### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 8, 200 5 EDWIN MA TTHEW BRY AN T v. F LOR A J. HOLLA ND , WA RD EN

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 3438 Steve Dozier , Judge

No. M2003- 02838-CCA -R3-HC - F iled April 7, 2005

The pe titioner, Edwin Matthew Bry ant, appea ls pr o se from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismiss al of his petition for habe as cor pus relief from his convictions for two c ounts of vehicular assault, a Class D fe lony , and re sulting sentences of four y ear s eac h to be served conc urre ntly in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. He c ontends that the trial court erre d in dismi ssing hi s wr i t o f habeas corpus without appointing counsel a nd that his sentence s are illega l because the trial c ourt sentenc ed him to i nc arc e ratio n and im po se d r e sti tut iona ndbe c aus e the tr ia l c ou rt e nh a nc e d e a c h o f h is s e n te n ces f

r o m t w o y e ar s to f

o u r y e ar s w ith o u t f

in d in g a n y

ap p li c ab le e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r s . We aff irm the trial court’s dismiss al of the pe tition. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d t h e o p i n i o n o f t he court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Edwin Matthew B ry ant, Pro Se, Nashville, Te nnessee . Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; J . Ross Dy er, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. ( Torry ) J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; Pamela Sue A nderson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee . OP IN ION
The re cord r efle cts that on Octobe r 3, 2001, the petitioner, pursuant to a plea a g ree ment, pled g uiltyto two counts of vehicula r assault. See T.C.A. § 39-13-106. The ag ree ment provided that the petitioner would re ceive two four- y ear sentenc es to be served concurre ntly and that the que stion of manner of ser vice would be left for determination by the trial court. At the sentenc ing he aring , the court orde red the sentenc es to be served in conf inement and or dere d the petitioner to pay restitution in the amount of $5,195.95. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for the writ of habea s corpus a lle g ing tha

t he wa s ill e g a lly c on str a ine d of his fr e e do m, a nd the tr ia l c ou rt su mma ri ly dis mis se d it

. On appe al, th e p et i t i o n er contends that the trial c ourt err ed by summarily

dismiss ing his pe tition-2-

without appointing him counsel a nd that his sen t en ce s are illega l. He cites State v. D avis, 940 S.W .2d 558 (Tenn. 1 9 9 7), for the proposition that a sentenc e involving both inca rce ration and restitution is i lleg al. He a lso contends that his sentence is ill eg al bec ause the trial court e nhance d his sentence without first finding a pplicable enhance ment fac tors. The state contends that the trial court prope rly

dismiss ed the petition and that Davis i s distinguishable f rom the instant case based up on a c ha ng e in l a w. Th e state , h ow e ve r, do e s n ot a dd re ss the pet it ion e r’ s c on te nti on that hi s sentenc e is illeg al bec ause of improper e nhance ment. We hold that the t ri al co u rt ’s summary dis mis sa l of

the pe tit ionfo r w ri t of

ha beas corp us was pr op e r b e c aus e the pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to state a c la im.
The trial c ourt may

summarily

dismiss a petition for writ of habea s corpus re lief when the pe tit ion e r do e s no t state a c og niza ble c la im. Pa ssa

re lla v. State , 8 91 S.W. 2d61 9, 62 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ). A p e tit ionfo r the writ o f h abe a s c or pu s may on ly be br ou g ht i f the jud g me nt i s void or the sente nce has expired. Arche r v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). Howe ver, if the claimed illeg ality

rende rs the judg ment or sentenc e voidable, r ather t h an void, no relief ca n be g rante d. I d. at 161. “I f the fa ce of the re cord shows that the court did not have jurisdiction, then the judgme nt is void.” Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W .2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998). The de termination of whether relief should be g rante d is a question of l aw which this court reviews de novo. Hart v. State, 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)

. T h e p e t i t i o n e r

ar g u e s t h a tD a v i s r e q u i r e s g r a n t i n g h i s p e t i t i o n f o r h ab e a s c o rp u s r e l i e f

. In Davis, our supreme court held that under the Sentencing Act of 1989, “ther e is no authority under which courts may

impose restitution as a part of a sente nce of incar cer ation.” Da vis, 940 S.W .2d at 962. Howe ver, the court a lso recog nized

that, eff ective July 1, 1996, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40- 35-104(c )(2) was amende d to include the f

o llowing se ntencing alternative: “Pay ment of re stitut ion to the victim or victims either alone or in addition to any other sente nce a

uthorized by

this subsection.” This statutory authorization for re stitut ion as a sente ncing alternative was not a va ila ble a t th e tim e of

the app e lla nt’ s se nte nc ing , an d it do e s n ot, there fore , aff

ect our holding in this opinion.
I d. n.6. The leg islature’s c hang e to the Sentenc ing A ct allowing for inca rce ration and r estitu t i on occur red in 1996. Altho u gh the re cord be fore us does not ref lect the date when the offe nses occur red, only that he wa s convicted i n October 2001, the petitioner ha s failed to alleg e why the 1996 law does not a

pply to his sentence. H e is not entitled to relief on this issue. Reg arding the enha nceme nt of the petitioner’ s sentenc es fr o m two y ear s to four y ear s, the rec ord re flec ts that the petitioner ag ree d to the four-y ear terms i n his plea a g ree ment. A sentenc e of four y ear s is within t he rang e authorized by statute for a Rang e I , standard of fende r. See T.C.A. §-3-

40-35-111 , -1 1 2. This issue is without merit. Be cause the petitioner’s pe tition for habea s corpus re lie f f a ils to s ta te a

c la im, we ho ld the tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in s umm a

ri ly dis mis sin g it.
B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g a ndthe re c or d a s a wh ole , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE