### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned On Brief

June 5, 2001 MARIE CAGLE f/u/b NATIONWIDE INSURANCE CO. v. SHANNON R. CASS Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for McNairy County No. 4805 Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge

No. W2001-00760-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 6, 2001

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court which dismissed an appeal from an order of the general sessions court. The basis for the trial court’s order was that the general sessions court had no jurisdiction to

grant an appeal to the defendant in the general sessions’ action, as the ten (10) day periodto appeal from general session s court to circuit court pursuant to section 27-5-108 of the Tennessee Code Annotated had elapsed. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Circuit Cour

t Affirmed; and Remanded
D AVID R. F ARMER , J., deliver ed the opi nion of the

court, in w

hich W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S. and H OLLY K. L ILLARD , J., joined. Shannon R. Cass, Pro se

. Jonathan T. Martin, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Marie

Cagle f/u/b

Nationwide Insurance Co.
OPINION
Suit was brought in the General Sessions Court of McNai ry County by Marie Ca

gle f/u/b Nationwide Insurance

Company

against Shannon R. Cass to recover for property damag e resulting from a motor vehicle accident. The civil warrant was issued on October 4, 1999, indicating that the matter was set for trial for October 19, 1999. The warr ant indicates that Ms. Cass was served on October 18, 1999. The warrant further indicates that judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff against the Defendant for $1,821 on January 25, 2000. On March 30, 2000, Ms. Cass filed a motion to set aside the judgment with a supporting affidavit which states that, on October 18, 1999, she ca l ledthe plaintiff’s attorney and the two of them mutually ag reed to a general continuance and wherein she advised the attorney how he could contact her. The affidavit further states that on that date she rece ive d a fa x fr om P lai nti ff’s att orn ey, Jonathan Martin, which contained a letter from him to the clerk of the general sessions court which stated that both parties had agreed to a general-2-

continuance. She further states that she and Mr. Martin agreed to continue the case after the first of the year 2000 and it was agreed that Mr. Martin would contact her at that time so they could discuss a trial setting. T

he affidavit fur

ther recites tha

t Ms. Cass was contacted by the payroll department of her employe

r on March 24, 2000

, that a garnishment had

been issued on her wages. She further recites that she received no notice of the setting of the case for trial on January 25, 2000. An order was entered in the general sessions court denying the motion to set aside default judgmen

t. While the order does not recite such, the parties are in agreement that the general sessions judge stated that anyone who

did not agree wi

th his order could a

ppeal to circuit c

ourt. The Plaintiff filed a mo

tion for judgment

on the pleadings

in the circuit cou

rt a skin g that court to dismiss the appeal because the Defendant, Ms. Cass, had not perfected a timely appeal from the general sessions judgment and that the g ene ral sessions judge lacked the authority to grant an appeal after the ten (10) day period as set forth in section 27-5-108 o f the Tennessee Code Annotated. An order was entered in the circuit court granting the motion anddismissing the app

eal. Ms. Cass appealed that

order to this court and presents the following issues as set forth in her brief:
I. Whether

the Circuit Courtwas in error, in dismissing

the Defe ndant, Cas s[’], Appeal?
II. Whether, it was proper for the McN air y Cou nty, General Sessions Judge to rule upon a c ase, in whi ch he had verb ally recused hi mself form hearing?
III. Whether

the Defendant Cass[’], “Due Process Rights” [were] violated by the con duc t of the Pla int iff ’s A tto rney?
The General Assembly has provided for appeals from an adve rse decision of the g enera l sessions court to c

ircuit court in sec

tion 27-5-108 whic

h states as follows : (a) Any party may

appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court to the circuit cou

rt of the county

within a period of ten (10) days on complying with the provisions of this chapter. (b) Thi s pr ovi sio n al low ing t en (1 0) d ays in which to perfect an appeal shall apply in every county of Tennessee, any provision of

any private act to the contrary notwiths tanding, it being the legislative intent to establish a uniform period of ten (10) days in which any such appe al may be perfected in any county in Tennessee. (c) Any ap

peal shall be hea

rd de novo in the ci

rcuit court. (d) If no appeal is taken within the time provided, then execution may issue. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108 (2000).
Generalsessions courts ar e courtsof limited jurisdiction. Their authority depends upon the nature and amount of the dispute and their judgments cannot exceed their jurisdictional limits or-3-

their subject matter jurisdiction. See Ware v. Meharry Me d. Coll. , 898 S.W.2d 181, 182-84 (Tenn. 1995).
The eastern section of this court rec

ently had an opportunity to visit the issue of whether a general sessions court has jurisdiction over any of the proceedings which occurr edin the case after the entry of judgment in Henry Schei n, Inc. v. Watts , No. E1999 -02128-CO

A-R3-CV,

2000 WL 222537, at * 1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2000) ( no perm. app. filed ). There the court said:
Our Supreme Court explained the jurisdiction of a General Ses sions Court in Travelers Indemnity Company v. Calli s , 481 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tenn. 1972) (quoting Caruthers’ History of

a Lawsuit , 8th Edition):
Cour ts of rec ord usually p ossess the power o

f correcting a

buses in final process awarded by them

. . . . This power does n ot belong to justices of the peace or

general sessions courts. Their jurisdiction is limited to the rendition of

the judgment, the granting of an appeal, the stay and issuance of the execution, and the issuing of wri ts of scire facias where proper. The theory of their jurisdiction is that it extends only to the limits defined by statute law, and that the giving to them jurisdiction of a subject

does not carry

with it all those general powers of making that jurisdiction effec tual, or of preventing its working injustice, which b elongs to courts of general jurisdiction. When a justice or gen eral sessions court renders judgment in a case and adjourns, the court is at an e nd, and the court h

as n o further power over it except what the statutes give. The court cannot after that day grant a new trial, or in any way pr event the consequence

s of its acts, however erroneous [they] may be. But the court may correct merely clerical errors in its judg

ments upon the appli

c ation of a party and pro pert y not ice to t he o the r par ty. Notwithstanding this limitation of jurisdiction, “relief might be had from an abuse of the process of a justice of the pea ce , or a Co urt of G ener al S ess ion s, b y a petition for certiorari to supersede and to quash the levy.” Travelers , 482 S.W.2d at 385. “The justice who issued t he execution has no

power to correc

t this abuse, but the circuit court, in virtue of its general revisory jurisdict ion, may supersede and quash the levy.” Jones v

. Willia ms , 32 Tenn. 105, 106 (1852).
A Circuit Court when acting as an appellate body cannot validate

a judgment which the GeneralSessions Court had no jurisdiction to make. Riden v. Snider , 832 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991 ); see Te nnessee Code Annotated § 16-10-112.-4- The timely perfecting of an appeal is a mandatory requirement, and if it is not comp lied with, the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Love v. Col lege Leve l Assessment Services, Inc ., 928 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn. 1996).
A party may

appeal from an adverse decision of the General Sessions Court to the Circuit Court within a period of tendays,and the appeal shall be heard de novo in the Circuit Court. Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-108.
Id

. Schein v. Watts is different on its facts in that there is no indication in that opinion that the defendant did not have timely notice of the setting in general sessions court. However, we believe that the applicable law concerning when the general sessions court loses jurisdiction of a ma tter is equally applicable to the case at ba r. We do not take the position that Ms. Cass did not have other remedies, but the remedy she sought is not available under the law of this jurisdiction.
With respect to

the second issue involving a recusal by the genera l sessions judge, Ms. Cass states in her affidavit

that she was advised by Mr. Martin and the clerk of the genera l sessions court that Jud ge Bo bby G ray h ad recu sed himself from this action. There is no indication in the record that Ms. Cass requested Judge Gray to recuse himself. Furthermore, he could have changed his mind after deciding sua sponte to recuse and there is no indication of any bias or prejudice on the part of Judge Gray

against Ms. Cass. With respect to the third issue the opposing party’s at torney, inso

far as this reco

rd reflects, is not an employee of

the state or federal government, nor can he be said to be a state actor, and thereforeis incapable of violating the adverse parties constitutional ri ghts. See State ex rel. Donehue v. Russell , 429 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tenn. 1967) (citing State ex rel. Dych v. Bomar , 378 S.W.2d 722 (1964)); and Bryant v. Tenent, Inc. , 969 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Hale , 840 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tenn. 1992)).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of circuit court is affi rmed and the costs of thi s app eal are t axe d to Sha ron R. C ass , an d he r su ret y, fo r wh ich exe cut ion may i ssu e ifnece ssa ry.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE