AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Operational

and Tactical Nexus

Small Steps toward Seamless

Effects-Based Operations

M. Shane Riza

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 22

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

February 2006

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Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

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Foreword

Welcome to another in our series called “The Wright 

Flyer Papers.” The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) 

is pleased to publish our best student research projects 

each academic year. Our research program is designed to 

encourage our students to explore topics and issues aimed 

at advancing the application of air and space power and 

understanding the profession of arms. To that end, this 

series reflects our desire to perpetuate the intellectual spirit 

of early military aviation pioneers who availed themselves 

of time, here at Maxwell, to reflect solid research, innovative thought, and lucid preparation. Put another way, we 

think they are worth your time to read.

The Wright Flyer Papers reflect an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and institutional issues. 

Some research provides new solutions to familiar problems. 

Other studies highlight new opportunities and the benefits 

of their pursuit. By making these research studies available 

through the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC intends to foster 

continued conversation amongst Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms . . . a conversation that has 

helped create the most capable fighting force the world has 

ever known.

RANDAL D. FULLHART

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Col Anthony Cain—first, for allowing me to change research seminars so late in the game and, 

second, for allowing me to write on a subject he was dubious 

about from the beginning. I thank Chuck Colgrove of Air Combat Command (ACC)/Flight Operations and Training Branch 

(DOTO) for permitting me to use the mission essential competenciesSM concept developed by the Air Force Research 

Laboratory and ACC/DOTO. Finally, I would like to express 

my gratitude to past and current instructors of the USAF 

Fighter Weapons School. In the face of numerous outside 

pressures, they have remained true to their calling and produced graduates who are the heart and soul of the training 

programs that guaranteed victory after victory in the post–

Vietnam era. They are the true keepers of the faith.

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Abstract

The literature on effects-based operations (EBO) seems to 

grow each day. Myriad definitions have appeared in service 

and joint doctrine writings as well as in other writings. Most 

are too far reaching for current capabilities, and they may 

be too far reaching for future capabilities. Both the United 

States Air Force (USAF) and the United States Joint Forces 

Command (USJFCOM) EBO definitions encompass all facets 

of national policy, including strategic outcomes. USAF and 

USJFCOM are attempting a quantum leap when smaller, 

more manageable steps are indicated to enable and embed 

an EBO culture in the planning community. Making the effort more difficult, service and joint doctrine writings often 

convey a sense of multipolarity when it comes to explaining 

EBO methodology. Joint planning doctrine is conceptually 

opposed to an idealized EBO methodology. Another impediment to EBO is a dichotomy in the way the USAF trains 

at the tactical level of war and the way EBO enthusiasts 

view campaigning at the operational level of war. One view 

focuses on events, missions, and platforms, while the other 

focuses on applying capabilities toward affecting systems 

and achieving a desired end state. The USAF purposefully 

evolved towards mission-based training programs following 

Desert Storm to link missions to combatant commanders’ 

desired capabilities. Unfortunately, this change fosters the 

misperception that missions are capabilities and leads to inefficient force presentation to the combatant commanders. 

Finally, though service and joint doctrine writings strive to 

distinguish the three levels of war, the officers who will plan 

campaigns matured during a time when the lines became 

increasingly blurred. While it is clear that tactical actions can 

have strategic effects, the doctrinal desire to segregate levels 

and the institutional desire to view operational planning as 

completely distinct from well-founded and practiced tacticallevel effects-based thinking is limiting the evolution of EBO 

in the operational realm. Solving these mind-set differences 

and smoothing the disconnects at the tactical/operational 

nexus may hold the key to seamless effects-based operations in future joint fights. However, small steps, not quantum 

leaps, are required. 

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This paper proposes two broad modifications to concepts 

and cultures to embed EBO at the critical nexus of the tactical and operational levels of war. Services, as part of the 

joint community, must narrowly define EBO in a quantifiable, measurable realm. The USAF needs to solve its tactical training/operational campaigning dichotomy by moving 

toward capabilities-based training. The services should stop 

clinging to the antiquated concept of separate and distinct 

levels of war with minimal similarities where no clear distinction actually exists. These small steps will build synergy 

between the execution of national policy and the planning 

that enables it. Such synergy may then aid the evolution toward the seamless continuum necessary for an EBO culture 

to thrive.

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Introduction

In this respect, recent attempts to develop and write joint military 

doctrine are helpful when their focus is on weapon systems 

capabilities and effects-based planning.

—Maj Gen David A. Deptula

The term effects-based operations (EBO) is banging its way 

into the lexicon. The United States Air Force (USAF) is wholly 

committed to the concept and is attempting to lead the other 

services along. Portions of the joint community, primarily 

the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), find 

merit in EBO and may increasingly consider it in planning 

for future operations. However, the USAF and USJFCOM are 

attempting a quantum leap when smaller, more manageable 

steps are indicated to enable and embed an EBO culture in 

the planning community.

Several obstacles impede the advancement of an EBO culture. Definitions of EBO are wide ranging and too encompassing for current capabilities. At times the definitions are 

even divergent in purpose. Arguments abound over whether 

EBO is simply a repackaged planning concept. The joint 

planning process seems at odds with the definitions and 

methods of EBO. Finally, there is an ongoing debate about 

whether EBO forms part of, as Maj Gen David A. Deptula 

says, a “change in the nature of warfare”1 or just a codification of the old ways in a new framework. Whether the 

concept is truly revolutionary, merely evolutionary, or just 

a new term for an old way is not important. Understanding 

service specifics and joint doctrine views of EBO is more 

applicable, but USAF and joint doctrine make this no easy 

task. Completely apart from the growing literature, service 

and joint doctrine writings often convey a sense of multipolarity when it comes to explaining EBO methodology. Joint 

planning doctrine, admittedly updated less recently than 

USAF doctrine, is conceptually at odds with an idealized 

EBO methodology, and it is unlikely to change significantly 

in the near future.

To make EBO a reality, the USAF must confront the dichotomy it created between the way it trains at the tactical level of war and the way it sees itself campaigning at 

the operational level of war. The tactical level focuses on 

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events, missions, and platforms, while the operational level 

focuses on the application of capabilities toward affecting 

systems and achieving objectives. The USAF’s training programs are tied to the way it reports its combat effectiveness 

via the Department of Defense’s (DOD) combat readiness 

reporting process. This process represents the unit’s primary mission(s) through the designed operational capabilities (DOC) statement. These missions become the basis of 

training and reporting combat “capabilities,” which can lead 

to inefficient force presentation to combatant commanders. 

Not all aircraft flying a given mission are equally capable. 

Though the USAF purposefully evolved into a mission-based 

training program, it is making strides toward capabilitiesbased training that will allow it to more effectively communicate the war-fighting abilities of particular units. This 

capabilities-based approach to training at the tactical level 

aids EBO at the operational level by incrementally smoothing the boundary between the two and creating a culture 

of understanding about how capabilities lay the foundation 

for creating effects.

Joint doctrine, primers on EBO, and intermediate developmental education instruction all go out of their way 

to illustrate the differences between the tactical and operational levels. Instead of adding clarity to the concept, these 

attempts act as tacit dismissals of tactical expertise. While 

joint and service direction should embrace the effects-based 

weaponeering process at the tactical level, they instead foster the idea that the operational level is something far above 

and previously out of reach of those officers who are experienced in using tactical methods and are moving into the 

“operational” stages of their careers. The idea rings hollow 

for midlevel officers coming of age in the post–Desert Storm 

era, partially because EBO has always been a part of their 

own training and partially because they recognize there is 

no longer a valid means of separating tactical actions from 

strategic effects. As such, it may be helpful to view the traditional levels of war through the filter of a new concept, one 

that sets strategic guidance apart but embraces the connection between tactical planning/execution and operational 

planning as the mechanisms of executing national policy.

Services must narrowly define EBO in a quantifiable, 

measurable realm. They should strive to link tasks to objecRiza Article.indd 2 5/19/06 3:46:18 
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tives where effects are more easily determined and quantified rather than the current strategy-to-task concept that 

is too far reaching for current assessment tools. The USAF 

needs to solve its tactical training/operational campaigning dichotomy, smoothing the lines at the nexus by moving toward capabilities-based training. Finally, the services 

should stop clinging to the antiquated concept of separate 

and distinct levels of war with minimal similarities where 

no clear distinction actually exists. These small steps will 

build synergy between the execution of national policy and 

the planning that enables it. Such synergy can then evolve 

into a seamless continuum necessary for an EBO culture 

to thrive.

Effects-Based Operations—What Are They?

Foremost in any discussion of EBO is the need to put 

the term in context, define what it is, and explain how it is 

used in planning and executing a joint campaign. Such an 

endeavor includes deciding on the evolutionary status of 

EBO, wading through doctrine and the growing literature 

on EBO to find a working definition, and then looking at 

how EBO is supposed to fit into the joint force commander’s 

(JFC) planning process. The idea is to help the reader understand the framework of EBO as the author relates its issues to the dichotomy between a tactical viewpoint and an 

operational one, on the one hand, and the blurring of the 

intersection between the two, on the other.

New Trick or Old Hat?

The argument over whether EBO constitutes a new way 

of thinking about warfare centers on what the application of 

force is supposed to achieve. Major General Deptula argues 

that Desert Storm marked the first use of parallel warfare, 

the ability to simultaneously affect an array of objectives,2

based on achieving specific effects instead of outright destruction.3 Essentially, he argues that EBO is focused on affecting systems to control an adversary—a departure from 

traditional attrition or annihilation strategies. EBO can 

control an enemy through viewing him as a system of systems where there is no need to destroy the entire system to 

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render it useless or to degrade it to the point that it becomes 

inconsequential. A careful planner only needs to apply the 

force necessary to a portion of the system to affect its other 

parts. Whereas previous wars relied on sequential attack of 

centers of gravity to roll back the adversary’s ability to continue the fight, the new warfare seeks to control an adversary through the swift application of effects-based parallel 

warfare. Major General Deptula states, “Using effects-based 

operations, the determinant of success is effective control of 

systems that the enemy relies upon to exert influence. . . . 

Changing the way we think about the application of force 

may produce more effective use of force.”4

Effects-based planning is as old as warfare itself. The 

Military Operations Research Society (MORS) puts it this 

way: “Consensus emerged that warfare, particularly effective warfare, has always been effects-based.”5 More bluntly, 

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, “Organization and 

Employment for Air and Space Operations” (draft, 10 May 

2004), states, “The effects-based approach is not new.”6 Regardless, recognizing its context allows us to proceed with 

defining what EBO truly is.

Defining EBO

Even with the quantity of information available, defining 

effects-based operations is not easy. Consider the following 

excerpt from a MORS workshop on EBO: “In the words of 

plenary speakers at the Workshop, EBO therefore becomes 

‘a way of thinking’ (Major General Deptula, USAF), ‘a common frame of reference between DOD and other agencies’ 

(Graham Kessler, J9, JFCOM), and it ‘coordinates sets of 

actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and 

neutrals, in peace, crisis, and war’ (Ed Smith, Boeing).”7 Not 

one of these tells us what EBO actually is or makes EBO 

distinct from any other method of planning for war. 

Surprisingly little has appeared on the subject in joint 

doctrine. The term EBO does not appear in any joint publication (JP) on planning (3 or 5 series) other than in JP 3-60, 

Joint Doctrine for Targeting. USJFCOM leads the joint community with an EBO white paper and a Joint War Fighting 

Center Doctrine Series pamphlet entitled “Operational Implications of EBO” and dated 17 November 2004. Perhaps 

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not surprising, the USAF has written more on the subject 

than any other service. The draft AFDD 2 added significant 

sections discussing the concept and method of EBO. The 

following illustrates the various definitions and descriptions in service and joint doctrine writings.

All-encompassing, cumbersome EBO definitions abound. 

USJFCOM defines EBO as “operations that are planned, 

executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment to influence or 

change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated 

application of selected instruments of power to achieve 

directed policy aims” (emphasis in original).8 In the words 

of the Institute for Defense Analyses, “Effects-based thinking requires the explicit and comprehensive linking of all 

actions to operational and strategic outcomes.”9 The items 

listed above in boldface must be separately defined to give 

the overall definition meaning.10 AFDD 1, Air Force Basic 

Doctrine, and AFDD 1-2, Air Force Glossary, define EBO 

more clearly as “actions taken against enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects that contribute directly to 

desired military and political outcomes.”11 This definition is 

more direct, but it seems to leave out the USJFCOM ideas 

on planning, assessing, and adapting. It takes a reading of 

AFDD 1-2 to see that “actions” are expanded to mean “operations, targeting, or strategy.”12 Though this statement clarifies actions in the original definition, it unfortunately defines 

a term by using that term. Clarity does not always accompany succinctness.

The only joint publication that addresses EBO, JP 3-60, 

does not define it. JP 3-60 states that “effective targeting 

is distinguished by the ability to identify the targeting options, both lethal and nonlethal, to achieve the desired effects that will support the commander’s objectives.”13 The 

statement is listed in bold under the heading of “EffectsBased Targeting.” Though this statement does not offer a 

definition, it does offer a narrower idea about what effective 

targeting does. This concept simply stops the effects linkage at assessable objectives. This causal linkage between 

actions and objectives is founded in EBO methodology, 

taking the strategy-to-task, objective-based joint doctrine 

planning process into the realm of EBO.14 However, linking targets to objectives is far less encompassing than true 

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strategy to task. This view of targeting relies on commanders and subordinate commanders to generate objectives that 

link to overall strategy and an end state or desired outcome, 

but the targeting is effective when it generates the desired 

effect toward achieving objectives. Idealized EBO would link 

the targets themselves to desired outcomes. While this may 

be possible, as will be seen later, it is unnecessary and too far 

to reach during these early days of EBO. If the commander’s 

plan is adequate, attaining objectives should achieve the 

military end state that supports the directed policy aims. JP 

3-60’s description of EBO falls short of an all-encompassing, idealized EBO concept for achieving “directed policy 

aims.” However, it clearly links effects to the commander’s 

objectives. This simple concept is the key to moving steadily 

into EBO.

The definitions above relate effects to policy aims, strategic outcomes, and political end states. These are the 

Holy Grail for EBO enthusiasts and represent the idea that 

planners are capable of explicitly determining all the effects (second, third, nth order, cumulative, and cascading) 

of a given action. It is not at all clear whether this is possible in the near term or even in the long term.15 There are 

simply too many variables to manage in systems of systems 

ultimately controlled by human nature. Additionally, confirming the effects and ensuring the plan is achieving its 

objectives—the job of combat assessors and analysts—is 

currently beyond the capabilities of the analytical community.16 While efforts to change this fact are laudable and 

should continue, current planners and the political establishment directing the military must understand that their 

best efforts will fall short of EBO’s idealized promise for 

the foreseeable future. For this reason, it is appropriate to 

narrow the scope, to take smaller steps versus attempting 

a massive paradigm shift before all the capabilities are in 

line. As one expert in joint targeting said, “We often apply 

overwhelming combat power, the adversary capitulates, 

and we do not know exactly why.”17 That system is brute 

force and lacks finesse, but it often works. There is time to 

narrow the focus of EBO and refine the methods for future 

increasing analytical capabilities. This may aid EBO’s acceptance in joint planning.

