alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. *v.*United States

No. 6135.

Invoices dated London, England, May 1943, etc.

Certified May 1943, etc.

Entered at New York, N. Y., June 2, 1943, etc.

Entry No. 731706, etc.

(Decided April 26, 1945)

*John D. Rode (Jacob L. Klingaman*of counsel) for the plaintiff.

*Paul P. Rao,*Assistant Attorney General *(Daniel I. Auster,*special attorney), for the defendant.

Cline, Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule A, hereto attached and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> It is hereby stipulated and agreed, subject to the approval of the court, that the issues in these appeals f.or reappraisement, enumerated in the annexed schedule, are the same in all material respects as the issues decided in *United States*v. *Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.,*Suit No. 4481, C. A. D. 305, and that thfe record in said case may be incorporated herein.

> It is further stipulated and agreed that the appraised value of the merchandise here involved, less the addition made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases, is equal to the cost of materials, and fabrication, manipulation or other process employed in manufacturing or producing such or similar merchandise at a time preceding the date of exportation'of the involved merchandise which would ordinarily permit the manufacture or production thereof in the usual course of business, plus the usual general expenses (not less than 10 per centum of sucb cost) in the case of such or similar merchandise, plus the cost of all containers and coverings, and all other co^ts, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition packed ready for shipment to the United States, and plus an addition for profit (not less than 8 per centum of the costs of materials and fabrication or manipulation and general expenses) equal to the profit which ordinarily is added to the cost of merchandise of the same general character *406by manufacturers or producers in the country of manufacture who are engaged in the manufacture of merchandise of the same class or kind.

> It is further stipulated and agreed that these cases may be submitted on the foregoing stipulation.

On the agreed facts I find the cost of production, as that value is defined in section 402 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values are the appraised values, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by¿the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
EXHIBIT 31.4

CERTIFICATION OF

PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Marcus Y. Smith, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the annual report on Form 10-K of SonoSite, Inc.; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    MARCUS Y. SMITHMarcus Y. SmithSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)


September 7, 2010
|   | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 2 to the annual report on Form 10-K of SonoSite, Inc.; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                                               |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   /s/ Kevin M. Goodwin                                        |
|   | Kevin M. Goodwin                                                   |
|   | President and Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer) |
No. 96-5815.

#### Nelson *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
11 TH C OURT OF A PPEALS E ASTLAND
, T EXAS J UDGMENT

In the interest of R.R.V., II, a child

, * From the 161st District Court of Ector County, Trial Court No. B

- 3276

- PC

.

No. 11

- 14

- 00214

- CV * February 10, 2015

* Memorandum Opinion by Bailey, J

. (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson , J. , and Bailey, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no

error in the order below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s opinion, the order

of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
#### STATE ex rel. Edward A. SHREFFLER v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 98-KH-2123.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 15, 1999.

IN RE: Shreffler, Edward A.; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writ; Parish of St. Tammany 22nd Judicial District Court Div. “F” Number 253732; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Number KW98 1394

Denied.

LEMMON, J. not on panel.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v JOHN DAVIS, Jr., Airman Second Class, U. S. Air Force, Appellant

9 USCMA 614, 26 CMR 394

No. 11,761

Decided September 19, 1958

*Miss Madeline E. DeFina, Lieutenant Colonel Ellis L.*Gottlieb, and *Lieutenant Colonel Robert 0. Rollman*were on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Michels*and *Captain John W. Fahrney*were on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

Homer Ferguson, Judge:

The accused, at his trial for larceny, expressly declined the services of the certified defense counsel appointed to represent him and was, at his request, represented at trial by individual military counsel who was not certified by The Judge Advocate General and who did not possess the legal qualifications enumerated in Article 27(b) (1) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 827. It is contended that the law officer erred to the substantial prejudice of the accused in allowing an unqualified “counsel” to represent the accused.

As was clearly enunciated in United States v Kraskouskas, 9 USCMA 607, 26 CMR 387, and for the reasons there set forth, an accused, even at his own insistence, may not be permitted lay representation before a general court-martial.

The decision of the board of review is reversed. A rehearing may be ordered.

Chief Judge Quinn concurs.

Latimer, Judge

(dissenting):

My reasons for not concurring with my associates are set forth in my dissenting opinion in United States v Kraskouskas, 9 USCMA 607, 26 CMR 387, this day decided. However, I wish to point out the care this law officer exercised in advising the accused of his rights. This is the record:

> “DC: The accused has been advised of his rights and he waives the presence of the appointed defense counsel and assistant defense counsel.

> “LO: Airman Davis, do you understand one of the members of the prosecution has been certified by the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, in accordance with Article 27b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and has qualified in the duties of trial and defense counsel for general courts-martial. No member of the defense has equivalent legal qualifications and you have the right to be represented by counsel who has *615such qualification; unless you expressly request that you be represented by the defense counsel now present, the court will adjourn pending procurement of defense counsel who is so qualified. I would like to know if you request to be represented by Major Mullís.

> “ACC: Yes, sir, I do.

> “LO: Do you also wish the serv-ises [sic] of counsel who has leg41 qualification equivalent to those of Captain Crawford, member of the prosecution who has been certified.

> “ACC: No, sir, I don’t request one.”

Needless to say, I would affirm the decision of the board of review.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          96,878
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   60,988
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     10,216
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               190,632
<PP&E>                                       9,065,528
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,766,923
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,559,386
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          671,595
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       791,782
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,032,290
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,082,485
<SALES>                                        249,535
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,442,918
<CGS>                                          139,842
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,378,484
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             141,959
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 71,430
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             71,430
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    71,430
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .05
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .05
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.3



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the
Quarterly Report of The PBSJ Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert J. Paulsen, Chief Operating Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  |                                                                                  
|----------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ------------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|February 13, 2004 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/    Robert J. Paulsen
|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                          | 
|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  | Robert J. Paulsen Chief Operating Officer,
Executive Vice President and Secretary
# Appendix_1_table
EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     I, Leonard J. Ksobiech state and attest that:

     (1) I am the Chief Financial Officer of OneSource Technologies, Inc. (the
"issuer").

     (2) Accompanying this certification is the Form 10-QSB for the period ended
September 30, 2004, a periodic report (the "periodic report") filed by the
issuer with the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), which
contains financial statements.

     (3) I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that based on my
knowledge:

          a. the quarterly report containing the financial statements fully
     complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange
     Act, and

          b. the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents,
     in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
     of the issuer for the periods presented therein.

/s/  Leonard J. Ksobiech
-----------------
Chief Financial Officer

Date: November 15, 2004
No. 74-855.

#### Fritts *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
May 22, 1959

Reap. Dec. 9438.

#### R. J. Saunders & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

REHEARING MOTION GRANTED

Motion by plaintiff.
# C_2013225EN.01005501.xml

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/55 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/55

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 3 October 2012 — Hardimpex Kft (in liquidation) v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Ügyek és Adózók Adó Főigazgatósága

(Case C-444/12)

2013/C 225/102

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest Municipal Court)

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hardimpex Kft (in liquidation)

Applicant:

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Ügyek és Adózók Adó Főigazgatósága

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Must Article 168(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a tax authority from refusing a taxable person the right to deduct from the amount of VAT which it owes the amount of VAT paid or to be paid on a supply of goods to it, because an earlier transaction in the chain of supply was irregular under the VAT legislation or because that taxable person can be criticised for having failed to check the origin of the goods featuring in the invoices issued by its supplier, without the tax authority demonstrating to the requisite legal standard that the taxable person knew or should have known of that irregularity?

Must Article 168(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a tax authority from refusing a taxable person the right to deduct from the amount of VAT which it owes the amount of VAT paid or to be paid on a supply of goods to it, because an earlier transaction in the chain of supply was irregular under the VAT legislation or because that taxable person can be criticised for having failed to check the origin of the goods featuring in the invoices issued by its supplier, without the tax authority demonstrating to the requisite legal standard that the taxable person knew or should have known of that irregularity?

---
No. 39132.

#### Petition 5638-R of Jos. Riedel Glass Works, Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

It appeared that the merchandise was entered at the invoice prices, a discount of 50 percent being allowed on some items and 40 percent on others. It was appraised at the invoice unit prices plus packing, less a discount of only 20 percent. On the authority of *Golding*v. *United States*(T. D. 49078) it was found that the petitioner was without intention to defraud the revenue or to conceal or misrepresent the facts or to deceive the appraiser. The petition was therefore granted. *Pastene*v. *United States*(21 C. C. P. A. 69, T. D. 46392) cited.
Docket No. FAA- Directorate Identifier: -AD 

l(vou make changes to the values in the table below. you IIIllS! ensure the totals update accordingly. fl 

They do not, chck (or Tah) into and then out <)flhe changed c.:e/1. 

Estimated Costs: 

Action Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

(e.g., Inspection, propeller, appliance) 

Work-hours Labor Parts Cost Total Costs Number of Total Cost replacement) (include cost (labor + u.s. for U.S. Fleet Do not include oncondition costs here access, testing, (@$85/h parts) Registered 

and close-up) our) Products 

Inspect Option I 33.5 48 

Inspect Option II 148.0 ·: 48 

t' (If 1; on 'I ,l(t 

{ 01 (l (}I) I 

)() f) (l(j ' I() 

{' {l ( }(, ' I 

( (1( (/ (l(l iii 

ll!i I I dO ;, 

I) 01 i (J 00 r. .) 

()(}( () ')0 I(, 

(J 01 0 ,tl} • (1(1 

() rH 1) 1ll 

'H I '• 

c { ,I { l ' 

I) '•( ') ' I I 

IJ II( • l, )I, ,, u.\ •l ,_l t,.. 

(! ,_I:J ) ''··- lt 

I { ,, I - ( ,_. 

The known number of products in compliance: 

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $740,520 

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $ 

On-Condition Costs: ~ 

Action Work-hours Labor cost Parts Cost Cost per Product 

(e.g., Inspection, (include access, (@$85/hour) 

replacement) testing, and closeup) 

If cracks are found, 

additional hours & 4,000.0 $26,000 

parts costs could 

occur. (max shown) 

... I• 

' l••' \ I 

8 
Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table 

that was assumed or might not be obvious. Thisfield can also be used to explain warranty costs): 

Executive Order 12866: 

Could the AD be considered a "significant regulatory action"? ~ 

YES* D NO [gJ 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures: 

Is the AD significant? 

YES* D NO IZI 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act: 

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for 

either a Yes or No answer. ~ 

YES D NO IZI 

Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska: 

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. ls it appropriate to include specific requirements for 

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode oftransp011ation? ~ 

YES* D NO IZI 

*Explanation : 

9
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1453 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1453

    To amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to allow the 
 transport, purchase, and sale of pelts of, and handicrafts, garments, 
 and art produced from, Southcentral and Southeast Alaska northern sea 
            otters that are taken for subsistence purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 29, 2011

  Ms. Murkowski (for herself and Mr. Begich) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, 
                      Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to allow the 
 transport, purchase, and sale of pelts of, and handicrafts, garments, 
 and art produced from, Southcentral and Southeast Alaska northern sea 
            otters that are taken for subsistence purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TRANSPORT, PURCHASE, AND SALE OF PELTS OF, AND HANDICRAFTS, 
              GARMENTS, AND ART PRODUCED FROM SOUTHCENTRAL AND 
              SOUTHEAST ALASKA NORTHERN SEA OTTERS TAKEN FOR 
              SUBSISTENCE PURPOSES.

    Section 102 of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 
1372) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(g) Sea Otter Pelts and Products.--Nothing in this Act 
prohibits--
            ``(1) the transport, purchase, sale of, or any offer to 
        purchase or sell, any pelt of an otter from the Southcentral or 
        Southeast Alaska stock of northern sea otters that is taken for 
        subsistence purposes in accordance with section 101(b)(1); or
            ``(2) the transport, purchase, sale, export of, or any 
        offer to purchase, sell or export, any handicraft, garment, or 
        art that is produced from the pelt of the Southcentral or 
        Southeast Alaska stock of northern sea otters that is taken for 
        subsistence purposes in accordance with section 101(b)(1), 
        regardless of whether the handicraft, garment, or art--
                    ``(A) is traditional or contemporary; or
                    ``(B) is or is not altered significantly''.
                                 <all>
```
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOUHAIR KHATIB,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

COUNTY OF ORANGE, a political

subdivision; MICHAEL S. CARONA,

an individual; BRIAN COSSAIRT, an

individual,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 08-56423

D.C. No. 8:07-CV-01012-DOCMLG

ORDER

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that

this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel

opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.

Judge Reinhardt did not participate in the deliberations or vote in this case.

FILED

SEP 13 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS