Docket No. 86982–Agenda 12–May 1999.

								In re GEORGE C. HOWARD, JR., Attorney, Respondent.

Opinion filed December 2, 1999.

	CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the

court:

	This case arises from an action filed by the Administrator of

the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission

(Commission) against respondent, George C. Howard, Jr.,

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(b) (166 Ill. 2d R. 753(b)).

The five-count complaint charged respondent with making a

misrepresentation concerning a past suspension in a petition to

practice pro hac vice in another jurisdiction; neglecting a criminal appeal; engaging in the practice of law while under a prior

suspension by this court; and failing to promptly refund unearned

fees. With regard to some of these alleged acts, the complaint also

charged respondent with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation. A panel of the Hearing Board found

the charges proven, with the exception of the allegations of

dishonesty, and recommended that respondent be suspended from

the practice of law for two years. The Review Board adopted the

factual findings of the Hearing Board, but reduced the

recommended suspension to a period of three months. On leave of

this court, the Administrator has filed exceptions (166 Ill. 2d R.

753(e)), contending that in reducing the recommended sanction,

the Review Board erroneously downplayed the gravity of

respondent’s current misconduct and prior disciplinary record.

BACKGROUND

	Respondent was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1962, and has

practiced predominantly in the specialty of criminal defense. His

disciplinary problems in this state began on December 12, 1984,

when the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

found that he had neglected three criminal appeals and ordered his

name stricken from its roll of practicing attorneys. Respondent was

reinstated by the Seventh Circuit about five years later and

permitted to resume practice effective January 1, 1990. In the meantime, in 1988, the Review Board issued a reprimand against

respondent based upon his Seventh Circuit suspension and, in

addition, his neglect of another criminal case. Then, on September

29, 1995, this court disciplined respondent for failing to

communicate with clients; failing to refund unearned fees;

converting funds; and neglecting two more criminal appeals. The

behavior giving rise to the September 1995 discipline occurred

between 1990 and late 1993. This court sanctioned respondent by

suspending him from the practice of law for 24 months, but staying

all of this period except the first five months, placing respondent on

a period of probation subject to certain conditions. As a result,

respondent was suspended from the practice of law from

September 29, 1995, until February 28, 1996. In re George

Howard, MR No. 11563 (September 29, 1995).

	On June 11, 1997, the Administrator brought the complaint

presently at issue. Count I charged respondent with knowingly

failing to report his Seventh Circuit suspension in a petition to

practice pro hac vice before the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. In proceedings before the Alaska court,

Reshat Shabani had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute

cocaine. He subsequently retained respondent to represent him in matters arising from the conviction. On June 5, 1991, respondent

filed a verified petition to appear pro hac vice on Shabani’s behalf in the Alaska court. In the petition, respondent averred that he had

“not been suspended for misconduct or any other causes,” failing

to disclose his Seventh Circuit suspension of December 1984.

Thus, count I charged respondent with making a false statement of

fact to a tribunal, in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct1; offering false evidence, in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(4); making a false statement in connection with an

application for admission to the bar, in violation of Rule 8.1(a);

engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4); and engaging in

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of

Rule 8.4(a)(5), or conduct tending to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute, in

violation of Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).

	In count II, the Administrator alleged that respondent had

neglected Shabani’s case by failing to file an appellate brief and

failing to return a $25,000 unearned fee Shabani had advanced to

him for that case. Thus, count II charged respondent with failing

to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, in violation

of Rule 1.3; failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation

consistent with the client’s interest, in violation of Rule 3.2; failing

to promptly refund unearned fees on withdrawal from the case, in

violation of Rule 1.16(e); and conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(5) and Supreme

Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).

	In counts III through V, the Administrator alleged that during

the period of respondent’s suspension from September 29, 1995,

to February 28, 1996, he engaged in the unauthorized practice of

law by accepting fees from and providing legal advice to three

criminal defendants, Clarence Williams, Ralph Williams, and

Raymond Olivarez. The complaint further alleged that throughout

his consultations with each of these defendants, respondent failed

to disclose that he was under suspension. Counts III through V

accordingly charged respondent with practicing law in a

jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal

profession in that jurisdiction in violation of Rule 5.5(a); and

engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4), and conduct

prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule

8.4(a)(5) and Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).