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EBO and Joint Planning

Definition ambiguity and a joint planning process that 

runs contradictory to an idealized effects-based methodology 

complicate planning at the operational level. The joint deliberate campaign planning process of JP 5-0, Doctrine for 

Planning Joint Operations, begins with the regional combatant commander assigning planning tasks to supported commanders, issuing planning guidance, and apportioning resources and forces to be used for planning purposes.18 The 

joint air estimate process (JAEP) begins the same way.19 As 

such, forces and resources are already apportioned before 

course of action (COA) development begins. The joint/coalition forces air component commander (J/CFACC) defines 

objectives for the planning staff to meet through the COA 

development process. JP 3-30, Command and Control for 

Joint Air Operations, alludes to the EBO concept by stating “the framework of operational objectives, tactical objectives, and tactical tasks provides a clear linkage of overall 

strategy to task”20 (see appendix A). The statement is simple 

enough, but it does not tell the whole story.

In the purest sense, the EBO planning cycle allows the 

planner to anticipate a specific outcome, or policy aim, without constraints. The object should be to achieve the political end state while determining the means and capabilities 

needed to do so. Not surprising, the USAF embraces this 

view of EBO. As the draft AFDD 2 states, “The effects-based 

approach is about securing objectives, not about platforms, 

weapons, or methods. Such an approach starts with desired 

outcomes—effects and objectives—and then determines the 

resources needed to achieve them. It does not start with particular capabilities or resources and then decide what can be 

accomplished with them.”21 While this view may be visionary, 

it does not exactly conform to the joint planning process. 

It also adds ambiguity by equating effects and objectives to 

desired outcomes. This is simply an overstatement of what 

effects and objectives are.

As noted above, the joint planning process begins with 

guidance from the combatant commander to include apportioning the force for planning purposes—a force that 

comes with preestablished capabilities. As JP 3-30 states, 

“COA development must take into account resource conRiza Article.indd 7 5/19/06 3:46:19 
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straints of the joint force at large.”22 By the time deliberate or 

crisis-action planning begins, idealized EBO is already off 

the tracks. Though the process is iterative and the JAEP 

allows the JFACC to request additional resources during 

mission analysis, the JFACC may not be in a position to 

do so until well into the estimate process. In fact, AFDD 2 

would submit that forces and resources are the last things 

the JFACC should consider.

Making matters worse, the draft AFDD 2 engages in 

doublespeak on capabilities, resources, and effects. In the 

pages following the emphatic statement that EBO does not 

apply capabilities and resources to see what must be accomplished, the document says, “Effects-based planning 

matches air and space component capabilities against the 

approved target list with a focus on achieving desired effects.”23 Matching capabilities to targets to achieve a given 

effect is far different from defining the effects that lead to an 

end state and determining which targets and to what degree they need to be affected to achieve the desired outcome. 

This is not a simple matter of semantics. In fact, the two 

cases are 180 degrees out of phase. Recognizing this result 

requires some knowledge of the joint targeting process.

Most joint target lists (JTL) are produced before or in 

conjunction with deliberate planning long before hostilities 

arise. JP 3-60 defines the JTL as “a consolidated list of all 

targets considered to have military significance in a combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR).”24 The 

lists are compiled without regard for particular objectives 

and in the absence of any campaign plan. They are simply 

targets of “military significance.” They also form the basis 

of every target list to follow and finally conclude with a daily 

joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) recommended 

by the joint guidance and apportionment team (JGAT), now 

referenced as the targeting effects team (TET) in Air Force 

Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFOTTP) 

2-3.1, and approved by the JFC. In essence, planners take 

a list of prepublished targets, select those that will affect 

daily objectives as laid out in the air operations directive, 

allocate preapportioned forces (and their capabilities) on the 

air tasking order (ATO), draw conclusions about what effects are supposed to take place due to the strikes, and then 

relate those back to objectives and strategies in the joint air 

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operations plan (JAOP). It is as if planners were injecting “effects” into the middle of the cycle instead of beginning with 

them in the “holistic” way envisioned by USJFCOM. The 

TET is not doing effects-based targeting; it is doing effectsbased allocation. In fact, the redesignation of the JGAT to 

the TET seems an admission that this is how the process 

works in reality.

In a final example of service schizophrenia, the USAF’s 

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education’s 

(CADRE) Joint Air Estimate Planning Handbook states that 

“EBO is an approach . . . that focuses on . . . military activities for the effects they produce rather than the targets 

or even objectives they deal with. In short, it focuses on 

desired effects more than on merely attacking targets or 

simply dealing with objectives” (emphasis in original).25 The 

line is completely contrary to the joint planning process, 

making effects an end unto themselves. In reality, a planner cannot separate the target or action from the effect. No 

force attacks targets without a sense of what it wants to 

achieve. Though the grueling mechanics of the ATO cycle 

drive planners to lose sight of effects and objectives during 

exercises, JIPTLs now explicitly relate tasks to JAOP and 

JFC objectives.26 The CADRE handbook, in attempting to 

divorce effects from objectives, makes them an end unto 

themselves. This directly opposes the essence of EBO, is 

contrary to joint planning, serves to cloud EBO issues, and 

stifles productive experimentation in the EBO realm. 

No doubt the term EBO, if not the concept, is ambiguous 

in service and joint doctrine. Official writings on the subject 

often seem divergent and circuitous. Current joint planning 

doctrine is at odds with the unconstrained, idealized view 

of EBO held by the USAF and USJFCOM. The larger issue 

may be that reality is at odds with such a view. It is hard to 

imagine a planning environment unconstrained by preapportioned resources and capabilities. The secretary of defense went on record with Reserve Army troops in Kuwait 

as saying that “You go to war with the Army you have, not 

the Army you want.”27 No less true is the idea that you plan 

within the constraints of available forces and the capabilities they lend to the fight. Services and the joint community 

must first decide what EBO really means. They should pare 

it down from the broad ideas about linking end states to tacRiza Article.indd 9 5/19/06 3:46:19 
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tical tasks and simply link tasks to operational objectives. 

It is a smaller step that may lay the foundation for broader 

perspectives to come, perhaps when the analytical community is capable of the assessment and predictive analysis 

required to make the USAF’s dream a nearer reality. 

The Tactical Training/Operational

Campaigning Dichotomy

Another impediment to the realization of true EBO is the 

dichotomy between the way the USAF trains and executes 

at the tactical level of war and the way it desires to plan and 

campaign at the operational level. Maj K. Noedskov, Royal 

Danish Air Force, observes:

For the pilot CAS [close air support] [and] AI [aerial interdiction] . . . 

are excellent descriptions of the missions he is about to conduct. . . . 

However for the operational level commander CAS [and] AI . . . are 

bad ways of describing the campaign the commander is about to 

conduct to achieve the desired effects.28

Missions do not describe effects or capabilities, but they are 

the basis of tactical training. That training is driven by the 

combat readiness reporting process that equates capabilities 

to missions. Though the beginnings of a capabilities-based 

training program are now in their infancy, the Air Force must 

continue this progression and change its training culture to 

fully exploit EBO.

Training as a Function of the Reporting Process 

Contrary to the common mantra that the USAF trains like 

it plans to fight, it actually trains to report its readiness to 

fight. The common system across the DOD that serves as a 

“registry of all operational units” is the status of resources 

and training system (SORTS).29 This system has three primary purposes: “It provides data critical to crisis planning; 

it provides data for the deliberate planning process; and is to 

be used by the CSAF and subordinate commanders in assessing their effectiveness in meeting their Title 10, United 

States Code responsibility.”30 Units are required to report 

their C-status, a measure of their ability to execute their 

wartime mission(s). These missions are defined on a DOC 

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statement, the purpose of which is to “summarize and provide source information for the mission(s) for which the unit 

is organized or designed.”31 While there is opportunity to 

list tasks, purposes for missions, and special capabilities, 

there is rarely room to break missions into individual tasks 

or capabilities.32 This deficiency has led to an idea throughout the DOD that mission and capability are equal.

DOC statements drive combat air forces’ (CAF) resourcing and training. SORTS supports the service chiefs’ responsibilities to “organize, train, and equip forces for use 

by combatant commands.”33 Major commands use information on DOC statements to determine different types of resources for their units, including weapons allocations, flying 

hours, spare parts, and rotations to live-fire deployments 

and exercises. As a commander evaluates his or her unit’s 

readiness for wartime tasking, the commander must also 

focus training on missions represented on the DOC statement and reported through SORTS.

Consider the sample DOC statement from Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-201, Status of Resources and Training 

System, for the 55th Fighter Squadron in appendix B. In 

section II, “Mission Identification,” the mission tasking narrative lists all the missions the unit is capable of flying. On 

the following page, missions are related directly to the basis 

for the training measured area C-status. While numerous 

capabilities comprise a mission such as Suppression of 

Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), they are not listed individually. 

Examples may include detection of enemy Integrated Air 

Defense System (IADS) emissions, location of enemy IADS, 

and destruction of enemy air defense systems by way of 

general purpose, inertially aided, or laser-guided bombs 

(LGB). These capabilities more correctly and discretely relate the kinds of tasks a JFC, through the JFACC, can use 

to achieve certain effects in the air superiority realm. However, forces are not presented to the JFC with any relation to these actual capabilities from the DOC statement. 

Although combatant commanders do not use DOC statements to task units (unit type codes do that through AFI 

10-201), the information is available across the DOD, and 

unit taskings under current operation plans and concept 

plans are shown on the DOC statement. This can lead to 

suboptimum force presentation and apportionment.

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F-15E, F-16, and A-10 squadrons may have CAS on their 

DOC statements, but not all platforms have the same capabilities in the CAS arena. Until recently, A-10 units were 

incapable of guiding LGBs with onboard systems, and none 

can operationally employ inertially aided munitions (IAM) 

like the joint direct attack munition. They do have large 

payloads, and their flight regime favors the constrained airspace that is the norm during CAS missions. F-15Es have 

much longer loiter times and can carry more ordnance than 

F-16s. However, due to lower numbers and their unique 

abilities to carry certain weapons more suited to AI or strategic attack target sets, they may be better allocated to other 

parts of the JAOP. Some F-16s have IAMs and LGB capability but may lack range and/or loiter time for AORs with 

basing rights issues, and none have the payload of either 

F-15Es or A-10s. These platform-specific capabilities and 

limitations are not likely to show on any DOC statement. 

However, they clearly represent discreet capabilities that 

should be used in planning for effects during operations of 

varying objectives in diverse AORs and situations. Missions 

are not equal to capability, yet the reporting process makes 

it appear that they are. 

Evolution to Mission-Based Training

The Air Force purposefully began to focus training on missions and to report those as capabilities to the combatant 

commands in the midnineties. The CAF oversight program 

for training combat aircrews was then called graduated 

combat capability and was focused on events that were 

“the right skills for our aircrew to have.”34 According to the 

Primer for Ready Aircrew Program (RAP), published by Air 

Combat Command (ACC) at the initiation of the current 

training program, there was an underlying assumption that 

effective training meant logging events, which was the key 

to reporting combat-ready status.35 However, it was easy to 

skew the readiness numbers. For example, a pilot could log 

a missile shot on a cross-country sortie, get a tally on an 

airliner, and call the mission a successful intercept sortie. 

Additionally, the flying-hour programs for CAF units were 

generated based on the MAJCOM-approved utilization rate 

for the aircraft assigned. The penchant for square-filling, 

Riza Article.indd 12 5/19/06 3:46:20 
13

along with a discrepancy in the way SORTS and a utilization rate-based flying-hour program required reporting for 

mission readiness, led to a change in the way the CAF conducts training.36

In 1996 the CSAF directed a change to CAF training. In 

that tasking, the chief laid out three requirements: “Develop a train-to-task process; provide an inextricable link 

between commander in chief (CINC) requirements, flying 

training, and readiness indicators; [and] model requirements 

accurately.”37 It was a laudable goal whose end would be an 

inextricable linkage of missions to combatant commander 

requirements expressed by way of the DOC statement. 

Theoretically, the joint mission essential task list (JMETL) 

flowed directly into the RAP tasking message to individual 

units through the Air Force mission essential task list and 

Air Force missions. The RAP publication stated, “This leads 

directly to your unit’s training program, specified in the 

RAP tasking message and your training plan, from which 

we derive your flying hour program. Successful execution 

will provide combat readiness for the CINC.”38 RAP tasking 

messages were to reference the JMETLs that were to be 

carried on to the DOC statements for tasked units. Those 

references are no longer explicitly stated.39 Instead, RAP 

tasking messages list required sorties by missions first—

not exactly a train-to-task mentality. For example, the F-16 

Block 50 tasking message grants the largest apportionment 

of sorties to SEAD.40 While it does task a number of events 

that may be called capabilities, “Dynamic A/A [air-to-air] 

targeting” is one such listing; most of the others are just 

events such as Have Quick or electronic protection use.41

The key is that events adding to the combat capability can 

only be logged during a RAP sortie—a sortie qualifying as a 

RAP mission.42 RAP related capability to mission by saying 

RAP would take “those capabilities . . . that ACC units can 

provide, and . . . match . . . what the CINC needs by placing 

those missions you can provide to your apportioned theater 

on your DOC Statement.”43 A current RAP tasking message 

makes the mission/capability linkage more explicit by stating commander option sortie allocation on combat missionready aircrew—frontline squadron flyers as opposed to attached aircrew working group or wing jobs—will be “only 

DOC tasked missions.”44 Mission-centric training is well 

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entrenched in the USAF.45 The future of true capabilitiesbased training is unclear.

Beyond Mission-Based Training

Recently, in coordination with the Air Force Research 

Laboratory (AFRL), ACC undertook a project to further refine the tactical tasks of joint campaign planning and attempted to define the true capabilities of the war fighter. 

Where the tactical task of “destroy 80% of the IADS’s Command Centers” from appendix A ends, tactical training actually begins. War fighters must accomplish a myriad of individual tasks to achieve this higher-level tactical task. Some 

of the tasks are specific to aircraft and missions. Others 

span all missions and platforms. Fire control coordination 

measures through JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Close Air Support, are one example of specific 

knowledge sets and tasks applicable to the single mission 

of CAS in all the platforms that perform it. To really understand the pickle button to the grand strategy linkage the 

Air Force so desires, much more work is needed in defining 

that enormous area of capabilities and tasks directly beneath the operational planner’s tactical tasks. It is possible 

for a fighter aircrew member to become a master of all missions by training to a correctly defined set of minitasks or 

skill sets—what the author dubbed the “Fighter Quanta.”46

It is a way to bridge the gap between true human-level capabilities and the limited, dogma-entrenched missions reported on DOC statements.

ACC and AFRL defined these minitasks in what they 

called mission essential competenciesSM (MEC) and the 

knowledge, skills, and experiences (KSE) that accompany 

them.47 These MECsSM went into the F-15C RAP tasking 

message for the first time in fiscal year 2005.48 They are a 

good first step and are a combined effort of training professionals from the ACC staff, the USAF Weapons School, and 

AFRL; but there is room for improvement—they are still 

rather broad. For example, “detects factor threats in the 

area of responsibility” is one of seven SEADs.49 In a flight 

briefing, that would be listed as an objective, while the rest 

of the brief would explain the tasks to accomplish it. These 

tasks and the continuing search for commonality among 

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15

missions can aid the idealized strategy-to-task concept of 

joint planning and EBO. Interestingly, this SEAD MECSM is 

similar to the air-to-air MECSM “detects factor groups in the 

area of responsibility.”50 While there are obvious differences 

in smaller, more discreet cockpit tasks that go into the two 

types of sorties, the similarities in these competencies for 

diverse missions lend credence to the possibility of linking 

tactical tasks and cockpit minitasks to create holistic weapons system capabilities across all missions. This should be 

the goal of every CAF training program, since it will only 

increase the war-fighting capability of the USAF. 

In the spring of 2003, the F-16 squadron at the USAF 

Weapons School completely redesigned its syllabus by divorcing syllabus missions from discreet skills, dubbed skill sets, 

required of F-16 weapons officers. This approach allowed 

a relatively unbiased look at what the end product should 

be capable of outside the human tendency to resist change 

and hold on to favorite syllabus sorties. The instructors at 

the F-16 Weapons School developed skill sets with slightly 

higher fidelity than the KSEs beneath the MECsSM. The tasks 

were more distinct; the skill sets more closely approached 

the Fighter Quanta concept alluded to above and discussed 

in the Weapons Review. The Weapons Instructor Course 

(WIC) syllabus is only a small subsection of CAF training, 

while the beast that the AFRL and the ACC’s training branch 

is attempting to tame is far larger and more complex.

Both approaches are valuable for developing cockpit 

skills that become capabilities. These capabilities, used in 

support of achieving tactical tasks and operational objectives, smooth the seam in the dichotomy between tactical 

training and operational campaigning. That training professionals found similar competencies across diverse missions 

highlights a trend in the correct direction for capabilitiesbased training programs and away from mission-centric 

thinking—steps toward the ultimate and essential dislocation of capabilities and missions.

The Air Force must change its training culture. Presently, 

it trains to report its combat status within the framework 

of SORTS by training to missions and presenting them as 

capabilities to the combatant commander. Perhaps SORTS 

reporting and the DOC statement should do away with the 

mission identification sections and directly report capabiliRiza Article.indd 15 5/19/06 3:46:20 
16

ties. This would create a much larger document but would 

add far more detail. Perhaps a further refined JMETL process would be a good place to start by detailing quantifiable 

capabilities necessary to execute combatant commander 

tasks. Processes such as the one that produced the MECSM

concept and F-16 WIC syllabus revision are valuable tools 

to guide this effort at the joint level. Much as the F-16 WIC 

divorced syllabus missions from weapons officer skill sets, 

it is up to Airmen to break the mission/capabilities linkage 

we created. The JFC must understand that F-16 or F-15E 

CAS is not the same as A-10 CAS. The RAP Primer stated, 

“Relating events to flying hours is difficult, and at the same 

time relating events to supported CINC mission requirements was also difficult.”51 That may be true. However, a 

combatant commander thinking only in terms of mission is 

not thinking about effects, and relating events to missions 

says nothing of capabilities. Difficult thinking is required if 

the tactical training/operational campaigning dichotomy is 

to be broken. 

The Levels of War: Myth, Model, or Maze?

Joint doctrine clearly lays out three separate and distinct 

levels of war that, when viewed in this manner, slow the 

progression of EBO. Understanding exactly where one level 

ends and another begins is similar to walking through a maze 

that endlessly turns on itself. In some sense, the levels of 

war are less a model for a wide spectrum of military actions 

than they are a myth. To be sure, an expert tactician cannot successfully plan a large campaign without broadening 

his or her perspective into the operational realm. However, 

that same planner cannot forsake all the learning about 

how to think and operate tactically and expect to succeed. 

Doctrine’s desire to separate the levels of war clashes with 

experience and well-founded tactical thinking. Additionally, 

as any unmanned aerial vehicle pilot or 20-year-old Marine with a journalist in tow during a firefight will tell you, 

there is no longer such a thing as a purely tactical action. 

Distinct definitions have little meaning. The joint community and doctrine attempt to distinguish between the three 

levels of war. But campaign planners should cling to the 

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value of well-developed, tactical effects-based thinking and 

recognize there is no longer such a thing as a differentiation 

between levels of war.

Doctrinal Views on the Levels of War

Both joint and Air Force doctrine go to great lengths to 

separate ways of thinking about military operations into 

three distinct categories called the levels of war. The definitions of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war 

from JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms, are included in their entirety at appendix C. At the tactical level, “Battles and engagements 

are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives 

assigned to tactical units or task forces.”52 This level is focused on the “arrangement and maneuver of combat elements” with respect to each other and the enemy to “achieve 

combat objectives.”53 The operational level is where “campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and 

sustained to accomplish strategic objectives”54—a doctrinal 

blurring of the lines in the definition. This level introduces 

operational objectives to link tactical actions with strategy 

and is focused on “sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources 

to bring about and sustain these events” that imply a 

broader scope of time and space than tactics.55 At the strategic level of war, the nation’s security objectives and presidential guidance determine national military objectives.56

JP 1-02 points out that “activities at this level . . . sequence 

initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power [and] develop 

global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives.”57 It is helpful to break the definitions down further 

and look at key words.

The true doctrinal distinctions between the levels of war 

may be understood better as execution for combat objectives at the tactical level; planning to achieve linking objectives at the operational level; and guidance and direction to 

achieve global or national objectives at the strategic level. 

Tactical operations occur where maneuver units execute 

combat to achieve immediate and near-term objectives. The 

operational level is about planning event sequences to link 

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combat to strategic objectives. This level is simply where 

national objectives or direction from the civil command authority become a plan to use the national instruments of 

power (IOP). The strategic level is concerned with providing guidance or direction to achieve national goals. The civil 

command authority assesses risk and gives guidelines for 

employment of the IOPs. This seems straightforward, but 

the connotation of levels and apparent application of the 

concept only to war cause ambiguity. The former creates 

an aura of distinct boundaries where expertise at one level 

might be viewed as limited or irrelevant in others. The latter 

seems to limit the concept solely to the military IOP.

It is unlikely that a fully holistic EBO methodology can 

take hold in the US political environment. National strategy 

provides the construct for planning that creates the concept 

for execution. However, if the USJFCOM definition of EBO 

takes hold, this approach becomes antiquated as it lacks a 

holistic view toward achieving national objectives. The holistic approach implies that policy makers not exclaim that 

“the policy is X; now find me the means to make it happen.” 

While it would be well for policy makers to be versed in 

an idealized EBO culture, the limitations of such a system 

were highlighted above in the example of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s trip to the AOR. When questioned about the 

possibility of military action in response to Iranian nuclear 

ambitions, Gen Richard B. Meyers, USAF, replied that “the 

president makes policy and the military is prepared to carry 

it out.”58 Though this would be an extremely difficult task 

for a military spread as thinly as it is in the Global War on 

Terror, the former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman publicly 

recognized that if told to take action, the military’s job is 

clear. It illustrates the one-way street that is policy direction to military strategy and is decidedly not an effective 

EBO methodology. For this reason, there may be a better 

representation for concepts similar to the levels of war that 

can remove some of the ambiguity, aid the progression of 

EBO, and apply it to all forms of national power. 

The levels of war may be viewed better as modules of national policy. These modules are execution, planning, and 

direction (see a graphic depiction of the concept at appendix D). Direction is set apart from the other two, though 

linked by objectives, and is concerned with policy making 

Riza Article.indd 18 5/19/06 3:46:20 
19

at the national level. The other two are intricately linked 

within the IOP and deal with carrying out policy. This concept more accurately represents the differences between 

governing guidance regarding policy and the mechanisms 

that make the policy a reality. It more closely relates those 

mechanisms necessary for overall success—planning and 

execution—within the IOP. Rather than seeing tactics and 

operations as two fully distinct levels, the module concept 

explicitly ties together planning and execution. Due to the 

limitations of the holistic and idealized EBO process noted 

above, it is better to focus EBO energies more narrowly on 

the planning and execution modules of policy as the concept 

shows in appendix D. Here, EBO can be effective in linking 

execution to planning and planning to the linking objectives 

derived from policy makers’ direction. In this way, planning 

and execution are seen as parts of the whole rather than as 

distinct levels. In this nexus EBO can thrive.

Embracing the Value of Tactical-Level Effects-Based 

Thinking

We currently have at our disposal a proven effects-based 

thinking methodology and a core of officers who are trained 

in its use. Unfortunately, due to a false requirement to separate the tactical level from the operational level, EBO is not 

viewed as the building block to broader campaign-level effects. Our military force grows leaders “from the ground up.” 

Line lieutenants do not show up to a joint air operations 

center and begin recommending apportionment. They begin 

as platoon leaders, wingmen, or junior intelligence officers. 

This foundation eventually grows leaders at the broader and 

higher levels of military operations. Young tacticians learn 

the art of small-unit maneuver, the military decision-making process, surface warfare, and weaponeering for desired 

probability of destruction (Pd). These tactics of the execution module of policy place the US military beyond comparison throughout the world. However, doctrine for campaign 

planning, the vast literature on EBO, and even intermediate 

developmental education institutions have tacitly dismissed 

such knowledge and experience as it applies to planning 

military operations at the campaign level. It guarantees reinvention of the wheel. A better option is for the joint comRiza Article.indd 19 5/19/06 3:46:21 
20

munity to embrace tactical-level effects-based thinking and 

integrate its methodology into campaign planning.

On the first day of orientation at the Air Command and 

Staff College, a speaker attempted to illustrate the students’ 

embarkation on a new career phase. He said he did not care 

how good we were tactically—that it no longer mattered. He 

told us we were there to learn about being operational leaders.59 During a recent syllabus exercise in creating a JAOP, 

a facilitator and instructor at the Air Force’s AOC replacement training unit embraced the idea of taking away majors’ weapons school patches and reissuing them only when 

the wearer demonstrated knowledge in planning air operations.60 Consider this note in the USJFCOM EBO pamphlet: 

“The use of the word ‘effects’ in an EBO context describes 

the potential conditions of PMESII [Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information] systems in the 

operational environment, not the immediate target effects 

of weapon systems or tactical-level actions.”61 These distinctions and the implied dismissal of tactical expertise 

should not exist and will only hurt the embedding of an 

EBO culture in the USAF and joint communities. Certainly, 

PMESII systems effects are different in magnitude, but they 

flow directly from immediate target effects. In fact, sometimes they are exactly the same. The speakers should have 

said, “Your tactical expertise, experience, and knowledge 

are absolutely essential to understanding the broader aspects of campaign planning and execution.” The USJFCOM 

pamphlet should have been linked to higher-level effects by 

stating that “immediate target effects and the methodology 

for determining them have a direct impact on the operational environment of PMESII.” These thoughts enable EBO 

planning by tactical experts.

Since the author’s commissioning in 1990, effects-based 

thinking has been involved directly in mission planning and 

execution. In the CAF, mission planning begins with the 

commander’s intent and objectives for a given mission. That 

intent involves the level of destruction or incapacitation the 

commander expects to achieve by attacking the target set. 

Mission planning begins in earnest with target analysis in 

relation to the desired level of destruction. This analysis 

focuses on target vulnerabilities, critical nodes, and target 

sets. The planner attempts to find a vulnerability that will 

Riza Article.indd 20 5/19/06 3:46:21 
21

gain the maximum effect to achieve the commander’s intent 

with as little force as possible. The planner seeks efficiency 

and economy of force because it leads to flexibility for the 

primary target and the ability to impose more damage to 

other targets or systems. Once the critical vulnerabilities 

are known, the planner weaponeers the individual impact 

points against various forms of ordnance to find the optimum match for the level of destruction required. This may 

include different forms of guidance, different bomb bodies, 

various fuzing options, or even mixed ordnance within a 

flight. The weapons effects needed to achieve the Pd also 

drive the release parameters and target-area tactics that 

drive the ingress tactics and support requirements (SEAD, 

tankers, etc.). These—in turn—drive the package composition, takeoff times, and mission brief time all the way back 

to the planning timeline. This is the very essence of EBO.

EBO is well known to every CAF mission commander 

if not every flight leader and wingman. EBO takes a commander’s intent and applies a logical, quantitative method 

to design a specific mission to achieve it. It is the natural 

way of the world for officers reaching the operational levels 

of their careers. Major General Deptula’s thoughts about 

planners thinking only in terms of destruction are from an 

earlier time.62 As the weaponeering process above shows, 

pure destruction never enters the discussion unless that is 

the commander’s intent. Tactical-mission planners do not 

think only in terms of outright destruction. Futhermore, 

those who will plan air operations will find pure destruction 

as a strategy of war to be beyond their experience. 

Doctrine and senior leaders must embrace the tactical 

expertise of those who will be doing joint planning in an 

EBO construct. Separating the two or discounting their expertise will only harm the development of EBO. Certainly, 

most senior leaders understand this, and recent CFACCs 

have made every effort to stack their combined air operations centers (CAOC) with weapons school graduates and 

other tactical experts for use in planning air operations.63

Highlighting the similarities between tactical weaponeering 

and EBO planning is far more productive than attempting to 

separate the tactical and operational levels. Officers at this 

critical juncture in their careers certainly see more similarities than differences in the nexus. They have also grown up 

Riza Article.indd 21 5/19/06 3:46:21 
22

during a time when single actions or immediate target effects can impact the strategic and political environment.

The Dissolving Tactical Action/Strategic Effects

Distinction

There may have been a time when tactical actions rarely 

had direct impact on the political environment, but there 

are no officers on active duty today who have seen it. It may 

be another military myth that Desert Storm was the first 

time an individual action had strategic consequences, but one 

needs only to look back to My Lai or the photo of the South 

Vietnamese police officer executing a suspected Viet Cong 

irregular to recognize the fallacy of this belief. Any individual action can have far-reaching ramifications—another 

reason the levels of war do not have much meaning to those 

midlevel officers beginning the operational stage of their 

careers. For a cadre of military officers whose careers have 

matured in the post–Desert Storm era of 24-hour news cycles, the separation between tactical actions and strategic 

effects is nonexistent. This serves to illustrate the efficacy of 

tactical-level effects-based planning methods in campaign 

planning and the reality of blurred lines between the levels 

of war. However, since most examples of individual actions 

having strategic consequences were due to unintended effects, it says little of a current ability to plan in an idealized 

EBO construct.

Every member of the US armed forces is fully aware that 

individual actions can have global consequences. A wellknown example of such an event was the bombing of the Al 

Firdos bunker during Desert Storm. By all intelligence estimates, the bunker was a valid military target, a command 

and control bunker where high-level Baath Party leaders 

often gathered. LGB technology allowed a precision strike 

that would have been impossible less than two decades earlier. Unfortunately, coalition intelligence was not sufficient 

to discover that the bunker was often used by Iraqi civilians. Over 100 bodies were pulled from the rubble of the 

bombed-out bunker under the intense light of the world 

media. Despite the validity of the target and highly effective 

tactical execution, the coalition could not stand the unintended effects of killing innocents. Targets in Baghdad were 

Riza Article.indd 22 5/19/06 3:46:21 
23

virtually wiped clean from the coalition target list and were, 

from then on, only approved at the highest level.64

Consider one more example: days before Operation Iraqi 

Freedom was to begin, two F-117s streaked over Baghdad 

in early daylight attempting to decapitate the Baath regime 

by killing Saddam Hussein himself. The mission was flown 

with minimum planning and far later into daylight than any 

F-117s before had flown a combat sortie. It was done before any systematic degradation of the Iraqi air defenses.65

The mission was an abject failure. However, this one sortie 

had the potential of achieving the primary objective of Iraqi 

Freedom with a fin kit and 2,000 pounds of tritonal bomb 

casings. A regime change would have occurred had Saddam 

been sitting peacefully in the restaurant as it turned into 

masonry dust. A single conventional weapon can achieve national objectives. This is the world and the military we serve 

in. The sooner policy makers and planners understand this 

fact of twenty-first-century warfare, the faster EBO concepts will evolve and flourish.

The levels of war, while a viable model for thinking about 

warfare in the past, are a myth today. This conceptual framework hinders the progression of EBO methods because of 

a perceived need to separate these levels and distinguish 

them from the others. It creates a sense that the value of expertise in execution, particularly in capabilities and effectsbased weaponeering of individual targets, is lessened—that 

operational planners have to think differently. In reality, 

they have to think the same way in a broader scope. Finally, 

any officer likely to be planning or executing campaigns understands there no longer can be a differentiation between 

tactical actions and strategic effects. When one weapon can 

satisfy a policy goal or alter the course of a campaign, the 

levels of war as distinct entities are extinct.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, nine years after CSAF guidance to “Develop 

a train-to-task-process, provide an inextricable link between 

CINC requirements, flying training, and readiness indicators, [and] model requirements accurately,”66 the USAF is 

only marginally closer to the goal. The term EBO is cloaked 

Riza Article.indd 23 5/19/06 3:46:21 
24

in ambiguity. Joint doctrine, Air Force doctrine, AFOTTPs, 

and manuals used to instruct the air-estimate process verge 

on circular logic and are often disjointed. Clearly, the joint 

community must decide on a working or workable definition 

of EBO before it can be fully integrated into the joint planning process. The focus should be narrowly defined in the 

near term as relating operational/planning objectives to execution tasks, as they are in JP 3-60. The joint community 

needs to grow into the concepts, while the analytical means 

to an idealized EBO process still lie in the future. The Air 

Force must be wary of overreaching in this arena by making 

sweeping statements that claim a focus on desired outcomes 

rather than by simply linking apportioned capabilities and 

effects to operational objectives. The TET executes effectsbased allocation, and during these initial steps into EBO, 

that may be all we are capable of. EBO is not something 

the Air Force should shy away from, nor should it claim a 

capability to do any more. The Air Force is starting, as Major 

General Deptula says, “a way of thinking” about warfare. 

At present, an unconstrained EBO methodology is neither 

practical, possible, nor in accordance with joint doctrine. As 

the joint community gets more comfortable with it, however, 

the EBO concept will naturally grow into an iterative process of linking strategic guidance to commander’s intent to 

objectives to tactical tasks to the competencies, knowledge, 

and skills necessary to accomplish those tasks. To put it 

in terms a fighter pilot understands, the challenge will be 

to raise a generation of young officers who understand the 

linkage between the pickle button and grand strategy. Along 

those lines, training concepts must evolve away from mission-centric paradigms.

For EBO to ever truly take hold, the Air Force must 

change its training culture. The focus of campaign planning 

is on capabilities that generate effects to support objectives, 

while the Air Force trains for missions and presents them 

as capabilities to the combatant commander. These are two 

disparate ways of thinking. Recall what Major Noedskov 

said of missions—“they relate for the pilot what he is about 

to accomplish, but they say little about how the operational 

commander achieves his objectives.” It is up to Airmen to 

break the linkage between mission and capabilities that 

the Air Force created. The JFC must understand that A-10 

Riza Article.indd 24 5/19/06 3:46:21 
25

CAS is not the same as F-16 or F-15E CAS. Recent moves 

toward capabilities-based training are encouraging and 

necessary processes if the Air Force is to be successful in 

breaking the linkage. More efforts along these lines can further refine the tactical tasks into actual cockpit tasks that 

give our aircrews essential competencies to bring capabilities to the joint fight. These efforts can lay the foundation 

for the all-encompassing vision of EBO the Air Force desires to achieve—the ultimate linkage of discreet, missionindependent cockpit minitasks to grand strategy. Such a 

continuum also recognizes the limitations of the current 

model of the levels of war. 

The conceptual framework of the levels of war and the 

perceived need to separate and distinguish them hinder 

EBO progression for a generation of officers who recognize 

the concept is extinct. The modules of national policy concept can highlight the distinction between setting national 

policy and the IOPs that carry it out. At the same time, it 

can highlight the interrelatedness of tactical actions and operational planning instead of attempting to set them apart. 

EBO can thrive at linking execution to planning and linking 

planning to the connecting operational objectives between 

direction/strategy and the IOP responsible for carrying out 

policy. This concept is a far more quantifiable realm and 

one better suited to the growth of the EBO concept. A narrowly focused EBO can benefit from current effects-based 

planning methods at the execution level. 

There is inherent value in the expertise of execution and 

capabilities/effects-based weaponeering; operational planners would do better to think more like tactical-mission 

planners than to attempt to set themselves apart and above. 

This new way of thinking about warfare is not about thinking differently for the generation of officers raised in an 

effects-based tactical planning culture. It is about stepping 

off from that solid foundation and applying similar methods 

on a broader scope.

The juncture of the tactical and operational or the merging of execution with planning is the focal point that will 

enable an EBO culture. The time has passed for arguing 

over EBO’s status as a revolution; the time also has passed 

for overstating abilities and grandly claiming an all-encompassing method. How the USAF and USJFCOM approach 

Riza Article.indd 25 5/19/06 3:46:21 
26

EBO will likely determine whether its full promise ever can be 

reached. Continuing along the same path surely will spell 

its demise, as the tools for predictive analysis do not yet 

exist. Taking small, narrowly focused steps, solving existing dichotomies, and recognizing the similarities involved in 

carrying out national policy serve as the best chance at laying the foundations for the USAF’s EBO dream. Embracing 

a continuum, particularly at the tactical and operational 

nexus, is the key to EBO.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see appropriate entry 

in the bibliography.)

1. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations, cover.

2. Ibid., 4.

3. Ibid., 3.

4. Ibid., 18.

5. Hayes et al., Analyzing Effects-Based Operations Report, 2.

6. AFDD 2, draft, Organization and Employment for Air and Space Operations, 73.

7. Hayes et al., 2.

8. United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Joint Warfighting 

Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7, 2.

9. Gleeson et al., New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations, 6.

10. USJFCOM Pamphlet 7.

11. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 98.

12. AFDD 1-2, Air Force Glossary, 26.

13. Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, I-5.

14. Mann et al., Thinking Effects, 2.

15. For a discussion of cascading, direct/indirect, and nthorder effects, see Mann et al., Thinking Effects, 2.

16. Saunders-Newton and Frank, “Effects-Based Operations.”

17. Interview with Air Command and Staff College faculty subjectmatter expert on targeting, 14 March 2005.

18. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, III-3.

19. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, III-4.

20. Ibid., III-10.

21. AFDD 2, 70. 

22. JP 3-30, III-11.

23. AFDD 2, 74.

24. JP 3-60, III-2.

25. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) 

Joint Air Operations Planning Course, Joint Air Estimate Planning Handbook, version 2 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: CADRE, 6 October 2003), 46.

26. Mann et al., 55.

Riza Article.indd 26 5/19/06 3:46:21 
27

27. “Troops Put Thorny Questions to Rumsfeld,” CNN, 9 December 

2004, n.p., http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/12/08/rumsfeld.

troops/.

28. Maj K. Noedskov, 2.

29. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System, 8 January 2002, 8.

30. Ibid., 8.

31. Ibid., 11.

32. Ibid., 181.

33. Ibid., 8.

34. Maj Luke Henry, 5.

35. Ibid., 5–7.

36. Ibid., 7.

37. Ibid., 9.

38. Ibid., 10.

39. HQ ACC/DOTO FY 05 RAP tasking message to ACC F-16 Block 50 

Operations Group commanders, memorandum, n.d. Reference includes a 

survey of ANG F-16, A-10, F-15C/E, and F-16 Block 30/40 RAP tasking 

messages.

40. Ibid., 3. Commander option sorties actually are a larger apportionment, but these sorties are for the expressed purpose of ensuring basicmission-capable pilots remain current and support the squadron mission. 

They can only be used on combat-mission-ready pilots in the squadron’s 

DOC-tasked missions.

41. Ibid., 3–4.

42. These include those listed with direct combat applications. There 

are non-RAP requirements that are related to basic aircrew proficiency, 

such as trail departure and instrument penetrations.

43. Henry, Primer for RAP, 10.

44. ACC F-16 Block 50 Operations Group commanders, memorandum, note 7, 5.

45. See also Jack F. Harmon, “Building the Fighter Pilot.” 

46. Riza, “A Grand Unified Theory of Fighter Quantum Mechanics,” 

42–49.

47. HQ ACC/DOTO, Air Force Research Lab, the Group for Organizational Effectiveness, Inc., and Aptima, Inc., are the joint owners of the service mark mission essential competencies. Terminology used here comes 

with permission of HQ ACC/DOTO, Chuck Colgrove.

48. HQ ACC/DOTO FY05 RAP tasking message to ACC F-15C Operations Group commanders, memorandum, n.d.; and interview with Chuck 

Colgrove, HQ ACC/DOTO.

49. Colgrove and Bennett, SEAD Mission Essential CompetenciesSM, 3.

50. Colgrove and Bennett, Air-to-Air Mission Essential CompetenciesSM, 

3.

51. Henry, Primer for RAP, 5.

52. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 522.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 389.

55. Ibid.

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28

56. Ibid., 507.

57. Ibid.

58. Gen Richard B. Meyers, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, interview by George Stephanopoulos.

59. Twenty-first STUS/CC, “First 50 Orientations,” briefing. 

60. Joint Air Exercise facilitator.

61. USJFCOM Pamphlet 7, 2.

62. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations, 11.

63. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the USAF 

Weapons School provided several augmentees to the United States Central 

Command (USCENTAF) CAOC at the request of the CENTAF/CC.

64. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 199.

65. Murray and Major General Scales, The Iraq War, 155.

66. Henry, Primer for RAP, 9.

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29

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(AFOTTP) 2-3.1. USAF Command and Control Nodes, 30 

December 2004.

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(AFRL)/HEAS joint report. Langley AFB, Va.: HQ ACC/

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———. SEAD Mission Essential CompetenciesSM. HQ ACC/

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Aerospace Education Foundation, Defense and Air Power 

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Adrienne J. Murphy, Williamson Murray, Tom O’Leary, 

and Joel B. Resnick. New Perspectives on Effects-Based 

Operations: Annotated Briefing. Institute for Defense 

Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, Document 

D-2583. Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 

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War. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

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Harmon, Capt Jack F., USAF. “Building the Fighter Pilot: 

Developing Transferable Skill Sets.” USAF Weapons 

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(RAP). Air Combat Command (ACC) report. Langley AFB, 

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Operations Group Commanders. Memorandum, n.d.

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Ala.: CADRE, 6 October 2003.

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31 March 2005.

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of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as 

amended through 31 August 2005).

JP 3-09.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

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33

Appendix A

Strategy to Task Linkage

LINKING STRATEGY TO TASK

JFACC Mission

Operational Objective 1: Gain Air Superiority Over Sector

JFC Mission

Tactical Objective 1: Disrupt adversary integrated air defense system (IADS),force it

into autonomous operations

Measurements of Effectiveness: Air Defense Fighter sorties reduced by 40 percent and

surface-to-air missile operating in autonomous mode

Tactical Task 1: Destroy 80% of IADS Command Centers

Tactical Task 2: Destroy 70% of IADS Communications Links

Tactical Task 3: Destroy 70% of SA-20 sites

(Reprinted from JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, fig. III-6).

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35

Appendix B

Sample DOC Statement from AFI 10-201

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Appendix B (Continued)

36

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37

Appendix C

Levels of War Definitions

(Reprinted from JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary 

of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended 

through 31 August 2005)

strategic level of war—The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines 

national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security 

objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national 

resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this 

level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks 

for the use of military and other instruments of national 

power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve 

these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.

operational level of war—The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and 

sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link 

tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives 

needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing 

events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain 

these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of 

time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and 

administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the 

means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve 

strategic objectives.

tactical level of war—The level of war at which battles and 

engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 

maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and 

to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

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39

Note: Modules of National Policy Concept was created solely by the author.

Appendix D

Modules of National Policy Concept

Policy Makers

Distinct

Linked by

Objectives

New

DIRECTION

Strategic Operational Tactical Old

Distinct Distinct

Modules of

National Policy

Levels of War

Instrument of

PLANNING

EXECUTION

Power

EBO

EBO

Strategy to Task Far-Reaching EBO

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