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CURRENT SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA |

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1 7 1979

FA R R t. L L 

KA.\ LA J Si a i l

L i t_ r\A. r\ / 

U»LVuAw i, ( H E A R I N G

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFB ICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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NI NE TY -SIX TH CONG RESS 

FIRS T SESSION

SEPTEM BER 6, 1979

Print ed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

□ □

52-492

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1979
• > * V

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLEM ENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman

L. H. F OUNTA IN, North Carolina 

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida 

CHARLES C. DIG GS, J r., Michigan 

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York 

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana 

LE STER L. WOLFF, New York 

JONA THAN B. BINGHAM, New York 

GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania 

CARDISS COLL INS, Illinois 

STEPHE N J. SOLARZ, New York 

DON BON KER, Washington 

GE RR Y E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 

AND Y IRELAND, Florida 

DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio 

DAN MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland 

WILLIAM H. GRAY III, Pennsylvania 

TONY P. HALL, Ohio 

HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan 

DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi 

FLOY D J. FIT HIA N, Indiana

WILLIAM 8. BROOMFIELD, Michigan 

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois 

PAU L F IND LEY, Illinois 

JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama 

LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio 

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California 

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania 

JOEL PRITC HARD, Washington 

MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey 

DAN QUAYLE, Indiana

J ohn J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Sta ff

Sarah Lisenby, Staff Assistant

S ubcom m it te e on Afr ic a

STEPHE N J. SOLARZ, New York, Chairman

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama

WILLIAM H. GRAY III, Pennsylvania MILLICE NT FENWICK, New Jersey

HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan

FLOYD J. FITH IAN , Indiana

Johnnie Carson, Subcommittee S taff Director

Stephen D. Nelson, Minority Staff Consultant

Steve Weissman, Subcommittee Staff Associate

David F rank, Subcommittee Staff Associate

(II )


CURRENT SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

THUR SDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1979

H ou se of R ep rese ntativ es ,

C om mittee on F or eign Affa ir s,

Sub co mm itt ee on Afr ic a,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:40 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House 

Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Solarz. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will 

come to order. Today we are privileged to have with us and to be 

hearing testomony from Rev. Jesse Jackson, the president of Operation PUSH , concerning his recent extraordinary trip to South Africa.

Reverend Jackson is an internationally respected civil rights 

leader and an eloquent advocate of economic and racial justice. 

Earlier this summer he traveled in South Africa for 2 weeks, assessing 

the state of South African race relations and studying the prospects 

for change.

In South Africa, Reverend Jackson met with a wide variety of 

people, including black leaders, residents of Crossroads and Soweto, 

government officials, and American corporate executives. Having 

sparked a significant and spontaneous positive response among many 

black South Africans, he is in a position to make a very valuable 

contribution to the dialog within our own country which flows out 

of our fundamental opposition to the principles of apartheid.

In his discussion with us today, we hope Reverend Jackson will 

share his perceptions concerning the possibility of meaningful and 

peaceful change in South Africa. We want to ascertain whether he 

detected any degree of flexibility within the white political leadership 

on the central issue of black participation in the political, social, 

and economic life of the country. We want to explore his suggestions 

for new directions and new initiatives in American policy toward South 

Africa.

When Congress and the administration consider African policy, 

our attention is often focused on crises and flash points—for example 

the war on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; conflicts in the Hom of Africa, 

Zaire, Uganda; -the spiraling number of refugees throughout the 

continent. But these pressing and immediate problems must not 

cause us to lose sight of the day-to-day damage inflicted on millions 

of non white South Africans by apartheid. The continued existence 

of the apartheid system remains the underlying and fundamentally 

most serious problem confronting Africa today. A moral issue of 

extraordinary dimension, apartheid must be addressed by our Nation 

in a manner consistent with the highest values of our democratic 

system.

(1)
2

While there may be disagreements in the Congress, even within our 

committee as to how best to deal with this problem, I think I can 

sincerely say that the apartheid system in South Africa and the existence of a racist and repressive regime in tha t country is a matter of 

deep and abiding concern to all Americans, white as well as black.

Reverend Jackson’s appearance before us today will be the prelude 

to an extensive series of hearings on South Africa which our subcommittee intends to hold next year. At that time we will examine 

the assumptions underlying U.S. relations with the South African 

Government and consider several pieces of legislation with respect to 

U.S. private investment in and U.S. foreign policy toward South 

Africa.

Reverend Jackson, I want to thank you for coming here today to 

give us the benefit of your observations and analysis.

STATEMENT OF REV. JESSE L. JACKSON, NATIONAL PRESIDE NT 

OF OPERATION PUSH

Reverend J ackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Diggs, Mr. 

Gray, and members of the Subcommittee on Africa. First, 1 want to 

express to you my sincere thanks on behalf of the board of directors 

of Operation PUSH and our South African delegation, for the invitation extended by you to present testimony on our recent trip to 

South Africa.

In its oversight and legislative functions, this subcommittee of the 

Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress can do an enormous 

amount of good in helping to shape our Nation’s foreign policy, in 

particular in our relationship to South Africa, and making tha t foreign policy consistent with the human rights sensitivities of the 

American public.

This is particularly important, in my judgment, because the clock 

of history is ticking away in South Africa. We have reached the 

countdown stage in the long struggle between the forces of freedom 

and institutionalized racist oppression.

The United States, in its own national interest, is required by 

historical circumstances to choose sides in tha t struggle and it would 

be very unwise, to say the least, for our country to be on the side of 

supporting moral bankruptcy and institutionalized racism.

Mr. Chairman, as you and the distinguished members of this committee well know, much has been written and said about conditions in 

South Africa. The range of national and international organizations 

that have addressed the problem of apartheid are quite extensive and 

the information they have published is considerable. This range includes such bodies as the United Nations Special Committee on 

Apartheid and the World Peace Council, as international bodies, and 

national organizations like PUSH, the American Committee on 

Africa, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the NAACP Task Force on 

Africa, and the International Freedom Mobilization, which last April 

convened a Summit Conference of Black Religious Leaders on Apartheid at the U.N. Church Center in New York.

Of course, this legislative body has access to voluminous amounts of 

published information by these and other organizations. In addition, 

many persons are available to this committee with particular expertise 

on African and international affairs. One calls to mind Mr. Johnny
3

Makitini, the North American representative of the African National 

Congress of South Africa; Bishop H. H. Brookins, chairman of the 

board of PUSH, who resided over an episcopal district of the AME 

Church in Lusaka earlier in this decade; Dr. Samih Farsoun, the current president of the Association of Arab-American University 

Graduates, who is professor of sociology a t the American University 

here in Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Randall Robinson, executive 

director of Trans-Africa, to mention only a few such persons.

The focus of my remarks today will be on observations made in 

connection with our 17-day visit to South Africa in J uly of this year, 

and in this context, I will also address specific questions of interest to 

this committee that were raised in Chairman Solarz’ letter inviting 

our testimony.

Our three-member delegation had an extensive and intensive visit 

to South Africa in July of this year. We made this trip in response to 

an invitation from the United Congregational Church of South 

Africa, and from the general secretary of the South African Council 

of Churches, Bishop Desmund Tutu.

During this trip, our delegation talked with people living in squatters 

camps, as well as executives of U.S. corporations. We met with factory 

workers in Port Elizabeth, scholars from various universities in 

South Africa, leaders of the Natal Indian Congress in Durban, 

1

 ‘banned” leaders like Mrs. Albertina Sisulu, high school students 

from Soweto, clergy attending the Annual Conference of the South 

African Council of Churches in Johannesburg, and many others, including many who have experienced arbitrary detention by the police 

for long periods of time. We spoke a t a mass meeting, which the press 

estimated at 15,000 people, a t the Regina Mundi Catholic Church in 

Soweto and had similar meetings in each city we visited. We m et in 

Kwazulu with the Chief Minister, Gatsha Buthelezi, as well as with 

the National Council of Inka tha, which he heads.

We came away from this trip with impressions deeply felt, both of 

the hope and sense of determination that is so alive in the hearts 

of the people, as well as with a sense of the tragedy of apartheid. 

Above all, as citizens of these United States, we feel the urgency of 

the need for our country to have a coherent Africa policy, which is 

understood by the people of tha t continent, as well as by the American 

people.

Mr. Chairman, I first w ant to attem pt to describe, in some measure, 

the South African arrangement. The apartheid system in South 

Africa is bruta lly enforced by the police and upheld by racist laws 

which represent a daily violation of the humanity of the black population in South Africa. We talked with a number of business leaders 

among white South Africans who fully agree with that estimate.

Apartheid, as we know it, is a political system. The South African 

Government does not recognize black humanity. There are 25 million 

people in South Africa, 18 million of whom are classified as African 

Blacks, another 2 million who are officially classified as “coloureds,” 

but who are black as well; and another half million classified under 

apartheid definitions as Indians.

In addition, there are 4.5 million whites, and although all are classified as white, in terms of the existing power relationships in South 

Africa, the 2.5 million Afrikaners rule the country and do n ot share 

power with either the 20 million nonwhites nor the other 2 million 

English-speaking white population.
4

One could say, “Well, thi s is ba d and we oppo se it, but wha t does 

th is have to do with U.S. fore ign policy ?” Th e U.S. inv olv em ent wi th 

th at rac ist regime—the economic, political, dip lom atic, mi litary , 

an d cultu ral ties between our Go vernme nt an d the ap artheid regi me 

of South Africa—c onstitut es a partn ersh ip of serious im po rt.

Th e Un ited States has official dip lom atic rel ations wi th the So uth 

African Government. Th is lega l cove r allows 350 U.S. busines s corporat ion s to ope rate the re. Th e hig hest return s on fore ign in ve stm en ts 

in the world are in So uth Africa, and ab ou t 2 pe rcen t of to tal U.S. 

fore ign investm ent is in th at country . Th e gr ea test sha re of thi s inve stm en t by U.S. com pan ies is concentra ted in five U.S. corpo ratio ns—Gen eral Mo tors, Fo rd, Caltex , IB M, and Mo bil. These 350 

U.S. cor poration s employ ab ou t 60,000 blac ks, in mostly menial, 

low -paying jobs wi th no union, and an othe r 40,000 whites , mostly 

in up pe r salary , wh ite collar occ upa tion s and ma nageria l pos itions.

These circum stance s put the U.S. Governm ent, an d our corpo rations, in an uneas y pa rtn ersh ip wi th South Afr ican ap artheid; 60,000 

bla ck jobs, and no union or citizensh ip rig hts , ca nn ot serve as a t ra de ­

off or a buffer for the qu est for full and equal citizen ship rig hts for 

20 million b lack people in So uth Afric a.

Th e partn ersh ip betw een the Un ite d State s and So uth Africa is an 

un easy one because it repres ents the mo st bla ta nt vio lation s of Preside nt Car te r’s hu man rig hts policy. Diplo ma tic rec ognition of the 

ap artheid regim e by the Un ite d State s paves the wa y and sets the 

clima te for business in vestm en t and marke t o utl ets . I t also encourages 

ot he r na tio ns to re lat e to South Africa, since they ha ve our exa mple to 

follow.

Th is pa rtn ership is a p olicy which places our co un try on a collision 

course with most of the cou ntries of Afr ica and wi th world pu bli c 

opinion . Tha t policy must be fund am en tal ly cha nge d in the na tio na l 

inter est.

M r. Chairma n, in yo ur le tter of Au gust 10, among the question s 

you asked is, “T o wh at e xten t are alt erna tiv es to ap artheid and separa te dev elopment bein g seriously considered by the So uth African 

Governm ent?” My ob servat ion s are th at th ey are n ot being con side red 

at all. Ap artheid and separate dev elo pm ent are two sides of the sam e 

coin. The regim e in South A frica is ma kin g some cosm etic change s in 

some of the grossest expressions of ap art heid, and gam bling on these 

changes to help them escape world condem nat ion and censure. T hrou gh 

this tac tic they h ope to preser ve in ta ct all of the bas ic fun ctions and 

ope rations of the sys tem of apart heid.

“S epa rate dev elo pm ent ” is an u pd ate d version of thi s policy wh ich, 

in conte nt, is designed to strip the major ity of South Africa’s bla ck 

population of an y suggestion th at they are citiz ens of S ou th Africa by 

imposin g a paper citizenship on tim e in the Ba ntus tans . On the ot he r 

ha nd , th ere does exist some degree of flexibility in at titu de s in th e w hite 

com mu nity, which are wor thy of note.

Ou r observations of the So uth African scene convince us th at the 

economic system an d the poli tical system there are on a collision course. 

Th e economic sys tem need s tra ined workers. Ap arthe id will no t tra in 

them . Th e economic sys tem needs people who work and pa y tax es and 

consume. W ith millions of b lac ks une mployed, they c an no t pa y taxes, 

an d they canno t consu me. So the few whites who are wor king h ave to
5

pay extremely high taxes for the military and the police apparatus 

needed to control the unemployed. Apartheid as a political system is 

failing the economic system.

The economic system needs money, bank loans and investments 

from the outside. But, because of the uncertainty of that system, it 

makes investment more difficult to come by. South Africa’s expanded 

trade and diplomatic relations with Israel, which are designed to 

circumvent the effects of world economic sanctions, will not succeed 

either.

Economically, the apartheid regime needs a 7-percent-a-year 

growth rate. From their own capital they can generate 3 to 3.5 percent 

a year, or about one-half what they need. The system needs $600 

million to $2 billion a year in new capital to grow. If we insist upon 

disinvestment because of disenfranchisement, and only support 

investment when there is full enfranchisement, we could make a valid 

contribution to the liberation of black people in South Africa. For we 

would force the business order, even though they are now gutless and 

scared, and do not want to face the political wrath of the rural classical 

capitalists over and against the urban industrial capitalists, into conflict with the political order and adjustm ents would have to be made.

This is n ot unlike what happened in our own Nation 100 years ago, 

when the rural classical captialism of the South confronted the industrial capitalism of the North. That was the basis of the Civil War; 

deciding which economic system would prevail. In South Africa, it 

will not be their conscience burning because of the enslavement of 

blacks that will bring about change. I t will be because we stimulate a 

confrontation between the economic and political order.

There is hope, because there is academic unrest, basically among 

the whites. White leaders are hemmed in by apartheid as well. Tyranny 

is similar to cancer. Racism, hatred, and fear are like cancer. If it ever 

comes near the heart, it soon goes all over the body. Tyranny cannot 

be localized. And so the academic leaders sit there saying, “ Reverend, 

the fact is, we don’t have academic freedom. Books are banned. We 

can’t do research on energy supply. We cannot do research on our 

own Government. Our freedom has been taken,” these white people 

are saying, “by apartheid.”

The same cancer that was designed to eat up black folk is now 

climbing up higher into the broader body politic. These academic 

leaders at universities told us the y were prohibited from doing research 

into police behavior or the judicial process; their access to books is 

limited, not by money bu t by Government policy. So they are seriously restricted in their academic pursuits. They are not free to look 

into the functions of foreign corporations, and informed us that section 2 of th e Terrorism Act prohibited any South African citizen or 

“noncitizen,” that is blacks, from arguing the case for disinvestment, 

under penalty of a minimum of 5 years in prison.

We met with church leaders. Some blacks had paid for a church. 

The church property was confiscated. They then had to rent the 

church that they had already bought. But Bishop Desmond Tut u is 

now preaching civil disobedience, arguing that the church must make 

a higher witness and be willing to face a crucifixion in order to get a 

resurrection. The very involvement of a visible church, with black 

and white clergy, which by definition breaks the law, is hope.

5 2 -4 9 2— 79------ 2
6

It is in these dev elopm ents t hat th ere m ay be some hope or pros pect 

for peacefu l change in So uth Africa. Never theless, it must be un de rsco red th at apart heid is violence , dai ly violence, imp lem ented by 

br ut al terroristic metho ds. It is a stat e of wa r ag ain st the hu man 

rig hts and citizens hip of the black majority po pu lat ion and a rep res ­

sion of the rights of mo st white citizens.

AV hat do South Afr ican blac ks think U.S . com panies should be 

doin g? Althou gh opinion is divided, mo st th in k they should be disinvesting. We talk ed with dozens of w orkers in American-o wne d plan ts 

and non e of them were willing to comprom ise a few token concessions 

of an affirmative act ion type , as a su bs tit ut e for their full hu man 

rig hts in South A frica. For, if an Am erican comp any were to give a 

pl an t to black South A fricans t oday, the white-rule d mino rity g overn ­

men t could tak e it back tom orrow.

Black South African s who talk of dis inv estm ent do so in pr ivate 

con versation , for to do so public ly would be to ris k jail. How ever, 

even those who fav or foreign i nvestm ent ad mit th at the pressure for 

dis inv est me nt is useful to all who wa nt to abolish ap artheid .

Ap art heid is an au thor ita ria n form of governm ent for blacks an d a 

lim ite d democracy for whites. Aparthei d, the official policy of the 

Go ver nm ent , will n ot g ra nt citizensh ip to the m ajor ity of the p opula ­

tion. Black Africans do no t h ave th e r igh t t o vote . Bla ck Africans have 

no official power. Th ey are in th e pre-Dred S cott day s, because a black 

ha s no rig ht th at a whi te is bound to respec t. Th ey ru n para llel 

societies. Th ey are separat e, bu t the re is no pre ten se of their being 

equ al. In Sou th Africa, blacks can not live in the cit y. Blacks ca nn ot 

own any pro per ty. Coloureds can g et pr op erty on a 99-year lease. In 

th e dow ntown areas there are area s of ‘‘coloured pre fer entia l,” which 

means th at blacks can not work dow ntown, except w hen there are no t 

enough coloureds to go aro und.

Th e $5.7 billion of dir ect or in direct inv est me nt th at U.S. cor porations hold in South Africa is an economic pillar for the apart heid 

regime. The attit ud es of these U.S. corporation s are such th at we can 

un derst and South African blacks saying th at they sh ould disi nvest.

Fo r example, we met with the leaders of the Mobil Corp, of South 

Africa at Mobil House in Capetown. Mr. Nich ols is their chief rep resenta tive. It should be no ted t hat a fte r 85 years of opera tin g in South 

Africa, the Mobil Co. in 1971 had a sit ua tio n in which all non white 

employe es were ma kin g th e absolute minim um wage, and none were 

in any advanced tra ining prog ram s. Mr. Nichols o pened his rem ark s 

in o ur c onv ersa tion by pu ttin g fo rwa rd a distinction betw een ap art heid 

an d separa te de velopm ent. I t seems t hat Mobil is opposed to apartheid, 

at leas t in giving lipservice to same, b ut does not tak e the same position 

on sep ara te dev elop men t, which I have no ted earlier is ap arth eid’s 

alter ego.

Mobil employs 3,0 00 workers , of whom ab ou t 1,600 are white. Af ter 

93 yea rs in Sou th Africa, Mobil has 1 African distr ict ma nager and 

8 sales managers, ou t of a man agerial force of ab ou t 200. Wh en we 

asked the c omp any leade rship if the oil they sell to the South Af rica n 

Gover nm ent is resold to Rhodesia and w as there by in violation of the 

embargo th at is supposed to be in effect, they replied th at the South 

Afr ican “Official Secrecies Act” prevents them, b yl aw , fro m answering 

an y questio ns regard ing wh ere they get their oil, or to whom they sell 

it.
Furthermore, he said that the General Law Amendment Act of 

1974 requires them to apply to the Minister of Economic Affairs to 

get permission to answer questions like the one we were asking, and 

they informed us that they could not continue the conversation unless 

we changed the subject. This is an example of the extent to which 

U.S. corporations accommodate to the rules of the apartheid regime, 

and are in effect willingly held hostage to the regime’s legislation.

We visited Ford in South Africa, in Port Elizabeth, and found that 

80 percent of its labor force is nonwhite. But 88 percent of its supervisors and managers are white. This is another example of the employment pattern of U.S. corporations, which fully fit into the design of 

apartheid in tha t they provide a majority of white workers with the 

best paying jobs and thereby make them beneficiaries of apartheid, 

rather than allies of the black workers in a common effort to improve 

conditions for all.

We asked the representatives of the Ford plan t management if 

their company was in compliance with U.S. Commerce Department 

regulations issued in February of 1978 regarding sales to the South 

African Government. Their reply was the following: “Our company 

has told us tha t these regulations apply to U.S.-origin products only, 

but that products licensed elsewhere can be sold to the South African 

Government.”

They went on to say that about 10 percent of their sales are to the 

South African Government, and tha t they hesitate to refuse sales 

because the Government has the power to effect a general boycott of 

Ford products in the South African market.

We visited General Motors of South Africa, their assembly and 

manufacturing plant in Port Elizabeth. I believe General Motors has 

been in South Africa since 1924. Today 52 percent of their labor force 

is nonwhite. They have one African foreman and no black employees 

in such white-collar jobs as the timekeeping department. We asked 

the leaders of the GM plan t how would they describe their relations 

with the South African Government. Their response was, “Good. The 

South African Government is a big customer.”

So these U.S. giant corporations have good relations with the 

apartheid regime. But the indigenous African National Congress of 

South Africa, founded in 1912, is banned by tha t same regime, and 

their leaders are either in exile or in jail on Robben’s Island. The 

National Convention Movement is banned. The Black People’s Convention Movement is banned, and Steve Biko, its founder, assassinated. African trade unions are banned. The Natal Indian Congress, 

founded by Gandhi, enjoys only semilegal standing and some of its 

leaders are among those individuals banned. Banned, Mr. Chairman, 

by the same Government that General Motors, Ford, and Mobil say 

they have good relations with, and in the latter two, that the Government is a good customer.

So South African blacks think U.S. companies should be disinvesting. “Is there a role for U.S. private investment in South Africa?” 

your letter asked me. Not if they are in partnership with the official 

policy and regime of apartheid and separate development and are 

willing hostages to apartheid law and customs. And that is their 

present posture, as it is the posture of the U.S. Government.

Mr. Chairman, as a ma tter of emphasis, I do wish to underscore 

again the point that South Africa, as an apartheid regime, does n ot
8

recognize black humanity. It does not recognize us legally. No black 

in South Africa has citizenship status or any protection under the 

law: No right to vote; no right to protest or assemble. For only 

citizens have that right and blacks are not citizens by the operational 

definition of apartheid.

Economically, we are not recognized. We experience either low 

wages or no wages. No African union is recognized. Businesses there 

are shielded by business protection acts externally and official secrecy 

acts internally. Socially, blacks are in the category of the “untouchables.” Apartheid assumes tha t a black person cannot dream, hurt, or 

aspire. It destroys family life. Religiously, apartheid assumes God 

made a creative error when he made a black man. The human community cannot coexist with apartheid. It is a moral illegitimacy tha t 

we must fight.

Now in terms of assessing current U.S. policy toward South Africa. 

It is clear t ha t the United States is a partner with South Africa, with 

its capital in the form of investments and loans. And capital attrac ts 

capital. The United States contributes to the social acceptance of 

South Africa. U.S. companies exploit cheap labor. U.S. companies 

abide by South African law. Ford and GM sell cars and trucks to the 

Government of South Africa, thereby circumventing the intent of the 

Commerce Department’s regulations by getting parts from Britain 

and England, but producing paramilitary equipment for South Africa.

South Africa makes $1.2 billion a year from the sale of the gold 

Krugerrand, and more than half of this amount, roughly $600 million, 

is money or foreign exchange earned by South Africa from sales of the 

Krugerrand in the American market.

The United States and South Africa exchange scientific personnel. 

The United States collaborates with South Africa in the expansion of 

South Africa’s nuclear capabilities, including the development of 

uranium capability, and so forth. So, America must make a decision 

about South Africa. The United S tates must determine which side of 

history it chooses to be on.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation you asked me to comment 

on how black political leadership in South Africa and the black 

community there responded to the proposed changes embodied in the 

Riekhert and Wiehahn reports. The information we received suggests 

that with respect to the Wiehahn commission report, it is obvious 

tha t many of the recommendations sound very good. I would say that 

there is a wait-and-see attitud e on the p art of black leadership because 

as you probably know, it is an old ploy of ruling circles in white 

minority regimes to respond to the uprising of a people byj creating a 

commission. Then the commission comes forward with a white paper 

and this white paper proposes th at things be looked into further. The 

issuance of the white paper is usually accompanied with a great deal 

of demagogic speeches, and then the paper is promptly shelved and 

no more is heard about it. Because by that time, they hope, the socalled natives will have calmed their restlessness. This is one of the 

classic styles of Western parliamentary rule, so we know that the 

Wiehahn commission report does have some very positive recommendations.

Of course, again if one looks at the details, we need to take into 

account tha t South Africa is an industrially developed society. Thus,
9

there is really no necessity for any government in South Africa that 

wishes to conform to democratically accepted norms of behavior to 

reinvent the wheel. Since all industrial countries have a generally 

accepted set of labor relations that govern the democratic rights of 

the laboring population— for example, to have unions, organize, and 

these sorts of elementary rights— it is not necessary for South Africa 

to invent anything new.

So the Wiehahn commission report suggests that they know what 

needs to be done with respect to establishing universally recognized 

norms of relationships between labor and business. The question is: 

What will it take to make them do it?

However, one must also look at the Wiehahn commission report 

from the standpoint of a couple of their recommendations. They say 

that all persons, irrespective of race, color, or sex, who enjoy permanent 

residence in South Africa and who are in fixed employment qualify 

for membership in a registered trade union.

Now that is very interesting because those qualifications, of course, 

mean that the large pool of migrant laborers, people that are classified as migrants, not as permanent residents, would not be covered 

under the Wiehahn definitions. People from Mozambique, Angola, 

and so forth, who work in the gold mines would not be covered.

The question then becomes who enjoys permanent residence in 

South Africa? If the Bantustan proposal is further pushed, this would 

mean that a majority of black people would not be given permanent 

residence in South Africa. So, whatever changes the Wiehahn commission represents, it would not apply to them.

It is also interesting that one of the clear provisions of the Wiehahn 

commission report is that the closed shop practice is suspended. Tha t 

is, the union protection pattern which has in all industrial countries 

protected the rights of industrial unions to organize, is suspended, 

and no further agreements in South Africa for closed shops may be 

permitted. The National Manpower Commission will be instructed 

to investigate the need for this practice to be retained, but as of now, 

the closed shop, as a union protection instrumentality, is abandoned 

in South Africa, even under the Wiehahn commission report.

So again, the fact remains that this report is perceived of as an 

evolutionary process by which South Africa will eventually arrive at 

some universally recognized standards of democratic rights for working people. The possibility that under apartheid such a thing will 

eventually happen is as good as the possibility that it will never 

happen. So again, I emphasize that the black leadership that we talked 

with seem to have a wait-and-see attitude with respect to it because 

there is no basis for looking to it as some type of emancipation 

proclamation.

The same is true of the Riekhert commission report. We can disf

>ense with it for the time being by saying categorically that since no 

egislation implementing the Riekh ert commission recommendations 

is expected before 1980, we will simply have to wait and see that 

legislation is formulated that represents implementation of this report 

before we could place any real judgment on it. But at any rate it is 

hardly a point on the agenda at the moment simply because there is 

not going to be any legislation covering their recommendations before 

1980, if at that time.
10

So, it is clear that neither of th ese repo rts represents much with regard 

to the ills th at plague Sou th Afric a. It is the will for f reedom amo ng 

the South African people them selv es, com bine d with inter natio na l 

pressures, th at will ultim ate ly decide the course of events in th at 

country . I rep eat, it is the will for freedo m amo ng the South African 

people them selves, combined with inter na tio na l pressure s, th at will 

ultim ate ly decide the course of events in th at cou ntry.

Now I will resp ond to the othe r q uestion you raised a bo ut the issues 

involved in the controversy surro undin g the world cha mpionship 

boxing matc h set for October 20 in Preto ria . Th is is a majo r sport ing 

event in South Africa. S outh A frica has gold power an d m ilitary power, 

bu t South Africa does no t have world acc eptance. Seventy natio ns 

of the world have said th at ap artheid is an in ter na tio na l crim e again st 

hu ma nit y. In South Africa, blacks mus t opera te wi th passes anti permission slips. There is no policy of mu ltir aci al sport s in South 

Africa. And even when the re are mo uth ing s from the top of the Govern me nt, at the v ery bott om every cit y still h as the right to det erm ine 

wh eth er or no t to obey the statem en t. And thus, it am ou nts to 

st at es ’ rights.

In Preto ria , where the figh t is being held , if a bla ck person were 

to go the re on any oth er occasion, othe r th an the nigh t of the fight, 

th at pers on would hav e to use a pas s to get in; would have to sit in 

a section for blac ks only; would have to use lavo ratory or toi let 

facilities for blacks only, as distinguished from coloured, Indian , and 

white. Th ey could no t use any of the social areas. And , with ou t a 

special perm it, they would be locked up going hom e because no black 

can be on the str ee t after 9 p .m. To be found on the str ee t therea fte r 

is to break the curfew laws.

Bu t, because South Africa wa nts to change he r face and at tr ac t 

money, as opposed to changin g her he ar t and bringing hu man rig hts 

to all human beings, on the nig ht of the fight, for thi s massive interna tio nal face lift, Sou th Africa will give blacks a one-nigh t rendez vous 

with dig nity. One nig ht they can come to the fight wi thou t a pass. 

One nig ht they can use the toilet of their choice. One nigh t th ey can 

sit anyplac e, while the cam eras of the world, opera tin g between the 

developed cities, in th at one-nig ht rendez vous with dig nity, th ey can 

say, “Thin gs are no t wh at they o ug ht to be in South A frica , bu t they 

are getting be tte r. The refo re, we should inv est money in South 

Africa.”

We in PU SH h ave joined with othe r hu man righ ts org ani zation s in 

a comm itm ent to fight to stop th at fight. Th e reasons behin d our 

comm itm ent and deter mination are the following:

First , a heavyw eigh t boxin g matc h held in South Africa fills th e 

mo st des per ate need th at the ap artheid regim e has for world acceptance. Th e spo rts route is the main highway throug h which the 

regim e hopes to gain acceptance and reduce world criticism.

Second, mu ltiracial sport s is a m yt h in So uth Africa. It is nonexistent, So NB C- TV will be tele visi ng a sport s m at ch in South 

Africa, which mak es it a pa rty to selling a fra ud to a worldwide 

audience . Th e Preto ria stad ium arra ngem ent, which I ju st r efe rred to, 

und ersc ores this fact.
11

Regardless of the outcome of the fight, the apartheid regime will 

gain from this event if it is held in Preto ria: international prestige, 

tax receipts, and a propaganda victory that will make it more difficult to isolate South Africa from participation in the 1980 Olympics, 

which is only 10 months away. So the timing of this fight is very 

important to take into account. The leaders of the few organizations 

which still enjoy legality in South Africa feel very strongly abo ut 

having the fight canceled. The one thing they asked of us in Durban 

and elsewhere was that we would put forth every effort to see to it 

that this fight was canceled.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, regarding recommendations that we have 

arrived at in relation to our partnership with South Africa, our 

delegation met with President Carter on August 9, 1979, and we 

submitted the following recommendations to the President:

One, we urged that the President instruct the Commerce Department to closely monitor the activities of General Motors, Ford, 

Caltex, Mobil Oil, and IBM in South Africa. The purpose of such 

monitoring is to establish that these companies are in full compliance 

with the inten t of the U.S. Commerce Dep artm ent’s regulation 

135, regarding the selling of supplies to the South African Government, and also with regard to maintaining the embargo against 

Rhodesia. This requires, at a minimum, strict monitoring of ac tivity 

by the executive branch of the Government.

Two, the second reform recommendation asked that the Justice 

Departm ent look into the scandal now shaking the South African 

Government, the Rhoodie investigation with which we are all familiar. 

We asked that the Attorney General investigate the use of South 

African Government funds to influence election campaigns in this 

country, such as the defeat of Senator Dick Clark, of Iowa, former 

head of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa. 

We feel that the American public needs more information on this, 

as well as an investigation into the South African Government’s 

attempts to use their funds to buy up U.S. news media—the Washingto n Star and the Sacramento Union—and influence public opinion 

here.

Three, we recommended to the President tha t any further negotiations between the United States and South Africa on the SASOL 

project be based upon the condition that universal adult suffrage 

and full citizenship for the black majority population of South 

Africa be recognized and established as a matter of law. And that we 

would not continue any negotiations on the SASOL project with 

South Africa until there was an understanding and a commitment 

to extend these democratic rights to the black majo rity population.

Four, we recommended to the President that he convene a White 

House Conference on Southern Africa within the next 6 months. 

This level of focus on the situation in tha t region of the world would 

help to mobilize public opinion and help shape a coherent United 

States-southern African policy.

The present policy of imposing economic sanctions on ZimbabweRhodesia which is changing to majority rule, while being in partne rship with South Africa, is a blatant contradiction in U.S. foreign 

policy.
12

This point is extremely important as are the others with respect to 

the executive branch of the Government in the light of the resignation 

of Ambassador Andrew J . Young. I think we all recognize the enormous contribution to public awareness tha t Ambassador Young 

made during his tenure as Ambassador to the United Nations and it 

has made the work of all of us easier.

The great debt that we owe to this distinguished public servant can 

only be fulfilled if we renew our efforts to place our country on the side 

of justice and human rights. The acid test of this posture is our relationship with the racist apartheid regime of South Africa.

Also it seems to me that the Congress has some very concrete things 

it can do and I want to include in our recommendations that the U.S. 

Congress legislate tha t the sale of the Krugerrand in this country be 

banned.

The vast amount of foreign exchange that the South African 

Government earns from the sale of the gold Krugerrand covers its oil 

bill and its defense budget and those are two very significant items in 

apartheid’s survival.

The banning of the sale of the Krugerrand which, for us, also adds to 

our problems of a trade deficit, adds to our problem of a balanced 

budget and contributes to the high price of gold on the world market 

because of the speculation in gold, would be a role that the Congress 

could play in helping concretely and in setting a climate that says, 

“This partnership with South African apartheid is being dissolved.”

It is very important for the Congress to contribute to such a climate 

because the Congress, according to the Constitution, is supposed to be 

the most representative of the three branches of Government.

I might add at this point it is the church organizations tha t have 

been making their appeals through stockholders’ resolutions on 

disinvestments; the student movements on major college campuses for 

disinvestment of university funds from corporations doing business in 

South Africa; mass-based movements against bank loans; the summit 

conference of black religious leaders anti activities like these that tell 

us where public opinion in America is on this question.

The Am eric an people oppose apartheid. They will support concrete 

actions by the Government in breaking the relationship with apartheid.

The Congress and the President must act. I am appealing to the 

Congress today to take steps tha t would represent giving some leadership to this mass sentiment. One concrete step tha t could be taken is 

tha t the Congress could legislate against the sale of the Krugerrand in 

the American market. We urge tha t you do so.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I may be permitted a very personal word, 

some persons were very critical of us because they said, “You have not 

been here long enough and you do not understand apartheid. There are 

just some things that you do not understand.”

There may be some things that I do not understand about South 

African apartheid. I doubt if there are many. For you see, when we 

arrived at the airport and I saw the signs “Black” and “White”, that 

was nothing new for me. I t was simply a reminder.

I told the press when they challenged me,

You ap pa rently do no t un de rstand . I was born an d bred in ap artheid, no t in 

So uth Africa bu t in So uth Carolina . I ha ve an ad va ntag e on you. I have known 

ap artheid from bo th sides. I grew up un de r ap ar theid bu t with th e help of God , 

I rose abo ve it. I know yo ur side but I also kno w th e under side. I un de rstand th e 

reject ion . Separate schools b y law is no thing new to me. It is a remi nder. Teach ers 

ma kin g dual salaries while bla ck teac he rs mak e less b y law is a remi nder.
13

The ANC is banned in South Africa but the NAACP was banned in America. 

They call ANC Communist but they called the NAACP Communist. I know 

rejection.

This division of color is nothing new to me. I waited tables. I caddied and 

shined shoes while the white boy was the cashier. I grew up where it was against the 

law for a black boy to know what a white boy knew. I know about signs in buses 

reading “Colored from the rear.” I know about “three-fifths human,” Plessy v 

Ferguson, “separate but equal,” Dred Scott, “a black’s got no rights tha t a white 

man must respect.” I told them, maybe you all don’t know me, but I know y’all.

Change is going to come in South Africa. Whether it will be essentially economic, political, and peaceful, or whether violent and relatively sudden is yet to be determined. That lies largely in the hands 

of those with power in Pretoria.

1 am also convinced that the United States for moral, economic, 

political, national interest, and national security reasons ought to 

help facilitate the change there. We should use our diplomatic, 

economic, political, and military leverage to foster change for black 

and white South Africans.

Chairman Solarz and members of the committee, I wish to than k 

you for the opportunity to share with you our experience and views 

relative to our recent visit to South Africa.

Your patience and interest in a rath er lengthy testimony is very 

much appreciated.

I am now ready to entertain any questions that you or the committee members may have.

Mr. Solarz. Reverend Jackson, I want to thank you for what must 

surely be one of the most moving and meaningful statements on the 

situation in South Africa which this subcommittee has heard.

We now have a vote in progress. I am going to recess the meeting 

of the subcommittee for about 10 minutes so the members can vote. 

When we return we will put some questions to you.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed for a vote on the floor.]

AFT ER RE CE SS

Mr. Solarz. The meeting of the subcommittee is called to order.

Reverend Jackson, you (lid not in your series of recommendations 

concerning possible American actions toward South Africa specifically 

address the question of disinvestment or prohibition on new investment or any legislation in some way regulating American investment in 

South Africa although you did speak about the whole question at 

some length in the body of your testimony.

Could you give us the benefit of your opinion as to whether or 

not you think it would be helpful for the Congress to enact such legislation and, if so, whether you make any distinction between the desirability of legislation requiring disinvestment as compared to legislation 

prohibiting new investment or some variation of those two 

possibilities?

Reverend J ackson. First of all, as a general rule, I endorse all forms 

of economic pressures which at one level is no more bank loans, no 

new bank loans, prohibit the sale of the Krugerrand in this country 

because of our own economic interest in what gold is doing to the 

dollar but also in terms of our ability to fight apartheid by using 

economic leverage.

52 -4 92 — 79 3
14

I think our country, Mr. Chairman, has three options in South 

Africa. One option is to remain there as a partner as we are now, an 

■enforcer of apartheid, a pillar of apartheid and think the world is so 

stupid tha t it does not know the difference.That is the present posture 

which is the status quo position.

The second position would be to use our streng th in South Africa, 

our economic strength, our scientific strength, our military strength, 

and our diplomatic strength to establish some immediate timetables 

for negotiation for the liberation of people there, just as we have our 

Camp David Summit trying to bring peace in the Middle Eas t, the 

use of our powers to bring about change now.

If we are not willing to do tha t, if it involves an offensive action, 

we should immediately disinvest and disengage totally.

In my judgment we have one of those last two options, to either disengage totally and frankly, I am far more impressed with the use 

of power and the public commitment to end apartheid because in one 

real sense simply to leave no responsibility is to rape and to run. We 

are part of the rapism in the arrangement.

Mr. Solarz. What was your opinion about the effectiveness of the 

Sullivan code? Do you think that code has served any constructive 

purpose in terms of improving the economic position of blacks in the 

country or is it essentially irrelevant?

Reverend J ackson. It represents no fundamental impact upon 

tha t system. The labor leaders told us tha t in 1971 those were the 

principles tha t they put forth bu t they fought diligently for them 

because their agenda now has shifted to dignity and shared power 

and not just some more rands to buy more time.

In effect they are saying does it matter if a few more rands and 

a few more blacks cannot own land, tha t a few more rands and a 

a few more blacks can be arrested without any show of cause for 5 

years.

The fundamental struggle there is not an affirmative action struggle. 

It is a liberation struggle. Affirmative action in my judgment is 

not a negative. It is not the problem nor is it the solution.

You are sitting on a different wavelength from the issue. We have 

looked north to the liberation struggle since the movement and 

what is happening in Nambia and their agenda is somewhat different 

than a better job.

Mr. Solarz. In your view, would it be constructive if the Congress 

were, for example, to legislatively implement the Sullivan code in 

its revised form by requiring American corporations doing business 

in South Africa to comply with such a code or do you think for the 

reasons tha t you just mentioned it really does not make much of a 

difference?

Reverend Jackson. I think that would be an impediment to progress because it creates an illusion that something fundamental is 

happening where something superficial is happening.

The fact of the matter is if our country is there and has 100,000 

people, about 60,000 of them are black, they help a few blacks but they 

help the 40,000 whites much more. The 40,000 whites really help 

to stabilize the middle class white oppressors of South Africa.

For this country to simply fight on level B for an affirmative action 

plan, it is irrelevant particularly when the real issue is IBM, Caltex, 

Mobil, General Motors, and Ford engaging in relationships with the
15

South African Government for the sale of m ilitary and paramilitary 

equipment or the use of the South African Government as a conduit 

lor oil to Rhodesia.

These are errors tha t are far more fundamental. The fact that the 

American company is there is to recognize tha t no African union is 

there. They have committees instead. There are unions that cannot 

bargain for themselves anil there are unions that have no right to 

protest.

Mr. Solarz. Would you support legislation which prohibited 

all new American investment in South Africa or would you feel th at 

did not go far enough and unless it required disinvestment that it 

would not be particularly helpful?

Reverend J ackson. No new investment is obviously a step in the 

right direction. The prohibition of the Krugerrand being sold here is a 

step in the right direction. A move to stop tha t fight from being 

broadcast is a step in the right direction.

We have to keep on stepping until we step up to a liberation date.

Mr. Solarz. I have one other question before I yield to my colleagues on the committee. You indicated in a certain sense it was too 

early to make a judgment on the Weihahn and Reikert commission 

reports because they have not been implemented.

Hypothetically, assuming that virtually all of the recommendations 

in those two reports are implemented, would you consider tha t significant progress or would that, too, be in a sense a kind of illusion 

which masks the continuing realities of the apartheid system which 

you described in your testimony?

Reverend Jackson. One man putting a timetable on the date of 

another ma n’s dignity is realized as extremely arrogant and sick. It 

is unkind.

Black South Africans need their citizenship affirmed tomorrow and 

the right to vote, at which time all of the commissions could be disbanded. You could take care of your own business from that point.

I think in contrast to our own struggle for the right to vote here as 

late as 1965, there were commission reports going around. There were 

some real interesting articles that blacks really should have the right 

to vote b ut since voting required intelligence, we should have at least 

a sixth grade literacy level. There was a lot of debate in these halls 

about whether or not we should have a sixth grade education.

It finally came on down to the fundamental issue of one man and 

one vote. If you pay taxes you should have the right to vote. If you 

are subject to military draft, you should have the right to vote. If 

you are a citizen you should have the right to vote.

All of these commissions to me are just clouds to separate the 

people from the sunshine. We need to get on down to the issue of 

the citizenship of black South Africans, the affirmation of their 

humanity. If their humanity is affirmed and the bill of human rights 

is affirmed, logic will take its course.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Reverend Jackson.

Mr. Diggs.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Firs t of all, Reverend Jackson, I would like to join in complimenting 

the many people who have given you due recognition for the contribution you have made toward educating the American public about 

the conditions with your high visibility and your articulation.
16

It has p ut a new perspective on this issue which is absolutely necessary if we are going to be able to address some of these questions 

realistically. This has certainly been true in the last 2 or 3 weeks, 

growing out of the wake of what is now called the Andy Young affair 

which has given a new focus to international issues and to their 

interrelatedness to domestic concerns particularly of black Americans 

but not confined to that.

I observed in your comments during the past few weeks that in 

almost every instance when you made reference to the implications 

swirling around Andy Young and tying it into your recent experience 

on this trip tha t you made a reference to the partnership between 

Israel and South Africa.

I wondered if you would comment on that? I noted in your testimony that you did single them out. I wondered if you would comment 

upon your interchange with the very influential Jewish community 

in South Africa, what their attitude is toward their Government’s 

policy, the basis upon which they rationalize their continued support 

outside of the apartheid but the way they rationalize when you ask 

them questions about the relationship between Israel and South 

Africa, and whether or not you see any prospective changes in attitude there among Helen Sfizman and her associates and finally, 

whether or not you feel this has any bearing upon the considerations 

in the black community as it relates to the credibility of people who 

are involved in this process?

You have mentioned it. You have emphasized the meeting of black 

American leaders in New York. You have made several references to 

it as being part of the tension generating elements within the relationship between the black American and the Jewish community as 

it relates to Israel.

Reverend Jackson. No. 1, we were also very concerned about the 

relationship with Germany, France, England, and other nations with 

South Africa as well.

It is very important to note t hat most of the nuclear collaborations 

were coming from France. One of the reasons why our strong feeling 

is tha t Rhoodie was finally extradited from France back to Africa is 

because of the nuclear relationship. They had to reach back and get 

a 102-year-old antiquated law. They had to do something to satisfy 

the France-South Africa relationship and tha t is a factor. Th at is a 

piece.

As we communicated with Mr. Oppenheimer, we talked with him 

and Helen Suzman and it appears tha t she is representing a liberal 

factor but not a liberation factor. People are making a choice between 

people who are with us and people who are not with us because the 

revolution is going on in South Africa.

You have many of your English-speaking whites and Jews who are 

willing to fight for some measure of decency for blacks but not willing 

to fight for dignity and power. I t is at tha t point tha t their tongue 

gets tripped up and they sta rt talking about one man and one vote.

For example, the statement Mr. Oppenheimer made, in spite of 

his pronouncements about blacks having a certain measure of dignity 

was we do not want to be oppressed any more by the cause we lose 

than we want to be oppressed by the Afrikaners.
17

Once you shift from discussing indecency which the Afrikaners represent, the decency which some of the liberals represent and discuss 

dignity and power, then there is a break between blacks and the 

consciousness movement.

There is a concern about the direction of Israel and South Africa. 

There has been upgrading of diplomatic standing between Israel and 

South Africa from consular to ambassador levels. There is an upgrading of the relationship. Since 1975 trade between Israel and South 

Africa has increased 1,000 percent.

Israel has become the conduit for the gold and diamond element 

th at Oppenheimer represents.

There is a concern on the one hand about the general European 

relationship with South Africa b ut in some specific sense black Americans are concerned about the Israel matter because of the historical 

relationship we have had with Jews in this country and also because 

we heavily invest in Israel in ways that we do not heavily invest in 

France and Germany and England and Canada.

There is a peculiar relationship that m ust be seen, it seems to me, 

in that context. It is a source of irritation and displeasure.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Solarz. Mrs. Collins.

Mrs. Collins. Tha nk you, Mr. Chairman.

Reverend Jackson, I share a great many of your views on this 

subject and other issues. I am particularly interested in the Sullivan 

code which I have observed to be nothing more than a negated leaf 

covering and what corporations are doing in South Africa and your 

remarks on General Motors and other corporations from America 

there.

Some 4 or 5 years ago, Congressman Diggs and I were in South 

Africa and we had a meeting at the Ambassador’s house. At tha t 

meeting we had representatives of the American business community.

I wonder if you had the same response I did from them. My reaction 

was I could not tell them from Afrikaners. I just could not. Their 

thinking was the same; their way of doing business was the same. 

They made excuses for the way the Government was run. They made 

excuses for the way their operations were run under those rules.

I wonder if you got the same kind of feeling when you were there.

Reverend J ackson. Fundamentally, but there were some interesting 

distinctions. The American corporations are under the pressure of 

meetings like this and Afrikaner businesses are not. The American 

business leaders there are managers and not owners. They operate 

more with a sense of being held hostage between the kind of pressures 

we apply here, political and economic, over and against their partn ership with the South African Government.

I found a greater willingness by the Afrikaners business leaders like 

Mueller from Nedbank and AP Glass & Co. and others to stick clearly 

to the issue because the Afrikaner business leaders know tha t the 

economic order is on a collison course with the political order.

There are some very definite needs tha t the Afrikaner business 

leaders have for the apartheid being on a collison course with. They 

need new investment. It is becoming more difficult to get. They need 

markets. They need productive workers who are trained. The apartheid 

education system says you cannot get trained here.
18

Th ey need workers who produc e and ap artheid rea lly slows down 

productio n because there is no inspira tio n or inc entive to prod uce.

One did get some dis tin ction, Mrs . Collins, in this sense th at the 

Am eric an companies are ju st kind of pa rtn ers in bed witho ut a 

ma rriage license. The Afrikaner business lead ers op era te on middle 

gro und, the American busines s leaders assume.

Th ey can discuss in a very he althy way their affirmative action 

appro ach and try to co ntrast their ov ert conduct with Afrikane rs 

generally in the sense th at those busin esses now have the black and 

wh ite signs down inside the building. In terg ra ted toilets and the like 

are inside the building.

Th ey assume no responsi bility for con duct outside the buildin g bu t 

once you leave discussing affirmative action, the Sul livan code and 

disc uss the qu estio n of citizensh ip and the righ t to vote and fu nd ame nta l questions, th ey are ju st the same.

Ford and Gen eral Moto rs now no longer de ny th e fact that t he y sell 

pa ramilitary equip me nt to the Gover nm ent . The y have sim ply g ive n 

reason s for why they have to do it, to com pete .

IB M, Caltex, a mi Mobil opera te a little differently . T he y d o n ot say 

it as boldly, at lea st Ca ltex and Mob il do no t. Th ey hide behin d th e 

business pro tec tive and secrecy act s but there is no fund am en tal 

difference betw eeen our com pan ies’ co nta ct there and South African 

com pan ies’ co ntact the re.

Mrs. Coll ins. Re veren d Jac kso n, I wondered if you had any 

recom me ndations to the Whit e House?

Re ver end J ackson. On Au gust 9, the Presiden t received them all 

and said th at we were going to hav e a followup me eting with Ambassa dor Y oung and talk ab ou t it. The events cha nge d r at he r radica lly 

the next week.

We hav e no t ha d an y kin d of followup meetin g. I am appea ling to 

him for anoth er me eting to fu rth er discuss this m at te r and intend to 

discuss this m at te r with Am bas sad or McH en ry as well.

We found the conversations with him and Mr. Jo rd an of some conside rable inter est on th e quest ion of a Whit e Ho use conference on 

So uth Africa. I con tend th at we n eed to have suc h a conference bec aus e 

ap ar t from the moral m at te r, our na tio na l in terest is at sta ke an d is 

jeopar dized bv the inc ohere nt policy.

It is obvious th at the me ssage N igeria sent to Brita in over the sou thern African sit ua tio n is no t in our future as it relates to Nigeria and 

othe r African natio ns as well.

The time clock is tickin g again st our ha vin g a pa rtn ersh ip in South 

Africa. All of the othe r Afr ican natio ns includ ing those are in an econom ic bind and do some b usin ess with So uth Afric a a nd are all again st 

apartheid.

Th e th reat to Am eric an interest in South Africa is no t Comm unist, 

it is racism. Somehow we found for obvious reas ons it f ar more difficult 

to fight a very present inter na l sp iri tuality th an we do a so-called 

fore ign economic ideo logy but the th re at to the relationship the re, 

people down the re are no t dealing so mu ch with Marx and Eng els as 

th ey are dealing with sta nd ard bla ck-white conduct .

Mrs. Coll ins. Tha nk y ou, Mr. Ch airma n.

Mr. Solarz. I hope the gen tlewoma n from Ne w Jerse y will understan d if we de pa rt from our custom of alternating between major ity 

and minority to give those memb ers who were here at the beg inning 

of the hearing an o pp ortunity to ask que stions first.
19

I would like to now call upon the distinguished gentleman from 

Pennsylvania, Mr. Gray.

Mr. Gray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly want to welcome Rev. Jesse Jackson to the committee 

and thank him for his testimony.

Reverend Jackson, it seems that the essential thru st of the path 

you are suggesting is somehow America or its corporations ought to 

totally disinvest in South Africa.

Of course the argument tha t has been heard is, there will be a loss 

of a great number of jobs and black African leaders are concerned 

about the loss of those jobs if American corporations totally withdraw 

from South Africa.

Am I correct in understanding your testimony, tha t based on your 

firsthand observation black leaders and leaders in Africa who are 

involved in this struggle for what you have termed as human dignity, 

clearly state tha t is not an acceptable trade-off and they would like 

to have American corporate interest withdrawn in order to bring 

pressure to change the Government of South Africa and the apartheid 

system?

Reverend J ackson. Firs t of all, I said our Government has two 

options. The third option is mute. The third option is to stay there 

and pretend to be immoral. The other option is to do what we did in 

the Middle East situation when we perceived to have a national 

interest there. We did not disengage. We used the sum total of th at 

power to convene the national convention, the international convention, and began to hammer out a relationship that both protected o ur 

interest, our future interest, and our investments.

If this country took the position that it would use its leverage to 

convene the forces, that is ANC, PAC as well as the Afrikaner Government toward the affirmation of citizenship rights, tha t would be 

the highest and best use of our power.

I think we ought to do that. If we are not willing to do tha t then 

we ought to leave because we are in the way of tha t meeting being 

called, bu t being called under other conditions. In my judgment that 

meeting will be called one day either with us as a catalyst for it or us 

as being determined to be on the wrong side of it.

That meeting will be called one day. There is a difference of opinion 

among leaders there about the disinvestment situation. There is no 

thre at in terms of a trade-off between tha t and dignity, the hiring of 

some black workers in Port Elizabeth who then if their children speak 

out have to be exiled. They are tired with that.

We had two meetings with the workers. One meeting we had on a 

Sunday afternoon after church. T hey told us what was actually going 

on and told us they would meet us the next day in the plants for the 

first time and act like we were strange.

Their concern at one level was that there be a moving toward the 

day when a final decision would be made.

I would think they would accept the first priority of this country 

using its power to bring about the change but right now that is not 

happening in any measure of any significance or in any fundamental 

wav.

The other option is for us to get out of the way in my judgment. 

Seventy-five nations have made a decision to disengage, to just leave.

Mr. Gray. In that context I would take your statem ent with regard 

on page 6 and the mention of Israel tha t you also, taking what you
20

have said, tha t we then ought to urge the disinvestment by other 

nations and quite a number such as Switzerland and even perhaps 

some African nations that have economic relationships.

Would you say t hat would be another step to bring about pressure 

to move from apartheid to human dignity?

Reverend J ackson. I agree and the reason why I agree that Israel 

and other nations need to do it is because no one nation a t this point,, 

given the price of gold, can quite do it economically alone. It will 

take a combination of nations moving in concert because of the 

perceived interest, for example, of the Western alliance as a case 

in point.

I think this country for reasons of its history, ideology, and matters 

in Israel ought to assume some leadership and not follow the pack.

Mr. Gray. That would not only be applied to Western nations 

but would th at also be applied to Mozambique, Botswana, and some 

African nations?

Reverend J ackson. The situation is a little different inasmuch as 

the people who are under the direct heat of economic survival find 

themselves assuring a marriage of their souls with the Devil in desperation, not in luxury.

You see the relationship this country has with South Africa is not 

one based upon necessity. It is identification with racist oppression. 

Th at becomes fundamentally different.

The backbone of the Israeli economy is not expanding with South 

Africa. It is the $5 million investment in this country. The best it 

can do for people in this country who support Israel’s right to exist is 

to support us. We support it.

I have contended for a long time tha t the State of Israel is an 

irreversible fact of history and since it is such a fact of history, there 

are three reasons why it should probably be supported.

One, America’s word is there. A nation can be no stronger than 

its word; second, because of the $5 million a day investment which 

is substantial; and third, because of the military options it represents 

for us there and the geopolitical location.

Having said that, we ought to be able to expect the highest and 

best humane conduct as a result of th at support.

Mr. Gray. One further question, you mention on page 5 that you 

noticed the flexibility in attitudes of the white community which are 

worthy of note.

Could you expand on that? Do you see the possibility of change of 

the apartheid system vis-a-vis the kinds of nonviolent struggle tha t 

you were one of the major participants in in this country as a civil 

rights movement?

Reverend Jackson. Only if it is a mass struggle and n ot a series of 

parties around certain liberals’ houses. It has to be a serious mass 

dramatic struggle much like Dr. King led and much like Gandhi led.

One of the things tha t pleasantly surprised me was an expanding 

witness of the church, white and black leaders in rather high visible 

profile relationships. Bishop Tutu’s call for people to react in civil 

disobedience was a major step forward toward the theology and the 

theological sense of apartheid. There was a conference of 6,000 ministers and church leaders the week before we got there.
21

About the only thing they had agreed on was tha t apartheid is a 

state of sin. Many of them had been embracing apartheid because 

they have been the state church supporters of th at arrangement.

That is a step forward in my judgment. The church began to become visible, to resent as opposed to enforce.

As it went to the academic community, you had men and women 

who had been trained at Oxford and Harvard and other places around 

this country and Europe who were intimidated by the process. Their 

books had been banned. Their research areas had been limited. That is 

the dissension.

I might say we found an English-speaking press struggling to 

represent the highest and best of a free speech tradition and that is 

they really carried most of what I said even if some ot them editorially disagreed every now and then. Even though some writers are 

banned, there is a real struggle by the press to represent what I call 

the highest and best in the free press tradition.

The par ty now has 17 members, far too few to make a significant 

difference in terms of a major vote. There is a very definite constituency of white people who recognize that apartheid is uncivilized 

and they want to change.

Another evidence is about 200 doctors in the last 4 or 5 years have 

left the country. They feel that the tension is too much to bear.

I would say to assume tha t there is this great unanimous consent 

among whites tha t support apartheid really is not so. There are some 

Ralph McGill’s in South Africa and there are some whites tha t are 

calling for a constitutional convention. We need to know more about 

who they are. They need to be identified.

Mr. Gray. Thank you, Reverend Jackson.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Wolpe.

Mr. Wolpe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Reverend Jackson, I think the state ment you have presented to 

this committee represented one of the most effective and persuasive 

critiques of both what is happening in South Africa and American 

policy toward South Africa.

There are two points I would like to focus attention on briefly 

before asking a question. One is the point that you made very effectively in response to an earlier question which is the coincidence of 

American self-interest with American principles in terms of human 

rights.

I think it is frequently perceived that considerations of national 

self-interest are inconsistent with honoring our commitment to 

human rights. I think this is one of those instances where it is very 

clear that the American self-interest happens to coincide very clearly 

with what makes sense in terms of what America has, at least on 

paper, advocated for some time.

The other point that I think bears repetition is the significance of 

the U.S. role in addressing the issue in South Africa because of the 

ways in which any national relationships prop up the South African 

regime.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask permission at this point if we 

might insert in the record the data available for the year 1978, the 

details of the economic relationships of many countries of the world 

with the South African regime both in terms of exports and in terms 

of imports.
22

Mr. Solarz. Without objection, the relevant material supplied 

by Mr. Wolpe will be inserted in the record at this time.

[The documents referred to follow:]

South African trade— 1978

In m ill io ns of Exports: U.S . do lla rs IF S to ta l____________ ________ ______ _______________________ 12.824

United State s______________________________________________ 1, 709. 1

United Kingdom___________________________________________ 1, 389. 6

Japa n_____________________________________________________ 885. 0

German y__________________________________________________ 815. 2

Fra nce____________________________________________________ 418. 9

Ital y_____________________________________________________ 407. 2

Switzerla nd________________________________________________ 330. 0

Belgium__________________________________________________ 310. 7

Netherlands_______________________________________________ 216. 8

Hong Kong------------------------------------------------------------------------- 172.9

Ca nada___________________________________________________ 151. 0

Sp ain _____________________________________________________ 115. 3

Republic of China__________________________________________ 114. 4

Israel_____________________________________________________ 65. 6

Australia__________________________________________________ 65. 2

Denm ark _________________________________________________ 33. 1

Austria___________________________________________________ 29. 7

Greece____________________________________________________ 28. 0

Norwa y___________________________________________________ 26. 0

Sweden___________________________________________________ 21. 0

Mexico________________________________________ 10. 4

Turke y___________________________________________________ 9. 8

New Zealand______________________________________________ 8. 6

Fin lan d___________________________________________________ 1. 8

Imports:

IF S to ta l____ _____________ ________________________________ 7.20 3

Germany __________________________________________________ 1, 528. 3

United Sta tes ______________________________________________ 1, 218. 7

United King dom___________________________________________ 1, 218. 3

Ja pa n____________________________________________________ 950. 0

Fra nce ____________________________________________________ 567. 1

Ital y_____________________________________________________ 268. 6

Switzerland________________________________________________ 195. 9

Netherlands_______________________________________________ 173. 3

Australia__________________________________________________ 155. 0

Belgium___________________________________________________ 134. 2

Can ada ___________________________________________________ 97. 6

Sweden___________________________________________________ 92. 8

Spain_____________________________________________________ 58. 7

Hong Kong________________________________________________ 46. 0

Republic of C hina__________________________________________ 41. 5

Austria___________________________________________________ 41. 1

Norway ___________________________________________________ 37. 2

Finland___________________________________________________ 28. 7

Isra el_____________________________________________________ 28. 0

Denmark__________________________________________________ 25. 7

New Z ealand______________________________________________ 7. 4

Greece____________________________________________________ 2. 4

Mexico___________________________________________________ 1. 6

Turkey___________________________________________________ 1. 2

Malays ia__________________________________________________ . 2

So urce : IMF Direction of Trade, 1979.
23

Mr. Wolpe. I think it is striking, for example, tha t the United 

States appears at the very head of the list in terms of South Africa, 

being the recipient of South African exports. The United Kingdom is 

second and Japa n is third and Germany is fourth; France is fifth. 

Italy is sixth.

Israel, which has been referred to, is somewhat down that list. The 

United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany are at the 

top of tha t list because they have such an overwhelming amount of 

economic trade that is involved in South Africa.

It just seems to me absolutely crucial that our country recognize 

the significance of our trading relationship to tha t regime.

I am pleased you have drawn attention to tha t relationship.

The question I would ask relates to other recommendations that 

have been made. You focused on four suggestions in terms of U.S. 

policy vis-a-vis South Africa. Others have suggested tha t the Car ter 

administration can and should do much more. The Janu ary 1978 

issue of “Foreign Affairs” is where William Cotter, the p ast president 

■of the African American Institu te and C. Clyde Ferguson of the 

Harvard Law School proposed 41 steps the U.S. Government might 

take to indicate our continuing growmg displeasure with apartheid.

Could you react to those proposals? I am sure you are aware of them.

Reverend J ackson. Yes; I have read those statements.

In my recommendation of the White House conference on South 

Africa, the substance of those recommendations would be in such a 

conference because you could have 41 steps or 141 steps b ut you must 

establish the fundamental foundation that South Africans who are 

black are human beings and human beings have human rights and 

those rights involve citizenship and the right to vote and legal status.

Once we establish tha t one thing, the rest of it falls in line. J ust 

establish this one point. You have the right to vote and you have 

that judicial protection, and from that, you can organize labor operator 

unions and you can then begin to demand wages and then you can 

begin the whole position in government.

You can make your own recommendations about how to have the 

rest of it. That is why I try n ot to deal with a laundry list. I try to 

deal with the fundamental thing and that is the citizenship and 

legal status.

1 would like to back up on something you said about what we did in 

Nicaragua and Iran and are about to do in the Middle East. We are 

again as a Nation allowing the tail to wag the dog. We are allowing 

special interests to jeopardize the national interests. In the national 

interest, we are relating to all of Africa which tremendously outweighs 

the special interest to protect a few of South Africa alone.

We are bucking the rhythm of the rest of the continent to protect 

South Africa’s illegal, immoral, illegitimate relationship with people. 

It seems to me that is foolhardy.

What America can do if it chooses to provide positive leadership 

is if we could help aid South Africa beyond the curtain of fear which 

separates the blacks from the whites and has both of them in the 

shadows of the tree and neither in the sunshine, South Africa being 

able to march militarily from the Cape to Algeria and nobody can
24

stop South Africa but economically, if South Africa becomes a civilized 

society toward other human beings, it could probably march from the 

Cape to France without being stopped economically and be healing 

the rest of Africa all along the way.

When one considers just 25 million people and the wealth beneath 

the soil in South Africa and all tha t land and her neighbors and her 

industrial development and the strategic position being on the Continent of Africa, the Cape with the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean 

coming together and kissing and tha t tremendous trade route, tha t 

really could be the treasure of the Earth. That could really be a 

southern African economic market. It could be a tremendous asset 

to world development if they could get beyond the racial relations 

there. It could have much to offer itself and the world.

It seems to me as opposed to trying to buy time and the caveman 

conduct, it ought to be spending for its interest and ours a way to 

relieve it of its fears. I t has far more today in the new world to gain 

than it does trying to protect the old world.

Mr. Wolpe. I share those sentiments fully. I would add a footnote 

and I would be interested in your reaction.

Might it not also be argued tha t even those corporate special interests tha t perceive themselves as having an interest in the status 

quo in terms of American foreign policy and in terms of their investment in South Africa, I would argue it is to their enlightened selfinterest to recognize th at unless we make changes in that policy and 

break the partnership between this country and that regime tha t 

their longtime economic interest in the African Continent which are 

beginning to be much greater relative to tha t of South Africa or are 

they going to be harmed?

Reverend Jackson. The psychological factor is someone said why 

did you single out America and Israel? It is for a very psychological 

reason. People have high hopes in those two nations. T hat is a psychological factor. Where there are no previous expectations, there is no 

basis for disappointment. There are people who really look forward to 

this country for being what it is on paper, a leader of the free world.

It is the same way with people who have some sense of Israel’s 

longing to be a rejected stone t hat turns into a cornerstone, economic 

harmony in the Middle East.

Even as people appeal for a positive leadership in those two nations, 

the isolation really grows out of a certain real desire for those nations 

to be leaders as opposed to enforcers of a very vicious status quo.

Mr. Wolpe. Thank you very much.

Mr. Diggs. I think tha t last point is very important because you 

have to look at it in tha t context. If you are going to put the gentleman ’s insertion in the record in proper perspective, the fact tha t 

Israel may be 10th or 12th or 15th on the list as opposed to us being 

No. 1 and England being No. 2, unless it is put in the proper perspective in view of our historical relationship and the differences between 

our relationship with South Africa and England’s historical relationship with South Africa which is entirely different, France’s relationship not only with South Africa b ut in a competitive sense with us, 

in other parts of the world, the historical World War II relationship 

with Germany and South Africa and then the more modern relationship tha t South Africa has had with Israel, the differences are so 

fundamental that to look at a list like that and say the United States
25

is first and therefore the implication in some people’s mind is tha t we 

ought to clean up our own shop and put pressure on England and France 

without making any reference to the basis upon which these other 

relationships are made and I think tha t would be unfortunately 

misleading.

I do not subscribe to tha t view, gentlemen, because I know of his 

personal interest in this matter. 1 know his conceptual purity on 

this matter. I do think the point tha t was just made by Reverend 

Jackson has helped to put the statistics that he proposed in the record 

at this point into some kind of perspective.

I have seen th at very list or a similar list used before. When I say 

“used” I do no t mean th at in a disrespectful way. I mean it was offeretl 

before as an explanation tha t when you look a t the list of our trade 

with South Africa as opposed to someone else’s trade, we are not so 

bad. They do not go on to explain or to answer the question as to why 

their relationship is and what it is based on.

I just wanted to make that point.

Mr. Wolpe. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond?

Mr. Solarz. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. Wolpe. I think he may have misconstrued what I was saying. 

My concern is tha t we recognize tha t there are an awful lot of countries tha t are helping to prop up the regime in South Africa by their 

relationship to it.

Reverend Jackson in response to a question from the other gentleman from Michigan indicated that indeed your concern was not only 

with Israel but concerned with all the other countries.

It seems to me it makes some sense to realize that there are a lot of 

countries that are in my judgment contributing or supporting the 

apartheid regime. My interest is that we deal specifically and immediately with that which we have immediate control over which is the 

American involvement and second tha t we recognize the support of 

the regime no matter where it is coming from and tha t we be consistent and clear in trying to provide the kind of leadership tha t will 

turn all of th at support around.

Reverend J ackson. Mr. Wolpe, you will remember President Carter 

went to th e Western nations a few weeks ago and discussed the energy 

situation and I believe it was Japa n where the conference was held. 

They even had a premeeting to determine what they were going to do. 

He came in with a factor called “leadership” and the pecking order 

fell in line and they followed No. 1.

Not only can we measure what is happening in South Africa by what 

we have invested but by the signals we send other people th at it is our 

right. We are leading other nations to invest there saying it is our right 

and the right thing to do.

Capital draws capital. That is why our responsibility and th at of our 

allies in line with their relationship to us must be very different in my 

judgment.

Mr. Solarz. When the second bells ring we will recess to vote and 

then we will come back for more questions.

Given the extent to which the gentlemen from Michigan as well as 

the gentleman from Pennsylvania has entered into an interesting 

colloquy with the witness concerning the economic relationship 

between Israel and South Africa, I do think it would be in order to 

make a few observations as chairman of the subcommittee.
26

Basically, wh at I would like to say is th at for those of us who are 

de ep ly concerned ab ou t the survival and sec urity of Isr ael, as well as 

th e stru ggle for rac ial eq ua lity and jus tice in So uth Africa, it is 

pa rti cu larly im po rta nt to muster the broadest possible base of su ppo rt for the efforts which are needed on beha lf of th ose very im po rtan t 

objectives here in the Congress.

In th ose te rms, I think it is ter rib ly im po rta nt fo r us to bo espe cially 

sen sitive to the ve ry leg itima te concerns and sen sitivities of the 

respec tive elem ents of those coalition s. At a tim e whe n the re has b een 

a lot of t alk in this co un try in th e last few weeks a bo ut the differences 

between the black and Jew ish com munities in America, I think it 

might n ot be inappropria te to call attention to th e f ac t t h at there ha ve 

bee n areas in which those two com munities have wor ked v ery closely, 

pa rti cu larly in the con tex t of the Congress, when it comes to fore ign 

policy.

1 think it is especially im po rtan t to tak e note of t he fa ct that on vote 

after vote of real importance to Israel, the overwhelming major ity of 

bla ck Members of Congress voted on beh alf of legisla tion which is 

str on gly sup portiv e of the survival and sec urity of Israel, ju st as on 

vo te after vote involving me asures relati ng to que stio ns of rac ial 

jus tice and equality and m ajor ity ru le no t only in So uth A frica b ut in 

Rhodesia as well, th e o verw helm ing m ajo rity of Jewis h M embers voted 

on beh alf of legislation whi ch was designed to foste r th e strugg le for 

major ity rule and decency and racial justice throug ho ut so uthe rn 

Africa. I think we have bee n wor king ve ry closely in the pa st an d 

hop efully we will con tinu e to w ork very closely in the futur e.

I ga ther on th e basis of you r tes tim ony th at it is y ou r feeling t h at it 

would be helpful, in the interest of racial eq ua lity in South Africa, if 

Isr ael reduced the level of its dip lom atic rep res entat ion which it ha d 

rec ently incre ased as well as reduce d or elim ina ted the level of its 

economic activ ity w ith South Africa?

Reveren d J ackson. I t would be fai r to say th at alm ost all of my 

tes tim ony was on Am eric a’s conduct the re. When I singled ou t thi s 

country , I mentio ned Isr ael as an also.

I would think this wou ld be the tim e for us to build upon those 

relationships t hat we have ha d in th e p ast and also deal with t hat which 

in fac t does threaten them.

Mr. Solarz. I appre cia te th at . I jus t wan t to clarify for t he record 

the fac t t hat it was m y impression that it was yo ur te stimo ny th at y ou 

were no t calling upon Israel to do anyth ing wi th res pec t to South 

Africa th at you were no t also calling u pon the o ther West ern co untrie s 

which have sign ificant economic relatio nsh ips wi th South Africa to 

do as well.

Would th at be a fair sta temen t, Reveren d Jac kso n?

Reverend J ackson. T hat is rig ht.

Mr. Solarz. I th in k th at is a ve ry he lpfu l and constructive wa y of 

pu tti ng it. I think th at serv es to minimize wh ate ver sensitivities are 

cre ated in the process of m aking t hat o bse rvation . I th in k fra nk ly it is 

a much more productive wa y of pu tti ng it bec ause if inter na tio na l 

pres sure is going to pla y a role in the stru ggle for rac ial eq ua lity in 

South Africa it is going to take actio n, no t only by Israe l, b ut b y man y 

oth er countries as well.
27

If Israel was the only country to cease dealing with South Africa, 

while i t may make a contribution to the objectives you spoke about, 

it would obviously be a relatively modest contribution compared to 

the impact tha t disinvestment or minimization of diplomatic relations 

between many other countries and South Africa would have as well.

Having said tha t, let me recess the hearing for 10 minutes. I have 

several other questions. You might want to respond to that observation or the other members m ight want to say something as well.

The subcommittee is adjourned for 10 minutes.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed for a vote on the floor.}

A F T E R R E C E SS

Mr. Solarz. How do you respond to the argument which a number 

of people have made that if international pressure including American 

pressure against South Africa is substantially increased through 

disinvestment, derecognition diplomatically, and that sort of thing, 

that, it would only have the effect of driving the Afrikaners deeper into 

the laager and it would make them more resistant to change than they 

have been up to now?

Reverend Jackson. People may resist pressure but they change 

because of it. We asked a number of Afrikaner business leaders who 

are arguing tha t a lot of change has taken place in the last 10 years, 

we said if th at is true, what is the basis for the change?

They said four things essentially. This is like six different groups of 

people. They said one, the fall of the French, British, and Portuguese 

to the North has had an impact on t hat society. They say disinvestment has slowed down economic growth potential enough to cause 

the business leaders to reconsider apartheid and its incompatibility 

to the economic system.

Third, the uprisings created a climate of economic uncertainty and 

the isolation which has forced the generation of youth who want to 

join the world to say they want to participate in the Olympics. They 

said they cannot join the world representing this antihu man 

proposition.

Those four factors or events have had as much to do with change 

as anything else. That is why I encourage disinvestment because even 

the people who said they are for change, the urban bank people and 

tha t crowd would say all right, if you want that to happen and if you 

think i t would encourage investm ent, even they had to admit, investment would simply take off the pressure for them to change.

That is why we finally decided on disinvestment.

Mr. Solarz. You said in your testimony there was divided opinions 

among the black leaders and the black community about the question 

of foieign investment in South Africa. Is it your view tha t the great 

majority of black people in South Africa would prefer a policy of disinvestment or are you not sure as to how the percentages would be?

Reverend J ackson. The workers, for example, in Port Elizabeth at 

the Sunday meeting before the official meeting said suppose the plants 

were taken over by the Government. They said it would not make 

any difference to us except they will not be able to run them for a 

long period of time. It would make no fundamental difference in their 

lives. There were some who were willing to say more openly than 

others that it was making a fundamental difference.
28

Mr. Solarz. Did you say during the course of your visit to South 

Africa t hat you detected differences in the attitude toward change in 

South Africa on the part of the older whites on the one hand in comparison to the younger whites on the other?

Reverend J ackson. The young whites are obviously more educated 

than some of the older whites. They feel the pains of isolation. They 

have looked back and they have come here to American universities 

and have been together with black people and white people and other 

kinds of creeds of people.

There is a restlessness there.

Even the Jewish and the English speaking and the British element, 

there is some noticeable difference there. There is nothing th at America 

is doing that is forcing the matter to a head. We are giving the people 

a choice, shall we choose between the American recommendations for 

change and shared power or shall we resist them?

We are not recommending anything. We are just indistinguishably 

connected with the status quo.

Mr. Solarz. One of your recommendations, Reverend Jackson, was 

that we prohibit trading in the Krugerrand. Do you have any reason 

to believe tha t if we took such an initiative that any other country 

would follow suit anti if no other countiy was prepared to follow suit, 

would such an unilateral action on our part make a difference and if 

so, in what way in terms of the prospects for change in South Africa?

Reverend J ackson. It would make a difference because the amount 

of the Krugerrand sale here is a tremendous asset on their society.

Mr. Solarz. Do you know how much?

Reverend Jackson. $600 million a year.

Mr. Solarz. From the United States.

Reverend J ackson. Out of a total of $1.2 billion sales in Krugerrand 

which is about $600 million here.

Mr. Solarz. About 50 percent?

Reverend J ackson. About 50 perecnt and it helps keep the price 

of gold up. It helps keep the value of the dollar down. J ust this whole 

inflated value attached to gold is also attached to the Krugerrand. It 

is one of those kinds of innocent odorless and tasteless froms of 

chemical warfare. I really would not support South Africa but just 

give me a little lobster. That is a terrible regime bu t a Krugerrand is 

kind of innocent.

The fact is it is not very innocent. It is a very heavy p art of their 

ability to leverage gold.

Mr. Solarz. Did you have any discussions during your trip to 

South Africa with Mr. Koornhof?

Reverend Jackson. Pete Koornhof, yes.

Mr. Solarz. Did you get any indication in your meeting with him 

of an intention on his part to enter into serious and substantive 

discussions with leaders of the black community in South Africa with 

respect to trying to evolve some kind of meaningful power sharing 

arrangement in the country?

Reverend Jackson. I was impressed with Mr. Koomhof’s delivery 

but not impressed with his ability to deliver. I n one sense he appears 

to be a man of great convictions, a trained man who is much too 

intelligent to try to embrace apartheid in some philosophical sense.

The fact is he does not speak for that government. They simply 

tolerate his advocacy. He cannot decide anything and make a 

difference.
29

One has to support his stan ding up but one cannot put a lot of 

confidence in his abilit y to change anything.

Mr. S ola rz. Was it you r feeling tha t he personally was committed 

to what you would call a meaningful change b ut he is un able to deliver 

on that or is it you r fe eling tha t Mr. Koo rnh of is o nly concerned about 

cosmetic changes rather than meaningful power sharing arrangements?

Rev eren d Jac kson. I think he would lik e to bring abo ut meaningful 

change but I think he underestimates two forces. I think he underestim ates the fears and the entrenchm ent of the Afrikaners. I think 

he underestimates the people with whom he has grown up.

I am convinced he underestimates the quest for bla ck people to get 

free. I think there is no real apprecia tion b y whit es in Sou th Afric a as 

to the boiling point of most blacks there.

I detect rath er clea rly on the tongues of the ve ry young and those 

who are not so you ng an acceptan ce of the fac t that they hav e to die 

to live. Th ey h ave to fight to live. Th ey h ave to use some of the same 

tactics that were used in SW AP O and by the people up north to live.

Man y of the young people kno w tha t, and the day the y fight for, 

the y mig ht not live to see. Th at has to be their price for social change.

I thin k there is a fu ndamen tal underestimation of the revolution ary 

quest for liberation by blacks.

Mr. Solarz. In the absence of the kind of mean ingful political, 

social, and economic changes whic h would sat isfy the aspirations of 

the bla ck people of South Afr ica, in your judgment how long do you 

thin k it will be before an indigenous liber ation movement begins to 

operate militar ily in South Africa?

Rev erend Jac ks on . I would not want to say tha t because it migh t 

hurt their chances of being successful.

The two choices that are there now is a serious economic political 

ratio nale process of change and shared power.

I mig ht add even thou gh it is a minuscule level, bac k in the South, 

wh at essentially happe ned, Congressm an Diggs and you and others 

recall, we raised the moral question of our d ign ity and of the economic 

and poli tical order but the political order in a ve ry demagogic fashion 

disregarded us so we did some marc hing and some praying and some 

dying and it still disregarded us.

We star ted using econom ic bo ycotts and we finally forced the economic order to convince the political order t hat southern apartheid cost 

too m uch. The economic bosses made decisions and the p olitical people 

fell in line.

Yo u are either going to have tha t kind of process where the economic 

order finally stands up and moves in unison with some serious economic challenge to Afr ikaner Gov ernm ent.

Yo u are either going to hav e that kind of radical change or you 

are going to have a bloody black-white confrontation tha t will be 

protracted. When tha t starts, no one can tell— except it is inevitable.

M y reading of this is there is something within the people that tells 

them that they ought to be free and something on the outside like 

north of them tells them tha t i t is possible.

When children at crossroads, in spite of all of the oppression the 

squatte r’s camp represents, can be at a one-room schoolhouse tha t 

the y have constructed called “ pea ce” and the y can still have a clear 

vision and sing a song, it is clear noth ing that has happened has been 

successful in alterin g the quest for liberation.
30

Th e fun era ls have simply been pla tfo rms th at say it has to come 

quicker. No thing has happened the re th at impedes the libera tion 

strugg le. Most of the n ega tive stu ff is a s tim ulu s for it.

Mr. Solarz. T ha nk y ou ve ry much, Reveren d Jac kson.

Mr. Diggs.

Mr. Diggs. I have one question , Mr. Ch air man, relatin g to Re veren d Jack so n’s suggestion to the President th at we have a Wh ite 

House conference. Cou ld you tell us your per cep tion or y ou r con cept 

of the kin d of conference you ha d in min d, wha t it migh t cove r in 

general and wh at you would expec t to come ou t of it an d who would 

you e xpe ct to parti cip ate in it?

Reveren d J ackson. Th e firs t thi ng to come ou t of it would be 

giving the Sou th African issue visibility. I think the Am erican 

pres s for example has failed us in covering so uthe rn Africa. That is 

why th ey are no t here toda y which is par t of the pro ble m. People 

do no t know about it.

NB C is anxious to cover a figh t in Sou th Africa and sell some soap 

and dogfood and stuff bu t th ey are no t here to cov er the business. 

T hat is why they should n ot be the re eith er.

A White House conferen ce would pu t mu ch on the minds of the 

Am erican press which becomes a way of ed uc ating the Am erican 

pub lic. I see th at as the first level of a ccomplish ment.

Second, I would think the Sub com mittee on So uth Africa for example ou gh t to help fash ion s uch an age nda . There are certa in thi ngs 

th at cann ot be left ou t of the South African scene bec ause So uth 

Africa to Rhode sia and Na mibi a is a part of a package of concern . 

We are j us t a few miles from Rhodesia.

Th e fact th at we could have distinct policies in Rhodesia an d 

embargoe s and all th at an d right across th e fence, a comple tely different 

policy, th at ju st shows the foolishness of the incoherenc e of the policy.

I t seems to me th at the se thi ngs are no t ap pa rent to the pub lic 

unless they are lifted up in a certa in kind of way. At seme po int in 

tim e you hav e wh at you call expert witnesses’ analy sis and at some 

po int conclusions and recom me ndations from a ve ry bro ad base of 

peop le and I have n ot conc eptualized the details of such a conference.

I have some sense of Whit e Hou se conferences th at are represen tativ e in their impac t. Ou t of th at comes a str on g position pa pe r th at 

does begin to educate peop le, n ot only on college cam puses bu t in the 

major public at large. Tha t is w ha t I would see.

If the Presi dent gives his full wei ght to th at , it ju st makes thi ngs 

ha pp en in the Un ite d Na tio ns and it ma kes things ha pp en in South 

Africa. It mak es things ha pp en h ere t h at would otherw ise no t h ap pe n 

wi th the South African q uestion which would stil l be un de r the rug 

bec aus e the Presi dent has no t come fo rth wi th an au thor ita tiv e 

position as he has on othe r issues. Th e Presiden t ess entially ignores 

it and forces i t to opera te un de r the im pe tus of its own power.

Mr. Diggs. Do you ge t the imp ress ion th at Chief Bu tulezi’s 

position on dis inv est me nt is rea lly his perso nal position or do you 

th in k th at is a rat ion alized position based upon counterpre ssu res 

from the Go vernm ent or othe r kin ds of forces th at migh t make his 

position counterpro ductive?

Re ver end J ackson. I th in k th e Chief, bec ause of the nu mber of 

people he represents, con siderably mo re at one leve l th an mo st
31

others, most others in South Africa are of the position where if ho 

calls for disinvestment, one of the first things a company would do 

is to fire something off to him and say you are forcing a lot of black 

folks to move out. He has to be mindful of th at as a tactic.

On the other hand, to call for disinvestment down there anti to 

be taken seriously is a step right into the land mines of the various 

business protective acts—which is another factor.

On the other hand, I think the Chief does not see the disinvestment 

versus investment argument as pivotal to the ultimate end of the 

liberation struggle there. That is why, for example, even though my 

position is different than his, we relate very well.

He was in Chicago last week. I think he is still in the country. 

We agree on almost everything except that because what is fundamental to me, he will accept the practical political idea of protect 

jobs right now but the most fundamental thing is he publicly ami 

privately avows to not go the Ban tu route. It seems everything else 

is methodological and temporary as compared with 6 million people 

finally conceding in some trade-off for a piece of desert.

I left there after meeting with him with a tremendous respect for 

his integrity and some awareness of the fact tha t I think he is operating on a hot stove without shoes, a very delicate position and with 

some challenging him and saying if you can say some things and 

get away w ith them, why does the Government let you do tha t and 

not others?

The consequences of moving on Butulezi will be more severe than 

to move in on some other people. It is just the fact that he is a very 

well-organized, disclipined politician and there are some people who 

represent nothing b ut ideas. If they are moved on, some folks will be 

upset b ut they are not organized to do anything.

If Butulezi is moved on, there are some people who might bring 

some immediate damage and I think he is more protected by the 

number of people he has organized than by any protection he gets 

from the Government.

I have real regard for his integrity.

Mr. Diggs. According to the press report release there were some 

of the younger elements who perceived themselves to be of the left 

of you and there are only three types of people involved in liberation 

movements—th at is, militant, more militant, and most militant— 

which are to the left of you and it does not mean you are subject 

to that characterization of moderate and they made some critical 

remarks about you and your motives and so on.

What do you think is the basis for their feeling you did not go far 

enough in what you said and where are these people when you are not 

around? You would think these would be the people who would be 

throwing bombs around there at night.

Reverend J ackson. The fact is that is an expression of the American 

population being misled by a press report. The fact of the matter is,, 

when we got there, a broad cross section of preachers, black and white, 

met us, the Bishop Tutu element. By the time we got to Capetown, 

the black consciousness element and the writers and the academic 

types and the workers from plants greeted us warmly. People were 

stopping cars in the middle of the street getting autographs saying 

keep on saying what you are saying.
32

We went down to Port Elizabeth. A church was designed to seat 

1,000. They had 3,000 people there and they were all on the outside. 

By the time we got to Regina, there were 3,000 people there. That was 

the sentiment of the people. When we got to Kwazulu, it was the same 

thing. There were two press reports tha t misled people.

It was said th at Bishop Zulu got up and said that outsiders really 

could not lead them. Tha t was out of context. He congratulated us 

lor coming and had this big celebration for us all day and he said no 

black American leader had ever come out in the rural areas to Kwazulu 

and furthermore, the urban leaders from Johannesburg had never 

come to Kwazulu and they were tired of people trying to tell them 

how to make decisions, coming from an urban situation, whether it 

was America or South Africa, who had not been to the delta or the 

Mississippi of tha t nation.

He was congratulating us on having come. In the meeting we had 

with Bishop Zulu and Bishop Tutu, one of the points of contention was 

neither Motlana nor Bishop Tut u had been to Kwazulu. The whole 

idea that he let us down is not accurate. Th at is completely taken out 

of context.

The idea about that being an element in Soweto, they said they did 

not need a preacher, they needed a pastor, and that was nothing but 

lies. When we got to Soweto those kids took us and carried us on their 

shoulders for a block right into the church. I guess you saw some of it 

on television. When we left it was the same thing.

Interestingly enough, there was no talk by any of the major three 

black leaders except praise whether it was Tutu, or Motlana. As a 

result of all three of them taking positive positions, it enabled us to 

pull off the unity meeting between the three of them. When we pulled 

off the meeting between them and they, really for their own reasons, 

did not want to come together but they finally tried to come together 

tha t night and no white leader who could immediately be condemned 

as a racist for challenging the unity meeting attended the meeting.

A black nameless, without an organization and without a portfolio, 

a black from Soweto said unifying black leadership was a diabolical 

Westem plot. How can one interpret the unity of divided black leadership as a plot except for liberation?

It just so happens this guy was not a youth, he was 56 years old, 

just out of prison 3 months and worked as a marketing representative 

for a milling company whose boss was upset with us because we took 

a position against the fight.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Gray.

Mr. Gray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Reverend Jackson, you mentioned earlier if South Africa basically 

got itself together and dealt with this fundamental question of human 

dignity anti empowerment of all its people th at South Africa could 

have a healing role throughout all the rest of Africa.

Could you expand on wha t you meant by “healing role”?

Reverend J ackson. If South Africa ceased to embrace apartheid 

and thus make it really eligible and appealing to Nigeria as an industrial partner, between the developing process in Nigeria and the 

developed process in South Africa and since there would be no fundamental ideological conflict with any other African nation, you would 

jus t have the heailng process and Africa would be inherent in such a 

relationship.
33

It could never take place as long as apartheid exists because apartheid and the aspiration of those black people could never be reconciled. It seems to me th at when President Carter pulled together Begin 

and Sadat, and everybody was saying i t could no t be done, it could 

only be done because there was a regard by the bo th of them for what 

this country had to offer through its President.

I think we need a Camp David type of concern for South Africa 

and it can be argued reasonably well t ha t forces from within South 

Africa identifying with the argument as to the advantages of moving 

beyond apartheid, not only is it morally bankrupt but it is economically unfeasible. It no longer has a theological underpinning.

In other words, you do not have people walking around saying 

God really meant for this to be. You do not even have that kind of 

underpinning. That is gone. It does not have an economic underpinning. It does not have anything protecting i t right now but a raw 

military underpinning.

Basically white people there know that a change is going to come. 

They just want to know when and how much bloodshed will be involved, hopefully none.

It is just t ha t tender in my judgment.

Mr. Gray. You mentioned also in your testimony that blacks 

have no official power. Did you detect in your visit any signs tha t 

blacks may have a power to bring about change if not “official”?

Reverend J ackson. Obviously as the labor base, if it would bring 

up work strikes, it could do to South Africa what happened in Iran. 

The Government uses its power to make that veiy unlikely, the way 

it locks up leaders unilaterally, the way i t detains leaders, the way it 

assassinates leaders, the way it makes any political organization illegal.

The amount of money spent on surveillance and wiretapping and 

th at type of thin g simply discourages t ha t kind of a rational process. 

Th at is why the only movement that can survive now other than an 

economic legal rationalizing process would have to be a bloody one 

because people’s rational options have been eliminated by the system.

Mr. Gray. How would you characterize the present administration’s 

policy toward South Africa with pas t administrations’ policies? Are 

there any significant substantive differences and if so what?

Reverend J ackson. I think the Nixon-Ford White House just 

embraced South Africa as an African ally. The expanding of relationships occurred during those regimes.

The support of the SASOL energy process was kicked underway in 

those regimes. In other words right now Nixon said they are going to 

be heroes. They got a lot of play in the press.

There is just a real hope in South Africa tha t Carter will use the 

idea of his advocating human rights as a threat because they never 

know a t what point he is going to turn the human rights sermon into 

a program of substance. The sermon threatens them. The substance 

could do them in in a very significant kind of way.

They celebrated Andy Young’s being removed from the U.N. but 

they would celebrate even more if Carter himself was going to be 

removed. That is their perception, that this administration is in 

conflict but the feeling is this administration is not politically moved to 

do anything beyond advocacy.

That is why I think that is the one error this administration is 

making, by underestimating the extent of the South African Watergate 

and its influence peddling in this country. Six months ago I read this
34

country was doing some surveillance in South Africa. They screamed 

loud and made a big international stink of it but the fact is there is 

circumstantial evidence. The South African Watergate scandal has 

tentacles in this country and perhaps in the last Government. There 

has been no call by a committee of Congress or by this administration 

for the Justice Department head, Mr. Civiletti, to attempt to meet 

with Mr. Rhoodie to find out to what extent his testimony could bear 

light on this situation.

I would hope, Mr. Solarz and Congressman Gray, that one of the 

things this committee would call for would be a meeting with Mr. 

Rhoodie. I think he would be instructive to us.

Mr. Gray. Let me than k you, Reverend Jackson, for being here. 

I am sure I am joined by the other colleagues tha t your testimony has 

certainly been helpful and certainly your firsthand observations of 

South Africa will be helpful to the whole deliberative process establishing policy throughout this Nation.

Thank you very much.

Reverend J ackson. Tha nk you.

Mr. Solarz. Let me conclude by saying if Mr. Rhoodie is prepared 

to meet with us, we would be delighted to meet with him. I will 

ask the staff to prepare whatever communications are necessary in 

order to convey to Mr. Rhoodie our interest in having him testify 

before our committee if he is in a position to come over here and 

testify. If he is not, we would be prepared to speak to his representatives and we would certainly be prepared to have either some of the 

members or the staff go over and meet with him if such arrangements 

could be made.

1 want to assure you we are concerned about the implications of the 

South African information scandal for our own situation.

This subcommittee is pursuing in a variety of different ways its own 

investigation of that situation.

Reverend J ackson. I think tha t those of us who take high profile 

positions, I think our lives and careers are in jeopardy so long as 

foreign governments feel they have some freedom to in fact violate 

our national security. Given the stakes that are involved in the South 

African economics, wiretapping and buying media and investing 

money in political campaigns, threatening life and limb is very much 

within the purview of their conduct.

That is why, Mr. Solarz, I have taken some aggressive positions 

fo determine the extent of that influence peddling system in this 

country.

Mr. Solarz. I quite agree with you. I want to assure you we have 

already taken steps to pursue this matter and we will continue to 

pursue it very vigorously.

We certainly would appreciate any suggestions or recommendations 

which you or anybody else might have from time to time about how 

we can constructively proceed on this matter.

I f I may close by giving a little sermon on some of the matters t ha t 

were discussed today. I simply want to conclude by saying tha t, in my 

judgement, those of us who are very much committed not only to the 

survival and security of Israel but to racial justice and equality in 

South Africa need all the help we can get if we are going to muster the 

kind of support within our own country for policies which will help 

achieve both of those objectives.
35

If Jewish-Americans could count on the support of no other groups 

for policies favorable to Israel other than the Jewish community, it 

would be a sad day for the future of Israel, just as it would not bode 

well for the future of racial justice and equality in South A frica if the 

black community in this country could not count on support from any 

other group for their concerns with respect to South Africa.

I think if we have learned anything over the course of the last 

decade it is that you do not have to be Jewish to support Israel just as 

you do not have to be black to be concerned about the current 

situation in South Africa.

I think those of us in positions of leadership and responsibility and 

visibility have a special obligation as we deal with these problems to 

conduct ourselves in such a way as to maximize the support which we 

can muster for our respective positions on these issues.

I am sure that in that effort we will be able to count on your own 

continued efforts and leadership just as I know the members of this 

subcommittee who have been deeply concerned about both of those 

problems, and other foreign policy issues as well, will continue to play 

a responsible and constructive role.

I think this has been a very useful hearing. We very much appreciate 

your taking so much time to share your views with us.

I do hope, now that you have testified before the subcommittee, 

that you will feel free from time to time if you have any suggestions 

about ways in which we can be helpful in these matters to let us know 

about it.

As I indicated at the beginning of the hearing, we are planning to 

have an extensive series of hearings on this whole question next year. 

Perhaps we might even look forward to your participation again at 

that time.

The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

L et te r F rom G en er al M oto rs C orp., to R ep res en ta ti ve S olarz,- 

R eg ar ding T es timon y of R ev . J es se L . J ackso n

General Motors Corp.,

General Motors Building, 

Detroit, Mich., October 15, 1979.

Hon. Stephen J. Solarz,

U.S. House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Solarz: This refers to the testimony of the Rev. Jesse Jackson 

before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa on 

September 6, 1979.

In his prepared testimony, he stated, “Ford and GM sell cars and trucks to 

the government of South Africa, thereby circumventing the intent of the Commerce Department’s regulations by getting parts from Britain a,nd England, but 

producing paramilitary equipment for South Africa.” We disagree with the 

accuracy of tha t statement.

By way of background, GM stockholders considered (but rejected) a proposal 

at its 1979 annual meeting tha t would have prohibited the sale of any vehicles or 

spare parts or provide any services to the South African police or military. The 

proponents of th e GM proposal relied, in part, on a letter from the U.S. State 

Department indicating sales by a U.S.-owned company of non-U.S. origin commodities and technical dat a to the South African police and military might 

circumvent th e intent of U.S. law.

The State Department subsequently indicated this lette r may have been subject 

to misinterpretation and, in clarification, advised that such sales by overseas 

subsidiaries of U.S. corporations are not affected by U.S. law. Moreover, the 

United States has not made it a policy objective to keep such commodities and 

technical dat a from reaching the South African military and police.

As you are aware, the Commerce Department regulations prohibit the export 

or reexport from the United States to South Africa or Namibia of commodities, 

technical data or product of the data if they are to be delivered to police or militar y entities. It should be noted that GM South African only sells to the police 

and military in South Africa regular commercial vehicles with neither U.S. 

content nor U.S. sourced technology exported after the effective date of the

regulations.

The commercial vehicles produced by GM South African are general purpose, 

similar to those available at dealerships. Equivalent products are readily 

available from other manufacturers in South Africa which are not subsidiaries 

of U.S. companies, and it is clear that the refusal of GMSA to sell such vehicles 

would not affect the operations of the m ilitary or police.

Please include this letter in the official record of your hearings.

Sincerely, R. F. Magill.

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