HEARING BOARD PROCEEDINGS

Counts I & II: The Shabani Case

	With regard to the pro hac vice petition, the Hearing Board found clear and convincing evidence that respondent had made a

false statement in failing to disclose his suspension and that he had

engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

However, the Board found insufficient evidence that the

misstatement was either knowing or intentional or that respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud or deceit.

	Respondent admitted that at the time he executed the pro hac vice petition, he was cognizant of his recent suspension and that the Alaska court required its disclosure. However, the petition was

prepared by his local counsel and presented to him along with other

documents for signature. Respondent testified that, in the haste of

reviewing and signing documents, he had neglected to read the

petition, but that if someone had called the misstatement to his

attention, he would have acknowledged the suspension. The Board

considered it mitigating that the misstatement involved a prior

suspension rather than a present one, as, at the time respondent

filed the petition, he had been reinstated in the Seventh Circuit for

18 months. The Board also accepted respondent’s testimony that,

in any event, the suspension would not have hindered his admission

to appear before the Alaska court: the suspension barred his

practice only within the Seventh Circuit, and, at the time he signed

the pro hac vice petition, he was a member in good standing of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompassed the district

court of Alaska. Further, according to respondent, he had been

admitted to practice in the Ninth Circuit subsequent to his

suspension from the Seventh Circuit, and also had appeared pro hac vice before the district court of Alaska on other matters several times between the years of 1971 and 1991.

	As to count II, the Board found clear and convincing evidence

that respondent had neglected Shabani’s appeal and failed to

promptly return unearned fees upon his withdrawal from Shabani’s

case. When Shabani retained respondent in May of 1991, Shabani’s

brother, Nick, advanced respondent a $25,000 retainer on

Shabani’s behalf. Respondent initially pursued post-trial relief in

Shabani’s case, and when that proved unsuccessful, filed an appeal

before the Ninth Circuit. However, he then failed to file an opening

brief by the September 16, 1991, due date. On February 11, 1992,

the Ninth Circuit issued an order to show cause why respondent

should not be sanctioned for his failure to file the brief and

mandating that the brief be filed within 11 days in order to avoid

dismissal of the appeal. Replying to the order, respondent

explained that he had been “constantly on trial” since filing the

appeal and had delegated responsibility for all of his appeals to “other personnel” in his office. Respondent stated that he had not

learned until February 10, 1992, that the brief was never filed.

Attorney Elreta Dickinson testified that respondent had given her

responsibility for his appeals during this time period, but could not

recall specifically being delegated the Shabani case. Dickinson

testified that respondent was upset when he learned the brief had

not been done and that he temporarily ceased assigning her appeals

as a result of this occurrence. At the end of February or early

March 1992, respondent withdrew from Shabani’s appeal, and

Alan M. Caplan was substituted as Shabani’s counsel. Caplan

completed Shabani’s appeal, securing a reversal of his conviction

by the Ninth Circuit (United States v. Shabani, 993 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1993)), although the conviction was later reinstated by the

United States Supreme Court (United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 130 L. Ed. 2d 225, 115 S. Ct. 382 (1994)).

	In February 1992, when he was substituted as counsel in

Shabani’s case, Caplan wrote a letter to respondent requesting a

return of the $25,000 retainer. When the refund was not

forthcoming, Caplan sent three more demand letters to respondent

on March 19, 1992, April 15, 1992, and June 2, 1992, on behalf of

Nick and Reshat Shabani, again to no avail. Over one year later on

October 1, 1993, respondent entered into a written agreement with

Nick under which respondent promised to repay $20,000 of the

funds. The agreement stated that Nick had advanced $25,000 to

respondent to represent his brother “in certain post-trial

proceedings.” The agreement noted that with regard to the post-

trial matters, respondent had made two trips to Alaska, but had

then failed to prepare an appellate brief. Accordingly, respondent

promised to return $20,000 of the original amount, with $5,000

due at execution of the agreement, and the $15,000 balance by

December 1, 1993. The Hearing Board observed that as of the

November 20, 1997, hearing before it, $5,000 was still unpaid.

Counts III through V: Practicing Law While Under Suspension

	The Hearing Board concluded that respondent had engaged in

the unauthorized practice of law under Rule 5.5(a), and committed

acts prejudicial to the administration of justice under Rule 8.4(a)(5)

and Supreme Court Rule 771, by giving legal advice for consideration to Clarence Williams, Ralph Williams, and Raymond

Olivarez, while under suspension by this court. However, the

Board disbelieved testimony on behalf of the three defendants that

respondent had never informed them that he was under suspension.

Accordingly, the Board found insufficient proof to support the

charge that respondent had engaged in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation with regard to the three

defendants.

	The Board consolidated its findings on counts III, IV and V,

noting that there was similar proof as to each charge. The Board

first concluded that, by respondent’s own admission, he had

consulted with each of the three defendants while under suspension

and engaged in “discussions which required legal knowledge and

skill.” Respondent had also accepted legal fees from these

individuals and deposited them into his personal account. However,

the Board also recognized respondent’s position that he had

consulted with these individuals out of a sense of responsibility to

his firm and a need to ensure that matters were handled correctly

during his suspension. Thus, the Board concluded that, “[w]hether

intentionally or not,” respondent engaged in the practice of law

during his suspension.

	At the hearing, Clarence Williams testified that he contacted

respondent in late November 1995. Respondent met briefly with

him at the Cook County jail, took notes about his case, and told

him that he would be filing a motion to suppress in his case, based

upon an unlawful police search. Respondent also took a retainer

fee on Clarence’s behalf and promised to appear at a December 19,

1995, court date. Although respondent eventually refunded the fee,

he neither filed the motion nor appeared at the December hearing.

Clarence retained a public defender and pled guilty to the charge

against him, receiving a six-year sentence.

	Ralph Williams was taken into custody in December 1995 on

charges of robbery and armed robbery. His mother Dorothy

contacted respondent on Ralph’s behalf, and respondent agreed to

“take care of” the matter, accepting a retainer fee from Dorothy.

Ralph testified that respondent met with him in jail in January or

early February 1996 and discussed the charges against him.

Following his suspension, respondent represented Ralph to the conclusion of his case.

	On November 3, 1995, Raymond Olivarez pled guilty to

conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and received a sentence of 70

months in prison. Olivarez’s daughter, Rachel Fernandez, testified

that she called respondent’s office in January 1996 and spoke to

respondent, who scheduled a meeting with her in his office the

following Saturday. At the meeting, Fernandez presented

respondent with pertinent court documents. According to

Fernandez, respondent consulted some “big law books,” and

advised her that her father had been sentenced in too high of a

range and that his sentence could be reduced. He requested a

retainer, which Fernandez paid the following Monday. On February

2, 1996, respondent told Fernandez he was planning to “file a

motion.”

	Before the Board, respondent admitted providing legal advice

to the three defendants, but argued, “[A]t no time *** did I appear

in any court, did I file any motion in any court, *** take any

deposition ***.” Respondent also provided evidence that he and

his office staff had informed each of the three defendants that he

was suspended and that he could not give legal advice or appear in

court during this period; nonetheless, the defendants demanded his

services. The Hearing Board accepted respondent’s position on this

point, and reasoned that, because of the relative brevity of his

suspension, his reputation, and the fact that he had others in his

office handling most of his cases, the three defendants likely elected

to hire him despite the suspension.

Recommendation

	The Administrator asserted that in light of respondent’s

behavior and prior discipline, disbarment was warranted.

Respondent offered no alternative sanction. In mitigation, the

Hearing Board recognized respondent’s life of service to others, as

evidenced by the accolades, awards and letters of appreciation he

received. Respondent volunteered in his community, his church,

and various social organizations, and had provided pro bono representation to his church for 20 years, as well as to many

individuals. He had also lectured free of charge at local law

schools. The Board also emphasized that, in contrast to other cases before it in which disbarment was recommended, the conduct at

issue involved no dishonest motive or moral turpitude. In

aggravation, the Board noted the “seriously aggravating impact”

of respondent’s prior discipline by the Seventh Circuit, the Review

Board, and this court, the fact that he had never repaid $5,000 of

the unearned retainer advanced by Shabani, and the seriousness of

his unauthorized practice of law. The Board recommended a two-

year suspension.

DETERMINATION OF THE REVIEW BOARD

	In reducing respondent’s recommended sanction, the Review

Board noted that, inter alia, by the time this case was being briefed before it, respondent had made full restitution of Shabani’s fee

advance. The Review Board further observed that respondent’s

behavior, both in this case and his prior disciplinary cases, involved

no dishonesty; that his failure to promptly return Shabani’s funds

was attributable to respondent’s cash flow problems; and that the

Hearing Board had failed to find that respondent’s practice of law,

though unauthorized, was intentional. Thus, in light of the

significant evidence in mitigation, the Review Board recommended

that respondent be subjected to three months’ suspension.

ANALYSIS

	The sole issue in this case concerns the appropriate sanction

to impose upon respondent. The Administrator argues that, in

reducing the recommended sanction from two years’ to three

months’ suspension, the Review Board erroneously downplayed

several incidences of serious misconduct proven to have occurred

in this case. She further asserts that in light of significant history of

prior discipline, disbarment is the more appropriate sanction. At the

very least, the Administrator urges, we should adopt the

suspension recommended by the Hearing Board.

	Although, in arriving at a sanction, this court affords deference

to the recommendations of the Hearing and Review Boards, such

recommendations are merely advisory, and the ultimate

responsibility for imposing discipline rests with this court. In re Chandler, 161 Ill. 2d 459, 472-73 (1994). We approach our analysis with the recognition that, in any disciplinary proceeding,

our goal is not to punish the attorney but rather to protect the

public from incompetent or unscrupulous attorneys, to maintain the

integrity of the profession, and to protect the administration of

justice from reproach. In re Bell, 147 Ill. 2d 15 (1992).

The Shabani Case

	The Administrator first argues that, in reducing respondent’s

recommended sanction, the Review Board incorrectly downplayed

the fact that respondent made an affirmative misstatement in his

pro hac vice petition. According to the Administrator, the Review Board focused upon the finding that the misstatement was the

result of a mistake, and ignored the Hearing Board’s

admonishment that respondent nonetheless had a duty to find and

correct the error. Further, in failing to apprise the Alaska court of

his suspension, respondent essentially deprived that court of

information highly relevant to its decision to deny or possibly

restrict his admission.

	We find no evidence that the Review Board unduly

downplayed this aspect of respondent’s misconduct. Giving

appropriate deference to the Hearing Board’s credibility findings

(see, e.g., In re Holz, 125 Ill. 2d 546, 557 (1988) (Hearing Board findings entitled to deference by Review Board as well as this

court)), the Review Board noted respondent’s testimony that, had

he noticed the inaccuracy in the petition, he would have corrected

it to reflect the suspension. The Review Board also considered

evidence that disclosure of the prior suspension probably would

not have adversely affected respondent’s Alaska petition: it was

confined only to the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction, and at the time

of the petition, respondent was already a member in good standing

of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompassed the

Alaska district court. Further, he had practiced before the Alaska

federal court on other occasions since the suspension without

repercussions.

	Next, the Administrator maintains that the Review Board

improperly considered as a mitigating circumstance the fact that

respondent eventually completed making restitution of Shabani’s

$25,000 fee advance. The Administrator argues that the Review Board completely disregarded respondent’s initial refusal to return

the funds despite Shabani’s repeated demands, and the fact that the

full refund did not occur until this case was being briefed before the

Review Board in late 1997 or 1998.

	Rule 1.16(e) states that a lawyer who withdraws or is

discharged from a case must promptly refund any portion of a fee advance that has not been earned. 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.16(e). The

failure to promptly return client funds will be subject to discipline.

See In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269 (1995); In re Fox, 122 Ill. 2d 402, 410 (1988); In re Dorsey, 731 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1987); ABA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct 45:1202 (1997) (citing

cases). Although there is scant guidance as to what time period is

deemed “prompt” under the rules, it is readily apparent that a delay

measured in years will fail the promptness test. ABA/BNA

Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct  45:1103-04 (1997),

citing, among other authorities, In re Jennings, 75 A.D.2d 676, 426 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1980)  (discharged attorney delayed 22 months

in refunding unearned fees). Delays of a shorter period also may be

subject to disciplinary sanctions, especially when the lawyer has

displayed indifference to repeated demands by the client for return

of the funds. Doyle v. State Bar,  32 Cal. 3d 12, 648 P.2d 942, 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982) (attorney delayed 10 months in returning

client funds despite repeated requests); People v. Coyne, 913 P.2d 12 (Colo. 1996)  (nine-month delay after promising to return

funds).

	We agree that the Review Board failed to properly consider

respondent’s clear violation of Rule 16(e). Respondent withdrew

from Shabani’s case in late February of 1992. Thereafter, he failed

to respond to four letters from Shabani’s new counsel demanding

return of the $25,000 advance. It was not until October of 1993,

over 18 months after he withdrew from the case, that respondent

entered into a written agreement with Shabani admitting that he

owed $20,000, and promising to pay $5,000 at execution of the

agreement and the remaining $15,000 by December 1, 1993. Even

then, however, respondent disregarded his promise, and did not

refund $5,000 until late 1997 or early 1998, when this case was

being briefed before the Review Board.

	In its discussion of mitigating factors, the Review Board pointed out that respondent had completed full restitution to the

Shabanis, and that his failure to more promptly deliver the funds

was “caused by cash flow problems related to the number of

repayments owed” rather than any corrupt motive. Making full

restitution has been considered a proper mitigating circumstance. In re Rotman, 136 Ill. 2d 401, 422 (1990); but see In re Feldman, 89 Ill. 2d 7, 13 (1982) (restitution never excuses improper

conduct). However, this is not so where the client’s repeated

demands for repayment have gone unheeded for 18 months, and

funds are forthcoming only after the client is forced to resort to

proceedings before the attorney disciplinary system. Rotman, 136 Ill. 2d at 422-23 (1990); Fox, 122 Ill. 2d at 410. Although Rotman was a case involving the conversion of client funds, we find its logic equally applicable to the withholding of unearned fees.

Further, we fail to view respondent’s “cash flow problems” as a

justification for his failure to even reply to Shabani’s requests for

his money, or, after finally executing an agreement, to reasonably

honor his promise to pay.

Practice of Law

	The Administrator next argues that the Review Board

understated the seriousness of respondent’s conduct in practicing

law during his suspension. In particular, the Administrator claims,

the Review Board erroneously considered as “substantially

mitigating” the fact that the Hearing Board stopped short of finding

that respondent had “intentionally” practiced law.

	Determining what conduct constitutes “practicing law” defies

mechanistic formulation. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 523 (1994); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 256 (1950). However, as we have consistently held, the practice of

law encompasses not only court appearances, but also services

rendered out of court (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 414 (1961)), and includes the giving of any advice or rendering of any service requiring the use of legal

knowledge (In re Bodkin, 21 Ill. 2d 458, 461 (1961); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 475-76 (1931); see also Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d at 523 (focus of inquiry whether activity in question required legal knowledge and skill so as to apply legal principles and precedent)).

	 It is clear that respondent engaged in the type of conduct

unequivocally precluded under our cases. He met with three

clients, accepted fee advances from them and deposited these

advances into his personal account. Then, after obtaining pertinent

information from them, he exercised professional judgment with

regard to their cases and advised them accordingly. Respondent

considered Clarence Williams’ case and told him that a motion to

suppress was necessary and would be filed. He met with Ralph

Williams in jail and, after taking notes of the meeting, advised him

concerning future action in his case. Finally, he consulted with

Rachel Fernandez, and, after examining what she believed were

legal references, apprised her that he would seek a reduction in her

father’s prison sentence. These functions required the employment

of legal discretion, knowledge and skill.

	 With this in mind, there can be no doubt that respondent

“intentionally” practiced law. It is suggested by both the Review

Board and respondent, however, that respondent is due a “lesser

sanction,” owing to the following language by the Hearing Board:

		“The evidence was clear and convincing that in connection

with each of the three criminal defendants, Respondent

provided legal advice and accepted a fee for legal services.

Whether intentionally or not, Respondent engaged in the practice of law during his suspension and thereby violated

Rules 5.5(a) and 8.4(a)(5) of the *** Rules *** and

Supreme Court Rule 771.” (Emphasis added.)

We do not believe that this language was intended as a “finding” of

diminished culpability with regard to respondent’s actions in this

case. To the extent it was, it is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. If the testimony of the three clients were not enough,

respondent admitted in his own testimony that he gave legal advice

to these individuals knowing that it was disallowed under the

Rules. There can be no clearer proof of intent. As this court has

previously stated, “[a] common maxim holds that ignorance of the

law is no excuse, and this is particularly true in a case where the

person who claims lack of knowledge of a relevant directive is a

practicing attorney.” In re Cheronis, 114 Ill. 2d 527, 535 (1986).  	Respondent further urges that while his conduct may have gone “over the line,” he was merely attempting to keep his practice

afloat during his relatively brief suspension. He argues that the

three defendants at issue compelled his immediate attention, and

that he was not subject to the strictures of our Rule 764 (134 Ill.

2d R. 764).2

	We recognize that, under certain circumstances, it remains

unclear what tasks may be undertaken by attorneys who are

suspended yet not subject to Rule 764. Indeed, the imposition of

a brief suspension does not mandate that the attorney give up on

his or her future livelihood. However, in this case, there should

never have been a question that respondent’s conduct exceeded

permissible boundaries. Our precedent has universally condemned

the unauthorized giving of legal advice for consideration; this

maxim has never been subject to exception or qualification. It is the

character of the respondent’s activity that determines whether the

practice of law has occurred, and it does not matter whether

considerations of business expediency would be better served by a

different rule. Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d at 524-25; In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 427 (1987). Thus, we find respondent’s argument

unavailing.

	We now turn to the question of a proper sanction. The

Administrator argues that respondent’s conduct in this case,

coupled with his significant history of prior misconduct, demands

a sanction far in excess of the three months advocated by the

Review Board. We agree.

	In order to ensure predictability and fairness, this court strives

to impose sanctions consistent with those imposed in other cases

involving comparable misconduct (In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 197 (1993); In re Weinberg, 119 Ill. 2d 309, 314 (1988)); nonetheless, we also recognize that each case is unique and must

be resolved in light of its own facts and circumstances (Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d at 197).

	As recognized by the Review Board, research fails to uncover

a case directly analogous to this one. However, it is well

established that culpable neglect of a client’s affairs is grounds for

discipline (see, e.g., In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509, 531 (1989); Fox, 122 Ill. 2d 402), and, in situations of repeated neglect, a lengthy suspension, even without a finding of moral turpitude

(Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269 (17 months’ suspension with 12 months stayed); Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509 (one-year suspension for chronic neglect, misrepresentations and prejudice to clients); In re Johnson, 93 Ill. 2d 441 (1982) (one year); In re Levinson, 71 Ill. 2d 486 (1978) (six months); In re Taylor, 66 Ill. 2d 567 (1977) (one year)). Further, neglect of criminal cases warrants a more severe

sanction because in such matters a client’s very liberty is at stake. Bell, 147 Ill. 2d at 39; Fox, 122 Ill. 2d at 409-10.

	In the Shabani case, respondent filed an appeal and then

essentially abandoned the matter by failing to file a brief, nearly

costing Shabani his right to appeal. We are unmoved by

respondent’s assertions that the appeal was subsequently

completed by a new attorney; this is not a mitigating factor. See

Smith, 168 Ill. 2d at 284-85. Further, we note that respondent’s prior discipline by the Seventh Circuit, the Review Board, and this

court involved a similar brand of behavior: as indicated previously,

this court disciplined respondent for failing to communicate with

clients; failing to refund unearned fees; converting funds; and

neglecting two criminal matters. Since 1984, respondent has been

found to have neglected at least seven matters entrusted to him,

which amounts to a serious pattern of neglect. This conduct,

combined with respondent’s practice of law in the face of

suspension, displays an utter lack of regard for the disciplinary

system and the rule of this court, as well as a tenuous concern for

the welfare of each of his clients.

	Nonetheless, we find disbarment unwarranted under the

circumstances of this case. See Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d at 428-29 (disbarment destroys professional life, character and livelihood and

must be imposed sparingly). We have repeatedly stated that where

corrupt motives and moral turpitude are not clearly shown, the

proper punishment is suspension rather than disbarment. In re Chapman, 69 Ill. 2d 494 (1978); In re Veach, 1 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74 (1953); see also In re Hogan, 112 Ill. 2d 20, 25 (1986). Further, we find it significant that the neglectful acts underlying respondent’s prior discipline by this court all transpired between

the period of 1990 and 1993, the same time as the mishandling of

Shabani’s 1991 appeal. Despite a busy criminal practice,

respondent has provided years of dedicated service to the

community, to his church, and to a segment of the population that

is often overlooked. He cooperated with the disciplinary process

and expressed remorse. In re Uhler, 126 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1989).

	However, as respondent’s prior suspension amounted to only

five months, we reject the three months’ suspension suggested by

the Review Board here. His present sanction should be sufficiently

meaningful to “impress upon [him] the shortcomings in the manner

he has conducted his practice, and to allow him to take additional

steps to insure that such events will not occur again.” In re Levin, 101 Ill. 2d 535, 542 (1984). For the reasons stated, respondent is

suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years.

	Respondent suspended.

	JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:

	I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that a onetwo-year

suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case. In my view, the

respondent should be disbarred.

	Regarding the misconduct involved in this proceeding, the

record reveals that the respondent, during a prior suspension

imposed by this court, met with clients, accepted money from

them, and offered them legal advice. Separately, the respondent

made a false statement on a petition seeking admission pro hac vice in a criminal matter before a federal court in Alaska, later neglected the defendant’s appeal in that case, and refused to return

the defendant’s fee.

	The respondent’s history of misconduct includes the

suspension previously imposed by this court, which arose from the

respondent’s neglect of two clients’ claims, his failure to promptly

refund client fees, and his conversion of client funds. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

suspended the respondent from practicing before that court for his

neglect of criminal appeals. The respondent also received a

reprimand from the Review Board based on the federal court

suspension and his neglect of another criminal case.

	The respondent’s record of misconduct in this case and in

prior matters warrants a more severe sanction than the two-year

suspension imposed by the majority. Because of the respondent’s

history of sanctions and misconduct, I believe that disbarment is

appropriate here.

	JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.

	JUSTICE HARRISON, also dissenting:

	Mr. Howard’s prior conduct has shown what a suspension will

mean to him. Nothing. The last time we told him to stop practicing

law he did it anyway. He was unable to comply with our mandate

for even five months. In direct contravention of our orders, he met

with clients in his office and in jail, took money from them and

dispensed legal advice.

	We had hoped that a suspension would teach Mr. Howard that

he should promptly return unearned fees. It did not. We had hoped

that a suspension would impress upon him the importance of not

neglecting criminal matters. It did not. Mr. Howard has persisted

in the very sorts of behavior that resulted in his discipline before.

How, then, can we have any expectation that he will comport

himself properly now?

	Although I am mindful of the positive aspects of Mr.

Howard’s contributions to the profession, it is apparent to me that

another suspension will do no good. Mr. Howard is what he is, and

he has made very clear through his actions that he is not receptive

to our efforts to help him reform. For the foregoing reasons, I

would accept the Administrator’s recommendation and vote to

have Mr. Howard disbarred.

	JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.