(Additional Counsel for Petitioners on Following Page)

No. 01-15-00989-CV 

________________ 

In the First Court of Appeals, 

Houston, Texas 

________________ 

ARNOLD & ITKIN, L.L.P., BECK REDDEN LLP, ALBRITTON LAW FIRM,

KURT ARNOLD, CORY ITKIN, JASON ITKIN, RUSSELL POST, FIELDS

ALEXANDER, JAS BRAR AND ERIC ALBRITTON, 

Petitioners, 

v. 

MARIA SANTOS LOPEZ DOMINGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT

FRIEND OF KAREN MARIEN ANDRADE LOPEZ, ET AL., 

Respondents. 

________________ 

From the 11th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas; No. 2015-28543 

________________ 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 

PERMISSION TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY 

ORDER AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 

DISMISS

________________ 

Reagan W. Simpson 

State Bar No. 18404700 

rsimpson@yettercoleman.com 

YETTER COLEMAN LLP 

909 Fannin, Suite 3600 

Houston, Texas 77010 

Tel. 713-632-8000 

Fax 713-632-8002 

Counsel for Petitioners 

Beck Redden LLP, 

Russell Post, Fields 

Alexander and Jas Brar 

Jeremy L. Doyle 

State Bar No. 24012553 

jdoyle@reynoldsfrizzell.com 

Reynolds Frizzell LLP 

1100 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Tel. 713-485-7200 

Fax 713-488-7250 

Counsel for Petitioners 

Arnold & Itkin, L.L.P., 

Kurt Arnold, Cory Itkin, 

and Jason Itkin 

Billy Shepherd 

State Bar No. 18219700 

bshpeherd@spmlegal.com 

Shepherd Prewett Miller 

PLLC 

770 South Post Oak Lane 

Suite 420 

Houston, Texas 77056 

Tel. 713-955-4440 

Fax +1 713-766-6542 

Counsel for Petitioners 

Albritton Law Firm and 

Eric Albritton

ACCEPTED

01-15-00989-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

12/10/2015 2:39:00 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 12/10/2015 2:39:00 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
 2 

Additional Counsel for Petitioners 

James Schuelke 

State Bar No. 24075037 

jschuelke@reynoldsfrizzell.com 

Reynolds Frizzell LLP 

1100 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Tel. 713-485-7200 

Fax 713-488-7250 

Counsel for Petitioners Arnold & Itkin, 

L.L.P., Kurt Arnold, Cory Itkin and 

Jason Itkin 

Sam Houston 

State Bar No. 10059550 

shouston@sschlaw.com 

Scott, Clawater & Houston L.L.P. 

2777 Allen Parkway, 7th Floor 

Houston, Texas 77019-2133 

Tel. 713-650-6600 

Fax 713-766-6542 

Counsel for Petitioners Arnold & Itkin, 

L.L.P., Kurt Arnold, Cory Itkin and 

Jason Itkin 

Allison Standish Miller 

State Bar No. 24046440 

amiller@spmlegal.com 

Shepherd Prewett Miller PLLC 

770 South Post Oak Lane 

Suite 420 

Houston, Texas 77056 

Tel. 713-955-4440 

Fax +1 713-766-6542 

Counsel for Petitioners Albritton 

Law Firm and Eric Albritton

John Black 

State Bar No. 24012292 

jblack@dalyblack.com 

Daly & Black, P.C. 

2211 Norfolk, Suite 800 

Houston, Texas 77008 

Tel. 888-492-2671 

Fax 713-655-1587 

Counsel for Petitioners Arnold & Itkin, 

L.L.P., Kurt Arnold, Cory Itkin and 

Jason Itkin 
 3 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. 4

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 6

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 7

I. THIS SUIT IS NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION. ................................................... 7

II. THE APPEAL INVOLVES A CONTROLLING LEGAL ISSUE................................... 9

A. The trial court correctly identified ripeness as the controlling 

issue that it had decided. ...................................................................... 9

B. Ripeness is a controlling issue. .......................................................... 11

III. A SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FOR DIFFERENCE OF OPINION EXISTS. .................. 12

IV. IMMEDIATE APPEAL WILL EXPEDITE THE CONCLUSION OF THE LITIGATION.

 ...................................................................................................................... 13

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ...................................................................................... 15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE UNDER APPELLATE RULE 9.4 .................................. 18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................... 19
 4 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 PAGE(S) 

CASES

Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., 

146 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................ 11

City of El Paso v. Madero Dev. & Constr. Co., 

803 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied) ............................ 13 

Fertitta Hospitality, LLC v. O’Balle, 

No. 01-14-00193-CV, 2014 WL 5780329 

(Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.) ....................... 11, 12 

Gulf Coast Asphalt Co. v. Lloyd, 

457 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) .............. 12 

Gulley v. State Farm Lloyds, 

 350 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) .......................... 10 

King-A Corp. v. Wehling, 

No. 13-13-00100-CV, 2013 WL 1092209 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 14, 2013, no pet.) .................................... 11 

Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 

964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998) .................................................................. 11, 13 

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Texas, Inc., 

971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) ........................................................ 8, 13, 14, 15 

Rothrock v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, 

No. 05-92-02332-CV, 1994 WL 183318 

(Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 1994, no writ) ................................................ 14 

Stier v. Reading & Bates Corp., 

992 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1999) ........................................................................... 8 

Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 

 325 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003) .......................................................................... 7 

Vestalia, Ltd. v. Taylor-Watson, 

No. 01-15-00332-CV, 2015 WL 3799505 

(Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2015, no pet.) .............................. 10 

Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 

 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000) ............................................................................ 8 
 5 

Warren v. Weiner, 

01-15-00432-CV, 2015 WL 4627404 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4, 2015, no pet.) ........................ 10, 15 

STATUTES & RULES

46 U.S.C. app. §688(b) ............................................................................................. 8

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §51.014 ...................................................................... 9 

Tex. R. App. P. 28.3 ................................................................................................ 18

Tex. R. Civ. P. 168 ..................................................................................................... 9 

OTHER AUTHORITY

Renée Forinash McElhaney, 

Toward Permissive Appeal in Texas, 29 St. Mary’s L.J. 729 (1998) ........... 12

 
 6 

INTRODUCTION

Three U.S. federal judges have ordered the Clients to pursue their claims in 

Mexican courts, while allowing them to return to U.S. courts if they cannot 

maintain their claims in Mexico. The Clients have instead chosen to bring a 

malpractice claim against their attorneys, premised on speculation about how the 

foreign and federal courts would have ruled had they proceeded with their claims. 

The trial court in this case issued an interlocutory order denying defendants’ 

pleas to the jurisdiction and for abatement on the ground that the claims in this case 

are ripe. That order threatens to erode the ripeness requirement, standing for the 

proposition that litigants can sue their lawyers when they are dissatisfied with the 

progress of their cases before any final resolution. The result will be the 

prosecution of a speculative malpractice claim that can lead only to a void advisory 

determination at great cost to the parties and the judicial system. Heightening the 

impropriety are issues of international comity. 

Ripeness is a threshold legal issue, protecting courts and parties from the 

burden of litigating a premature suit. An immediate appeal from the interlocutory 

order will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. The 

Clients’ maneuvers to bypass the judicial process following an adverse forum 

ruling have important ramifications for ripeness, malpractice, federalism, and 
 7 

comity jurisprudence. Therefore, the petition for permission to appeal should be 

granted. 

ARGUMENT

I. This Suit Is Not Ripe For Adjudication. 

The Clients’ response largely ignores the core ripeness issue. Straining to 

cast the issue presented as anything but a threshold legal question, the Clients 

avoid discussing the impropriety of bringing a malpractice claim following a forum 

non conveniens ruling in a case that has not been finally resolved. 

Three separate federal judges found that conditional dismissal in favor of a 

Mexican forum was warranted. (Pet. Tabs 3, 5, 6, 7). Because of the return 

jurisdiction clause in the second dismissal, the Clients can seek reinstatement in 

U.S. federal court should the Mexican courts refuse to exercise jurisdiction. (Pet. 

Tab 6 at 2, Tab 7 at 15). “A return jurisdiction clause remedies” concerns about 

forum availability “by permitting parties to return to the dismissing court should 

the lawsuit become impossible in the foreign forum.” Vasquez v. 

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 2003). 

The Clients nevertheless abandoned the underlying litigation midstream. If 

their malpractice suit continues, the state court will have to lay conjecture upon 

conjecture to reach an advisory opinion. 
 8 

“At the time a lawsuit is filed, ripeness asks whether the facts have 

developed sufficiently so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather 

than being contingent or remote.” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & 

Se. Texas, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). “By focusing on whether the 

plaintiff has a concrete injury, the ripeness doctrine allows courts to avoid 

premature adjudication, and serves the constitutional interests in prohibiting 

advisory opinions.” Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. 

2000). 

The Clients have not, and may never, experience a legal injury. They 

complain that they have lost the opportunity to litigate in U.S. federal court. (Resp. 

at 18). But if their claims are barred in Mexico as they argue,1

 they can return to 

U.S. federal court. Likewise, the Clients complain that the Lawyers’ conduct cost 

them their Jones Act claims, but the Jones Act claims were dismissed without 

prejudice. See Pet. Tab 4.2

 Without any final rulings in the underlying suit, the 

 

1

 Among other allegations, the Clients contend at page 9 of their Third Amended Petition (Pet. 

Tab 2) that the defendants’ waiver of limitations in the underlying case is invalid in Mexico and 

that the plaintiffs’ choice of a U.S. forum precludes jurisdiction in Mexican courts. 

2

 The Jones Act precludes citizens of other countries injured in waters outside the United States 

from bringing a Jones Act claim unless there is absolutely “no remedy” afforded by the country 

where they reside or where the accident happened. 46 U.S.C. app. §688(b); see Stier v. Reading 

& Bates Corp., 992 S.W.2d 423, 431-32 (Tex. 1999) (detailing the history and purpose of this 

provision). While the Clients imply at pages 3-4 of their Response that the Jones Act standard is 

akin to the forum non conveniens standard of available remedy, they do not go as far as to argue 

that Mexico affords absolutely no remedy to its citizens when they are injured in Mexico by the 

negligence of others. And as to Texas state law claims mentioned at page 3 of the Response, the 

preemption of any such claims by the Jones Act is settled law. See id. 
 9 

Clients’ malpractice claims are premature, and adjudicating them would contradict 

the ripeness doctrine and, on the facts of this case, offend notions of international 

comity and federalism. 

II. The Appeal Involves A Controlling Legal Issue. 

Although the trial court was incorrect in ruling that this case is ripe for 

adjudication, it was correct in identifying ripeness as a controlling issue. Further, 

ripeness falls within the type of issues that are proper for permissive appeals. 

A. The trial court correctly identified ripeness as the controlling 

issue that it had decided. 

The trial court’s interlocutory order permits appeal on a threshold legal 

question: 

As required by section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil 

Practice & Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil 

Procedure 168, the Court identifies the following issue of 

law as the subject of the permitted interlocutory appeal: 

Whether this case, as pleaded by plaintiffs, is ripe for 

adjudication. 

(Pet. Tab 1 at 2). Notwithstanding any statements the trial court may have made 

during a preliminary hearing, the key is this: the trial court issued an order denying 

a plea to the jurisdiction because of the court’s decision that the case is ripe for 

adjudication and then allowed an interlocutory appeal on the controlling ripeness 

issue. (Pet. Tab 1). Leaving no doubt, the interlocutory order expressly stated that 

the malpractice case was ripe: “The Pleas in Abatement and Pleas to the 
 10 

Jurisdiction . . . are hereby denied because the Court has decided that the claims for 

malpractice in this case are ripe for adjudication.” (Pet. Tab 1 at 2). 

Wholly distinguishable are cases cited by the Clients—cases in which the 

trial court declined to decide the controlling legal issues in a summary judgment 

ruling. For example, in Vestalia, Ltd. v. Taylor-Watson, No. 01-15-00332-CV, 

2015 WL 3799505, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2015, no pet.), 

a blanket summary judgment denial, with no explanation, gave no indication of the 

trial court’s stance on the four questions presented on appeal. Id. Likewise, in 

Gulley v. State Farm Lloyds, 350 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, 

no pet.), the trial court denied competing summary judgment motions and declined 

to determine the proper interpretation of an insurance policy’s endorsements, 

despite identifying the controlling legal question as which one of two possible 

interpretations was correct. The Clients also cite Warren v. Weiner, 01-15-00432-

CV, 2015 WL 4627404, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4, 2015, no 

pet.), but that opinion does not even describe, let alone critique, the interlocutory 

order. 

Unlike the judges in the cases cited by the Clients, the trial court here 

expressly found the Clients’ malpractice claim to be ripe for adjudication and then 

identified ripeness as a controlling issue. 
 11 

B. Ripeness is a controlling issue. 

“Ripeness is an element of subject matter jurisdiction” and “is a legal 

question subject to de novo review.” Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 

922, 928 (Tex. 1998). According to the Clients, “a controlling question of law is 

one that deeply affects the ongoing process of litigation.” (Resp. at 12). Here, the 

ripeness question determines whether the malpractice suit can proceed, which is 

indeed a “deep effect.” 

Attempting to cast ripeness as a fact question, the Clients list potential 

disputed fact issues that might arise in a hypothetical trial. See Resp. at 14. 

Whether their claims are barred in Mexican courts is hardly a fact issue, as the 

Clients contend (id.); it is a legal issue, which should be decided by a Mexican 

court as directed by three U.S. federal court orders. They even try to convert 

ripeness into a factual question on mitigation of damages. Id. 

Further, the Clients cite inapposite cases. For example, they cite Alexander 

v. Turtur & Associates, 146 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2004), apparently contending that 

the typical trial-within-a-trial in a legal malpractice case means that it is 

permissible to try an ongoing and unfinished case within their malpractice case. 

Similarly, they cite summary judgment cases laden with contested facts. See, e.g.,

King-A Corp. v. Wehling, No. 13-13-00100-CV, 2013 WL 1092209, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 14, 2013, no pet.); Fertitta Hospitality, LLC v. 
 12 

O’Balle, No. 01-14-00193-CV, 2014 WL 5780329, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.). 

But the unmistakable and distinguishing fact here is that the Clients are 

asserting a claim about harm that has not and may not ever occur. The fundamental 

legal question at issue is whether the case, as pleaded by the Clients, is ripe for 

adjudication in the first place. 

III. A Substantial Ground For Difference of Opinion Exists. 

Without citing a case on point, the Clients contend that whether the claims 

are ripe for adjudication is not a legal question that poses substantial grounds for 

disagreement. “Substantial grounds for disagreement exist when the question 

presented to the court is novel or difficult, when controlling circuit law is doubtful, 

when controlling circuit law is in disagreement with other courts of appeals, and 

when there simply is little authority upon which the district court can rely.” Gulf 

Coast Asphalt Co. v. Lloyd, 457 S.W.3d 539, 544-45 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (quoting Renée Forinash McElhaney, Toward Permissive 

Appeal in Texas, 29 St. Mary’s L.J. 729, 747–49 (1998)). 

No Texas court has addressed whether a plaintiff ordered on forum non 

conveniens grounds to refile in a foreign court, with the option of returning to 

federal court to seek reinstatement, can instead bring a malpractice case prefaced 

on speculation about how the foreign and federal courts would have hypothetically 
 13 

ruled. Yet this is precisely what “this case, as pleaded by plaintiffs,” (Tab 1 at 2), 

seeks to do. Any trial court ruling would be nonbinding and would upset 

international comity and federalism principles. The trial court’s ripeness 

determination represents a vast expansion of malpractice law, enabling litigants to 

short-circuit the judicial process by paying experts to stand in the place of judges 

and court proceedings. 

IV. Immediate Appeal Will Expedite The Conclusion Of The Litigation. 

Resolution of the ripeness question will materially advance the ultimate 

termination of the litigation. If the case is not ripe, the lawsuit cannot proceed, and 

any result would amount to an impermissible advisory opinion. 

The ripeness “doctrine has a pragmatic, prudential aspect that is directed 

toward” judicial efficiency. Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 443. The doctrine “conserves 

judicial time and resources for real and current controversies, rather than abstract, 

hypothetical, or remote disputes.” Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928. “[A]voiding 

premature litigation prevents courts from ‘entangling themselves in abstract 

disagreements.’” Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 443 (quoting City of El Paso v. Madero 

Dev. & Constr. Co., 803 S.W.2d 396, 398–99 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ 

denied)). Here, the trial court would be making nonbinding interpretations of how 

Mexican and Texas federal courts would rule on unique jurisdictional and 

procedural matters. 
 14 

The Clients suggest that a finding that the case is not ripe will protract the 

litigation process because they will be forced to litigate their underlying claims. 

Clients’ argument underscores the fallacy of their position: malpractice claims are 

not a stand-in for judicial resolution of underlying disputes. Judicial economy in 

the trial court would be squandered on a premature case. There has been no final 

resolution of the Clients’ underlying claims, nor have the Clients been barred from 

Texas federal courts. The Clients’ purported injury has not and may never occur. 

See Rothrock v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, No. 05-92-02332-CV, 1994 WL 

183318, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 1994, no writ) (“Where the 

misfeasance or nonfeasance is intertwined with an adjudicative process that is 

necessary to complete invasion of the protected interest, injury is not suffered until 

an adjudicative decision is made.”). 

The malpractice litigation cannot continue if this Court finds the case to be 

unripe. But in the absence of an appeal, the parties and trial court will expend 

resources on a premature case premised on contingent and hypothetical facts. Any 

damages model would be speculative and unreliable. And the trial court ruling 

would ultimately be void as an advisory opinion beyond the subject matter 

jurisdiction of Texas courts. See Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 443 (the prohibition on 

advisory opinions “extends to cases that are not yet ripe”). “Refraining from 
 15 

issuing advisory opinions and waiting for cases’ timely factual development is . . . 

essential to the proper development of the state’s jurisprudence.” Id.

Further, despite the Clients’ suggestion, no Texas rule bars consideration of 

a permissive appeal when a mandamus petition is pending. In attempting to create 

such a prohibition, the Clients cite Warren, 2015 WL 4627404, at *1. But that oneparagraph opinion found that the petition for permissive appeal failed to “establish 

that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a 

substantial ground for a difference of opinion.” Id.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant the petition for 

interlocutory appeal, deny the Clients’ motion to dismiss, and grant the Lawyers all 

other relief to which they are entitled. 

 
 16 

Respectfully submitted by 

Counsel for Petitioners: 

/s/ Reagan W. Simpson 

Reagan W. Simpson 

State Bar No. 18404700 

rsimpson@yettercoleman.com 

YETTER COLEMAN LLP 

909 Fannin, Suite 3600 

Houston, Texas 77010 

Tel. 713-632-8000 

Fax 713-632-8002 

Counsel for Petitioners 

Beck Redden LLP, Russell Post, 

Fields Alexander and Jas Brar 

/s/Jeremy L. Doyle 

Jeremy L. Doyle 

State Bar No. 24012553 

jdoyle@reynoldsfrizzell.com 

James Schuelke 

State Bar No. 24075037 

jschuelke@reynoldsfrizzell.com 

REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP 

1100 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Tel. 713-485-7200 

Fax 713-488-7250 

Counsel for Petitioners Arnold & 

Itkin, L.L.P., Kurt Arnold, Cory Itkin 

and Jason Itkin 

/s/Billy Shepherd 

Billy Shepherd 

State Bar No. 18219700 

bshpeherd@spmlegal.com 

Allison Standish Miller 

State Bar No. 24046440 

amiller@spmlegal.com 

SHEPHERD PREWETT MILLER 

PLLC 

770 South Post Oak Lane 

Suite 420 

Houston, Texas 77056 

Tel. 713-955-4440 

Fax +1 713-766-6542 

Counsel for Petitioners 

Albritton Law Firm and Eric 

Albritton
 17 

/s/Sam Houston 

Sam Houston 

State Bar No.10059550 

shouston@sschlaw.com 

SCOTT, CLAWATER & HOUSTON L.L.P. 

2777 Allen Parkway, 7th Floor 

Houston, Texas 77019-2133 

Tel. 713-650-6600 

Fax 713-766-6542 

Counsel for Petitioners Arnold & Itkin, 

L.L.P., Kurt Arnold, Cory Itkin and 

Jason Itkin 

/s/John Black 

John Black 

State Bar No. 24012292 

jblack@dalyblack.com 

DALY & BLACK, P.C. 

2211 Norfolk, Suite 800 

Houston, Texas 77008 

Tel. 888-492-2671 

Fax 713-655-1587 

Counsel for Petitioners Arnold & 

Itkin, L.L.P., Kurt Arnold, Cory 

Itkin and Jason Itkin 
 18 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE UNDER APPELLATE RULE 9.4 

I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(E), incorporated by Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 28.3(g), because it contains 2,286 words, excluding the parts of the 

briefs exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(E). 

/s/ Reagan W. Simspon 

Reagan W. Simpson 
 19 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5(e), I hereby 

certify that a true and correct copy of this brief has been served on lead counsel 

and additional counsel for respondents by electronic means and/or via e-mail on 

December 10, 2015, as follows: 

Lance Christopher Kassab 

David Eric Kassab 

The Kassab Law Firm 

1420 Alabama 

Houston, Texas 77004 

lck@texaslegalmalpractice.com 

dek@texasleglamalpractice.com 

Counsel for PlaintiffsRespondents 

Brett Wagner 

Larry Joe Doherty 

Ryan W. Smith 

Doherty  Wagner 

13810 Champion Forest Drive 

Suite 225 

Houston, Texas 77069 

brett@dwlawyers.com 

larry@dwlawyers.com 

ryan@dwlawyers.com 

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Respondents 

/s/ Reagan W. Simspon 

Reagan W. Simpson