[Cite as In re I.T.A., 2012-Ohio-1689.]

STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

IN RE: GUARDIANSHIPS OF: ) CASE NOS. 11 BE 27 

) 11 BE 29 

I.T.A. ) 

) 

AND ) OPINION 

 ) 

A.A. ) 

) 

 ) 

) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Probate Division, of Belmont 

County, Ohio 

Case Nos. 99GD594; 99GD593 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Appellant: Nawaz Ahmed, Pro se 

#A404-511 

Chillicothe Correctional Institution 

15802 State Route 104, North 

Chillicothe, OH 45601 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Dated: March 26, 2012
[Cite as In re I.T.A., 2012-Ohio-1689.]

WAITE, P.J. 

{¶1} In these two combined appeals, pro se Appellant Nawaz Ahmed is 

attempting to appeal over 30 orders and judgments filed in the guardianship cases of 

his two minor sons. The guardianships of the estate were created in 1999 after 

Appellant murdered his wife and three others. The guardianships were necessary to 

protect the insurance proceeds that the boys received due to their mother’s murder. 

Appellant filed a previous appeal in the guardianship cases and lost that appeal. 

Appellant is now attempting to appeal virtually every trial court decision in the 

guardianships entered since 2004. He contends that he should have been notified of 

the successor guardianship appointment as well as all subsequent events in the 

guardianships; that all orders in the guardianships after the appointment of the 

successor guardian are void; that his brother should have been appointed as the 

successor guardian; and that the probate court had no authority to act after one of 

the boys reached his 18th birthday. Appellant’s arguments have either been waived 

or are not supported by the law or the record. We overrule all of Appellant’s 

arguments in the two appeals, and affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Background

{¶2} Appellant appeals the decisions of the Belmont County Court of 

Common Pleas, Probate Division, in two separate guardianships of the estate. 

Appellant is the natural father of I.T.A., born Feb. 23, 1993, and A.A., born Sept. 1, 

1995. The guardianships of the estate were set up in 1999 for the two boys after 

Appellant murdered his wife (the boys’ mother) and three other family members. He 

was later sentenced to death for the murders. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme 
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Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 

2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, reconsideration denied by 103 Ohio St.3d 1496, 

2004-Ohio-5605, 816 N.E.2d 1081; certiorari denied by Ahmed v. Ohio, 544 U.S. 

952, 125 S.Ct. 1703, 161 L.Ed.2d 531 (2005), rehearing denied by 545 U.S. 1124, 

125 S.Ct. 2901, 162 L.Ed.2d 312. Appellant currently remains in prison awaiting 

execution. 

{¶3} The main asset of the guardianship estates was the mother’s $500,000 

life insurance policy, split equally between the two boys. Appellant had previously 

challenged the validity of the guardianships and was rebuffed by both the probate 

court and this Court. In re Guardianship of Ahmed, 7th Dist. No. 02 BE 56, 2003-

Ohio-5463, reconsideration denied by 7th Dist. No. 02 BE 56, 2003-Ohio-6390, 

appeal not allowed by 101 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2004-Ohio-1293, 805 N.E.2d 539. 

{¶4} On July 19, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal in the 

guardianship of I.T.A. (Appeal No. 11-BE-27). In it, Appellant referenced 18 

judgments or orders of the probate court beginning with an order dated July 23, 

2004. This judgment entry appointed Grace Hoffman as the successor guardian to 

I.T.A. Neither this order nor the subsequent 16 orders listed in the notice of appeal 

were directly appealed in the time allotted by App.R. 4. The most recent order 

referred to in the notice of appeal is a June 22, 2011 order that terminated the 

guardianship pending the submission and court approval of the final accounting of 

the guardianship. This order was filed within 30 days of Appellant’s July 19, 2011, 

notice of appeal. This order was interlocutory and will not become final until the court 

approves the final accounting (which apparently has not yet occurred). With very few 
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exceptions, interlocutory orders are not appealable and any appeal from such an 

order will be dismissed. See, e.g., Bautista v. Kolis, 142 Ohio App.3d 169, 174-175, 

754 N.E.2d 820 (7th Dist.2001); State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St.3d 

420, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994). We conclude that the orders and judgment entries listed 

in the notice of appeal are either interlocutory orders or are untimely because the 30-

day period to appeal found in App.R. 4 has expired. 

{¶5} Also on July 19, 2011, Appellant filed a motion in probate court in the 

guardianship of I.T.A. titled “Motion to Order the Guardian to Provide a Full and 

Complete Copy of her Files about this Guardianship and also file the same with the 

Probate Court ASAP.” The primary goal of the motion was to induce the probate 

court to vacate all orders subsequent to February 22, 2011. The stated rationale was 

that I.T.A. had reached the age of majority on February 22, 2011, and Appellant 

argued that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the case after that date. 

Appellant also presented various claims and accusations against the successor 

guardian. 

{¶6} In the guardianship case of A.A., Appellant filed a motion in the probate 

court seeking to vacate all decisions made by the successor guardian or the court 

from July 23, 2004 to the present, asking for an accounting of the guardianship, 

requesting the guardian to post a bond, and requesting that fees to the guardian be 

denied. This motion was filed with the above other motions on July 19, 2011. 

{¶7} On August 15, 2011, Appellant filed an appeal in the guardianship of 

A.A. (Appeal No. 11-BE-29), even though the probate court had not yet ruled on his 

July 19th motion. He appealed 14 different court orders, again starting with the order 
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of July 23, 2004, appointing Grace Hoffman as successor guardian. The most recent 

order listed in his notice was entered on May 9, 2011. The 30-day time period to 

appeal that judgment had expired by the time Appellant filed his notice of appeal on 

August 15, 2011. It does not appear that there are any final orders listed in this 

second notice of appeal that are actually appealable. 

{¶8} The trial court overruled both of Appellant’s motions to vacate on 

August 19, 2011. Appellant later amended both of his notices of appeal to include 

the August 19, 2011, judgment entries. 

{¶9} The only final appealable orders that may be reviewed at this time are 

the judgment entries filed on August 19, 2011, overruling the two motions to vacate 

filed by Appellant on July 19, 2011. 

Issues on Appeal

{¶10} Appellant has filed two very similar briefs on appeal. Although 

Appellant has listed a variety of assignments of error, the arguments supporting each 

assignment of error are rambling, repetitive, difficult to decipher, and at times 

incoherent. He refers to documents that are not in the record; he personally attacks 

the guardian and the trial court while making his arguments; and he has violated 

numerous procedural rules on appeal. We will address a number of these 

preliminary matters before we attempt to glean the substance of any issues that may 

be discerned from Appellant’s filings on appeal. 

{¶11} Appellant has been previously warned against using court filings as a 

forum for personal attacks against the guardian, the attorneys in the case, and the 

trial judge: “These types of personal attacks are, of course, not legal arguments and 
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should not be in an appellate brief. We advise Ahmed that he should not dilute his 

legal arguments with this type of invective in the future.” In re Guardianship of 

Ahmed, 7th Dist. No. 02 BE 56, 2003-Ohio-5463, ¶9. Appellant has attacked both 

guardian Hoffman and the probate judge in these appeals, as well as in his filings 

with the probate court. These types of personal vituperations, upbraidings, and 

abusive tirades against officers of the court have no place in legal filings and are 

stricken from the record. 

{¶12} Although we are aware that Appellant is acting pro se, he is 

nevertheless bound by the same rules and procedures as litigants who retain 

counsel. Meyers v. First National Bank of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio App.3d 209, 210, 444 

N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist.1981). This extends to the rules governing the content, size and 

parameters of the briefs filed on appeal. Many of those parameters are found in 

App.R. 19(A), which states: “[w]ithout prior leave of court, no initial brief of appellant 

* * * shall exceed thirty-five pages in length” and shall have “double spacing between 

each line of text except quoted matter”. Appellant has submitted a 35-page, singlespaced brief. He has also exceeded the margin requirement for the text set forth in 

App.R. 19(A). Because the text of the brief is single-spaced and exceeds the 

maximum margins, it is effectively more than twice the size permitted by App.R. 

19(A). The rules for the size and parameters of the appellate brief are there to set 

maximum limits that apply to all litigants. One court has considered an appellant’s 

disregard of the double-spacing rule as “tantamount to failing to file any brief,” and we 

agree. Fuller & Associates v. Am. Home Health Care, Inc., 5th Dist. No. 

2003CA00377, 2004-Ohio-4342, ¶8. Any exceptions to the prescribed size and 
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format of the briefs must have prior permission of the court, and no such permission 

was requested, argued or granted. App.R. 19(A); Loc.R. IV. We have previously 

warned Appellant that he risks dismissal of his appeals due to violations of the rules 

governing page limits, spacing, and other aspects of the appellate brief. In re 

Conservatorship of Ahmed, 7th Dist. Nos. 01 BA 13 and 01 BA 48, 2003-Ohio-3272. 

{¶13} Hence, we would ordinarily simply dismiss these appeals due to the 

irregularities mentioned above. However, we will grant Appellant the courtesy of 

briefly addressing the main themes that we believe he is raising in his briefs. Those 

themes are: Appellant’s frustration with not being notified about the successor 

guardianship appointment or the events occurring after that appointment; Appellant’s 

belief that all orders issued on or after July 23, 2004, in both guardianships are void 

and should be vacated because the appointment of the successor guardian was 

invalid; his contention that his brother should have been appointed successor 

guardian; and his belief that all court orders issued in the guardianship of I.T.A. after 

February 23, 2011 (the date the boy turned 18) are void because the guardianship 

ended on that date. 

{¶14} The judgments under review in this appeal are the two entries issued 

on August 19, 2011. The motions were primarily Civ.R. 60(B) motions seeking to 

vacate a wide variety of probate court judgments and orders. To prevail on a motion 

to vacate a judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) 

the party has a meritorious defense to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is 

entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and 

(3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and where the grounds of relief are 
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Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment. GTE 

Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146,351 N.E.2d 113 

(1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing 

court will not disturb a trial court's decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. 

Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987). “Abuse of 

discretion” connotes more than an error in judgment; it implies that the trial court's 

judgment is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶15} It is axiomatic that a Civ.R. 60(B) motion may not be used as a 

substitute for direct appeal. Key v. Mitchell, 81 Ohio St.3d 89, 90-91, 689 N.E.2d 548 

(1998); Doe v. Trumbull Cty. Child. Serv. Bd., 28 Ohio St.3d 128, 131, 502 N.E.2d 

605 (1986). Moreover, the rule cannot be used to circumvent or extend the time for 

filing an appeal. Blasco v. Mislik, 69 Ohio St.2d 684, 686, 433 N.E.2d 612 (1982). 

Appellant has clearly attempted to use his July 19, 2011 motions to vacate over 30 

judgments and court orders that had not been directly appealed. A Civ.R. 60(B) 

motion cannot be used in this way, and therefore, Appellant cannot use this appeal to 

collaterally attack any judgment entries issues prior to August 19, 2011. 

{¶16} Appellant also used the July 19, 2011, motions to call for an accounting 

of the guardianships. Appellant did not file exceptions to any of the interim periodic 

accountings in either estate as required by R.C. 2109.33. In order to challenge a 

guardian’s administration of an estate, exceptions to the account must be filed. 

Guardianship of Skrzyniecki, 118 Ohio App.3d 67, 72, 691 N.E.2d 1105 (6th 
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Dist.1997). Appellant has waived any errors regarding the administration of the two 

guardianship estates by failing to file exceptions. 

{¶17} Appellant further used the July 19, 2011, motions to attack the validity 

of the successor guardian’s authority. Appellant claims that he did not receive notice 

of the proceedings regarding the successor guardian, and for that reason, the 

appointment of the successor guardian should be voided. Appellant appears to be 

relying on the requirement in R.C. 2111.04(A)(1) that notice of the guardianship 

proceedings be given to the child’s next of kin and “[u]pon each parent of the minor * 

* * provided the parent is free from disability other than minority.” This issue was not 

raised in either of the motions that Appellant filed in the probate court, and neither the 

guardian nor the probate court has had an opportunity to address it. This is reason 

enough to dismiss Appellant’s argument. An appellate court will not consider any 

alleged error in a civil matter which the complaining party could have called to the 

attention of the trial court at a time when such error could have been avoided or 

corrected by the trial court. Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210, 

436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982). This rule applies to probate court proceedings and to 

issues regarding proper notice: “it should be noted that * * * appellant failed to raise 

the issue of lack of notice in the probate court. Thus, she has waived this argument 

on appeal.” In re Estate of Lindsay, 7th Dist. No. 04-MA-259, 2005-Ohio-5930, ¶12. 

{¶18} In addition, R.C. 2111.04(A)(1)(b) does not require notice to be given to 

parents or next of kin for successor guardianship proceedings. This issue was 

thoroughly examined in Matter of Edwards, 8th Dist. No. 72473, 1998 WL 122360 

(Mar. 19, 1998): “The requirements of R.C. 2111.04 are met if notice is given that the 
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jurisdiction of the court has been invoked on the question of whether or not a 

guardian should be appointed. Notice need not be given that a second person has 

applied for the position of guardian, even if the second person is appointed guardian. 

The identity of the appointee does not [a]ffect the substantive rights of the ward. If 

the substantive rights of the ward are not [a]ffected, the substantive rights of the next 

of kin are not [a]ffected either. * * * Ohio law does not require that notice be given to 

the next of kin of the appointment of the successor guardian.” (Citations omitted.) Id. 

at *2. 

{¶19} We also note that notice under R.C. 2111.04 is not required to be given 

to a parent under a “disability other than minority.” Appellant is under the legal 

disability of his conviction and present incarceration for aggravated murder. The 

definition of legal disability has traditionally included those who are serving a prison 

term: “[P]ersons under age, insane persons, and convicts are said to be under legal 

disability.” Black’s Law Dictionary 461 (6th Ed.1990). See also, R.C. 2111.01(D) 

(which defines incompetent to include "any person confined to a correctional 

institution within this state."); R.C. 2131.02 (which defines “legal disability” as 

“[p]ersons in captivity”). For each of these reasons, his arguments regarding the 

alleged lack of notice of the successor guardianship proceedings are overruled. 

{¶20} Appellant argues that he should be permitted to appeal all judgments 

entered as far back as 2004, because he was not notified of the guardian’s activities 

or the court’s filings. He believes he should have received notice of every court order 

in these guardianship cases because he is the natural parent of the children. He 

provides no legal basis for that conclusion. There is nothing in R.C. Chapter 2111 
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that requires the court to notify the natural parent of any event, order or judgment 

taking place in the guardianship, except for the initial hearing to appoint a guardian 

as explained earlier. 

{¶21} Appellant contends that Juanita Lewis was never officially removed as 

guardian; that Grace Hoffman somehow unilaterally imposed herself as successor 

guardian; and that the appointment of the successor guardian was never journalized. 

There is no basis in the record to support Appellant’s claims. On July 12, 2004, the 

prior guardian Juanita Lewis filed a motion to appoint a successor guardian because 

Ms. Lewis had a terminal illness. Ms. Hoffman applied to be the successor guardian. 

The court held a hearing on July 23, 2004, and Grace Hoffman was duly appointed 

as successor guardian. The probate court’s journal reflects that Attorney Hoffman 

was appointed successor guardian on July 23, 2004. The record contains all the 

proper documentation to establish that Ms. Lewis resigned and Ms. Hoffman was 

appointed as successor. 

{¶22} Appellant contends that his brother, Ilyas Ahmed, should have been 

appointed as successor guardian due to provisions in Appellant’s will. Appellant 

made a similar argument in his first appeal of the guardianships and lost that appeal. 

In re Guardianship of Ahmed, supra, 7th Dist. No. 02 BE 56, 2003-Ohio-5463, ¶10. 

We give the same response now that we gave in that case: “ ‘It is well-established 

that an order appointing a guardian is a final order from which an appeal may be 

taken.’ In re Lajoie (Mar. 31, 1998), 6th Dist. No. L-96-408, at 5. Since Ahmed did 

not directly appeal that decision, he has waived the right to raise those issues at a 

later time. Dayton Women's Health Center v. Enix (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 67, 70, 555 
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N.E.2d 956.” Id. at ¶11. It is also apparent that Appellant’s brother Ilyas Ahmed 

never applied to be guardian pursuant to the requirements of R.C. 2111.03, and thus, 

he could not have been so appointed. 

{¶23} Appellant’s next argument centers around the probate court’s 

continuing involvement with the guardianship of I.T.A. after he reached his 18th 

birthday on February 23, 2011. Appellant contends that, pursuant to In re 

Guardianship of Hollins, 114 Ohio St.3d 434, 2007-Ohio-4555, the probate court’s 

jurisdiction ended on that day and that all of the court’s decisions, orders and 

judgments after that date are invalid and void. It is true that a guardianship 

predicated on the ward’s minor status ends when the ward reaches the age of 

majority. Id. at syllabus; see also R.C. 2111.46. Nevertheless, the probate court also 

is required to preside over the final accounting of the ward’s estate, and for this 

reason, the probate court retains continuing jurisdiction over the guardianship until it 

is settled and final, despite the fact that the final accounting will occur after the ward’s 

18th birthday. “R.C. 2109.302(A) * * * necessarily provides an independent grant of 

jurisdiction to the probate court for the consideration and settlement of a guardian's 

final account * * *.” Id. at ¶27. The probate court in this case correctly stated that it 

retained continuing jurisdiction over the guardianship even after I.T.A. reached the 

age of majority in order to account for the funds in the guardianship. 

{¶24} Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court somehow failed to 

supplement the record on appeal in Case No. 11 BE 27 (guardianship of I.T.A.) 

pursuant to App.R. 9(E). App.R. 9(E) provides the procedure to correct or modify the 

record on appeal. Appellant submitted a request to the trial court to add three 
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documents to the record on appeal, and the motion was denied. One of the 

documents, a judgment entry, is already in the record. The second and third 

documents are a last will and testament and a bill for services. There is no indication 

on the documents themselves or in the docket that they were ever part of the record 

in I.T.A.’s guardianship. Appellant has also failed to file a motion with this Court to 

correct the potential App.R. 9(E) problem. Merely mentioning a possible App.R. 9(E) 

error in a party’s merit brief does not preserve the error for review. Thomas v. 

Harmon, 4th Dist. No. 08CA17, 2009-Ohio-3299, ¶24. 

{¶25} In conclusion, there are no meritorious issues raised in these two 

appeals. Appellant has waived all possible issues regarding the judgments or orders 

entered prior to August 19, 2011, by not filing direct appeals of those orders. 

Appellant improperly attempted to use Civ.R. 60(B) as a substitute for direct appeal, 

and therefore, the only entries properly on appeal are those from August 19, 2011. 

He has waived any issues regarding the administration of the successor guardian 

over the guardianship estates by failing to file exceptions to the interim accountings. 

He waived any error regarding insufficiency of notice of the appointment of the 

successor guardian by failing to raise it in the trial court. In addition, the guardianship 

statutes do not require notice to be sent to the natural parent or next of kin in 

successor guardian proceedings. The record reflects that the successor guardian 

was properly appointed and the appointment was journalized. Appellant did not 

timely challenge the appointment of the successor guardian or argue at that time that 

his brother should have been appointed instead, hence, this issue is waived. The 

probate court has continuing jurisdiction to administer the final accounting of the 
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estate of I.T.A. after his 18th birthday, pursuant to the holding of In re Guardianship 

of Hollins, supra. Appellant failed to properly supplement the record, and any error 

regarding whether the record should have been supplemented is waived. All of 

Appellant’s arguments are overruled, and the two judgment entries issued by the 

probate court on August 19, 2011, in the guardianship cases of A.A. and I.T.A. are 

affirmed. Appellant’s attempted appeal of any judgment entries, decisions or orders 

of the probate court prior to August 19, 2011, are hereby dismissed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.