NUMBER 13-17-00052-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

EX PARTE SHARYN SUE HYDE

On appeal from the 425th District Court of 

Williamson County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant, the Texas Department of Public Safety (“the Department”), argues on 

appeal that the trial court erred by granting appellee Sharyn Sue Hyde’s petition for 

expunction. We reverse and render.

I. BACKGROUND1

 1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a 

docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 

(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
2

On May 27, 2006, Hyde was arrested for and subsequently charged by indictment 

with possession of a controlled substance. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 481.115 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). The possession of a controlled 

substance charge was dismissed and re-filed as an attempt to possess a controlled 

substance charge. See id.; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (West, Westlaw through 

2017 1st C.S.). Hyde pleaded guilty to the attempt to possess a controlled substance 

charge, and was sentenced to deferred adjudication community supervision for eighteen 

months.

On April 28, 2016, Hyde filed a petition to expunge the records of her May 27, 2006 

arrest. In response, the Department filed an answer denying that Hyde was entitled to an 

expunction of her May 27, 2006 arrest because she served a term of community 

supervision for her arrest. The trial court signed an order granting the expunction on July

5, 2016. The Williamson County District Attorney’s Office filed a motion for new trial, 

which was not granted. The Department then filed this restricted appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, the Department argues that the trial court erred by expunging Hyde’s 

record of arrest. Specifically, the Department argues that: (1) the trial court 

misinterpreted the expunction statute; (2) Hyde failed to present legally sufficient 

evidence that she was entitled to expunction; (3) the trial court failed to hold a hearing. 

We agree with the Department.

A. Restricted Appeal

To prevail on a restricted appeal, a party must show: (1) it filed notice of appeal 

within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) it was a party to the underlying action; 
3

(3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did 

not timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions 

of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 30; 

Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004).

The Department filed its notice of restricted appeal on January 5, 2017, which was 

exactly six months after the order was signed on July 5, 2016. Thus, the Department 

timely filed its notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c). The Department was a party 

to the case and filed an answer, but it did not participate in any hearings or file any postjudgment motions. See Alexander, 134 S.W.3d at 848. Therefore, the only remaining 

question is whether error is apparent on the face of the record. See id.

B. The Expunction Statute

It is constitutionally presumed that judicial records are open to the public. See, 

e.g., Dallas Morning News v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655, 663 (Tex. 1992); 

Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). The expunction statute 

provides a narrow exception to this principle and is intended to eradicate records of 

wrongful arrests. In re State Bar, 440 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2014). Chapter 55 of the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the requirements and procedures governing 

the expunction of criminal records. See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 

55.01–55.06 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Under Article 55.01:

(a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest 

for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all 

records and files relating to the arrest expunged if:

. . .

(2) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not 

resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was 
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no court-ordered community supervision under Chapter 42A for the 

offense, unless the offense is a Class C misdemeanor . . .

Id. art. 55.01(a)(2) (emphasis added). “[F]or a petitioner to be entitled to expunction under 

article 55.01, all charges arising from the arrest must meet that article’s requirements.” 

S.J. v. State, 438 S.W.3d 838, 845 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.) (emphasis 

added). In other words, “individual charges within an arrest” are not subject to expunction; 

an arrest can only be expunged if every offense arising from that arrest meets the 

requirements of 55.01. Id.; see Ex Parte Vega, 510 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi 2016, no pet.); Travis County Dist. Atty. v. M.M., 354 S.W.3d 920, 927 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2011, no pet.); see also Ex parte M.R.L., No. 10-11-00275-CV, 2012 WL 763139, 

at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 7, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting the party’s 

argument that “the expunction statute should apply to each charge or offense for which a 

person is arrested separately”).

It is undisputed that the possession of a controlled substance charge in the present 

case was dismissed and resulted in no final conviction. However, Hyde pled guilty to the 

offense of attempted possession of a controlled substance, which indisputably arose out 

of the same arrest, and she was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision 

for eighteen months. Hyde seeks to expunge records of her possession of a controlled 

substance charge, but the unit of expunction is the entire arrest, not the individual 

charges. See S.J., 438 S.W.3d at 845; Ex parte Vega, 510 S.W.3d at 551. Because 

Hyde’s arrest resulted in court-ordered community supervision, expunction is not 

available. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 55.01(a)(2). We sustain the 

Department’s first issue. Because we agree with the Department on its first issue, we 

need not reach its subsequent issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s order, and render judgment denying Hyde’s petition for 

expunction.2

NORA LONGORIA

Justice

Delivered and filed the

21st day of June, 2018.

 2 We note that the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Elliot provides that the relief afforded 

by our judgment applies equally to all law enforcement agencies named in the expunction order, whether 

or not they participated in this appeal. 815 S.W.2d 251, 251–52 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that the 

reversal of an expunction order applies to all law enforcement agencies named in it even if those agencies 

did not appeal).