alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2012209EN.01001401.xml

| 14.7.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 209/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.7.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 209/14

---

Action brought on 7 May 2012 — ZZ v EMA

(Case F-51/12)

2012/C 209/24

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: ZZ (represented by: S. Orlandi, J.-N. Louis, D. Abreu Caldas, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Medicines Agency

Defendant:

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Application for annulment of the decision to reject the applicant’s request for renewal of his temporary staff contract by the European Medicines Agency.

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | annul the decision of 1 September 2011 by which the EMA rejected the applicant’s request of 22 August 2011 for renewal of his temporary staff contract; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of 1 September 2011 by which the EMA rejected the applicant’s request of 22 August 2011 for renewal of his temporary staff contract;

| — | order the European Medicines Agency to pay to the applicant, on a provisional basis and subject to increase, the sum of EUR 1; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Medicines Agency to pay to the applicant, on a provisional basis and subject to increase, the sum of EUR 1;

| — | order the European Medicines Agency to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Medicines Agency to pay the costs.

---
No. 96-1317.

#### Johnson *v.*United States.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
33905.

#### BRYANT et al. v. NESBITT.

Submitted August 25, 1978

Decided September 28, 1978.

*Wehunt & Eason, William A. Wehunt,*for appellants.

*Bell & Desiderio, Ruby Carpió Bell,*for appellee.

Undercofler, Presiding Justice.

In a habeas corpus action, the trial court held appellants in contempt for failure to produce the minor child of the appellee-father. We reverse because there is no evidence that appellants had possession of the child when the action was filed on June 9, 1978, or thereafter. The evidence shows the mother brought the child from Texas to appellant’s house in DeKalb County on April 17, 1978, after four days; at the mother’s request, they took her and the child to the child’s great grandmother’s house at a specific address in St. Louis, Missouri, and they have not seen either since then.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
(Reap. Dec. 9460)

#### Sipman, Incorporated *v.*United States

Entry No. 141-C.

(Decided June 15, 1959)

*Bharretts, Raley & Garter*for the plaintiff.

*George Goehran Douh,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

This appeal for reappraisement relates to certain so-called seamless API casing and tubing exported from Germany and entered at the port of Corpus Christi, Tex.

*676Stipulated facts, upon which the case has been submitted, establish that the proper basis for appraisement of the merchandise in question is export value, as defined in section 402(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, and that such statutory value therefor is the entered miit values, less inland freight of $5 per metric ton, and I so hold. Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
### Lignite resources of North Dakota

By: Russell Alan Brant

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/cir226

#### Links

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- Plate:  **Plate 1**                            (pdf)
- Download citation as:  RIS                         |                         Dublin                            Core

#### Abstract

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format                        (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it is recommended that you download                        the documents to your computer and open them with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your                        browser may not display or print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge. More information                        about viewing, downloading, and printing report files can be found at the common download problems FAQ.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00662-CR

Alberto Aguirre RENDON,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR13-1227

Honorable Susan Harris, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 20, 2016

DISMISSED

In this appeal, initially, Appellant Alberto Aguirre Rendon had court-appointed counsel. 

Later, after the trial court determined Appellant was not indigent, the trial court discharged 

appointed counsel. Appointed counsel advised Appellant that his brief was due on February 22, 

2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5(c). After the deadline to file the brief passed and Appellant did not 

file a motion for extension of time or a brief, on February 29, 2016, we ordered Appellant to file 

either his brief or a motion to dismiss this appeal not later than March 10, 2016. We advised
04-15-00662-CR

- 2 -

Appellant that if no brief or motion was filed by that date, we would abate this appeal and remand 

the cause to the trial court for an abandonment hearing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b)(2). 

On March 14, 2016, after Appellant had not filed a response to our February 29, 2016 

order, we abated this appeal and remanded the cause to the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b); 

Samaniego v. State, 952 S.W.2d 50, 52–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.). We ordered 

the trial court to conduct a hearing to answer the following questions: 

(1) Does Appellant desire to prosecute his appeal?

(2) Is Appellant now indigent? If Appellant’s circumstances have changed such that 

Appellant is now indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be 

necessary to assure the effective assistance of counsel, which may include the 

appointment of counsel. If Appellant is not indigent, the trial court need not appoint 

counsel for appeal. 

(3) Has Appellant abandoned the appeal?

On March 23, 2016, as ordered, the trial court held an abandonment hearing. After 

Appellant was sworn, the trial court read this court’s February 29, 2016 order in its entirety to 

Appellant. Appellant asked the court to determine whether he was indigent for purposes of appeal, 

and the trial court again found he was not. The trial court asked Appellant if he wished to prosecute 

his appeal; Appellant answered no. The trial court asked Appellant if he was abandoning his 

appeal; Appellant answered yes. The trial court found that Appellant did not desire to prosecute 

his appeal, and Appellant has abandoned this appeal. 

We reinstate the appeal on this court’s docket. We construe Appellant’s sworn statement 

in open court that he does not desire to prosecute this appeal as an oral motion to dismiss this 

appeal. Appellant’s motion is granted; this appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
#### Pacific Custom Brokerage Company *v.*United States

No. 7734.

Entry Nos. H-569; H-570; V-2638.

(Decided August 30, 1949)

*John C. Bay*for the plaintiff.

*David N. Edelstein,*Assistant Attorney General *(Richard E. FitzCitibon,*special attorney), for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

Tbe appeals for a reappraisement enumerated in Schedule “A,” attached hereto and made a part of this decision, present tbe question of tbe proper dutiable value of certain merchandise imported from Canada.

Tbe respective parties have submitted tbe appeals for decision upon a stipulation to tbe effect tbat tbe issues herein are the same in all material respects as those the subject of *C. J. Tower & Sons*v. *274
      *United States,*21 Cust. Ct. 314, Reap. Dec. 7624, and that the record in that case may be incorporated herein. The parties have also agreed that the prices at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country of exportation, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, for exportation to the United States, were the appraised values, less additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases, and that there was no higher foreign value.

Upon the agreed facts, I find the export value, as defined in section 402 (d), Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for determining the values of said merchandise, and that such values are the appraised values, less additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
#### Jimmy L. WILSON, et al. v. The STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

No. 98-C-0824.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 8, 1998.

In re Wilson, Jimmy L.;—Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 56647-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA97-0541.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., not on panel.
Before the Second Division,

April 1, 1942

No. 47022.

#### Petitions 6053-R, etc., of F. Giesler (Nogales).

Opinion by

Dallinger, J.

An examination of the papers disclosed that the-entries were liquidated February 23, 1940, whereas the petitions were not filed in this court until May 14, 1940. As more than 60 days had elapsed after liquidation the petitions were dismissed as untimely.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                    Consent of KPMG LLP, Independent Auditors

The Board of Directors
SonoSite, Inc.

     We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(Nos. 333-51820, 333-82739, 333-49401, 333-74833 and 333-60112) on Form S-8 and
registration statements (Nos. 333-68610, 333-91083 and 333-83278) on Form S-3 of
SonoSite, Inc. of our report dated February 14, 2002, relating to the
consolidated balance sheets of SonoSite, Inc. as of December 31, 2001 and 2000,
and the related consolidated statements of operations, cash flows and
shareholders' equity and comprehensive loss for each of the years in the
three-year period ended December 31, 2001 and the related financial statement
schedule, which report appears in the December 31, 2001 annual report on Form
10-K/A Amendment No. 2 of SonoSite, Inc.

                                     /s/ KPMG LLP

Seattle, Washington
April 12, 2002
# C_2016038EN.01005802.xml

| 1.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 38/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 38/58

---

Order of the General Court of 23 November 2015 — Slovenia v Commission

(Case T-118/15) (1)

1

((Action for annulment - EAGGF - Guarantee Section - EAGF and EAFRD - Time-limit for bringing an action - Starting point - Out of time - Inadmissibility))

(2016/C 038/78)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Slovenia (represented by: L. Bembič, acting as Agent)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Rous Demiri and D. Triantafyllou, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Action for annulment of Commission Implementing Decision 2014/950/EU of 19 December 2014 on excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2014 L 369, p. 71), in so far as it excludes certain expenditure incurred by the Republic of Slovenia.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action as inadmissible.

| 2. | Holds that there is no need to rule on the applications for leave to intervene submitted by the Italian Republic, the French Republic and Hungary. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Holds that there is no need to rule on the applications for leave to intervene submitted by the Italian Republic, the French Republic and Hungary.

| 3. | Orders the Republic of Slovenia to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Republic of Slovenia to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

| 4. | Orders the Republic of Slovenia, the Commission, the Italian Republic, the French Republic and Hungary to bear their own costs relating to the applications for leave to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders the Republic of Slovenia, the Commission, the Italian Republic, the French Republic and Hungary to bear their own costs relating to the applications for leave to intervene.

