IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40247

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JUNIOR RAFAEL VARGAS-GUZMAN, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 5:15-CR-1166-1 

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges 

PER CURIAM:*

Junior Rafael Vargas-Guzman pleaded guilty to illegal reentry of the 

United States by a deported alien. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s

denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Once the district court accepts a defendant’s guilty plea, the defendant 

has no absolute right to withdraw his plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d); United 

States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2009). A district court may grant 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 17, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-40247 Document: 00513880009 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2017
No. 16-40247

2 

a motion to withdraw a guilty plea upon a showing of “a fair and just reason 

for requesting the withdrawal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). In assessing 

whether there is a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea, the 

district court should consider the factors set forth in United States v. Carr, 740 

F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984). 

“[T]he burden of establishing a fair and just reason for withdrawing a 

guilty plea rests with the defendant.” United States v. Brewster, 137 F.3d 853, 

858 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court should base its decision on the totality 

of the circumstances. United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d 641, 646 (5th Cir. 

2009). We review a district court’s order denying a defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 645. 

Vargas-Guzman made no showing in the district court, and likewise does 

not show on appeal, that he likely could have mounted a successful collateral 

attack on his deportation proceeding pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), and 

therefore his contention that he adequately asserted his innocence based on 

the availability of a collateral attack lacks merit. See United States 

v. Mendoza-Mata, 322 F.3d 829, 834 (5th Cir. 2003). Our review of the guilty 

plea proceeding establishes that Vargas-Guzman had the close assistance of 

counsel and that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; therefore, these 

factors weigh against him. See Carr, 740 F.2d at 345. Further, the factors 

listed in Carr “are non-exclusive,” United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 

361, 364 (5th Cir. 2014), and the district court did not err in considering 

Vargas-Guzman’s failure to demonstrate more than a speculative possibility of 

obtaining relief from his deportation order. See Mendoza-Mata, 322 F.3d at 

834. The delay of approximately 33 days in filing his pro se motion to withdraw 

his plea also weighs against Vargas-Guzman. See Carr, 740 F.2d at 345. 

 Case: 16-40247 Document: 00513880009 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2017
No. 16-40247

3 

The district court explicitly determined that conducting a jury trial of 

Vargas-Guzman would be a waste of judicial resources. The district court is in 

the best position to know the effect that withdrawal of the guilty plea would 

have on its resources, and therefore its determination on this factor “is entitled 

to substantial deference.” Carr, 740 F.2d at 345. Even if Vargas-Guzman is 

correct that his trial would have been a simple matter, the fact that a short 

time would be needed for trial “does not necessitate a finding that there is no 

inconvenience to the district court.” McKnight, 570 F.3d at 650. Finally, 

although the Government does not identify any specific prejudice that it would 

have suffered from withdrawal of the plea, “the absence of prejudice to the 

Government does not necessarily justify reversing the district court’s decision 

to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. at 649. 

In view of the foregoing, considering the totality of the circumstances, 

the denial of Vargas-Guzman’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not an 

abuse of the district court’s discretion. See id. at 650. Accordingly, the 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 16-40247 Document: 00513880009 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/17/2017