maj Dean and with 

Anthis. 1963; Martin and Clever, 

COIN Tab with 

Doyle and Lt Col Charles E. 

in Hist. Van 

USAF Plans and Policies in Vietnam, 

p 25: hist. p 

Chief to CINCPAC, 

Memo. Landsdale to Col David C. Jolly, 

Binder 

Memo, Maj Gen C 

Plans Programs. USAF, Binder 

Vietnam box 

Van USAF Plans and POLICIES 

in South Vietnam. p 26: hist, 

p Times, Feb 

1962; to 

Jan and Feb 1962; 

paper, CA Mar I, 1962; CINCPAC 

Feb Item 3; 

Ref for Feb Tab 

CINCPAC 

Feb 3-22; CINCPAC to 

MACV, Mar 

to 13th Mar 

Hist, p 

Maj Gen Martin to 

I Binder Vietnam I9 box 

8; hist, p 3; Gen 

Frank Logistic Support in the 

Vietnam Era, I-III (Washington, 1970). p 

with Maj William C. 

Johnson and Capt Ernest C. Cutler. Feb 

Chief to 

1961; hist. 

Hist, 

55: 

Maj Gen Travis Hetherington. 

Staff Visits. hist, 

62; Maj Thomas Hickam with 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 124-133 I 

TSgt Harry M. Nonamaker. Dec I I. 1962, with 

Capt Edwin J. Rhein. Jr.. Jan 3. 1963. with 

Chaplain Squires. Jan 16, 1963. and with CWO 

William Weakley. Jan IO. 1963; Martin and 

Clever. App 2. COIN Intvws. Tabs F. G. and H. 

28. Intvw. Maj Thomas J. Hickam with Capt 

(Chap) Donal M. Squires. Jan 16, 1963; Martin 

and Clever, App 2. COIN Intvws, Tab I; hist, 2d 

ADVON. Nov61-Oct 62.pp 67-70; End of Tour 

Reports, Lt Col Kenneth M. Keyte, Apr 20, 

1963. and Capt Forrest P. Meek, Apr 9. 1963. 

29. Intvw. Hickam with Auten, Feb 15,1963; 

ibid., Tab L; hist. 2d ADVON. pp 67-70. 

30. Report of CSAF's Visit to SVN, Apr 62. 

3 1. Maj Gen Spurgeon Noel, Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965-70 

(Dept of the Army, Wash D.C.. 1973). pp 5 and 

9. 

32. Intvw. Hickam and Grainger with CWO 

A C. Liberator, Nov 20. 1962; Martin and 

Clever, App 2. Tab A. 

p 11. 

33. Hist, 2d ADVON. pp 182-83. 

Chapter XII 

Farm Gate and the Vietnamese Air Force 

I. Chief. AF Sec. MAAGV. Agenda Bk for 

Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5C; Gleason paper. 

ca. Mar I. 1962; ClNCPAC Rcrd. 4th SECDEF 

Conf. Item 5. 

2. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF 

Conf. Tab 3. TP-I; Proj Corona Harvest Oral 

Hist intvw with King, pp 52-53; Futrell, personal 

conversations with Gleason and Dougherty. 

3. DAF-IR-1521904: hist. 2d AD. I. xiv; 

CINCPAC Rcrd, 3d SECDEF Conf, Feb 19. 

1962. Item 3; Gleason paper, ca. Mar I. 1962. 

4. Hist. 2d ADVON, p 144; Itrs. Anthis to 

Moorman. Mar 28. 1963. Det 2A to 2d 

ADVON, Jun 5, 1962. 

5. Rprt. Cairney and Evans, May 4, 1962; 

Gleason End of Tour Report. 

6. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF 

Conf. Tabs 2 nd 3; Palmer briefing in Hist. 5th 

AF. Jan-Jun 62. 11. Doc 144. 

7. CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d SECDEF Conf, Feb 

19. 1962. Item 2. 

8. Anthis briefing. Mar 62 SECDEF Conf, 

in Hist, 2d AD, II, Doc 206; msgs, PACAF to 

13th AF. Mar 15. 1962, to CSAF. Mar 17, 1962. 

and to CSAF. Feb 20. 1962; Report of CSAF's 

Visit to SVN. Apr 62, pt 2; Itr. Moorman to 

Anthis. ca. Feb 28. 1962; CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d 

SECDEF Conf. Feb 19. 1962. 

9. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC. Feb 27. 

1962. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Mar 17, 1962. 

and to MACV. Aug 22. 1962. AmEmb Saigon 

to SECSTATE. Mar 3. 1962; Martin and 

Clever. Ill. 60-63; Moorman presentation. ca. 

Feb 62. pt 1. p 30. 

IO. MACV hist monograph. Milirary Assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam, 1960- 

1963. p I I. 

I I. Msg. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Mar 21. 

1962; msg. USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Mar21, 

1962. 

304 

12. Msgs. AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE. 

Mar 28. 1962. PACAF to 13th AF. Mar 22. 

1962, JCS to CINCPAC. Mar 27. 1962; hist. 

13th AF. 1962. 1.81-83: MR. Maj Gen John M. 

Reynolds. Mar 22. 1962. 

13. Report of CSAF's Visit to SVN. Apr 62. 

Item 6. 

14. Hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 62. Ill; Monthly 

Hist Rprts. PFOCO. Mar and May 62: hist. 

PACAF, Jul-Dee 62. II; hist. PFODC. Jul 62: 

hist. 13th AF. 1962. I. 81-83; hist. 509th FISq. 

Jan-Jun 62, pp 166-67. 

15. Msg. MACV to AmEmb Laos. Aug 22. 

1962; Proj Corona Harvest Oral Hist intvw with 

Anthis, pp 129-31. Itrs, Harkins to O'Donnell 

and Felt, Mar 22. 1963. 

16. Msgs. 13th A F t o PACAF. Mar IO. 1962. 

MACV to CINCPAC, Mar 24, 1962. 2d 

ADVON to 13th AF. Apr 12. 1962; CINCPAC 

Rcrd. 4th SECDEF Conf, Mar 21. 1962. ltem 5. 

17. Msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF. Apr 21. 

1962. and PACAF to CINCPAC, May 8. 1962; 

Report of CSAF's Visit to SVN. Apr 62, paras 4 

and 7; 2d ADVON Bk for May 62 SECDEF 

Conf. Item IA: Mueller to 2CCR. Jun 5. 1962. 

18. Msg. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Jul 17. 

1962. 

19. Ltr. Anthis to Pritchard. Oct 20. 1962. 

20. PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 62 SECDEF 

Conf. Tab I; CINCPAC Rcrd, 6th SECDEF 

Conf. Jul 23, 1962. Item 2. 

21. Msg. 13th AF to PACAF. Aug 6. 1962; 

Itrs. Anderson to Bowers, Jul 19. 1962. Anthis to 

Col Nguyen Xuan Vinh. Aug 8, 1962. and 

Anthis to Nguyen Dinh Thuan. Aug I I. 1962; 

hist. Asst for Mutual Security, USAF. Jan-Jun 

62. p 57; Chief. AF Sec, MAAGV, Agenda Bk 

for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5C; PACAF 

Summary of Actions, Gen Wheeler's Party, Sec 

1. Tab A. See also, PACAF Ref Bk for Oct 8. 

I 

I 

! 
Notes to Pages 133-138 

26. Msgs. CSAF to PACAF. Oct 6, 1962. 

CINCPAC 

Summary of Decisions Taken at 7th SECDEF 

Conf. Oct 8. 1962. Item 6. 

27. Msgs, PACAF to TAC. Oct 12 and 13. 

1962; Itrs. Anthis to Pritchard. Oct 20. 1962. and 

Moorman to Anthis. Oct 23. 1962. 

28. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF and 13th AF. 

Oct 22. 1962. 

29. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC. Nov 7. 

1962. and CINCPAC to JCS. Nov 9. 1962. 

30. Msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF. Mar 9. 

1962. CINCPAC to ADMINO. CINCPAC. 

Oct 22. 1962, 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 24. 1963: 

Moorman presentation, ca. Feb 63. 1. Question 

I I: PACAF Summary of Actions. Gen 

Wheeler’s Party. Sec I. Tab C; msg. PACAF to 

CSAF, Feb 14. 1963. 

31. Hilsman. To Mow 4 Nation, pp 453-67. 

32. AFXOPJ Book ofActionsin SEA. 1961- 

1964. Item Ill F; msg. CSAF to PACAF. Dec 

12. 1963. 

1962. SECDEF Conf. Tab A3; Itr, Harkins to 

Moorman, Oct I. 1962: ClNCPAC Summary of 

Decisions Taken at Seventh SECDEF Conf. 

Oct 8. 1962. Item 6: msg. PACAF lo TAC. Oct 

13. 1962: Long rprt. Oct 18. 1962. 

22. Msg. 13th AF to PACAF. Aug 6. 1962; 

hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec 62. III. Aug 13. 1962. 

23. Msg, PACAF to CSAF. Sep 29, 1962; Itr. 

Pritchard to Anthis. Oct 1, 1962. 

24. 1st and 2d Fighter Squadrons became the 

514th and 516th; 3d Liaison became 

the 110th. 112th and 114th; 1st and 2d Helicopter became the 211th and 213th: 1st and 2d 

Transport became the413th and 415th; the Special Air Mission became the 312th Squadron; 

tactical reconnaissance elements formed the 

716th Squadron: the 12th. 23d. 30th. and 41st 

Air Base Squadrons operated at Nha Trang. 

Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut,and Da Nang, respectively. Msg. CHMAAGV to CINCPAC. Sep 

19, 1962. 

25. Msg. DA to USARPAC. Aug 16. 1962. 

Chapter XIII 

Air Operations, 1962: Interdiction, Strikes, and Reconnaissance 

I. Anthis presentation at Mar 62 SECDEF 

Conf. in Hist. 2d AD. II, Docs 200.203, and 205; 

CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEF Conf, Dec 16.1961. 

Item 2. 

2. Chief, AF Sec. MAAGV, Agenda Bk for 

Feb 62 SECDEF Conf; Moorman presentation 

to Congressional Committee, ca. Feb 63, 1. 

pp 1-1 I. MACV Summary of Highlights, Feb8 

1962-Feb 7, 1963, pp 14. and 27-30: PACAF 

Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF Conf. Action 

Tab F. 

3. PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 62 SECDEF Conf. 

Tabs 1A. MACV to CINCPAC, 

May I. 1962: Itrs. Anthis to Brig Gen H. D. 

Aynesworth. Oct 28, 1963. and to Gen Jacob E. 

Smart. Nov 25, 1963, and Col Harry O. Patterson to CINCPAC. Jun 62; rprt. Capt Charles H. 

Tardiff, Aug 4. 1962. 

4. Report of CSAF’s Visit to SVN, Apr 62, 

Intel Sec; MACV, Rcrd, 5th SECDEF Conf, 

May I I, 1962. Item 8. 

5. Chief, AF Sec, MAAGV, Agenda Bk for 

Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5; PACAF Ref Bk 

for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Tab 5. TP-I; 

CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d SECDEF Conf, Feb 19. 

1962. Item 5. 

6. PACAF Ref Bk for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf 

pt I-B and Tab C; CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d 

SECDEF Conf, Feb 19, 1962. Item 5; msgs, 

AmEmb Phnom Penh to OSD, Jan 22. 1962. 

SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon, Jan 24. 1962. 

and AmEmb Saigon to CINCPAC. Jan 26, 

1962. 

7. CINCPAC Rcrd, 3d SECDEF Conf, Feb 

19. 1962, Item 3: msg. USAIRA. Bangkok. to 

PACAF, Jan 31. 1962; PACAF Ref Bk for Feb 

62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5. 

8. Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAGV. Feb 4, 

1962. 

9. CINCPAC Rcrd, 3d SECDEF Conf, Feb 

19. 1962. Items 2. 3. 4. 5: Moorman memo, Feb 

23. 1962; PACAF Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF 

Conf, Items 3 and 5: Itr. Maj Gen Richard C. 

Weede, Feb 27. 1962: msgs. JCS to CINCPAC. 

Mar 12. 1962. PACAF to CSAF. Feb 20. 1962. 

10. Anthis briefing. Mar 62 SECDEF Conf. 

in Hist. 2d AD. II. Doc 205. 

I I. Msg. 13th AF to PACAF. Mar 4. 1962; 

PACAF Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF Conf. 

Items 3 and 5. 

12. PACAF Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF 

Conf. Item 7; CINCPAC Rcrd. 4th SECDEF 

Conf, Mar 21. 1962. Item 5; Hilsman, To Move 

a Narion, pp 441-44. 

13. Easley End of Tour Report, ca. Aug 5. 

1962. 

14. Ltr, Anthis to Pritchard. Dec 20, 1962. 

15. The direction finder had been designed by 

305 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 

General in the basement of his quarters 

in Washington. was personally interested inelectronics and he hoped that various air 

navigation aids, such as radio 

range indicators, would give instant and unambiguous bearings on radio stations. 

CINCPAC 4th 

Mar Item hist, 

Recon Sq. I. 

Hist, AD, 157; MACV to 

May 1963; Ref for 

May Agenda Item Tab 3: 

CINCPAC 8th May 

Item 3; Air Interdiction and 

Ground Support, in Martin 

and Clever, Tab A. 

Ref for May 

Agenda Item Tab E. 

Bernard Fall, The Two A 

Political and Military Analysis, (New 

1963). 355-56; see 

to MACV, May and 

Report of Visit to 

Intel MACV 5th 

May I and 8: 

Agenda Book for May Item 

I-A; hist. I. 

citing Intel Digest. May 

1962: CINCPAC 6th 

1962; Item 5: CINCPAC to MACV, 

MACV to I I, 

CINCPAC to MACV, and 

and 

Anthis to 

Moorman to Harkins, 1962: and 

Harkins to Moorman, I, 1962: 

Maj Andrew Chapman to 

16 1962; 

CINCPAC to 

and AD to 

US of State. American Foreign 

Policy: Current Documents. 

Saigon to 

1962: 

Ref for Tab 

Report of Visit by Team to Jan 

para 

CINCPAC 

Saigon 1962: 

MACV Summary of Highlights, Feb 

Feb 40: memo, Lt Gen Le Van 

Limitation of Air and Artillery Supports along 

Vietnam Republic Border Corridor, 

to Saigon, 

to 

CINCPAC 

CINCPAC to I I, 

to Saigon. 

to 1962; 

Anthis to 

Ref for Mar 

Item 3: Anthis briefing at the Mar 

in AD. Doc 203; 

End of Tour Report, 1962; 

Final Analysis Directive Program No. 

39-43; 13th to 

Mar 1962; see Moorman 

Anthis, Feb 

Thomas and Douglas 

Evans Feb 1962: paper, 

Mar I. 1962: to 

and Evans May 1962: 

MACV to CINCPAC. May 

to I and II 

Hetherington 1962: 

to 1962: 

and Evans to May 1962; 

End of Tour Report. 

13th to Mar 

MACV to and 

to 13th and 1962: 

Ref for Mar 

Item 

MACV to CINCPAC, May 

to 13th Mar 1962: 

to I. 

and Evans May 1962; 

to 

to 13th to 

and CINCPAC to MACV. 

and Evans May 1962: 

Lt Col William Lewis to Mar 1962: 

paper. Mar I. 1962: hist. AD. I. 

I 10: Anthis to Maj Carl 

MACV Summary of Highlights, Feb 

1962-Feb Col John C. 

13th 10. Lt Col 

Miles Doyle to I I. 1962: 

MAY 9, ADVON to 

Feb and AD to 

1962; paper, Mar I. 1962: 

Ref for Mar 

Tab See also Counterinsurgency 

Lessons Learned. 1962: Col 

Winston Anderson, Jan 1963: Anthis 

to Moorman. 1963; 13th Final 

Report, 

to Anderson, 

Moorman to Henderson. with 

1963: Report of Visit by Brig Gen Gilbert 

and 1962; 
Notes to Pages 144-149 

52. PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 62 SECDEF 

Conf, Tabs IA. IC. and 5; Itr. Patterson to 

CINCPAC, Jun 62. Visiting Saigon in July. 

Gen. Walter C. Sweeney, Jr.. Tactical Air 

Command commander, urged General Anthis 

toestablish photocellsat Pleiku and Da Nangat 

once in order to speed the delivery of data to I 

and II Corps. Msg, 2d ADVON to PACAF, Jul 

17. 1962. 

53. CINCPAC Rcrd.6th SECDEF Conf. Jul 

23, 1962. Item I; msgs. MACV to CINCPAC. 

Aug 8. 1962. and CINCPAC to JCS, Aug 8, 

1962; PACAF Ref Bk for Oct 62 SECDEF 

Conf, Tab H. 

54. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS. Sep 8. 1962; 

rprt. Col J. L. Asbury. Jr.. Nov 22. 1963: hist. 2 

ODC, Jan-Jun 64. in Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64. 

IX, Doc 9; Oakah L. Jones, Organization, Mission and Growth ofthe Viernamese Air Force, 

1949-1968. p 50: hist, PACAF. Jul-Dec 62, II. 

and Jan-Jun 63. II; hists. PFIDC, Sep 62, Apr 

63; hist. 13th AF. Jan-Jun 63, 1, xiv. 

55. Msgs. CINCPAC to JCS. Sep 8,1962.2d 

ADto PACAF, Sep 14. 1962. and Nov 14. 1962. 

and to 13th AF, Nov 28. 1962; Itr. Harkins to 

Moorman. Oct I, 1962; PACAF Summary of 

Actions, Gen Wheeler's Party. Sec 11. Tab B. 

56. Two other RB-26s went at the same time 

to Thailand. PACAF Ref Bks for Jan and Mar 

SECDEF Confs; msg. MACV to CINCPAC, 

May I, 1962. 

57. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Nov 14, 1962. 

and Jul 10, 1963; PFLPL, Sep 12. 1963. 

58. Ltr, Felt to MACV, Sep I. 1962: MACV 

Summary of Highlights, pp 189, 213: msgs. 2d 

AD to CSAF. Nov 30. 1962. and MACV to 

CINCPAC, Apr 29. 1963; memo, Anderson for 

Anthis, Feb 23. 1963. 

59. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Sep 15. 1962. 

and Jun 26. 1963. and to 13th AF. Sep 26, 1962; 

Itrs. Anthis to Pritchard, Aug 4, 1962, and to 

Milton. Aug 9, 1962: .PACAF Summary of 

Actions. Gen Wheeler's Party. pt 11. Tab 1 I; 

memos, Col Harvey W. Brown for Rowland, 

Apr 19 and 22. 1963. 

60. PACAF Summary of Actions. Gen 

Wheeler's Party, Sec I, pt Ill, Tab A; msgs, 2d 

AD to PACAF, Dec 23, 1962. MACV to 

CINCPAC. Apr 29. 1963. 

61. Memo. Dir/Plans. USAF. for DCS/ 

Plans and Ops, USAF. Dec 17, 1962. 

62. Ltrs. McElroy to Anthis. May 6. 1962, 

and Anthis to McElroy, May 22. 1962. 

63. App C, RAAF ASU 18/3/Air (28). Jun 

14, 1962. 

64. Ltr, Anthis to Nguyen Cao Ky. Aug I I. 

1962. 

65. Msg. CINCPAC to DIA, Mar 13, 1963; 

PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf. Oct 8,1962, 

Tab K-I. and for May 63 SECDEF Conf. 

rprts. Maj Hal G. Bowers, Jan 9. 1963, and Capt 

Bryant C. Kuhman. Sep 4, 1962; 2d ADVON/ 

AF Sec. MAAG. MAAG Symposium. Aug 9, 

1962. 

39. MACV Army Sec. Lessons Learned I 

and 6. Mar 30 and Apr I I. 1962; msgs, MACV 

to CINCPAC. Jun I and Jul9.1962. CINCPAC 

to JCS, Jul9, 1962. and Aug I I. 1962.2d AD to 

13th AF. Dec21, 1962. PACAFto 13th AF, Jul 

30, 1962. JCS to MACV, Aug 3, 1962. to 

CINCPAC. Jul27. 1962: CINCPAC Rcrd. 6th 

SECDEF Conf, Jul 23, 1962, Item 1. The 

Marine helicopters wished to be based at Da 

Nang. but because the U.S. Army had a company there. they went to the Soc Trangairfield in 

the delta. Later, they traded stations with an 

Army company. because they were more effective in mountainous terrain. Maj John J. Cahill 

and Jack Shulimson. Draft, "History of U.S. 

Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun 

65,"pp 14-16, and 76-81. 

40. Mueller rprt, Aug 4, 1962; msg, 

CINCPAC to JCS. Aug I I. 1962. 

41. Msgs. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Sep 16, 

1962,and ClNCPAC to MACV. Ju128 and Aug 

3. 1962; MR, Col S. H. Nigrc. Jan 9. 1963. 

42. Hiat. 2d AD. pp 149-50: Martin and 

Clever, V. 52-53; Fall, Two Vier-Nums. 

pp 378-79; msg, CINCPAC to MACV, Sep 12. 

1962. 

43. PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 62 SECDEF 

Conf, Tab I. 

44. Ibid.; 2d AD, Ops Analysis Paper 3, Oct 

15. 1962; msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Jul 31 

and Aug 27, 1962. CINCPAC to JCS. Aug 28. 

1962. 

45. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS. Aug I I, 1962; 

rprt, Maj Eugene R. McCutchan, Aug 24, 1962. 

46. Ltr. Harkins to Moorman. Oct I, 1962; 

hist, 2d ADVON, Nov 15, 1961-Oct 8. 1962. 

p 150; Martin and Clever, V, 54; End of Tour 

Report. Capt Edwin J. Rhein, Jr., Dec 28. 1962; 

msg, 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 6.1963: 2d AD Ops 

Analysis Paper 3, p 17. 

47. Rprt, Lt Col Byron R. Kalin, Sep4, 1962; 

observations, Capt Bryant C. Ruhman, Sep 4, 

1962; msgs. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Sep 22, 

1962, and MACV to CINCPAC. Sep 14, 1962. 

48. Ruhman observations; Capt Kenneth H. 

Wells, Sep 14. 1962; msgs. CINCPAC to 

MACV. Sep5. 1962,and MACV to CINCPAC. 

Sep 14, 1962. 

49. Rprt. Maj William J. Kuntz, Sep 30, 

1962: msg, 2d AD to 13th AF. Dec 21, 1962. 

50. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF, Oct 31, 1962. 

and to CSAF. Dec 15, 1962: Burgin rprt, Nov 

15, 1962: Anderson to PACAF. Jan 14. 1963; 

hist. SAWC. Apr 27-Dec31. 1962. pp 188, 197. 

51. MR, Anthis. Oct 19. 1962; hr, O'Donnell 

to Harkins, Mar 8, 1963 

307 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 149-160 

Agcndaltem3.Tab E:Bernard Fall."Talkwith 06. Msgs. CINCPAC to ADMINO. 

Ho Chi Minh." The N~M Republic. Oct 12. 1963, CINCPAC. Oct 22. 1962. and to JCS. Oct 22. 

and in Fall. Ho Chi Minh on Re\dulion, 1962: CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf. 

pp 320-24. May 6, 1963. Item IB. 

Chapter XIV 

Ap Bac and Related Matters 

I. CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf. 

May 6. 1962, pp 2-a/ b-3. 

2. PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF 

Conf. Item I; MACV Summary of Highlights. 

Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7. 1963, p 95. 

3. Msg. JCS toSECDEF. Aug 13. 1962; rprt. 

J-5 to JCS. Aug 7. 1962. 

4. Ibid.: memo. Review of USAF Actions 

and Progress since May I. Ref Bk l'or July 62 

SECDEF Mtg. 

5. Ltr. O'Donnell to LeMay. Jul 28, 1962. 

6. CINCPAC Rcrd. 6th SECDEF Conf. 

7. Memo. JCS for SECDEF, Mar 7. 1963; 

memo and tabs. Lt Col Franklin Rose. Jr.. 

Dir/Plans. USAF. to CSAF. Jan 28. 1963; 

MACV National Campaign Plan for SVN. Dec 

15. 1962. 

p 2-2. 

8. Msg, CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 13. 1963. 

9. PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF 

Conf. Item I; Report of Visit by JCS Team to 

SVN, Jan 63. Scc Ill: MR, Col E. H. Nigro, Jan 

9. 1963; intvw with Lt Col Charles E. Trumbe. 

Jr.. by Grainger, Jul 13. 1963; msg. 2d AD to 

PACAF. Nov 5, 1962. 

10 Msgs. USARMA to DA. Nov 26. 1962. 

2d AD to PACAF. Oct 18. 1962; Itr. Col 

Winston P. Anderson to Dir/ Mat. 2d AD. Jan 

15. 1963. 

I I. Rprts. Bowers to Dep/Dir. JOC, Jan 9 

and Feb I. 1963, and Lt Col Donald K. Reamy, 

Feb 8. 1963. 

12. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF. Feb 6, 1963: 

memo, Anderson for Anthis. Feb 23. 1963: Itr. 

Maj James C. Dunn to 13th AF. Jan 21. 1963. 

13. Ltrs. Moorman to Harkins. Sep 3. 1962. 

and Rowland to Maj GcnGlen W. Martin. Mar 

14. 1963.2d AD to PACAF. Oct 22. 1962.and 

Jan 3. 1963. 

14. Msgs. 2d AD to 13th AF. Oct 22, 1962, 

Dec 10. 1962.and Jan IO. 1963. and PACAFto 

13th AF, Dec 8. 1962: hist. 13th AF, 1962. I. 

107-08. 

15. Memo. Anderson for Anthis. Feb 23, 

1963; msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Oct 22, 1962. 

Jan 8. 1963, and to 13th AF. Dec IO. 1962. and 

Jan IO, 1963, and CINCPAC to JCS, Nov 9. 

1962. 

16. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF, Oct 22. 1962. 

Jan 27. 1963. and MACV to CINCPAC. Dec 2. 

1962; MACV Summary of Highlights. p 66: 

PACAF Summary of Actions. Gen Wheeler's 

Party. pt 11. Tab D: Air Staff Observations. 

South Vietnam. Jan 16-30. 1963. pp 9-1. 

17. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Sep 14 and 

30, Oct 30 and 31. Nov I. and Dec 23, 1962. Jan 

27.1963,and toCSAF.Sep30.1962; MACVto 

CINCPAC, Oct 25, Nov 17 and 19. 1962: 

PACAF Summary of Actions, Gen Wheeler's 

Party. Sec II. Tabs A and 10: msg, Maj Gen 

John W. Carpenter Ill to Burchinal. Jan 23. 

1963. 

18. Rprt. Capt Lester G. Frazier. n.d.: Nigro 

memo of Felt Visit with Diem. Jan 9. 1963; 

msgs. CINCPAC to JCS, Oct 22. 1962. and 2d 

AD to 13th AF. Nov 22, 1962: Itr. Bowers to 

Dep/Dir. JOC, Dec I I. 1962. 

19. Bowers rprts. Dec 28. 1962. and Jan 10: 

1963: Maj Eugene R. McCutchan rprt, Jan 15. 

1963; Nigro memo, Jan 9. 1963: msg, 2d AD to 

PACAF. Mar 5. 1963. 

20. Rprt. Maj Herbert L. Prevost. Jan 15. 

1963; Report of Summary Briefing Given by Lt 

Col John P. Vann. Jan 6. 1963; Halberstam. 

Making of a Quagmire. p 146; Burchett. Vietnam. pp 193-94: JOC Briefing Summary, Jan 3. 

1963; msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 3 and 7, Apr 

6. 1963, and to 13th AF, Jan 4. 1963. 

21. Msg, 2d AD to CSAF. Jan 18. 1963. 

22. MR. Col S. N. Nigro, Jan 9. 1963; mags. 

2d AD to 13th AF. Jan 10 and 1 I. 1963. and 

CINCPAC to MACV, Jan 4. 1963. 

23. Ltrs, Anthis to MACV, Jan 16. 1963. 

Anderson to Dir/Mat, 2d AD. Jan 15. 1963: 

intvw with Truinbo by Grainger, Jul 13. 1963: 

PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf. 

Agenda Item I. 

24. Rprts. Lt Col Donald K. Roamy. May 8. 

1963. Maj William J. Kuntz. Feb IO. 1963. Lt 

Col Bill A. Montgomery to 2d AD, Aug63. Oct 

63. and Nov 63. and Lt Col Charles J. Chennault 

to 2d AD. Nov 13. 1963; End of Tour Report. 

Col Benjamin S. Preston. Jul 64: Itr. Capt B. L. 

Ruliman to Chief ALO/ FAC Sec, 2d AD, Jul2. 

1963. 

25. Ltr. Anthis to Smart. Nov 25, 1963. 

i 

308 
Notes to Pages 160-167 

(Washington. 1963). pp 549-53: Martin and 

Clever. 11. 8-10, 

42. Burchett. Vietnam. pp 85-99. 

43. Ibid.: intvw with Lt Col Charles E. 

Trumbe by Grainger, Jul 13, 1963: rnsg. 

CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 13. 1963: and PACAF 

Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf. Agenda 

Item I. 

44. MR.Col E. H. Nigro. Jan9. 1963: Public 

Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy. 1963 

(Washington. 1964), p 11: Report of Visit by 

JCS Team to SVN. See IV. para 7. 

45. Msg. ClNCPAC to MACV, Nov9. 1962: 

CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf. May 6. 

1963. Items I b and 4: House of Representatives. 

Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. 88th Cong. 1st 

sess (Washington. 1963). p 8: hr. O’Donnell to 

Harkins. Mar 8. 1963: and PACAF Ref Bk for 

May 63 SECDEF Conf. Agenda Item 4. 

46. MR, Conf with Ngo Dinh Nhu on Apr 

12. 1963. Intel Rprts 63 and 69A-702. box 1/ 15: 

PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf. 

Agenda Item 4: msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Saigon, May 13, 1963: House of Representatives. Fureign Operations Appropriations. 88th 

Cong. 1st sess (Washington. 1963). pt 2. 

47. Ibid.. pp 94-95: msg. CINCPAC to JCS. 

Apr 4. 1963: CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF 

Conf. May 6,1963. Items I and I b: and PACAF 

Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf, Agenda 

Item I. 

48. DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 3: IV.B.4.. 

Dir/Plans. USAF,to 

PACAF, Apr 30, 1963. and to TAC. May 20. 

1962: CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf, 

May 6. 1963, Items 2 and 4. 

49. Hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 63. 11. Jun 63: 

Manpower Review and Analysis of 13th AF 

Activities. Jun 28. 1963: End of Tour Report. Lt 

Col James C. Dunn. Jul22. 1963: hist. PACAF, 

Jul-Dee 63. I. pt 2. Oct 63: DOD Pentagon 

Papers, Bk 3: IV.B.4.. 12-13. 15-16. 

50. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF 

Conf, Tab 4C: intvw with Trumbo by Grainger, 

Jul 13. 1963. 

51. Msg. MACV to JCS. Jun 13. 1963. 

pp 89-91, 

26. Ltrs. Anthis to Gen Jacob E. Smart. Nov 

25. 1963. and O’Donnell to Harkins. Mar 8. 

1963: msg, CINCPAC to JCS. Feb 16, 1963. 

27. Msg. CSAF to PACAF. Jan 9. 1963: Itr. 

Anthis to JCS. n.d.: Anthis notes on matters to 

be taken up with Gen LeMay. ca. Mar 63. 

28. Ltrs. Harkins to O’Donnell and Felt. Mar 

22. 1963. 

29. Ltrs. Felt to Harkins. May 20, 1963, and 

to O’Donnell. May 24, 1963. 

30. Ltrs. Harkins to Felt. Jun 21. 1963. 

Anthis to Martin. Sep 2. 1963: MACV Directive 

44. Jul 8. 1963: intvw with Henderson by 

CHECO. Dec 20, 13th AF. 

Feb 6. 1964. 

3 1. Hilsman. Two Movea Nation. pp 453-67. 

32. Memo. Col W.V. McBride. DiriPlans. 

USAF. to CSAF. Jan 5. 1963. 

33. Report of Visit by JCS Team to SVN. 

Jan 63. The USAF contingent consisted of Lt. 

Gen. David A. Bruchinal. Lt. Gen. G.P. Disosway, 

Maj Gen William W. Momyer. Col Robert M. 

Levy. and Lt Col Harry M. Chapman. 

34. Report of Visit by JCS Team to SVN. 

Jan 63. pt III. 

35. Ibid.. see also msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. 

Jun 27. 1963. MACV to CINCPAC, Nov 17. 

1962. ClNCPAC to MACV, Nov 19. 1962.and 

PACAF to CSAF, Apr 16. 1963. 

36. Report of Visit by JCS Team. Jan 63. Sec 

IV: msgs. JCS to CINCPAC. Feb 17. 1963. and 

CINCPAC to MACV. Feb 17. 1963: Itr. Moorman to Anthis. Feb I I. 1963. 

37. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 24 and 

27. 1963. PACAF to CSAF. Feb 14. 1963. 

SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon. Feb 15. 1963: 

Report of Visit by JCS Team. Jan 63, pt IV. 

38. Msgs. CINCPAC to MACV, Mar 2. 

1963. and PACAF to 2d AD. Mar 2. 1963. 

39. Report of Visit by JCS Team to SVN. 

Jan 63. See 11. paras 2 and 2a. and See V, 

para la. 

40. Air Staff Observations. South Vietnam. 

Jan 16-30. 1963. 

41. Msg. MACVto DIA. Mar 12. 1963: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. 

US Senate, Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscul Year 1964. 88th Cong, 1st sess 

Chapter XV 

Air Operations, 1963 

I. Three C-123s were detached to Thailand. 

PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf. 

Agenda Item I: rnsg. CINCPAC to MACV. 

Jun24, 15. 

2. Msgs. USARPAC to CINCPAC. Apr 19. 

1963. CINCPAC to USARPAC. May 1. 1963. 

and to MACV. Jan 24 and Jul21. 1963. and 2d 

AD to PACAF, Jul 9. 1963: Itr. Anthis to 

309 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 167-1 71 

1963; hist. 6091st Recon Sq. Jul-Dec 63. pp I I15; PACAF Counterinsurgency Lessons 

Learned, Sep 12. 1963. 

12. CINCPAC Rcrd, 8th SECDEF Conf. 

May 6. 1963. Item 3; hr. Rose to MACV 5-5, Oct 

23. 1963: PACAF Ref Bk for May63 SECDEF 

Conf. Agenda Item 4; msg, MACV to 

CINCPAC, Apr 29, 1963: intvw with Kennedy 

by Gausche, Feb 4. 1964. 

13. Ltrs. Anthis to Brig Gen H. D. 

Aynesworth. Oct 28. 1963. and to Smart. Nov 

25. 1963; Mellish rprts. Dec9. 1963,and Jan 15, 

1964: Col Harvey E. Henderson End of Tour 

Report. Feb 5, 1964; PACAF Ref Bk for May63 

SECDEF Conf. Agenda Item 4; Ops Analysis 

Ofc. 2d AD. Counterinsurgency Lessons 

Learned. Jan-Jun 64. Jun 4. 1964. 

14. Rprt. Brig Gen Virgil L. Zoller to CSAF. 

Jul 5. 1962; see also Proj Corona Harvest Oral 

Hist lntvw 83 with Col William M. Martin. cu. 

Jan 30. 1971; PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF 

Conf. May 13. 1964. Fact Sheet 6; MACV 

Summary of Highlights, p 135. 

IS. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF, Jul IO. 1963. 

16. PACAF Summary of Actions. Gen 

Wheeler's Party. pt 2. Tab 20: Lt Col Miles M. 

Doyle End of Tour Report. Feb 6. 1963; intvw 

with Maj William J. Johnson and Capt Ernest 

C. Cutler, Jr.. by Grainger. Feb 7, 1963: Anthis 

file of items to be taken up with Gen LeMay, ca. 

Mar63: msgs. 13th AFto PACAF, Aug9. 1963. 

17. Ltr. Anderson to Anthis, Apr 12. 1963; 

hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 63, II. May 63; Itrs. 

Anthis to Brig Gen Joseph W. Stilwell and to 

Moorman. May 28. 1963; msg. 2d AD to 

PACAF, Jan IO. 1964. 

18. Quoted in msg. PACAF to CSAF, Jan I. 

1963. 

19. To conceal B-26s as strike aircraft. they 

were referred to as RB-26s. the reconnaissance 

configuration. 

20. Msgs. CSAF to JCS. Feb 8. 1963. 

PACAF to CSAF. Feb 20, 1963, 2d AD to 

PACAF. Feb 18. 1963; hist. SAWC. Jan-Jun63, 

p 166. 

21. Msg. CSAF to PACAF. Mar 5, 1963; 

22. Ltr. Anderson to Anthis, Apr 12. 1963: 

msgs, 313th AD to PACAF. Apr 27, 1963, and 

13th AF to PACAF. Apr 27, 1963; hist. 

PACAF. Jan-Jim 63, 11, Jun 63; Manpower 

Review and Analysis of 13th AF Activities, 

RVN. Jun 28. 1963; Henderson End of Tour 

Report. Feb 5. 1964: hist. 13th AF, Jul-Dec63.1. 

10-1 I. 

23. Hist Data Rcrd, 1st ACS. Jul-Dec63,incl 

4; hists. SAWC. Jan-Jun 63. II, Item 74, and 

Jul-Dec 63. p 119; hist, 13th AF. Jan-Jun 63, 

p 72; msgs. CSAF to PACAF, Jun 17. 1963. and 

PACAF to CSAF. Apr 30. 1963. 

rprt, Col Frank R. Pancake. Mar 20. 1963. 

Martin. Sep 2. 1963; intvw with Kennedy by 

Gausche. Feb 4. 1964. 

3. Ihid.: ltr, Anthis to Smart, Nov 25. 1963; 

msgs. 2d AD to 13th AF. Feb 25. 1963. and 

315th AD to P.4CAF. Feb 25. 1963. 

4. Hist. 315th TCGp. Jan-Jun 63. pp 15. 19. 

35; Itr. Maj Gen R.G. Weede to 2d AD, Apr 18. 

1963; hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 63. II. Jun 63. 

5. Hist. 315th TC Gp. Jan-Jun 63. p 24; Itrs. 

Capt Louis W. Gaylor to USAFS( P)V. Jun 16, 

1963. Anthis to Martin. Sep 2. 1963. and to 

315th CP. May I I, 1963; ACTIV. Final Rprt. 

6. Hist. 13th AF. Jul-Dec63. I. 17; intvw with 

Kennedy by Gausche. Feb 4. 1964; Itr. Anthis to 

Smart. Nov 25. 1963. 

7. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Mar 22. 1963, 

Sep 29, 1963. and Oct 5. 1963, MACV to 

CINCPAC. Oct 3. 1963. PACAFto 2d AD. Oct 

30.1963,CINCPAC to CSAF. Mar 15and May 

II. 1963: Hearings before the Committee on 

Appropriations. US Senate, Foreign Assisrance 

and Related Agencies Appropriations, for 1965. 

88th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1964). 

pp 160-61: Hist Data Rcrd. 34th TG. Jul-Dec 

63. p I and atch 3: hist. 13th AF, Jul-Dec 63. 1, 

116; hist. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF, JulDec 63. pp 53-54; memo with atch. Col Roger E. 

Phelan. Dir/ Plans, USAF. to Asst VCS. USAF, 

Aug 13. 1963; hr, Carpenter to Moorman, Apr 

I. 1963. 

8. Hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec62. II. Dec62: hist. 

13th AF. 1962. I. 107-08: msg. AF Sec, 

MAAGV. to PACAF. Aug 12. 1963; PACAF 

Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned, Sep 12. 

1963. 

9. Hist. PACAF, Jan-Jun 63. II, Jan 63; Van 

Staaveren. p 33: msgs. PACAF to 13th AF, 

Mar I. 1963. 5th AF to 41st AD. Mar 27. 1963. 

2d AD to 13th AF. Jan IO. 1963. MACV to 

CINCPAC. Mar 15. 1963; hist. 5th AF. 1963. I. 

59; PACAF Summary of Actions. Gen 

Wheeler's Party, Sec I. Tab F: hist. PACAF. 

Jan-Jun 63. I I. Mar 2, 1963. 

IO. Hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec 62. II. Nov 62; 

Report of Visit by JCS Team to SVN. Jan 63, 

Sec II. para 2c(S)(b); hr. Anthis to Milton. Jan 

I I. 1963. 

I I. Msgs. 1st Air Commando Gp to AFLC 

Ln Ofc, Jul I, 1963. 2d AD to PACAF. Aug 25 

and Sep 21. 1963. MACV to CINCPAC. Mar 

15. 1963,5thAFto4lstAD,Mar27, 1963. 13th 

AF to PACAF, Apr 12. 1963. 13th AF to 2d 

AD. May 6. 1963. 2d AD to 13th AF, Jun 27. 

1963,and PACAFto2d AD. Sep 13. 1963: hists. 

PACAF. Jan-Jun 63. II, Feb 24-Mar 2. 1963. 

III. Jun 63. and Jul-Dec 63. Ill. Jul 63: Itr, 

Henderson to Moorman, Jul 25. 1963; End of 

Tour Reports. Capt Harry C. Rudolph. ca. Oct 

63. and Capt Joseph E. Simanonok. Oct 15. 

P 9. 

i 

I 

310 
Notes to Pages 

Hist, 13th 22-23: 

"Chronology." for William C. 

"Reconnaissance in SEA," 

1-90; End of Tour Report. Col John C. 

Feb 1963: Moorman to 

Anthis, Feb I I. and Anthis 

to Moorman, Mar 1963: hist. 

to May 

and AD to Jan IO, 1964; 

Anderson End of Tour Report, 1963: 

Order 1963; 315th 

(Assault), and 

I; hist. III, 

AD to 6220th Jan 

Report of Visit by Team to 

Jan para 8; MACV Summary of 

Highlights. 

Memo of Felt-Diem Meeting. Jan 

1963: with by 

Anthis to Milton. 1963: 

Capt John 1963: and 

to Anthis. 

Saigon to 

10 

to Saigon, 

and Saigon to 

and 1963; Ref 

for May Agenda Item I: 

and CINCPAC 8th May 

Item 

CINCPAC 8th 

May Item I; of Actions in 

SEA, Items VI-E. 

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, Foreign 

of 88th 

(Washington, 1963). 

CINCPAC 8th 

May Item 3; CINCPAC to 

Digest. 

Capt Lester Jan I I. 

Feb and Mar 

Maj James 

and Capt Edward Robinson, May 63; 

Ref for May 

Agenda Item I. 

Lt Col Charles Allen, 

Capt Louis A. 30-May 

and 1963; CINCPAC of 

Special 

Item End Maj Walter 

Bruce, 

Hist. AD, 13-14; 

AD Regulation Jan 1963; 

Harkinsto 

Anthis. May Lt Col Charles Allen to 

AD. May 

and 

1963; AD to Jan 10 

and to AD, Feb 1964; marginal 

comments by Ross on 

Ref for May 

Agenda Item 

Counterinsurgency Lessons 

Learned. 1963; hist. AD. 

VI. Doc AD to 13th 

1963: Army Lessons Learned 

Feb IO. 

Martin and Clever. 67-69: AD 

to 10. 1963: Final Operational Test and Evaluation. in 

I I: Col Thomas to Hien. 

May 1963; to 1963: 

Ref for 

Tab 

Capt to AD. 

and Capt Fred 

CINCPAC to 

Jan 1963; and (draft), 

"History of US Marine Corps Operations in 

Vietnam, 65." 16-17: 

to 1963; with by 

1963: Simmons to 

1972; Capt Donald 

to AD, 

63; Capt Ronald A. Johnson to 

AD. and 

Anderson to Anthis. 1963; 

Lt Col Henry C. to II Jan 

and Lt Col James 

Maj Magnus Johnson, Feb 

and Lt Col Charles Allen, Feb 

I I, 1963; to ea. 

to II Jan 

and to AD, and Mar 

1963; Maj Magnus Johnson, to II 

Corps. Feb and Lt Col Charles 

Allen. to AD. Feb I I. 1963; Lt Col 

Charles Allen. Mar and May 

1963: Van Plans and Policies in 

South Vietnam, Hist. 1965). 

Maj John 1963; 

Bruce End of Tour Report. ea. 64; 

Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. Foreign 

Appropriationsfor 88th 

(Washington, 230; AD 

13th 

CINCPAC of Special 

Item 

Maj William I. Jan 10 

Lt Col James Feb 1963; End of 

Tour Maj Robert Butler. 

Ref for May 

Agenda Item I; Doyle End of Tour Report. Feb 

I 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 177-183 

6. 1963; msg, 2d AD to PACAF, Feb 15, 1963: 

hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 63. I, pt 2. Nov 63; hist, 

PACAF, Jan-Jun 64. I, pt 2, Jan 64. 

49. Rprt, Maj Clarence M. Van Meter. Jul3, 

1963; rprts, Lt Col Donald K. Rearny. Feb 28, 

1963. Mar 8, 1963,and 1st Ind. Lt Col James O. 

Cowee. n.d.: rprt, Capt Bob W. Quinn, n.d.,and 

1st Ind. Cowee, Apr 8. 1963: M Rs, Maj Stephen 

J. Carrig, Mar 28, 1963, Apr I. 1963; rprt, 

Burgin, Apr I, 1963, and 1st Ind, Cowee, Apr 8, 

1963. 

50. Rprt, Burgin. Apr 22, 1963, and 1st Ind, 

Cowee. n.d.; PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 

SECDEF Conf. Agenda Item I. 

5 1. Ibid.: rprt. Burgin, Apr 21, 1963, and 1st 

Ind. Jun 6, 1963; rprt. Lt Thomas G. Mclnerney. 

Jun 22, 1963. 

52. 1st Ind, rprt, Burgin, Apr 25. 1963; rprt. 

Mclnerney, Jun 22. 1963. and Cowee. 1st Ind. 

n.d.; rprt. Burgin. Jul 1. 1963. 

53. Martin and Clever, V. 96-97; rprt. Capt 

Fred W. Maberry. Jul 5-6, 1963. 

54. Doyle End of Tour Report, Feb 6, 1963; 

hist, 13th AF, Jul-Dec63.111, Doc 79; Summary 

of Aircraft Lost and Damaged, 1963; msgs, 2d 

AD to PACAF, Jul 5 and Jul IO. 1963; Itrs. 

Martin to Anthis, Sep 17. 1963, and Anthis to 

Martin, Oct 9, 1963. 

55. Anderson End of Tour Report, Apr 5, 

1963; Itr, Maj Gen Robert R. Rowland to Maj 

Gen Robert N. Ginsburgh, Apr 72. 

56. Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64. VI, Doc 31; 

PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF Conf, 

Tab 28; Itr, Henderson to Moorman, Aug I, 

1963. 

57. Msg. AmEmb, Vientiane. to SECSTATE, Apr 26. 1963: PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 

63 SECDEF Conf. Tab 28: rprt, Mellish. ca. 

Aug 21, 1963; msg. USAIRA, Saigon, to DIA, 

Jul 18. 1963. 

58. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, Nov I, 1963, 

MACV to JCS, Jun 13. 1964, 2d AD to 13th 

AF, Aug 21. 1963. 

59. Bruce End of Tour Report. ca. Jun 64; 

CINCPAC Rcrd of Special SECDEFSECSTATE Mtg, Nov 20, 1963, Item A4; rprt, 

Maj Robert K. Butler, Oct 30, 1963: Butler End 

of Tour Report, Jun 8, 1964; Burchett, Vietnam, 

p 89. 

60. Hearings before the Committee on 

Appropriations, US Senate, Foreign Assistance 

and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1964, 

88th Cong, 1st sess (Washington. 1963), p 374: 

MR, Ross. Oct 7, 1963; Van Staaveren. USAF 

Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963, 

61. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF 

Conf. Tab 28; rprt, Capt Donald V. MacKellar, 

Oct 9. 1963: MR, Henderson, Oct 7. 1963; rprts. 

Maj John G. Schmitt, Jr.. Sep 17, 1963, and Lt 

pp 73-74. 

Col Bill A. Montgomery, ea. Aug 63. 

62. End of Tour Report, Col Harold E. 

Walker, Aug 21, 1964; Debriefing of Walker, 

Sep 15, 1964 hist, 13th AF, Jul-Dec63, Ill, Doc 

79; rprt. Lt Col Carry Oskamp, Oct I, 1963; ltr, 

Col R L. Gleason to Carl Berger. May 12, 1972. 

63. Msg, 2d AD to 13th AF, Sep 2, 1963; Itr, 

Anthis to Maj Gen Sam Maddux, Jr., Oct I I, 

1963; msg, PACAF to CSAF, Oct 9 1963. 

64. Hist, 34th CAMRON, Jul 8-Dec 31, 

1963; Henderson End of Tour Report. Feb 5. 

1964: Capt Glenn E. Frick End of Tour Report, 

Jul 20, 1963; rprt, Mellish. Jan 15. 1964; End of 

Tour Reports. Capt Roy H. Lynn, Jr., Capt 

Thomas G. Cain, and Lt Wells T. Jackson, in 

Hist. SAWC, Jul-Dec 63. II. Doc 35. 

65. Martin and Clever, IV, 62-64; Maj 

William I. Burgin End of Tour Report. Jul I I. 

1963: rprts. Mclnerney. Jul 22, 1963, and 

Mellish, ca. Aug 21. 1963; MacKellar intvw by 

Grainger. Aug 29, 1963: Lt. Col K. L. Collings 

rprt. Sep 15. 1963; Combat Ops. 19th TASS. 

Dec 31. 1962. in Hist, 13th AF. Jul-Dec63, Ill, 

Doc 80: Mellish rprt, Oct 16, 1963; msg. 2d AD 

to PACAF. Oct 5, 1963; and Lt Col John J. 

Wilfong End of Tour Report. Jun 30, 1964. 

66. Rprts. Mellish. Jan 15. 1964. and Maj. 

John G. Schmitt, Jr.. Sep 2. 1963, and 1st Ind. 

Allen. Sep 12, 1963; memo. Ross for Anthis. Oct 

IO. 1963. 

67. Van Meter. rprt.Jul 18. 1963,and 1st Ind, 

Cowee. n.d.: Maj Harold L. Johnson rprt. Sep6, 

1963, and 1st Ind, Allen. Sep 17. 1963; Schmitt 

rprt. Sep 18, 1963, and 1st Ind. Allen, Sep 28. 

1963: Mellish rprt. ca. Sep 18. 1963. 

68. Ltrs. Cowee to 7th Div ALO, Jul8, 1963, 

and Mellish to Dep/Dir. Ill ASOC. Aug 20. 

1963; Mellish rprt. Sep 16. 1963; msg, MACV to 

CINCPAC, May 18. 1963; PACAF Ref Bk for 

Nov 63 SECDEF Conf, Tab 28; hist. 2d AD, 

Jan-Jun 64, VI, Doc 31; Quane rprt, Oct 19. 

1963. 

69. Msg, 13th AFto PACAF, Aug 12, 1963; 

PACAF Ref Bk for May 64 SECDEF Conf, II. 

Ops Fact Sheet 6; Lawrence J. Hickey. Night 

Close Air Support in RVN, 1961-1966 (HQ 

PACAF, Proj CHECO, Mar 15. 1967).pp 5.32: 

PACAF 

2B; msg, 2d AD to PACAF, Jan 10, 1964; intvw 

with Kennedy by Gausche. Feb 4, 1964: hist. 

msg. 2d AD, Jan-Jul 64, VI; msgs. 2d AD to 

PACAF, Nov 16, 1963.and PACAF to 5th AF. 

Oct 9, 1963. 

'70. Msg, 2d AD to 13th AF, Aug 21. 1963; 

Butler rprt, Oct 3, 1963: msg. 34 Tac Gp to 2d 

AD, Sep 13, 1963: Capt Thomas G. Cain, End of 

Tour Report, n.d.. in Hist, SAWC, Jul-Dec63, 

II. Doc 35. 

'7 I. Butler rprt. Oct 3, 1963: msg. 34th Tac Gp 

to 2d AD, Sep 13. 1963: Cain End of Tour 

312 
Notes to Pages 184-189 

Jun 64, III. hist rprt, Jan 64. 

74. Butler rprt. Nov 26. 1963; Itrs, Pierce to 

Dep/Dir. AOC. Oct 19. and 21. 1963; Quane 

Notes. Oct 19-21. 1963. 

75. Mclnerney rprt, Nov 27. 1963. 

76. Msgs. MACV to JCS. Jun 13. 1964. and 

JCS to CINCPAC. Nov I, 1963; Pierce. End of 

Tour Report. Jul 24. 1964. 

Report, n.d.. in Hist. SAWC. Jul-Dec 63, II, 

Doc 35. 

72. Collings rprt. Sep 15. 1963, and 1st Ind. 

Lt Col Milton R. Pierce. Sep 24, 1963: rprt. Capt 

Don O. Quane, Oct 23.1963; Butler End of Tour 

Report. Jun 8. 1964. 

73. Msgs. PACAF to 2d AD. Nov 19, 1963, 

to CINCPAC, Dec I, 1963. and MACV to 

CINCPAC, Dec 24. 1963: hist. PACAF, JanCHAPTER XVI 

Collapse of the Diem Government 

I. CINCPAC Rcrd, 8th SECDEF Conf, 

May 6, 1963, Item MM lb. 

2. Martin and Clever, Ill, 64; Dennis J. 

Duncanson, Government and Revolution in 

Vietnam (New York, 1968). pp 327-33; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee 

on Appropriations. House of Representatives, 

Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964. 

88th Cong. 1st sess (Washington, 1963). pt 3. 

pp 264-65. 

3. DA Pamphlet 550-40. Area Handbook for 

Vietnam. Sep 62. 

4. Foreign Operations Appropriations for 

1964. pt 2, pp 14-17. and 89-91; Public Papers of 

the Presidents: Kennedy. 1963. p 421; msg. 

SECSTATE t o A m E m b Saigon, May 13. 1963. 

5. Martin and Clever. Ill. 65-70; msg, 

CINCPAC to MACV, Jun 5. 1963. 

6. Msg. USAIRA Saigon to DIA. Jul 18. 

1963. 

7. Quoted in msg. PACAF to CSAF, Jul 23. 

1963. 

8. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. p 988: 

Dept of State. Bulletin, Vol 56. 799. 

9. Martin and Clever. Ill, 73-75; CQ Background. China and US Far East Policy, 1945-57. 

p 125. 

10. lntvw with Anthis by Gausche and 

Grainger. Aug 30. 1963. 

I I. US Dept of State, American Foreign 

Policy: Current Documents. 1963 (Washington, 

1967). pp 862-66; DOD Pentagon Papers, 

IV.B.5.. xiii; msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Saigon. Aug 21. 1963; and see Hilsman, To 

Move a Nation. p 486. 

12. Msgs. 2d AD to CINCPAC, Aug 21, 

1963, and ClNCPAC to JCS, Aug21, 1963, and 

Aug 25. 1963. 

13. According to General Taylor. the message was dispatched without concurrence by the 

Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

although Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric 

and Taylor himself were informed of its contents. James C. Thompson, Jr.. “How Could 

Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy,” Arlantic. Apr 

68. pp 50-5 I; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 

p 991; Hilsman, To Move a Nation. pp 483-88: 

Taylor. Swords and Plowshares. p 292; msg. 

State to Lodge. Aug 24. 1963. in DOD Pentagon 

Papers, Bk 12: 536-37. 

14. John Mecklin. Mission in Torment; An 

Intimate Account of the US Role in Vietnam 

(Garden City. 1965). pp 193-95; Martin and 

Clever, III. 83; US Dept of State, American 

Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1963. 

pp 862-66; msg CINCPAC to JCS. Aug 25, 

1963. 

15. Dept of State. Bulletin. Vol 56. 799; 

Baltimore Sun. Apr 4. 1968. p 4. 

16. Hilsman, To Move a Nation. p 492. 

17. Msgs, Lodge to Rusk. Aug 29. 1963. in 

N. Y. Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 197-98. State 

to Lodge and Harkins. Aug 29, 1963. in DOD 

Pentagon Papers. Bk 12: 538; Henry Cabot 

Lodge. The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal 

Narrarive (New York. 1973). pp 208-13. 

18. Msg, PACAF to CSAF, Aug 29. 1963. 

19. US Dept of State. American Foreign 

Policy: Current Documents. 1963. pp 869-70; 

msg. PACAF to CSAF. Sep 8. 1963. 

20. Public Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy, 

21. Msg. CINCPAC to A D M I N O 

CINCPAC. Oct 22. 1962: Martin and Clever. 

III. 127-28. 

22. Ibid., p 102; Buttinger. Vietnam. II. 186. 

242; Mieczyslaw Maneli. War of the Vanquished 

(New York, 1971), pp 132-52. 

23. US Dept of State, American Foreign 

Policy: Current Documents. 1963, pp 87 1-72. 

882-83; Anthony T. Souscaren. The Last of the 

Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam (Pittsburgh. 

1965). p 109. 

1963. pp. 651-52. 

24. Msg. PACAF to CSAF. Sep 8, 1963. 

25. Ibid.: Mecklin. Mission in Torment. 

pp 222-23; Schlesinger. A Thousand Days. 

313 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 189-198 

p 995: Dept of State. Bulletin. VoI 56. 799. 

Kennedy on November 7 ended secret reports. 

and Lodge restored the country team concept. 

26. Msg, 2d AD to PACAF, Mar 12. 1964; 

Martin and Clever. Ill, 80-81. 99-104; 

Halberstam, Makingofa Quagmire, pp 252-53. 

27. Halberstam, p 659: Schlesinger. A Thousand Days, pp 995-96; memo, McNamara and 

Taylor for the President, Oct 2, 1963. in DOD 

Pentagon Papers. Bk 12: 554-89: msgs, 2d AD to 

PACAF, Sep 29 and 30, 1963, and Oct 2, 1963. 

PACAF to 2d AD. Oct 9. 1963: Itrs. Frederick 

W. Flott to Harbin, Oct 2, 1963, Wade to 

CHMAAGV, Sep 30. 1963. 

28. Public Pupers of the Presidents: Kennedy. 

29. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1963. p 280 US 

Dept of State. Ameriran Foreign Po1icy: Current Documents, 1963. pp 875. 877; CQ Background, China and US Far East Policy, 1954-67, 

p 129; Hearing before the Subcommittee on the 

Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. 

United Stares Po1icy toward Asia. 89th Cong. 2d 

sess (Washington. 1966). pt I, pp 154-55. 157; 

Duncanson. Government and Revolution in 

Vietnam, pp 286-338. 

30. Martin and Clever. Ill, 106-07, 109-10; 

Thompson. Defeating Communisr Insurgency. 

p 42: Mecklin, Mission in Torment. pp 277-78; 

hist. 13th AF, Jul-Dec 63.1.75; msg, PACAFto 

1963, PP 759-60. 

5th AF. Aug 27. 1963: msg. JCS to CINCPAC. 

Oct 29. 1963; Shaplen. Lost Revolution. 

pp 188-212; Halberstam. Making of a 

Quagmire. pp 277-99. 

31. Ibid., pp 288-99: msgs. 2d AD to 

PACAF, Nov 28 and Dec 2. 1963; Martin and 

Clever. 111. 110-18. 

32. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF 

Conf. Tab IA: hist. Dir/ Plans, USAF. Jul-Dec 

63. p 233: US Dept of State. American Foreign 

Policy: Current Documents. 1963. pp 879-80. 

33. CINCPAC Record of Special SECDEFSECSTATE Meeting, Nov 20, 1963. Item IA: 

PACAF Ref Bk for Nov63 SECDEFConf. Tab 

4A; msg. 2d AD to PACAF. Dec 3. 1963; 

Mellish rprt, Dec 9. 1963. 

34. Martin and Clever, III 118: PACAF 

Background Bk for SECDEF meeting of May 

13, 1964, II. Ops Fact Sheet 6 hist. 2d AD. 

Jan-Jun 64. VI. Doc 31; CINCPAC Record of 

Special SECDEF-SECSTATE Meeting. Nov 

20. 1963. Items A2 and 83. 

35. Public Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy. 

1963. p 846. 

36. CINCPAC Record of Special SECDEFSECSTATE Meeting, Nov 20. 1963. Items B3 

and B4; Hearings before the Committee on 

A p p rop rial i o ns. US Senate . Foreign Assistance 

and Related Agencies Appropriations,for 1964. 

88th Cong. 1st sess (Washington. 1963). p 348; 

hist. 13th AF. Jul-Dec 63, I, 16 and 66. 

CHAPTER XVIl 

Objectives Confirmed, Methods Expanded 

I. PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of 

May 13. 1964. II. Fact Sheet 4: hist. Dir/Plans. 

USAF. Jul-Dec 63. p 65; New York Times. Pentagon Papers. pp 232-33: DOD Pentagon 

Papers. Bk 3: IV.C.1..4; Johnson. Vantage 

Point, p 45. 

2. Msg. JCS to CINCPAC, Dec 6. 1963: 

Johnson. Vantage Point, p 45. 

3. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF, Dec 20 and 21. 

1963: memo, McNamara for Johnson, Dec 21. 

1963. 

4. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. 

Johnson, 1963-64 (Washington, 1965). I, 106; 

PACAF Ref Bk for Mar 64 SECDEF Conf, 

Tab 8. for SECDEF Conference of May 13, 

1964. pt II Tab G; Cong Rec. May 9, 1968. 

p 12618; msg,2d A D t o PACAF. Mar IO. 1964. 

5. CINCPAC Record of Special SECDEFSECSTATE Meeting, Nov 20, 1963. Item 2A; 

Mellish rprt, Dec 9, 1963; rprt, Col Lawrence W. 

Brady. Dec 3. 1963; Halberstam. Making of a 

Quagmire. p 307. 

6. Mclnerney rprt. Dec II, 1963, 1st Ind., 

Butler. Dec 12. 1963. 2d Ind. Collings. n.d.. 3d 

Ind. Pierce. Dec 22.1963: msg, 2d AD to CSAF. 

Dec I. 1963: 2d AF Ops Analysis Paper 4. Feb 

II. 1964. 

7. Capt Richard W. Von Hake. rprt, Dec 17. 

1963. 

8. Mellish rprt. Jan 15. 1964. 

9. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF 

Conf. Talking Paper. Tab 28. 

10. Capt Kent C. Spears rprt, Jan 8. 1964: 

msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 4. 1964, 

ClNCPACto MACV, Jan 18. 1964; Martinand 

Clever. V, 99-102. 

11. Mellish rprt, Jan 15, 1964. 

12. Hearings before Subcommittees of the 

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. Supplemental Defense AppropriaI 

314 
Notes to Pages 198-204 

tions,for 1966. 89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 

1966). p 62: msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Dec 20 

and 21, 1963: Shaplen. Lost Revolution. p 232; 

CINCPAC Record of Special SECDEFSECSTATE Meeting. Item B3; see also memo. 

McNamara for the President. Mar 16, 1964. in 

Gravel Pentagon Papers. I II, 502. 

13. Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York. 1965). pp 153-54: DIA. Cold 

War (Counterinsurgency) Analysis. Republic of 

Vietnam. Dec 1, 1964. SecD,pp 10-1 I; Hearings 

before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations. U.S. Senate. Dept of Defense 

Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong. 1st sess 

(Washington. 1965). pt 2. p 764. 

14. AFXOPJ Book of Actionsin SEA, 1961- 

1964. Item VI-I: Gravel Pentagon Papers. III. 

35-42. 

15. Msgs. AmEmb Saigon to CINCPAC. 

Jan 30. 1964. MACV to CINCPAC, Jan 31. 

1964; Hearings on Military Posture before 

the Committee on Armed Services. House of 

Representatives. 88th Cong, 2d sess (Washington, 1964). pp 7120-21, and 154-56: Public 

Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1963-64, 

pp 256-60 Gravel Pentagon Papers, Ill, 38-39. 

16. CJCS to Dir Jt Staff. Feb 5. 1964. 

17. Msg. CSAF to Smart [Feb 641. 

18. Capt Donald V. MacKellar rprt. Feb 10. 

1964: Hearings before the Subcommittee to 

Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees 

and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary. 

US Senate, Refugee Problems in South Vietnam 

and Laos. 89th Cong. 1st sess (Washington, 

1965). pp 294-95. and 298: 2d AD APEX 

CPSACT Rprt. Feb 6. 1964; Maj Gen Edward 

G. Lansdale. "Viet Nam: Do We Understand 

Revolution?" Foreign Affairs. Oct 64. pp 84-85. 

19. CQ Background. China and US Far East 

Policy, 1945-67(Washington 1967). pp 134. 136: 

2d AD Chronology, Jan-Dec 64. 

20. Memo. McNamara for Taylor, Feb 21. 

1964: see also msgs. PACAF to CSAF, Feb 21, 

1964, and CSAF to Smart, n.d. 

2 I. Hilsman, To Move a Nation. pp 527-34; 

Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1963- 

64. I. 304. 

22. See msg, PACAF to CSAF. Feb 24. 

1964. 

23. Msgs. CINCPAC to JCS, Feb 8, 1964, 

and MACV to JCS. Jun 13. 1964; PACAF Ref 

Bk for SECDEF Conf of May 13. 1964, pt I. 

Tab F. 

24. Adm U. S. G. Sharp, CINCPAC, and 

Gen W.L. Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 1968) 

(Washington. 1969). 

25. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF. Mar 8, 1964. 

26. Gravel Pentagon Papers. III, 43-45. 

27. Msg. PACAF to CSAF. Feb 24, 1964. 

28. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961- 

64. Item IV: Hearings before a Subcommittee of 

the Committee on Appropriations. House of 

Representatives. Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965. 88th Cong. 2d sess (Washington. 

1964). pt I. p 369: msg. JCS to SECDEF. Mar 

2, 1964. 

29. 2d AD Chronology. Jan-Jun 64 SharpWestmoreland. Repor,. p 92; Hearings before 

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Supplemental 

Defense Appropriations for 1966.89th Cong. 2d 

sess (Washington. 1966). pp 64-65: msg, 2d AD 

to CSAF. May 12, 1964. 

30. Msgs. 2d AD to 13th AF. Mar 3. 1964. 

and PACAF to 2d AD. Mar 13. 1964: Mellish 

rprt, Apr 15. 1964. 

3 1. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p 3 10: 

msgs. 2d AD to CSAF, Mar 11. 1964. and 

PACAF to CSAF, Mar 12, 1964. 

32. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Mar 6. 8, and 

10. 1964; PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of 

Mar 12. 1964. Tab 2; memo. McNamara for 

Johnson, Mar 16. 1964. 

33. Msgs. 2CCR-64-077C and 0848. 

34. Memo, McNamara for Johnson, Mar 16, 

1964. 

35. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961- 

64. Item IV-I; PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF 

Conf of May 13. 1964. pt I: Public Papers of the 

Presidents: Johnson, 1963-64. I, 387-88: 

Johnson, Vantage Point, pp 66-67; msg, CSAF 

to JCS. Mar 14. 1964; Gravel Pentagon Papers. 

III.499-510. 

36. Msg, JCS to SECDEF. Mar 17, 1964. 

37. Hearings before the Committee on 

Foreign Relations, US Senate, Foreign Assistance. 1964. 88th Cong, 2d sess (Washington. 

1964), pp 541-64: msg, MACV to 2d AD, Mar 

27,1964: msg, JCS to CINCPAC, May 12. 1964 

msgs, MACV to 2d AD. Oct 29. 1964. and to 2d 

AD. Nov 20. 1964. 

38. Msg. 2d AD to CSAF. Apr 17. 1964 

PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of May 13. 

1964. Plans Fact Sheet 12; AFXOPJ Book of 

Actions in SEA. 1961-64, Item IV-M: msg. State 

to AmEmb Saigon, Apr 28, 1964; Public Papers 

of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 

(Washington, 1967). II, 760-63. 

39. Cong Rec, May 9. 1968. p 12618: CQ 

Background, China and Far East Policy, 

40. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64, I, pt 2, 66-67. 

41. PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of 

May 13. 1964, pt I. Tab C: Butler to ALO IV 

Corps rprt, May27,1964; Sharp-Westmoreland, 

Report. p 93; msgs, 2d AD to CSAF May 12 

and 13. 1964: New York Times, Pentagon 

Papers, p 246. 

42. Memo, CJCS to SECDEF. subj: Alterna1945-67. p 139. 

315 
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

ments on American Foreign Relations, 1964, 

pp 232-29. 

48. AFXOPJ Book of Actionsin SEA. 1961- 

64, Item IV-O; CM-451-64. Jun 5. 1964. 

49. New York Times, Pentagon Papers, 

pp 250-51 (Gravel Edition. III 174-77). 

50. New York Times, Pentagon Papers. 

p 256 (Gravel Edition, III 182); Johnson, 

Vantage Point. p 67. 

51. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC. Jul 2 and 9. 

1964: hist. PACAF, Jul-64-Jun 65. Nov 64 

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961-64. 

Item IV-O. 

52. Hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 64, I, pt 2. 171-72; 

New York Times. Pentagon Papers. p 247. 

tive Courses of Action. Apr 14, 1964: Joseph C. 

Goulden. Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf 

of Tonkin Affair-Illusion anti Reality 

(Chicago. 1969). pp 

Diri Plans, USAF. Apr 64. 

44. Lodge. Verbatim of Conf. Saigon. 

May 12. 1964, p 19: PACAF Ref Bk for 

SECDEF Conf of May 13. 1964. pt Tab G; 

New York Times, Pentagon Papers. p 246. 

45. Ibid.. pp 245-49: msg. JCS to CINCPAC, 

May 1964. 

46. New York Times, Pentagon Papers, 

47. Ibid.. p 250: Jules Davids, ed. Docupp 249-50. 

CHAPTER XVlll 

The War in Vietnam, 1964 

I. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 27, 1963; 

Sharp-Westmoreland Report. p 104. 

2. Hist. PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. I. pt 2.46-55: 

hist. Dir/ Plans. USAF. Jul-Dec 63. p 233; Itr. 

Smart to Taylor, Apr 8. 1964. 

3. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC. Feb 15. 1964, 

PACAF to 13th AF. Mar 6. 1964. to CSAF. 

Mar 21. 1964. and CINCPAC to JCS. Mar, 22, 

1964. 

4. Ltrs. Smart to Taylor. Apr 8, 1964. Taylor 

to Smart. n.d.: msg. CINCPAC to JCS. Mar 22, 

1964; hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64. I, pt 2. Apr 64. 

5. Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations. US Senate. Foreign Assistance and 

Related Agencies Appropriations for 1964.88th 

Cong, 2d sess (Washington. 1964). pp 206-07; 

msg. 2d AD to CSAF. Apr 17. 1964. 

6. Talking Paper on USAF Ops in VN. Jan 

7. Msgs. 2d AD to CSAF. Apr 17. 1964. to 

PACAF. Mar 24. 1964. and to 5th AF. Apr 29. 

1964. 

8. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF. Apr 20 and 23. 

1964. 

9. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF, May 7. 1964: 

PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of May 13. 

1964. Plans Fact Sheet 8; hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 

64. I, pt 2. May 64. 

IO. PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf 

of May 13. 1964. Talking Paper 4. 

I I. Hist, PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. I. pt 2. 

46-55. 

12. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item 

msgs. C S A F t o PACAF, Jun 17 and 19, 

1964, and MACV to JCS. Jun 19, 1964; hist, 

PACAF, Jul 64-Jun 65. I. pt 2, 46-55. 

1964. 

13. End of Tour Reports. Lt Col Bill A. 

Montgomery. Jun 27. 1964. Col Robert J. 

Loughry, Jul 22. 1964. Pierce. Jul 22 and 24. 

1964. and Walker.Aug 21. 1964;msg,2d A D t o 

PACAF, Jan 28. 1965. 

14. Ltr. Moore to Baron. Jan 18, 1965. 

15. Dir/Plans, USAF, Debriefing Rprt of 

Col David T. Fleming. Aug 9, 1965. 

16. Ltr. Col W. D. Ritchie to 2d AD. Oct 2. 

1964. 

17. Msg. PACAF to 2d AD, Jan 23. 1965. 

18. 2d AD. Ops Analysis Div. Tech Memo 4, 

Jul I. 1965. 

19. Hist. MACV, 1965.p 95: MACVDir95- 

I I. Jun21. 1966; 7th AF Pamphlet 55-1. Mar 20. 

20. Hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec 63. I, pt 2. Dec 63; 

msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Dec 3 and 9. 1963; Itr. 

Brig Gen Milton B. Adams to CHMAAGV. 

Dec 8. 1963: msg. PACAF to MACV. Dec 13. 

1963; msg. PACAF to 13th AF and 2d AD. Dec 

1963. 

21. The 41st Tactical Wing was established at 

Da Nang, the 516th Fighter Wing moved from 

Nha Trang to Da Nang, and the 62d Tactical 

Wing was organized at Pleiku. 

22. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Apr 20 and 

May 4. 1964. P A C A F t o 2d AD, Apr 18, 1964. 

to CSAF. Jun 3. 1964; Proj Corona Harvest 

Oral Hist Intvw 241 with Lt Gen Joseph H. 

Moore, Nov 22, 1969, pp 2-3. and 29. 

23. Lt Col Bill A. Montgomery rprt. Mar 12. 

1964; Itr. Maj Gen J. H. Moore to Ky. Apr 3. 

1964; msg, PACAF to CSAF. Jun 3, 1964. 

24. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF, Apr 20 and May 

2. 1964. 

1968. pp 25-26. 

I 

316 
Notes to Pages 212-219 

47. Quane rprt, Apr 14, 1964. 2d Ind. 

Osburne, Apr 22. 1964: Maj Alan G. Nelson 

rprt. May 4. 1964. 

48. Butler rprt, May 27. 1964.2d Ind. Lt Col 

Milton R. Pierce, May 30, 1964. 

49. Msgs. PACAF to 2d AD, Apr 14. 1964, 

2d AD to PACAF. Apr 15. 1964. MACV to 

CINCPAC, Feb 17, 1964; hist, 2a AD, Jan-Jun 

64. 1. 70-7 I. 

50. Msgs. 2d AD to 13th AF, Mar 3, 1964. to 

ASOCs, Mar 21, 1964. to PACAF, Mar 18, 

1964. and Apr 20, 1964. 

51. Msgs. 2d AD to 13th AF. Jan 21. 1964, 

and Feb 6, 1964. 

52. Msg, 2d AD to 13th AF, May 15, 1964. 

53. Msgs. 2d AD to 13th AF. Feb 6, 1964, to 

54. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF. Apr 12, 1964. 

55. Msgs, 2d A D t o 13thAF, Mar2. 1964.10 

CSAF. Apr 15. 1964. to PACAF. Apr 20, 1964. 

and PACAF to 13 AF, May 8, 1964. 

56. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Apr IS. 1964, 

and to CSAF. Apr 17, 1964; Itr. Harkins to Maj 

Gen Tran Thien Khiem, Apr 17. 1964 PACAF 

Ref Bk for May 13,1964, SECDEF Conf. Plans 

Fact Sheet 3; and AFXOPJ Book of Actions in 

SEA. 1961-64, Item Ill-N, 

57. Ltr. Moore to LeMay. Apr 7, 1964: msgs. 

2d AD to CSAF. Apr 12, 1964. PACAF to 2d 

AD, May 6. 1964. and CSAF to PACAF. Apr 

30. 1964. 

58. Memo. Sandborn for Moore, May 7. 

1964. 

59. Msgs, PACAF to CINCPAC, Apr 27, 

1964, C S A F t o PACAF, Apr 30, 1964. 13th AF 

to PACAF. May 8, 1964, and 2d AD to 

PACAF. May 8. 1964. 

60. Memo, Rowland for Ginsburgh, Apr 2. 

1972. 

61. PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of 

Mar 12, 1964,.Tab 9; Itr. Rowland to 

Ginsburgh, Apr 72. 

62. Msgs, 2d AD to 13th AF. Apr 24. 1964. 

and PACAF to CSAF, May 6. 1964. 

63. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961- 

64, Item Ill-M; msgs. CSAF to PACAF, Apr 

30, 1964. PACAF to 2d AD. May 6. 1964. to 

CINCPAC. May 4, 1964. and CINCPAC to 

JCS. May 8. 1964. 

64. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. May I I. 1964. 

to CSAF. May 13. 1964. 

65. Msg. CSAF to PACAF, May 16, 1964; 

Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, Foreign Assistonre and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1965. 88th 

Cong, 2d sess (Washington. 1964). p I8 I. 

PACAF. Apr 20. 1964. 

66. Msg JCS to CINCPAC, May 20. 1964. 

67. Hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 64, I. 48-52; 

PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conference of 

May 13. 1964, Item 6A; Maj Walter S. Bruce 

25. Montgomery rprt. Apr 16. 1964. 

26. Ltr. Anthis to Smart, Nov 25. 1963: 

PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF Conf. 

Tab 2A. 

27. Ltr, Ross to MACV J-5. Oct 23, 1963: 

PACAF Ref Bk for Nov63 

2A; msg. PACAF to CSAF, Nov 9, 1963: hist. 

PACAF, Jan-Jun 64, 1. pt 2, Jan 64. 

28. Msgs, 2d A D t o PACAF. Jan 10 and Feb 

21, 1964; 2d AD Ops Analysis Paper 4, Feb I I, 

1964: hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64. II, 28. 

29. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64.1. pt 2. Jan 64; 

msg. 2d AD to 13th AF. Jan 23, 1964. 

30. Msgs, 2d A D t o PACAF. Feb 18. 1964. 

CINCPAC to JCS, Feb 21. 1964, MACV to 

JCS. Feb 22, 1964: AFXOPJ Book of Actions in 

SEA. 1961-64. Item Ill-K. 

31. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF, Mar 8 and IO. 

1964: hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 64. III. Mar 64. 

32. Ltr. Smart to Taylor, Apr 8, 1964; 

PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of Mar 12, 

1964. Tab IB; AFXOPJ Book of Actions in 

SEA, 1961-64. Item Ill-K. 

33. Msg. 2d AD to PACAF. Mar I. 1964; 

Preston End of Tour Report. Jul 64; hist, 2d 

AD, Jan-Jun 64, IX. Doc 12. 

34. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, II, 31; msg, 

PACAF to CINCPAC. Mar 28. 1964. 

35. 2d AD Chronology. Jan-Dec 64 hist. 2d 

AD, Jan-Jun 64, VI. Doc 21. 

36. Msgs. 2d AD to PACAF. Mar 18. 1964, 

PACAF to CINCPAC, Mar 28, 1964, and 

CINCPAC to JCS, Apr 1. 1964. 

37. Preston End of Tour Report. Jul 64; 

msgs. 2d AD to CSAF, Mar 25. 1964. and Apr I. 

1964; trip rprt. Justin MacDonald and Howard 

Anderson, McClellan AFB, Calif.. Apr 10, 1964: 

Itr. Moore to LeMay, Apr 7. 1964: hist, PACAF, 

Jan-Jun64, A D t o 13thAF. 

Apr 24. 1964. 

38. Msg, 2d AD to PACAF, Apr 12. 1964: 

Mellish rprt. Jan 15. 1964:Itr. Moore to MACV, 

Oct 22, 1964. 

39. Capt Don O. Quane rprt. Jan 29. 1964. 

40. Lt Olin B. Gundiff rprt. Jan 28, 1964. 

41. 1st Ind to Gundiff rprt. ca. Jan 28, 1964; 

and Butler rprt. Jan 16, 1964. 

42. Mellish rprts. Jan 15 and Mar 15, 1964; 

2d AD Chronology, Jan-Dec 64. and Jan 16. 

1964; Lt Anthony J. Zilinsky Report of Staff 

Visit. Mar IO. 1964. 

43. Mellish rprt. Apr 15. 1964. 

44. Quane rprt. Jan 30. 1964; Maj Earl D. 

Jameson rprt. Mar IO. 1964, 1st Ind. Mellish. 

Mar 13, 1964.2d Ind. Lt Col Albert H. Holman, 

Mar 19. 1964; Mellish rprt, Apr 15. 1964 Mellish 

Itr. Mar 18. 1964. 1st Ind. Capt William M. 

Leimkuehler, Apr I. 1964.and atchd memo, n.d. 

45. Mellish rprt, Apr 15. 1964. 

46. Butler End of Tour Report, Jun 8. 1964. 

317 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 220-229 

Carlos O. Beasley Report, May 5. 1964; Butler 

rprt. Jun 4. 1964. 

80. Mellish rprt. May 15. 1964; Montgomery 

End of Tour Report. Jan 27. 1964; Pierce End of 

Tour Report. Jul 24. 1964; hist, PACAF, JanJun 64. I. pt 2. Hist Rprt. Dir/ Policy. Jun 64. 

81. Rprt. Moore to MACV. Aug 3, 1964. 

82. Ltr. Moore to Brig Gen W. E. DePuy. Jul 

17, 1964; Sharp-Westmoreland. Report, p 93. 

83. Pierce End of Tour Report, Jul 24. 1964; 

hist. 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. II. 58-60. 

84. Capt Franklin D. Peschel rprt. Jul 29, 

1964. 1st Ind. Maj Earl D. Jameson, Aug I, 

1964; hist. 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, II. 61-64; Itr. Lt 

Col John P. O’Regan to Dep/ Dir, III ASOC. 

Aug 21. 1964. 

85. Ops Analysis Ofc. 2d AD, Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned. Jul 4. 1964. 

86. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC. Jul 16. 

1964. CINCPAC to JCS. Jul 20, 1964. and 

MACV to CINCPAC. Jul 28, 1964. 

87. Maj Alan G. Nelson rprt. May 4. 1964. 

88. Msg. MACV to CINCPAC .Jul 16, 1964. 

89. Msg. MACV to OASD/PA, Aug 20, 

1964: 2d AD Operating Instructions I. Aug I. 

1964: Itr. Col W. D. Ritchie to 2d AD, Oct 2. 

1964; MACV Directive 95-4, Sep 7, 1964. 

90. Ritchie rprt. Oct 2. 1964; hist. TAC. 1964. 

I. 294; msgs. PACAF to CINCPAC, Sep 5, 

1964. CSAF to PACAF, Sep 7, 1964; Ops Analysis Div, 2d AD, Tech Memo 4. Jun I. 1965. 

91. Msg. 2d AD to CSAF. Sep 21. 1964; Itr. 

Moore to Baron. Jan 18. 1964; and Brooks End 

of Tour Report. Jan 9, 1964. 

End of Tour Report. ea. Jun 64; SharpWestmoreland. Report, p 90. 

68. Montgomery Rprt, Jun 8, 1964; msg. 2d 

AD to PACAF. Jun I. 1964. 

69. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, IX. Doc 12; Itr. 

Moore to MACV. Jun 2, 1964. 

70. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Jun 64. to 

PACAF. Jun 4. 1964. 

71. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Jun I and 7, 

1964. to CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT. Jun 3. 

1964. 

72. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS, Jun 17. 1964; 

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64, 

Item VII C. 

73. Preston End of Tour Report, Jul 64; msg. 

2d AD to PACAF. Jun 4, 1964: Itr. Moore to 

MACV, Jun 2, 1964; intvw with Col William E. 

Bethea. Jan 65, in Hist. 2d AD. Jul-Dec 65. V. 

Doc 5; hist. PACAF, Jan-Jun 64. III. PFMSS 

Wkly Activity Rprt. Jun 26-Jul 3, 1964: rprt. 

Moore to MACV, Aug 3. 1964. 

74. Ltr, Moore to MACV, Oct 22, 1964. 

75. Msgs. 2d AD to CSAF, Apr 17. 1964. to 

PACAF. Apr 20. 1964. and May 18. 1964. 

76. Ops Analysis Office. 2d AD, Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned. Jul 4. 1964: Lt Col 

Albert H. Holman rprt. Jun 8. 1964: and Itr. 

MSgt Clarence M. Hall to AOC. ca. Jul I. 1964. 

77. Hist Data. 2d AOC. Jul-Dec 64, in Hist, 

2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. V. Doc I I: Itr, Moore to Col 

Oakley W. Baron, Jan 18. 1964. 

78. Mellish rprt. May 15. 1964. 

79. Ibid.; Itrs, Rowland to Ky. Oct 26. 1964, 

Hall to Dep/Dir OAC. ea. Jul I I. 1964; Maj 

CHAPTER XIX 

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident 

1. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64, 1. pt 2, Jan2. Hist. SAC. Jul-Dec 64. III. 122-23. 

3. Ibid.. pp 124-25; msg, CINCPACFLT to 

CINCPAC. Jul 24, 1964; hist, 41st Air Div, 

Jul-Dec 64, pp 66-70. 

4. Msg. 13th AF to ATF. Oct 10, 1964; 

AFXOPJ Hook of Actions in SEA, Item IV-Q. 

5. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, Jul 2. 1964, and 

2d AD to PACAF. Mar 23. 1964: Itr. Johnson to 

Taylor. Jul 2, 1964, quoted in msg, CINCPAC 

to PACAF, Jul 3. 1964; see Taylor, Swords and 

Plowshares. p 3 16. 

6. Maxwell Taylor, "The Case for Continued 

Bombing of the North," Washington Star, Oct 

22, 1967: see also Taylor, Swords and Plowshares. pp 3 15-1 7. 

Mar; Goulden. Truth pp 33, 92-95. 

7. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Jul 16. 1964, 

and CINCPAC to JCS. Jul 20. 1964; DOD 

Pentagon Papers. Bk 3: IV.B.3.. 43-54. 

8. Goulden. Truth p 32; CQ Background, 

China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967. p 

142. 

9. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC, Jul 17 and 

Aug 16. 1964. 

10. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64. 1. pt 2, JanMar; Goulden. Truth pp 92-95. 

I I. New York Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 

12. Goulden. Truth pp 86, 127-28. 

13. The question of the covert activities and 

the South Vietnamese patrol-boat raids as provocation for the attacks on the Maddox can be 

followed in: Hearings before the Senate Com258, 288-89. 

318 
Notes to Pages 229-236 

mittee on Foreign Relations, The Gulf of Tonkin. The 1964 Incidents. Feb 20, 1968, and pt II, 

Dec 16, 1968. 90th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 

1968); Goulden, Truth; John Galloway, The 

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Rutherford, 'N.J.. 

1970); Eugene G. Windchy. Tonkin Gulf(New 

York. 1971); and Anthony Austin, The President's War (New York, 1971). 

14. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS. Aug 5, 1964. 

15. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, Item 

Ill-P msg. JCStoCINCPAC. Aug5. 1964; Hist 

Data, Plansand Rqmts Div, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64 

hist. TAC, Jul-Dec 64, IV, Doc 4; hist, 405th Ftr 

Wg, Jul-Dec 64. II, Docs. 2, 3. and 4; hist, 41st 

Air Div. Jul-Dec 64. pp 55-58: hist. 401st TFWg. 

Jul-Dec 64. pp 33-34: hist, 27th Ftr Wg, Jul-Dec 

64. App I; hist, 313th Air Div. Jul 64-Jun 65. p 

302; hist, SAC. Jul-Dec 64. p 131. The Thai 

government approved the movement of additional USAF forces into Thailand but was reluctant to have combat sorties flown from the country. The Thais finally agreed to the latter if they 

were absolutely necessary and if their bases were 

not publicly revealed. Msg, DEPCOMUSMACTHAI. to CINCPAC, Aug 7. 1964. 

16. Telecon I. 2d AD to 13th AF, Aug 7. 

1964. 

17. Msg. MACV to CINCPAC, Aug 6.1964. 

18. New York Times. Pentagon Papers, pp 268- 

69; msgs. PACAF to CINCPAC, Aug 8, 1964, 

and 2d AD to multiple addressees, Aug 7, 1964; 

Sharp-Westmoreland, Report. p 13. 

19. Msg, PACAF to CINCPAC. Aug 8. 

1964. 

20. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC, Aug 7, 

1964. and CINCPAC to MACV, Aug 8. 1964. 

21. Msg. AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 

Aug 9. 1964. in New York Times, Pentagon 

Papers. pp 346-48; excerpts from Summary of 

Taylor's Mission Rprt from Saigon, Aug IO. 

1964, in ibid.. pp 291-94. 

22. Sharp-Westmoreland, Report, pp 11-13; 

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 

Relations, US Senate, The Gulf of Tonkin, the 

1964 Incidents. 90th Cong, 2d sess. passim; 

Goulden. Truth. pp 76-81, 122-57; Davids, ed, 

Documents on American Foreign Relations. 

1964, pp 216-17; Johnson, Vantage Point. pp 

23. Bundy Memo on Actions Available to the 

U.S. after Tonkin, in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp 294-98; AFXOPJ Book of 

Actions in SEA. Item IV-T. 

24. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS. Aug 17, 1964. 

in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp 

298-300. 

25. Msg, U.S. Mission Saigon to State. Aug 

18, 1964. in ibid., pp 349-52. 

26. Hist Data. Plansand Rqmts Div. 2d AD, 

Jul-Dec 64; msgs, 2d AD to PACAF, Aug 25, 

1964, and 2d AD to 13th AF. Oct 28. 1964. 

27. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, Item 

IV-x. 

28. DIA. Cold War (Counterinsurgency) Analysis, Dec I. 1964; Sharp-Westmoreland. Report, p 94; 2d AD Chronology, Jan-Dec 64. 

29. JCS Memo for SECDEF. Aug 26. 1964, 

in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp 

354-55. 

30. AFXOPJ Rook of Actions in SEA, Item 

IV-x. 

31. Memo. Bundy for President Johnson. 

Sep 8. 1964. in New York Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 357-59. 

32. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item 

IV-T: Johnson Vantage Point, p 120. 

33. NSAM 314, Sep IO, 1964, in New York 

Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 359-60. 

34. DIA, Cold War Analysis, Dec I. 1964; 

Sharp-Westmoreland, Report, pp 90. 94-95; 2d 

AD Chronology. Jan-Dec 64; AFXOPJ Book 

of Actions in SEA. Item IV-V. 

35. CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1967, II, 962: 

Goulden. Truth, pp 159-60; Briefing by Chief. 

PACAF Assistance Team, Sep 64, in Hist, 2d 

AD, Jan-Jun 64, VI, Doc 3; Hist Data, Plans & 

Rqmts Div, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64 Itr, 20th PR to 

PACAF. Jan 1, 1965. 

112-19. 

CHAPTER XX 

Diffusion of Air Assets 

I. Ltr. Moore to Ferguson, Mar 16. 1965. 

2. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, Item 

Ill-C. Because forty air liaison officer and forward air controller teams would take all of 

STRICOM resources. only twenty were sent. 

Memo. SECDEF to JCS, Aug 7, 1964; DJSM1349-64 to ADS/ISA, Aug 5. 1964. 

3. Hist Data, 2d AD Ops Services Div. JulDec 64 hist, PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. Ill. Hist 

Rprt, DPO, Jul-Dcc 64 hist, TAC, 1965. p 627.. 

4. Msgs. JCS to CINCPAC. Aug II, 1964. 

MACV to CINCPAC. Aug 19, 1964, PACAF 

to CINCPAC. Sep 5. 1964. CSAF to PACAF. 

Sep 7, 1964, 2d AD to CSAF. Sep 21. 1964; 

319 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 236-241 

Brooks End of Tour Report, Jan 9, 1965. 

5. Hist, 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. II. 5. 

6. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Feb 21. 

1965. and PACAF to 5th AF. Apr 12. 1965. 

7. CHECO intvw with Lt Col Garth Reynolds. Jan 65: rprt. 2 CCR to MACV. Sep 2. 

1964. From July through September 1964.3.553 

requests for air support were received. of which 

2.403 were honored: 918 were refused because of 

a lack of aircraft. Ltr, Moore to MACV. Oct 22. 

1964. 

8. Ltr, Lt Col Clarence R. Osbourne. Jr., to I 

CALO. Sep 3, 1964. 

9. The 34th Group then discontinued the use 

of napalm on night support missions. Reynolds 

intvw. Jan 65; Hickey. Night Close Air Support 

in RVN, 1961-1966. p 34. 

IO. USAF advisors assigned to Vietnamese 

squadrons had never been prohibited from flying single-seater A- I Hs in strike formations. but 

Taylor first learned about this practice late in 

October. Thinking that high-ranking officials in 

Washington were unaware of this. he informed 

McNamara and General Wheeler, who saw no 

reason to change the situation. Rprt, 2 CCR to 

MACV. Sep 2. 1964; msgs. PACAF to CSAF, 

Sep 4. 1964, to CINCPAC, Sep 5. 1964. CSAF 

to PACAF. Sep 6. Oct I. and Oct 17. 1964, and 

CINCPAC to JCS. AFXOPJ 

VIII-G; 

I I. Rprts. 2 CCR to MACV. Nov 3, 1964. 

Jan 4 and Dec 2. 1965: msg. 34th Tac Gp to 2d 

AD. Nov 11, 1964; Bethea intvw. Jan 65; 

MACV Monthly Eval Rprt, Dec64, Annex B. p 

22; Bailey End of Tour Report, Mar 20.1965: Lt 

Col William R. Eichelberger End of Tour 

Report, ra. May 9. 1965; hist. 2d AD, Jul-Dec 

64. II, 44-45; hr. Rowland to Ginsburgh. Apr 72. 

12. Hists, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64, I. pt 2, Jun 

64. and Jul64-Jun 65. III. Jul64; Bethea intvw. 

Jan 65; msg, PACAF to 2d AD. Jun IO. 1964: 

Wilfong End of Tour Report, Jan 30. 1964. 

13. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Aug 11. 

1964. and CSAF to PACAF. Aug 29, 1964: 

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item Ill-R. 

14. Hist PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65, III. Oct 64. 

15. Bethea intvw. Jan 65: Oxburne to I 

CALO. Sep3. 1964; Miller End of Tour Report, 

Feb 7. 1965; and Itr. Janssen to Woodyard. Oct 

29. 1964. 

16. Lt Clare C. Eaton rprt, n.d. 

17. William B. Graham and Amron H. Kat7. 

SIA T: Single Integrated Attad Team. A Concept for Ofrensive Military Operations in South 

Vietnam (The RAND Corp. 1965): Itr, Col William Burke to 2d AD. Oct 29. 1964: msgs. CSAF 

to 2d AD. Nov20. 1964.2d ADto 13th ADand 

13th AF, Dec 3, 1964, MACV to CINCPAC, 

Feb 21. 1965: hist. PACAF, Jul 64-Jun 65. Ill. 

Book of Actions in SEA. Item 

Oct 64. 

18. Ltr, Moore to Baron. Jan 18. 1965; Hist 

Data, 2d AOC, Jul-Dec 64: Itr, Rowland to Ky. 

Oct 27, 1964: memo. Stilwell for C/S. RVNAF. 

n.d.: and Itr, Moore to Pritchard. Apr 27. 1965. 

19. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item 

VII-G; msg. CSAF to PACAF. Feb IO. 1965. 

20. Bethea intvw, Jan 65: hist. PACAF. Jul 

64-Jun 65. III. Feb 65: rprt. 2 CCR to MACV 

J-3. Feb 5. 1965: Guthrie End of Tour Report, 

ra. Aug 65: Bailey End of Tour Report, Mar 20. 

1965; Eichelberger End of Tour Report,ca. May 

9. 1965; 2d AD Ops Analysis Div, Tech Memo 4. 

Jun I. 1965. 

21. Hist Data. 2d AD Ops Services Div. JulDec 64: Itr. Maj Gen A. J. Kinney to Moore, Sep 

2. 1964. 

22. Hickey. Night Close Air Support. p 34: 2d 

AD Ops Analysis Office. Counterinsurgency 

Lessons Learned, Jan 18, 1964; PACAF Assistance Team Briefing. Sep 64. 

23. Ltr. Kenny to Moore, Sep 2. 1964: Hist 

Data. 2d AD Ops Services Div. Jul-Dec 64; 

Capt Joseph Yarrish End of Tour Report. Mar 

I. 1965. 

24. An XM-70 pod for launching 40-mm 

grenades from A-Is as an antipersonnel weapon 

had a feed system that frequently malfunctioned. 

The old 2.75-inch aerial rocket. previously little 

used because it buried itself in theground before 

exploding, received another warhead and an 

XM-427 super-quick graze-action fuze. A new 

"Westo" mix of napalm incendijel proved stable 

in storage. and stabilizing fins added to napalm 

tanks allowed delivery in a dive-bomb mode. 

But the fire pattern was small and left a longburning incendiary puddle in the impact crater. 

The best napalm employment continued to be 

the low-level splash attack. Variable-time radar 

proximity-fuzed general purpose bombs failed 

to have good antipersonnel effect. and the 2d Air 

Division fell back on the "daisy-cutter" technique. whereby nose-fuze extenders attached to 

bombs produced a waist-high explosion. Yarrish End of Tour Report. Mar I. 1965; address 

of Gen Moore at PACAF Commanders Conf. 

Feb 22-25. 1965. 

25. Kenneth Sams. First Test and Combat 

HQ PACAF. Proj CHECO. Dec 

8. 1965): Itr, Ferguson to Moore. Nov 12, 1964: 

msg, MACV to CSAF. Dec 29, 1964; Hearing 

before the committee on Armed Services. House 

of Representatives. Fiscal Year 1966 Supplemental Authorization for Vietnam. 89th Cong. 

2d sess (Washington. 1966). pp 5125 and 5160; 

USAF Spec Ops Force. Proj Corona Harvest 

rprt. Jan I. 1965-Mar 31. 1968. chap 3. pp 1-3. 

26. Msg.2d ADto CSAF. Mar 15. 1965: hist, 

27. Rprt, Asbury to PFODC. Nov 22. 1963: 

TAC. 1965. I. 298-99. 

I 

320 
Notes to Pages 

21-22: MACV to AD. Mar 

to Mar 1965: 

Col WITZENBURGER to MACV 

Feb 

AD. Analysis Tech Memo 

I. 1965; Col James HAGERSTROM to 

AD. 

to Mar 

and MACV to AD. Mar 1965: MACV 

Directive I. 

Hist, AD. I. 102-3: Montgomery End of Tour Report, 

Hist. AD. Of 

the remaining thirteen Caribous of the U.S. 

Army's Aviation Company, four were 

assigned to the 145th Aviation Battalion in 

Corps. three to the I Corps Aviation Detachment. the Aviation Battalion in the 

Corps. three to the Delta Aviation Battalion 

in Corps, and one to Bangkok. 

Dir/Plans. USAF. Debriefing of 

Fleming. 1965: AD. Debriefing 

of Col Robert Jones. 10.. 1965; 

Analysis AD. Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned. Jan 

Hist. Materiel, AD. 64; 

MACV to CINCPAC. 1964: hist. 

AD, I. and 51: A. 

and E. Patterson. Assault 

Operations, Jan (HQ 

Feb 1967). 40: 

to MACV. 1964; to 

MACV Jan 1965; AD Monthly Summary of Aviation Activities. Jan IO. 

AD Stat of Combat Support 

Missions, in Hist, AD. 

VI. Docs 

with Kennedy by Feb 

1964; Analysis AD Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned. 1964; Lt Col Victor Curtis, Tour Report. Jan 65: 

Maj Leonard End of Tour 

Report. Mar 

Fleming Debriefing 1965; 

hist. 315th (Assault). 64; Hist 

Data, AD Services 64: 

to MACV. and Curtis End 

of Tour Jan 

and Patterson. Assault AIRLIFT 

Operations. 40; MACV to CINCPAC, and 1964; Book of 

Actions in SEA, Ill-C. 

Hist. Dir/Plans. USAF, 

Saigon to 

1963; Charles Herbicide 

Operations in Southeast Asia, 1961-June 

(HQ 

1967). 

Saigon to 

1963; Moore to MACV. 1964: 

Lt Col Paul Rainowski End of Tour Report, 

Ross to MACV 1963; 

AD to Jan IO. 1964: 

Jan 

Ref for of 

Mar Tab 8; hist. 

III, Mar 64: MACV to CINCPAC, Jan 

Hist. 64: to 

Ginsburgh. 

I, 

Film processed at Tan Son Nhut was 

flown immediately to Clark Air Base. where the 

Armed Forces Courier Service picked it up and 

delivered it to Washington. usually within thirtyfour hours after a photo mission. Other copies 

went to for the U.S. Air Attache in Vientiane. who received them within twenty-four 

hours. In July. two were assigned to the 

Air Division as photo couriers. AD to 

May 1964; Hist Data. 

64; hist, III, May 

64: Col Allison C. Brooks to MACV 

Three were flown to 

where Thai pilots used them to photograph the 

results of strikes in Laos. Since the U.S. air 

attache in Vientiane wanted this photography 

within twelve hours, established a 

photo processing cell at Hist, 

I. 

Jan 

to CINCPAC. May 

13th 

and to I I. 

CINCPAC to Mar 

Jan I, 1965: 

AD to 1964: to 

MACV Jan 

Col Alfred The €C-47 in 

Southeast Asia. MAY 1966-June (HQ 

1968). 

AD to I. to 

IO. AD. 

to I I. 

Hist. 64: to 

MACV, 

Hist. to 

MACV. Jan 1964; his!. AD 

Analysis AD, Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned, Jan 1965; Analysis. TAC. draft. Planning and Control of the 

Air-Ground Operations in South Vietnam by 

Thomas 65; Col Lauren 

to AD. 1965; MACV 

Monthly Eval Jan Annex 

I 
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 250-257 

and Ross to MACV. Nov 3. 1963. 

61. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC. Mar II. 

1963. CINCPAC to ADMINO. CINCPAC. 

Oct 22, 1962; CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF 

Conf. May 6. 1963. Item I; msgs. CINCPAC to 

MACV. May I I. 1963. and CSAF to PACAF. 

May 13. 1963. 

62. Lt Col Ray A. Robinson. Jr.. End of 

Tour Report. Apr IO. 1965. 

63. Ltr. Ross to MACV. Nov 3, 1963. 

64. DOD Penragon Papers. Bk 3: IV.C.1.. p 

39; msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon. Apr 

28. 1964. 

65. USAF Spec Ops Force, Proj Corona 

Harvest, Apr I, 1968-Dec 31. 1969. Sec 2. pp 

25-26; rprt. Moore to MACV. Oct 22. 1964; 

Robinson End of Tour Report. Apr 10. 1965. 

66. Ltr, Moore to MACV. Oct 2. 1964; 

USAF Spec Ops Force. Proj Corona Harvest. 

Apr I. 1968-Dec 31. 1969. Sec 2. pp 25-26 and 

Robinson End of Tour Report. Apr IO. 1965. 

67. Rprts. 2 CCR to MACV J-3 Dec 2. 1964. 

and Jan 4, 1965: Reynolds intvw. Jan 65. and 

Bethea intvw. Jan 65. both in Hist. 2d AD. 

Jul-Dec 64, V. Docs 5 and'8; Capt Earl E. Tighe 

End of Tour Report, Apr 15. 1965. 

rprt. Montgomery to 2d AD. Jun 8. 1964: msg: 

2d AD to PACAF. Jun 18. 1964; Collins. Herbicide Operarions in SEA, pp 7-9. 

55. Hist Data. 2d AD Ops Services Div. JulDec 64; rprt. Moore to MACV. Oct 22. 1964: 

rprt. 2d AD) to MACV, Nov 3 and Dec 2. 1964. 

and Jan 4. 1965; Collins, Herbicide Operations 

in SEA, pp 9- 15. 

56. Msg. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Jan 30. 

1962: Gleason paper. ca. Mar I. 1962: PACAF 

Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF Conf. Tab 8; intvw 

with Col R.L. Gleason. May 12. 1972. 

57. CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d SECDEF Conf. 

Feb 19. 1962. Item 3; msgs. JCS to CINCPAC. 

Mar 12. 1962. and CSAF to PACAF. Apr 20. 

1963. 

58. General Moorman presentation before 

Congressional Committee. I. ca. Feb 63: MACV 

Summary of Highlights. Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7, 

1963. p 53. 

59. Msg, CSAF to PACAF. Apr 20. 1963; Itr. 

Anderson to Anthis. Apr 12. 1963: MACV 

Summary of Highlights. Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7. 

1963. 

60. Ltr. Anderson to Anthis. Apr 12. 1963: 

Itr. Doyle to 2d AD. Oct I I. 1962; Maj John P. 

Anderson to D/AFTU-Vietnam. Aug 21, 1963. 

CHAPTER XXI 

End of the Advisory Phase 

I. Msg. 13th AF to MACV. Oct 7, 1964: Itr, 

Moore to Baron, Jan 18. 1965: and Guthrie End 

of Tour Report. ca. Aug 65. 

2. Kenneth Sams. Historical Background to 

Viegcong Morrar Attack on Bien Hoa (HQ 

PACAF, Proj CHECO. Nov9. 1964): Hit Rprt, 

PFOOP. Aug 64: Moore address at PACAF 

Commander's Conf. Feb 22-25. 1965: hist. 

PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. II. pt 2. 

3. Ibid., Hist Rprt, PFOOP. Aug64. Ill.and 

Sep 64; AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 

1961-1964. Items IV-X. IV-V, and IV-Y: New 

York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp 320-22; Johnson, Vantage.Point, p 119. LeMay intvw, May 

29. 1972. 

4. Hist. 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64. II. 94. 

5. Sharp-Westmoreland. Report. p 95: rprt. 

Edwards to 2d AD Hist Ofc, ca. Jan 65; Guthrie 

End of Tour Report, ca. Aug 65. 

6. "The Lowdown from the Top U.S. Command in Saigon." Life, Nov 27. 1961. pp 46, 

51-53: AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961- 

1964. Item IV-Y. 

7. Ibid.; New York Times, Pentagon Papers, 

pp 324-25. 

1964, Items IV-Y and IV-Z. 

York Times, Pentagon Papers, p 335. 

Actions in SEA. 1961-1964. Item IV-2; msgs, 

JCS to CINCPAC, Dec 19. 1964. and CINCPAC to MACV. Jan 9. 1965: Brooks End of 

Tour Report. Jan 9. 1965. 

II. Msgs.2dADto23dABGp.Dec24. 1964. 

and to 80th TFS. Dec 25. 1964, CSAF to 

PACAF. Dec 24. 1964: hists. 19th TFW. JulDec 64. p 40, Jan-Jun 65. p3; Robert T. Helmka 

and Beverly Hale, USAF Operarions,from Thailand. 1964-1965 (HQ PACAF. Proj CHECO. 

Aug IO. 1966). pp 81-82; AFXOPLC. Analysis 

of Southeast Asia Air Operations, I. Sec 2. 

12. Msgs, Det 2, 18th TFW, to 2d AD, Jan 

18. l965,2d AD to PACAF, Jan 17. 1965. 13th 

AF to PACAF. Jan 27. 1965. and 2d AD to 

CSAF, Mar 15. 1965: Helmkaand Hale. USAF 

Operarions from Thailand. pp 6 1-65. 123. 

13. Ibid.. p 91: Public Papers of the Presi8. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961- 

9. Msg, MACVto2d AD. Dec 19, 1964; New 

IO. Ibid.. PP 335-36; AFXOPJ Book of 

322 
Notes to Pages 258-267 

dents: Lyndon E. Johnson. 1965 (Washington. 

1966). 1.57: New York Timer. Pentagon Papers. 

p 339. 

14. Msgs. ADMINO. CINCPAC. to CINCPAC. Feb 27. 1965. AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE. Jan 18. 1965. to CINCPAC. Mar 1. 

1965. and 13th A F t o CINCPAC, Jan 30. 1965; 

AFXOPLC, Analysis of Southeast Asia Air 

Operations. I. Sec 2. 

15. Msgs. CINCPAC to JCS. Jan 21. 1965. 

PACAF to 13th AF. Jan 23, 1965. AmEmb 

Vientiane to SECSTATE. Mar 6. 1965. 

USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF. Jan 24. 1965. 

JCS to CINCPAC. Jan26. 1965. AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC. Jan 27. 1965. OASD/lSA to AmEmb Vientiane,-Feb 3. 1965. 13th AF to 

PACAF, Feb 6. 1965, AFXOPLC, Analysis of 

Southeast Asia Air Operations. I. Sec 2. p 8-9: 

Helmka and Hale. USAF Operations from 

Thailand, 1964-1 965. pp 19. 7 I. 84. 

16. Msg. MACV to 2d AD. Dec 28. 1964: 

New York Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 336-37: 

Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 

pp 43. 166-67: James C. Thompson, Jr.. "How 

Could Vietnam Happen'?". p 5 1. 

17. Sandborn. End of Tour Report, Dec 8. 

1961: Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp 106-08. 

18. Hist. 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. II, 99; Itrs. 

Moore to Ky. Dec 29, 1964, and Rowland to 

Ginsburgh, Apr 72. 

19. Hist, 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. II, 109-12; rprt. 

Capt Stanton R. Musser. Dec 14. 1964. 

20. Ltr. Moore to Baron. Jan 18. 1965: rprt. 2 

CCR to MACV J-3. Jan 4. 1965: Sam, First 

Test and Combat Use of AC-47. p 5. 

21. Woodyard rprt; Kenneth Sames. The 

Battle of Binh Gia. 27 Dec 64 I Jan 65 (HQ 

PACAF. Proj CHECO, Dec 27. 1965). p 2. 

22. Ibid.. pp 2-6. 

23. Woodyard rprt: hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. 

24. Ibid., p 15. 

25. Sams, The Battle of Binh Gia. pp 6-8. 

26. New York Times. Pentagon Papers. pp 

337-40. 

27. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 65, II. 8 and I I: Itrs. 

Everding to Hiller, Jan 8. 1965. Rowland to 

Ginsburgh. Apr 72; Brig Gen A.W. Schinz 

Debriefing Report. Oct 22. 1966. 

II. 12 and 15. 

28. Msg. PACAF to CSAF. Jan 6. 1965. 

29. Hist, PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. III. Jan 65; 

msgs, PACAF to 13th AF, Jan 23, 1965, and to 

5th AF. Apr 12. 1965. 

30. Sharp-Westmoreland, Report, p 107: 

memo. Edumunds for Moore. Jan 18. 1965; 

PACAF Activity Input to Proj Corona Harvest 

on In-Country Strike Operations in Southeast 

Asia. I Jan 65-31 Mar68.V.pt I. 1965. 15-18; 

and msgs. PACAF to 13th AF. Jan 23, 1965. 

and 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 28. 1965. 

31. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961- 

1964. Item V-1: msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, 

Jan 2. 1965. PACAF to 13th AF, Jan 23. 1965. 

13th AF to 

2d AD, Feb 15. 1965. 

32. Msg, 2d AD to PACAF. Jan 28. 1965. 

33. Ltr. Col H.L. Price to 2d AD, Jan 2. 1965: 

34. MACV. Monthly Evaluation Rprt. Jan 

35. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 65, II. 16-17. 22. 

36. Feb 

4. 1964; hist, 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65, II. 29: Robinson End of Tour Report, Apr 10. 1965; MR. 

Woodyard, Mar I. 1965. 

37. New York Times, Pentagon Papers. p 

337; Ball, Discipline of Power. pp 317-18: Taylor. "The Case for Continued Bombing." 

38. Sharp-Westmoreland, Report. p 107; 

hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. II. 8. 

39. Stebbins. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1966. p 129: Cooper. Lost Crusade. pp 255-62: Donald S. Zagoria. Vietnam 

Triangle (New York. 1967). p 151: Johnson. 

Vantage Point. pp 122-24. 

40. Rprt of Investigation, Pleiku Incident. by 

Board of Officers to Investigate Incident at 

MACV Compound and Camp Holloway. 

Pleiku, RVN. Maj Gen Milton B. Adams, 

USAF, President. Feb 16. 1965. 

41. Sharp-Westmoreland. Report. pp 14-15: 

hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. pp 22-26. 

42. Hist, PACAF. Jul I, 1964-Jun 30, 1965. 

I. pt 2, 96: hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 65. II. 238-239: 

msg, PACAF to 13th AF and 5th AF. Feb 65. 

43. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 65. II. 26-28; 

Bethea intvw. Jun 6, 1965: Guthrie End of Tour 

Report, ca. Aug 65. 

44. Hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. II. 31-33. 

45. Sharp-Westmoreland. Report. pp 107- 

108: hist, 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65, II. 34-35: Itr. 

Mataxis to 2d AD, Feb 28. 1965: msg. MACV to 

CINCPAC. Feb 21. 1965. 

46. MACV. Monthly Evaluation Rprt. Mar 

65, Annex B. p 23. 

47. Msgs. PACAF to 2d AD. Mar 2. 1965. 

CSAF to PACAF. Mar 6, 1965. CS to CINCPAC. Mar 9. 1965,and ADMINO. CINCPAC. 

to MACV. Mar 10. 1965. 

MACV Immediate Release, Jan 65. 

65. Annex B. Air Force, p 19. 

323 

A- I E Skyraider 

A-I H Skyraider 

AD-4 Skyraider 

AD-5 aircraft 

aircraft 

AD-6 aircraft 

R 

AB 

Able 

AD 

Prop-driven, single-engine, land- or carrier-based multipurpose aircraft. 

developed to permit greater versatility as an attack bomber or utility 

aircraft. Two crew. Formerly designated AD-5. 

Prop-driven, single-engine. land- or carrier-based multipurpose aircraft. 

Carrying heavy stores on its centerline rack, this plane is especially 

equipped for low-level attack bombing. A single-seater, like all Skyraiders 

other than the series. Formerly designated AD-6. 

The C-47 transport converted into a gunship by adding the General 

Electric I A The had several nicknames: Puff the 

Magic Dragon, Dragon Ship, and Spooky. 

Prop-driven. single-engine, land- or carrier-based aircraft used for divebombing, tactical support, and other combat missions. One crew. 

See A- I E Skyraider. 

See EA-I F Skyraider. 

See A-I H Skyraider. 

antiaircraft 

Army Air-Ground System (US) 

Army Air Operations Section, MACV 

air-to-air refueling 

air base 

air base advisory team 

air base group 

United States Air Force photographic reconnaissance detachment at Don 

Royal Thai Air Force Base( 1961-62) Tan Son Nhut Air 

Base. 

air base squadron 

airlift command post: airborne command post. 

air commando squadron 

Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Army Concept Team in Vietnam (US) 

air division 

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 

administrative office 

advanced echelon 

air depot wing 

Air Force 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

AFAG 

AFB 

AFCC 

AFCHO 

AFF 

AFLC 

AF Sec, MAAGV 

AFTU-V 

AFXOD 

AFXOP 

AFXOPI 

AFXOPJ 

AFXOPLC 

AFXPD 

Agile 

AGM 

AGOS 

AID 

AIG 

AlRA 

Air Link 

Air Progress 

ALCC 

ALO 

ALPIT 

Amb 

AMC 

AmEmb 

AMFPA 

AOC 

aPP 

ARDF 

Air Force Advisory Group 

Air Force Base 

Air Force component commander 

Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force 

Army Field Forces, South Vietnam 

Air Force Logistics Command 

Air Force Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam 

Air Force Test Unit - Vietnam (US) 

Director of Doctrine. Concepts. and Objectives. United States Air Force 

Director of Operations. United States Air Force 

Special Air Warfare Division, Deputy for Tactical/Transport Forces. 

Directorate of Operations, United States Air Force 

Assistant Director for Joint Matters. Directorate of Operations. United 

States Air Force 

Tactical Division. Deputy for Tactical/Transport Forces. Directorate of 

Operations, United States Air Force 

Director of Plans. United States Air Force 

Remote area counterinsurgency research and development by Advanced 

Research Projects Agency. 

air-to-ground missile 

Air-Ground Operations School (USAF) 

Agency for International Development (US) 

address indicating group 

air attach; 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization air exercise in Thailand (1957). 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization air maneuver in Thailand ( 1959). 

airlift control center 

air liaison officer 

Authorized Low Priority Interdiction Target 

Am bassad or 

Air Materiel Command 

American Embassy 

Air Materiel Force Pacific Area (USAF) 

air operations center 

appendix 

airborne radio direction finding 

326 
ARMA Army attache 

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency. A separately organized research and 

development agency of the Department of Defense under the direction 

and supervision of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. 

ARPAC Army Forces. Pacific (US) 

ARVN 

ASD/ ISA 

AS1 Aerospace Studies Institute (USAF) 

ASOC air support operations center 

Associated States 

in Indochina 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

Vietnam, Laos. and Cambodia 

asst assistant 

A-Staff Air Staff. Formerly used in numerical combinations as with J-Staff. which 

see. 

ASU aeromedical staging unit 

atch attachment 

atchd attached 

ATF air task force 

ATF-I3(P) 

ATGp air transport group 

ATSq air transport squadron 

AVCO aviation company (USA) 

13th Air Task Force (Provisional) (USAF) 

8-26 Invader A three-place, midwing, all-metal monoplane, light-bombardment aircraft 

with tricycle landing gear. Powered by two prop-driven engines. Three 

crew. 

8-57 Canberra 

B-58 Hustler 

8-47 Stratojet A swept, high-wing, multi-engine jet aircraft with swept tail surfaces and 

tandem landing gear. Four engines are paired in pods below and forward of the wings. Other two engines are in individual pods at wing tips. 

Three crew. 

A wide-short, midwing, twin-jet bomber aircraft with retractable tricycle 

landing gear. Two crew. 

Long-range, high-altitude, high-speed aircraft. Wing is full cantilever midwing modified delta design. Powered by four turbojet engines equipped 

with afterburners. Engines mounted inindividual nacelles, two per wing. 

mounted on pylons beneath each wing. 

Bristol Type 170 Prop-driven, twin-engine. cantilever high-wing monoplane designed as a 

freight or passenger transport. Used in Southeast Asia by the Royal New 

Zealand Air Force. 

British Supermarine I An amphibious aircraft used by the British during World War II for 

reconnaissance and general naval duties, including air/sea rescue. The 

French Navy employed this aircraft in Indochina. 

Sea Otter 

327 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Back Porch 

Barn Door 

Barrel Roll 

Bell Tone 

Bent Bow 

Big Safari 

Binh Lam Special 

Zone 

Black Watch 

Booster Shot 

Box Top 

Brave Bull 

C-54 Skymaster 

C-I Flying Boxcar 

C-I Provider 

C-I24 Globeinaster 

United States communications system in South Vietnam. 

Movement of French military personnel by air from Europe to Vietnam 

Establishment of tactical air control system in South Vietnam ( 1962). Barn 

Door II extended the system to Thailand. 

United Statesair interdiction ineastern later limited 

activity in northern Laos. 

bomb damage assessment 

United States Air Force airdefense detachment at Don Royal Thai 

Air Force Base. 

Rapid delivery airdrop 

Air Force Logistics Command technical rework of infrared equipment 

Republic of Vietnam Armed tactical zone in the provinces of 

Binh and Lam Dong (1964). 

book 

photographic activity in Laos that was transferred to Vietnam 

Pacific Air Forces airdelivered village aid project in 

United States Air Force intelligence over the Gulf of 

1964). 

An especially modified C-97 employed for reconnaissance in Southeast 

Asia during 

Light. low-wing. prop-driven, twin-engine cargo aircraft of all-metal construction. Two crew. four passengers. 

Prop-driven, low-wing monoplane with retractable landing 

gear, utilized as a cargo. ambulance, or troop transport. Two crew, 

twenty-four passengers. 

low-wing monoplane with retractable tricycle 

landinggear. A long-rangecargo, troop. or personal transport. Six crew. 

A twin-boom, high-wing. land monoplane of all-metal construction having 

a conventional tricycle gear with a steerable nose gear. Its two reciprocating engines have constant-speed. four-blade. reversible-pitch propellers. Five crew. forty-two troops. 

Prop-driven. two-engine, high-wing monoplane. Used to transport combat 

and other equipment for airborne assault troops, the resupply by air of 

advanced combat positions, evacuation of wounded. and air transportation of paratroops to the drop ZONE Two crew, sixty troops. or fifty 

litters plus four attendants. Also served a5 a forward air control/flareship. (The features two pod-mounted turbojets in addition to its 

piston engines.) 

A low-wing monoplane powered by four reciprocating engines. Has clamshell cargo doors in front fuselage and loading elevator in center fuselage I 
C-130 Hercules 

CH-21 Workhorse 

CH-34 Choctaw 

CV-2B Caribou 

C/ 

CALO 

CAM RON 

Candy Machine 

CAP 

CAS 

CASF 

CAT 

CATO 

Cat Paw 

CBU 

CC 

CCTG 

CCTS 

CDNl 

CDTC 

C-E 

CHECO 

capable of transporting heavy ground-force and ordnance equipment in 

the main cabin. Five crew. two hundred troops or 127 litters plus 

twenty-five ambulatory patients. 

A high-wing. all-metal construction, medium-range, land-based monoplane, for rapid transportation of personnel. cargo. or paratroops. 

Powered by four turboprop engines. Four crew. ninety-two troops or 

sixty-four paratroops. or seventy litters plus six attendants. 

All-metal, semi-monocoque-constructed helicopter for transport and 

cargo operations. Crew compartment in nose. side-by-side seating. Has 

three-blade. all-metal rotors arranged in tandem and turning in opposite 

directions. Tricycle-type landing gear. Two crew. sixteen passengers. 

Formerly designated H-21. 

Sikorsky Model S-58 helicopter equipped with a four-blade. main rotor 

and a tail rotor. Has two-wheel main landing gear and small tail wheel. 

Two crew, eighteen passengers. Formerly designated H-34. 

Prop-driven, twin-engine transport with load-carrying capacity comparable to that of the C-47. Has short-takeoff-and-landing capability. Crew 

of two and thirty-two passengers. 

Chairman or Chief of 

corps air liaison officer 

consolidated aircraft maintenance squadron (USAF) 

United States Air Force F-102 interceptor air defense teams in Vietnam. 

Superseded Water Glass. 

combat air patrol 

close air support 

composite air strike force 

Civil Air Transport Corporation 

Combat Arms Training and Organization Division, United States Military 

Assistance Advisory Group. Saigon 

Provisional United States Air Force C-I 19 maintenance detachment in 

Vietnam (1954). 

cluster bomb unit 

combat cargo 

combat crew training group 

combat crew training school; combat crew training squadron 

Committee for the Defense of National Interests. or Lao conservative 

political party. 

Combat Development and Test Center 

communications-electronics 

Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations 

1962); Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations 

1965); Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations 

1970) 

329 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Chien Thang 

Chieu Hoi 

CHMAAGV 

chron 

C1 

CIA 

C1 DC 

CINCARPAC 

ClNCFE 

CINCPAC 

CINCPACAF 

CI NCPACFLT 

CINCUNCI FEC 

CI N C U SA FE 

Civil Guard 

CJCS 

CJTF 

CM 

CM H 

CNO 

COC 

COIN 

Cold War 

comd 

comdr 

COMFEAF 

COMPAF 

COMSEADEFCOM 

COM USMACTHAI 

COMUSMACV 

Condor 

“The Victorious.” Government of Vietnam military campaign plan officially issued in February 1965. 

“Open Arms.” Government of Vietnam cause designed to persuade Viet 

Cong (0 rally to the government cause. 

Chief. Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam 

chronology 

counterintelligence 

Central Intelligence Agency (US) 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (RVN) 

Commander in Chief. Army Forces Pacific 

Commander in Chief, Far East 

Commander in Chief. Pacific Command 

Commander in Chief. Pacific Air Forces 

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet 

Commander in Chief. United Nations Command/ United States Far East 

Command (1950-1956) 

Commander in Chief. United States Air Forces in Europe 

See RF, Regional Forces. 

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Commander, Joint Task Force 

Memorandum (The Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff) 

Chief of Military History, United States Army 

Chief of Naval Operations (US) 

combat operations center 

counterinsurgency 

A hostile encounter between nations or groups of nations that stops short 

of actual armed conflict. It uses the weapons of politics. diplomacy. 

economics, espionage, police action, and propaganda to gain advantage. 

command 

commander 

Commander, Far East Air Forces 

Commander. Pacific Air Force 

Commander. Southeast Asia Defense Command (US) 

Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand 

Commander. United States Military Assistance Command. Vietnam 

French military thrust out of Laos toward Dien Bien Phu (1954). 

I 

I 

330 
conf 

Cong 

Cong Rec 

Corona Harvest 

COSVN 

counterinsurgency 

CQ 

CRC 

CRP 

C/S 

CSAF 

CSAFM 

CTZ 

curr 

DA 

DABlN 

DA F 

D/AFTU-V 

Dep/ 

DCS/ 

DCS/ S&L 

conference 

Congress of the United States 

Congressional Record 

United States Air Force evaluation of air operations in Southeast Asia. 

Central Office for South Vietnam (Viet Cong Headquarters) 

Those military. paramilitary, political. economic. psychological, and civic 

actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency. 

Congressional Quarterly 

control and reporting center 

control and reporting post 

Chief of Staff 

Chief of Staff. United States Air Force 

Chief of Staff Air Force Memorandum 

corps tactical zone (RVNAF) 

current 

Department of the Army (US) 

Data Base Inventory 

Department of the Air Force (US) 

Director of Air Force Test Unit Vietnam 

Deputy for 

Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Deputy Chief of Staff. Systems and Logistics, United States Air Force 

DEPCINCUSARPAC 

DEPCOM USMAC- Deputy Commander. United States Military Assistance Command. 