---

(1)  OJ C 146, 4.5.2015.

1

---
Exhibit
10.41





ADDENDUM
TO EMPLOYMENT AND NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENT





This
ADDENDUM TO EMPLOYMENT AND
NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENT (this "Addendum"), dated as
of February 18, 2008, is between The Sheridan Group, Inc., a Maryland
corporation (the "Employer"), and
Robert M. Jakobe (the "Employee")
(collectively, “the Parties”).





WHEREAS, the Parties entered
into an Employment and Non-Competition Agreement (the “Agreement”) on or about
April 1, 2007; and





WHEREAS, a question has arisen
between the Parties with respect to the application and duration of §§6(e), 7, 8
and 9 of the Agreement; and





WHEREAS, the Parties wish to
enter into this Addendum to clarify their intent and eliminate any ambiguity
with respect to §§6(e), 7, 8 and 9 of the Agreement; and





WHEREAS, it is the intent of
the Parties that all terms and conditions of the Agreement shall continue to
remain in full force and effect, subject to the clarification set forth in this
Addendum.





NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby
agreed as follows:





1.           The
above recitals are incorporated herein by reference, and are intended to be
binding upon the Parties.





2.           The
Parties acknowledge and agree that it is the mutual intent of the Parties that
the Employee’s rights and remedies upon termination set forth in §6(e) of the
Agreement apply to the termination at anytime of
Employee’s employment by the Employer (and/or the Employer’s successors and/or
assigns) without Cause pursuant to §6(c) or by the Employee with Good Reason
pursuant to §6(d).  Moreover, it is the Parties’ specific intent that
the Employee’s rights and remedies upon termination set forth in §6(e) will
survive the termination of the Agreement.





3.           The
Parties acknowledge and agree that it is the mutual intent of the Parties that
the Employee’s obligations to the Employer (and/or the Employer’s successors
and/or assigns) set forth in §7 (Inventions; Assignment); §8 (Confidential
Information); and §9 (Non-Competition) of the Agreement apply to the termination
at any timeof Employee’s employment with Employer (and/or the Employer’s successors
and/or assigns). Moreover, it is the Parties’ specific intent that the
Employee’s obligations to the Employer set forth in §7, §8 and §9 will survive
the termination of the Agreement.





4.           The
Parties each acknowledge and agree that this Addendum is supported by the
consideration set forth in the Agreement, which the Parties acknowledge to be
good and valuable.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and
intending to be legally bound hereby, the Parties hereto have caused this
Agreement to be duly executed as of the date and year first above
written.





THE SHERIDAN GROUP,
      INC.By:
            /s/JohnA.SaxtonJohn A. SaxtonPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer/s/RobertM.JakobeRobert M. Jakobe
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 96 (Friday, May 18, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 28072]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-9625]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


Manufacturer of Controlled Substances; Notice of Registration

    By Notice dated October 25, 2006, and published in the Federal 
Register on November 1, 2006, (71 FR 64298), Cambrex Charles City, 
Inc., 1205 11th Street, Charles City, Iowa 50616, made application by 
letter to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to be registered as 
a bulk manufacturer of Sufentanil (9740), a basic class of controlled 
substance listed in schedule II.
    The company plans to manufacture the listed controlled substances 
in bulk for distribution to its customers.
    No comments or objections have been received. DEA has considered 
the factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(a) and determined that the registration of 
Cambrex Charles City, Inc. to manufacture the listed basic class of 
controlled substance is consistent with the public interest at this 
time. DEA has investigated Cambrex Charles City, Inc. to ensure that 
the company's registration is consistent with the public interest. The 
investigation has included inspection and testing of the company's 
physical security systems, verification of the company's compliance 
with State and local laws, and a review of the company's background and 
history. Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823, and in accordance with 
21 CFR 1301.33, the above named company is granted registration as a 
bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed.

    Dated: May 14, 2007.
Joseph T. Rannazzisi,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug 
Enforcement Administration.
 [FR Doc. E7-9625 Filed 5-17-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
No. 50741.

#### Protests 517017-G, etc., of Jacobsen & Kupitsky et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Mollison, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
No. 47662.

#### Protests 865418-G, etc., of Irving L. Hartman Co. et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

"In accordance with stipulation of counsel that certain of the merchandise consists of hats or hoods of ramie and cellophane the same as those involved in Abstract 47291, the claim that they are dutiable at only 25 percent ad valorem under paragraph 1504 (b) (1) was sustained.
Exhibit 32.1   WorldNet, Inc. of Nevada  CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 18 U.S.C. Section 1350  The undersigned executive officer of WorldNet, Inc. of Nevada (the “Company”) certifies pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:  (a) the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (b) the information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.    Date: November 8, 2006 /s/ Donald R. Mayer Donald R. Mayer Principal Executive Officer Principal Financial Officer
No. 6333.

#### JAMES WALSH vs. ERNEST BLATTMAN, ET ALS.

Syllabus.

1. . Where two vehicles, traveling towards each other at a right angle, approach an intersection, the rights of each are equal, and accordingly each should exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to the other.

2. Where, in such case, a collision occurs through the joint or combined negligence of both parties, no right of action accrues for the injuries sustained.

Appeal from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Division “A,” No. 106,557. Honorable T- C. W. Ellis, Judge.

Florence Loeber, for plaintiff and appellant.

Daly & Echezabal, for defendant and appellee.

His Honor, EMILE GODOHAUX,

rendered the opinion and decree of the Court, as follows:

As plaintiff’s motorcycle and defendant’s automobile, traveling towards each other at a right angle, approached the intersection of Esplanade and Dorgenois Streets, it was .apparently inevitable that they would collide unless one of the parties stopped or checked the speed of his vehicle in order to permit the other to pass.

-Each of the parties saw or could have seen the approach of the other in ample time to halt or to check his speed and thus avoid an accident; but instead of doing so they both continued on their course, with the result that, although defendant swerved to the left in an effort to avert the accident, the vehicles in fact collided as the plaintiff w.as .attempting to drive across the junction in front of defendant’s car.

*259Opinion and decree, March 15,1915.

Upon, these facts, which are uncontradicted, we are of opinion that the trial Court properly rejected plaintiff’s claim for damages.

Where two persons approach each other at a crossing under the circumstances stated, the rights of each are equal and accordingly each should use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other. In the present instance each exhibited a total disregard of the rights of the other and neither made any timely effort to avoid injury to the other. The collision was due to their combined or joint negligence and consequently no right of action arises for the injuries sustained.

In fact were it necessary to determine the question of comparative negligence, we would be inclined to hold that plaintiff’s conduct was the more reprehensible, since if the vehicle of plaintiff, who admits that he saw defendant approaching, was traveling at the slow speed that he claims, namely, about 3 miles an hour, he could the more readily have stopped to permit the passage of defendant’s auto which, according to plaintiff’s testimony, “was going mighty fast. ’ ’

We find no error in the judgment and it is accordingly affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Juan Pedro ZEPEDA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 04-98-01032-CR, 04-98-01033-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

March 17, 1999.

Mario A. Trevino, San Antonio, for Appellant.

Susan D. Reed, Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, for Appellee.

Before PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice, PAUL W. GREEN, Justice, SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Juan Zepeda appeals the denial of “shock probation,” for which we have no jurisdiction. *Houlihan v. State,*579 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); *see also Perez v. State,*938 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, pet. ref d) (finding no jurisdiction over order granting shock probation). Zepeda invites us to construe his appeals as writs of habeas corpus, as the Court of Criminal Appeals did in *Houlihan. See*579 S.W.2d at 216-17. We decline to do so because, unlike the Court of Criminal Appeals, we do not have original habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal matters. *See In re S.G., Jr.,*935 S.W.2d 919, 922 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ dism’d w.o.j.). Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed.1

1

. We also note the trial court granted Zepeda permission to appeal. This permission, however, does not confer jurisdiction on us. *Cf. State v. Roberts,*940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim.App.1996) (holding that agreement cannot create jurisdiction in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority).