J-S47021-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INT. OF: N.Q.K., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.Y., NATURAL MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 826 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 8, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A-8958

IN THE INT. OF: R.R.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.Y., NATURAL MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 827 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 8, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A-8959

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 11, 2021

K.Y. (Mother) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions of Luzerne 

County Children and Youth Services (CYS) for the involuntary termination of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S47021-20

- 2 -

her parental rights to her daughter, R.R.J., born in June 2016, and son, 

N.K.Q., born in July 2017, (collectively, Children). We affirm.1

Relevant to the present matter, CYS obtained emergency custody of 

Children on May 8, 2018, when police found R.R.J., who was less than two 

years old at the time, hanging out of the window of Mother’s apartment, 

unsupervised. Mother was sleeping at the time of the incident, and the police 

had a difficult time waking Mother while they knocked on her door. Children 

were placed in foster care because of Mother’s drug and alcohol abuse, mental 

health issues and parenting issues. Children’s fathers were not available 

resources at the time of placement as N.K.Q.’s father was incarcerated and 

the whereabouts of R.R.J.’s father were unknown.2 On July 16, 2018, the 

orphans’ court adjudicated Children dependent.

On October 22, 2019, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). The 

____________________________________________

1 By separate orders entered the same day, the orphans’ court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights G.Q.K., the natural father of N.Q.K., and C.J., 

the natural father of R.R.J. G.Q.K. attended the evidentiary hearings but did 

not participate in this appeal. At the time of the evidentiary hearings, C.J.’s 

counsel indicated that C.J. did not contest the termination of his parental 

rights and that he would sign a consent to termination of his parental rights. 

N.T. 1/22/20, at 4-5. Neither G.Q.K. nor C.J. have appealed, and they have 

not participated in this appeal. No other unknown fathers have appealed. 

2 At the time of Children’s removal from Mother’s care, Mother’s mother 

(Maternal Grandmother) was caring for Children’s three older siblings, and 

Maternal Grandmother did not identify herself as a resource for Children until 

after CYS filed the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children. 
J-S47021-20

- 3 -

orphans’ court appointed Maria Turetsky, Esq., (Attorney Turetsky)3to serve 

as guardian ad litem and legal counsel (GAL/Counsel) for Children.4 

On January 9, 2020, the orphans’ court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on the petitions. At the hearing, the CYS presented the testimony of 

Scott Carey, CEO and Clinical Treatment Supervisor at Wyoming Valley Alcohol 

and Drug Services; Rebecca Ciliberto, a case manager in the Intensive Family 

Reunification Program at Family Service Association; Michelle Lutinski, a case 

manager at Family Service Association; Raina Cole, Director of Intake Services 

at Northeast Counseling Services; Anthony Black, an employee at Community 

Counseling Services; Kristie Rollman, a permanency plan worker for CYS; 

Christina Oprishko, a treatment coordinator for Luzerne County Division of 

____________________________________________

3

It appears from this Court’s docket that Attorney Turetsky was formerly 

listed as Maria Margaret Bertha but has since changed her last name.

4

 In In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (plurality), our 

Supreme Court held that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) requires that counsel be 

appointed to represent the legal interest of any child involved in a contested 

involuntary termination proceeding. The Court defined a child’s legal interest 

as synonymous with his or her preferred outcome. 

At the time of the instant hearing, the Children were two and three years old. 

In In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court held that the 

trial court did not err in allowing the children’s guardian ad litem to act as 

their sole representative during the termination proceeding because, at two 

and three years old, they were incapable of expressing their preferred 

outcome. 
J-S47021-20

- 4 -

Corrections; and Serena Stackhouse, a drug and alcohol counselor at 

Graniteville House of Recovery. Mother testified on her own behalf. 

On January 22, 2020, the orphans’ court conducted a second evidentiary 

hearing on the petitions. CYS presented the testimony of Ms. Rollman. Mother 

presented the testimony of Maternal Grandmother, and Mother testified again 

on her own behalf.

On May 8, 2020, the orphans’ court entered decrees involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(8) and (b). Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).5 

The orphans’ court filed an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) explaining 

its findings and conclusions under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). Specifically, 

as to Section 2511(a)(8), the orphans’ court summarized the evidence from 

the hearings as follows: 

Mr. Scott Carey testified that he is employed at Wyoming Valley 

Alcohol and Drug Services, a local outpatient treatment provider 

for substance abuse disorder. Mr. Carey indicated that he is the 

assistant chief executive officer and clinical treatment supervisor. 

Mr. Carey stated that he had access to all of Mother's records at 

Wyoming Valley Alcohol and Drug services.

According to Mr. Carey, Mother was referred to Wyoming Valley 

Alcohol and Drug Services on May 25, 2018 by [CYS]. Mr. Carey 

testified that Mother appeared for an intake at his office on May 

25, 2018; however, only a portion of the intake assessment was 

taken from Mother. Mother was asked to return on June 1, 2018 

____________________________________________

5 On July 29, 2020, this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.
J-S47021-20

- 5 -

to complete the intake; however, Mother did not appear for her 

appointment.

Mother was then rescheduled for her next intake appointment 

which was December 18, 2018. Mother did not appear for that 

appointment. Mr. Carey testified that other than her first intake 

appointment, Mother did not appear for any additional 

appointments in order to complete her evaluation.

Mr. Carey testified that prior to May 25, 2018, Mother did engage 

in a treatment program at Wyoming Valley Alcohol and Drug 

Services; however, Mother did not successfully complete any 

treatment program at Wyoming Valley Alcohol and Drug Services. 

Ms. Rebecca Ciliberto testified that she is employed at Family 

Service Association as a case manager in the Intensive Family 

Reunification Service Program (IFRSP). Ms. Ciliberto testified that 

she received the referral from [CYS] on May 31, 2018. Ms. 

Ciliberto testified that she met Mother at the [CYS] office on June 

8, 2018 in order to complete the paperwork for the program. Ms. 

Ciliberto then scheduled a meeting with Mother on June 12, 2018 

at Mother's residence. When Ms. Ciliberto arrived at Mother's 

home, Mother was not present.

Ms. Ciliberto testified that Mother did not have a telephone; 

therefore, she was not able to contact her. Ms. Ciliberto was 

finally able to contact Mother on June 29, 2018 at [CYS]. Ms. 

Ciliberto testified that on that day, she observed a visit between 

Mother and [Children]. [However,] Ms. Ciliberto was not able to 

have a session with Mother [due to a family celebration]. Another 

session was scheduled at [CYS] on July 5, 2018. Ms. Ciliberto 

indicated that she observed a visit between Mother and [C]hildren 

at [CYS] on July 5, 2018 and then scheduled another parenting 

session with Mother. After meeting Mother on July 5, 2018, Ms. 

Ciliberto lost contact with Mother. Ms. Ciliberto indicated that the 

telephone number she had for Mother was not in service. Ms. 

Ciliberto was later informed that Mother was incarcerated.[6] Ms. 

Ciliberto indicated that since her agency was unable to work with 

incarcerated patients, Mother was deferred from the program. 

Ms. Ciliberto was not able to develop any goals for Mother in the 

____________________________________________

6

It appears that Mother was incarcerated for an unspecified amount of time 

in 2018, and from September to December of 2019. However, neither party 

produced evidence or testimony specifying the dates or reasons for Mother’s 

incarceration. 
J-S47021-20

- 6 -

program. She was unable to schedule meetings with Mother and 

have interactive sessions with her. 

Ms. Ciliberto testified that during [one of] her interactions with 

Mother, she suspected that Mother was under the influence of 

alcohol or a controlled substance while she was with [Children]. 

Mr. Paul Dorang testified that he is employed at Family Service 

Association as a case manager. Mr. Dorang indicated that he 

received a referral from [CYS] on December 13, 2018 regarding 

Mother in this case. According to Mr. Dorang, the referral was for 

the Intensive Family Reunification Program.

Mr. Dorang testified that he met with Mother sometime in January 

2019 in order to explain the program, the policies and the 

procedures. Mr. Dorang testified that he created three goals for 

Mother in the program. The first goal was for Mother to obtain 

and maintain stable housing. The second goal was for Mother to 

understand how her personal decisions affect her as well as her 

kids. The last goal was for Mother to maintain her sobriety and 

complete all mental health services. Mr. Dorang testified that he 

had approximately ten (10) sessions with Mother working with her 

until May of 2019. Mr. Dorang also observed nine (9) visits 

between Mother and [C]hildren. Mr. Dorang testified that he did 

not have any concerns with Mother's basic parenting skills; 

however, he did have concerns Mother's interaction with 

[C]hildren during the visits.

According to Mr. Dorang, Mother had mental health issues. Mr. 

Dorang testified that Mother had mood swings and at times she 

would storm out of the visits or not appear for the visits. She 

would also begin screaming and would be very argumentative and 

emotional. At times, Mother had to be removed from the room 

because it was too traumatic for [C]hildren. 

According to Mr. Dorang, Mother also had trouble with her 

personal decision-making skills. Mr. Dorang testified that the 

relationship between Mother and N.[Q.]K.’s [f]ather was toxic. 

There was tension between Mother and [N.Q.K.’s f]ather. Mr. 

Dorang explained that many times Mother and [N.Q.K.’s f]ather 

would be fighting and arguing with each other prior to the visit. 

Mother would appear at the visits very emotional, crying and then 

storming out of the visits. During the first three months, Mother’s 

emotional actions took place in the presence of the children. As a 

result, Mr. Dorang recommended that the parents have their visits 

separately. Mr. Dorang stated that even though the visits were 
J-S47021-20

- 7 -

separate, Mother would still appear tense during the visits. She 

would be texting on her phone during the visits. Mr. Dorang 

indicated that when Mother was closed out of the program on May 

24, 2019, [for lack of progress] he still had concerns with Mother’s 

ability to effectively parent [C]hildren. 

According to Mr. Dorang, Mother did not achieve the goal of 

obtaining and maintaining adequate housing. Besides not 

obtaining adequate housing, Mother did not achieve the goal of 

understanding how her personal decisions affect [C]hildren with 

respect to drug and alcohol services. Mr. Dorang indicated that 

during the first three months working with Mother, Mother was 

verbally motivated and expressed a willingness to accept services. 

However, Mother never followed through [with] services. Mr. 

Dorang indicated that Mother did not submit to any toxicology 

screens when she was instructed to do so. Mr. Dorang indicated 

that Mother understood the consequences of not following through 

with court ordered services specifically submitting to toxicology 

screens. According to Mr. Dorang, although Mother had good 

intentions and understood what was explained to her. Mother did 

not follow through with the services and did not submit to 

toxicology screens. 

Mr. Dorang testified that Mother had missed three (3) parent 

education appointments. He explained that Mother did not follow 

through with her sessions. He stated that he gave Mother more 

than three chances to follow through. According to Mr. Dorang, 

when there were sessions scheduled, Mother would not call him 

to advise if she could not attend but would simply not attend 

without excuse. On occasion, Mother would “storm out” and not 

follow through with her scheduled sessions. Mr. Dorang further 

stated that Mother, at times, would appear thirty (30) minutes 

late for sessions without calling and would be very emotional. 

[C]hildren would be waiting for her. The case aides would have 

to calm Mother down prior to her visits. According to Mr. Dorang, 

Mother, at times, was a “wreck” and would break down. Mother 

would then be told to submit to a toxicology screen; however, 

Mother would not go. 

Mr. Dorang testified that Mother also did not achieve her third goal 

of maintaining sobriety and completing recommended mental 

health services. As a result, Mother was “closed out” of the 

Intensive Family Reunification Service Program on May 24, 2019. 

Mr. Dorang emphasized that Mother was “closed out” of the 

program due to Mother’s lack of progress by not remedying any 
J-S47021-20

- 8 -

of the initial reasons for placement, lack of contact, 

noncompliance with drug and alcohol services, noncompliance 

with mental health services, and relationship issues with [N.Q.K.’s 

f]ather.

Ms. Raina Cole testified that she is employed at Northeast 

Counseling Services, an [o]utpatient mental health facility, as a 

director of intake services. Ms. Cole’s duties involve 

administration in the admissions department, obtaining 

assessments, and [e]nsuring patients complete services. 

Ms. Cole indicated that she received a referral for Mother for 

mental health evaluation from Luzerne County Children and Youth 

on March 26, 2019. Ms. Cole stated that she reached out to 

Mother on March 27, 2019 and left a message with an unidentified 

person for Mother to return the call. Ms. Cole was not able to 

reach Mother in order to schedule an assessment.

Ms. Cole stated that on April 17, 2019, Mother called and 

scheduled an appointment for April 19, 2019; however, Mother 

did not appear for that appointment. Ms. Cole stated that her 

agency sent letters to Mother in April and May of 2019; however, 

Mother never responded to the letters. 

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 6/29/20, at 6-11.7 Based on the foregoing, the orphans’ 

court concluded that CYS established grounds for termination under Section 

2511(a)(8). 

As to Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court stated:

[CYS] presented credible testimony regarding the needs, welfare 

and best interest of [C]hildren, in relation to their Mother. [Kristie 

Rollman, a permanency plan worker for CYS,] testified that 

[Children] were placed with the foster parents on May 8, 2018. 

Ms. Rollman testified [Children] live with the foster parents and 

their newborn son. According to Ms. Rollman, [Children] are 

assimilated into the [foster] family. Ms. Rollman described seeing 

pictures of [C]hildren in the home and further indicated that 

[C]hildren attend all family functions. Ms. Rollman stated that 

____________________________________________

7 The trial court noted that Mother had made progress after the filing of the 

petitions to terminate her parental rights. 
J-S47021-20

- 9 -

[C]hildren referred to their foster parents as “mom and dad”. 

According to Ms. Rollman, the foster parents wish to adopt 

[C]hildren. The foster parents are also aware that[,] should they 

be permitted to adopt [C]hildren, . . . [C]hildren would have the 

same rights that biological children would have. Ms. Rollman 

indicated that she did not have any concerns regarding the foster 

parents’ wish to adopt [Children].

Ms. Rollman testified that she believes the foster parents meet 

[C]hildren’s physical needs. According to Ms. Rollman, the foster 

parents provide them with food, shelter, and clothing. The foster 

parents also meet [C]hildren’s developmental needs. Ms. Rollman 

stated that [C]hildren are developmentally on target and they 

have age-appropriate toys in their home. Ms. Rollman testified 

that [C]hildren are also up-to-date on all the medical needs. 

Furthermore, the foster parents meet [C]hildren’s emotional 

needs. For instance, when [C]hildren are happy, the foster 

parents congratulate them on their accomplishments. When 

[C]hildren are sad, the foster parents comfort them.

Ms. Rollman further indicated that there is a parent[-]child bond 

between the foster parents and [C]hildren. The foster parents 

meet all [C]hildren’s needs. According to Ms. Rollman, there has 

been limited contact between Mother and [C]hildren. Ms. Rollman 

indicated that the last time Mother had seen the children was in 

May 2019. Ms. Rollman testified that after the visit, [R.R.J.] was 

exhibiting certain behaviors, and [N.Q.K.] was not engaged with 

[Mother] during the visits. Ms. Rollman indicated that[,] in light 

of [C]hildren not seeing [Mother] since May 2019, there was no 

longer a continued relationship between Mother and [C]hildren. 

Ms. Rollman testified that the foster parents were able to meet all 

of [C]hildren’s needs and there is a parent/child bond relationship 

between them. Due to the lack of contact between Mother and 

[C]hildren, Mother was not able to fulfill all of [C]hildren’s needs 

and will not be able to provide them with permanency[,] and . . . 

adoption would be in their best interest.

Id. at 16-18 (record citations omitted). 
J-S47021-20

- 10 -

The orphans’ court, in its conclusion, acknowledged that Mother had 

made progress toward sobriety after the filing of the petitions to terminate 

her parental rights, but stated: 

Mother was given ample time to address and remedy her 

problems, but has failed to successfully do so. The [c]ourt finds 

that she is not currently able to meet [C]hildren’s needs by failing 

to remedy her mental health issue, drug and alcohol issue and 

complete her parenting education.

Th[e c]ourt was emotionally moved during Mother’s testimony at 

hearing when she described the new life that she has found in 

sobriety. The [c]ourt sincerely hopes that Mother continues her 

pursuit of a sober life and continues to thrive in the new reality 

that freedom from substance abuse offers.

However, [C]hildren needed their mother in May of 2018 and one 

year later in May of 2019, she was sadly unable to remedy the 

conditions that gave rise to placement. At the time of initial filing 

in October of 2019 and at the time of hearing in January 2020, 

the [c]ourt cannot base a decision upon hopes and intentions, 

however thankful it is that Mother has claimed them.

The foster parents have amply demonstrated that they meet the 

physical, developmental and emotional needs of the minor 

children. [C]hildren . . . have thrived under their care. Today, 

[C]hildren need and deserve a permanent home with loving 

capable parents.

Id. at 20. 

Mother raises one issue on appeal:

1. Whether the [orphans’ court] erred in terminating parental 

rights and/or abused its discretion in giving primary 

consideration pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[ §] 2511(b) to the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of 

[Children] because testimony presented at trial establishes a 

strong parent-child bond that [termination] would be 

detrimental to the physical, emotional, and general well-being 

of [Children?]
J-S47021-20

- 11 -

Mother’s Brief at 3.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of 

the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the children.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 
J-S47021-20

- 12 -

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court found that CYS established the grounds for 

termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
J-S47021-20

- 13 -

Instantly, we initially note that Mother did not challenge the orphans’ 

court’s findings under Section 2511(a)(8) in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, 

nor has she addressed Section 2511(a)(8) in her brief. Accordingly, we find 

that Mother has waived any challenge to the orphans’ court’s findings and 

conclusions under Section 2511(a)(8).8 See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 

462, 465–66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (noting that “this Court will not review a claim 

unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant's brief, and 

supported by citations to relevant authority”); see also Krebs v. United 

Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

____________________________________________

8 Even if not waived, however, we would deem any challenge to the 

termination under Section 2511(a)(8) to be meritless. 

We have explained:

Section [2511] (a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to 

remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the 

court. Once the 12-month period has been established, the court 

must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s 

removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith 

efforts of [the child welfare agency] supplied over a realistic time 

period. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require 

the court to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to 

remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the 

availability or efficacy of [the child welfare agency] services.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court adequately addressed all of the elements of Section 

2511(a)(8), and the record overwhelmingly supported the orphans’ court’s 

decision, findings, and conclusions. See Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 5-18.
J-S47021-20

- 14 -

(stating that any issue not set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s 

statement of questions involved is deemed waived).

Mother, in the single issue presented in this appeal, asserts that the 

orphans’ court erred in finding termination of her parental rights justified 

under Section 2511(b). Mother argues that CYS failed to present clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights would be in the 

best interest of the Children. Mother’s Brief at 11. Specifically, Mother 

contends that CYS “failed to prove that it would not be detrimental to sever 

the parent-child bond between Appellant and [Children].” Id. at 13. 

According to Mother:

Testimony from the caseworker states that there is a level of 

comfort between [Children and Mother] and that, at times, 

[C]hildren, during their supervised visitation, went to [Mother] 

seeking that comfort. 

This testimony is supported by [Maternal Grandmother]’s 

testimony, who has regularly observed visitation between [Mother 

and Children] before placement. She also testified that there is a 

very strong and very close relationship between [Children] and 

their siblings.

It is clear that [Mother] shares a strong and loving bond with 

[Children] and that it would be detrimental to separate parent and 

children in this instance. When visits are occurring in an unnatural 

and somewhat staged setting, it may be difficult to ascertain the 

full perspective of how strong the mother-child bond is. 

However, testimony presented in this case established there was 

at least a strong bond prior to placement. [Mother] spent every 

day of her life with [Children]. She testified that when she is a 

sober parent, as she is now, she is an amazing parent and can do 

a good job. Again, the consideration the [orphans’ c]ourt needs 

to allocate to the child’s best interests is separate and apart from 
J-S47021-20

- 15 -

the conduct of [Mother]. [Mother] has undoubtedly given her best 

to not only meet the developmental, emotional, and physical 

needs of [C]hildren prior to placement, but she is prepared to . . 

. meet those same needs should [C]hildren be returned to her 

care.

Id. at 13-15. 

As our Supreme Court has stated:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly 

interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, 

and stability. [T]his Court [has] held that the determination of 

the child’s needs and welfare requires consideration of the 

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The utmost 

attention should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond.

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citations omitted)(formatting altered). 

In the context of Section of 2511(b), the orphans’ court “must take into 

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” 

See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[A] parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of. . . her child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill. . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (internal citations omitted).
J-S47021-20

- 16 -

It is sufficient for the orphans’ court to rely on the opinions of social 

workers and caseworkers when evaluating the impact that termination of 

parental rights will have on a child. Id. The orphans’ court may equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child and may consider intangibles, such 

as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Ultimately, the 

concern is the needs and welfare of a child. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. 

Instantly, as Mother notes there was evidence of a bond between Mother 

and Children. See N.T., 1/22/20, at 19 (indicating that Ms. Rollman observed 

Children going to Mother for comfort during visits), 36 (indicating that 

Maternal Grandmother observed a bond between Mother and Children), 61 

(indicating that Mother testified that Children became upset when she would 

leave visits). However, the orphans’ court found little to no evidence that 

severing the bond would have any detrimental effect on Children. See N.T., 

6/29/20, at 20.

The competent evidence in the record supports the orphans’ court’s 

determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve 

Children’s best interests. Children have been in foster care since May 8, 2018. 

See N.T., 1/9/20, at 107. The orphans’ court credited Ms. Rollman’s 

testimony that Children have been assimilated into the foster parents’ family 

and that “there is a parent[-]child bond, they meet all their needs, [and 

Children] refer to them as mom and dad.” N.T., 1/22/20, at 8, 10. Notably, 
J-S47021-20

- 17 -

Ms. Rollman testified that Mother last visited Children in May of 2019. Id. at 

11. Ms. Rollman indicated that R.R.J. “was exhibiting some behaviors after” 

Mother’s visits and that N.Q.K. was not “very engaged during” the visits. Id.

at 11. Ms. Rollman testified that because Mother has not seen them since 

May of 2019, the “continued relationship” between Mother and Children was 

“not there” at the time of the hearing. Id. Ms. Rollman did not believe that 

Children would suffer any detrimental effects if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. Id. at 15. 

Furthermore, we note that GAL/Counsel also recommended that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve Children’s best interests. 

GAL/Counsel’s Report and Recommendation, 2/19/20, at 4. GAL/Counsel 

observed the Children interact with their foster parents and noted that the 

“Children have a very strong and loving bond with the current foster family

and they have found stability, consistency, dependability, and comfort with 

them.” Id. 

Therefore, having reviewed the orphans’ court opinion and the record,

we find competent evidence of record supporting the orphans’ court’s decision. 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We conclude that the orphans’ court appropriately 

considered Children’s need for safety and stability and determined that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights best served Children’s needs and 

welfare. As we do not discern an error of law or abuse of discretion in the 
J-S47021-20

- 18 -

orphans’ court rulings, we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating

Mother's parental rights. See id. 

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/11/2021