Deputy Commander in Chief. United States Army, Pacific 

THAI Thailand 

dept department 

De Soto 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency (US) 

Dir/ Director of 

dir director; directorate: directive 

direction finding 

United States offshore intelligence collection. 

Procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency emitters with the use 

of a highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver 

of ancillary equipment. 

Dirty Thirty United States Air Force C-47 transport pilots attached to the Vietnamese 

Air Force (1962-63). An unofficial nickname. 

33 I 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

DMZ 

doc 

doppler radar 

Duke’s Mixture 

EA- I F Skyraider 

Eagle Flight 

E DC 

est 

Corsair 

Freedom Fighter 

Hellcat 

Kingcobra 

Sabre 

Super Sabre 

division 

Director Joint Staff Memorandum 

demilitarized ZONE 

document 

Department of Defense (US) 

A radar system that differentiates between fixed and moving targets by 

detecting the apparent change in frequency of the reflected wave due 

motion of target or the observer. 

Provisional United States Air Force aircraft maintenance detachment 

Vietnam 1954). Formerly “Project Revere.” 

drop ZONE 

Similar to A-I E except that it is equipped for countermeasures. Four crew. 

Formerly designated AD-SQ. 

A C-47 that has electronic countermeasures capability or electronic devices 

to permit employment as an early warning radar station. Three crew. 

A tactic for helicopter employment. 

Economic Cooperation Administration (US) 

European Defense Community 

Nickname for bomb (1965). Formerly “Lazy Dog.” 

electronic intelligence 

estimate 

evaluation 

Prop-driven, Navy fighter used in various models both 

during and since World War 

An all-metal. single-place. jet fighter. Has tricycle 

landing gear and steerable nose wheel. Nose is fitted with 

cannon. Can carry sixty-two hundred pounds of ordnance. Has 

a range of four hundred miles and a speed of about nine hundred miles 

per hour. 

A World War II, prop-driven. single-engine, Navy fighter. 

A prop-driven, Navy fighter. 

Prop-driven, low-wing fighter. Developed during World 

War II, chiefly for ground-attack work. One crew. 

All-metal, low-wing. fighter interceptor with 

swept-back wings and tail. Has tricycle landinggear and nose radar. One 

crew. 

Supersonic. turbojet-powered, tactical and air superiority 

fighter. Has a low, thin. swept wing and nose air intake. Employs air 

I 
F-101 Voodoo 

F-102 Delta Dagger 

F-105 Thunderchief 

FAC 

FAG 

FAR 

Farm Gate 

FEAF 

FEALOGFOR 

FEC 

FIC 

Field Goal 

Fire Brigade 

Firm Link 

FlSq 

Flaming Dart 

FM 

fragmentary 

operations order 

FTD 

ftr 

FY 

G 

brake and drag chute. Can provide close support for ground forces and 

be refueled in flight. One crew. 

Single-place. twin-engine, swept midwingjet aircraft designed as an escort 

and penetration fighter. Has a swept one-piece horizontal stabilizer set 

high on its fin tricycle-type landing gear. 

Single-engine. supersonic, all-weather. delta-wing, jet interceptor used in 

air defense. Has tricycle landing gear. speed brakes, and drag chute. One 

crew. 

A supersonic, single-engine. turbojet-powered. all-weather. tactical fighter. 

Capable of close support for ground forces. Its range can beextended by 

inflight refueling. One crew. 

forward air control: forward air controller 

forward air guide 

Royaume, or Royal Lao Army 

Detachment 2. 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron. and subsequently United States Air Force air commandoactivity at Bien Hoa Air 

Base. Vietnam. 

Far East Air Forces (USAF) (1944-56) 

Far East Air Logistics Force (USAF) 

Far East Command (US) 

French Indochina 

United States Air Force RT-33 photo jet reconnaissance in Laos (1961). 

United States Air Force-Vietnamese Air Force air transport rapid alert 

capability for Army of the Republic of Vietnam airborne employment. 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization maneuvers in Thailand (1956) 

fighter interceptor squadron 

United States-Vietnamese Air Force air reprisal strikes against North 

Vietnam (February 1965). 

frequency modulation 

The daily supplement to standard operations orders governing the conduct 

of the air war in Southeast Asia. It contained mission number and 

function. type of ordnance. time on target. and other instructions. 

field training detachment 

fighter 

fiscal year 

The measure or value of the gravitational pull of the earth or of a force 

required to accelerate or decelerate any freely movable body at the rate 

of about 32. I6 feet-per-second. To pull "three Gs"means to be subjected 

to a G-force of three Gs. 

333 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

GCA 

GHQ 

G LO 

GP 

gP 

GPO 

Green Python 

Green Turnip 

G-Staff 

GVN 

H- I9 helicopter 

H-21 helicopter 

H-34 helicopter 

H-43 helicopter 

HC-47 Skytrain 

H H43 

HU-I helicopter 

HU-IA helicopter 

HU-IB helicopter 

HU-16 Albatross 

Hail 

Hawk Eye 

HF/DF 

Hilo Hattie 

hist 

HMM 

Hoi Chanh 

ground controlled approach 

general headquarters 

ground liaison officer 

general purpose (bombs or forces) 

group 

Government Printing Office (US) 

United States Air Force reconnaissance operations at Udorn Royal Thai 

Air Force Base, Thailand. 

Loan of United States Air Force C-47s to the French (1954). 

Army staff; used in numerical combinations with J-Staff, which see. 

Government of Vietnam 

See UH-19 Chickasaw 

See CH-21 Workhorse 

See CH-34 Choctaw. 

See HH-43. 

The C-47 transport especially equipped for search and rescue missions, and 

with twice the normal fuel load, a stronger landing gear, and jet-assisted 

takeoff. Three crew. Formerly designated SC-47. 

A twin rotor, single-engine helicopter designed for crash-rescue operations. 

Semi-monocoque-constructed fuselage. Rotors are intermeshing. counter-rotating rotors, each with two blades, mounted side-by-side. Has 

non-retractable, four-wheel type, landing gear. Two crew, three passengers. Formerly designated H43. 

See UH-IA Iroquois and UH-IB Iroquois. 

See UH-IA Iroquois. 

See UH-IB Iroquois. 

Prop-driven, twin-engine. high-wing, amphibious aircraft with all-metal 

hull and fixed wing floats, For search and rescue missions. Four crew, 

ten passengers. 

Initial nickname for Mk-44 bomb. 

Experimental airborne radio direction finding C-47 (later EC-47) activity 

in Southeast Asia. 

high frequency/direction finder 

An especially equipped United States Air Force C-54 reconnaissance 

aircraft employed in Vietnam (1962-63). 

history; historical 

medium helicopter squadron (USMC) 

A Viet Cong returnee under the Chieu Hoi program. 

334 
Hop Tac Sequential concentric military operations to safeguard Saigon under the 

plan. 

HQ headquarters 

International Cooperation Administration (US) 

International Control Commission 

identification, friend A system using electronic transmissions to which equipment carried by 

friendly forces automatically responds, for example, by emitting 

impulses, thereby distinguishing themselves from enemy forces. 

or foe 

inclosure 

i indorsement 

instructor 

intelligence 

in trail Aircraft directly behind one another. 

interview 

initial photographic interpretation report 

intelligence report: infrared 

IRAN 

Age 

inspection and repair as necessary 

Overall program for United States Air Force materiel support of the 

French in Indochina (1953-54). 

I SA International Security Affairs (US) 

Prop-driven, low-wing. transport monoplane built in Germany by Junkers. 

Joint Airlift Allocations Board (MACV) 

joint air operations center 

JATO jet-assisted takeoff 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint General Staff 

joint operations center 

Joint Air-Ground Operations System (MACV) 

Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (US) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 

Joint Operational Evaluation Group. Vietnam (MACV) 

Joint Research and Test Activity (MACV) 

Joint Staff. Used in numerical combinations as (Personnel). 

(Operations), (Logistics), (Plans). 

and Electronics). 
I 

THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S 

it 

JTD 

JTF 

J ungle J i m 

JUSMAG 

JUSMAP 

KB-50 Superfortress 

KC- I35 Stratotanker 

K BA 

KIA 

kilometer 

L-18 

L-19 aircraft 

L-20 aircraft 

L-26 aircraft 

L-28 aircraft 

landline system 

Lazy Dog 

Leaping Lena 

In 

LOC 

LOP 

LORAN 

LPR 

Itr 

joint 

joint table of distribution 

joint task force 

The 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron and subsequent United 

States Air Force air commando activity at Eglin Air Force Base, 

Florida. 

Joint United States Military Advisory Group 

Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group 

Tactical aerial tanker powered by four reciprocating engines and two 

turbojet engines. Capable of simultaneous aerial refueling of three 

fighter-type aircraft by the probe and drogue method. Six crew. 

Long-range. high-performance tanker powered by four turbojet engines. 

Has a flying boom for aerial refueling. Performs high-speed. highaltitude refueling of bombers and fighters. Can be used as a cargo 

and/or troop transport. carrying up to eighty troops. Four crew. 

killed by air 

killed in action 

Equals 3.280.8 feet. about two-thirds (.62) of a mile. 

Prop-driven. single-engine. braced high-wing, light monoplane. Enclosed 

cabin seats two in tandem. Has dual controls. 

See 0-1 Bird Dog. 

See U-6 Beaver. 

See U-9 Aero Commander. 

See UH-IO Helio Super Courier. 

Telephone or telegraph communication by wire over, on. or under the 

ground. 

Nickname for M k-44 bomb. earlier called “Hail’ and later “Elda.” 

United States and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces long-range reconnaissance interdiction teams. 

liaison 

line of communications 

line of position 

Long-range electronic navigation system that uses a time divergence of 

pulse-type transmissions from two or more fixed stations. Also called 

long-range navigation. 

Laotian People’s Rally. or neutralist political party 

letter 

336 
Lucky Dragon High-altitude aerial reconnaissance flown by Strategic Air Command U-2 

aircraft (1964). Later called "Trojan Horse." 

landing zone 

Marcel Dassault French prop-driven. twin-engine, all-metal. light military transport and 

M.D. 3 15 Flamant liaison monoplane. 

MIG-15 Single-engine. turbojet. Russian fighter aircraft. designed and developed 

by Mikoyan-Gurevich. One crew. 

MIG-17 Single-engine, turbojet. Russian fighter aircraft that by 1953-54 began 

replacing the MIG-IS in the Soviet Air and Naval Service. 

MK-IX Spitfire British prop-driven. single-engine, low-wing fighter developed by Supermarine. One crew. The speed. rate of climb. superior maneuverability. 

and great firepower of the Spitfire made it one of the greatest combat 

aircraft ever built. 

Moranc-500 Cricket Prop-driven. single-engine, high-wing. liaison aircraft. Built by Moranc 

Saulnier. it is the French version of the German Fieseler Fl-156 Storch 

communications monoplane. Two crew. 

MAAC Military Assistance Advisory Group 

MAAGV Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam 

MACSOG Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group 

M ACTH A I Military Assistance Command, Thailand 

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

MAG Military Advisory Group 

Mail Pouch RT-33 photo courier service from Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base. 

Thailand (1961-62). 

M&O manpower and organization 

MAP Military Assistance Program 

Market Project for the loan of United States Air Force B-26s to the French in 

Vietnam (1954). 

Market Time 

mat materiel 

MATS 

MDAP Mutual Defense Assistance Program 

memo memorandum 

meter Equals 39.37 inches 

MG machinegun 

United States Navy patrols off South Vietnamese coasts 

Military Air Transport Service (USAF) 

MIG A popular designation for certain Russian fighter aircraft designed and 

developed by Mikoyan and Gurevich. 

Millpond United States covert assistance actions in Laos (1961) 

331 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

MR 

M 

M 

Mule Train 

NATO 

Night Owl 

Nomad 

NORM 

NVA 

Bird Dog 

Mohawk 

monthly evaluation 

Primitive mountain tribesmen (numbering about eight hundred thousand) 

who had a history of antipathy toward the Vietnamese. They were not 

absorbed into the mainstream of Vietnamese life. 

memorandum for record: military region 

Military Revolutionary Council 

manuscript 

message 

Military Sea Transport Service 

Nickname of initial United States Air Force C-I detachment in Vietnam. 

Northern Air Material Area (USAF) 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

noncommissioned officer-in-charge 

National Campaign Plan 

no date 

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam political 

National Intelligence Agency. South Vietnam 

national intelligence estimate (US) 

Night delivery of ordnance by aircraft under illumination of their own 

National Internal Security Council. South Vietnam 

Lao Sat Lao) 

An armed trainer aircraft configured for the Mutual Defense 

not operationally ready maintenance 

not operationally ready supply 

no place: no publisher 

National Security Action Memorandum 

National Security Council (US) 

North Vietnamese Army 

arm). Also sometimes abbreviated or 

flares. 

Assistance Program. 

Single-engine, two-place tandem. closed cabin, high-wing aircraft of conventional strut-braced, two-spar design. All metal and semi-monocoque 

fuselage with a fixed pitch propeller. Twenty-four volt electrical system. Two crew. Formerly designated 

Prop-driven. single-engine. surveillance (day and night) airplane with visual observation and photographic capabilities. Crew of two. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs 

! 
PA 

office 

on-the-job training 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Public Affairs 

office in charge of construction 

One Buck 

On Mark 

United States Tactical Air Command composite air strike force deployment to Southeast Asia in August in response to the Gulf 

attack. 

Extensive modification of aircraft performed by the On Mark 

Operation Plan 

Engineering Company. 

operations 

order of battle The identification. strength, command structure. and disposition of the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

personnel, units. and equipment of any military forces. 

Privateer 

Pagoda 

Panama 

Paper Sack 

Paris 

Parrot’s Beak 

Lao 

Pathfinder 

Patricia Lynn 

Special Tactical 

Zone 

A four-engine bomber and reconnaissance monoplane. developed by Consolidated during World War for the United States Navy. 

boat. Has amphibian capability, with a retractable tricycle undercarriage in the hull. 

all-metal, parasol-wing patrol-bomber flying 

Pacific Air Forces (USAF) 

Pacific Fleet 

Pacific Command (US) 

Pacific Air Force (1954-1956) (USAF) 

Call sign of the control and reporting post at Pleiku. 

Call sign of the control and reporting post (later control and reporting 

Suspension of Defense and Assistance Program deliveries to lndoCall sign of the control and reporting center at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. 

The tip of the Cambodian salient west of Saigon, South Vietnam. 

Laotian communists. 

Two or more aircraft using lead aircraft’s LORAN for navigation 

reconnaissance aircraft equipped with improved day-and-night 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces special tactical zone in the provinces of 

center) at Air Base. 

china following the Geneva agreements of 

cameras and infrared sensors. 

Long, Binh Long, and (1962-63). 

des Jars (Plain of Jars). A military strategic area north-northeast of 

Vientiane in Laos. 

programs evaluation office 

Popular Forces, or the former Vietnamese Self Defense Corps. Locally 

recruited South Vietnamese volunteers. organized into squads and platoons. and used chiefly as security forces in villages and hamlets. 
T H E AD VI SO R Y YE A R S 

PFDOP 

PFIDC 

PFLPL 

PFMLP 

PFMSS 

PFOCO 

PFODC 

PFOOP 

Phyllis Ann 

Pierce Arrow 

Pipe Stem 

POL 

POW 

P PC 

PSP 

pt 

Queen Bee 

R-4D 

RB-26 Invader 

RB-47 Stratojet 

RB-57 Canberra 

RC-47 Skytrain 

RF-101 Voodoo 

RT-28 Trojan 

RT-33 Shooting Star 

RAAF 

Deputy Chief of Staff. Plans and Operations, Pacific Air Forces 

Director of Intelligence, Pacific Air Forces 

Plans Division. Directorate of Plans. Pacific Air Forces 

Assistant for Logistical Plans. Directorate of Materiel. Pacific Air Forces 

Supply and Services Division. Directorate of Materiel. Pacific Air Forces 

Combat Operations. Assistant Chief of Staff Operations. Pacific Air 

Forces 

Assistant Chief of Staff Operations, Pacific Air Forces 

Operations Plans Division. Directorate of Operations, Pacific Air Forces 

EC-47 airborne radio direction finding aircraft and project. Followed 

experimental “Hawk Eye.” 

United States Navy retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. August 

5. 1964. 

United States Air Force photographic reconnaissance detachment at Tan 

Son Nhut Air Base (1961-62). 

petroleum. oil. and lubricants 

prisoner of war 

Photographic processing cell. A facility. generally mobile. equipped for the 

processing, printing. and interpretation of reconnaissance sensor products and other production normally related to the reconnaissance 

intelligence function. 

president 

project 

People’s Revolutionary Party (southern branch of the North Vietnamese 

communist (Lao Dong) party). 

pierced steel planking 

part 

United States Air Force communications reconnaissance missions over the 

Gulf of Tonkin (1964). 

United States Navy transport similar to the Air Force C-47 

The B-26 modified for reconnaissance missions by changes in nose and 

The B-47 modified and equipped for photographic reconnaissance misThe B-57 modified for photo reconnaissance. Two crew. 

The C-47 transport with equipment permanently installed for photoreconnaissance and/ or electronic reconnaissance missions. Three crew. 

Day or night photographic reconnaissance version of the F-101. 

The T-28 configured for photo reconnaissance. Two crew. 

Reconnaissance version of the T-33. Two crew. 

Royal Australian Air Force 

installed equipment. Three crew. 

sions. Three crew. 

I 

340 
rad 

Ranch Hand 

RAND 

R&D 

rcrd 

recon 

ref 

Revere 

RF 

RKG 

RLAF 

Rolling Thunder 

rprt 

rqmt 

RTAF 

RTAFB 

RVN 

RVNAF 

SC-47 aircraft 

SA 

SAC 

SACSA 

Saddle Soap 

SAF 

SAMAP 

SAMSq 

SAR 

SASF 

SAW 

Saw Buck 

radio 

Nickname of United States Air Force C-I23 aerial spray detachment 

deployed to Vietnam in 1961-62 and applied to later defoliation and 

herbicide activity. 

Research and Development (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica. 

California). 

research and development 

record 

reconnaissance 

reference 

Provisional United States Air Force aircraft maintenance detachment in 

Vietnam (1954). Later called “Duke’s Mixture.” 

Regional Forces (the former Vietnamese Civil Guard). These were local 

South Vietnamese defense forces. recruited and used within one of the 

administrative regions into which the country was divided. 

Royal Khmer (Cambodian) Government 

Royal Laotian Air Force 

Sustained United States air strikes against North Vietnam (March 1965- 

October 1968). 

report 

requirement 

Royal Thai Air Force 

Royal Thai Air Force Base 

Republic of Vietnam 

Ripublic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

See HC-47 Skytrain. 

Secretary of the Army 

Strategic Air Command (USAF) 

Special Assistant to the Director. JCS Joint Staff. for Counterinsurgency 

Loan of B-26aircraft to the French by the United States Air Force (1954). 

Secretary of the Air Force 

Southern Air Materiel Area Pacific (USAF) 

special air mission squadron 

search and rescue 

special aerial spray night 

special air warfare 

United States Tactical Air Command composite air strike force deployments to Southeast Asia in mid-I962 and afterward. Also the nickname 

of the United States Air Force C-I23 detachment deployed to Vietnam 

in mid-1962. 

and Special Activities 

34 I 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

SAWC 

SCAR 

SCAT 

scramble 

SDC 

SEA 

SEAAS 

SEACOORD 

Sea Dog 

Sea Swallow 

SEAT0 

sec 

SECDEF 

2 CCR 

2 ODC 

SECSTATE 

secy 

sess 

SHAPE 

shoran bombing 

Short Count 

Shufly 

SlAT 

SLAR 

SLAT 

SM 

SNlE 

so 

Special Forces 

sq 

SSB 

stf 

Special Air Warfare Center (IJSAF) 

strike control and reconnaissance 

selected counterinsurgency air target 

To take off as quickly as possible (usually followed by course and altitude 

Self Defense Corps (RVN) 

Southeast .Asia 

Southeast .Asia Airlift System 

Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee for US Missions 

Project for the loan of United States Air Force C-47s to the French (1953). 

Government of Vietnam clear-and-hold operation in Phu Yen Province 

instructions). 

( 1962). 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

section 

Secretary of Defense (US) 

Commander, 2d Advanced Echelon; Commander, 2d Air Division 

Director of Current Operations. 2d Advanced Echelon: Director of Current Operations. 2d Air Division 

Secretary of State (US) 

secretary 

session 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

Bombing done after positioning the aircraft to the bomb-release point by 

Air surveillance flights over South Vietnamese coastal waters flown by 

Nickname for United States Marine Corps helicopter squadron and detradar adapted to the purpose. 

Farm Gate (1961-62). 

achment in Vietnam. 

single integrated attack team 

Side-looking airborne radar. Views at right angles to the axis of the vehicle. 

which produces a presentation of terrain or moving targets. 

Special Logistics Actions. Thailand 

staff memorandum 

special national intelligence estimate 

special order 

Military personnel with cross-training in basic and specialized military 

skills. They were organized into small multiple-purpose detachments 

with the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency operations. and to 

conduct unconventional warfare operations. 

squadron 

single sideband 

staff I 

342 
sum 

Sunrise 

Sweet Sue 

Swing Back 

Swivel Chair 

Strike Command (US) 

subject 

summary 

"Binh Minh." Highly publicized Government of Vietnam clear-and-hold 

South Vietnam 

Experimental night reconnaissance aircraft equipped with early 

Spare parts support for aircraft through cannibalization. 

Project for the loan of United States Air Force C-I 19s to the French and 

operation in Binh Province (1962). 

infrared sensors. 

associated USAF maintenance support 

Texan 

Trojan 

Prop-driven, single-engine, two-seat, low-wing, trainer airplane. 

Prop-driven, single-engine. low-wing, all-metal monoplane with 

tricycle landing gear with steerable nose wheel. For primary pilot 

training. Two crew. The version is an attack plane. capable of 

carrying a variety of ordnance on counterinsurgency missions. 

Shooting Star all-metal, full-cantilever low wing, two-seat, 

jet aircraft. Designed for training of flight personnel. Incorporates 

laminar-flow wing sections, dive flaps, pressurized and heated cockpit. 

Has hydraulically operated tricycle landing gear. Two crew. 

All metal, jet-powered, two-place, low-wing monoplane 

primary trainer employing a retractable tricycle landing gear. Is completely equipped with flight instruments. Features side-by-side seating. 

Nose gear is equipped with power steering. Two crew. 

Similar to except that it is a two-place, side-by-side trainer version 

for combat use. Two crew. 

Delta Dagger 

tactical 

TAC Tactical Air Command (USAF) 

tactical air control center 

tactical operation 

tactical air control party 

tactical air control system 

tactical air direction center 

Taiwan Defense Command (US) 

troop carrier 

temporary duty 

tech technical 

TERM Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission 

task force 

tactical air reconnaissance center (USAF) 

tactical air support element (MACV) 

Tactical Air Warfare Center (USAF) 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

TFS tactical fighter squadron 

TFW tactical fighter wing 

T-MC transport movement control 

TO&E 

TOC tactical operations center 

Toy Tiger 

TRAC 

Triangle 

TRIM , Training Relations and Instruction Mission 

Trojan Horse 

TSG tactical support group 

Turnaround 

table of organization and equipment 

Night photographic modification of RF-101 aircraft 

Targets Research and Analysis Center (MACV) 

Military operation by Royal Lao Army in north-central Laos (July 1964). 

High-altitude aerial reconnaissance flown by SAC U-2 aircraft. Formerly 

"Lucky Dragon." 

The length of time between arriving at a point and departing from that 

point. It is used in this sense for the turnaround of shipping in ports. and 

for aircraft refueling and rearming. 

U-l Otter 

u-2 

U-3 

U-6 Beaver 

Prop-driven, single-engine, short-range. high-wing, light. utility aircraft. 

Can operate on wheels. wheel-skis. or floats. Has throw-over control 

column. dual rudder controls. tailwheel powered steering, and doubleslotted wing flaps. Two crew, eight passengers. 

Single-seat. single-engine jet aircraft. Has long, wide, straight wings to give 

it a glider-like characteristic and increase its load capacity to accommodate data-collection instruments, as well as the ability to operate above 

seventy thousand feet. Used for high-altitude reconnaissance and 

weather sampling. 

Prop-driven. twin-engine. low-wing monoplane with a tricycle landing 

gear. Used for administrative and light-cargo purposes. Two crew, three 

passengers. 

Single-engine. high-wing, all-metal monoplane. Has fixed landing gear, 

throw-over controls, and dual rudder controls. For general utility missions. One crew. five passengers. Formerly designated L-20. 

U-9 Aero Commander Prop-driven. twin-engine. light, high-wing. cantilever monoplane with 

tricycle landing gear. For administrative missions. One crew, five passengers. Formerly designated L-26. 

Prop-driven. single-engine, light. short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft used 

for general utility missions. Two crew, two passengers. Formerly designated L-28. 

U-IO Helio Super 

Courier 

U-17 Prop-driven. single-engine, high-wing. all-metal, six-place. utility aircraft 

with conventional fixed landing gear and tail-wheel. Adaptable for 

various missions such as personnel, cargo, and ambulance operation. 

UH-I helicopter 

UH-IA Iroquois 

See UH-IA lroquois and UH-IB Iroquois 

Used for transporting personnel and supplies. Has two-blade, helicopter 

shaft driven by a gas turbine engine. Torque counteracted by a twoblade, tail rotor mounted on a tail boom. Has skid-type landing gear. 

Provisions for dual controls and internal ferry tank. One crew, five 

passengers. Formerly designated H U-I A. 

UH-IB Iroquois 

344 

Used to transport personnel and supplies and as a gunship. Similar to 

UH-I A except for engine and wider rotor blade, copilot controls, provi- 

! 
UHF 

us 

USA 

USAF 

for armament. and capability to carry three litters. Two crew, seven 

passengers. Formerly designated 

All-metal. semi-monocoque fuselage helicopter. Has one all-metal. threeblade, main rotor and an all-metal two-blade, antitorque, tail rotor. 

Engine mounted in nose. landing gear. side-by-side seating, 

external cargo sling. dual controls. Used for general utility operations. 

Two crew, ten passengers. Formerly designated 

Similar to Choctaw. Utility version. Two crew, twelve passengers. 

U Chickasaw 

ultra high frequency 

United Nations 

United Nations Command 

United States (of America) 

United States Army 

United States Air Force 

United States air attache 

United States Ambassador 

United States Army attach; 

United States Army. Pacific 

United States Army Special Forces, Vietnam (Provisional) 

United States Army War College 

United States Marine Corps 

United States Navy 

United States Operations Mission 

VHF 

Viet 

Viet Minh 

VIP 

Vulture 

Water Glass 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization exercise in Thailand 

Viet 

Vice Chief of Staff 

very high frequency 

Vietnamese communists. usually South Vietnamese communists. 

Initial description of Vietnamese communists. Was later used to indicate 

ethnic North Vietnamese forces whoentered Laos prior to regular North 

Vietnamese Army troops. 

very important person 

Vietnam 

Vietnamese Air Force 

Voice of America 

volume 

Proposed United States Air Force bombing operation in relief of 

(1954). 

United States Air Force rotational air defense deployments to Tan 

Son Nhut (1962-63). Superseded by “Candy Machine.” 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Water 

wg 

WIA 

Pump Detachment 6, 1st Air commando to Thailand in 

1964 and applied to subsequent special air warfare activity at Udorn 

Royal Thai Air Force Base. 

wing 

wounded in action 

Wounded Warrior United States Air Force aeromedical evacuation of French repatriated sick 

and wounded military personnel from Vietnam to Europe (1954). 

Wring Out United States Air Force project to reach authorized strength of 137 wings 

with existing personnel (1956). 

Yankee Team United States tactical air reconnaissance missions in Laos. 

Z Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean 'Time) 

I 

346 
For the purposes of both history and self-evaluation, the United States Air 

Force began in an extensive effort to identify and collect documents on its 

role in the conflict in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Air Force expanded 

its normal historical program. It also established a new activity named Project 

Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, later 

called Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations 

During the next several years, USAF commands and agencies involved in the 

war searched their records and selected papers pertinent for historical research. 

Records of USAF staff agencies in the Washington National Records Center at 

Suitland, Maryland, and of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command 

(CINCPAC) in the Federal Records Center at the Naval Supply Depot, 

Pennsylvania, were screened for data on the air war. 

All these sources, together with others, were indexed into the computerprocessed Data Base Inventory (DABIN) System at the Aerospace Studies 

Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Maintained by the 

Technical Systems Branch of the Albert Historical Research Center 

at Maxwell AFB, DABIN identifies source materials ranging from multivolume 

studies to single-page messages, including title, issuing agency or author, date, 

general subject, and significant key words in titles. It reveals the location of 

sources by finding numbers in the collections noted above as well 

as those in the Reference Division of the Historical Research Center and the Air 

University Library. A query to DABIN by an authorized researcher can obtain 

the listings of sources and, more specifically, the locations of the items referenced 

in the footnotes of this volume of history. 

GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES 

Books and Documents 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

The records kept by the United States Air Force and its subordinate 

commands and agencies are the major source materials for this volume. At the 

Washington level, the holdings of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, are the most useful collection of high-level Air Force policy and planning 

papers. The semiannual histories of the Directorate of Plans and of the Assistant 

for Mutual Security give succinct information on policy formulation. The study 

cited this history as Book of Actions in Southeast Asia, 

July was prepared in the Directorate of Operations. It summarizes 

recommendations of the USAF Chief of Staff with respect to the conflict. Special 

studies prepared by the Office of Air Force History also give perspective on 

policy matters, and the following are particularly useful: 
I 

THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Hildreth, Charles H. USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 1961-1962. February 

USAF Special Air Warfare Doctrines, 1963. August 1964. 

Lemmer. George F. The Laos Crisis of 1959. May 1961. 

Van Staaveren, Jacob. Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958. November 1962. 

USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. June 1965. 

USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964, December 1965. 

USAF Plans and Policies in Southeast Asia, 1965. October 1966. 

1964. 

The officially published United States- Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: 

Study Prepared by the Department of Defense (Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 197 1) and The Pentagon Papers, published in various editions, 

also provide essential information on high-level policy decisions. The Historical 

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff kindly screened and made available from its 

files selected documents pertaining to this volume. 

Military command histories and their supporting documents have been 

useful sources. The annual CINCPAC Command Histories are of high quality, 

and annual MACV Command Histories are available for 1964 and 1965. A 

special historical study prepared by the Directorate of Historical Services, Far 

East Air Forces (FEAF), FEAF Support of the French Indo-China Operations, 

1 July 1952-30 September 1954, contains details on the beginnings of USAF 

activities in Southeast Asia. After 1956, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) histories 

(semiannual, except for a one-year coverage from July 1964 to June 1965) give 

information on Southeast Asia, as do reports and diaries of PACAF staff 

agencies. Thirteenth Air Force histories offer progressively less detail as the war 

progressed. A perfunctory History of the Second Advanced Echelon, Thirteenth 

Air Force, July I, 1961-December 3 1, 1961, contains little of value for research. 

But a History of the 2d ADVON, November 15, 

by Joseph W. Grainger and TSgt George P. Day and issued on November 12, 

1963) is an excellent narrative with supporting documents. No narrative history 

of the 2d Air Division in 1963 exists, but supporting documents for such a history 

afford a good coverage of the period. Excellent semiannual 2d Air Division 

histories were completed from January 1964 under the direction of Kenneth 

Sams, 2d Air Division historian and director of CHECO in Saigon. 

Valuable operations information is contained in the following studies: 

Anthony, Maj Victor B.. USAF. The Air Force in Sourheast Asia: Tactics and Techniques of Night 

Operations, 1961-1970. Washington: Office of Air Force History, March 1973. 

Bowers, Col Ray L., USAF. “The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Tactical Airlift.” Washington: Office 

of Air Force History, draft manuscript, 1971. 

Cahill, Maj John J., USMC, and Shulimson, Jack. “History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in 

Vietnam, January-June 1965.” Washington: Historical Branch. G-3 Division, United States 

Marine Corps, draft manuscript, 1968. 

Komer, Robert W. The Malayan Emergency, in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. R-957-ARPA. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, February 1972. 

Lewis. Thomas T. “The U.S. Military View of the Vietnamese War in 1963: Realistic Optimism or 

Bureaucratic Distortion.” Master’s Thesis, George Washington University School of Government and Business Administration, September 1972. 

Rowley. Maj Ralph A., USAF. USA FFAC Operationsin Southeast Asia, 1961-1965. Washington: 

Office of Air Force History, January 1972. 

von Luttichau, Charles P. “The U.S. Army Role in the Conflict in Vietnam.” Washington: Center of 

Military History. United States Army, draft manuscript, n.d. 

i 

i 

I 

348 
Project established in October was designed to give 

an immediate reporting operations. In was 

additionally charged to microfilm documents for incorporation in at the 

Air University. A few microfilmed documents trace back to the period of this 

history, but the major importance of as a source to this history of the 

period lies in the following studies, most of which are often accompanied by voluminous supporting documents: 

Anderson, Capt USAF. and Rescue in Southeast Asia, October 

Bear, James SEA, September 

Coffin. Lt Col Monty USAF, and Maj Ronald USAF. The ROYAL Thai Air Force. 

Collins. Capt Charles USAF. Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia, 1961-June 

Robert USAF. and Hale. Beverly. USAF. USAF Operatiom from ThaiHickey, Lawrence Night Close Air Support in March 

Col Alfred USAF. The in Southeast Asia. MAY 1966-June September 

Jones. Maj USAF. Organization, Mission and Growth of the Vietnamese Air Force, 

Lt Col Robert USAF, and Porter, Melvin Air Traffic Control in SEA, 

Lt Robert USAF. Yankee Team, MAY 1964-June March 

Martin. Lt Col Donald USAF. and Clever. Carl Southeast Asia Report. October 

Wesley The War in Vietnam. January 

Evolution OF THE Engagement for Southeast Asia, September 

Porter. Melvin. Tactical Control Squadron Operations in SEASIA, October 

Maj John C., USAF. Laotian Air Force, September 

Kenneth. The Battle OF Binh December January July I. 

Command and Control, December 

Escalation of the War in Southeast Asia. JULY-DECEMBER December 

Final Test and Combat Use of the December 

Historical Background to Vietcong Mortar Attack on November 

Kenneth, and Lt Col Bert USAF. USAF Support OF Special Forces in SEA. 

Smith, Capt Mark E.. USAF. USAF Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia. October 

Thompson, Maj A. USAF. Strike Controland Reconnaissance in SEA, January 

Capt Edward, USAF. Operations in September 1961-July 

Capt Robert USAF. Air Operations in the Delta. December 

Lt USAF. and Assault AIRLIFT Operations. January 1961-June 

February 

The USAF Southeast Asia End of Tour Report Program was established 

in response to a requirement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for all the armed 

services to provide observations from all senior officers completing a tour of duty 

in an area threatened by insurgency. After the number of officers in Southeast 

Asia grew to sizable proportions, the Joint Chiefs relaxed the requirement. 

However, the Air Force continued the End of 'Tour Reports as an internal 

program initially under and later the Office of Air Force History. The 

September 

October I 

land. August 10, 

October 

February 

1961-December May 

November 1961-February March 

January 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

observations in these reports frequently supply insights not captured by formal 

reporting systems. 

The Southeast Asia Oral History Program was started in 1967 to plan, 

conduct. and process tape-recorded interviews with knowledgeable persons and 

to record their experiences, observations, and recommendations. These oral 

interviews are especially worthwhile in filling informational gaps in written 

sources. The Office of Air Force History has continued the oral history program 

and has expanded it to encompass USAF activities well beyond Southeast Asia. 

The Reference Division of the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research 

Center maintains guides to End of Tour Reports and oral histories. Some of the 

latter are privileged and unavailable to researchers until a future time. 

Other Department of Defense studies consulted include: 

Climatology of Southeast Asia. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Project Corona Harvest. August 

1968. 

Communist Policy Towards Southeast Asia. 1954-1969: A Chronological Compendium. Prepared 

by Battelle Memorial Institute. Columbus. Ohio. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Project Corona 

Harvest, October I, 1970. 

The Employment of Airpower in the Greek Guerrilla War. Maxwell Air Force Base. Ala.: Aerospace 

Studies Institute. 1964. 

Farmer, J.. and Strumwasser, M. J. The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller: An 

Analysis of Mosquito Operations in Korea. RM-5430-PR. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation. October 1967. 

Futrell. Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. New York: Duell, Sloan and 

Pearce, I96 I. 

United States Policy To ward Sourheast Asia 1943-1968: A Chronological Compendium. 

Maxwell Air Force Base. Ala.: Project Corona Harvest. 1968. 

A Chronology of Significant Airpower Events in Southeast Asia. 1950-1968. Maxwell Air 

Force Base. Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute. 1969. 

Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. 

1907-1964. 2 vols. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute. 1971. 

Goure. Leon. Some impressions of the Effects of Military Operations on Viet Cong Behavior. 

RM-4517-ISA. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation. March 1965. 

Graham, William B.. and Katz. Amron H. SIA T: Single Integrated Attack Team: A Concept for 

Offensive Military Operators in South Vietnam. RM-4400-PR (Part II. Santa Monica: The 

RAND Corporation, November 17. 1964. 

Physical and Cultural Environment of Southeast Asia. Maxwell Air Force Base. Ala.: Project 

Corona Harvest. November I. 1968. 

Sharp. Adm U.S.G USN. and Westmoreland. Gen W.C.. USA. Report on the War in Vietnam (As 

of 30 June 1968). Washington: Government Printing Office. 1969. 

Vigneras. Marcel. Rearming the French. [United States Army in World War II: Special Studies]. 

Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History. Department of the Army. 1957. 

CONGRESS 

Senate. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to the Associated States of Indochina. 

October 27. 1953. Indochina. 83d Cong. I st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 

1953. 

House. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Mutual Security Act of 1954. 83d 

Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954. 

Senate. Compilation of Studies and Surveys Prepared Under the Direction of the Special Committee 

to Study the Foreign Aid Program. Foreign Aid Program. Senate Document 52.85th Cong. 1st 

sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1957. 

House. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs. Mutual Security Program in Laos. 85th Cong. 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1958. 

350 
Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs of 

the Committee on Foreign Relations, Situation in Vietnam. 86th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: 

Government Printing Office, 1959. 

House. Seventh Report by the Committee on Government Operations, June 15 1959. U.S. Aid 

Operations in Laos. House Report 546.86th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing 

Office. 1959. 

Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 

Act and Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. Analysis of the Khrushchev 

Speech of January 6, 1961.87th Cong, 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961. 

The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination. Senate Document 36. 88th Cong. 1st sess. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963. 

Senate. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Vietnam 

and Southeast Asia. 88th Cong, 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1963. 

House. Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on 

Armed Services. Close Air Support. 89th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing 

Office. 1966. 

Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and 

Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary. Refugee Problems in South Vietnam and Laos. 

89th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965. 

House. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services. Fiscal Year 1966 Supplemental Authorization for Vietnam. 89th Cong. 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1966. 

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 

Assistance Fiscal Year 1966- Vietnam. 89th Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing 

Office, 1966. 

House. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs. United States Policy Toward Asia. 89th Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1966. 

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and 

Vietnam. 90th Cong. 1st sess. 3d revised edition. Washington: Government Printing Office. 

1967. 

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Submission of the Vietnam Conflict to 

the United Nations. 90th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1967. 

Senate. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations on February 20. 1968. The Gurfof 

Tonkin. The 1964 Incidents. Parts I and 2. 90th Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government 

Printing Office. 1968. 

“Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam.” Congressional 

Record. May 9, 1968, pp 12614-12620. 

Senate. Hearings before the Subcommitteeon United States Security Agreementsand Commitments 

Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Security Agreements and 

Commitments Abroad. Kingdom of Laos. Part 2.91st Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1970. 

Senate. A Study Submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations. 

PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS 

The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Victory and the Threshold of Peace. 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950. Washington: GovernPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951. Washington: GovernPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954. Washington: 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955. Washington: 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957. Washington: 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958. Washington: 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61. Washington: 

New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. 

ment Printing Office, 1965. 

ment Printing Office, 1965. 

Government Printing Office. 1960. 

Government Printing Office, 1959. 

Government Printing Office. 1958. 

Government Printing Office, 1959. 

Government Printing Office. 1961. 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961. Washington: GovernPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962. Washington: GovernPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963. Washington: GovernPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64. Washington: 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965. Washington: 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966. Washington: 

ment Printing Office, 1962. 

ment Printing Office, 1963. 

ment Printing Office. 1964. 

Government Printing Office. 1965. 

Government Printing Office. 1966. 

Government Printing Office, 1967. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1957. 

American Foreign Current Documents, 1956. Washington: Government Printing Office. 

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957. Washington: Government Printing Office, 

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1958. Washington: Government Printing Office, 

1959. 

1961. 

1962. 

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1959. Washington: Government Printing Office. 

1963. 

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962. Washington: Government Printing Office, 

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963. Washington: Government Printing Office. 

The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. 1945. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1955. 

A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam’s Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam. Washington: 

1966. 

1967. 

Government Printing Office. 1961. 

Articles 

Bundy. William P. “The Path to Viet-Nam: A Lesson in Involvement.” US Department of State 

Durbrow. Ambassador Elbridge. “Hanoi’s Intensified Aggression- 1959.” Air War College SupKennedy. Col Thomas B.. USAF. ”Airlift in Southeast Asia.” Air University Review 16 (JanuaryKnox. Capt Thomas R.. USAF. “Waterpump, 1964-1965.” Aerospace Commentary 2 (Spring, 

Milton, Maj Gen Theodore R.. USAF. “Air Power: Equalizer in Southeast Asia.” Air University 

Secord, Mack D. “The Viet Nam Air Force.”Air University Review I5 (November-December 1963). 

Smith. Gen Frederic H.. Jr.. USAF.”Nuclear Weaponsand Limited War.”Air University Quarterly 

Sunderman. Lt Col James F., USAF. “Air Operations in Viet Nam: Night Flare Strike.” Air 

Bulletin 57, September 4, 1967. pp 275-287. 

plement. November 1967. pp 7-8. 

February 1965). 72-82. 

1970), 5 1-59, 

Review 15 (November-December 1963). 2-8. 

60-67. 

Review I2 (Spring, 1960). 3-27. 

University Review 15 (September-October 1964), 82-91, 

NON-GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES 

Books 

Acheson. Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: W. W. 

Austin, Anthony. The President’s War. New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1971. 

Norton and Company. 1969. 

I 

I 

352 
Ball, George W. The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Strucrure. Boston: Little, 

Bates. Victor. Vietnam, A Diplomatic Tragedy: The Origins of the United Stares Involvement. 

Beal, John Robinson. John Fosrer Dulles. 1888-1959. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1959. 

Bouscaren, Anthony Trawick. The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. Pittsburgh: Duquesne 

Burchett, Wilfred G. Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War. New York: International PubButtinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 

Champassak, Sisouk Na. Storm Over Laos: A Contemporary Hisrory. New York: Frederick A. 

Cole. Allan B., ed. Conflict in Indo-China & Inrernational Repercussions: A Documentary History. 

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 

CQ Background. China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967. Washington: Congressional Quarterly 

Curl. Peter V.. ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954. New York: Council on Foreign 

Davids, Jules, ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1964. New York: Council on Foreign 

de Gaulle. Charles. The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle. Vol 3: Salvation, 1944-1946. New York: 

Dommen. Arthur J. Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization. New York: Frederick A. 

Duncanson. Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University 

Eden, Anthony. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 

Eisenhower. Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandare for Change, 1953-1956. Garden City. 

The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and 

Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Philadelphia: J. B. 

Ho Chi Minh on Revolution. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 

Street Without Joy: insurgency in Indochina, 1946-1963. 3d revised edition. Harrisburg: 

The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2d Edition. New York: Frederick 

Galloway. John. The Gulfof Tonkin Resolution Rutherford. N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson University 

Gould-Adams. Richard. The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles. London: 

Goulden. Joseph C. Truth is the First Casualty: The GUlf of Tonkin Affair-Illusion and Reality. 

Graff, Henry F. The Tuesday Cabinet: Deliberarion and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon 

Halberstam. David. 7he Making of a Quagmire. New York: Random House. 1965. 

Halpern. Joel M. Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos: A Study of Tradition and 

Innovation. Yale University Southeast Asia Series. No. 4. New Haven: Yale University Press. 

1964. 

Brown and Company, 1968. 

Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1965. 

University Press, 1965. 

lishers, 1965. 

Praeger. 1961. 

1945-1955. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1956. 

1970. 

Service. 1967. 

Relations, 1955. 

Relations, 1964. 

Simon and Shuster, 1960. 

Praeger, 1964. 

Press, 1968. 

1960. 

N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963. 

Company, 1965. 

Lippincott Company, 1967. 

The Stackpole Company, 1963. 

A. Praeger, 1963. 

Press. 1970. 

Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962. 

Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. 

B. Johnson. Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 

Hemmer, Ellen. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1954. 

Higgins, Marguerite. Our Vietnam Nightmare. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. 

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Polirics of Foreign Policy in the Adminisration of John F. 

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1948. 

Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspecrives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Holt. 

Kennedy. Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967. 

Rinehart and Winston. 1971. 

353 
THE ADVISORY YEARS 

in New New Crosscurrents Press. [ 

Remembers. Translated and edited by Strobe Boston: 

Lacoutre. .Jean, and La Fin 1954 Paris: Editions due 

Edward In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. New 

A Nation of Sheep. New Norton and Company. 

Lodge. Henry The Storm Has Many A Personal Narrative. New Norton 

John. Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the US Role in Vietnam. Garden City. 

de Paris: LIBRARY 

Edgar. The Indo-China War, A Study of Guerrilla Warfare. London: 

Pike. Douglas. The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of 

War. Peace, and the Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Robert Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the War. Princeton: Princeton 

Marcus and Fall, Bernard The Reader. New Random House, 

Gen Matthew USA. Soldier. New Harper and Brothers, 

Roy, Jules. Battle of New Harper and Row, 

Arthur A Thousand DAYS John in the White House. Boston: 

Robert. South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress. Boston: Company. 

Robert. The Lost Revolution. New Harper and Row, 

Theodore C. Kennedy New Harper and Row, 

Stebbins. Richard Documents on American Foreign Relations, New Council on 

Documents on American Foreign Relations, New Council on Foreign 

Documents on American Foreign Relations. New Council on Foreign 

Taylor, John Combat Aircraft of the World. New Sons, 

Taylor, Maxwell Swords and Plowshares. New Norton and Company. 

Thompson, Robert. Defeating Insurgency: The LESSONS of Malaya and Vietnam. New 

Hugh. Laos, STATE or London: Oxford University Press, 

Truman, Harry Memoirs: Years of Hope. Garden City. Doubleday and Company, 

ARMY and Richard A. SOUTHEAST Asia Among the World Powers. LexingWarner. The Last Confucian. New The Company, 

Eugene C. GULF New Doubleday and Company, 

Donald Vietnam TRIANGLE New Pegasus. 

Paul E.. on American Foreign Relations, New Council on 

Documents on American Foreign RELATIONS New Council on Foreign 

Little. Brown and Company, 

Harper and Row, 

and Company, 

Doubleday and Company. 

and 

South Vietnam. Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 

Press, 

University Press, 

Company, 

Foreign Relations, 

Relations, 

Relations, 

Frederick A. 

ton: University Press. 

Foreign Relations, 

Relations. 

Articles 

Strategy." THE SATURDAY Evening Post, March 

Bowers. Ray "Americans in the Vietnamese Air Force: 'The Dirty Thirty.' Aerospace 

William C. "The Saddest War." Life, December 

Historian, September 
Chassin. Gen G.J.M.. French Air Force. “Lessons of the War in Indochina” Interavia 7 (1952). 

Collins. Gen J. Lawton, USA. “What We’re Doing in Indochina.” Interview. U.S. News World 

Fall. Bernard B. “Talk with Ho Chi Minh.” The New Republic, October 12. 1963, pp 19-22. 

Ford, Corey. “The Flying Tigers Carry On.” Saturday Evening Post, February 5, 1955, pp 24-25ff. 

and February 12, 1955. pp 30ff. 

Graff, Henry F. “Teach-In on Vietnam by The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

Defense and the Under Secretary of State.”New York Times Magazine, March 20. 1966. pp 25. 

128-133. 

Kuter, Gen L.S., USAF, CINCPACAF. “The Pacific Air Forces.” Air Force, October 1957, 

pp 63-66, 69-70. 

Lansdale. Maj Gen Edward G., USAF. “Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution‘?” Foreign 

“The Lowdown from the Top U.S. Command in Saigon.” Life, November 27. 1964. pp 46, 51-53. 

McNamara. Robert S. “The Communist Design for World Conquest, Some Shift in our Military 

Nixon, Richard M. “Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy.” Reader’s Digest. November 1964, 

Rose, Jerry A. “Our Undeclared War in Vietnam.” Reporter. May 10. 1962. pp 30-32. 

Taylor. Maxwell. ”The Case for Continued Bombing of the North.” Washington Star. October 22, 

Thompson, James C., Jr. “How Could Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy.” Atlantic, April 1968. 

Waddell, L.S. “Phase Out for Charlie-One-One-Nine.” Pegasus. October 1955. pp 1-6. 

Weyland, Gen Otto P.. USAF. “Can Air Power Win ‘Little Wars?” Interview. U.S. News World 

Williams. Lt Gen Samuel T.. USA, Ret. “Why the US is Losing in Vietnam-An Inside Story.” 

670-75. 

Report. March 4. 1955, pp 82-88. 

Affairs, October 1964, pp 75-86. 

Thinking Required.” Viral Speeches of the Day, March I. 1962. pp 296-99. 

pp 283-300. 

1967, p E2. 

pp 47-53. 

Report. July 23, 1954. pp 54-61. 

Interview. U.S. News World Report, November 9, 1964, pp 62-72. 

355 
I 

I 
A Luoi Valley: 248 

A Shau Valley: 175, 248 

Able Mable: 147-148, 171, 229, 241-243 

Acheson. Dean: I I 

Adams, Milton B.: 207 

Advanced Echelon (ADVON), 2d: 95-102, 108, 110-1 13. 122. 124. 138 

Advanced Research Projects Agency: 73, 112, I16 

Advisors 

assessment of accomplishments: 267-268 

civilian: 204 

in combat role: 105, 218-219 

French, with MAAG: 39 

details from MAAG: 40, 75 

number. expansion and reduction: 97, 151. 162, 166-167. 171. 192. 195, 216. 268 

range of operations: 151, 162, 216 

Aerial Port Squadrons 

8th: 11 1, 167 

6493d: Ill 

Aerial Resupply Unit, 8081st: 16 

Agency for International Development: 144 

Air America: 257 

Air Asia: 181 

Air Base Group, 23d: 171 

Air Base Squadrons 

33d: 171 

34th: 171 

6220th: 101 

6221st: 101 

6222d: 101. 171 

6223d: 101 

Air bases. See Airfields 

Air Commando Squadrons 

1st: 171, 181. 200-201, 212-214. 218-220. 238, 246, 251 

19th: 236 

Air Defense, RVN Air Force: 128. 131 

Air Depot Wing. 24th: I I. 15 

Air Divisions 

2d: 101, 112, 141. 146, 153, 160, 171-172. 175. 178. 

230, 232, 235. 241. 244-246, 250-253. 264 

315th: 16. 31. 41, 45. 81. 106. 108. I I 1. 171, 247 

322d: 22 

Air drops. See Airborne operations: Airlifts of troops and supplies 

Air Forces 

Far East: 10-1 I. 15-17. 23.41-42 

Fifth: 41, 43-45. 74-75. 131 

Pacific: 41. 43-44, 47-48. 81, 83, 95. 101, 106. 112. 120, 217, 229, 232. 236, 241. 244. 250. 253 

Thirteenth: 41-42. 45, 47. 81, 83,95. 101. 106. 108, 120, 124, 131, 133. 147. 232 

263-264. 266 

Air-ground liaison: 106. 128. 131, 140. 143, 159. 168. 178, 182, 196. 215-216. 239, 244 

Air-ground operations. See Tactical air support 

Air-Ground Operations School: 178. 240 

*Numerals in italic indicate an illustration of the subject mentioned 

357 
Air Materiel Command: 42 

Air Materiel Force Pacific Area: 42 

Air National Guard: 65 

Air operations 

air-ground liaison: 106. 128. I3 I. 140. 143. 159. 168. 178. 182. 196. 239. 

244 

airstrike missions: 120-122. 128. 136-139. 172-174. 178. 183-184. 191. 196-197. 199. 

212. 220-22 I. 245. 254. 257-267 

artillery fire direction: 37 

bombing missions: 25-26. 120, 139. 156. 158. 172. 264 

communications intercept missions: 228 

communications systems and equipment: 55. 81. 106-107. 142-144. 146. 159-160. 

composite strike force in: 46. 247 

convoy support missions: 174. I78 

coordination and control: 42-44. 55-56. 74-75. 82-83.95-96. 105-106. 124. 136. 159. 

cropdestruction missions: 219. 247-250 

damage assessments: 174. 199. 212 

defoliation missions: I 247-250. 264 

effect on pacification: 236-238 

effectiveness. studies on: 25. 134. 157. 213 

electronic intelligence missions: 235 

escort missions: 25. 133. 145 

forward air controllers in: 106-107. 121. 128. 136. 138-140. 142-144. 151, 168. 

172, 175, 177-178. 247 

175. I. 214-215. 217. 225. 227. 260-261 

172-176. 180. 181-182. 184. 197, 199,214-215. 221.224. 

236. 267 

hamlet defense. support of I74 

helicopter missions. escort of 144. 146. 157-158, 174. 176. 197. 267 

identification. friend or foe: I3 I 

infrared reconnaissance missions: 138. 148. 168-169. 243-245, 266 

intelligence collection and transmission in: I38 

joint operation. first: I28 

joint operations center in: 

language barrier in: 221 

logistics centralization: 42 

mixed crews in combat: 220.267 

mobile combat reporting post: 74. 82 

napalm strikes: 10, 19. 121. 128, 141. 146. 156, 158. 179. 238. 260 

night missions: 96, 127- 127. 132, 168.174-175. 224. 244. 247. 259-260 

operations center in: 142 

photographic reconnaissance missions: 74-75. 127. 135, 138, 147-148. 

psychological warfare missions: 122. 219. 251-252 

reconnaissance missions: 25. 37. 82. 128-129. 139. 143, 147-148, 169. I7 I. 174. 182. 

restrictions on: 133. 141, 159, 172. 224 

results, assessment of I34 

rocket assault missions: 158. 130. 158. 237 

roles and missions in: 49 

search-and-rescue missions: 50, 170. I83 

tactical air support missions. See Tactical air support missions 

target acquisition and designation: 55, 136, 138-139. 140, 143. 146, 156, 196. 245 

traffic control in: 131 

warning system: I29 

83. 106. 128. 142, 

196, 227. 239-241. 243-244. 256-259, 268 

! 

I 

I 

358 
Air refueling Squadron. 421st 229 

Air Rescue missions. See Search-and-rescue missions 

Air Rescue Serv ice (Pacific): 45 

Air Rescue Squadron. 31st: 45 

Air Training Command: 154 

Air warning system: 129 

Airborne operations 

American: 120. 167 

French: 16-1 8. 20. 26 

Republic of Vietnam: 112. 156-159. 164. 180. 196. 228. 246 

armament loads: 128. 132. 240. 256-257 

casualties evacuation by: 31. 122. 219. 260. 267 

combat readiness and faults: 181. 212-214. 218. 20. 238. 243. 246 

corps. assignment to: 21 I 

losses: I 16. 146. 158. 178. I8 I. 183- 184. 2 13. 220. 229-230. 238. 246-247. 250. 253. 257. 260. 

265-266. See also Helicopter losses 

maintenance and repair: 50-52. 55. 125, 181 

modifications in: 79-80 

obsolete models: 54-55 

spare-parts stocks: 50 

types. See Aircraft types 

Aircraft 

Aircraft types 

A-1: 77, 153. 174-176. 179. 181-184. 196-197. 199. 212-214. 222. 224-225, 238-240. 243. 

253-254. 257.259-261.263-264. 266-268 

AC-47: 24 I. 242. 260-26 I. 266 

AD-4: 55 

AD-5: 131. 169 

AD-6: 55. 67. 75. 82. 84. 121. 127-129. 132. 137. 139. 142-143. 145-146. 156-158. 178 

8-26: 7. 9. 10. 17-18. 24. 31. 77. 79-80. 121, 127-129. 130. 131. 133-134. 136-137. 139. 145-146. 

151. 154. 156-158. 171. 174-176. 178. 181. 183-184. 196-197. 199. 212-214. 217.242 

0-29: 22-23. 25-26. 29 

B-52: 263 

B-57: 69. 2 12-2 13. 2 17. 229. 237, 238. 245. 253.262. 263. 267 

Bristol Type 170: 246 

C-45: 50. 147 

C-47: 6n. 8. 10-1 I. 16-17. 19. 24. 26. 31. 49-50. 55.67. 73 77.79. 82.96. 108. 112. 123, 128. 

131-135. 147. 153. 156. 167. 171-172. 174-175. 181-183. 196.214.220.224, 240-241.244. 

246-247.249. 25 I. 260-261. 267 

C-54: 138 

C-I 19: 8. 15- 17. 19. 22. 25-26. 3 I 

C-123: 93. 108. 109. 110-113. 114-115. 116, 119-120, 141, 146, 152, 154-156, 167, 180, 182-183. 

196. 224. 236, 245. 247-250. 257. 261. 264. 268 

C-124: 20. 22. 31 

C-130: 58. 81. 228. 230 

CH-34: 222 

CV-2: 107, 110-1 12, 146. 154-155. 167. 215. 236. 238. 246-247. 265 

Dassault M.D.-315 Flamant: IO, 36 

EA-I: 169-170 

EC-47: 244 

F-4: 257 

F-4U: 24 

F-5: 153 

359 
F-86: 

I3 I, 

184 

KC-135: 

51. 138 158. 

138. 

L-26 

MIG-15: 

MIG-17: 

Spitfire: 

Morane-500 Cricket: 10, 

I I I I I I 

I12 

Supermarine-I: 

U-1: I 10, 

U-10: 

I 

: 
UH-1: 

UH-34: 144 

107, 144. 147, 155, 157-158,164, 167, 175. 178, 183. 

Airfields 

air strikes against: 173 

conditions at: 55, 123-124. 132, 177, 183. 215, 263 

construction and repair: 39, 52, 81, 151, 177, 184, 217, 238, 263 

defense of: 82. 264 

security measures at: 170. 253, 264 

suitability survey: I 10 

tenant status of USAF: 123 

Viet Cong attacks on: 253 

Airlifts of troops and supplies: 8, 16. 19. 20-21. 24-27, 33. 50, 55. 58. 73-74, 106. 108. 110-1 12. 

121-122, 128, 130, 144-146, 154-156, 171. 178, 182-184. 196,204-205. 

214. 219. 245-247.254-255. 260-261. 266 

Airmen, personal hardships of: 124 

Ambush operations by Viet Cong: 53. 112-1 13. 145, 174, 179, 196-197. 224. 259-260 

An Khe: 176. 267 

An Lao: 259 

An Xuyen Province: 178, 196, 214 

Andersen Air Force Base: 230 

Anderson, Winston P.: 250 

Annam: 4-5 

Anthis. Rollen H.: 99 

and air operations coordination and control: 106. 136, 142-144. 147-149. 153, 155. 159-161. 171 

and airborne operations: I12 

and aircraft overuse: I8 I. 2 I2 

and aircraft strength expansion: 133-134, 154 

and airlift operations: I 11-1 12 

appointed special assistant for counterinsurgency: 227 

on Army concept of aircraft use: 160 

on combat role for Air Force: 123 

commands ADVON: 95-96 

commands MACV air components: 97-98 

commands 2d Air Division: 101 

and communications systems: 160, 178 

on defensive measures: I78 

Diem and Nhu. assessment of 187 

and escort missions: 145 

Harkins. relations with: 101-102 

and helicopter missions escorts: I59 

on intensifying operations: 192 

on interdiction missions: 135 

and MACV command authority: 98 

and mixed crews in combat: 131 

and pilots training: 132, 152 

and radio homing: 168 

and reconnaissance operations: I71 

on roles and missions: 148 

and self-sustaining RVN Air Force: 134 

sonic boom, use of 141 

and sorties by RVN Air Force: 132 

and tactical air strikes: 120. 136-139. 171-172 

and tactical target designations: 140-141 

and training programs: 127 

36 I 
I 

An tiaircraft ope rat ions a nd systems 

Viet Cong: 283-285 

Viet Minh: 17-19. 25-26. 212 

Ap Bac: 157-160. 163. 177. 264 

Armed Forces Council, RVN: 267 

Armor operations: 261 

Armorers. See Technicians 

Arromanches (French carrier): 18. 24 

Artillery fire support, Viet Minh: 18 

Assissinations by Viet Cong: 52, 67. 72 

Atomic weapons. See Nuclear weapons 

Atrocities by Viet Cong: 52. 67, 72 

Australia: 35 

Ba Thu: 136 

Ba Xuyen Province: 103 

Bac Lieu: 183. 202 

Ball. George W.: 100. 187-188 

Ban Boung Bau road bridge: 257 

Ban Ken bridge: 257 

Ban Me Thuot: 53. 122. 148. 151. 169. 177. 179. 182 

Ban Tang Vai: 259 

Bao Dai: 3. 5. 7, 10-1 I. 34 

BARRELL ROLL Operation: 256 

Bartley. John P.: 170 

Bay of Pigs incident: 63. 68 

Ben Cat: 145, 197, 224, 254 

Ben Cau: 199 

Ben Suc: 255 

Ben Tuong: I82 

Berlin blockade: 5 

Bethea, William E.: 221. 222 

Bidault. Georges: 26 

Bien Hoa Airfield: 50, 52. 55, 81. 83. 96, 104. 113. 116. 124. 127. 129, I30. 136. 145. 148. 151. 

157. 168, 171. 175. 181-182, 184. 195. 197. 21 1-220. 229. 233, 235. 238-239. 

243, 250, 253-254, 260-261. 262. 267-268. 27 1-272 

Bien Hoa Province: 75. 200 

Binh Dinh Province: 37. 255 

Binh Duong Province: 104. 200. 224 

Binh Gia: 260. 263 

Binh Hung: 109 

Binh Long Province: 156. 197 

Binh Thuy (formerly Can Tho): 238-239 

Binh Xuyen (religious group): 37 

Black Watch: 171 

Blanchard. William H.: 217-218 

Boat bases. air strikes against: 230 

Boi Loi woods: 264 

Bomb loads and types: 128. 181. 197,212.230. 340. 257 

Bombardment Squadrons. 8th and 13th: 229 

Bombardment Wing, 3d: 212 

Bombing missions. See Air operations 

Bonin Islands: 44 

Bowers. Charles J.: 142 

3 62 
Bridges, air strikes against: 

Brink, Francis 

Brink Hotel incident: 

Raymond: 

Brooks, Allison, C.: 

Buddhists, demonstrations by: 

William 

Bunker systems, Viet 

C. Turner Joy. 

Peninsula: I 

River: 

Joseph C.: 

Cambodia 

American recognition of 

bombing OPERATIONS in and near: 

border violations charged by: 

breaks relations with 

breaks relations with United States: 

French patrol of 

Japanese occupation of 

military assistance to: 

neutral status sought by: 

as sanctuary: 

relations with 

supply ORGANIZATION for: 

Cameron. William 

Camouflage. use of 

by Viet 

by Viet Minh: 

Camp Courtney: 

Camp 

Can Tho (later Binh Airfield: 

(religious group): 

Cap Saint Jacques Airfield. See Tau Airfield 

Cap 

Capital Military District, 

Card. 

Carpenter. John III: 

Carrier aircraft. strikes by: I73 

Fidel: 

Casualties 

from air power, estimates of: 

American: 

attitude toward figures: 

Australian: 

civilians: 

evacuation by airlift: 

first in USAF: 

French: I 
Navy. evacuation by: I 

REPUBLIC of Vietnam: 

VEIT 

Minh: 

Cat Airfield: 

Central Highlands: 

Central Intelligence Agency: 

Central for South Vietnam 

Central Target Analysis and Research Center: 

Ceylon: 

La: 

Chemical agents 

tests of 

use charged: 

Chemical plants, air strikes against: 

China, Nationalist: 

China, People's Republic of 

on Air Force combat role: 

India. incursions into: 

intervention, threat of 

military assistance by: 

nationals, evacuation of 

Taylor mission, reaction to: 

China Theater extended: 

Province: 

Churchill. Winston: 

Civil affairs: 

Civil Air Transport: I 

Civil Guard. 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group. 

Civilians 

casualties: 

evacuation of 

Clark Air Base: I I. I I I. 

Cluster 

Cochin China: 

Collins, 

and air support for 

and armed forces strength estimates: 

and army loyalty, investigation by: 

Combat Application Group. 

Combat Cargo Group. I I I 

Combat Crew Training Squadron. 4400th: 

Commander in Chief, Pacific. Felt. Harry Sharp. Grant; Stump. Felix 

Pacific Command 

Commander, United States Forces. Vietnam: 

Communications intercept missions: 

I 

I 
Communications systems. equipment and operations: 55, 81, 106-107, 121, 142-144, 146. 159-160. 

Composite Air Strike Force: 46, 247 

Composite Reconnaissance Unit. 363d: 230 

Congress 

172. 177- 178. 22 I. 247 

and American commitment: 23 

military assistance, amendment to: 190 

and reserve units call-up: 65 

23d: 171 

33d: 171, 181 

34th: 171 

41st: 220 

Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadrons (CAM RON) 

Constellation, USS: 230 

Convoys. See Motor convoys 

Core. USNS: 115 

Corps Tactical Zones 

I: 106, 140, 142, 145-146, 159. 161. 174, l90,200,211-214,267 

II. 106. 121, 129, 137. 140. 142, 173, 175. 177. 190, 200, 211. 219, 240, 253, 265-266 

253. 263 

III. 106. 129, 142, 145. 156-157, 175, 177, 179. 182, 190, 197, 199-200, 213-217, 243, 245, 248, 

IV: 153, 157-159, 172. 175, 177, 179. 182-183, 191, 200, 215, 235. 243. 253, 263 

Counterinsurgency 

policy of differentiating: 224 

RVN concept of 39, 54, 103 

Crew chiefs. See Technicians 

Cropdestruction missions: 219, 247-250 

Cua Ron: 229 

Cubi Point, Philippines: 131 

Curtis. Victor N.: 247 

Czechoslova kia: 5 

Da Lat: 96, 122. 248, 250 

Da Nang Air Base: 4, 7, 17, 22, 24, 31. 49, 52, 68, 74, 83, 101, 106-108, 109. 110-1 I I, 127, 

129, 132. 136. 142, 145-147, 159, 167, 169, 171, 174-176. 179. 198. 21 I, 219-220. 

228-230, 233. 235, 237, 238. 246, 248, 254, 256-257, 259. 266, 268. 272-274 

Dak Ket: 139 

Dam Doi: 183 

Dau Tieng: I97 

Decker, George H.: 64. 133 

Defense, Department of (see also McNamara, Robert S.; Wilson, Charles E.) 

cold-war defense, responsibility for: 63 

in command structure: 65 

military assistance programs, role in: 7. 47 

Reorganization Act (1958): 46 

Defense Intelligence Agency: 186 

Defoliation project: 73. 112-1 13, 117, 247-250. 265 

De Gaulle. Charles: 58. 188-189 

Delmore. Fred J.: I16 

Demilitarized zone established: 30 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. See North Vietnam 

Demolitions operations by Viet Cong: 181. 204, 261, 265 

DePuy, William E.: 208. 263 

Deserters from Viet Cong: I73 

365 
I 

Diem, 

advisors criticized by: 

and air operations and units. control 

and air units commitment: 

and American troops commitment: 

and armed forces expansion: 

and armed forces reorganization: 

assassinated: 

and bombing operations: 

on Cambodia as sanctuary: 

Central Intelligence Organization formed by: 

charges invasion by North: 

and Civil Guard improvement: 

and clear-and-bold operations: I19 

command structure fixed by. 

conspiracies against: 

and counterinsurgency operations: 

defense treaty with U.S. sought by: 

and defoliation project: 

on economic assistance: 

elected President: 

fiscal reforms, promised by: 

and government reforms: 

infiltration, alarm over: 

intelligence activities control by: 

jets requested by: 

Kennedy program, reaction to: 

and expansion: 

and MACV activation: 

martial law declared by: 

and military command formation: 

military operations, control by: 

and national campaign plan: 

and National Internal Security Council: 

and navy. formation of 

optimism of 

plebiscite protested by: 

and political disturbances: 

popular support lacking: 

ranger units activated by: 

relations with United States: 

religious affiliation: 

resettlement project: 

residence attacked: 

security agency formed by: 

strategic hamlets plan: 

and supply routes, interdiction of 

on tactical air support: 

and tactical zones organization: 

Taylor evaluation of 

threats to government, complaints about: 

and training programs: 

unification, opposition to: 

elimination, estimates for: 153 

I 

I 
C. Douglas: 

Direction finders: 

Do Son Airfield: I 

Do War Zone: 

use by patrols: 

Don. Van: 

Don Airport: 

Dong 

Dong River: 

William E.: 

Doyle. Miles 

John Foster: 

and American commitment: 

on Communist threat: 

and Geneva Accords: 

and military assistance program: 

and military forces of concern for: 

plebiscite protested by: 

Dunning. John 

on armed forces strength: 

and government reforms: 

and intelligence organizations: 

relations with Diem: 

Eden, Anthony: 

Alan C.: 

Edwards 

Eglin Air Force Base: 

Eighth Army: 

Eisenhower, Dwight I I, 

and air commitment: I7 

ambassadors role strengthened by: 

and American 

and armed forces strength: 

armistice proposals by: 

and Chinese intervention: 

and defense of 

and defense: 

government stability, concern for: 

and independence movement, policy on: 

and Laos. intervention in: 

and military assistance programs: 

and requisites for French success: 

support of 

and training programs: 

Electricians. See Technicians 

Electronic intelligence missions: 

Paul 

England. See United Kingdom 

Equipment losses. See Materiel losses 

Escort missions: 
I 

Far East Air Logistics Force: 16-1 7. 41 

Far East command: 41.43 

Farm Gate: 78-84. 95-96. 100-101. 107. 113, 120-124, 127-134, 136-140. 144146, 148. 151, 155. 

Felt. Harry D.: 87 

157-159. 168, 170-172, 174. 181, 183. 200, 212. 214, 219, 248, 250 

and advisors in combat role: 219 

and advisors force reduction: 165 

and ADVON operations: 95-96. 100 

and air commando units: 81-82. 86. 95 

and air-ground liaison: 136-137, 170 

and air operations coordination and control: 83, 95, 155-156, 160-161 

and air operations, restrictions on: 172 

and air strikes against North: 201. 206 

and air units commitment: 69 

and aircraft armament: 162 

and aircraft for Army: 110-1 I I 

and aircraft for RVN: 54. 75. 86, 131. 213 

and aircraft strength expansion: 134, 138 

and airfields construction: 86, 184 

and airlift operations: 108. III 

and Ap Bac disaster: 159 

and armed forces expansion: 54 

and Cambodia, incursions into: 204 

and Chinese pilots for RVN Air Force: 133-134 

and clear-and-hold operations: 104 

and combat role for U.S. Air Force: 123 

in command structure: 46 

and commander for U.S. forces: 94 

and commanders' lack of initiative: 86 

and counterinsurgency operations: 54, 170 

and covert actions against North: 195 

and defoliation project: I16 

Diem reassured on U.S. support: 149 

on firepower of airplane vs. helicopter: 197 

on forward air controllers: I70 

Harkins. evaluation of: 102 

and Harkins' command authority: 98 

and Harkins' relations with Anthis: 101-102 

heads Pacific Command: 

and helicopter missions, escort for: 143-144. 159 

and initiative against Viet Cong: 139-140 

and intelligence collection and transmission: I38 

on intensifying operations against North: 192. 204 

and interdiction missions: 135 

and jets for RVN Air Force: 147-148. 168 

joint task force concept: 46-47 

and Kennedy program: 71 

and Laos. incursions into: 58. 204 

on MAAG reorganization and expansion: 69. 73 

on MACV organization and staff 97-98. 207-208 

and Marine Corps commitment: 188 

and military assistance programs: 47 

and military operations. control of: 56 

and mixed crews and air combat: 83. 123 

368 
and mobile combat reporting post: 

and napalm strikes: 

and national campaign plan: 

and pilots training program: 

on political disturbances; 

on province chiefs' meddling: 

and reconnaissance MISSIONS 

retires: 

on supplies 

and supply routes, air interdiction of: 

and tactical air strikes: I73 

and target acquisitions: 

and targets in North: I73 

training programs: 

and troop units commitment: 

and flights: 

and unified command for Vietnam: 

evaluation of 

Field Hospital. 8th: 

Fighter Commando Squadron. 

Fighter Interceptor Squadron. 509th: 

Fighter Squadron. 16th: 

Finned ammunition: 

FLAMING DART I and II Operations: 

Flares. use of 

Fleming, David 

I30 

Flight Service Center and Network: 

Floods. effect on operations: 

Food service. deficiencies in: 

Foreign Legion: 

Michael 

Fortified hamlets plan. See Strategic hamlets plan 

Forward air controllers: 

FRANCE 

advisors with 

air operations by: 

aircraft deliveries to: I. 

aircraft losses: 

aircraft recovered from: 

aircraft strength: 

airfield construction and repair: 

ammunition deliveries to: 

casualties: I 

finned missiles. use by: 

flight crews. lack of 

Foreign Legion: 

government, aid in stabilizing: 

independence. agreement on: 

manpower strength: 10. 

materiel losses: I9 

military assistance to: 

Mobile Group 100: 
sorties, number of 7, 19 

and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35 

supply requirements: 19 

supply system and operations: 10 

support of war declines: I I 

training programs: 36, 49-50 

and Vietnam partitioning: 30 

Vietnamese, alienation of 17, 23-24, 34 

Vietnamese. desertions from: 29 

withdrawal to south: 29-30 

withdrawal from Vietnam: 39-40, 50 

Freeman, Edinund F.: 7 

Fuel supplies: I24 

Fulbright. .J, William: 68 

Galbraith. John K.: 94 

Gatling gun (minigun): 240-241, 242 

Gavin. James M.: 19, 24 

Geneva Accords: 18, 23. 26-27. 30-3 I, 35. 52. 54, 64-65, 74-75, 123, 147, 172, 206, 251 

Gia Dinh Province: 200 

Gia Lam Airfield: 15, 18 

Gilpatric, Roswell L.: 68. 70-7 I 

Gleason, Robert L.: 128; 136 

Goure: Leon: 236 

Graham. William B.: 239 

Great Britain See United Kingdom 

Greece. civil war in: 5 

Greene, Wallace M., Jr.: 204, 234, 254 

Ground crews. See Technicians 

Groups support. See Tactical air support 

Guam. supply organization for: 42 

Guerrilla operations 

by Viet Cong: 53. 56, 103, 116, 120, 145, 181. 191, 196-197, 199, 259 

by Viet Minh: 3-5. IO. 18 

Gulf of Tonkin crisis: 229, 234-235, 239, 243, 247 

Hail (Lazy Dog) missiles: 24, 26 

Hainan Island: 24, 230 

Haiphong: 4.8 

air strikes against: 173, 254 

operations at: 5. 16-18. 29 

Halberstam. David: 163 

Hamlet defense, support of 174 

Hanoi 

air strikes against: 254, 256 

aircraft strength in: 25 

operations at: 5, 16, 18. 29 

Viet Minh control of 3-4 

Hanoi Delta: 24 

Hao Cain: 66 

Harkins. Paul D.: 87, 164 

and ADVON reorganization: 100 

and air operations coordination and control: 131. 144, 155. 160-161. 167. 169 

and air operations, restrictions on: 172. 203 

I 

! 

370 
and Air Force representation at MACV: 

and aircraft for Army: I 

and aircraft for 

and aircraft strength expansion: 

and airlift operations: 

and American phase-out: 

and disaster: I59 

and Army control of Marine Corps aviation: 

and assistance withdrawal threat: 

and authority as MACV commander: 

and Cambodia border violations: 

and clear-and-hold operations: 

and command of forces: 

commands MAC Thailand: 

commands MAC Vietnam: 

and defoliation project: 

and crisis: 

and helicopter missions, escort of 

and helicopter units, control of: 

on initiative against 

on intensifying operations: 

and jets for Air Force: 

assessment of: 

and MACV staff structure: 

military situation, report on: 

and napalm strikes: 141 

and national campaign plan: I53 

and political disturbances; 

and radar operations: 

retires: 

and tactical air strikes: 

and tactical air support: 

elimination. estimate for: 

and of conflict: 

on bombing operations: 

on Diem support: 

and government reforms: 

and political disturbances: 

and troop units commitment: 

and air operations coordination and control: 

and air strikes against North: 

and Laos, incursions into: 

and low-altitude reconnaissance: 

Harris, Hunter. 

Province: 

Haven. 

Heat detecting devices: 

Heath. Donald 10, 

Helicopters 

airplane escort of 

in airlifts: 

armament loads: 

Army concept of use: 

I 
casualties evacuation by: 

control by Army: 

in gunship role: 

losses: 

Marine Corps operations: 

tactical strikes by: 

transfer to Air Force: 

types. Aircraft types 

Henderson. Harvey E.: I 

HERGERT I8 

Albert 

Air Force Base: 

Hicks, Robert 

High National Council. 

Highways (numbered). See Routes 

Roger 

on air power lethality results: 

on bombing operations: 

on border control operations: 

CRITICIZES air and military operations: 

and political disturbances: 

on tactical air strikes: 

Diem praised by: 

and 

and independence movement: 

intensified operations. reaction 

plebiscite, demand for: 

support by China and Soviet: 

Taylor mission, reaction to: 

unification, plans for: 

Chi Minh 

Chi Minh 'Trail: 

(religious group): 

Holden, Paul: 

Me Island: 

Island: 

Honolulu CONFERENCES See 

also Saigon. conferences at 

Hue: 

Hung 

Air Force Base: 

Hutchinson, Donald 

Identification. friend or 

Indochina (see also each area BY later 

allied cooperation in: 

American policy toward: 

Chinese policy in: 

French control of 

geographical features: 

independence movement: 

Japanese occupation: 

Infrared devices: 

Harold: 
Intelligence collection and reports: 18. 54. 85. 135. 137-138. 152. 157. 163. 169. 179. 199. 227-228. 

235.243.245, 250, 261 

Inter-Ministry Committee for Strategic Hamlets. RVN: 104 

International Control Commission: 30. 40. 50. 53. 85. 100. 162. 189. 230 

International Cooperation Administration: 52 

Interzone V: 139. I73 

Jablonsky. Harvey Jr.: 137-138 

Japan. supply organization in: 42 

Johnson, Harold K.: 204 

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 209 

and advisors. reduction in force: 195. 204 

and air strikes against North: 229. 253-254. 256. 265-266 

and aircraft for RVN: 213. 229 

becomes President: 192 

and bilaterial consultation agreement: 230 

Congress supports military operations: 232 

and covert actions against North: 195. 227. 234 

Diem, conference with: 70 

and government, stability for: 256 

and Gulf of Tonkin incident: 229 

on intensifying operations: 195, 198-199. 203 

and jets for RVN Air Force: 238 

Khanh. relations with: 198 

and Laos. incursions into: 195. 234 

and MACV. officers assigned to: 195 

and military assistance programs: 70 

and patrols by Navy: 229. 234 

policy of Vietnam: 195 

and provisional government: 195 

and psychological warfare missions: 25 I 

on support for U.S.-RVN units: 203 

and Taylor authority: 227 

and U-2 flights: 195 

on Viet Cong control by North: 195 

and Vietnamization of conflict: 195 

Johnson. U. Alexis: 261 

Joint Airlift Allocation Board: 246 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and advisors in combat role: 105, 219 

and air base defense: 254 

and air commando units: 80. 83 

and Air Force expansion: 41 

and air operations coordination and control: 216 

and air strikes against North: 205-206. 234-235. 253-254 

and aircraft for RVN Air Force: 75. I I I. 167-168, 212. 229. 238 

and aircraft strength expansion: 134. 218. 220. 229, 238. 266 

and American aircraft in combat: 267 

and Cambodia border violations: 141, 203 

and China, pre-emptive strikes against: 29 

and clear-and-hold operations: 20 

cold-war defense, responsibility for: 63 

and combat role for U.S. Air Force: 131 

and command structure: 43. 65 

373 
and communications systems and equipment: 107 

and counterinsurgency operations: 54 

and defense of RVN: 43 

and defoliation project: 112. 247 

on Diem crisis. security during: 191 

government. concern for stability: 35-36 

and helicopters combat role: I62 

on intensifying operations against North: 198-190. 201. 203-205 

and jets for RVN Air Force: 200. 238. 264. 266 

and Laos. incursions into: 64. 204-205. 254 

and Laos as infiltration route: 64 

and MACV commander authority: 97 

and MACV staff structure: 207. 210 

and military assistance programs: 6. 35-36 

military situation. report on: 179 

and mixed crews in combat: 82-83, 144. 238 

and national campaign plan: 152 

and psychological warfare missions: 250 

and RVN armed forces strength: 36. 39, 71-72 

and Special Forces assignment: 228 

and supply routes, air interdiction of 80 

on supportr for U.S.-RVN units: 203 

and targets in North: 172-173. 233-234 

Taylor report. reaction to: 88 

and training programs and proposals: 36, 69. 72, 220 

and troop units commitment: 69. 71. 88. 198. 254 

on unified command for Vietnam: 94 

Joint Frequency Coordinating Board: I78 

Joint General Staff. RVN 

and air operations coordination and control: 55. 172. 221 

air operations. restrictions on: 141 159. 172, 22 I 

and airborne operations: 112. 158 

and aircraft assignments: 107 

and airlift operations: 246 

Army domination of: 50 

bombload restrictions by: 129 

intelligence collection and transmission: 138 

intensifies operations: 166 

and jets in strike role: 265 

and political crises: 56. 187 

recognized by provisional government: 191 

and tactical air strikes: 139 

Joint military mission, U.S.: 15 

Joint operations center: 83. 106. 128. 142. 21 I 

Joint Operations Evaluation Group, RVN: I59 

Joint Strategic Survey Council: 90 

Joint Task Force 116: 46-47. 58, 64, 94 

Jungle Jim units: 79-84. 100 

I 

I 

Kadena Air Base: 229-230, 243. 257 

Kalin, Byron R.: 146 

Kats. Aaron 14,: 239 

Kennedy, John F. 

activates MAAC Laos: 64 

I 

314 
aggression blunted, belief in: 

and air units commitment: I70 

and aircraft deliveries to 

assassinated: 

and assistance withdrawal threat: 

ambassadors. role strengthened by: 

civic action program: 

and cold-war defense. responsibility for: 

on combat developments and test center: 

counterinsurgency plans: 

and Cuba crisis: 

and defoliation project: 

on replacement: 

economic development program: 

and government reforms: 

on guerrilla warfare, danger from: 

on as MACV commander: 

on intensifying operations: 

and Laos, intervention in: 

expansion: 

and military assistance programs: 

nuclear tests resumed by: 

policy on Vietnam: 

and radar facilities: 

reserve units. call-up by: 

and armed forces expansion: 

government, aid to: 

Special Forces commitment: 

Special Group (Counterinsurgency) formed by: 

Taylor mission to government: 

training programs expanded by: 

troop units commitment by: I 

and atrocities: 

and VIETNAMIZATION of conflict: 

and air strikes against North: 

and consultation agreement: 

chief of state, proposal for: 

civil government overthrown by: 

and clear-and-hold operations: 

command structure reorganized by: 

fall of predicted: 

forms government: 

government of. instability: 

on intensifying operations against North: 

leads attacks: 

and National Pacification Plan: 

proclaimed President: 

resignation considered by: 

resigns: 

and Special Forces expansion: 

and standard of living. enhancing: 

support by United States: 

proclaimed acting premier: 
I 

and war declaration against North: 204 

and Laos. cease-fire in: 65, 71 

on national liberation wars: 55-56, 63, 71 

and West Berlin, threat to: 58 

Kidnappings by Viet Cong: 52 

Kien Giang Province: 178 

Kien Hoa Province: 178, 214 

Kien Long: 204, 215 

Kien Phong Province: 53 

Kim, Le Van: 190 

King. Benjamin H.: 79, 81-82, 96, 127-128 

Kontum: 53. 56. 122 

Kontum Province: 173. 263 

Korat Air Base, Thailand: 229-230, 256. 280 

Kosygin, Aleksei N.: 265 

Krulak. Victor H.: 189 

Kuter, Laurence S.: 45 

Khrushchev. Nikita S. 

and air units. control of 4344 

on command structure: 43-44 

and local air forces, relations with: 42. 45 

and logistics. control of 42 

and military assistance programs: 47 

mobile strike force concept: 4546 

and air operations coordination and control: 21 1-212 

commands air force: 21 I 

and corps, assignment of aircraft to: 2 I I 

and intensification of operations: 228 

leads Zone D assault: 254 

and paradrops into North: 228 

personal anti-coup aircraft: 263, 267 

teamwork, appeal for: I10 

Ky. Nguyen Cao: 222 

Kyes, Roger M.: 23 

Lackland Air Force Base: 79 

Langley Air Force Base: I12 

Language barrier: 221 

Laniel, Joseph: 22 

Lansdale, Edward G. 122, 199 

Lao Dong Party: 52.56, 58. 103 

Laos 

aircraft deliveries to: 58 

American recognition: 5 

French control of 3 

incursions into: 58-59, 64 

Japanese occupation: 3 

military assistance to: 16 

operations in: 15, 17, 53. 58, 63. 148 

photographic reconnaissance over: 74-75, 243 

as sanctuary and infiltration route: 56. 58. 67. 72-73. 163. 204, 227 

supply organization for: 42 

Larson Air Force Base: 22 

Lassman. B. D.: 180 

I 

I 

376 
Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de: 10 

Lazy Dog finned ammunition: 24-25, 240, 261, 266 

Leaflet drops: 37, 122, 196.249, 250 

LeMay, Curtis E.: 87 

and ADVON reorganization: 100 

and air-base defense: 264 

and air commando units; 79-84, 100 

and Air Force representation on MACV: 101 

and air operations policy: 119, 201 

and air strikes against North: 201. 204-205. 254 

and air units commitment: 90 

and aircraft for Army: I 10, 244 

and aircraft for RVN Air Force: 168 

and aircraft underuse: 125 

and airlift operations: 245 

and armed C-47 evaluation: 241 

and combat role for U.S. Air Force: 132 

criticizes air and military operations: 161 

on Farm Gate declassification: 170- I7 I 

and helicopters as gunships: 225, 236 

on intensifying operations against North: 203 

and joint operations center: 142 

and Laos, incursions into: 64-65, 227, 257 

and MACV staff structure: 97-98, 210 

and mixed crews in combat: 132 

and options for action against North: 234 

and RVN Air Force combat effectiveness: 131-132 

strategic plans, disagreement with: 152 

and troop units commitment: 90 

on Vietnam policy: 91 

and air commando missions: 83 

and clear-and-hold operations: I19 

and command structure: 44 

and government reforms: 67 

on mixed crews in combat: 84 

on troop units commitment: 69 

Lemnitzer, Lyman L.: 66 

Lenin, Nikolai: 55 

Lloyd, Robert M.: 17 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 

and air power, RVN failure to use: 197 

and air strikes against North: 206 

and assistance withdrawal threat: 188-189 

becomes ambassador: I86 

and conspiracies against Diem: 186 

on Diem-Nhu replacement: 188-190 

on intensifying operations against North: 202-205 

Khanh. assessment of 198 

on motivating Vietnamese: 192 

and political disturbances: 187-188 

and political reforms: 191 

resigns: 210 

Logistical operations and systems. See Supply operations and systems 

Long An Province: 198. 200 

377 
Long My: 

Loudspeaker, use of: 

Ma River: 

Douglas: 

Sam, I. 

Mail service: 

Maintenance crews. Technicians 

Maintenance and repair: IO. 

Roger 

Pass: 

Manila: 

Mansfield. Mike: 

Islands, in command structure: 

Marseille. airlift from: 

Marshall, Carl I12 

Theodore C.: 

Materiel Group. 6410th: 

Materiel losses 

by France: 

by forces: 

by 

Mathison, Richard 

Chester E.: 

Robert: 

John 

John 

McDonald, David 

Stephen 

Lionel C. 

and air commando mission: 

aircraft assignment by: 

and bombing operations: 

commands U.S. Forces. Vietnam: 

on crisis in Vietnam: 

heads 

and military operations. control of 

and Army expansion: 

and tactical air control system: 

James 

William 

Claude 

Robert 

and advisors. number of 

and air commando training mission: 

and air operations coordination and control: 

and air strikes against North: 

and aircraft for Air Force: 

and aircraft strength expansion: 

and airlift operations: I IO, I19 

and American phase-out: 

on American combat role: 
on Army mission in Vietnam: I19 

assistance withdrawal threat: 189-190 

and B-57 for contingency use: 218 

centralizes decision-making: I23 

and China, intervention by: 234 

and Chinese pilots for RVN Air Force: 133 

and clear-and-hold operations: 104, I19 

and Combat Developments and Test Center: 73 

on combat role for U.S. Air Force: 123 

and communications systems and equipment: 107 

comprehensive measures for RVN aid: 93 

conferences with commanders. See Honolulu conferences; Saigon, conferences at 

and counterinsurgency forces. expanding: 63, 80 

and counterinsurgency plans: 80. 82 

and defoliation project: 112-1 13, 116-1 17 

on Diem-Nhu replacement: 190 

on flares. use in air strikes: I37 

ground war, stress on: 259 

and Gulf of Tonkin incident: 229 

and helicopter deliveries to RVN Air Force: 144 

hostilities end, predictions of 122, I5 I, I90 

on intensifying operations: 192. 202 

and jets for RVN Air Force: 147 

and Laos, incursions into: 195. 256 

and Laos, intervention in: 64 

and MACV organization and staff 97. 171. 207-208, 210 

and materiel transfer to RVN: 166 

and military assistance programs: 105. 151. 192 

and mining operations: 202 

missions to Vietnam: 190. 195, 202 

and mixed crews in combat: 82-83, 131, 218, 238 

monitors aid program: 93 

and negotiations to secure peace: 265 

and nuclear tests. resumption of 65 

and options on action against North: 203. 234 

and pilots shift to airlifts: I 10 

on political conditions in RVN: 179 

and political disorders: I85 

on priorities for RVN: 72 

on provisional government: 192. 195 

and' psychological warfare missions: 123. 250 

and radio use in air warnings: 137 

on roles and missions: 102 

and supply routes, air interdiction of 80 

on tactical air control systems: 93. 106 

and tactical air control: 121. 138. 217 

Taylor report. reaction to: 88 

and training programs: 133. 220. 243 

and troop units commitment: 69. 88-89.9 I 

and U-2 flights: 195 

and unified command for Vietnam: 94 

and Viet Cong elimination. estimates for: 151 

and Vietnamization of conflict: 133, 137. 151-152. 166, 218. 220 

McNaughton, John T.: 255 

379 
Medical Air Evacuation Group. 6481st: 31 

Medical services: 3 I. 122. 125. 2 19, 260, 267 

Meier, Henry C.: 176 

Mekong Delta. operations in: 34. 3'7. 49. 72. 74, 153. 157. 177. 179. 183. 204. 21 7. 221 

Mellish, David S.: 174. 215 

Mendenhall. Joseph A,: 189 

Mendes-France. Pierre: 30. 33 

Military Air Transport Service: 3 1, 8 I 

Military assistance advisory groups 

Air Force Army representation on: 47, 49 

local air forces. developing: 48 

military assistance, role in: 4748 

annual allotments: 151 

priorities in: 7 

Military Assistance Program 

Military Revolutionary Council. RVN: 191. 233 

Military Sea Transport Service: 31 

Milton. Theodore R.: 54. I I I 

Minh. Duong Van: 186. 190-191. 195. 198, 233-234 

Minh, Tran Van: 267 

Minh. Tri Pham: 77 

Minigun. See Gatling gun 

Mining operations by Viet Cong: 183 

Misawa Air Base: 229 

Missile assaults: 230. 257 

Mobile combat reporting post: 74. 82 

Mobile Communications Group, 1st: 107 

Mobile Group 100: 30 

Molotov. Vyacheslav M.: 30 

Monroe Doctrine: 58 

Montagnards: 73. 116-1 17. 173. 179 

Moody Air Force Base: 130 

Moore, Joseph H.: 209 

and advisors grades: 216 

and air base defense: 253 

and air escort missions: 225 

and air-ground liaison: 216 

and air operations coordination and control: 21 I. 216. 225 

and aircraft strength expansion: 217. 238 

commands 2d Air Division: 208 

and helicopters as gunships: 236 

and helicopters. removal from air bases: 264 

and infrared reconnaissance: 244 

and jets. use of 264 

and joint air operations center: 221 

Joint General Staff. liaison with: 217 

and Laos. incursions into: 257 

and liaison and strike aircraft shortage: 238 

and MACV staff structure: 208 

and mixed crews in combat: 218, 264 

and RVN Air Force organization: 21 I 

and tactical air support controls: 216-217 

and tactical air support missions: 217 

380 
Thomas 

and reorganization: 

and airlift operations: 

and defoliation project: I16 

heads mobile strike force: 

and self-sustaining Air Force: 

American: 

Air Force: 

armed forces: 

Viet 

Morale status 

Morse. Wayne 

Mortar assaults, by Viet 

Morton. 

Motor convoys 

support missions for: I78 

Viet attacks on: 

Mountbatten. Louis: 

Eugene 

Mule Train: 

Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949): 

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1950): 

My Tho: 

Air Base: 

Dong: 

Napalm strikes: IO. 

Nape road bridges: 

Wilfred C.: 

Frank C.: 

National Intelligence Agency. 

National Liberation Front (Viet 

National Security Council 

and air strikes against North: 

and Communist expansion. threat of 

and defense of Vietnam: 

and Diem support: 

on intensifying operations against North: 

and Laos. incursions into: 

and military assistance program: 

military operations, proposals for: 

and naval patrols resumption: 

and armed forces expansion: 

and training programs: 

on troop units commitment: 

Eugene: 

Navigation systems: 

New Times: 

New Zealand: See Royal New Zealand Air Force 

Ralph 

Diem. See Diem, 

See 

I 
I 

Nha Trang Airfield: 10-1 I, 15, 36, 50, 96, 101, 107, 125, 127, 132, 142, 148, 151, 154-155, 168, 

Nhu, Madame Ngo Dinh: 163-186 

Nhu, Ngo Dinh: 34. 56, 58, 104, 129, 139. 165. 185-191. See also Diem. Ngo Dinh 

Night operations 

171. 176-177, 181, 185, 211, 239,.246-247. 263, 274-275 

by RVN forces: 96, 127-128, 132, 168, 174-175, 182-183. 214, 224. 244, 247, 259-260 

by Viet Cong: 253, 260 

by Vier Minh: 22 

Night-vision devices: 148 

Nixon, Richard M.: 33 

Nolting. Frederick E.: 87 

and ADVON operations: 95-96, 101 

and air commando units: 81-82 

and air operations, restrictions on: 172 

and aircraft deliveries to RVN air force: 75, 131 

and American combat role: 170 

and Cambodia border violations: 141 

and defense treaty with United States: 73 

and defoliation project: 113, 116-1 17 

Diem reassured on U.S. support: 149 

on Diem reply to Kennedy program: 94 

on Diem support: I88 

and jets for RVN Air Force: 129 

and Kennedy comprehensive plan: 71 

and napalm strikes: 141 

on relations with RVN: 166, I85 

and tactical air control: 83 

and tactical air strikes: 129. 137-139 

North American Aviation. Inc.: 214 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 5 

North Vietnam (see also Ho Chi Minh) 

aggression by affirmed: 100 

air strikes against: 230 

aircraft strength: 230 

airlifts of troops and supplies: 128-129 

Communist control of: 34 

Diem overthrow exploited by: 191 

independence proclaimed: 4 

invades South: 53 

migration to South: 3 I, 34 

navy, assaults by: 229. 232 

Nhu contact with: 189 

number in South: 198 

peace negotiations rejected by: 206 

population: 34 

recognition by China and Soviet: 5 

regular forces move to South: 204, 227 

supply system and operations: 195. 198 

Taylor mission. reaction to: 85 

on USAF combat role: 100, 162 

and Viet Cong expansion: I63 

Northern Air Materiel Area Pacific: 42 

Nuclear weapons 

considerations on use: 29. 64-65 

382 
in test exercise: 46 

Observers training programs: 10 

O'Daniel, John W. 

and French advisors: 39 

and French plans: 15 

and Dien Bien Phu defense: 18,25 

heads MAAG: 19 

and training programs: 36 

Oden. Delk M.: 225 

O'Donnell, Emmett: 87 

and Air Force representation at MACV: 101 

and air commando units: 82-83 

and air operations coordination and control: 129. 160 

and air operations. restrictions on: 172 

on air operations policy: I19 

and aircraft strength expansion: 133 

airlifts. control of: 108 

and bombing strikes: 104 

commands Pacific Air Forces: 47 

and defoliation project: 113, I16 

and Laos, intervention in: 65 

and military assistance programs: 48 

on RVN Air Force deficiencies: 69 

strategic plans. disagreement with: 152 

and tactical air control: 106, 160 

and tactical air strikes: 135, 137 

Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities: 227 

Office of Strategic Services: 3 

Oil-spot concept. See Clear-and-hold operations 

Oil storage plans, strike against: 173. 229. 230. 254, 256 

Okinawa, supply organization in: 42 

Olson. Arvid E.: 10 

On Mark Engineering Company: 181,212 

O'Neill, James E.: I70 

Osborne. Clarence R.. Jr.: 215 

Overseas Press Club: 22 

Pacific Command (see also Felt. Harry D.; Sharp. Ulysses S. Grant; Stump, Felix B.) 

in command structure: 41. 43-44. 46, 65 

territorial area: 46 

Pacific Fleet: 44, 219, 229. 232 

Pacification, effect of air operations on: 236-238 

Page Communications Engineers, Inc,: 107 

Pakistan: 35 

Paramilitary units: 67-68, 152, 157. 225. See also Civil Guard; Civilian Irregular Defense Groups; 

Paratroopers. See Airborne operations 

Paris. airlift from: 22 

Parrot's Beak: 136 

Partridge. Earle E. 

Montagnards: Popular Forces; Regional Forces; Self-Defense Corps 

and air operations conduct: 29 

and American commitment: 29 

begins USAF withdrawal: 31 

383 
I 

in command structure: 41 

logistics, control by: 42 

and military assistance program: 24-25, 31 

Passman, Otto E.: 185 

Pathet Lao: 63, 204, 268 

Patricia Lynn: I71 

Patrols 

ground: 179 

naval: 227-229, 234-235, 266 

Pay service: 125 

People's Revolutionary Party (North Vietnam): 103 

Personnel carriers: 157-1 58, 260 

Petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL). See Fuel supplies 

Phan Thiet: 21 5 

Philippine Air Lines: 3 I 

Philippines 

in command structure: 44 

nationals. evacuation of: 31 

and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35 

supply organization in: 42 

Phnom Penh: 129, 163 

Pho Sinh: 182 

Photographic reconniassance missions: 74-75. 127, 135, 138, 147-148, 168, 241-243 

Phu Quoc Island: 141 

Phu Yen Province: 116-1 17, 236 

Phuc Yen: 230. 235,254 

Phuoc Long Province: 117, 145, 156 

Phuoc Thanh Province: 75, 156, 174,250 

Phuoc Tuy Province: 200,2 15,245.26 I, 266267 

Phuoc Vinh: 72 

Pilots 

civilian. See Civil Air Transport 

friction with Vietnamese: I 10 

training programs. See Training programs 

Plain of Jars: 204-205, 233 

Plain of Reeds: 53, 157 

Pleiku: 30, 53, 56, 83, 106-107, 122, 127, 129, 132-133, 136, 142, 147, 151, 169, 171, 174-176, 

Pleiku Province: 263 

Pleven, 18 

Poland: 25 

Polei Kleng: 122 

Polei Krong: 122 

Pope Air Force Base: 108, I 11-1 12 

Popular Forces, RVN. 177, 215. 225 

Porter. Daniel B., Jr.: 158 

Porter, John M.: 220 

Potsdam Conference (1945): 4 

Power plants, strikes against: 173 

Press reports. effect of 163, 170, 185- 186, 257 

Preston, Benjamin S.. Jr.: 213-214, 220 

Prevost, Herbert L.: 157- I58 

Prisoners of war 

2 I I. 263. 265-266, 275 

interrogating and processing: 135 

I 

I 

384 

I 
Gilbert 

Propaganda by Viet 

Robert 

Psychological warfare missions: 

Duc Province: 

Province: 

Tin Province: 

I85 

Quartermaster Airborne Supply and Packaging Company, 

Quarters. conditions in: 

Qui 

Radar systems and operations: I2 I. I3 I, 

Arthur 

Radio communications. See Communications SYSTEMS and equipment 

Radio direction finding: 

Radio Research Unit. 

Ranch Hand: 

RAND Corporation, studies by: 

Ranger Units. 

Reconnaissance missions: 

Reconnaissance Squadron, 

Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, 13th: 

Red River and Delta: 

Refueling operations: 

Region Viet 

Regional Forces, 

Religious groups. demonstrations by: 

Republic of Korea 

supply organization in: 

war in: 

American troop strength in: 

border defenses: I72 

Cambodia. relations with: 

economy, plans for improving: 

elections in: I, 

financial procedures, improving: 

government stability. concern over: 

independence : 

infiltration by North: 

materiel delivered to, value of 

migration from North: 

military staff inaction, effects of 

political disturbances in: 58. 

population: 

provincial organization: 

provisional government recognized: I 

terrain features: 

Republic of Vietnam (See also Diem, 
warfare begins in: 53 

air crews, combat effectiveness: 176-1 77 

air defense by: 128, 131 

airborne operations. See Airborne operations 

and aircraft assignment and control: 107-108, 142 

aircraft deliveries to: 49-50, 52. 54-55, 75. 127. 132-133, 151, 153-154, 179, 238-239, 243, 251, 

airlifts of troops and supplies. See Airlifts of troops and supplies 

combat effectiveness: 67. 75 

command positions, Army officers in: 50 

equipment shortages: 179, 239 

ground crews effectiveness: 132 

morale status: 18 1, 2 I7 

organization and strength: 37-39, 49. 75, 153, 207 

organizational unity: 133 

pilots, combat effectiveness of 50, 54. 127, 131-1 32 

relations with U.S. Air Force: 42 

resources parceling by: 21 I 

scramble time: 132. 175, 182, 2 I5 

sorties, number flown: 55.67, 131-133, 149, 

squadrons renumbered: 133 

surprise applied by: 219 

Taylor Report on: 86 

training programs: IO, 36, 50. 79-84, 125. 127-128, 131, 134, 147, 151-152, 154. 168, 179, 219. 

22 I, 239,243. 25 1 

units activated: 50 

Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF). See also Republic of Vietnam armed forces 

263, 267-268 

62d Tactical Wing: 263 

1st Air Transport Group: 50,55. 108, 131 

1st Liaison Group: IO, 36 

43d Transport Group: 243 

1st Air Transport Squadron: 50 

1st Fighter Squadron: 50, 54-55, 127. 129. 132 

1st Helicopter Squadron: 50, 55 

1st Liaison Squadron: 50, 127 

1st Radar Squadron: 74 

2d Air Transport Squadron: 50 

2d Fighter Squadron: 127, 131-132 

2d Liaison Squadron: 50. 127 

3d Liaison Squadron: 127 

I 10th Liaison Squadron: 176 

I I 2th Liaison Squadron: 177. 2 15 

116th Liaison Squadron: 239 

122d Liaison Squadron: 177 

312th Special Mission Squadron: 10 

514th Fighter Squadron: 175, 179, 213-215 

5 16th Fighter Squadron: 179. 2 19-220, 224, 238, 259. 263 

518th Fighter Squadron: 212-213 

520th Fighter Squadron: 220, 238 

716th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron: 147, 212, 

Republic of Vietnam armed forces 

casualties: 145, 156-158. 177, 179. 184, 191, 196-197. 266 

civil affairs, neglect of 54 

Civil Guard: 37, 39, 54. 65-66, 67, 71-73, 184-185. 191 

I 

3 86 
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups: 

Combat Developments and Test Center: 

commands, discontent in: 

counterinsurgency operations: 

desertions from: 

discontent over Diem policies: 

intelligence collection dissemination: 

joint operations center: 

materiel losses: 

morale status: 

offensive actions, number of 

organization and strength: 

paramilitary units: 

Popular Forces: 

psychological warfare campaigns: 

Regional Forces: 

security systems: 

Self-Defense Corps: 

supply operations and systems: 

airborne operations. See Airborne operations 

airborne units: 

airfield defense by: 

armor operations: 

artillery fire support: 

combat effectiveness: 

command structure. defects in: 

communications systems and equipment: 

defoliation project: I I7 

guerrillas. training to fight: 

operations. number of: 

organization and strength: 

ranger units: 

search-and-clear missions: 

search-anddestroy missions: 

security, diversion to: 

Special Forces units: 

training programs: 

Division: 

Division: 

5th Division: 

7th Division: 

9th Division: 

Division: 

Division: 

25th Division: 

14th Regiment: 

40th Regiment: 

Republic of Vietnam Army (see Republic of Vietnam armed forces) 

Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps: 

Republic of Vietnam Navy 

assaults by: 

organization and equipment: 
patrols by: 228 

Richardson. .John H.: 165. 189 

Ridgway, Matthew B.: 19. 24 

Road construction and repair by Viet Cong: 257 

Roadblock construction by Viet Cong: 183 

Roberts. C. A.: 87 

Rocker assault missions: 128. 130. 158. 237 

Roles and missions defined: 46 

ROLLING THUNDER Operation: 266 

Roosevelt. Franklin D.: 3 

Ross. Donald H.: 174 

Rostow. Walt W.: 85-86. 89. 201 

Route 7: 257 

Route 8: 256-257 

Route 12: 257 

Route 15: I 13 

Route 19: 30. 266-267 

Route 23: 257. 259 

Route 121: 257 

Rowan. Carl T.: 251 

Rowe. Leonard A,: 242 

Rowland. Robert R.: 98. 153-154 

Royal Australian Air Force: 149, 236. 237. 246 

Royal New Zealand Air Force: 246 

Ruddell, George 1.: 213 

Rung Sat: 37 

Rusk, Dean: 66 

and air operations. restrictions on: 172 

and air strikes against North: 254 

and aircraft deliveries to RVN Air Force: 75 

and aircraft strength expansion: 134 

on Americans combat role: 162. I70 

and assistance withdrawal threat: 188-190 

and Cambodia border violations: 136. 141. 203 

on commander for U.S. forces: 94 

and defoliation project: 112-1 13. 116-1 17 

on information on combat. releasing: 162 

on intensifying operations: 192. 203-204 

and jets for RVN Air Force: 147, 168 

Khanh government supported by: 235 

and Laos. incursions into: 58. 65. 256 

and MACV organization: 97 

on military assistance increase: 192 

and napalm strikes: 141 

and options for action against North: 234 

and political disturbances: 187-188 

on RVN neutralization: 71 

and troop units commitment: 83, 89 

Russia. See Soviet Union 

Ryukyu Islands in command structure: 44 

Saigon: 10. 31, 115. 202 

as Capital Military District: 153 

in communications system: 107 

388 
conference at: 119. 212. See also Honolulu conferences 

operations in and around: 49, 56. 103-104, 145, 177, 196, 248,255, 261. 266 

political disturbances in: 185-187, 192, 266-267 

as special tactical zone: 68 

troop unit arrivals in: 17 

Viet Minh control of 3-4 

Saigon River: 204 

Saipan, USS: 24 

Salan. Raoul: 10 

Sandborn. Richard T.: 217 

Sanders, William B.: 24-25 

Schell, D.F.: 180 

Scobel. Uwe-Thorsten: 199 

Seaborn. James B.: 206 

Sealift of troops: 154 

Search-and-clear missions: 214, 219 

Search-and-destroy missions: 104. 128 

Search-and-rescue missions: 50. 170, I83 

Security measures: 17 

Self-Defense Corps, RVN: 37. 39. 66, 67. 71-72, 191 

Sercel. John: I72 

Seven Mountains: 172. 178 

Seventh Fleet: 22, 259, 266 

Shank, Edwin G.. Jr.: 213, 218 

Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant: 209 

and air base defense: 233 

and air operations coordination and control: 232 

and air strikes against North: 229. 232, 235, 253 

and aircraft assignment and replacement: 212 

appointed CINCPAC: 210 

and covert operations against North: 233 

and Laos. incursions into: 233, 256. 259 

and low-altitude reconnaissance: 243 

and MACV staff structure: 210 

and naval patrols: 233 

and troop units commitment: 233 

and troop units strength, expanding: 228 

Shaughnessy. John F.. Jr.: 170 

Shaw Air Force Base: 74 

Shofner, Floyd D.: 108 

Side-firing system: 240 

Sides. J. H.: 87 

Sihanouk, Norodom: 140-141. 199 

Slavich. Ivan L.: 164 

Smart. Jacob E.: 209 

and advisors in combat role: 219 

and aircraft assignment and replacement: 213 

and 8-57 for contingency use: 218 

Chiang. conference with: 188 

and corps, assignment of aircraft to: 2 I 1 

and Diem crisis: 189 

and Hail finned missile: 208 

at Honolulu conference: 192 

and MACV staff structure: 207-208. 210 

389 
on tactical air support missions: 213 

Smith. Frederic H., Jr.: 46 

Smith. Sory: 4143 

Smith, Walter B.: 3 I 

Smoke bombs and markers: 128. 174, 224, 247 

Soc Trang Airfield: 133, 171, 177, 183-184, 213, 215, 260 

South Korea. See Republic of Korea 

South Vietnam. See Republic of Vietnam 

Southeast Asia Airlift System: I I 1-1 12, 156. 167. 236, 246 

Southeast Asia Command: 4 

Southeast Asia Defense Treaty (1954-55): 35 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: 35, 58,203 

Southern Air Materiel Area Pacific: 42, 50 

Soviet Union 

armistice proposals: 30 

and Geneva Accords: 31, 203 

intervention. threat of 203 

and Laos. cease-fire in: 64 

military assistance by: 17-18, 103, 128, 199 

nuclear explosions by: 65 

Taylor mission. reaction to: 85 

and Viet Cong expansion: 163 

West Berlin. threats to: 65 

Spare parts: 50 

Spears. Ken C.. Jr.: 197 

Special Aerial Spray Flight: I12 

Special Air Warfare Center: 240 

Special Assistant to the Director for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities: 105 

Special Forces 

American: 53. 73. 82, 155-156. 172-173. 179. 224. 246-247 

Republic of Vietnam: 145-146. 175. 187, 191. 239 

Staley, Eugene: 71-72 

State, Department of. See Acheson. Dean: Rusk. Dean 

Stead Air Force Base: 79 

Steel plants, strikes against: 173 

Sternberg, Ben: 207 

Stilwell, Richard G.: 208 

Strategic Air Command: 195. 227. 230. 264 

Strike Command: 160. 229 

Students, demonstrations by: 233 

Stump, Felix B. 

and air units. control of 44 

and American commitment: 29 

and command structure: 41-44 

and defense of RVN: 43 

and military assistance programs: 41-42 

and mobile forces. reliance on: 46 

Sullivan, William H.: 199. 204 

Supply operations and systems 

Air Force organization for: 42, 45, 47-48. 108 

Air Force withdrawal from: 31 

air units, commitment of 17 

aircraft. use in. See Airlifts of troops and supplies 

American: 15. 24 

390 
centralization of 

French: 10 

in Laos: 

losses in. See Materiel losses 

North Vietnamese: 

reserve stocks, lack of 

Republic of Vietnam: 

surface vessels in: I24 

suspension of I 

I 

Minh: 

Support Group, 6499th: 

Sweeney. Walter C., 

Sweet Sue: 

Air Base: 

Tactical Air Command: 

Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center: 

Tacticalairsupport: 

Tactical Air Support Squadron, 19th: 

Tactical Control Groups 

5th: 

507th: 

36th: 

44th: 

67th: 

80th: 

428th: 

613th: 

614th: 

615th: 

Tactical Fighter Wing. 405th: 

Tactical Groups 

34th: 

Tactical Fighter Squadrons 

Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 

Tactical Support Groups 

6009th: 

6010th: 

Tactical Wing, 

Taiwan: 

Air Base. Thailand: 

Tam 

Tan Airfield: 

Tan Son Nhut Airfield: 10 I IO, 

Tank losses, Army: 

Target acquisition and designation: 

I 
Tay Ninh Province: 37. 157, 174. 177. 214 

Taylor, Maxwell, D: 87 

and advisors. number of 190 

and advisors in combat role: :219 

and air strikes against North: 205-206, 233, 253-35, 261. 266 

and aircraft strength expansion: 218. 263 

appointed ambassador: 210. 227 

authority in military affairs: 227 

and covert actions against North: 233. 255 

and crop-destruction project: 248 

and Diem-Nhu replacement: 190 

and government. stability for: 228, 255-256, 259 

and helicopters as gunships: 2 19 

hostilities end. prediction of: 190 

and infiltration routes interdiction: 255 

on intensifying operations against North: 192. 198, 204. 228 

and jets for RVN Air Force: 264-265 

Khanh government, assessment of: 227. 232 

and Laos, incursions into: 233, 255-256 

and MACV staff structure: 208. 210 

and mixed crews in combat: 238 

and naval patrols resumption: 233 

missions to RVN: 77. 84-89. 190. 202 

and options for action against North: 233 

on political conditions in RVN: I79 

and reconnaissance missions over North: 233 

Special Group (Counterinsurgency) headed by: 105 

Tchepone: 74, 205.257 

Technicians 

commitment to Vietnam: 15, 17 

French lack of 34 

training programs: 10 

Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission: 53 

Terrain. effect on operations: 26, 157. 169. 177, 221, 261 

Terry, Ronald W.: 241 

Thailand 

air strikes from: 173 

aircraft strength in: 268 

Diem crisis, reaction to: I88 

mobile strike force test: 46 

and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35 

supply organization for: 42 

threats to: 15 

Thanh Phu District: 214 

Thant, U: 188-189 

Thompson. Robert G. K.: 91. 103-104. 165 

Throckmorton. John L.: 210 

Thua Thien Province: I I7 

Ticonderoga. USS: 229-230, 232 

Timmes, Charles J.: 97, 137 

Tonkin: 4-6, I I. 15-17 

Tourane. See Da Nang 

Traffic control: I3 I 

! 

392 
Transport Squadrons, Provisional 

1st: I IO. I12 

2d: Ill 

Trapnell. Thomas J. 10. 16 

Tribal Area Development Program: 69 

Troop Carrier Group: 171, 236. 246. 248 

Troop Carrier Squadrons 

309th: 171 

310th: 171. 247 

311th: 171 

346th: 108 

773d: 58 

776th: 108 

777th: I I I. 167 

Troop Carrier Wings 

62d: 22 

314th: 230 

463d: 230 

464th: 112 

483d: 16 

516th: 230 

Truehart, William C.: 186 

Truman. Harry 6 

Trung Lap: 221 

Tuan Giao: 25 

Tunis. airlift from: 22 

Tuy Hoa: 151 

Twining. Nathan 38 

and Air Force expansion: 41 

French air operations. evaluation by: 34 

and military assistance program: 23 

and organizational pattern, RVN Air Force: 37-39 

Tyrell. Robert L. 186 

Ubon. Thailand: 107. 169 

Udorn Air Rase. Thailand: 268, 280-281 

United Kingdom 

and intervention in Indochina: 23, 26 

and Laos, cease-fire in: 64 

and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35 

and Soviet strength: 3 

and Cambodia border violations: 205 

and Diem crisis: 189 

United Natios Command. in command structure: 41. 44 

United Press International: 123 

United States 

United Nations 

and Geneva Accords: 31 

nationals. evacuation of 3 I, 188. 200. 266 

and NATO formation: 5 

Pacific command structure: 41 

public dissent against war: 190 

and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35 

Southeast Asia security, policy on: 35 

393 
war materiel. embargo on: 5 

advisors. See Advisors 

and air units commitment: 70. 74 

airborne operations. See Airborne operations 

aircraft for Army needs: I 10 

aircraft deliveries to RVN Air Force: 131. 133. 148. 167-168, 171-172. 208, 212-213. 219. 

229-230, 238. 250. 268 

United States Air Force 

airlifts by. See Airlifts of troops and supplies 

Army. rivalry with: 148 

combat role situation: 100-101. 138-139 

counterinsurgency units: 79-84 

first units committed: I I 

expansion program: 42 

MACV staff. representation on: 97. 207-208. 210-21 

morale status: 82. 122. 181. 214 

personnel strength. See Advisors 

policy direction. role in: 207 

relations with RVN: 42 

sorties. number flown: 108. 135, 144. 148, 167. 174. 

Taylor report. reaction to: 90 

tenant status at airfields: 123 

on troop units commitment: 68 

turnaround time rates: 181 

unit reorganization: 171 

weapons development by: 240-241 

on Wheeler assessment: 162- I63 

United States Air Force Council: 37-38 

United States Air Force Pacific: 43-44 

United States Air Force Reserve: 65, 236 

United States Army 

and air base defense: 264 

Air Force. rivalry with: 148 

and air operations coordination and control: 143 

aircraft assignments: 21 5 

aircraft losses: 246. 260, 265-266 

aircraft strength: 148 

communications systems: 221 

defoliation and crop-destruction projects: 248 

helicopters. concept on use: 146-147 

helicopters. control of 144 

helicopters in gunship role: 157-158. 177. 197. 109. 215, 225 

and loudspeaker missions: 251 

photographic reconnaissance by: 148 

reconnaissance missions: 182 

sorties. number flown: 215 

Special Forces units: 53. 73. 82. 155-156. 172-173. 179. 224. 246-247 

in tactical air strikes: 121 

tactical air support, concept of 160. 167 

troop strength in Vietnam: 151 

and troop units commitment: 70 

52d Aviation Battalion: 265 

1st Aviation Company: I I I, 167 

18th Fixed Wing Aviation Company: I 10 

81. 184. 191, 238. 251. 264 

I 

394 
Aviation Company: 

Aviation Company: I8 I 

Helicopter Company: 

Special Air Warfare Detachment: 

United States Army, Pacific: 

United States Army Security Agency: 

United States Army Support Command, Saigon: 

United States Army Support Command, Vietnam: 

United States Army Support Group, Vietnam: 

United States Forces. Japan: 

United States Forces, Korea: 

United States Forces. Vietnam: 

United States Marine Corps 

and air base defense: 

and air operations coordination and control: 

helicopter deliveries to Air Force: 

helicopter operations by: 

Helicopter Squadron: I75 

troop strength in Vietnam: 

troop units commitment: 

United States Military Assistance Advisory Group. Indochina (see also Harkins, Paul 

Lionel C.): 

activation and mission: 

Air Force representation on: 

air patrols proposed by: 

and aircraft for Air Force: 

and airlifts. control of 

arrivals: 

in command structure: 

and counterinsurgency operations: 

defoliation project: 

functions shifted to MACV: 

inactivated: 

MACV, relationship with: 

military assistance programs, role in: 

ORGANIZATION and strength: 

and photographic jets for Air Force: 

training programs: 

United States Military Assistance Command, Laos: 

McGARR 

United States Military Assistance Command. Vietnam (MACV). See also Harkins, Paul 

Westmoreland. William C. 

activated: 

Air Force representation: I 

deputy commander authorized: 

Geneva Accords violation affirmed: 

relationship with: 

organization and staff structure: 

personnel strength: 

and air base defense: 

air operations by: 

aircraft deliveries to Air Force: 

aircraft losses: 

Amphibious Group One: 

United States Navy 
escort missions: 25 

patrol operations: 227-229. 234-235. 266 

personnel strength in Vietnam: 151 

pilot training program: 219 

VA-I52 Squadron: 219-220 

United States Navy. Pacific: 43, 48 

United States Taiwan Defense command: 44.97 

Vann. John P.: 157-158 

Vienna Conference (1961): 64. 71 

Viet Cong 

air defense operations: 283-285 

airfields, attacks on: 253 

ambush operations: 53. 112-1 13. 145, 174. 179, 196-197, 224. 259-260 

assassinations by: 52, 67, 72 

bunker systems: 173 

camouflage use: 127-128 

casualties: 121-122, 128, 13'7, 139, 145, 156-158, 172-174, 177-178, 183-184, 191-192, 196, 199. 

cover and concealment, use of: 135, 266 

demolition by: 181. 204, 261. 265 

desertions from: I73 

geurrilla operations: 53. 56. 103. 116. 120. 145. 181. 191, 196-197. 199, 259 

infiltration into South: 35 

influence and control extended: 201-202 

intensification ofattacks: 72, 129. 131. 179. 183-184. 191. 224.253. 259-260 

kidnappings by: 52 

materiel losses: 178, 219 

Nhu contact with: 189 

mining operations: 183 

morale status: I73 

mortar assaults: 179, 183. 253, 265 

motor convoys, attacks on: 197 

night operations: 253, 260 

organization and strength. estimates of: 53, 64, 67. 72. 85. 139. 163 

paramilitary units: I39 

prisoners of war lost: 109. I2 I. 128, 156. 158. I78 

propaganda campaigns: 113-1 14, 117, 137-138 

road construction and repair: 257 

road blocks. use by: I83 

ruses by: 56, 137 

supply operations and systems: 72. 117.227, 266 

tactics: 163, 184 

war aims. identification of: 85 

9th Division: 266 

48th Regiment: 260 

aggression by. threat of: 35 

air defense operations and systems: 17-19, 25-26. 212 

artillery fire support: 18 

camouflage use: 19 

casualties: 22 

guerrilla operations: 3-5, 10. 18 

night operations: 22 

204. 2 13-2 14, 254. 259-260. 264. 266-267 

Viet Minh: 3-4 

I 

396 
supply operations and systems: 18 

withdrawal to North: 30 

air force activation and strength: 10, 36 

aircraft deliveries to: 10, 16 

American recognition of 5 

armed forces effectiveness: 36 

armed forces expansion: 10 

armistice supervision: 30-3 I 

demarcation line agreed on: 30 

elections scheduled: 30 

refugees. evacuation by aircraft: 31, 32 

withdrawals by U.S. Air Force: 31 

Vietnam Coordinating Committee: 199. 204 

Vinh: 173. 205. 228-230 

Vinh Binh: 121 

Vinh Binh Province: 239, 266 

Vinh, Kuan: 209 

Voice of America: 187 

Von Hake, Richard W.: 196 

Vung Ro Bay: 266 

Vung Tau Airfield: 50, 52. 110. 113. 261 

Vietnam, State of 

War Zone C: 136. 177.24.4 

War Zone D: 112-1 13. 128. 139-141. 145. 156, 173, 177. 197. 244. 248-250. 254-255. 264 

War Zone X: 140 

Warning systems: 129 

Weapons losses. See Materiel losses 

Weather. effect on operations: 25-26. 139, 144. 146. 156, 169, 175. 229, 266 

Weede. Richard G.: 97. 112, 153.208 

Wells. Joseph B.: 7 

Westmoreland. William C.: 222 

on adivors in combat role: 219 

and advisors grades: 216 

and air escort missions: 225 

and air-ground liaison: 2 I6 

and air operations coordination and control: 225 

and air strikes against North: 230, 261. 266 

and aircraft strength expansion: 21 1-212. 220. 236, 238. 240 

and aircraft strength reduction: 239 

appointed MACV commander: 210 

appointed MACV deputy commander: 207-208 

Army air doctrine, adherence to: 236, 245. 264 

commands Army components: 210 

and helicopters on alert: 225 

and helicopters as gunships: 236. 263 

and infrared reconnaissance: 244 

on intensifying actions against North: 205, 263 

and jets in combat role: 265-267 

and joint air operations center: 221 

Joint General Staff, advisor to: 2 I7 

and markings for U.S. aircraft: 267 

and mixed crews in combat: 220, 267 

and Moore as combined air commander: 232 

397 
and pilot training program: 

and Special Forces units: 

and supply operations: 

and tactical air support: 

on target acquisition: 

and troop units strength, expanding: 

success, concern over: 

Wheeler, EARLE 

and air operations coordination and control: 

and aircraft strength expansion: 

on intensifying operations against North: 

and MACV staff structure: 

and options for actions against North: 

and tactical air control: 

Vietnam situation, assessment of 

White, Thomas 

White phosphorus bombs: 

John 

Williams, Samuel 

Wilson, Charles E.: 

Wilson, 

Women in forces: 

Cut: 

Air Base: 

Robert 

Eugene, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE