U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

32–304PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

COUNTERING IRANIAN PROXIES IN IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Serial No. 115–159

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

VACANT 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu, research fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 7

Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D., president, Institute for the Study of War ..................... 29

Mr. Michael Pregent, senior fellow, Hudson Institute ......................................... 36

The Honorable Barbara Leaf, Rosenblatt Distinguished Visiting Fellow, The 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy ........................................................ 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 4

Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Prepared statement .................................................... 10

Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 31

Mr. Michael Pregent: Prepared statement ............................................................ 38

The Honorable Barbara Leaf: Prepared statement ............................................... 47

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Ted Poe: 

Letter to the Honorable Mark Pompeo, Secretary, U.S. Department of 

State, from the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, and the Honorable Ted Poe, dated August 29, 2018 ........................ 68

Letter to the Honorable Ted Poe from Mr. Charles S. Faulkner, Acting 

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, dated 

September 24, 2018 .......................................................................................... 69

(1)

COUNTERING IRANIAN PROXIES IN IRAQ 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitation in the rules. 

I will make my opening statement and, then, yield to the ranking 

member, Mr. Keating from Massachusetts, for his opening statement. 

For years, Iran has gone unchecked as it expanded its influence 

and recruited legions of murdering proxies across the Middle East. 

Lavishly funded by sanctions relief under the Iran Nuclear Deal, 

a network of terrorist criminals sow chaos in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Iraq. Their objective: To expel U.S. influence 

from the region, conquer our allies, and subjugate millions, and establish the regime in Tehran as the undisputed master of the Middle East. 

One of the central fronts in Iran’s effort to do this is in Iraq. 

Make no mistake about it, Iran wants to make Iraq a puppet state 

of Iran. Exploiting Iraq’s weak government and the fight against 

ISIS, Iran has mobilized thousands of militiamen and proxies to 

gain power in Baghdad. They are using their growing influence in 

Iraq to foster sectarianism, secure a supply line to terrorists in 

Syria and Lebanon, and recruit fighters for their many wars. 

Iran is not interested in building a strong and sovereign Iraq. 

Iran is not interested in a peaceful Iraqi society where Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and Kurds live in harmony together. As America 

and our allies have come to help fight ISIS and restore Iraq’s legitimate authority over its own territory, Iran has been working to undermine our hard-won victory and threaten our soldiers and our 

diplomats. 

In May, Iraq held its first election since the defeat of the ISIS 

caliphate. But many Iraqis did not bother to vote because they saw 

that the system in their country is corrupt. Like the Iranian people, they see the hand of Iran’s oppressive regime in undermining 

the institutions in Iraq. They see Iran’s proxies, men who swear alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:23 Oct 18, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_TNT\092618\32304 SHIRL
2

legiance to the Supreme Leader in Tehran, running for office in 

their own country of Iraq. They see the vast wealth of their nation 

being squandered to pay for Iran’s militias while they live in poverty, without clean water or electricity. 

The Iraqi people are now in the streets demanding a change. 

They do not like the direction their nation is going and the heavy 

influence of Iran in their nation’s politics. We should not, either. 

Men that ordered the murder of Americans only a few decades 

ago are gaining a foothold in Iraq’s new government. These Iranian-supported terrorists turned politicians regularly threaten 

Americans and our allies while their militias have committed 

countless atrocities across Iraq and Syria. For years, they have 

murdered their own countrymen and have forced thousands from 

their homes. Meanwhile, our Government has sought to appease 

Iran’s proxies in Iraq. 

Despite the President’s clear direction to counter Iran’s expansionism across the Middle East, the State Department has shielded 

these murderers from any punishment. They say now is not the 

time; we could upset the status quo. We are allowing fear to get 

the better of common-sense foreign policy. 

That is why I have introduced H.R. 4238, the Iranian Proxies 

Terrorist Sanctions Act, introduced over a year ago. The bill would 

target two specific Iraqi militias, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat 

Hezbollah al-Nujaba, commonly referred to as AAH and HHN, 

which are terms that I will use because they are a lot easier to pronounce. 

These terrorists answer directly to Iran and they have the blood 

of Americans, Iraqis, Syrians, and Kurds on their hands. For some 

unknown reason, we have refrained from targeting these groups, 

despite their evil acts. U.S. inaction has allowed these terrorists to 

gain more and more power in Iraq and now in the Iraqi Government. 

As is usually the case in Washington, ‘‘analysis paralysis’’ has set 

in. So-called ‘‘experts’’ say Congress should not be mandating sanctions and we should pass the buck to the Executive Branch. We 

have the responsibility as representatives of Americans killed by 

these groups to not stand idly by. 

My staff was in Baghdad last month, and the Embassy staff 

scoffed at this legislation, saying sanctions would provoke the terrorist militias. Ironically, just a few weeks later, these groups 

launched a mortar attack against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. 

This stalling technique of government bureaucrats who have a 

long track record of inaction on this issue is not good for the United 

States foreign policy or the Iraqis. While we do nothing, Iran is 

doing everything. They are expending all of their efforts to consolidate their power in Baghdad, and it is paying off. 

It seems to me Americans should be tired of investing blood and 

treasure in Iraq as Iran seizes more power. If Iraq is ever going 

to become a strong and independent nation, we must take a stand 

against Iranian proxies in that nation. 

Without objection, I want to introduce two letters: One letter 

from Chairman Royce and myself to the Secretary of State requesting the Secretary of State to examine these two terrorist organizations and to see if they meet the foreign terrorist organizations reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:23 Oct 18, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_TNT\092618\32304 SHIRL
3

quirement. We received a reply yesterday that basically said what 

the requirements were to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization; basically, no answer at all. 

Without objection, I would like to introduce both of these into the 

record. 

Mr. KEATING. No objection. 

Mr. POE. And now I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. 

Keating from Massachusetts. Go ahead. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]

4


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Opening Statement of the Honorable Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Hearing: 

"Countering Iranian Proxies in Iraq" 

September 26, 2018 

(As prepared for delivery) 

"For years now, Iran has gone unchecked as it expanded its influence and recruited legions of 

murdering proxies across the Middle East. Lavishly funded by sanctions relief under the Iran 

nuclear deal, a network of terrorist criminals sow chaos and conflict in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, 

Lebanon, and Iraq. Their objective: to expel U.S. influence from the region conquer our allies 

subjugate millions and establish the theocratic regime in Tehran as the undisputed master of 

the Middle East. 

One of the central fronts in Iran's effort to conquer the region is in Iraq. Make no mistake, Iran 

wants to make Iraq a puppet state of Iran. Exploiting Iraq's weak government and the fight 

against ISIS, Iran has mobilized thousands of militiamen and political proxies to gain power in 

Baghdad. They are using their growing influence in Iraq to foster sectarianism secure a supplyline to terrorists in Syria and Lebanon, and recruit fighters for their many wars. 

Iran is not interested in building a strong and sovereign Iraq. Iran is not interested in a peaceful 

Iraqi society where Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, or Kurds live in harmony together. As America 

and our allies have come to help fight ISIS and restore Iraq's legitimate authority over its 

territory, Iran has been working to undermine our hard-won victory and threaten our soldiers 

and diplomats. 

In May, Iraq held its first elections since the defeat of the ISIS caliphate. But many Iraqis did not 

bother to vote, because they saw the system as corrupt. Like the Iranian people, they see the 

hand of Iran's oppressive regime undermining the institutions in Iraq. They see Iran's proxies, 

men who swear allegiance to the Supreme Leader in Tehran, running for office in their country. 

They see the vast wealth of their nation being squandered to pay for Iran's militias while they 

live in poverty, without clean water or electricity. 

The Iraqi people are now in the streets demanding a change. They do not like the direction their 

nation is going and the heavy influence of Iran in their politics. We should not either. 

Men that ordered the murder of Americans only a decade ago, are gaining a foothold in Iraq's 

new government. And what have we done to stop them? 

These Iranian-supported terrorists turned politicians regularly threaten Americans and our 

allies while their militias have committed countless atrocities across Iraq and Syria. For years 

they have murdered their own countrymen and have forced thousands from their homes. 

Meanwhile, our government has sought to appease Iran's proxies in Iraq. 
5


32304e-2.eps

Despite the President's clear direction to counter Iran's expansionism across the Middle East, 

our State Department has shielded these murderers from any punishment. They say, now is not 

the time, we could upset the status quo. We are allowing fear to get the better of us. 

That is why I introduced H.R. 42.38, the Iranian Proxies Terrorist Sanctions Act a year ago. 

This bill would target two Iraqi militias, Asa'ib Ahl ai-Haq (AAH) and Harakat Hezbollah aiNujaba (HHN). These terrorists answer directly to Iran and have the blood of innocent 

Americans, Iraqis, Syrians, and Kurds on their hands. For some inexplicable reason, we have 

refrained from targeting these groups despite their countless evil acts. Our inaction has allowed 

these terrorists to gain more and more power in Iraq. 

As is usually the case in Washington, 'analysis paralysis' set in. The 'experts' now say Congress 

should not be mandating sanctions and we should pass the buck to the executive branch. We as 

representatives of Americans killed by these groups should not stand idly by. 

My staff was in Baghdad last month and the Embassy staff scoffed at my legislation, saying 

sanctions would provoke these terrorist militias. Well just weeks later, these groups launched a 

mortar attack against the US embassy in Baghdad. 

Another argument we now hear is that while Iraqi government formation is underway, it is not 

the right time to sanction these groups. But will conditions for designation be any better once 

these thugs hold key government positions? This is just a stalling technique of government 

bureaucrats who have a long track record of inaction on this issue. There will simply never be a 

perfect time to sanction these groups. 

While we do nothing, Iran is doing everything. They are expending all their efforts to 

consolidate their power in Baghdad. And it's paying off. Decisive action must be taken now. 

Americans are tired of investing blood and treasure in Iraq as Iran seizes more power. If Iraq is 

ever going to become a strong and independent nation, we must take a clear stand against the 

Iranian proxies in that nation. And that's just the way it is." 
6

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have held a number of hearings on Iran and its destabilizing 

activities throughout the region. Today we focus specifically on 

Iran’s engagement in Iraq. It would be an understatement to say 

that the security situation in Iraq has presented an incredible challenge to the United States foreign policy and national security. And 

throughout, the Iraqi people have suffered greatly over the course 

of multiple conflicts. 

Today we are at a critical juncture. How the U.S. engages with 

Iraq, with its government, its people, and its economy can have an 

outsized impact on whether Iraq is able to build on the fragile security that exists today and actually achieve lasting stability. Iraq 

has to be more than where we have a military base to combat ISIS. 

This hearing today is, therefore, timely and important because, 

as we shape our own policy toward Iraq for the coming years, we 

can’t ignore Iran’s influence and interest there. The history between Iran and Iraq is long and complex, and Iran’s entrenched influence throughout Iraq’s policy and military apparatus stymies efforts to strengthen democratic institutions there and ensure that 

the Iraqi Government can effectively protect its citizens from internal and external threats. 

A government must be able to exercise control over the use of 

force within its borders, and the political parties and representatives in a country must be loyal, first and foremost, to their country 

and their people. Iran’s control over and ties to political and military groups in Iraq flies in the face of these critical objectives and 

undermines Iraq’s ability to ever be able to fully be independent 

and secure. 

How to reduce and manage Iran’s influence, however, is an open 

question, not only because of Iran’s ties to powerful entities and individuals in Iraq, ones that run deep, but also because our policies 

toward Iran and across the region, as well as those of our allies, 

are also at play. 

There are two general ways to think about approaching the 

issue: By countering the Iranian influence, their agents, and actions, on the one hand, and by working ourselves and our allies to 

support Iraq in pursuit of its own stability and sovereignty, both 

of those things. 

Countering Iran’s influence in the region through sanctions and 

related means has received a lot of attention. However, I am concerned that we don’t do enough to also pay enough attention to the 

policies that would support Iraq in becoming more independent and 

more resilient to Iranian policies and actions, actions that undermine that independence. 

Today, I look forward to discussing our options for moving forward to address Iran’s influence in Iraq. Specifically, what steps 

our State Department should be taking alongside Treasury, DoD, 

Commerce, and others? What can and should we be doing as part 

of a coalition with our allies to further this progress? What barriers 

exist to reducing the influence of Iran’s proxies in Iraq, and what 

can we do with our allies to eliminate those barriers? And also, 

what should we avoid in terms of policy missteps, so that the conflict that is mired in Iraq’s past can be overcome in favor of staVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:23 Oct 18, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_TNT\092618\32304 SHIRL
7

bility, a stability that keeps Iraq safe, keeps Americans safe, and 

promotes our shared interest in the region? 

We are seeing a shift in Iraq right now where people are demanding that their government be accountable to them, and not to 

foreign interests. We share that vision for Iraq’s future and have 

a lot more that we could do to promote closer, more productive diplomatic security and economic ties with Iraq that Iraqi interests 

would benefit by. 

We have this opportunity to break with the history of challenges 

and conflicts in Iraq and, instead, choose how we will support a different path forward. It is my hope that we will take this opportunity and use it wisely. 

And so, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today 

and hearing from you on what should be another important committee hearing, and hopefully, one that can move us forward to be 

successful in this endeavor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, objections, questions, extraneous materials for the record, 

subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

And without objection, all of the witnesses’ prepared statements 

will be made part of this record. 

I ask that each witness keep your presentation keep your presentation to no more than 5 minutes. When you see the red light come 

on in front of you, it is very simple; just stop, not slow down; just 

stop. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Behnam Taleblu is a research fellow at the Foundation for 

Defense of Democracies, where he specializes in nonproliferation 

issues in Iran. 

Dr. Kimberly Kagan is the president of the Institute for the 

Study of War. She was awarded the Distinguished Public Service 

Award by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike 

Mullen, for her service advising U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. Michael Pregent is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. 

He is a former intelligence officer in the United States Army, serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, including as an embedded advisor to 

the Iraqi Government. 

And Ambassador Barbara Leaf is the Rosenblatt Distinguished 

Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

Previously, she served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab 

Emirates as well as other senior positions at the State Department, 

including as the first Director of the Office of Iranian Affairs. 

Mr. Taleblu, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BEHNAM BEN TALEBLU, RESEARCH 

FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. TALEBLU. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Trade, and 

Nonproliferation at the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on behalf of FDD, thank you for inviting me to testify. 

8

It is a privilege to present my analysis today alongside Dr. 

Kagan, Mr. Pregent, and Ambassador Leaf, all of whose work on 

Iraq and Iran, as well as their service to our country, I respect and 

admire. 

Also, I want to personally thank Judge Ted Poe, who I understand is retiring this year, for his leadership in Congress on the 

Iran issue. 

Mr. POE. You are thanking me for retiring? Is that what you 

said? [Laughter.] 

Mr. TALEBLU. For your leadership, sir, for your leadership. 

Today, I will focus my comments on Iran’s proxy strategy and 

militias, while highlighting measures like designations to counter 

Iran’s armed agents of influence. Such as move does two important 

things. One, establishes the predicate for a new Iraq policy beyond 

the ISIS mission, and, two, helps implement the regional components of a more comprehensive Iran policy, which the current administration called for almost 1 year ago. 

The Islamic Republic’s proclivity for using proxies is not only 

consistent with its ideological goals, but also reflects a cognizance 

of escalation dynamics and the country’s military aptitudes. Iran 

uses proxies, terror groups, and militias throughout Iraq and the 

Middle East because they enable the regime to do five key things. 

One, help mask its hand abroad, aiding in deniability. 

Two, dampen the prospects for escalation against Iranian territory. 

Three, exploit the U.S.’s high bar for the use of force by operating in the gray zone. 

Four, enter conflicts at an earlier stage, helping shape the outcome quicker, since militias are cheaper and easier to deploy. 

And five, translate relatively cheap military power into a durable 

political influence. 

This last point is crucial, given the success of doing it in Lebanon 

with Hezbollah, and now, the threat of Iraqi Shiite militias capturing the state. 

Now to the militias. While there are too many militias to review 

in detail, my written testimony profiles four key militias, two of 

which are AAH and HHN. Both these groups retain overt links to 

Iran, are an impediment to Iraqi sovereignty, and a threat to U.S. 

foreign and security policy in Iraq and Syria. 

The ascendency of these militias who seek to draw Iraq into 

Iran’s orbit and eject the U.S. from the region is a threat. Three 

U.S. Presidents have used designations before to disrupt the 

IRGC’s financial support networks, expose its agents and affiliates, 

and publicly stigmatize them. It is now time to go with that approach in Iraq. 

It is my recommendation that the U.S. use counterterrorism authorities to designate select Iranian proxies in Iraq that retain 

close ties to the IRGC. The legal authorities for such a move already exist, as does the evidence, as does the commensurate regional approach toward their patron, Iran. This makes the main 

issue one of political will. 

Designating Iran-backed militias at a time when anti-Iranian 

sentiment is on the rise in Iraq can strengthen the hand of those 

who want to contest Tehran in Baghdad. A designation can also 

9

send a message of deterrence and resolve against those who would 

side with Tehran over Washington willingly. 

As a cautionary note, my recommendation for a terrorism designation should be seen as a floor, not ceiling, for U.S. policy. Designations will not do away with the Iranian proxy threat, but they 

can help the U.S. approach the problem with Iranian expansion 

and subversion more directly by using all elements of national 

power. 

In my written testimony, I offer a survey of authorities, more detailed arguments in favor of designations, counterarguments, as 

well as my attempt to rebut those counterarguments. I also offer 

at least 10 recommendations for Congress, ranging from naming 

and shaming to inquiring about the IRGC’s penetration of the Iraqi 

economy and arranging for non-military aid. I can also speak to 

non-congressional measures, if asked. 

Earlier this month, the U.S. Special Representative for Iran, 

Brian Hook, said, ‘‘We don’t make a distinction between the Iranian Government and these Iranian Shiite militias that are around 

the Middle East.’’

Now is the time to operationalize that call. America cannot afford 

to cede Iraq with its human capital, natural resources, and legacy 

of more than a decade of American investment in terms of blood 

and treasure to Iran. To be clear, there are risks to any strategy 

that involve countering Iran in Iraq. But, if the U.S. does nothing, 

Iran’s subversion of Iraq’s politics and security is guaranteed. 

Thank you for your time and attention. I can address the militias 

more in detail later, but I look forward to your questions. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taleblu follows:]

10


32304a-1.eps

ering Iranian 

in Iraq 

oxies 
11


32304a-2.eps

Behnam Ben T aleblu September 26, 20 18 

Chainnan Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Trade, and Nonproliferation at the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on behalf of the 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies~ thank you for inviting me to tcslify. It is a privilege to 

present my analysis alongside Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Mr. Michael Prcgcnt, and Ambassador 

Barbara Leaf, all of whose work on Iraq and Iran, as well as their service to our cmmtry, l respect 

and admire. 

Today, I will focus my comments on Iran's proxy strategy and militias while highlighting measures 

to counter these forces in Trag. Designating Iran's armed agents of influence can serve as a 

predicate lor a nc'A Iraq policy beyond the anti-Islamic State mission. It can also help implement 

the regional component of a more comprehenslve iran policy, which the current U.S. 

administration called for almost one year ago. l 

Broader Iranian Motivations and Strategy 

Properly orienting the present discussion about Iranian militias in Iraq begins not in Baghdad hut 

in Tehran. The radical Khomeinist interpretation of Shiite Islam llllderpinning the I979 Islamic 

Revolution was something Iranian revolutionaries intended for export. Despite emphasis on the 

prioritization of'·regime survival"2 in assessments of Iranian strategy, the regime's ideology and 

desire to export the revolution remain important drivers of Iranian foreign and security policy. 

Indeed, surveying the chaos in the Middle East in 2015, the commander of Iran's Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds-Forcc (JRGC-QF), Qassem Solcimni, boasted, "We arc 

witnessing the export of the Islamic Revolution throughout the region. From Bahrain and Iraq to 

Syria, Yemen and North Africa."3 Scrutinizing that llst reveals a host of conflict zones, almost all 

of which feature a malign lranian element in the form of a proxy or militia group that is 

destabilizing the region or subverting the status quo. 

Although Tehran also employs soil power methods to export the revolution throughout the region 

and beyond,' the Islamic Republic's reliance on a diwrse anay of militants to wield hard power 

abroad is unquestionable. Iran has spent nearly four decades creating, cultivating, am1ing, funding, 

and training groups in various theaters to further its revolutionary cause. Iran has also worked to 

1 The V./hite Ilousc, "Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy;· October 13, 2017. 

(QLLp~;_(:~i...:·:O..:l::~V!J..iS:h!lb&·~J;..\2.Y.Li2ri~llJ:u;~_j..>lfllenlen.kJ~nark~~itk!l1dLilllU2:irdn-:-l!Jll~~·D 

2 U.S. Department of Defense, "Unclassified Report on the Military Power of Iran," .April:2010, page 1. 

(https:'/li.Jsmo/mun:eprlnt-'dot~ 1Hm 20lO.pdt). Looking at history, the regime has ahvuys had a penchant f(x 

expediency and sell:..preservation. but only \\-hen hacked into a corner. Notable instances include: I) Ayatollah 

Khumeini's begrudging acceptance ora Lniled Nations Security Council-sponsored ceasellrc agreem~nt in July 

!988 to end the bloody J 980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Khomcini famou'>iy likened this acceptance to drinking from a 

"pmsoned chahce.'' 2) In September 2013, after years of escalating s.anctions against Iran's illicit nuclear program, 

Khomeini's successor Ayatollah Kharnenei called for ~howing '"heroic llexibility,'' thereby authorizing a new em of 

nuclear diplomacy \\·ith the PS-+-1 that led to the interim (.lPOA) and tina! (JCPOA) nuclear deals. 3 Jeremy l~ender and Michael B Kelley, "Thi" sentence "hould cause a lot concern 

March 17, 2015. ( h1!r~~~'LY:Y~.» .J:u0in~:.-2in~i9~r_,_'2.Q1Jl~·,;s:m~:.er.}:_@QlJ.L: 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies ·wv\1\\·.defenddemocracy.org 
12


32304a-3.eps

Behnam Ben T aleblu September 26, 20 18 

co-opt existing groups or their members. Among Iran's longest-nmning and most successful 

attempts to do the former include Lebanese Hezbollah5 and the Badr Organization in Iraq. 6 

Evidence or the latter is found in Tran's more recent arming7 of the Houthi rebels in Yemen. 

YVhy Proxies? 

The Islamic Republic's proclivity for using proxies is not only consistent with its ideological goals, 

but also reflects a cognizance of escalation dynamics and the country's military strengths and 

\vcaJ;;ncsscs.x Tran uses proxies, terror groups,9 and militias throughout the Middle East (and in 

Iraq, in particular) because they enable the regime to do tive key things: 

• Help mask its hand abroad: By drawing on non-Iranian actors10 \\ith pre-existing 

grievances, Tehran achieves a measure of plausible deniahility in the asymmetric assaults 

and terror attacks it orders against its adversaries. 

• Dampen prospects for escalation against Iranian territory: Should Iran's ''hand" be 

revealed, having a robust proxy network spread out across the Middle East ·- or even 

multiple groups within a single country like Iraq - can deter escalation against Iranian 

equities while keeping conflict localized and, most importantly, avvay from the Iranian 

homeland, 

• Play to its strengths - and its adversaries' weakness - by operating in the gray 

zone'': 11 Iran's ability to engage in graduated escalation \Vithout provoking an outright 

response from its conventionally superior foes highlights Tehran's understanding of its 

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adversaries' high bar for the use of force as well as their reservations about employing that 

force. Iran frequently uses proxies and terror groups to impose costs on adversaries while 

avoiding direct retaliation, enabling Tehran to make incremental gains with limited costs. 12 

• Enter conflicts at an earlier stage and shape the outcome: 13 Equipping and deploying 

militias to a theater of conflkt is far cheaper than training and sending conventional ftlrccs. 

This reduced price tag lov,. crs the bar for intervention and for the usc of force by Iran and 

its proxies. Taken as a measure of their political commitment, an early intervention can 

but docs not al\vays- enable Tehran greater say over the direction of a conllict over time. 

Translate relatively cheap military power into duJ'ablc political influence: For Iran, a 

longstanding and successfUl relationship between a patron and a proxy moves beyond men, 

money, and munitions, and focuses instead on political support to co-opt key state 

institutions or the entire state \Vhere the proxy is active. Thus, Lebanese Hezbollah is 

playing an influentia114 - and by some estimates, the most influential 15 - role in Lebanese 

politics today, The same tln·cat exists in Iraq today with respect to IRGC-backed militias. 

The Evolution of Iran Proxies' O!y'ectives 

Prior to the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran employed proxies for two basic purposes: conducting acts 

of terrorism against targets antitl1ctical to regime interests and ideals, and subverting or co-opting 

central authority in states that were at odds with Tehran. Aller 2011, when Syria's Assad regime 

was in periL Iran surged Lebanese Hczbollah and the lRGC into the Syrian theater. Iran also 

created, trained, and am1ed Arab and non-Arab Shiite militias to rally in defense of the one Arab 

government Tehran could count as an ally. This soon became the model for the third type of proxy 

employment: militia support to shore up states aligned with, or favorable towards, Tehran. 

Building on Iran's extensive proxy net'vvork in Iraq, 16 a similar cadre of actors \Vas marshaled in 

2014 to reconquer territory from the Islamic State, The regime helped channel Iraqis (mostly 

Shiites) and other newly created proxies into the broad mnbrella force called the Popular 

Mobilization Units (PMUs). flattlcf'icld experience for this "Shiite Liberation Am1y," 17 an 

12 This strategy defined the lranian experience in Jraq from2003-201l. See: Hen Connable. Jason H. Campbell, Dan 

Madden, ''Stretching and Lxploiting Tlu·csholds fOr High-Order War: How Russia, China, and Iran Arc Eroding 

American TnJ1ucncc Using Timt.:-Tcslcd Mca:'.un:s Shml of War;' 2016. 25. 

and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. 1

"' Tn VYcstcrn parlance, thi~ is called Iran's "Shiite Foreign Legion."' llut in 2016, an TRGC offictal coined the term 

"Shiite Liberation Army'' during an inlerview \Vilh hardline media. See: "<< <t..._.:.:. _)m'~ Y. ~.J_,._. .l Y,:, J_JI_}.fo.i:i ,,.:; ~·J 

.::)..l w.::·~ ~_,1.:: _p.....;.l_y~ (The Fatemi~youn Were The Forefront of The War In Syriai'The Artesh' Has Several 

Vohmtecr Martyrdom Divisions)," Tasnim ,l\·-ews Agl:'ncy (Iran), August 18, 2016. 

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integrated multi-ethnic force loyal to the IRGC-QF that can be deployed across national boundaries 

in service of the Islamic Republic's foreign adventures, marks a potenti<:~lly new era in Iran's use 

ol'proxy forces. 

Identifying Iran's Agents of Influence in Iraq 

Shiite militias in Iraq have come a long way since the first years after the fall ofSaddam Hussein, 

when firebrand cleric Muqtada ai-Sadr's Jaish ai-Mahdi (JAM) and the Badr Brigade dominated 

the scene." The multiplicity ol' militias in Iraq today is a product or the splintering ol'thc JAM's 

''Special Groups"FJ during the Iraq War, as well as the mobilization oCwhat became the PMU in 

2014. The threat, according to expe11s, is that "this constellation of Iranian-backed militias is 

eclipsing official Iraqi institutions, and sowing the seeds of conflict for decades to comc." 20 But 

more than checking or oYershadmving Iraqi institutions is the threat that comes from integrating 

militlas21 into the Iraqi security forces or seating them in government without vetting and 

disarming them, or ignoring what their true allegiances may bc. 22 

While political and religious groups lie outside the scope of this testimony, Iran-backed militias 

often contain some political or religious components that ground them in the &tate and society in 

which they operate. With reference to Iraq, it is important to recall that revolutionary Iran has had 

long-standing ties to the Da '\va party,23 and that Iran \Vas once home to many Iraqi Shiites in exile, 

particularly during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Iran's continued relationship with, and 

cultivation of~ these entities is strategic. Over time, these relationships have provided Iran with 

inroads into Iraq's politics, society, and economy. As Soleimanl once claimed, "'\Ve're not like 

the Americans. \Vc don't abandon our friends. "'24 

Soleimani's dictums matter not only because they offer insight into the mind of a noted terrorist, 

but because as IRGC-QF chief: he is one of lew Iranian security o!1icials sutliciently empowered 

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to have the capability to see his intentions through. 25 Many Shiite militias have received training, 

weapons, or direction from Tehran, usually at the behest ofthe IRGC-QF26 Recent news oflranian 

missile proli/Cration to Shiite militias in Traq should come as no ~urprisc as it is a measure of 

Tehran's fondness for, and investment in, these groups. 27 For these militias, 1t is a point of pride 

to be visited by Soleimani on the battlefield and be photographed alongside him-'" 

Knmtting Your Enemy~ Profiles (~f Four Ke·y lvfilitias 

The pro tiles below present important details about four of the most influential !ran-backed Shiite 

militias in Traq. Of those tour, Asa'ih Ahl ai-Haq and Harakat He7.bollah ai-Nujaha have the most 

overt links to Iran and to (not yet designated) elements of the Iranian threat network in Iraq. The 

list below is not exhaustive. There arc many other Iran-backed forces in [raq, as well as others 

operating in Syria and across the region. For additional information on militias operating in both 

theaters. I highly recommend the scholarship of my colleagues David Adesnik and Amir Toumaj, 

who produced 10 militia protilcs for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in February 

2018.'9 

Munathama Badr30 (Badr) 

• Name (English): The Badr Organization 

Year founded: 1982, renamed in 201231 

Current leader: Hadi al-Amiri31 

Current sanctions: None 

Democracies, 1-- ebruary 2g, 20 I 8. (l>Ur/:•'l'''-·'ldsDdc!e-'-""'c!"'lc'"i!'l!'edi:dD_l0·-c.DL"~-l;e<J<e<C~ni:lillc;cl"'"li!e2') 

w Translileraled 1i"om Arabi~.:: 

11 Philip Smyth, '"Should Iraq's ISCI Forces Really Be Considered 'Good Militias'?," The 

.\Tear East Policy, 17, 2016, 

NoYCmber 6, 2014. 

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Tics to Iran: Badr sided with Iran against it> fellow Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq War.11 Badr, 

which is popularly know"' as "Iran's oldest proxy in lraq,"34 has adopted Iran's Khomeinist 

interpretation of lslam. 35 

Threat: Badr has e1Icctive l:Ontrol of Iraq's interior ministry, 36 strong presence in many 

PMU units, and retention ofweaponry. 37 Al-Amiri has reportedly threatened to topple any 

American-imposed govemment. 38 

Other notes: 

o Radr holds 22 scats in Iraq's parliament as part ofthe Fatah coalition. 39 

o The militia was originally named Faylaq al-Badr (The Badr Corps), which was the 

anned wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (which later 

became the Islamic Supreme Council oflraq)40 

o Badr partook in the oflensivc to dislodge the Peshmcrga Jrom Kirkuk aller the 2017 

independence referendum by Iraqi Kurds. " 

Kata'ib Hczbollah (KH) 

• Name (English): The Hezbollah Brigades/Brigades of the Party of God 

Year founded: 2007 (with roots in 2003)42 

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Current leader: Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi (aka Abu Mahdi ul-Muhandis)41 

Current sanctions: In 2009, the U,S. designated KH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 

(FTO) and employed counterterrorism authorities from Executive Order (EO) 13224 as 

"ell EO 13438, which targets those who destabilize Iraq. EO 13438 also targeted alMuhandis.44 AI-Muhandis is "subject to secondary sanctions," according to the Treasury 

Department's Office or Foreign Assets Control..t5 

Tics to Iran: The most recent State Department Country Reports on Terrorism notes that 

KH receives material support from Iran. ~° KH has also received training in lran . ..t 7 U.S. 

military officials have stated that KH takes direct ·'orders" from the IRGC-QF. 48 According 

to Stanford University's Mapping Militant Organizations Project, KH collaborated with 

Asa'ib Ahl ai-Haq to create Harakat Hezbollah ai-Nl.\juba4 " Al-Muhandis also worked for 

the JRGC, aiding in the bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait City in 

1983."' 

fhreat: KH leader ai-Muhandis has threatened violence on multiple occasions against the 

U.S., 51 claiming the group anticipates targeting U.S forces after the Islamic State 

campaign. 52 

Other notes: 

o An offshoot of KH now has one seat in the Iraqi parliament under the Fatah 

coalition. 53 

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o Iran has come to rely on KH, among seYeral other Iraqi Shiite militias. to bolster 

Tehran's pro-Assad coalition in Syria. 5-1-

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) 

• Name (English): The League of the Righteous 

Y car founded: 200655 

Current leader: Qais ai-Khazali"' 

Current sanctions: None 

Ties to Iran: AAH is "extensively trained and funded by'' Iran's IRGC. According to a 

noted scholar, ·'Khazali has reportedly pledged allegiance to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali 

Khamenel."jR 

Threat: AAH claims to have carried out at least 6,000 attacks on American military and 

coalition forces from its inception in 2006to the end of the Iraq War in 2011 59 The group 

is capable of carrying out lethal ambushes, such as the one in January 2007 that killed five 

American service members. 60 

Other notes: 

o AAH's political wing, '·aJ-Sadiqoun," won an estimated 13-15 seats in the recent 

parliamentary elections and was part of the Fatah coalition. 61 

o The group is more than just a militia- AAH provides social services to Shiites in 

Iraq. 02 

o AAH has sent lorccs to light in Syria to defend the lran-a1if,~led Assad regimc 6 ' 

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Harakat Hezbollah al-N ujaba (HHN) 

• Name (English): The Movement of the Noble ofHezbollab/Movement ofthe Noble oflhe 

Party of God 

Year founded: 2013 6

' 

Current leader: Sheikh Akram ai-Ka'abi 65 

Current sanctions: The U,S. Treasury Department designated ai-Ka'abi in 2008, prior to 

HHN's founding, pursuant to EO 13438 "for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and 

the Government oflraq."66 

Ties to Iran: Al-Ka 'abi is dedicated to Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei and Iran's vision 

of Islamic govcmancc. AI-Ka'abi has met with, and is widely admired by, Iran's 

revolutionary elite. 67 Sheikh Mokhtar, Nujaba's Syria commander, reportedly told a group 

of Hezbollah fighters in 2016, "We will go to defend anywhere the Islamic Republic of 

iran deems necessary, because we arc committed to [the] Supreme Lcadcr." ~ 

Threat: The U.S. designated AI-Ka'abi for '·leading attacks against members of the 

Govemment of Iraq and Coalition Forces."69 Al-Ka'abi said publicly he wou]d overthrow 

the Iraqi central government if the Supreme Leader asked him to do so. 70 

Other notes: 

o HHN partook in the siege of Aleppo. 71 

o In early 2017, Iranian outlets reported comments !rom an HHN spokesman 

claiming that the group had established a "special brigade" in Syria ·'ready to take 

actions to liberate [the] Golan."72 

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Debating a Designation for lran 's Proxies in Iraq 

The ascendancy of han-backed militias in Iraq is a threat to U,S, interests since it r'ctrther draws 

the country into Iran's orbit and has the potential to erode U.S. influence and room for maneuver. 

This was recently demonstrated when militias attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities in two b·aqi 

cities. 73 Iran-backed Shiite militias spent nearly a decade targeting U.S. service members during 

the Iraq War/4 cutting their teeth on the issue of resistance against America. Now, despite some 

setbacks, 75 these groups are seeking to translate their military success 76 into greater political 

pov. er 77 in Baghdad. 

Three U.S. Presidents··· George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and now Donald Trump have relied 

on designations to push back on the expansive influence of Iran's IRGC by disrupting its financial 

suppmi networks, exposing lts agents and affiliates, and publical!y stigmatizing them. It is nmv 

time to apply that approach in Iraq. It is my recommendation that the U.S. move to designate select 

Iranian proxies in Iraq that retain close ties to Iran and the IRGC. The legal authorities lor such a 

move already exist, as docs the evidence required for designations. This makes the main issue one 

of political will. 

As a cautionary note, my recommendation of a terrorism designation for such entities should not 

preclude future U.S. actions against Iran in Iraq and in defense of Iraqi sovereignty. Designations 

will not do away with the Iranian proxy threat in hag. But they can help the U.S. approach the 

problem of Tranian expansionism and subversion more directly and by using all clements of 

national po\·ver. 

Below is a brief overview of the legal authorities available to U.S. policymakers to designate 

dements of Iran~s proxy network in Traq. I then summarize arguments in favor of designations, 

follmved by an attempt to engage with and refute counterarguments to such a move. 

7

l Krishnadev C'alanmr. "Tnm1p's Latest Warning to Iran Didn't Come Out ofNowhere," The A!lanfic. September 

12, 2018. ( hl1p:·<//v, 1". y,. 'ltec:tlan~ic . ..:om1 intemationaL''ar(llive/20 J. 8i09;trunm· 'sarns, d·om~shi!.HlJ i1itia~imq!569989i) 

""~As described in: ":Vlichael R. Gonion and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endganw: The Inside Stm}' of the Stmgglefhr 

George W. Bush to Barack Obama (Ne\v York: Pantheon Books, 201 2). 

Shi 'itc Paramilitary Icadcr AI-Amiri Withdm'\vs 

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Surve_y (l Legal Authorities AlreacJ.v in Place 

• Designation Pursuant to EO 1322478 

o Name: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who 

Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism7ll 

o Date signed: September 23, 2001 

o Slllnrnm·y of punishments: Enables the U.S. to block the assets of foreign 

individuals and entities related to the subject matter of the order, as well as their 

agents, arfiliates, and associates. 

o Recommendation: To target select Iran-hacked militias in Iraq with this order, since 

they are agents oflran's IRGC and are overseen by Iran's IRGC-QF. This EO was 

used to designate both the IRGC and JRGC-QF."' 

Designation Pursuant to EO 1343881 

o Name: Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in 

Iraq 

o Date signed: July 17, 2007 

o Summary of punishments: "prohibit[s] all transactions between the designees and 

any U.S. person and fi·eeze[s] any assets the designees may haw under U.S. 

jurisdiction.~~82 

o Recommendation: This EO can be used against mllitia networks in Iraq. In fact. lt 

has already been used againol the leaders of oelect militias, but the stigma 

surrounding a terrorism designation is greater. 

Addition to FTO List 

o Maintained by the U.S. Department of State since 1997, the foreign Terrorist 

Organization (FTO) list is public, thereby naming and shaming foreign militant 

groups that partake ln terrorism or ''retain the capability and intent to engage in 

terrorist activity or terrorism. " 83 Listing an entity makes its members subject to a 

U.S. visa/travel ban, prohibits U.S. persons from supporting the listed entity, llild 

requires U.S. financial institutions to Lake control of any funds in accounts linked 

to an FTO or its aftiliatcs. 

U.S. Deparunent of State, Bureau 

13224,'. September 23, 2001. (l]u.r.s;.';;::.n;:,go;t,,_gp!'!·"'-''£lOc.91h§rLl.,sl 

-\l Executive Order 13224, Who Commit, Threaten to 

Commit, or 

Treasury. "Fact Sheet: Designation oflranian Entities and lndividuals for 

and Support for T erronsm;· October 25, 2007. ( h~ps: I ",V\'.'\'-. rr..::a."urv .!!m·, nresscerli~I:'XE:.~r_eJ~?~~Q.L;Q;~hpl1:11Jlli£.:~J; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, '"Treasury Designates the 

!ROC under Terrorism Authority and Targets TRGC and Military Supporters under Counter-Proliferation 

Authority," Cktober 13, 2017. (h1!r~:l~v\n.,:.t!'~:9o~~IY~W"~J1!:~52':..(~l_~.rwr~~5.-..!:t;.k<;g;_c_~_:_l!i!&e.o:!~.li:l.Ql:L? .. ;J~m-'i.) 

81 .lc,xeculi\e Order l343B, "'Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabili..-:ation Effort& in lraq," July 

19. 2007. (b.lOf}o::.·.v, "•.lUlCctillfl:,gQ'CI}~!illg££SC_C!;i•lt:r!oill~;J[QlJ2c_llQ~U\IJS\.!ll:ic.J'[l~QQi) 

in lraq,'' 

s.> U.S. Department of State. 

Organizations," accessed September 19,2018. (tillQ&'f'.'<'.=stlJ8;<"1_!LlJi):lo;,Q\lliT..C"""Glill'-'"''f'") 

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Behnam Ben T aleblu September 26, 20 18 

Arguments in Favor ofDesif{nating Iran's Pro.\y ]

1

{etwork in Iraq 

• A step towards a coherent Iraq policy 

o Righting wrongs: For several years, Washinb'lon has not had a clear Iraq policy 

other than its suppmi for the anti-Islamic State mission, When it comes to the late 

of Iraq, operating without a clearly articulated aud opcrationalized vision cau lead 

to regional perceptions of American aloofness at best and disinterest at worst. 

American pas~ivity was most evident when it came to confronting issues like 

sectarian slaughter committed by Shiite milltias,84 the response from Shiite militias 

to the Kurdish independence referendum in 2017," as well as the 2018 

parliamentary ch:ction and the political crisis that has ensued. A designation against 

groups that have American blood on their hands in Iraq or report directly to Iran in 

attempts to frustrate American foreign policy in Iraq would begin to change that. 

o Signaling capabilities and ne1v_(ound resolve: Designating groups like AAH and 

HHN signals that the U.S. does care about a wide array of issues ranging from 

government formation to Iraqi sovereignty, the fate of the PMU, as well as checking 

Iranian influence in Iraq. Tl also indicates that the U.S, can and will usc all avenues 

available to produce favorable outcomes, even if it means openly angering the 

Iranians in Iraq. 

o Send;ng a deterrent message: Designating AAH and HHN sends a message to 

!ran's current (and potential) partners in Iraq, There is a plethora of Iran-linked 

actors in the PMU~n as \Veil as individuals seeking positions within the Iraqi 

government that want to subordinate [raq' s national politics to Iranian interests. By 

issuing designations, the U.S. can incentivizc groups to move away from Iran and 

lay the predicate for targeting others. 

Given Badr's already entrenched political and military influence, a U.S. 

designation may not ini1uence its behavior. But stigmatLdng AAH, which 

just gained a substantial bloc of seats in the Iraqi parliament, may be 

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Behnam Ben T aleblu September 26, 20 18 

possible and could reinforce the message that America stands \Vith those 

vvho work in Iraq's national interest. 

Operationalizing the call to push back on Iran in the region 

o Building on words: In his October 2017 address on the Iran deaL President Trump 

promised that he would engage with "allies to ~:ountcr the regime's destabilizing 

activity and support fOr terrorist proxies in the region ... ra In an address this month. 

Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook said, "We don't make a distinction 

between the Iranian government and these Iranian Shlite militias that are around 

the Middle East." 88 'fhese are both powerful statements, but must be followed up 

with concrete action. Iran is still able to support its militias in Iraq and carry out its 

proxy strategy, which is designed to eject America lrom Iraq and permanently keep 

Baghdad weak. 

o Holding groups accounrahle: Stigmatizing and impeding the financing or groups 

that have blood on their hands and meet the criteria of being an agent or affiliate of 

the TRGC and/or the IRGC-QF is consistent with long-standing bipartisan efforts 

to pressure Iran. It also represents a seriou~:, effort to prevent Iran from solidifying 

its hold on Iraq. 

o Recognizing the regional challenge: lflran's modus operandi in the region is to usc 

proxies, terror groups, and militias to disguise its hand, then U.S. policy must 

expose Iran and its activities at every turn. By using a variety oflegal and economic 

means to name and shame AAH and HHN, the U.S. would contest an impmtant 

component of !ran's Iraq policy. 

o Thinking heJ'ond Iraq: Given that. many of Iran's Iraqi proxies are also active in 

Syria, designating them could have second or third order effects on a different 

battlefield. As Iran's militias work to bolster the Assad regime, a designation can 

stigmatize those actors before they become featw·e into any political 'lCttlement or 

become legitimized. 

Countering the Counterarguments to Designating Iran's Prm.y I\'ef1.vork in Iraq 

Below, I present four likely counterarguments to designating elements of Iran's proxy netvvork as 

well as my attempt to refute each cow1tcrargument. Whichever argwncnt ultimately prevails, 

prudence and a nuanced understanding or Iran's security strategy and Iraqi internal politics will 

remain essential. To be clear, there arc risks to designating AAH and HHN. But if the U.S. docs 

nothing, Iran's subversion of the political process and security forces in Jraq \\ill be guaranteed. 

87 The \Vhitc House, ''Remarks by President Trump on lnm Strategy,'' October 13, 2017. 

(tJ.J:E~~i~}~'c...~ ·-~LfliJc.h.Q.l10Q,gQy/.hr.h.i~D.!l '\_?t~If'..:J:lC_l}!:,'![h:.Irl..ill:.~S~.l!S \.BiQ.Q..lJ1-Jillm~:i.G1.!1.-.S!!:f!1_cgy_:) 

~~See comments by Bnan Hook in video: '·Iran's Missile Proliferation: A Conver~ution \\ith 

Hook September 19 Fvcnt:' The Hudson Institute, September 19.2018. 

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Efficacy: Designations are not effective and are at best svmbolic. They will only bolster 

those in Iraq iVho peddle anti-Americanism. 

o The idea that designations will instantaneously dry-up funding to a terror group is 

a misunderstanding of the applicability of this policy tool. Designations against 

Iranian proxies are only a component of a U.S. strategy against Iran in Iraq. 

o While there arc limited linancial restrictions and penalties that come with a 

designation, these designations send an important message. This symbolism can be 

most effective ln Iraq, \Vith the goal to show militias- by virtue or their patronage 

- as agents of Iran at a time \Vhen Iraqi Shiites are grieving and have stormed an 

Iranian consulate. 

Stratification: A graduated approach to sanctions, initial~vfocusedjust on militia leaders, 

is preferable to a blanket designation of elements of! ran's pro:r:y network. 89 

o The logic behind graduated escalation - whether bombingq0 or sanctions - is to 

incrementally increase costs to an adversary to inccntivize a change in behavior. 

But parceling out and delaying designations at such a low level would more likely 

signal timidity. 

o The growing influence of Iran's Shiite militias in Iraq - as well as the regime's 

willingness to resort to overt punishment against targets in lraq91 -means that it is 

too late to stratify and sub-divide designations. Those who sought graduated 

measures should have made their case years earlier, as the militia threat \Vas 

funning. 

I do not oppose the principle of graduated pressure, but designations against 

an Iranian proxy should form the baseline for that pressure strategy, not its 

upper limit. 

Timing: Given the ongoing talks over government formation in Iraq, now is not a good 

time fOr sanctions. 

o U.S. attempts to stigmatize IRGC-Iinkcd actors while a government is forming in 

Baghdad could actually have a positive effect. Such a move signals U.S. resolve to 

push back against Iran in the region and provides hacking to local actors looking to 

marginalize those \Vho subvert Iraqi policy for Iran's benefit. 1t will also become 

increasingly clear vvho in the Iraqi government is willing to work with a proxy of 

Iran instead of the U.S. That in tw·n, could facilitate the introduction of harsher 

political and economic measures. 

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o The desired designation - by virtue of congressional mandate - is likely to take 

time to be implemented. Take for example the Countering America's Adversaries 

Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of2017. The bill o11ercu a 90-uay window f<x 

the president to designate the fRGC as a terrorist organization pursuant to EO 

J 322492 Jt is likely that any new attempt by Congress to direct the actions of the 

executive branch's hand will feature a similar countdown. 

Harm: Sanctioning proxies would anger Iran, rrhich in turn could cause serious harm to 

U.S. personnel in Iraq 

o This is the most serious counterargument because Iran and its proxies retain the 

capability to retaliate against the U.S. in Iraq. However, to believe that Iran and its 

proxies have been entirely peaceful unti1 now ignores hostilities such as the recent 

attacks in Baghdad and Basra against American diplomatic properties. U.S. 

designations of Iranian proxies is not the driver of violence inlraq. 

Contingem:yplanning and fOrce protection must be critlcal clements of U.S. 

policy in lraq. However, like designations, they cannot be the only elements 

of that policy. 

o Despite the risk of retaliation, there is also reason /(x very cautious optimism. Tran 

has threatened massive retaliation before, but it has also backed do""' when faced 

with a firm threat of reprisal. 93 

o In October 2017, Washington ended the debate over the question of "is the JRGC a 

terrorist group"'" by designating it under EO 13224. Since then, the IRGC has not 

wrought havoc in Traq because oCthat label due to its own concems about escalation 

as well as responding to a non-violent move with overt violence. Moreover, the 

designation has helped stigmati;.c the IRGC and its affiliates "hilc increasing the 

pressure on Iran. lt is also the predicate by which the U.S. is able to designate HHN 

and AAH- for having ties to the IRGC and JRGC-QF. 

Poundation for Defense of Democracies 15 \V\V\\·.defenddemocracy.org 
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Behnam Ben T aleblu September 26, 20 18 

o Lastly, should any Iranian militia respond to a terrorism designation- a label which 

at least one group, AAH, openly applauds95 - \Vith an act of terrorism, then that 

militia has only proven that it rightfully deserves the terrorist label and should be 

aggressively countered. 

General Recommendations for U.S. Policy toward Iraq 

While targeting AAH and HHN in Iran's proxy net\vork in Iraq is important, designations alone 

do not constitute a successful policy. Congress should reinvigorate its oversight role to make sure 

there is bipartisan synergy on U.S.-lran policy and on regional U.S. interests like the stability of 

Iraq. Helping lay the groundwork for what a successful Jraq policy post-Islamic State looks like 

can go a long way. Bclov. is a list of' recommendations for the U.S. Congress on this matter: 

Task and Target: Congress should ask the intelligence community about sources of 

revenue or key Iran-backed Sh11tc mill Lias in Iraq. This will aid in target selection if it can 

be assessed that harsher coercive economic tools will impede Iran's financing of Iraqi 

Shiite militias. Simultaneously, Congress should require a report from the administration 

about sectors oftl1c Iraqi economy (if any) that IRGC-owncd or -controlled entities have 

penetrated. 

• ~arne and Shame: The U.S. government must escalate its campaign to stigmatize Iran's 

Shiite militias to keep the spotlight on Iraqi groups likes AAH, HHN. and KH. 

Inquire: Congress should meet with members of the executive branch to determine what, 

if uny, infonnation operations are underway against Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq. 

Upgrade: Congress should urge U.S. government-funded Arabic language programming 

to better cover local events in Iraq and the rise of Iraqi nationalism, particularly in the wake 

of anti-Iran protests in Basra.90 

Deliver: Congress and the administration should consider a robust non-military aid 

package to Iraq that can be centered on improving the lives of ordinary Iraqis. 

• Re,iew and Reassess: When the new Iraqi government is formed, revisit the Strategic 

Framework Agreement (SFA)97 between the U.S. and Iraq and look for areas to improve. 

~JJY~~ J..lo..S~i..S"' j...: •• :;jl :!.Sly «j.:J' j.\1 ~':.....=. ('Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq' or Iraq: Vole are Proud 

!\rc On The Terrorism List ofAmeri.:a)." Fan )Veil'S .1gem:r (Tran) May 29, 2018. 

(ht~rs::.'v;'\"\\Y.ti1fSne\\~.C:J:J1/11>2WS,'] J970J()St)l)(,2g2 1) fo-15.~: y•l~,_.,_l J 1 ;, .... :""" ,>±~-_)1·~-S-,-..):C\,.,-.o~ },;SI~jlpM,j-•,.JIM._:.<bL'-.~'L'",r. ) 

96 Tamer El-Ghobashy and iV!ustafa Salim. ··chanhng 'Iran. out!' Iraqi protef..tcr:o. torch lraman Com.ulatc in 1:3asra," 

The Wm·hington Post. September 7. 2018. 

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32304a-18.eps

Behnam Ben T aleblu September 26, 20 18 

There is a need nmv more than ever to make sure both countries interpret the document the 

same \vay. The U.S. must clarify to the Iraqi gove111ment that integrating designated entities 

into the goycrnment can entail risks Lo the U.S.'s ability to carry out the politicaJ and 

economic sections of the SFA in its entirety. 

• Meet and Plan: Continue to meet with members of the executive branch- especially the 

Defense Department- to red team contingency plans that include scenarios about Iraq's 

political future and the integration of Iran-backed militias into the Iraqi state. The goals 

should be how best to secure U.S. interests should America !'ace low-probability but highimpact scenarios. 

Communicate: Members of the U.S. govemmcnt (and especially members of Congress) 

must clearly communicate that stabilizing Iraq is a national security priority. As a major 

oil exporting state, especially one that has seen ample American blood and finances 

invested in its defense and stabilization, Iraq cannot fall prey to lran 's regional 

machinations. This message must be conveyed to both domestic and foreign audiences \vho 

are cognizant of the paradox of an administration that wants to be less involved in the 

Middle East but simultaneously more active in contesting and confronting Iran. 

Build and Expand: Some Gulf states are increasingly the targets aCiran's ire and have 

sought ways to counter and deter Iranian aggression. both at the local and international 

lcYels. Congress and the administration should focus get these states to support a strong, 

stable, and suvereign Iraq to check Iran in the region and impede its use of proxies. 

Reach out and Connect: Congress should commence a high-level dialogue with the new 

Iraqi government on Iran deal-relnted sanctions. With the heaviest U.S. sanctions on Iran 

returning in early November, lran wil1 be looking for ways to bust sanctions using its 

militia and proxy net works, as well as pressuring Iraq (among other jurisdictions of weak 

central authority) to not enforce U.S. sanctions." The U.S. must educate Iraqi la\\1nakers, 

politicians, as well as banks and businesses about the risks of financial dealings \Vith Iran 

after November 4. It should also make clear that despite the re-imposition of sanctions 

waived by the nuclear deal, America still vvants its international partners to respect UN 

restrictions and travel bans from that deal, which Iraq has not been enforcingY9 

There is an impression rightnmv that America can do, "perhaps not much,"100 in Iraq. But targeting 

Iran's network in Iraq_ is one way to change that. America cannot afford to cede Iraq, \Vith its 

human capital, natural resources, and legacy of more than a decade of American lnYestment in 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 17 "\\'V.'"\v.defenddemocracy.org 
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32304a-19.eps

Behnam Ben T aleblu September 26, 20 18 

terms of blood and treasure, to Iran. Thank you very much for your time and attention, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

Foundation tOr Defense of Democracies 18 \\'V\\.\·.defenddernocracy.org 
29

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Dr. Kagan? 

STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY KAGAN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, 

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR 

Ms. KAGAN. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, colleagues, thank you for 

inviting me to testify and thank you for your expertise provided 

today. 

Iraq stands at a crossroads. It held a parliamentary election in 

May 2018, and as of today, it has not formed a government. The 

composition and the character of the next Government of Iraq will 

determine whether the U.S. can achieve its long-term goals and objectives, which I outline in my written testimony, through determined U.S. diplomatic engagement, backed by positive and, if needed, coercive instruments of policy. 

Iranian political proxies are competing with Iraqi figures acceptable to the U.S. and to the Iraqi people for control of the Iraqi Government. Victory for the Iranian proxies would likely lead to the 

expulsion of the U.S. from Iraq and de facto Iranian control over 

Iraqi foreign policy at least, if not its domestic policy also. 

Iraqi political parties are prohibited by law from maintaining 

armed militias, but many, nevertheless, do in reality. The most 

militarily capable of those militias respond to Iran and, in particular, to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. 

These militias have been actively shaping the political environment 

to influence the government formation process not just politically, 

but through the use of force. They have also recently fired rockets 

toward the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for the first time since 2014. 

American interests absolutely require that the future Iraqi Government not include the de facto leaders of these militias. The Iraqi 

Government has nominally incorporated some of these militias into 

the Iraqi Security Forces, unfortunately. They have acquired ISF, 

Iraqi Security Forces unit designations, hoping to obfuscate the fact 

that they remain distinct militia units responsive to separate 

chains of command and control. 

They have, nevertheless, rebuffed the Prime Minister’s recent attempts to declare himself their Commander-in-Chief as recently as 

this month. Their true allegiance is to their Iranian masters. 

These forces will continue to corrode the ISF regardless of who 

becomes the next Prime Minister if these forces are permitted to 

remain effectively outside of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s control or 

if the next Prime Minister is himself an Iranian proxy. The situation is unacceptable to the U.S. not simply because it will lead to 

attacks on American personnel and likely the expulsion of American forces; it will also erode the Iraqi Security Forces capability 

in the same way that occurred in 2013, allowing ISIS to seize large 

swaths of Iraq. 

The Trump administration has recently begun acting to resist 

the efforts of Iranian political proxies to capture the Iraqi state. It 

has begun to use the threat of the imposition of existing American 

sanctions aimed at Iran against Tehran’s agents in Iraq and those 

who do business with them. Iraq has had to send a delegation to 

Washington to request special exemptions from these sanctions for 

30

the first time since the U.S. has waived them in the past without 

demanding any quid pro quo. 

The two organizations, AAH and the Nujaba movement, unquestionably, deserve to be sanctioned. And AAH, in particular, is responsible for killing, among others, five Americans in Karbala in 

2007, a crime in which its leader, Qais Khazali, was actually 

complicit. And the Nujaba movement is a splinter of AAH and is 

establishing itself as a regional terror network. 

Now, however, is not the moment for Congress to mandate the 

imposition of sanctions on these or any other specific groups or individuals in Iraq. The threat of sanctions, either broad or highly 

targeted, is the most powerful non-military weapon American diplomats in the region have. The behavior of Iraqis as our diplomats 

have threatened to use this weapon of sanctions demonstrates its 

significance, because it changes Iraqis’ behavior. Our diplomats are 

showing the determination and skill to use this tool in an extremely delicate effort to keep Iranian agents out of government. 

And right now, our priorities should be ensuring that Iraq forms 

a government that is sovereign, capable, and acceptable. Should 

the U.S. not be able to do so, or should these organizations, of 

course, remain after the government formation process, that is the 

time when Congress should consider mandating these sanctions 

against these terrorist groups. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kagan follows:]

31


32304b-1.eps

Prepared Testimony of 

Dr. Kimberly Kagan 

President, Institute for the Study of War 

Before the 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Hearing on "Countering Iranian Proxies in lraq" 

Wednesday, September 26, 2018 

The Institute for the Study of War is a non-partisan, non-profit 501 (c)(3) organization and does not take 

institutional positions on legislation. The views expressed in this testimony are solely those of the 

witness. 
32


32304b-2.eps

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify on this imporlanttopie. 

The United States has enduring national se~.:urity requirements in Iraq. The hard-fought gains of 

the United States, its global coalition, and the Iraqi people to expel the Islamic State of Iraq and 

a\ Sham (ISIS) from its strongholds, including Mosul, are necessary but insufficient to ensure 

long-tem1 American interests inlraq. The endurance of those gains is threatened, moreover, by 

factional fighting and major governance failures throughout Iraq that have led both to 

widespread popular protests and to the mobilization of armed groups. 1 

Core American objectives in Iraq are as follows: 

Deny Iraq as a safe haven to al Qacda, ISIS, and potential successors by: 

o Destroying their military organizations and preventing them !rom reconstituting; 

o Diminishing the drivers of instability in which these groups rise and flourish; 

o And ultimately ending the communal civil wars in Iraq and Syria on terms !hal set 

conditions to achieve both of the goals above. 

• Integrate Iraq into the states system in the Middle East in ways benefiting U.S. interests 

and allies by: 

o Encouraging U.S. allies to re-establish diplomatic, economic, and other normal 

state-to-state relations with its Arab neighbors; 

o Maintaining Iraq as a U.S. ally against terrorist groups and slate sponsors o[ 

terror, including Iran; 

o Ensuring Russia does not become a primary military partner tor Iraq; 

o And ultimately extricating [raq from the global and regional conflict in Syria. 

Prevent Iran from using Iraq as a base for hegemonic expansion in the Middle East by: 

o Ensuring Iraq retains sovereign institutions of govemment; 

o Extricating Trag from global and regional conflicts;2 

o And denying Iran the ability to recruit, pay, retain, and replenish military proxies 

for use in Iraq and elsewhere; 

• Maintain the free flow of goods, resources, and services that benefit a global economy, 

while preventing sanctioned countries, persons, and entities from profiting illegally. 

Iraq stands at a crossroads. It held a parliamentary election in May 2018. As of September 24, 

2018, it has not yet tormed a government. The composition and character of the next 

government vvill determine whether the U.S. can achieve its goals through determined U.S. 

diplomatic engagement with Iraq backed by positive and, if needed, coercive instruments of 

policy. 

Ins tillite Jor the Study of War (ISW) • 1400 16th Street NW Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. 20036 

Vo/\Vw.uncterstandin~var.org 

2 
33


32304b-3.eps

Iranian political proxies are competing with Iraqi ligures acceptable to the U.S. lor control of the 

Iraqi government. Victory for the Iranian proxies would likely lead to the expulsion of the U.S. 

Jrom Iraq and de .facto Iranian control over Iraqi foreign policy at least, if not domestic policy. 

Iraqi political parties are prohibited by law from maintaining armed militias, but many 

nevertheless do. The most militarily-capable of those militias belong to the Iranian proxies. 

They have been actively shaping the political environment to influence the government 

forn1ation process. They have also recently fired rockets toward the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad 

for the first time since 2014. American interests absolutely require that the future Iraqi 

government not include the defacto leaders of these militias. 

TI1e Iraqi government has nominally incorporated some ofthese militias directly into the Iraqi 

Security Forces (ISF), Lmfortunately. They have acquired ISF unit designations hoping to 

obfuscate the fact that they remain distinct militia units. They nevertheless rebuffed the prime 

minister's attempts to declare himself their commander-in-chief earlier in September 2018. Their 

true allegiance is to their Iranian mastcrs.3 

These forces will continue to corrode the !SF regardless of who becomes the next prime minister 

if they are permitted to remain effectively outside of the Iraqi prime minister's control--Dr if the 

next prime minister is himself an Iranian proxy. This situation is unacceptable to the U.S. not 

simply because it will lead to attacks on American personnel and the likely expulsion of 

American forces, but also because it will replicate the erosion of !SF capability that allowed ISIS 

to seize large areas ofiraq in 2014. 

The Trump Administration has recently bcgw1 acting to resist the el1orts of Iranian political 

proxies to capture the Iraqi state. It has begun, for the first time, to use the threat of the 

imposition of American sanctions aimed at Iran against Tehran's agents in Iraq and those who do 

business with them. Iraq has had to send a delegation to Washington to request special 

exemptions from these sanctions, again for the first time, since the U.S. had waived them without 

demanding any quid pro quo from Iraq in the past. 

Asaib A hi al Haq (AAH) unquestionably deserves to be sanctioned for its long history of killing 

Americans, including most notahly the kidnapping and murder of five Americans from Karbala 

in 2007-a crime in which Qais al Khazali, AAH's leader, was personally complicil. Harakat 

Hizbullah al Nujaba, a newer group, is establishing itself as a regional terror nctlvork in support 

ofiranian objectives and certainly also, therefore, deserves to be sanctioned. 

Institute for the Study ofWar(ISW) • 1400 16th Street \fW Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. 20036 

W\VW.understandin~var.org 
34


32304b-4.eps

Now is not the moment, however, for Congress to mandate the imposition of sanctions on these 

or any other specific groups or individuals in Iraq. The threat of sanctions-either broad or 

highly-targeted---is the most powerful non-military weapon American diplomats in the region 

currently have. The behavior oflraqis as our diplomats have threatened to use that weapon 

demonstrates its significance. Our diplomats have shown the detcnnination and skill to use this 

tool in the extremely delicate effort to keep Iranian agents trom gaining control of the Iraqi 

government. 1l1ey must retain full power to choose exactly when, where, and how to deploy this 

tool in a series of negotiations that Congress cannot possibly follow or react to in real time. 

I do not in principle oppose Congressionally-mandated sanctions against Iranian proxies-or any 

other enemies of the United States in Iraq or elsewhere. Conb>Tess may well quite appropriately 

revisit the question of sanctioning these or other groups in Iraq once the new Iraqi government 

has formed and is seated-which may be soon. It is useful, moreover, to have legislation ofthis 

type under active consideration in Congress at this time to lend credibility and seriousness to 

American threats to sanction Iraqi entities. But the time to act on this legislation is after a new 

govennnent forms and not before. 

American national security in Iraq, the region, and beyond absolutely requires rolling back, 

weakening, and ultimately eliminating armed Iranian proxies beyond the Islamic Republic's 

borders. The U.S. should use all instruments of national power, including sanctions such as 

those being considered in this body, other diplomatic and economic pressures and incentives, the 

strengthening ofiraqi government and security institutions, the long-term deployment of limited 

American military forces to assist an independent and acceptable Iraqi stak, and other means as 

required. But all such eff01ts must be coordinated by a region-wide strategy to contain and rollback Iranian aggression and subversion of its neighbors. The administration must articulate as 

part of its counter-Iranian efforts a specific long-tenn approach to removing Iranian-controlled 

tighting torces trom within the !SF and Iraq generally. 

Iraq is not yet lost Iranian intluence flowed in to till the vacuum lett by the departure of U.S. 

forces in 2011 and American hesitancy following ISIS's rise in 2014. Recent administration 

efforts are clawing back some of the ground that the U.S. has lost to Tehran. Efforts to roll hack 

militias and ensure a sovereign and independent Iraqi govemment deserve support. 

I thank the committee for the opportunity speak before you today, and look forward to your 

questions. 

Institute for the Study of War (ISW) • 1400 16th Street :-.IW Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. ~0036 

vvww.understandin~var.org 

4 
35


32304b-5.eps

1 Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan, "The U.S. Can Defuse Iraq's Crisis," The Wall Street 

Journal, September 12, 2018, https:J~\x,n,;vv,· .Y•lsi .conv nrtit:les/the-u-s-can-defuse-iraqs-crisis-15~67~)2976. 

'Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Ghambir, Christopher Kozak, Hugo 

Spaulding, and Katherine Zimmerman, "U.S. Grand Strategy: Destroying ISIS and a! Qaeda, Repot1 Two: 

Competing Visions for Syria and Iraq: The Myth of an Anti-ISIS Grand Coalition," Institute for the Study 

of War and the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project, 2016, 

Institute for the Study of War (TSW) • 1400 16th Street "'W Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. 20036 

\\'\vw.understandin~var.org 

5 
36

Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Kagan. 

Mr. Pregent? 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL PREGENT, SENIOR FELLOW, 

HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. PREGENT. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, on behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am 

honored to testify before you today about countering Iranian proxies in Iraq. 

We are being asked today to define the threat of these militias, 

their role in Iraq, and what we can do about it. I come at this from 

a different position. I am a former intelligence officer. But when I 

was asked to do this by General Petraeus and H.R. McMaster in 

2007, my job was to find levels of Iranian influence in the Iraqi 

Government and the Iraqi security intelligence apparatus. 

If I had had the amount of intelligence that I have today back 

in 2007, Qais Khazali wouldn’t have 15 seats in the Iraqi Council 

of Representatives. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis would not be the Deputy Commander of the Hashd al-Shaabi, the Popular Mobilization 

Units. Qassem Soleimani would not be walking the streets after 

Sunni towns are destroyed in this ISIS campaign. 

The level of evidence of Iranian influence in the Iraqi Government has never been higher than it is now, and I can’t believe that 

we are sitting here trying to get Asaib Ahl al-Haq designated as 

a terrorist group when it has killed Americans when it was a premiere militia responsible for EFP attacks against Americans, explosively formed penetrator attacks against Americans, where it kidnapped five Americans in hopes of trading them for captured IRGC 

Quds Force operatives, only to have them executed when the raid 

went wrong. 

Qais Khazali had one seat in 2014 in Parliament. Because of our 

obfuscation in this U.S. anti-ISIS campaign where we actually empowered Iraqi Shiite militias tied to Iran to take credit for the victories against ISIS in this campaign, he now has 15 seats in the 

COR. My argument today is, discredit Qais Khazali now, sanction 

Qais Khazali and AAH now, so that once the Iraqi Government is 

formed, those seats are toxic. No one would want to stand next to 

Qais Khazali. 

We need to make it a point that no Iraqi politician that says they 

are pro-U.S. can feel comfortable standing next to Qais Khazali. 

They are very comfortable doing that now. We can’t make it comfortable for the current Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, to stand 

next to Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a designated terrorist who is the 

leader of Kataib Hezbollah. Kataib Hezbollah is already a foreign 

terrorist organization. 

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is already designated. Yet, he is the 

Deputy Commander of the People’s Mobilization Units, or the Popular Mobilization Units. He has killed Americans. He has directed 

that Americans be killed. He gets a government paycheck. No Iraqi 

politician is afraid to stand next to him unless you are somebody 

who is opposed to him being in the government. He commands the 

budget. He decides what militias get money. 

37

Now Kim brought up a great point. These militias are now in the 

Iraqi Security Forces. That means they have access to U.S. intelligence, U.S. equipment, U.S. funds. And if I was able to go to General Petraeus in 2007 and say, a Badr Corps officer is actually now 

the Minister in the Ministry of Defense, he would have said, ‘‘I 

can’t believe that.’’

Qasim al-Araji is the Director of the Ministry of Interior. He is 

a Badr Corps officer. And the biggest problem that we are talking 

about now, it is difficult for us to make an argument—I don’t know 

why it is, but there are some on the other side that don’t want to 

designate AAH and Harakat Nujaba. But the key facilitator to everything Qais Khazali wants to do, everything that Abu Mahdi alMuhandis wants to do, everything that Qassem Soleimani wants to 

do, is the leader for the Badr Corps, and his name is Hadi al-Amiri. 

He is the commander of the Hashd al-Shaabi, the People’s Mobilization Units. 

Qais Khazali, in his declassified tactical intelligence reports, said 

that Badr Corps trained on explosively formed penetrators, trained 

on sniper missions, trained on rocket attacks, trained on mortar attacks against U.S. personnel. Yet, we have this argument that is 

dominant in Washington, DC, that Badr Corps is not as bad as 

AAH, not as bad as Harakat Nujaba, not as bad as the IRGC Quds 

Force, when Badr Corps facilitates everything these militias are 

doing in Iraq, are doing in Syria. 

So, I will close with this: We need to listen to the Iraqi people. 

There is the first time the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds in Iraq have told 

us to do something about Iranian influence. The Shia have burned 

down AAH offices. They have burned down Badr Corps offices. 

They have burned down Kataib Hezbollah’s offices, and they 

burned down the Iranian Consulate. They are trying to tell us 

something. Listen to them. 

And I will stop there. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pregent follows:]

38


32304c-1.eps

Testimony of 

Michael Pregent 

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 

on 

11Countering Iranian Proxies in Iraq" 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Wednesday, September 26, 2018 
39


32304c-2.eps

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, on behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am honored to 

testify before you today about Countering Iranian Proxies in Iraq. 

We've are being asked today to define the threat of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsQuds (Jerusalem) Force (IRGC-QF) Iraqi militias, their role, and how the U.S. can counter Iran's 

malign influence. 

How bad is it? Well, Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps- Quds Force, now has an armed political party that came in second in Iraq's elections. It 

is named the Fatih Coalition, and it is poised to have a major role in Iraq's next government. 1 

They are threatening Americans, they've launched rockets and mortars at our embassy in 

Baghdad, at our consulate in Basra; they are in Syria, and they want to go to Jerusalem.' 3 

Iran's Proxies are positioned to be dominant players in Iraq's new government. 

Soleimani's directed and funded Iraqi militias have a political party called Fatih and they 

came in second in Iraq's parliamentary elections. They came in second to Moqtada ai-Sadr, a 

man who directed militia attacks against the U.S. on behalf of Qassem Soleimani, and ahead of 

Prime Minister Hader ai-Abadi, a man that stood aside along with U.S. officials and allowed 

IRGC-QF Iraqi militias to grow influence over Iraq's political and security situation. 4 

Fatih coalition members, to include the new Sunni speaker of the Council of Representatives, 

are taking pro-Iran positions to include threatening the U.S., condemning the U.S., and 

announcing that Iraq would not adhere to U.S. sanctions on lran.5 

What is Fatih? Fatih is comprised of key IRGC-QF militias and enablers. 

1 Falih Hassan and Rod Nordland, "Iraqi Political Alliance Unites a U.S. Friend and Foe" NYT, 

June 23, 2018. https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/world/middleeast/iraq-elections-primeminister.html 

2 John Irish and Ahmed Rasheed, "Exclusive: Iran moves missiles to Iraq in warning to enemies" 

Reuters, August 31, 2018. https:/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-iraq-missilesexclusive/exclusive-iran-moves-missiles-to-iraq-in-warning-to-enemies-idUSKCN1LGOWB 

3 Michael R. Gordon, "White House Blames Iranian-Backed Militias for Attacking U.S. Facilities in 

Iraq" WSJ, September 11, 2018. https:f/www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-blames-iranianbacked-militias-for-attacking-u-s-facilities-in-iraq-1536707458 

4 Ahmed Aboulenein, Maher Chmaytelli, "Populist cleric Sadr all but wins Iraq election" Reuters, 

May 13, 2018. https:/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-election/populist-cleric-sadr-all-butwins-i raq-election-id USKCN 11E091 

5 Amir Toumaj, "Analysis: Tehran's push to force US exit from Iraq" Long War Journal, 

September 21, 2018. 

https:/ /www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/09/analysis-tehrans-push-to-force-us-exitfrom-iraq.php 
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32304c-3.eps

Abu Mehdi ai-Mohandes has killed Americans. Mohandes is the leader of the IRGC-QF created, 

funded, trained, and directed Kataib Hezbollah or Hezbollah Brigades, and is also the deputy 

commander of the Hashd ai-Shaabi or the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). 6 

Mohandes is also a designated terrorist and his group is a designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization. Surprisingly, Mohandes receives a paycheck from the Iraqi government, has 

access to U.S. intelligence, equipment, and funding through a Badr militia network in the Iraqi 

Security Forces. The PMU have been absorbed into the Iraqi Security Forces and now fall under 

the Prime Minister's office. 7 

Qays Khazali has killed Americans. Khazali is the commander of the IRGC-QF created, funded, 

trained, and directed Asaib a hi ai-Haqq, or League of the Righteous, a group that has killed 

Americans, continues to threaten Americans in Iraq and Syria, and is responsible for launching 

mortar and rocket attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the consulate in Basra8. 

Khazali is also a member of the Fatih coalition, and his group AAH went from 1 seat in 

parliament to 15 seats.9 

Akram ai-Kaabi has killed Americans. AI-Kaabi, formally of Asaib a hi ai-Haqq, leads the IRGCQF created, funded, trained, and directed militia Harakat Hezbollah ai-Nujaba. Akram ai-Kaabi 

is designated for killing Americans and his group was attacked by U.S. airstrikes in Syria for 

threatening U.S. forces in ai-Tanf, Syria. 10 11 

Akram ai-Kaabi is no friend of the Iraqi Government and has said if the Supreme Leader gave 

the word he would overthrow the Baghdad GovernmentY 

6 David Daoud, "PMF deputy commander Muhandis details Hezbollah opsin Iraq" Long War 

Journal, January 9, 2017, https:/ /www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017 /01/pmf-deputycommander-muhandis-details-hezbollah-ops-in-iraq.php 

7 U.S. Department of Treasury, "Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability 

in Iraq" DOT, July 2, 2009. h1tps://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg195.aspx 

8 Michael R. Gordon, "White House Blames Iranian-Backed Militias for Attacking U.S. Facilities in 

Iraq" WSJ, September 11, 2018. https:/ /www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-blames-iranianba c ked-m i I iti as-for -attacking-u-s-faci I i ti es-i n-i raq -15 36 707 458 

9 Kenneth Pollack, "The unfortunate rise of the Khazali Network" AEI August 30, 2018. 

ht!P?_:L/~ww. ae i .p_r:glpu bJi<;? ti ().QL'1lli':_u nf_g rtUD.£1~1~12-of ::_i:h_e- khjga I i-net~o_r_l<i 

10 U.S. Department of Treasury, "Treasury Designates Individuals and Entities Fueling Violence 

in Iraq" DOT, September 16, 2008. https:l/www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/hp1141.aspxwwwwww 

11Babak Dehghanpisheh, "The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus" Reuters, 

September 22, 2017. https:/ /www.longwarjournal.org/tags/harakat-al-nujaba 

12 Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, "Iraqi Shiite militia leader says he would overthrow government 

if ordered by Iran's supreme leader" Long War Journal, November 12, 2015. 
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To counter Iran's Proxies in Iraq we must first acknowledge that Badr Corps is Iran's premiere 

proxy in Iraq. Badr facilitates everything Iran's IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani, Abu 

Mehdi ai-Mohandes, Qays Khazali, and Akram ai-Kaabi want to do in Iraq and Syria. Badr is 

Iran's premiere proxy in Iraq and Qassem's go-to is Hadi ai-Ameri. 

Soleimani's greatest asset is Hadi ai-Ameri, the leader of the IRGG-QF created, funded, trained, 

and directed Badr Corps. Ameri is also the head of the Fatih coalition and the commander of 

the Hashd ai-Shaabi where Badr, Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib a hi ai-Haqq, Harakat Nujaba, and 

Kataib Imam Ali are the command and control structure for the hundred-thousand-man force. 

13 14 

Hadi ai-Ameri facilitates everything Qassem Soleimani wants to do in Iraq through his network 

of highly placed Badr officers throughout Iraq's intelligence and security apparatus. Ameri's 

lieutenants facilitate IRGC-QF militia activities, procure U.S. M1 Abrahams tanks, have access to 

U.S. intelligence through Qassem ai-Araji's MOI 15, and have access to funds through the Prime 

Minister's security budget. 16 

Soleimani's premiere proxy is Badr Corps. In Khazali's Tactical Interrogation Reports (TIR), he 

states Badr Corps trained in Iraq on the same tactics AAH did to target Americans. 17 Badr Corps 

is the face Soleimani wants to show to the U.S. We often hear the argument from senior U.S. 

officials that, "Badr isn't as bad as the others". In fact, Badr is worse. Badr facilitates and masks 

everything Soleimani, Mohandes, and Khazali, and Akram ai-Kaabi are doing in Iraq. 

https:/ /www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/11/us-designated-terrorist-of-iraqi-militiareportedly-in-aleppo.php 

13 Guido Steinberg, "The Badr Organization: Iran's Most Important Instrument in Iraq" German 

Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 2017. https:(/www.swpberli n.org/fi lead min/ contents/products/com ments/2017C26 sbihill:!f 

14 Phillip Smyth, "Iranian Militias in Iraq's Parliament: Political Outcomes and U.S. Response" 

WINEP, June 11, 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranianmilitias-in-iraqs-parliament-political-outcomes-and-u.s.-response 

15 Associated Press, "Iraq Interior Minister Qassem ai-Araji Was Twice Detained by U.S." May 8, 

2017. https ://www. n bcnews.com/ news/world/iraq-interior-minister -qasim-a 1-a ra ji-was-twicedetained-u-n 756166 

16 Inspector General, Department of Defense, "Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent 

Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines I Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress I October 1, 2017- December 31, 2017" DOD, February 2, 2018. 

http://www.dodig.mil/reports.htmi/Article/1430685/lead-inspector-general-for-operationinherent::.resolve-and-operation-pacific-eag/ 

17 Josh Rogin, "Iraqi terrorist turned politician told U.S. interrogators he worked with Iran to kill 

Americans" Washington Post, August 30, 2018 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/joshrogin/wp/20 18/08/30/i rag i ·terrorist··tu rned· politician-told· u-s interrogators-he· worked-withiran-to-kill-americans/?utm term=.eec64b8493bb 
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Badr's saturation of Iraq's Security Forces is none more evident than having top Badr officer 

Qassem ai-Araji, detained twice by U.S. forces for providing lethal aid to kill Americans, as the 

Minister of lnterior.18 His ministry facilitates IRGC-QF militia access to U.S. intelligence, funds, 

and equipment. 

Arguments for Designation and Targeting. 

Designated terrorists and terrorist organizations are seeking to destabilize Iraq, they are 

threatening Americans in Iraq and Syria, and they have access to U.S. intelligence, funds, and 

equipment. Designated terrorists are being rejected by Iraqis, and their terrorist organization 

affiliates are having their offices set ablaze by Iraqis who have had enough of Iran and its 

proxies. It's time for the U.S. to do what Sunnis, Kurds, and now Shia Iraqis are asking us to do 

-stand behind them and give them strength to push back against Qassem Soleimani. 19 

Asaib a hi ai-Haqq and Harakat ai-Nujaba were created, funded, and trained by the IRGC Quds 

Force- these IRGC-QF militias answer directly to Qassem Soleimani and grew their influence 

under the U.S. ISIS campaign. 20 

Policy Recommendations. 

Maximum Pressure Campaign is needed for Kataib Hezbollah. 

We need a maximum pressure campaign on Abu Mehdi ai-Mohandes and his Kataib Hezbollah 

militia. Mohandes and Kataib Hezbollah are designated, and I'm not sure they feel it. Kataib 

Hezbollah has penetrated Iraq's economic sectors to benefit the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah. 

Everything and everyone Kataib Hezbollah touches should be subject to U.S. secondary 

sanctions. 

Designate Badr. Badr is not the Baath party- De-Baathification affected teachers, technocrats, 

relatives, anyone who was employed by the Saddam regime had to join the party. Badr is 

simply an IRGC-QF proxy, it is not a party, and being a member of Badr is not required to be in 

government. De-Badrfication is needed in Iraq, de-Badrfication will end Soleimani's ability to 

use legitimate institutions such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Interior (MOl), 

Ministry of Transportation (MOT), and Ministry of Energy (MOE) to further Iran's strategic hold 

on Iraq's security apparatus and sever Soleimani's penetration of Iraq's economic sectors. 

18 Associated Press, "Iraq Interior Minister Qassem ai-Araji Was Twice Detained by U.S." May 8, 

2017. https:/ /www. n bcnews.com/news/world/iraq-interior-min ister-qasim-a 1-a raji-was-twicedetained-u-n756166 

19 Isabel Coles and Ali Nabhan, "Iraqi Protesters Torch Iranian Consulate" WSJ, September 7, 

2018 https://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-protesters .. torch-iraniatHonsulate-1536356602 

20 Ahmed Majidyar and Husayn Hosoda, "Iran-Backed Iraqi Groups Threaten Violence Following 

U.S. Terrorism Bill" December, 6, 2017. http://www.mei.edu/content/article/io/iran-backediraqi-groups-threaten-violence-following-us-terrorism-bill 
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Sanction Qays Khazali and Asaib a hi ai-Haqq (AAH). We must sanction Qays Khazali to 

discredit Qays Khazali, sanction Qays Khazali because Iran doesn't want us to and the Iraqis 

protesting do. Sanction Qays Khazali to disrupt his position ahead of government formationsanction him so that politicians that want to work with the US ahead of Iran see a message that 

the US will not overlook the IRGC-QF's influence in the Iraqi government. 

Sanction Akram ai-Kaabi and Harakat Hezbollah ai-Nujaba (HHN). Akram ai-Kaabi directed 

Americans be killed during the Iraq War and is threatening to do so again. Akram ai-Kaabi's 

group has moved on American forces in Syria and as a result, his forces were attacked and 

decimated by American air power. He is threatening to target and kill Americans again in Iraq 

and Syria. 

By not sanctioning AAH and addressing the IRGC-QF's influence in Iraq has created a Force 

Protection issue. The argument that designating AAH and HHN will put US soldiers at risk is a 

straw man argument- allowing AAH and HHN to grow their influence by ignoring their role 

puts our soldiers at risk. 

Listen to Iraqis. All Iraqis are saying no to Iran's malign influence in Iraq except for the religious 

parties and militias tied to Iran- the ones we are unfortunately backing as well. Now is the 

time to use U.S. leverage and Treasury tools to help Iraqis limit Iran's influence and bring Iraq 

back into its traditional role as a bulwark against Iranian aggression and expansion. 

We can do this by increasing our pressure campaign on the designated FTO Kataib Hezbollah, 

by not granting waivers for Iraq to do business with Iran, and to designate Asaib a hi ai-Haqq 

and Harakat ai-Nujaba. Let's make it hard for Hadi ai-Ameri to be in the same room with 

Soleimani and his designated lieutenants- Ameri and Badr Corps need to feel that they are 

next. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. 

Michael Pregent 

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 

1201 Pennsylvania Ave NW #400 

Washington, DC 20004 

Mike Pregent is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is a senior Middle East analyst, a 

former adjunct lecturer for the College of International Security Affairs, and a visiting fellow at 

the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. 
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Pregent is a former intelligence officer with over 28 years' experience working security, 

terrorism, counter-insurgency, and policy issues in the Middle East, North Africa, and 

Southwest Asia. He is an expert in Middle East and North Africa political and security issues, 

counter-terrorism analysis, stakeholder communications, and strategic planning. 

He spent considerable time working malign Iranian influence in Iraq as an advisor to Iraq's 

Security and Intelligence apparatus, including an embedded advisory role with Prime Minister 

No uri ai-Maliki's extra-constitutional Office of the Commander-in-Chief. An office set up to 

ensure Iranian-backed Shia militia party control of Iraq's security and political process. 

Pregent served in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, served as a liaison officer in Egypt during the 

2000 Intifada, as a counter-insurgency intelligence officer at CENTCOM in 2001, and as a 

company commander in Afghanistan in 2002. 

Pregent served as an embedded advisor with the Peshmerga in Mosul 2005-06. Also, as a 

civilian SME working for DIA, he served as a political and military advisor to USF-1 focusing on 

reconciliation, the insurgency, and Iranian influence in Iraq from 2007-2011. He was a violent 

extremism and foreign fighter analyst at CENTCOM from 2011-2013. 

He holds a Masters in Strategic Public Relations from The George Washington University and is 

a graduate of the U.S. Army's Defense Language Institute in Modern Standard Arabic and 

Egyptian Dialect. 

Mike is a free-lance writer for the The Wall Street Journal and a contributing writer to the Daily 

Beast. 

Mike Pregent has numerous publications on ISIS, Iran's Qods Force, and on Syria and Iraq. His 

writings have been published in Foreign Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, 

Foreign Policy Magazine, The Tower Magazine, Long War Journal, New America Foundation, 

CNN, AI-Jazeera, Business Insider, and the Daily Beast. 

Mike frequently appears as an expert analyst on Shia militias, Iran, Iraq, and ISIS with 

appearances on BBC World News, MSNBC, AI-Jazeera International, CNN, CNN International, 

VOA Persia, and Fox News. 
45

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Ambassador? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEAF, 

ROSENBLATT DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Ms. LEAF. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished committee members, on behalf of the Washington Institute, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to offer my perspective on a new variant of an old challenge for the United States 

and Iraq and some suggestions for how we might proceed in the period ahead. 

No issue has so confounded U.S. policymakers across three administrations as how best to counter the role of Iran and the proxy 

forces it established on the terrain of its one-time foe. Washington 

has felt frustrated in its ability to blunt Iran’s predatory and destabilizing activities. Certainly, Iran achieved its overriding strategic 

goal over the last 15 years, ensuring that Iraq could not pose a national security threat to Iran. 

To that point, Tehran used a varied set of tools, proliferation of 

well-equipped and trained Shia militias, subordinating and intimidating Iraqi politicians, directly intervening to shape a compliant 

government in Baghdad, gaining economic leverage over Iraq at 

large, and infiltrating Iraqi Security Forces. 

But much of Iran’s earlier success was a product of exploiting 

three factors: The internal weakness of Iraq, U.S. mistakes, and 

the external environment. Changes wrought in all three do not 

wholly favor Iran today, and they offer material for crafting a refreshed and integrated U.S. approach to Iraq. 

As the Senate follows action by the House to consider legislation 

for imposing U.S. sanctions on these two Iranian-controlled Iraqi 

militias, I would urge the administration to do the following or consider the following: Don’t interrupt Iran while it is making mistakes. Tehran is suffering some of its most dramatic setbacks in 

Iraq since 2003, including violent anti-Iranian protests in Basra recently. A move for comprehensive sanctions on Asaib Al-Haq and 

Harakat Hezbollah would give Tehran a welcome chance to change 

this narrative to an anti-U.S. focus. 

Designate Harakat Hezbollah as a warning shot. There is less 

prospect for blowback. The militia does not take part in the political process and its leader was previously designated. 

Issue Asaib Ahl al-Haq sanctions at the right moment and on its 

leader first. Quietly signal to Iraqi interlocutors that Asaib Ahl alHaq leader Qais Khazali and the group will be designated eventually, but hold off for now during delicate government formation. 

Don’t crowd all the Shia factions to close ranks around Asaib ahl 

al-Haq. Iraqi leaders appear readier to swallow sanctions on the 

case than on the group writ large. Many of the group’s foot soldiers 

joined after 2014 to fight ISIS, not to further a pro-Iranian agenda. 

Finally, coordinate with the new Iraqi Government. This is going 

to be challenging. Consulting is a gesture of no surprises/respect 

for the new government of a friendly country, and it may help us 

and the new Prime Minister manage the internal reaction productively. 

46

The final three points: The Iraq of 2018 is not the Iraq of 2005 

or 2011. Iraqi nationalism is percolating vividly just beneath the 

surface of the body politic with a corresponding antipathy toward 

Iran, and that presents a bold opportunity for the U.S., if handled 

adroitly. 

Washington, likewise, is different. The Trump administration appears fixed on fixing Iran’s destabilizing regional activities. If it is 

serious, Iraq is the place to set that effort in motion with method 

and energy. Don’t be limited to sanctions. Remind the Iraqi public 

and political class what ties with the U.S. offer that Iran cannot: 

Respect for Iraqi sovereignty, help in gaining security and stability, 

access to international financing and investment that will help create jobs. 

Finally, Iraq’s isolation of earlier years has ebbed, replaced by 

warming ties with Jordan and a similar trend with its Gulf neighbors. The U.S. must press those partners to deepen their engagement with Baghdad. 

The contest for influence in Iraq for too many years has been a 

lonely game for the U.S. against Iran. It need not be. Washington’s 

Arab allies have proximity; common language; shared history, not 

all of it unpleasant; some of them, deep pockets; all of them, sound 

national security reasons to pull Iraq firmly back into the community of nations. 

Unlike Washington, Tehran has an unblinking focus on Iraq, 

linked to its efforts in Syria. As with Syria, Iran’s influence in Iraq 

corresponds directly to the degree that Iraq is weakened, estranged 

from its neighbors, and isolated internationally. The U.S. must do 

what it does best, what Iran cannot do: Mobilize other regional and 

European partners as well as international financial institutions to 

the effort of bringing stability and security to this vital country. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Leaf follows:]

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Containing Iranian Proxies in Iraq 

Barbara A. Leaf 

Rosenblatt Distinguished Visiting Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade 

September 26, 2018 

·----------·-------------------------· 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished committee members, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before this committee to offer my perspective on a new variant of an old challenge 

for the United States in Iraq, and some suggestions to consider for how we might proceed in the period 

ahead as Iraqi politicians form a new government 

Perhaps no issue has so confounded U.S. policymakers across three administrations in their approach lo 

Iraq as that of countering the role of Iran and the proxy forces it established on the terrain of its onetime 

foe. Whether with political, economic, or military tools, Washington has repeatedly felt frustrated in its 

ability to blunt fran's predatory and destabilizing approach to Iraq. 

Iran achieved its overriding strategic goal in Iraq over the course of the past decade and a half: ensuring 

that Iraq could not pose a national security threat to Iran. Tehran used a varied set of tools: proliteration of 

well-resourced, equipped and trained Shia militia proxies, some of which morphed into political actors: 

suboming and intimidating Iraqi politicians; directly intervening to attempt lo shape a compliant (or at 

least non-hostile) government in Baghdad; and inl11trating Iraqi security forces. But I would argue that 

much of Iran's earlier success was a product of exploiting three factors: the internal circumstances in Iraq; 

U.S. mistakes in both policies and activities: and the external environment in Iraq's immediate 

neighborhood and the wider region, In other words, it is worth reflecting thoroughly on the changes 

wrought in all three-which, perhaps counter-intuitively, do not wholly favor Iran-as a way of crafting a 

refreshed and integrated policy approach to Iraq. 

In that regard, as the Senate follows action by the House to consider drall legislation-the "Iranian 

Proxies Terrorist Sanctions Act" which calls for imposing U.S. sanctions on two Iranian-controlled Iraqi 

militias, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Harakat Hezbollah ai-Nujaba (HHN)-1 would urge the 

Administration to assess the how and when of using such a tool. I would recommend the Administration 

deploy it as part of a larger integrated and re-energized strategy; that the United Stales do so carefully 

\Veighing timing and sequencing, so as to minimiLe Iran's manipulation of the issue at this delicate stage 

oflraq's government formation process; and that it consult with Iraq's new govcnuncnt in proceedings. 

Factors intemal and cxtemalto Iraq present significant new challenges to Iran in using its tried-and-true 

playbook there. The Iraq of2018 also otTers opportunities to the United States if Washington is willing 

and able to invest the requisite energy in the bilateral relationship. It is more urgent than ever that 

Washington do so. A progressive sense of drift ofU.S. attention, coupled with an excessive focus on 
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picking '·our guy" at each phase of government formation, risks ceding the advantage to Iran. Unlike 

Washington, Tehran has an unblinking focus on its neighbor, which it views as part and parcel of its 

ctiorts in Syria. 

The United States must also do what it does best-what Iran cannot dn-mobilize other regional and 

European partners, as well as intemational financial institutions, to the effort of bringing stability and 

security to this vital conntry. 

THE SOURCES OF IRANIAN INl<'LlmNCE 

There has long been a tendency among some analysts and policymakers (including in the GLLI f) to view 

Iran's principal inroad in lraq as sectarian in nature, given Iraq's Shia majority. A review of the multiple 

tools Tehran has deployed over time underscores that this is both an outdated and overly simplistic 

perspective. 

Shared History with Some. Willingness to Work with A II 

In the immediate days of post-Saddam Iraq, Iran could and did draw on a set of deep relationships and 

shared history with the spectrum of major Shia political figures who re-entered Iraqi politics, many of 

whom had spent years in exile or in hiding in Iran; others, like Badr chief Hadi ai-Ameri and members of 

the Dawa Party and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (!SCI), had a deeper kinship, forged in fighting 

alongside Iranian forces against Iraq in the 1980-1988 war. But Tehran had never neglected relations with 

Iraqi Kurdish leaders, who have made the trek to consult with Tehran with as much regularity as 

Baghdad's Shia political class. Even Smmi leaders have been wooed. 

Familiar Plavbook 

From the opening days of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. forces faced the phenomenon of Iranian-backed 

Iraqi militias, which grew in number, strength, and lethality over the cou"'e ofthe ensuing eight years of 

the American troop presence there. Indeed, Iranian-backed militias pulled offtwo of their most notorious 

and lethal attacks, in Karbala and Baghdad, against American and British persmmel, at the high-water 

mark ofthe U.S. combat presence in Iraq in 2007, when U.S. forces numbered approximately 166,000, 

alongside an additional 12,000 coalition troops. Iran methodically proliferated these militias, peeling off 

elements fi·om Muqtada al-Sadr's movement and Hadi ai-Ameri's Badr Organization to f(mn groups like 

Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah. 

Promising Internal Environment 

Iraq's descent into turmoil, sectarian violence, and a full-blown Sunni insurgency played havoc with U.S. 

cflorts to stabilize the country, but provided a permissive operating environment for Iranian lethal-aid 

efforts. Over the course of each national election, IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani 

became a powerful kingmaker and broker behind Baghdad's closed doors. 

Promising External Environment 

A pariah state under Saddam, isolated politically and economically under UN sanctions, estranged from 

its Sunni neighbors following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq from 2003 on had little prospect of 

reintegration into the regional lamily of nations. Indeed, its intemal turmoil ensured Iraqi lcad~>rs were 

focused inward; the U.S. troop presence, even after the signing of the 2008 Security Agreement between 

Baghdad and Washington, offered a convenient excuse for regional states to shun Iraq as "occupied"; and 

demographics in a democratic Iraq, in which a Shia majority perpetually viewed by Iraq's neighbors as 
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'"in ·rehran 's pocket" \vould dominate the national government, gave Tehran the ultimate advantage in 

deepening and exploiting Iraq's isolation. 

THE UNITED STATES: PLAYING THE SHORT TERM, ON IRAN'S TERMS 

Set side by side, U.S. investment of resources in Iraq from 2003 to 2018 would seem to dwarflran's 

(albeit exact figures on Tehran's spending are elusive). Washington's spending in lraq-combining 

defense, reconstTuction, stabilization, and assistance expenditures-totaled well over S2 trillion. 

Borrowing from a model used in Afghanistan, the United States also moved in 2005 to establish an 

eventual sixteen Provincial Rcconstmction Teams (PRTs) across Iraq (with a smaller number embedded 

with U.S. military units around Baghdad), led by U.S. diplomats and staffed by civilian subject matter 

experts to bring development assistance, technical and administrative capacity-building, and mle-of-law 

training directly to the provincial level of the country. 

!led such a team in Basrah from 20 I 0 to 2011, in a highly kinetic environment fostered by the full 

spectrum oflranian-backed militias in the country, which regularly directed mortar and rocket attacks at 

the base where we were co-located with U.S. division headquarters. My staff and I, like U.S. forces, were 

regularly targeted by these militias with lEOs and EFPs. 

There was no question that then, as now, U.S. personnel were at a severe disadvantage to Iranian 

"'diplomats" and agents, who moved fi·eely in an environment that Tehran and its proxies had 

methodically made inhospitable and insecure for us and Westerners in general. The development ofthesc 

Iraqi militias by Iran thus had multiple purposes: fighting an asymmetrical war against U.S. and coalition 

forces; providing Tehran leverage on and against an ostensibly friendly government in Baghdad; keeping 

Iraq perpetually unstable and Traqi security services intimidated by and incapable of constraining the 

militias; fostering a forbidding and insecure environment for Western governments, businesses, or other 

agents of outside influence; intimidating Iraqi politicians and the public; and ultimately, ensuring Iraq's 

continuing estrangement from its Sunni neighbors. 

Washington's preoccupation over successive elections (encouraged by Iraq's own politicians) with 

picking "the right man'' to push as prime minister as a means of achieving U.S. strategic goals was 

ultimately a game that carried risks and-most notably in the case ofNouri al-Maliki-backfired. 

Ironically, Maliki was also ''Soleimani's man.'' But he is forever afler tetmed "V,lashington's man,'' as a 

result of a bitterly contested, drawn-out government formation process in 20 I 0. It was the sectarian 

policies he pursued after the U.S. troop withdrawal, and as Washington's hands-on approach to Iraq 

disappeared, that contributed devastatingly to both the emergence of lSI S and the collapse of Iraq· s 

security forces in the spring of 20 14 as ISIS overran Ramadi and Mosul. 

IRAQI ELECTIONS: ACUTE VOTER ALIENA TTON AND BAGHDAD-CENTRIC 

DEALMAKING 

Iraq has just completed the tlrst act of a three-act play, forming a national government following elections 

on May 12. These elections were distinguished by exceptionally low voter turnout (a claimed 44 percent 

that was more likely closer to 25 percent, the lowest by far since the first parlian1entary elections in 

2006); widely perceived corruption, including in the follow-on recount; no commanding lead for any of 

the Shia pm1ics; and splintered ranks among the Sunnis and Kurds, the latter heretofore the kingmakers in 

government formation. In addition to the poor showing of Prime Minister Abadi-despite presiding over 

the victory against ISIS-another surprise vvas the jump in seats for Asaib Ahl al-llaq, from I in 2014 to 

15 in this year's run. 
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In the race to build a coalition that would fom1 the next goven1ment, the two front-runners, Muqtada aiSadr and Hadi al-Ameri, competed against each other to woo many of the same allies. Policy agendas 

played no role. This was strictly transactional deal-making, quite unplugged from the country's enormous 

problems, 

The United States, by all accounts, has focused single-mindedly on a second term for Abadi; awkwardly, 

he was an early candidate for inclusion in the coalition being shaped by Sadr, whose militia battled U.S. 

troops from 2003 to 20 ll, and who foreswore any contact with U.S. officials even after the 2011 troop 

withdrawal. Iran initially backed the efforts of two allies, Hadi al-Ameri and Nouri al-Maliki, who 

worked closely with two successive administrations. 

~'ID TREND LINES: NATIONALISM PERCOLATING, FRUSTRATION WITH POOR 

GOVE&"'Al'IICE BOILING 

The Baghdad-centric govcmment formation game ensued side by side with-and apparently impervious 

to-an emption in July of public protests in Basrah, Iraq's second-largest city and heart of the cmmtry's 

energy resources. Chronic electticity and clean \Vater shortages, the former made worse by Iran's 

diversion of the first lor its own domestic needs and the latter by the catastrophic !ltilure of Basrah's 

water-treatment plant, sparked protests that took a spectacular and violent turn in September. 

The ultimate loser in the domestic tumult that ensued was "Washington's man," Prime Minister Abadi, as 

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani publicly enjoined Baghdad's politicians to put to the side those leaders 

who had already been "tried" (and found wanting). Former PM Nouri al-Maliki was the other casualty, 

and two fanner competitors, Sadr and Ameri, pushed by Qasem Soleimani, joined efforts to build out the 

first elements of govemment ti:Jrrnation, a Sunni speaker of the Parliament and two deputy speakers. 

Iran's agility and willingness to drop one favored coalition clement (Maliki) and work with another 

(Sadr)-despite a long history of difticult relations with the latter-led the Baghdad political class to 

deem Telu·an the winner/Washington the loser in this episode of the Iraqi political game. 

But the spectacle of enraged iraqi protesters in September sacking and burning not just the symbols of the 

state, but for the tirst time the offices of Iranian-backed militias and parties, as well as Iran's consulate, 

was extraordinary. The events-in Iraq's Shia heartland-offered potent evidence of two factors which 

do not augur well for Iranian interests in the long-tetm: percolating Iraqi nationalism (with a not-so-latent 

anti-Iranian character) and seething public grievances with poor governance, poor service delivery, and 

Iraq's economic weakness, despite its status as the fourth largest oil producer globally and the prospective 

wealth it holds in the world's fifth largest oil reserves, two-thirds of which are in Basrah. 

BACK TO BASICS FOR THE LONG GAME: U.S. I:'IIFLUENCE AND POWER 

Against such a tmbulent backdrop, one seemingly navigated adroitly by Iran's chief of lraq policy, Qods 

Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, it is tempting to conclude that the United States will always be 

severely disadvantaged ·by Iran's proximity, its coercive tools and infiltration oflraqi patiics and 

institutions, its years of effoti and commitment to the project. 

But while the operating environment in Iraq lor America's diplomats and military remains as challenging 

as ever, the United States has a coherent and-most importantly-positive set of national security goals 

that align well with those oflraq, including its next government. and the security, economic and political 

tools to pursue them. Those goals, across three very different U.S. administrations-a stable, sovereign, 

secure Iraq, reintegrated into its neighborhood-remain as vital as ever, and in conflict with Tehran's own 

zero-sum proposition for Iraq. They also speak well to that 60 percent of Iraq's nearly 40 million citizens 
51


32304d-5.eps

who are twenty-five or younger, \vhose aspirations----for jobs, decent public services, security----depend on 

the country breaking out ofthe isolation that has plagued it for forty years. 

lran's isolation and straitened llnancial resources have sharpened its co~rcive approach to Iraqi politicians 

in this latest period of govemment f(llmation. The proliferation of its proxies in post-ISIS Iraq has 

provided Tehran with a greater power to intimidate Iraq's political party chieftains than ever before. 

Credible stories of not-so-veiled death threats in the mix of discussions over the speaker election abound. 

But Iran is isolated in the wider region-with only Bashar al-Assad's Syria, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and 

Yemen's Houthis to call its allies-and internationally, Tehran fares little better beyond highly 

transactional relationships with Russia and China. 

Ultimately, Tehran relies on isolating and weakening its neighbor-and playing divide-and-rule within 

Iraq's three major communities-to address its own national s~curity goals. Iran's economic policies are 

similarly predatory. Those goals and policies are weming thin on significant parts of the Iraqi public, to 

judge by September's riots. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

Sanctioning AAH and lJHN, while eminently justifiable in legal terms, is a tool which should be levied 

with an eye to timing and sequencing to maximize the desired effects and minimize Tehran's ability to 

exploit domestic Iraqi backlash. 

Don't interrupt Iran while it is making mistakes. Tehran is suffering some of its most public and 

dramatic setbacks in Iraq since 2003, with protestors chanting "'Iran out," burning images ofthc 

Supreme Leader. and looting the Basrah consulate. Wading in right now with comprehensive 

U.S. sanctions on AAH m1d HHN would give Tehran a welcome distraction and a chance to 

change the narrative, whip up Iraqi nationalism, and put pressure on Iraqi politicians to defend the 

two groups. 

Designate HHN lirst as a waming shot. Placing sanctions on HHN alTers little prospect of 

significant blowback in Iraq. Like Kataib Hezbollah, HHN does not take part in the political 

process; its leader was previously designated for "threatening the peace and stability of Iraq." 

HHN remains active in Syria, m1d targeting it would serve the dual purpose of'highlighting U.S. 

resolve on that front. Notably, the group can be designated by executive order at any time; the 

administration need not be tied to Congress's timeline. 

Issue AAH sanctions at the right moment. For now, Washington should quietly signal key Iraqi 

interlocutors that AAH leader Qais al-Khazali and AAH will be designated eventnally. This must 

be done carefully so that the issue does not land like a bomb in the middle of govemment 

formation talks, which would likely torce all Shia militia leaders-even Sadr- to close ranks. 

Washington should therefore be prepared to wait on announcing formal designations and 

sanctions. As with HHN, the president can sanction AAH by executive order at any time. 

Sanction Khazali before AAH. Iraqi leaders appear readier to swallow sanctions on Khazali than 

sanctions on AAH writ large, apparently yjc\ving the group's leaders as more ncfarioll'i than its 

rank-and-file fighters. Washington has precedent for such a move in designating HHN leader 

Akram Kaabi years bctorc seeking sanctions on his group. This approach may split Khazali and 

other AAH leaders away rrom the group's foot soldiers, many of' whom joined after 2014 

specifically to fight the Islamic State, not to further a pro-Iranian agenda. Designating AAH as a 

whole could follow later; in tact, d1e prospect of such sanctions could inccntivizc the Iraqi 

government to demobilize AAH soldiers more urgently. 
52


32304d-6.eps

Coordinate with the new Iraqi government. The final complexion of the government that 

emerges-and the fnturc prime minister-may make this challenging, but an effort to 

communicate the intent and the context lc>r the decision, privately and ahead of the public 

announcement in Washington, is both a gesture of common "no surprises" respect for the 

government of a friendly country, and may help us-and the new PM-managc the internal 

reaction productively. 

The iraq of20i8is Not the iraq of2005 or 20ii 

Iraqi nationalism is percolating just beneath the surface ofthe body politic~- with a corresponding 

antipathy towards Iran --as is a boiling sense of public anger about poor governance and public services. 

Washington, Likewise. is Different 

The Tmmp Administration appears fixed on "fixing" lran's undermining of regional partners in a way 

that the two preceding administrations were not; whether the strategy as such amounts to more than 

heated rhetoric and reimposition of crushing sanctions is less clear. Certainly, if the Administration is 

serious about containing Iran's efterts in the region, there is no place (aside trom Syria) more important to 

set to that effort with seriousness, method, and energy; unlike Syria, lraq offers a cleaner playing field. 

The Administration's latest efforts in calling back to service Ambassador Jim Jeffi-ey as envoy on Syria. 

and the evidence emerging of a more coherent policy on SyTia-retaining a blocking/constraining U.S. 

troop presence, engaging Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and key European allies-is quite encouraging in that 

regard. 

A similar multipronged effort is needed on Iraq, with visible participation by senior ofticials in 

Washington. This is no suggestion to go back to the era of weekly video conferences by the President or 

Vice President with the lraqi PM. But it must be clear to [raq's public, its political class, and to lran that 

Washington has an enduring commitment to a strategic relationship with Iraq. An early trip to Baghdad 

and Erbil by Secretaries Pompeo and Mattis will provide a clear signal of intent. Discussion about a longtenn training mission for Iraq's security forces, including the Counter-Terrorism Service, should be high 

on the agenda. But the issue of a U.S. terce presence should not swamp discussion of all other aspects of 

the bilateral relationship. Likewise, an early invitation to Washington to the new PM and key members of 

the cabinet should be a priority, with a proposal for a structured approach to meeting annually. 

Final!v, Iraq ·s Isolation ofEar/ier Years Has Ebbed 

Saddam's legacy, as well as the by-product of Iran's "ownership" of a Shia-dominated Baghdad, 

poisonous relations between Saudi King Abdullah and tenner PM Nouri al-Maliki, and the regional 

politics over U.S. "occupation of Iraq," has been replaced by a warming of tics with Jordan and at least 

the beginning of the same trend with its Gulf neighbors. The United States must engage with those 

partners to push for deepening of their engagement with Baghdad. 

The contest for influence in Iraq for too many years has been a lonely game for the United States against 

Iran. It need not be. Washington's Arab allies have proximity, common language, and history (not all of it 

unpleasant), some of them deep pockets, and all of them sound national security reasons to pull Iraq 

finnly back into the community of states. The United States should do what it does best-lead the way. 
53

Mr. POE. Thank you all very much. 

I believe that what the four of you have said is probably news 

to most Americans, completely unaware of the situations that you 

have talked about. And that is unfortunate. 

Ambassador, is the United States in the business of nation-building of Iraq? 

Ms. LEAF. No, not at this point. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Kagan, do you believe that the United States is in 

the business of nation-building? 

Ms. KAGAN. No, I do not. I believe the United States is in the 

business of helping Iraq secure itself; helping to keep Iraq sovereign, and helping Iraq to stabilize after ISIS took it over. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Dr. Pregent, I could tell you wanted to answer 

that question. I skipped you real quick. 

Mr. PREGENT. I would say the United States, unfortunately, has 

been the role of obfuscating the role of Iran. When we talk about 

what we are trying to do in Iraq, we are basically taking the Dawa 

Party position. We are taking a Shia political party tied to Iran’s 

position on the way forward in Iraq and we are not listening to the 

Iraqi people. 

Our intelligence community didn’t see ISIS coming. We didn’t see 

Iran’s creeping influence because of the intelligence gaps that we 

had, based on the level of engagement with Iraq, because we are 

talking to the Dawa Party and we are talking to Iraqi generals. 

And I have never met an Iraqi politician who has ever said the situation got worse on his watch or her watch, and I have never met 

an Iraqi general that said the situation got worse on his watch. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Taleblu? 

Mr. TALEBLU. No, I don’t believe that the U.S. policy is nationbuilding, but I do believe that the U.S. does want to disabuse itself 

of Iraq entirely. And the reason I say that is the reason we are 

having a hearing about do these entities or do Iran’s proxies in 

Iraq warrant designation in 2018 and not in 2007 or 2017 or 2016. 

It is because Washington simply seems to be pivoting away from 

Iraq and the Middle East at a time when Iran is looking to escalate 

and entrench itself in the Middle East. 

Mr. POE. Do you think that Congress should take up and consider legislation to designate AAH and HHN as terrorist organizations? 

Mr. TALEBLU. I mean, my initial wish was that the administration, multiple administrations, which have the legal authority to do 

so, would have done it earlier. So, it is never too late to correct a 

mistake, in my view. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Kagan? 

Ms. KAGAN. I would like the administration to take up designations to enforce sanctions that are possible through existing designations on terrorist groups, and depending on the outcome of government formation, then Congress should take up the legislation. 

Mr. POE. Ambassador Leaf? 

Ms. LEAF. Mr. Chairman, I think the administration has a number of things already in its toolkit. This is one of them that you 

might——

Mr. POE. Should Congress take it up? That is my question. 

54

Ms. LEAF. Well, I am not really supposed to offer an opinion on 

that from my standpoint, but if you do, there is legal justification, 

absolutely. 

And I can tell you I was on the receiving end of a lot of Iranian 

resourcing and outfitting of these militias in 2010 to 2011. I know 

very well, and many people knew very well then, the extent to 

which Iran was proliferating the field with destabilizing elements. 

I would like to see those tools used appropriately at the right time. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Pregent? 

Mr. PREGENT. I think we should definitely designate AAH and 

Harakat Nujaba now to prohibit them from gaining more influence 

in the Iraqi Government. 

Mr. POE. Let me reclaim my time. Realistically, if Congress did 

this today, it would be a year before that would ever actually take 

place. 

Mr. PREGENT. It wouldn’t matter. Qais Khazali would hear it, 

and Qais Khazali would be affected by it. 

Mr. POE. All right. Let me ask you this. It is based on your testimony. So, does the United States give the Iraqi Government 

money, hard cash? 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes. 

Mr. POE. And you have testified that the Minister of Defense of 

Iraq is one of these bad guys? 

Mr. PREGENT. The Minister of Interior, Qasim al-Araji, was detained twice by U.S. forces for providing——

Mr. POE. Interior, not the Defense? 

Mr. PREGENT. Interior, sir, but Interior controls the Federal police, all these militias, has access——

Mr. POE. And has access to U.S. intelligence? 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes, has access to U.S. intelligence. 

Mr. POE. So, we are paying money to the Iraqi Government, and 

this individual gets part of that money, obviously, or his agency 

does? And this organization, these two organizations have committed terrorist acts against Americans, and they have access to 

U.S. intelligence in Iraq? 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes. So, they have——

Mr. POE. Is that right? 

Mr. PREGENT. It is. That is the glaring truth to all of this. 

Mr. POE. Why do we do that? 

Mr. PREGENT. Because you will hear key language, if you listen 

to it. Former terrorist, now politician—Qais Khazali is not a former 

terrorist; he is still a terrorist and a politician. Qasim al-Araji is 

not a former member of Badr Corps. 

Mr. POE. There is no such thing as a former politician. 

Mr. PREGENT. He is a current member of Badr Corps and he is 

the Director of the Ministry of Interior. And you can’t make those 

arguments. You see General Votel sitting across from Qasim alAraji, a man detained twice for providing lethal aid to AAH to kill 

Americans, directed by Qassem Soleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, sitting next to an American general, telling 

him, ‘‘No, I’m not giving funds, equipment, or training to any Shia 

militias.’’ And then, you find U.S. M1 Abrams tanks, not battlefield 

captures, but tanks that were given to them by Iraq Security 

Forces to be used against Kurdish allies in the Kirkuk offensive. 

55

This isn’t a political statement. This is just simply a statement 

of fact. Kataib Hezbollah, Badr Corps, and AAH have bragged 

about being able to use American equipment, from night vision goggles to advanced small armed weapons——

Mr. POE. And tanks? 

Mr. PREGENT. To M1 Abrams tanks. And this is a violation of the 

Leahy law. 

Mr. POE. This befuddles me. 

Mr. PREGENT. This is a violation of the Lipinski Act. 

Mr. POE. I have to reclaim my time. 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes, sir, it is a pleasure. I will stop. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Keating here wants to ask a lot of questions, and 

I am going to let him. 

Mr. KEATING. Just quickly, if you could, yes or no, Mr. Pregent. 

Is our level of intelligence sufficient now in Iraq? 

Mr. PREGENT. It is not. 

Mr. KEATING. You made a statement that it is much improved. 

Mr. PREGENT. It is not, sir, unfortunately. June 9th, 2009, we 

had a campaign called Out of the Cities, where we brought everybody back to major bases. Our intelligence footprint went black. We 

didn’t know what was going on in Iraq. 

Our intelligence now is highly classified signals intelligence and 

highly classified human intelligence. The signals intelligence is basically a PR platform where Iraqi politicians can get on a cell 

phone and say very positive things about how they are not involved 

in sectarian acts or targeting of Americans or targeting of Iraqis. 

Mr. KEATING. Right. 

Mr. PREGENT. And the human reports are basically Brett 

McGurk going and talking to Iraqi politicians, and you have senior 

American official meets with Iraqi official, says that everything is 

okay. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. If I could, our time is so limited. 

Mr. PREGENT. Sure, sure. 

Mr. KEATING. Ambassador Leaf, I agree with a lot of your recommendations that you brought forward. I am concerned, too, that 

we are mostly one-dimensional on military emphasis. Now we are 

very sanction-centered perhaps in our alternatives. And one of my 

concerns has always been the lack of contingencies and other alternatives. Because as we go down this road, the more roads we have 

to influence things, the better off. And I think it has to be much 

more dynamic than it has been. 

So, can you talk to us a little bit about what the State Department, the USAID, the Commerce Department, the kind of things 

that you think they should be doing? Because we are all in agreement on this. I don’t think most Americans, they are not looking 

at the ball here. I mean, this is one of the more critical areas that 

we are dealing with in the entire global footprint right now. We 

have invested so much in this. Yet, we are not paying enough attention. But that attention has to be at so many different levels to 

be effective. 

Could you comment on what we could do in some of these other 

areas I mentioned? 

Ms. LEAF. Yes. So, Congressman, you know, Iraq has always 

been a tough place to work as an American diplomat, a civilian offiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:23 Oct 18, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_TNT\092618\32304 SHIRL
56

cial; obviously, for our military troops as well. Much of that was 

not only the violence that blew up in terms of Sunni violence and 

insurgency early on, but this proliferation of Iranian-backed militias made the operating environment for us extraordinarily difficult. 

As I said earlier, when I was in Basra 10 years ago, I had to go 

around with humvees and MRAPs. Nonetheless, I got out and 

about, and I met with governors and politicians and generals and 

normal Basrawees, as they call themselves. 

We have a consul general in Basra who was singled out in the 

aftermath of the violence against the Shia militia offices and the 

consulate. He was singled out as this great agent that was wreaking havoc against Iranian interests really in that area. 

That goes to the point that our diplomats are actually out in the 

terrain meeting all the time and doing what we do around the 

world, which is cultural and educational work, helping draw investment and business folks to a very difficult country. 

It was no accident that there was a shot taken against the consulate, a shot taken against——

Mr. KEATING. I hate to interrupt, but——

Ms. LEAF. Sorry. I’m very sorry. 

Mr. KEATING. I just want to get a sense of——

Ms. LEAF. Yes? 

Mr. KEATING. One of the puzzles I have at the end is this: We 

have talked about this increased nationalism in Iraq now. But can 

they get beyond their own divisions, Shia, Sunni, Kurds? I mean, 

we want them to be able to be stable and secure. How much of a 

problem do these divisions that are——

Mr. PREGENT. This is the first time you have Sunnis, Kurds, and 

Shia all saying Iran needs to get out of Iraq. We ignored it when 

the Sunnis said it. We ignored it when the Kurds said it. We cannot ignore it when 60 percent of the population of Shia is now telling us to do the same thing. 

Mr. KEATING. That is great. Now what about internally looking 

at Iraq, though, and their own stability and their own ability as a 

democracy going forward? How much of that is still a very difficult 

obstacle for Iraq going forward? 

Dr. Kagan? 

Ms. KAGAN. It is, indeed, a difficult obstacle for Iraq and Iraqis. 

There is an incredibly fragile state in Iraq, but it matters to the 

United States, its national interests, its economic interests, that 

the fragile state that exists now in Iraq builds itself into a robust 

sovereign state that is capable of securing Iraq from terrorists and 

is on our side. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay, very quickly, because I am over my time. 

Just one quick question, yes or no. Give us a little hope here, too. 

I mean, going forward, putting a new government together after an 

election, my belief is the U.S. should look at this as a new opportunity going forward. Do you think this presents us a greater opportunity with this government? They have their own feeling of 

sovereignty. It is not just like our guy that is there. Doesn’t that 

present an opportunity? Just quickly, yes or no. 

57

Mr. TALEBLU. Yes, and it is an opportunity that should not be 

squandered, both for the sake of post-ISIS Iraq and for the sake of 

pushing back on Iran. 

Ms. KAGAN. The United States has a unique opportunity to stand 

with the people of Iraq against Iran. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes? 

Mr. PREGENT. The U.S. has an opportunity to stand with the people of Iraq against the current political parties that control Iraq. 

Ms. LEAF. And, sir, I would just say that it is important that we 

not stick to an old model of trying to pick a guy. 

Mr. KEATING. Right. 

Ms. LEAF. We ought to have a full flank of guys. 

Mr. KEATING. I agree with that opportunity. 

Okay, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Perry? 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pregent, we met some time ago at a hearing where this was 

outlined. The IRGC, as you know, you gave me the locations, the 

picture of the map with the IRGC flag on an M1 tank. And it was 

manifest in an amendment that I offered in the NDAA which 

passed. And it is about reporting. You know, it was as far as I 

could go, right? I wanted all the funds stopped immediately in the 

Train and Equip Program until we could prove that none of that 

taxpayer money was going to the IRGC or being used by IRGC 

proxies. 

I talked to the Secretary about it and he said, ‘‘Look, we can’t 

control if they fall into their hands.’’ You know, they get them and 

there is a certain amount of that that happens, and it is not our 

country and we can’t control that, which I said, ‘‘We can control if 

they ever get any more,’’ right? 

I couldn’t convince enough folks on the initial amendment, but 

we have this one. So, I think we will see some reporting, and I 

hope we do, which will inform us. And then, maybe we can take 

some policy action. 

What are the downsides for designating these two organizations 

as terrorist organizations? What are the downsides? Why wouldn’t 

we do that? 

Mr. PREGENT. The argument is that it becomes a force protection 

issue if we designate them. But I would argue that it is already——

Mr. PERRY. Hold on. 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. For people that don’t know—you and I know. 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. But explain why that is a problem. 

Mr. PREGENT. We are afraid that, if we designate them, they will 

attack us. Well, they have already threatened to attack us. They 

have killed Americans in the past. AAH just launched rockets and 

mortars against our Embassy. They are actually being blamed for 

killing Iraqi protesters in Basra, to include prominent female protesters in the last 24 hours. So, they are already doing that. 

Harakat Nujaba is the one terrorist organization that we have 

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croached on the U.S. training mission in al-Tanf. AAH and KH surrounded an American base after President Trump authorized cruise 

missile attacks. They are already threatening us. They are already 

willing to attack us. 

Not only do we need to designate them, we can attack them now 

for a force protection issue, but we should actually change the 

AUMF as well to allow the targeting of designated terrorist organizations. We are okay killing Sunni terrorist groups. We need to be 

able to do the same with Shia ones that threaten U.S. forces. 

Mr. PERRY. I have got an AUMF that does exactly that, but I 

can’t seem to get much traction on that as well from either side. 

What is the downside? I mean, if we don’t designate. They are 

out there. We know they are out there. They are using our stuff. 

They are attacking us. They are threatening to use it against us 

and attack us. If we ignore them, what is the potential? 

Mr. PREGENT. Qais Khazali is so afraid of designation that he 

has sought to hire a lobbying group in DC to keep Congress from 

designating his terrorist group. 

So, here is the argument. Here is the biggest thing. Here is the 

strategy. If we don’t designate Qais Khazali, then the argument, a 

month or 2 months from now, when government is formed, is that 

we can’t go after somebody who has 15 seats in congress. That 

would be influencing their election process. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. PREGENT. This is a strategy to not designate AAH now, so 

that once AAH becomes a formal part of the Iraqi Government, the 

argument from the State Department will be, we can’t designate 

them now because they are in the Council of Representatives. That 

is the strategy and that is why we should designate them now. 

Mr. PERRY. Because it has worked in Jordan with the MB and 

other places, right? We can’t do anything because they operate 

within the government. But there is a bigger, I guess there is a 

more desperate downside that, sure, then they are crafting policy 

and they are involved in crafting policy, but, then, they actually 

gain strength from a legitimate standpoint, and there is almost 

nothing we can do about it. 

Mr. PREGENT. What is the strategy? Not to do anything now, but 

once they get entrenched in the Iraqi Government, then make the 

argument that we can’t because they are actually sitting COR officials, and we would be doing what we say Russia is doing in our 

election, influencing an election. 

Mr. PERRY. And thank you. So, with what little time I have left, 

tangible steps? Designation has to be one of them. What tangible 

steps? 

Mr. PREGENT. Put them on the AUMF. They are designated terrorists. They threaten Americans in Syria, in Iraq. 

DoD is now contemplating putting air defense assets back into 

Iraq, not to protect against an ISIS threat, but against an Iranian 

threat, using Iraqi proxies. We are now moving or contemplating 

putting in counterfire battery systems and artillery, not to defend 

against ISIS, but to defend against Iraqi militias tied to Iran. 

So, we need to designate. We need to have other tools, such as 

the AUMF, and increase our intelligence focus on these groups, and 

59

stop relying on Dawa Party talking points to say that they are not 

a threat. 

Mr. PERRY. Would that counter-battery be located at the Embassy or other points throughout the country, like in Basra or elsewhere? 

Mr. PREGENT. Anywhere we have U.S. assets, you should have 

a Q36 and Q37 radar. You know what those are. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. PREGENT. Those are radars that tell you where it came from. 

And this AAH attack on our Embassy came from a Shia-controlled 

neighborhood just east of Sadr City, where the Badr Corps Iraqi 

military commander was in charge of that battle space. So, you literally have Iranian proxies or IRGC Quds Force proxies in uniform 

and out of uniform threatening Americans. And our argument can’t 

be we can’t designate them because they will attack us. They already are. 

Mr. PERRY. Already are, right. 

I yield. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Schneider? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I want to thank the chairman and 

ranking member for having this hearing, and the witnesses for 

being here and sharing your perspectives. 

Ambassador Leaf, you made, I think, the poignant comment that 

2018 is not 2006 or 2011. And if I can, I would like to ask the panel 

to look forward longer term. What is the long-term implication of 

failing to thwart the influence of Iran in Iraq, of failing to put a 

stop to these proxies? I will just go straight down the table. 

Mr. TALEBLU. The long-term implications are gross, sir, and that 

is why it is an excellent question. It would be ceding a country 

which has immense oil resources to the world’s foremost state 

sponsor of terrorism. It would be moral in terms of the human, material, blood, treasure that the U.S. has spent there. It would be 

political. It would be Iran being able to use Iraq as a launchpad, 

a literal launchpad. They could forward-deploy Tails, short-range 

ballistic missiles. Iran already has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. They could forward-deploy them into Iraq 

there. 

It could destabilize Saudi Arabia. We had the same concerns 

about a strong Iraq in the nineties doing that to Saudi. The same 

could happen if a strong pro-Iran Iraq could do that. The list, most 

unfortunately, goes on and on and on. Every opportunity that we 

have along the DIME paradigm—diplomacy, intelligence, military, 

economic—to influence Iraq, Iran would seek to co-opt that and use 

Iraq against us. It is a zero-sum game between the U.S. and Iran 

in the Middle East, and ceding Iraq would be a gross mistake. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Kagan? 

Ms. KAGAN. I agree. In addition, the risks of creating conditions 

in which Iraq, once again, falls prey to terrorists, Sunni terrorist 

groups that exploit the vacuum, political and security, that exists 

when a sectarian Shia government backed by Iran controls their 

Security Forces, that risk goes up and up. And that is why it is a 

matter of national security to have Iraq stabilized, not under the 

strong hand of Iran, but under a political accommodation that is 

enduring. 

60

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Pregent? 

Mr. PREGENT. This is a time to go after everything Iran touches 

in Iraq. Iraq’s economy is actually doing better than Iran’s is. 

Iran’s is in the tank. This is an opportunity to pull Iraq away into 

its traditional bulwark status. 

But one of the biggest obstacles we face is, first off, ISIS is not 

defeated. ISIS has stepped up its attacks in Diyala, Saladin, 

Kirkuk Province. They have now had suicide bombings in Baghdad. 

So, ISIS isn’t defeated, and the Shia militias are actually okay with 

that, because they use the argument that, because ISIS is still 

around, that they can continue to punish Sunni communities, 

Kurdish communities, and Shia Nationalist communities. 

We have to bring Iraq back into its traditional stance, an independent, sovereign country. I believe in relationships with your 

neighbors, but the United States doesn’t dictate who the President 

of Mexico is going to be. The United States doesn’t command Canada’s security forces. The ‘‘Islamic Republic of Mexico’’ doesn’t decide who our President is, and the ‘‘Islamic Republic of Canada’’ 

doesn’t have primacy over our security forces. 

I want a role for Iraq that is absent Iranian influence other than 

trade and agricultural, religious activities, not this malign influence. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador Leaf? 

Ms. LEAF. So, the one point of variance I would have with Mike 

is that, when you talk about Iraq’s traditional posture within the 

region, it was, if we look back in recent history prior to 2003, it 

was a very violent, aggressive, threatening relationship that it had 

in multiple directions. 

So, I agree with all my fellow panelists; this is a key point to influence the shape of things to come. But I do believe strongly that 

we have to step nimbly within sometimes the minefields, metaphorically, of Iraq’s own domestic politics. We have to get, as I have 

said earlier, greater buy-in to the effort by Saudi Arabia and the 

UAE, in particular. And you saw that in the past year, but it has 

got to be deepened. 

We can’t go it alone and we can’t do things that knock about and 

play to Iran’s strength. The Iraqi nationalism is boiling. It is not 

just percolating; it is boiling. And I think we need to let it play that 

out. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, I have to reclaim my time. I don’t have the 

clock, but I see the light is on. 

Thank you. I think one of the challenges, proxies are a tool. It 

is not a strategy. Iran has a broader strategy, but the strategy is 

to drive their goals, and their goals are regional and disruptive to 

the entire region, I think. I think that is a key thing to understand. 

I wish I had more time. I will posit the question, and I guess we 

will leave it hanging. But, broadly, I think the conversation we 

need to have in Congress, and in this country, is what is the role 

of the United States, and drawing the distinction between that 

role, between engagement—and U.S. engagement is critical—but 

also leadership. And is there a role for U.S. leadership? Can we 

achieve our goals, what can be our strategy, without U.S. leadership? 

With that, I will yield back. 

61

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Well said. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the members of the panel, and apologies because I sort 

of came in on the fly. It has been a day. 

I want to start on the macro and work my way down. So, if I 

sound like I am way off the subject matter of countering Iranian 

proxies in Iraq, it is because I am, but we are going to sort of try 

to do a big picture down. And I am going to start all the way over 

in Northeast Asia and North Korea, as we talk about Korea nuclear and missile technology, right? 

North Korea right now has three marketable commodities: 

Human beings, which they almost literally sell. And you should 

learn more about that if you don’t know about it. That there are 

people being sold for revenue for a state in 2018 is beyond comprehension. Coal and missile and nuclear technology. Economically, 

they are in a vice. 

Now, when you have but few marketable commodities, and there 

are people on the market for those commodities, you are going to 

sell them to who you can sell them to. That is the macro. We are 

working our way down. 

I would argue, and I think it is almost unassailable in its logic, 

that it is far more important what rhetoric is put out by the 

mullahs to the Iranian people than to the international community; 

that we should listen to what is said in Farsi and not what is said 

in English. 

And the rhetoric that is put out by the mullahs—and I listen to 

a Member of Congress, who I shall not name, say, ‘‘Well, Rouhani 

is the duly-elected President in a legitimate election.’’ And then, I 

had to counsel this individual that there were 403 people who declared for that particular election, and the mullahs essentially approved four. So, sure, it was a free and fair election, if you consider 

that about 99 percent of the people that wanted to run were disallowed, right? 

And so now, we have got a paradigm wherein, if you listen to the 

rhetoric in Farsi, and then, you take the historical paradox as it 

relates to nuclear configuration, right, mutually-assured destruction, and you lay an atheist nation state and its ideology, the Soviet Union, for example, on top of that, and then, contrast it to 

what is coming out of Iran, we need to consider that perhaps the 

game is a little different, right? The Iranian mullahs do not think 

like the former Soviet Union. 

So now, we are moving down another level. I did some math one 

time and estimated that, between 1979 and 1988, in the green revolution, if you adjusted for population, the United States in 1945 

and Iran present-day, that the Iranian regime had killed as many 

of its people by percentage as the United States lost during the entire Second World War. That is the regime against its people. It is 

the IRGC and the Quds, et cetera, and they have demonstrated a 

willingness to quite literally shoot young female students in the 

face in the streets, with cameras rolling. 

And so now, as we look at this Iranian move toward the Mediterranean, that has manifested itself not just in Iraq, but also in 

Syria, and we look at what violence and horror has been visited 

62

upon dissidents in Iran, why are we to expect anything different 

in Iraq, et cetera, and Syria? 

And so, it has taken me a long way to get to the point, but I 

guess the point is that it is important we are here today. And so, 

the question I would have—and I have a finite amount of time as 

well—is, Iraqi Kurdistan, the number of attacks, say, for example, 

in Erbil are a fraction of what they had been. Now it is not nonexistent, and to be sure, we haven’t defeated ISIS. It is political 

rhetoric that is dangerous at best and stupid at worst to suggest 

that we have defeated an idea, because we won’t defeat the idea 

in the short term. You can’t beat an idea on the battlefield. We 

have eviscerated a lot of their war-making capability, but it is you 

can crunch all you want and we will make more. There are people 

coming because they believe in that idea. 

So, what is being done differently in places like Iraqi Kurdistan 

where we do see some stabilization, some assertion of localized control and some autonomy, and a reduction in Iranian influence that 

is not being done in, say, Iraq writ large? And what lessons can we 

learn? 

And then, secondarily, is there a way that the United States can 

support and advocate on behalf of ethnic and religious minorities? 

You know, the Nineveh Plain, for example, was in 2004 home to 

about 1 million, 1.5 million, Christians. I think last time I tried to 

get a good count, it was 200,000, which, by the way, by my definition would be definitely cleansing, if not genocide. 

But what can we learn from Iraqi Kurdistan, and what can we 

do to help ethnic minorities and religious minorities in Iraq? And 

how can we encourage an integration of these two subsets of the 

Iraqi population to create a sustainable Iraq? 

Mr. Taleblu? 

Mr. TALEBLU. Taleblu. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay, I was ballpark. Sorry. 

Mr. TALEBLU. That was quite close, though. Thank you, sir. 

Just based on the predicate you laid there with the North Korean-Iranian relationship, and Iraq first, it is very important to 

point out that some of Iran’s most important medium-range ballistic missile systems do come from North Korea. It was actually 

the Iran-Iraq War that spurred Iran toward Pyongyang to procure 

those systems. The Shahab-2 and -3, the Shahab-3, and the 

Khorramshahr are all based on liquid-fueled North Korean design. 

So, that is important to note for the record. All of them can carry 

a nuclear payload. 

Based on your question to the Kurds, I mean, the first kind of 

non-empirical thing to learn is hope, hope and determination. The 

U.S. has more than just capabilities on its side; it has resolve. It 

needs to win the balance of resolve against Iran. 

So, when you have ethnic minorities, as well as the rest of the 

majority in the country, resolute against Iran, you have an Iraq 

that you are able to use (a) as part of your regional strategy 

against Iran and (b) to support itself. So, the quest for sovereignty 

and resolve is something I would take from the experience of Iraqi 

Kurds. 

Mr. GARRETT. And is there sort of a stratification as it relates to 

Iraq? You have got Kurds and Shia and Sunni. In the Sunni, I 

63

mean, is there a discernable lack of interest in sort of nationalist 

cooperation? I will let you finish and go from there. 

Mr. TALEBLU. No, I think the Sunnis do want to be part of the 

political process, and when they are excluded from the political 

process and when they are downtrodden and dispossessed and 

squeezed into a corner, when you have Shiites finally take power 

is when you get things like ISIS. Everyone in Iraq deserves a 

choice that is much better than Qassem Soleimani or ISIS. 

Ms. KAGAN. That brings me to an opportunity that I think we 

now have in Iraq to support and sustain population in the second 

largest city in Iraq, Basra, which is contested among different Shia 

political parties. There is a humanitarian disaster in Basra right 

now. It is water is non-potable. Latest reports that I have received 

are that 95,000 humans have been hospitalized in Basra as a result 

of the undrinkable water. 

These are the angry people who are protesting the government 

elites that are trying to form a corrupt government. This is the political milieu in which people are asking not for militia safety, but 

actual government institutions that are responsive. 

The United States should stand with the people of Basra. It 

should ensure that it, the United States, and its allies, are providing humanitarian aid to the people of Basra, not the Shia militia groups, not the Iranian-backed elements. The way that we can 

actually gain the most opportunity in Iraq is to support the people 

and not the politicians. 

Mr. PREGENT. It is very hard to do that, unfortunately, supporting the people, and then, still supporting Baghdad’s government. The Dawa Party is basically in charge. 

This picture in Basra where protests emerged in the face of 

Haider al-Abadi, ‘‘our guy in Baghdad,’’ in quotations, the one we 

are pushing forward, and Prime Minister Maliki, who is an Iranian 

puppet, who is somebody that led the Dawa Party, and it was conditioned on U.S. air support to defeat ISIS that Maliki stepped 

down, because he was blamed for this disenfranchisement in the 

Sunni and Kurdish populations. 

Their faces have now been merged. There is no party that is not 

tied to Iran, unfortunately. Even the moderate parties, Hikmah 

Party, Sayirun, Dawa—there is Dawa Tanzim and, then, there is 

Dawa—still want the U.S. to exit Iraq. And that is an Iranian strategic goal, is to get the U.S. out. 

The best answer for all three groups, you have disenfranchisement in the Sunni population, the Kurdish population, and the 

Shia population. They are all asking us to do something about Iran. 

This is the first time that has happened, and it is a great opportunity for the United States to listen to the people by not supporting the current structure in Iraq. And I don’t know how we do 

that when there are no other parties that are allowed to form and 

to build consensus. 

Twenty-five percent of Iraqs voted in this election. Some will say 

it is as high as 40 percent. Well, it was 60 and 80 percent before. 

And I don’t know how we go forward, but we need to recognize the 

problem and we are ignoring it. 

Ms. LEAF. Congressman, one of my pet peeves is the diminishing 

profile that the bilateral relationship with Iraq has had in WashVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:23 Oct 18, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_TNT\092618\32304 SHIRL
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ington for some years now. And really, we need to do better than 

that. And I say it to this administration, too. Look, the administration took what I think is a very important step forward in pulling 

together a more coherent policy on Syria, including how you deal 

with Iran there, by appointing Ambassador Jim Jeffrey. And you 

have seen the results already. 

We need not an envoy as such for Iraq, but you need a more coherent approach and a visible one with high-level Washington engagement. So, I would say, just as Dr. Kagan said, we can do something very significant in Basra. We can do something very significant in terms of working with the Kurds and getting Erbil and 

Baghdad back on a better track. 

We have an impact within Iraq of bringing people together, not 

weakening them, splintering them. And I would say, as soon as 

this new government is seated, an early visit by Secretaries 

Pompeo and Mattis would be in order, and an invitation for that 

Prime Minister to come to Washington. Reinvigorate the relationship. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I know I am a million miles over. 

Mr. POE. You are. I agree with you on that. [Laughter.] 

Ms. LEAF. I think I just put him over. [Laughter.] 

Mr. GARRETT. No, no, you didn’t. I was over before. Begging your 

indulgence for 30 seconds? 

Mr. POE. The gentleman is recognized for 30 seconds. 

Mr. GARRETT. First of all, I knew that Ms. Leaf was smart, but, 

then, when I read that she is an alumni of both the College of William and Mary and the University of Virginia, I realized you were 

really smart. 

Ms. LEAF. Thank you. 

Mr. GARRETT. Ultimately, there are two points Dr. Kagan pointed out. The USAID paradigm always has been historically to deliver aid to people, ingratiating people and engendering goodwill toward the United States. Having said that, though, where people 

don’t exercise self-determination, right—and so, it is kind of like 

the Chinese aid paradigm is give money to despots and dictators 

and ingratiate yourself to despots and dictators. The people aren’t 

being able to—they don’t feel empowered or enfranchised. So, we 

have to somehow change that. 

I grew up in a ‘‘you break it, you buy it’’ world, No. 1. No. 2, 

without walking down the regime change road, there are opportunities inside of Iran, because the IRGC and the Quds guys are out 

in the field, and the people in Iran are feeling a little antsy. So, 

I just want to say I support the Iranian people exercising some selfdetermination, and that is one of my indulgents for it. I think it 

is important to be said from here. 

Mr. POE. You got a lot in in 30 seconds. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. It has been very informative, very good. We appreciate your expertise. 

The full committee tomorrow is taking up this very issue that we 

have discussed or you have discussed today, and we appreciate 

your valuable information. Very, very difficult times. But thank 

you once again. 

The subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

W ASHTNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in Room 2200 

of the Rayburn House Of1ice Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

h:ttp:iiwv..'\V.Forcign ... A..fl~s.house_,_g;Q_Y): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, September 26, 2018 

2:00p.m. 

Countering Iranian Proxies in Iraq 

Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu 

Research Fellow 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D. 

President 

Institute for the Study of War 

Mr. Michael Pregent 

Senior Fellow 

Hudson Institute 

The Honorable Barbara Leaf 

Rosenblatt Distinguished Visiting Fellow 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES or SUD COMMITTEE ON ~~~~~~-"_.,._or_is_"_:_'•_11_'m_:'I_"_ 01.::.ife_,_·ut_lo_"c_' "_"_a_'l:_"_"l_e~~~~- HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date Septemflel' 26,2018 .Room_ 2200RJIOB 

Starting Time~~2~:0~0-..P~II~I Ending Time 3: 13[)l1! __ 

Ucccsscs ( __ to __ )( __ to __ )( __ to __ )L__to __ )L__to __ )( __ to __ ) 

Rapresematit'e PtJe 

·Open Srsslon 0 Executive {closed) Session D Telcvisccl D 

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Coullfering Tranian Pmxies ill frart 

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NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with mr • if they are no/members offu/1 commillee) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same ~s mccting-;;-;;-tice "ttached? Yes EJ NoD af "no", pft:Ct.()e list below ond indude title, agerrcy, departmenl, 01' argrmfza!ion) 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

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