Filed 3/26/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

SIMONA WILSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 

EDISON COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B275845

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. YC065545)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for Los Angeles 

County, Ross M. Klein, Judge. Judgment reversed and matter 

remanded; cross-appeal dismissed as moot.

Grassini, Wrinkle & Johnson, Roland Wrinkle and Lars Johnson 

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Southern California Edison, Carla M. Blanc, Leon Bass, Jr.; 

Limnexus, Arnold Barba, Sandra Sakamoto; Munger, Tolles & Olson, 

Stephen M. Kristovich; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Jonathan H. 

Eisenman and Robin Meadow for Defendant and Appellant. 
This case is before us for the second time. It involves a 

homeowner–plaintiff Simona Wilson–who bought a house next door to 

an electrical substation (the Topaz substation) operated by defendant 

Southern California Edison Company (Edison). After remodeling her 

master bathroom four years after she moved into the house, Wilson felt 

low levels of electricity in her remodeled shower when she adjusted the 

showerhead. This flow of electricity was due to neutral-to-earth voltage 

(NEV), also referred to as stray voltage, on her property. Because NEV

is unavoidable in a grounded electrical system, such as the one operated 

by Edison, Edison was unable to completely eliminate it from Wilson’s 

property as Wilson insisted, although it recommended ways to reduce 

the voltage in her shower to below-perceptible levels. Fearing for her 

safety and the safety of her three children, Wilson moved out of the 

house into a rental property. Because she could not afford to pay both 

the rent on that property and the mortgage on her house, the house 

went into foreclosure, ruining her credit.

Wilson sued Edison for negligence, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (IIED), and nuisance, and sought punitive damages. 

In the first trial, the jury found in favor of Wilson on all three claims, 

awarding $550,000 on the negligence and IIED claims, $500,000 on the 

nuisance claim, and $3 million in punitive damages. Edison appealed. 

In a published decision (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co.

(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123 (Wilson I), we found there was insufficient 

evidence to support the negligence and IIED claims or the punitive 

damages award, and found that the jury relied upon irrelevant evidence 

when determining the nuisance claim. (Id. at p. 130.) We reversed the 

2
judgment, ordered judgment entered in favor of Edison on the 

negligence and IIED claims, and remanded to the trial court for a 

retrial on the nuisance claim. (Ibid.)

On retrial the trial court, over Edison’s objections, allowed Wilson 

to present extensive evidence of incidents related to stray voltage at the 

house that occurred before Wilson bought it and at other nearby

properties, and Edison’s conduct with regard to those incidents. The 

jury again found in favor of Wilson, and awarded her $1.2 million in 

damages on her nuisance claim. Wilson moved for her attorney fees 

under Code of Civil Procedure1 1021.5, on the ground that her action 

resulted in a published decision (Wilson I) that addressed an important 

right affecting the public interest, i.e., whether the California Public 

Utilities Commission (the PUC) had exclusive jurisdiction over claims 

regarding stray voltage. The trial court denied the motion, finding that 

Wilson’s financial stake in the litigation was a sufficient incentive to 

pursue the litigation.

Edison appeals from the judgment in favor of Wilson, and Wilson 

cross-appeals from the denial of her attorney fee motion. 

Edison contends in its appeal that: (1) it is entitled to judgment 

because, as a matter of law, the harm Wilson suffered cannot outweigh 

the public benefit of providing electricity; (2) it is entitled to a new trial 

because the trial court improperly allowed Wilson to present 

inflammatory irrelevant evidence related to stray voltage incidents 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.

3

 
involving prior owners or tenants of the property or other nearby 

properties; (3) it is entitled to a new trial on damages (if not a retrial on 

both liability and damages) because the jury improperly included in its 

award damages to which Wilson was not entitled, such as attorney fees; 

and (4) it is entitled to a new trial on damages (if not a retrial on both 

liability and damages) because the $1.2 million award is excessive.

In her cross-appeal, Wilson contends the trial court erred in 

denying her request for attorney fees under section 1021.5 because the 

legal right that was enforced in Wilson I was important and protects the 

public interest, the published opinion conferred a significant benefit on 

the general public, and the cost to pursue a case against a large entity 

such as Edison transcended her personal interest.

We find that based upon the evidence presented at trial, we 

cannot conclude as a matter of law that the harm Wilson suffered does 

not outweigh the public benefit of Edison’s conduct. However, we find 

that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence related to

stray voltage incidents involving prior owners or tenants of the house or 

other properties, and that the admission of that evidence was 

prejudicial to Edison. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and 

remand to the trial court for retrial of the nuisance claim. In light of 

our reversal of the judgment, we dismiss as moot Wilson’s cross-appeal.

BACKGROUND

A. Fundamentals of Electrical Distribution Systems and Electricity

As was the case in Wilson I, “[a]nalysis of the facts and issues in 

this case requires a basic understanding of electricity and electrical 

4
distribution systems.” (Wilson I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.) We 

therefore include here our discussion of the fundamentals of electrical 

distribution systems and electricity from our earlier opinion:

“Electricity is produced at a generating plant. Because it is not 

economical to send electricity over long distances at low voltages, the 

electricity produced at the plant is stepped up through transformers to 

a very high voltage before it is sent out over transmission lines. A 

substation, such as Edison’s Topaz substation at issue in this case, 

receives the high voltage electricity from the generating plant and steps 

it down through transformers to 4,000 volts. It then sends the 

electricity over distribution lines out to the neighborhood power poles, 

where an additional transformer steps down the voltage to 240/120 

volts before delivering the electricity to homes or businesses.

“In order for electricity to flow, there must be a complete circuit.

In other words, when electricity is sent out from a transformer to a 

‘load’ (i.e., something that is using electricity, such as a light or 

appliance), it must have a return path. Typically, electricity is sent 

over one conductor (wire), called the ‘hot,’ and returns on another 

conductor called the “neutral.” The flow of electricity is referred to as 

‘current’ and is measured in amperes (or amps); voltage is the pressure 

that drives the current. The amount of current depends in part upon 

the amount of resistance in the circuit; e.g., a 100–watt lightbulb has 

5
less resistance than a 60–watt lightbulb, so there will be a larger 

current flowing through it (and therefore the bulb burns brighter).[2]

“For safety reasons, electrical systems usually are grounded. That 

means that at various points in the system, including at the substation, 

a connection is made from the neutral to the ground, i.e., the earth.

Because the earth is conductive, it can provide a return path for the 

flow of electricity. Therefore, if, for example, an energized wire fell to 

the ground from the distribution lines, the earth would provide a path 

for the current to return to the substation, where a protective device 

would break the circuit. But the conductivity of the earth also can 

present a danger to someone who touches a source of electricity. If that 

person is in physical contact with the earth, electricity will flow from 

the electrical source, through his or her body, to the earth and on to the 

distribution system or substation, thus completing the circuit. The 

amount of current will depend on the resistance of the person’s body, 

the amount of contact area, and the amount of voltage present.

“In a grounded electrical system, there will always be some 

current flowing back to the substation through the earth. This is 

referred to as neutral-to-earth voltage, or ‘NEV,’ and it cannot be 

entirely eliminated. NEV is one cause of ‘stray voltage,’ which is 

voltage of 10 volts or less appearing on objects that are not part of an 

electrical system, that can be simultaneously contacted by members of 

2 “The amount of current also depends on the amount of voltage. The 

amount of current is calculated using Ohm’s Law: current (in amps) equals 

voltage (volts) divided by resistance (ohms).” (Wilson I, supra, 234 

Cal.App.4th at p. 131, fn. 1.)

6

 
the general public.[3] Metal objects, such as water pipes or gas lines, 

that are buried in or connected to the earth will conduct electricity, so if 

a person in a home touched a water pipe that was energized due to NEV 

while also touching the earth or another conductor at a different 

voltage, a circuit would be completed and current would run through 

that person’s body. This ‘touch potential’ can be eliminated by replacing 

metal pipes with plastic pipes or installing isolators (such as a short 

section of plastic pipe) to stop the flow of electricity onto metal fixtures, 

or by connecting (or ‘bonding’) the two conductors to equalize the 

voltage between the two.

“The physiological effects of current flowing through a person’s

body depends upon the amount of the current. According to a leading 

reference, a woman who encounters a current of 0.3 milliamps (mA) 

would not feel anything. At 0.7mA, she would feel a slight tingling; that 

typically is the perception threshold. At 1.2mA, she would feel a shock, 

but it would not be painful and muscular control would not be lost. She 

would feel a painful shock at 6mA, but she would still have muscular 

control. The let-go threshold is at 10.5mA, and at 15mA, she would feel 

a severe shock, have muscular contractions, and her breathing could be 

difficult.[4]” (Wilson I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 130-132.)

3 “Stray voltage also can be caused by wiring faults (i.e., a short circuit in 

which an energized conductor makes contact with a grounded surface) or 

corrosion of a neutral conductor.” (Wilson I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 131, 

fn. 2.)

4 “These current figures are for 60-Hz, alternating current, like the 

electricity supplied to homes. Another leading reference chart, which takes 

into account the amount of time of the contact, shows that perception is 

7

 
B. Events Leading Up to Lawsuit

Wilson and her then-husband Ryan bought the house at issue–

located at 904 Knob Hill Drive in Redondo Beach–in March 2007, when 

she was pregnant with her second child.5 The house is adjacent to 

Edison’s Topaz electrical substation. Before buying the house, Wilson

asked the prior owner and his broker about the substation; based on 

that conversation, she was satisfied that there were no safety hazards 

associated with the substation affecting the house. 

Wilson first became aware there was a voltage issue affecting her 

property on Friday, August 22, 2008, when Ryan came home and found 

a tag on their door saying that the gas had been shut off due to 

electricity at the gas meter, and instructing them to contact Edison. 

Because they did not get the notice until Friday night, they had to wait 

until Monday to contact Edison, so they had no gas for the weekend. 

On Monday, Ryan contacted Edison, and Edison sent someone to the

house. That person attached a wire to the gas meter and ran the wire 

to the substation. Wilson was told that the purpose of the wire was to 

allow Edison to monitor the voltage on the gas meter in order to satisfy 

the gas company that it was safe to turn the gas back on. 

possible up to 0.5mA, and that current above 10mA likely would produce 

involuntary muscle contractions, but there usually would not be any harmful 

physiological effects.” (Wilson I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, fn. 3.)

5 Ryan moved out of the house in late December 2008; he and Wilson 

ultimately divorced. 

8

 
In April 2010, Wilson got another notice from the gas company 

that there was electricity at the gas meter. This time, however, the gas 

company did not turn off the gas. Wilson did not contact Edison or the 

gas company, since Edison was still monitoring the gas line and the gas 

had not been turned off. Her reaction to the notice “[r]anged from 

annoyance to fear, irritation, frustration.” 

In February 2011, Wilson remodeled her master bathroom. Her 

father, a tile and stone contractor, did the work. He removed the 

bathtub, which was sitting on a wooden pedestal, and changed the 

drain to convert it to a tiled stall shower on a concrete slab. The drain 

was connected to a cast iron pipe that ran through the ground. He also 

added an outdoor shower. The remodel took several weeks, and was 

completed in March 2011. 

After the remodel was completed, Wilson noticed that every time 

she adjusted the showerhead in the master bathroom shower she would 

“get this tingling in [her] arm.” She is a swimmer, and thought she 

might have a pinched nerve. On April 19, 2011, she was taking a 

shower and told her boyfriend, Jason Stelle, that she thought she had a 

pinched nerve, so he said he would adjust the showerhead for her.6 

When he did so, he “felt basically a tingling sensation starting in [his] 

fingers and starting to emanate down [his] arm.” 

Wilson called her father and told him about what they felt. Her 

father was concerned that one of his staples had nicked a wire during 

6 Stelle was engaged to Wilson; he lived at the house with Wilson from 

September 2009 until September 2011. 

9

 
the construction, and wanted his electrician to do some testing. 

Wilson’s father brought his electrician to the house the next day. The 

electrician did some testing, and confirmed there was voltage in the

shower; he also found voltage at the gas meter, water meter, two hose 

bibs, and the waste and overflow pipes for the bathtub. He found that

even after he turned off all power to the house there was voltage in 

those locations. He recommended that they call Edison. 

Stelle, who worked from home and therefore was able to meet 

with service people at the house, called Edison that day (April 20) or 

the next day.7 No one from Edison came to the house either day. On 

April 22, which was a Friday, Wilson called Edison and demanded that 

someone tell her what was going on. That day, Edison technicians came 

to the house on two separate occasions and took readings. Stelle spoke 

with the technicians, but they did not provide any explanation for what 

was happening, nor did they provide a solution to the problem. 

Wilson called Edison several times the following week, until 

April 27, when Matt Norwalk, a technical specialist in Edison’s Power 

Quality Department went to the house and spoke to Stelle. Norwalk 

took voltage measurements in the master bathroom shower and gas 

meter, both with a resistor and without one.8 He found 2.4 volts 

7 Wilson testified that Stelle “called Edison immediately.” Stelle, 

however, testified that he called the day after Wilson’s father and the 

electrician came to the house. 

8 A resistor is used to simulate the internal body resistance of a person, 

to determine how much, if any, electricity would flow through a person who 

came in contact with the item while in contact with the ground. 

10

 
without the resistor in the shower (from the showerhead pipe to the 

drain) and 2.2 volts with it, and 1.5 volts without the resistor at the gas 

meter and 0.5 volts with it. He explained to Stelle that the voltage was 

stray voltage from the normal delivery of electrical power. He noted 

there was a history of stray voltage on Wilson’s property, although he 

did not provide any specifics regarding the types of incidents that had 

occurred. He did, however, tell Stelle that Edison had done a 

simulation study for a previous owner of the property that explained the 

stray voltage phenomenon. According to Stelle, Norwalk told him that 

the stray voltage was within Edison’s standards, and there were no 

plans to change it. Stelle asked Norwalk to come back to the house 

when Wilson could be there so he could explain it all to her. A meeting 

was arranged for May 6. 

On May 6, 2011, Norwalk, along with two other Edison employees, 

met with Wilson, Wilson’s father, their electrician, and Stelle (although 

Stelle was caring for the children for most of the meeting). The meeting 

lasted for about two hours. The group walked around the house, 

starting with the master bathroom, and then going to the gas line, since 

those were the two main concerns. Norwalk took measurements at the 

shower, and got the same readings he had gotten on April 27, i.e., 2.4 

volts without the resistor and 2.2 volts with the resistor. They then 

went to the gas meter, where Norwalk measured 1.4 volts without the 

resistor and 0.5 volts with the resistor.9

9 Norwalk testified that it typically takes around one volt in order to 

push enough current through a human body that electrical current can be 

perceived. 

11

 
In addition to taking the measurements, Norwalk showed Wilson 

a graph of the readings on her gas line, which Edison had been 

monitoring since 2008. Wilson noted that there was a “huge chunk of 

data missing.” Norwalk explained that the memory card on the 

machine that was monitoring the voltage had run out, and Edison did 

not catch it from December 2010 until April 2011. But he showed 

Wilson that the measurements that were taken right before the memory 

card ran out and right after it was replaced were nearly identical. 

The parties dispute what happened next.

According to Wilson, Norwalk told her that the conditions at her 

house were within Edison’s safety standards. Norwalk recommended 

that she shower at off-peak hours, when people were not using as much 

electricity, so the load on the substation was not as great. She testified 

that neither Norwalk nor either of the other Edison representatives 

offered any way to fix the stray voltage problem, although she admitted 

they gave recommendations about ways to make the master bathroom

shower less conductive, including possibly bonding the showerhead to 

the drain in the shower to make it so there is no shock potential. 

Wilson did not find those recommendations helpful because she believed 

they were temporary measures; she wanted a permanent solution that 

would completely eliminate the stray voltage on her property. 

According to Norwalk, Wilson asked how Edison was going to get 

rid of the voltage at the gas meter and master bathroom shower, and he 

explained that, because it was stray voltage from the normal operation 

12

 
and delivery of electrical power from the substation, the only way to 

resolve it would be to either put isolators within the plumbing system or 

to bond the sewer line to the water line. Wilson’s father asked him how 

that would be done, and Norwalk explained that it might require 

removing the tile floor of the shower (for bonding) or cutting holes in the 

wall (for isolators). Norwalk told Wilson that she could use the 

contractor of her choice to do the work and submit the bill to Edison for 

reimbursement.10 Wilson said that she did not want any more 

construction in her house because her children had already been 

exposed to construction dust and she did not want them exposed to 

more; she wanted Edison to fix the problem on its side, without doing 

any work on her house. 

A few days after the May 6 meeting, Wilson had a telephone 

conversation with Rick McCollum, an investigations manager for 

Edison. What was said during that conversation also is in dispute. 

According to McCollum, he told Wilson that Norwalk and other 

technicians had offered some solutions to the stray voltage at her house, 

and that Edison would be happy to pay to implement those solutions, 

either by having Wilson use her own plumber and be reimbursed by 

Edison or by having Edison hire a plumber to do the work. Wilson, 

however, said that she did not want people traipsing through her house. 

10 Both Stelle and Wilson’s father testified that they did not hear anyone 

from Edison offer to pay for any kind of remedy to deal with the voltage on 

the shower or gas line. 

13

 
At one point, he asked her what she wanted from Edison, and she said 

she wanted Edison to buy her house. 

According to Wilson, McCollum only suggested bonding as a way 

to minimize the stray voltage in the shower, and did not say that 

Edison would pay for it. She did not tell McCollum that she wanted 

Edison to buy her house. 

Wilson continued to live in the house with Stelle and her 

children.11 As a precaution to protect herself and her children from 

electricity, she covered everything that was metal (like faucets) with 

duct tape and put rubber mats down almost everywhere. She stopped 

using the master bathroom shower. She and the older children 

showered outside, and she showered more at the gym.12 In June or July 

2011, she felt a shock while using the outside shower, and stopped 

using it after that. 

C. Filing of the Lawsuit and Subsequent Events

In September 2011, the same day she filed the present lawsuit, 

Wilson moved out of the house. She moved to a rental property about 

three miles away. In October, shortly after she moved out, she received 

a letter from Edison, offering to fix the stray voltage issue by putting in 

plastic plumbing pipes. She rejected the offer because she had signed a 

11 In 2011, Wilson had three children–two with her husband and one with 

Stelle–who ranged in age from one to six years old. 

12 We note there is a second bathroom in the home, with a 

bathtub/shower. Neither Wilson nor any of her children ever felt electricity 

while using the bathtub/shower. 

14

 
one-year lease on the rental property, and because she “felt it was a 

band-aid and not a solution”; she wanted the stray voltage completely 

eliminated, rather than simply reduced to below perception levels. 

At the time Wilson moved out of the house, she was current with 

the mortgage payments, but as a result of having to pay to live at the 

rental property, her house went into foreclosure. The foreclosure 

dropped her credit rating by over 350 points, and all of her credit cards 

dropped her down to bare-minimum levels. 

In February 2013, Edison found out that Wilson’s house had been 

sold. Norwalk met with the new owners’ broker and told him about the 

tingling sensation felt by the previous owner. He asked to take voltage 

measurements throughout the property, both inside and outside. He

found perceptible levels of voltage in only two places: the master 

bedroom shower and the outside shower.13 He told the broker that 

Edison could bring in a plumber to install sections of polyethylene 

piping in the copper water lines or to use a dielectric union (another 

kind of isolator) to eliminate the voltage at those places. The broker 

agreed. 

Norwalk discussed the options with the plumber, and they decided 

to try the dielectric unions first, to see if that would eliminate the 

voltage on the master bathroom shower and the gas line. After they 

were installed, Norwalk measured the voltage in the shower and at the 

gas line. At the gas line he measured zero volts with and without a 

13 Although the gas meter had some voltage, it was below a perceptible 

level. 

15

 
resistor, but voltage remained at the shower. Edison brought the 

plumber back for another day to install sections of polyethylene piping 

in both the master bathroom shower and the outside shower. After that 

work was done, Norwalk measured zero volts with the resistor at all 

locations. Installation of all the isolators took two or three days, and 

cost just over $5,000. 

In addition to installing the isolators, Edison tested other methods 

that might reduce the stray voltage at the property. In February 2013, 

Edison installed a dedicated transformer for the house, to see if 

isolating a transformer to that location would lower the stray voltage. 

It found that although the dedicated transformer lowered the stray

voltage, it did not eliminate it entirely, and the fluctuation of load on 

the substation would bring the voltage up to a perceptible level.14

In May 2013, Norwalk was contacted by the broker for the 

property, who told him there was a prospective buyer, John Seamons, 

who wanted to meet with him to get an explanation regarding the stray

voltage. Norwalk met with Seamons at the house. Norwalk told him 

about the voltage measurements, the history of the house (including 

14 The voltage level at the property already had been reduced when, in 

October 2012, Edison performed additional grounding at the substation. This 

work was done after a car accident caused a high voltage line to fall into one 

of the supply lines coming from the substation, which elevated the voltage on 

the grounding grid. Due to concerns about the safety of Edison personnel at 

the substation, a study of the grounding grid was conducted, and ground 

wells were installed to enhance the ground grid. After the work was 

completed, Norwalk discovered that the stray voltage on Wilson’s property 

was reduced by approximately 40 percent, although it did not reduce the 

voltage to below perception levels. 

16

 
that the prior owner had felt a tingling sensation in the shower), and 

explained the work Edison had done to install isolators. He also told 

Seamons that if he decided to change any of the plumbing in the house, 

he (Norwalk) would make himself available to discuss the best way and 

best work methods to continue the isolation at those locations. 

Seamons lived in the house with his wife and children from July 

2013 to May 2015. During that time, neither he nor any member of his 

family experienced stray voltage anywhere on the property. They 

moved out of the house for work reasons. 

When Seamons was selling the house, he contacted Norwalk and 

asked him to come to the house to recheck the voltage measurements. 

Norwalk did so, and detected some voltage–slightly above one volt–on a 

spigot on the outside of the house. Edison brought in a plumber to 

install a section of polyethylene piping into the supply to the spigot, 

which reduced the voltage to zero. Norwalk also found zero volts at the 

master bathroom shower, the outside shower, and the gas meter. He 

provided those readings in writing to Seamons so he could provide them 

to the new owner. Since that time, Edison has not received any 

complaints of stray voltage regarding the property. 

D. First Trial and Appeal

As we described in more detail in Wilson I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th 

123, Wilson’s claims for negligence, IIED, and nuisance were tried 

before a jury. In that trial, a significant amount of evidence was 

presented related to the history of stray voltage at 904 Knob Hill Drive 

and the surrounding neighborhood, much of which we set forth in our 

17
statement of facts.15 (Id. at pp. 132-135.) Wilson also presented a 

significant amount of evidence of various physical injuries she suffered, 

although she did not present evidence showing that these injuries were 

caused by her exposure to stray voltage. (Id. at pp. 139, 158.) 

The jury found in favor of Wilson on all three of her claims, and 

awarded her $550,000 on her IIED and negligence claims, $500,000 on 

her nuisance claim, plus $3 million in punitive damages. (Wilson I, 

supra, 234 Cal.App. at p. 140.) Edison appealed, raising several 

contentions, including that Wilson’s claims fell under the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the PUC. In our published decision, we concluded that 

the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the claims, but found 

there was insufficient evidence to support Wilson’s IIED and negligence 

claims, and that the punitive damages award was unjustified. (Id. at p. 

140.) We determined, however, that “[w]e cannot conclude there was 

insufficient evidence to support Wilson’s nuisance claim, since it 

requires the jury to balance the gravity of the harm from the 

interference with Wilson’s use and enjoyment of her property against 

the social utility of Edison’s conduct.” (Id. at p.151.) We nevertheless 

found that the nuisance claim could not stand because “the jury 

considered evidence of Wilson’s physical injuries (which should not have 

15 We note that Wilson, in her respondent’s brief/cross-appellant’s opening 

brief, recites this history “word-for-word and unadorned” from our opinion as 

part of her statement of facts. This is inappropriate. Our statement of facts 

in Wilson I was based upon the evidence presented at the first trial (which 

included other claims for which the historical evidence was relevant). The 

only facts relevant to this appeal are the facts that were presented to the jury 

at the second trial.

18

 
been considered because there was no evidence those injuries were 

caused by her exposure to stray voltage) in balancing the harm against 

the social utility and finding in favor of Wilson.” (Id. at pp. 151-152.) 

Therefore, we remanded the matter for retrial on the nuisance claim. 

(Id. at p. 160.) In doing so, we noted an issue regarding the jury 

instruction for that claim (CACI No. 2021), and directed the trial court 

to give an additional instruction to supplement CACI No. 2021. (Id. at 

pp. 160, 163-164.)

E. Retrial

On remand, the case was assigned to a different judge. The trial 

court entered judgment in favor of Edison on the negligence and IIED 

claims, ordered Wilson’s claim for punitive damages stricken, and set 

the matter for trial on the nuisance claim. 

Before trial, Edison filed several motions in limine, including 

motions to exclude all evidence and argument relating to (1) the alleged 

existence of stray voltage at any property other than Wilson’s, or at 

Wilson’s property before she owned it, or (2) Edison’s prior ownership of

Wilson’s property (or other nearby houses) or its putting those houses

on the market in the 1990s. The trial court granted those motions to 

the extent they sought exclusion of evidence related to other properties 

or to Edison putting Wilson’s property on the market in the 1990s, but 

denied them to the extent they sought to exclude evidence related to the 

history of the property and its previous owners or tenants. In making 

its ruling, the court stated: “we need some context as to what Edison 

knew, when they knew it, what responses they took, and then how that 

19
dovetails or compares with the action of Edison in the particular period 

involving Ms. Wilson.” 

In light of this ruling, Wilson presented a significant amount of 

evidence related to stray voltage issues encountered by previous owners 

or tenants of Wilson’s property, as well as some evidence related to 

stray voltage issues throughout the neighborhood. This evidence 

included (1) testimony from a former tenant of the house about shocks 

she and her young children experienced when they lived there in 1995 

to 1997; (2) testimony from a former longtime employee of the Southern 

California Gas Company about the gas company’s issues with stray 

voltage both at Wilson’s house and in the neighborhood; (3) testimony 

from a former employee in Edison’s real estate department who was 

involved in preparing the property for sale between 1997 and 1999, who 

was subject to extensive questioning about his experience with stray 

voltage at the property during that time as well as the prior history of 

people experiencing stray voltage there; (4) testimony from the former 

facility coordinator for Edison, who was questioned about reports he 

received regarding former tenants getting shocked in the house when 

Edison owned the property; and (5) Norwalk’s testimony on crossexamination regarding reports by prior owners or tenants of shocks 

they received at the property. 

Wilson’s attorney emphasized this evidence in his closing 

argument, criticizing Edison for failing to fix the problem, and asking 

the jury to send a message to Edison: “[T]he question is going to be 

whether Edison is going to get away with this. With your verdict, you 

can say no. You can say no, Edison, you are not going to get away with 

20
telling people over and over and over again that they are safe, that you 

fixed it. . . . They [i.e., Edison] don’t care. What your verdict can do is 

make them care.”

During deliberations, the jury sent out two questions. 

The first question asked for clarification on question No. 8 on the 

special verdict form–“Did the seriousness of the harm outweigh the 

public benefit of Southern California Edison’s conduct?”–asking, “What 

is meant on the part stating public benefit? i.e., is it the street? 

Southern California?” After conferring with counsel, the court sent a 

written response to the jury stating, “Without a specific geographical 

location, the focus is on the public benefit of Edison’s conduct in 

supplying electricity to its customers.” 

The second question asked, “In this case, what is the definition of

harm? (i.e., mental? physical? financial?)” In response, the court 

referred the jury to the first two subdivisions of CACI No. 2022.16

The jury came back with a special verdict in favor of Wilson, 

awarding her $1.2 million in damages. The jurors were polled. On four 

16 CACI No. 2022 was added by the Judicial Council in response to Wilson 

I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pages 163-164. As read to the jury, it provided

in relevant part: “In determining whether the seriousness of the harm to 

Simona Wilson outweighs the public benefit of Southern California Edison’s 

conduct, you should consider a number of factors. To determine the 

seriousness of the harm Simona Wilson suffered, you should consider the 

following: [(a)] The extent of the harm, meaning how much the condition 

Southern California Edison caused interfered with Simona Wilson’s use or 

enjoyment of her property and how long that interference lasted; [(b)] The 

character of the harm, that is, whether the harm involved a loss from the 

destruction or impairment of physical things that Simona Wilson was using[,] 

or her personal discomfort or annoyance.” (See CACI No. 2022.)

21

 
critical questions–(1) did Edison create a condition that was an 

obstruction to the free use of property so as to interfere with the 

comfortable enjoyment of life or property; (2) was this condition of such 

duration, nature, or amount as to have unreasonably interfered with 

Wilson’s use or enjoyment of her land; (3) was Edison’s conduct a 

substantial factor in causing Wilson harm; and (4) did the seriousness 

of the harm outweigh the public benefit of Edison’s conduct–the jury 

was split nine to three. 

Judgment was entered in favor of Wilson and against Edison in 

the amount of $1.2 million. Edison filed motions for a new trial and for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov), and Wilson filed a motion 

for attorney fees. 

In its new trial motion, Edison submitted the declarations of two 

jurors (one of whom voted in favor of Wilson) stating that the jury 

discussed and considered compensating Wilson for the value of her 

house, the damage to her credit, and her attorney fees, and agreed to a 

$1.2 million verdict based on these considerations. Based upon those 

declarations, Edison argued there was jury misconduct entitling it to a 

new trial. Edison also argued it was entitled to a new trial on the 

grounds that (1) the damages award was excessive; (2) there was 

insufficient evidence to support the damage award; (3) there was 

insufficient evidence to support a finding of liability; and (4) the court 

committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence related to the history 

of Wilson’s property before she owned it. In its motion for jnov, Edison 

argued there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict because 

the evidence does not support that Wilson suffered “substantial actual 

22
damage” or that the gravity of any harm she suffered outweighs the 

social utility of Edison’s distribution of electricity.

In her attorney fee motion, Wilson argued she was entitled to fees 

under section 1021.5 because she ultimately prevailed on an issue of 

broad public importance, i.e., whether the PUC had exclusive 

jurisdiction over claims related to stray voltage, and the cost to Wilson 

of litigating against Edison was disproportionate to her personal stake 

in the outcome of her case. She requested an award of over $3 million 

(a lodestar of just over $1 million, with a multiplier of three). This 

figure included her fees from both the first and the second trials, as well 

as the prior appeal. 

The trial court denied all three motions. Edison timely filed a 

notice of appeal from the judgment and denial of its posttrial motions, 

and Wilson timely filed a notice of cross-appeal from the denial of her 

attorney fee motion. 

DISCUSSION

A. Law Governing Private Nuisance Claims

A private nuisance claim is a claim for “a nontrespassory 

interference with the private use and enjoyment of land.” (San Diego 

Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937 

(Covalt).) As our Supreme Court has explained, it requires proof of 

three elements. 

First, the plaintiff must prove an “interference with the plaintiff’s 

use and enjoyment of that property.” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 

937.) 

23
Second, the plaintiff must prove “that the invasion of the 

plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land was substantial, 

i.e., that it caused the plaintiff to suffer ‘substantial actual damage.’ . . . 

The degree of harm is to be judged by an objective standard, i.e., what 

effect would the invasion have on persons of normal health and 

sensibilities living in the same community? [Citation.] ‘If normal 

persons in that locality would not be substantially annoyed or disturbed 

by the situation, then the invasion is not a significant one, even though 

the idiosyncracies of the particular plaintiff may make it unendurable 

to him.’ [Citation.] This is, of course, a question of fact that turns on 

the circumstances of each case.” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 938.) 

Third, “‘[t]he interference with the protected interest must not 

only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable’ [citation], i.e., it 

must be ‘of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute 

unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.’ 

[Citations.] The primary test for determining whether the invasion is 

unreasonable is whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the social 

utility of the defendant’s conduct, taking a number of factors into 

account.[17] [Citation.] Again the standard is objective: the question is 

17 Those factors were spelled out in Wilson I, and are incorporated in 

CACI No. 2022 as follows: 

“To determine the seriousness of the harm [name of plaintiff] suffered, 

you should consider the following:

“a. The extent of the harm, meaning how much the condition 

[name of defendant] caused interfered with [name of plaintiff]’s use or 

enjoyment of [his/her] property, and how long that interference lasted.

24

 
not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable, 

but ‘whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole 

situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.’ 

[Citation.] And again this is a question of fact: ‘Fundamentally, the 

unreasonableness of intentional invasions is a problem of relative 

values to be determined by the trier of fact in each case in light of all 

the circumstances of that case.’ [Citations.]” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 

at pp. 938-939.)

“b. The character of the harm, that is, whether the harm 

involved a loss from the destruction or impairment of physical things that 

[name of plaintiff] was using, or personal discomfort or annoyance.

“c. The value that society places on the type of use or enjoyment 

invaded. The greater the social value of the particular type of use or 

enjoyment of land that is invaded, the greater is the seriousness of the harm 

from the invasion.

“d. The suitability of the type of use or enjoyment invaded to the 

nature of the locality. The nature of a locality is based on the primary kind of 

activity at that location, such as residential, industrial, or other activity.

“e. The extent of the burden (such as expense and inconvenience) 

placed on [name of plaintiff] to avoid the harm.

“To determine the public benefit of [name of defendant]’s conduct, you 

should consider:

“a. The value that society places on the primary purpose of the 

conduct that caused the interference. The primary purpose of the conduct 

means [name of defendant]’s main objective for engaging in the conduct. How 

much social value a particular purpose has depends on how much its 

achievement generally advances or protects the public good.

“b. The suitability of the conduct that caused the interference to 

the nature of the locality. The suitability of the conduct depends upon its 

compatibility to the primary activities carried on in the locality.

“c. The practicability or impracticality of preventing or avoiding 

the invasion.” (CACI No. 2022; see also Wilson I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 163-164.) 

25

 
The Supreme Court noted that the latter two elements “flow[] 

from the law’s recognition that ‘Life in organized society and especially 

in populous communities involves an unavoidable clash of individual 

interests. Practically all human activities unless carried on in a 

wilderness interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of 

interference, and these interferences range from mere trifling 

annoyances to serious harms. It is an obvious truth that each 

individual in a community must put up with a certain amount of 

annoyance, inconvenience and interference and must take a certain 

amount of risk in order that all may get on together. The very existence 

of organized society depends upon the principle of “give and take, live 

and let live,” and therefore the law of torts does not attempt to impose 

liability or shift the loss in every case in which one person’s conduct has 

some detrimental effect on another. Liability for damages is imposed in 

those cases in which the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to 

be required to bear under the circumstances, at least without 

compensation.’ [Citation.]” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 937-938.) 

A finding of an actionable nuisance does not require a showing 

that the defendant acted unreasonably. As one treatise noted, 

“[c]onfusion has resulted from the fact that the intentional interference 

with the plaintiff’s use of his property can be unreasonable even when 

the defendant’s conduct is reasonable. This is simply because a 

reasonable person could conclude that the plaintiff’s loss resulting from 

the intentional interference ought to be allocated to the defendant.” 

(Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 88, p. 629.)

26
B. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Edison contends on appeal that it is entitled to judgment because 

the tingling sensation Wilson felt, which could have been remedied for 

$5,000, cannot constitute a nuisance when weighed against the public 

benefit of Edison’s conduct, i.e., providing electricity to the community. 

In making this argument, Edison defines the claimed nuisance as “a 

slight tingling sensation caused by stray voltage,” and asserts that 

“Wilson’s annoyance over the stray voltage was only reasonable–and so 

was only actionable–to the extent that the stray voltage was 

perceptible.” 

Edison’s argument fails at its definition of the claimed nuisance in 

this case. As litigated by Wilson, the claimed nuisance–i.e., the 

allegedly unreasonable interference–was the presence of stray voltage 

on her property, whether perceptible or not. As she repeatedly stated, it 

was not sufficient to eliminate the perceptible voltage by bonding the 

showerhead to the drain or adding isolators; she wanted the stray 

voltage eliminated entirely. Thus, the alleged harm she suffered was 

not limited to the tingling sensation she felt in the master bathroom 

shower–or the shock she felt in June or July 2011 while using the 

outside shower. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury 

could also find that Wilson suffered harm caused by the stray voltage 

even when it was not perceptible. 

For example, Wilson’s expert testified that he went to Wilson’s 

house and took voltage measurements, and measured three volts from 

the plumbing in the kitchen sink to the wet floor. Thus, even though 

Wilson had never perceived electricity at the kitchen sink, the jury 

27
could conclude that a reasonable person would be annoyed or disturbed 

by the unperceived stray voltage. That this might be characterized as 

fear of a future injury does not mean that it cannot be considered an 

alleged harm for purposes of a private nuisance claim if the jury 

determines that that fear was reasonable. (See McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser 

Co. (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 247, 254 [“mere apprehension of injury from a 

dangerous condition may constitute a nuisance where it interferes with 

the comfortable enjoyment of property”].) 

Edison’s reliance on Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. 

County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036, for the proposition that

fear of a future injury is insufficient to support a nuisance claim is 

misplaced. In that case, the plaintiffs–owners of commercial units in an 

industrial park located on the border of an airport–alleged that the 

location and construction of a jet fuel farm at the airport 100 feet from 

their property interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property 

because it caused them to fear a catastrophic accident from an aircraft 

accident or rupture of the fuel tanks. (Id. at p. 1039.) The appellate 

court held that this was insufficient to state a cause of action for private 

nuisance. It noted that “[i]n this state . . . a private nuisance action 

cannot be maintained for an interference in the use and enjoyment of 

land caused solely by the fear of a future injury.” (Id. at pp. 1041-1042.) 

The plaintiffs’ nuisance claim failed in that case because there had been 

no actual physical invasion or damage to them or their property. (Id. at 

p. 1042.)

28
In contrast, in this case there is an ongoing physical invasion of 

Wilson’s property–there is no dispute that there is stray voltage 

affecting her entire property. Moreover, there is no dispute that the 

stray voltage has, at times, been perceptible, causing a tingling 

sensation or a shock. Thus, if a jury concluded that a reasonable person 

would fear further encounters with perceptible stray voltage, it could 

find that that fear substantially interfered with Wilson’s use and 

enjoyment of the property.

A jury also might find other kinds of harm caused by 

imperceptible stray voltage, such as limits on what could be done in a 

further remodel. As Norwalk counseled Seamons when they met to 

discuss the stray voltage at the property, Seamons would need to

consult with Edison before doing renovations that involve plumbing to 

discuss what would need to be done to prevent perceptible stray voltage. 

In identifying these possible harms, we do not mean to imply that 

the invasion Wilson alleges necessarily is substantial and that the harm 

she allegedly suffered outweighs the public benefit of Edison’s provision 

of electricity. That is for a jury to decide. We simply point them out to 

demonstrate that the balancing that Edison contends favors it as a 

matter of law is not as simple as Edison makes it out to be. In light of 

the evidence presented at trial, we cannot conclude as a matter of law

that Edison is entitled to judgment.

29
C. Admission of Evidence Regarding Prior Owners/Tenants and

Other Properties

As noted, before trial Edison moved to exclude evidence regarding 

stray voltage incidents at houses other than Wilson’s house, or incidents 

that occurred at Wilson’s house before Wilson bought the property. 

Edison argued that this evidence was not relevant to Wilson’s nuisance 

claim because “any liability of [Edison] for nuisance must be based upon 

an interference with [Wilson’s] use and enjoyment of [Wilson’s] Property 

during the time that she owned the property.” The trial court denied 

Edison’s motion with respect to incidents at Wilson’s house, finding the 

evidence was relevant to show what Edison knew, when it knew it, and 

how it responded in the past.18 On appeal, Edison contends the trial 

court erred in admitting this evidence, and that the admission of the 

evidence prejudiced Edison. We agree. 

1. Most of the Evidence Was Not Relevant to the Nuisance

Claim

“‘No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.’ (Evid. Code, 

§ 350.) ‘“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence . . . having any tendency in 

reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to 

the determination of the action.’ (Evid. Code, § 210.) ‘The test of 

relevance is whether the evidence tends “‘logically, naturally, and by 

18 Although the trial court granted the motion with regard to incidents 

involving properties other than Wilson’s, some evidence nevertheless was 

allowed in during trial. 

30

 
reasonable inference’ to establish material facts. . . .”’ [Citation.] A 

trial court ‘is vested with wide discretion in determining the relevance 

of evidence,’ but it has ‘no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.’ 

[Citation.]” (Velasquez v. Centrome, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 1191, 

1211.)

Wilson contends the evidence regarding the history of stray 

voltage at her property and other nearby properties is relevant to 

(1) notice as it relates to the element of unreasonableness; (2) the 

existence of a nuisance; (3) causation; and (4) why Wilson refused to 

accept Edison’s offer to install isolators at her showers and gas line. 

She misunderstands the elements of a nuisance claim and ignores the 

facts of this case.

To prove her nuisance claim, Wilson has to prove (1) Edison’s 

conduct caused an interference with her use and enjoyment of the 

property; (2) that the interference was substantial, i.e., that it caused

her to suffer substantial actual damage; and (3) that the interference 

was unreasonable, i.e., that it was of such a nature, duration, or amount 

as to constitute unreasonable interference with her use and enjoyment 

of the land. (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 937-938.)

Wilson’s first argument–that evidence of other people’s experience 

with stray voltage on the property (or other nearby properties) is 

relevant to notice as it relates to the element of unreasonableness–is 

based upon a faulty reading of the element. Wilson contends that “any 

and all evidence probative of the reasonableness of Edison’s conduct is 

admissible.” But the issue to be decided in a nuisance case is not the 

reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. A defendant’s conduct may 

31
be reasonable but still result in an unreasonable interference with the 

plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her property.19 (Prosser & Keeton, 

supra, § 88, p. 629.) In any event, the conduct at issue is the conduct 

that causes the interference with Wilson’s use and enjoyment of her 

property. Edison’s conduct with regard to prior occupants of the house 

has no relevance to this issue.

Wilson’s second argument–that the evidence at issue is relevant to 

show the existence of a nuisance–is difficult to decipher. Relying upon 

product defect and negligence cases, Wilson appears to argue that 

evidence of similar occurrences in the past tend to establish that the 

defendant had notice of a defect. She contends that Edison “hotly 

contested the existence of a nuisance,” and the challenged evidence had 

a tendency to refute that because it showed that Edison had received a 

“constant stream of complaints” regarding stray voltage in the 

neighborhood but did nothing about it until it was forced to.20 But the 

only nuisance whose existence is contested in this case is the private 

nuisance Wilson alleged, i.e., that stray voltage caused by Edison 

unreasonably interfered with Wilson’s use and enjoyment of her 

19 The reasonableness of Edison’s conduct might be relevant to a 

negligence claim, but we previously found there was insufficient evidence to 

support such a claim against Edison. (Wilson I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 

140.)

20 We note that this latter argument–that Edison had notice of prior 

complaints but did nothing until it was forced to–is not a proper argument on 

a nuisance claim. Rather, it is an argument for a negligence claim for which, 

as noted, we previously found there was insufficient evidence. (Wilson I, 

supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 140.)

32

 
property. Whether Edison had notice of similar alleged complaints of 

stray voltage made at other times or with regard to other places is not 

relevant to establish an alleged nuisance in this case.

In Wilson’s third argument, she contends that evidence of similar 

conditions in the neighborhood and of similar complaints in the past is 

relevant to show that the harm she suffered was from the same cause. 

Even if this were true, it ignores the fact that the cause of the 

interference with Wilson’s property was not contested in this case. 

While Edison may have contested (and continues to contest) that the 

interference rises to the level of a nuisance under the law, it has never 

contested that the stray voltage at Wilson’s property is caused by its 

conduct in transmitting and distributing electricity to the area. 

In her final argument, Wilson contends that the challenged 

evidence was relevant because her “knowledge of Edison’s treatment of 

all the prior occupants of her house regarding stray electricity . . . was a 

factor in her refusing to move back into the house based on Edison 

saying they would finally fix it . . . –or at least the jury could so find.”

But there is no evidence that this was a factor in her decision not to 

move back into the house. Rather, Wilson testified that she refused to 

move back into the house because she had signed a one-year lease on a 

rental property and because she considered Edison’s proposed fix a 

“band-aid” rather than a real solution since it would not completely 

eliminate the stray voltage on her property. Moreover, it appears that 

Wilson did not have any of the detailed evidence presented at trial 

when she made her decision; she testified that Norwalk told Stelle 

about the history of stray voltage at the property but did not provide 

33
any specifics, and that she asked for more detailed information from 

Edison, but never received it. 

Although this last argument fails to show that the extensive 

evidence of prior stray voltage incidents that was presented at trial was 

relevant to Wilson’s nuisance claim, it does suggest that there could be 

some relevance to a small subset of that evidence. Evidence of Wilson’s 

knowledge of those incidents at the time she filed her lawsuit and

moved out of the house with the intent not to return could be relevant 

to the extent that knowledge contributed to any fear of future incidents 

she experienced. The rest of the evidence regarding those incidents and 

incidents involving other properties, however, was irrelevant, and the 

trial court erred by allowing that evidence to be admitted.

2. Admission of the Evidence Prejudiced Edison

Error in the admission of evidence is reversible only if it 

prejudiced Edison, i.e., if “there is a ‘reasonabl[e] probab[ility]’ that it 

affected the verdict.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 

Cal.4th 704, 715.) “A ‘reasonable probability’ in this context ‘does not 

mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than 

an abstract possibility.’” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 

659, 682.) We find there is a reasonable chance that a result more 

favorable to Edison would have been reached had the challenged 

evidence been excluded.

First, the prior history of stray voltage on Wilson’s property was 

raised throughout the trial, from Wilson’s opening statement, through 

34
several witnesses who testified solely about that history, to closing 

argument.

Second, Wilson’s counsel used that evidence extensively in his 

closing argument, contending that Edison had acted improperly for 

decades and asking the jury to send Edison a message through its 

verdict.

Finally, this was a close case. The jury split nine to three on four 

key questions. It is reasonably probable that one or more additional 

jurors would have found in favor of Edison on those questions in the 

absence of the challenged evidence.

Because we find that Edison was prejudiced by the admission of

irrelevant evidence, we reverse the judgment in favor of Wilson and 

remand the matter for a retrial on the nuisance claim. On retrial, the 

evidence regarding prior stray voltage incidents at Wilson’s property or 

neighboring properties is inadmissible except to the extent the evidence 

relates to Wilson’s knowledge of those incidents at the time she filed the 

lawsuit and moved out of the house with the intent not to return and 

that knowledge contributed to the harm she allegedly suffered. 

D. Other Issues Raised

In light of our determination that the judgment must be reversed 

and the matter remanded for retrial, we need not address the other 

issues Edison raises in its appeal. And, because the judgment is 

35
reversed, Wilson no longer is the prevailing party. Therefore, her crossappeal challenging the denial of her motion for attorney fees is moot.21

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for retrial 

on the nuisance cause of action. Wilson’s cross-appeal is dismissed as 

moot. Edison shall recover its costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MANELLA, J.

COLLINS, J.

21 Edison filed a request for judicial notice relating to the cross-appeal. In 

light of our finding that the cross-appeal is moot, we deny that request.

36