alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Minerals Management Service (MMS) 

# AGENCY:

Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior. 

# ACTION:

NOA of Programmatic Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). 

# SUMMARY:

                        The Minerals Management Service (MMS) has prepared a programmatic EA and a FONSI for the implementation of the CIAP. This EA was prepared to assist agency planning and decisionmaking in future assessment of individual projects (40 CFR 1501.3(b)). The programmatic EA is available on the MMS Web site at:                         *http://www.mms.gov/​offshore/​CIAPmain.htm*.                     

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Mr. James F. Bennett, Chief, Branch of Environmental Assessment, Minerals Management Service, 381 Elden Street, Mail Stop 4042, Herndon, Virginia, 20170. Telephone: (703) 787-1660,                         *jf.bennett@mms.gov*.                     

Dated: April 13, 2007. 

Chris C. Oynes, 

Associate Director for Offshore Minerals Management.

[FR Doc. E7-9337 Filed 5-15-07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4310-MR-P
#### Harry PEARSON, Appellant, v. Athena C. PEFKAROU, M.D., et al., Appellees.

No. 98-2550.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 2, 1999.

Harry Pearson, in proper person.

Diaz *&*Morel-Saruski; Hicks & Anderson and lia J. Klion, Miami; Wicker, Smith, Tutan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford and Shelley H. Leinicke, Ft. Lauder-dale; Woman, Appleby & Brennan and David Appleby, Ozark, MO, for appellees.

Before COPE, FLETCHER, and SORONDO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court dismissed Harry Pearson’s medical malpractice claim for lack of prosecution, pursuant to rule 1.420(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Our review of the record reveals that there had been no affirmative activity in the case for a period of one year preceding the filing of the motion to dismiss and good cause had not been shown as to why the action should remain pending. As a consequence the trial court had no choice but to grant the motion. *See Industrial Trucks of Fla., Inc. v. Gonzalez,*351 So.2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Mr. Pearson’s suggestion that his status as a pro se litigant should excuse his failure to prosecute his cause on a timely basis, while understandable, must be rejected. Self-representation does not relieve a party of the obligation to comply with the rules of court. *See*§ 454.18, Fla. Stat. (1997); *Carr v. Grace,*321 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), *cert. denied,*348 So.2d 945 (Fla.1977).

Affirmed.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed March 20, 2024. 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-2119

Lower Tribunal No. F95-37823

________________

The State of Florida, 

Appellant,

vs.

David Whitehead, 

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E.

Trawick, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez,

Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Law Offices of Ron M. Kleiner, Esq., and Ron M. Kleiner, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and GORDO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>I
     This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from the
audited financial statements of Toups Technology  Licensing,  Incorporated dated
December  31,  1998  and is  qualified  in its  entirety  by  reference  to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                         1
<CURRENCY>                  US Dollars

<S>                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                JAN-31
<PERIOD-START>              JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                       1
<CASH>                          772,080
<SECURITIES>                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                 1,848,236
<ALLOWANCES>                   (79,237)
<INVENTORY>                     542,655
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              3,175,510
<PP&E>                        2,170,072
<DEPRECIATION>                  152,159
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                5,685,185
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         1,629,930
<BONDS>                         322,112
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                         22,217
<OTHER-SE>                    3,710,926
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  5,685,185
<SALES>                       2,221,709
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              2,221,709
<CGS>                         1,395,958
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 5,985,169
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>               14,613
<INCOME-PRETAX>             (5,174,031)
<INCOME-TAX>                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>         (5,174,031)
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                (5,174,031)
<EPS-BASIC>                     (.45)
<EPS-DILUTED>                     (.45)



</TABLE>
33990.

#### BOWMAN v. BOWMAN.

Per curiam.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Fulton County which granted the appellant-wife temporary alimony and attorney fees. The wife filed suit for divorce, alleging that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Appellee-husband filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a divorce on grounds of cruel treatment. After hearing evidence, the trial court awarded the wife temporary use of the marital residence but granted the husband the use of one bedroom and bathroom, awarded the wife $2,000 a month as temporary alimony, and $5,000 on account as attorney fees. The husband was ordered to continue to pay all property taxes for the residence; maintain insurance coverage on the house and its contents; pay for maintenance and repairs of the house and premises; provide the wife with the use and possession of the automobile presently driven by her; pay all costs of insurance, maintenance and repairs in connection with the vehicle; pay all reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses incurred by the wife and ordered to continue to maintain medical insurance coverage for the wife comparable to what he had *260previously been maintaining for her.

Argued September 18, 1978

Decided September 27, 1978.

*Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Robert R. Richardson, Emily S. Bair,*for appellant.

*Mitchell, Clarke, Pate & Anderson, William M. Pate, Benjamin Johnson,*for appellee.

On appeal the wife contends that the trial court’s award is inadequate and constitutes a flagrant abuse of judicial discretion.

This court will not control the discretion of a trial judge in awarding temporary alimony and attorney fees ".. .unless it can be clearly shown by the appellant that the trial court committed grievous error or a gross abuse of discretion.” *Wilbanks v. Wilbanks,*238 Ga. 660, 663 (234 SE2d 915) (1977).

We have reviewed the entire record in this case and we conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in making the award.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Exhibit 32.1

Certification by the Principal Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2003


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003, each of the undersigned officers of Iroquois Gas
Transmission System, L.P., a limited partnership organized under the laws of the
State of Delaware (the "Partnership"), does hereby certify that, to the best of
such officer's knowledge:


     1.   The accompanying Quarterly Report of the Partnership on Form
          10-Q/A for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 (the "Report")
          fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of
          operations of the Partnership.



                                          /s/ E.J. Holm
                                          ---------------------------
                                          E. J. Holm
                                          President
                                          June 22, 2005



                                          /s/ Paul Bailey
                                          ---------------------------
                                          Paul Bailey
                                          Vice President and Chief
                                          Financial Officer
                                          June 22, 2005
Flint Creek Environmental Controls Costs

10/21/11 - Rev.4

$/Year $/Year

4.2 O&M

Variable $5.36

Aux Power $8.02

Fixed $4.73

Total O&M $18.11

Notes: A - Cost are in $MM

WFGD
No. 48827.

#### Protests 90810-K, etc., of Nippon Dry Goods Co. et al. (San Francisco and Seattle).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
No. 42077.

#### Protests 797360-G, etc., of D & B Sales Corp. et al. (Boston, etc.).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NOS. 02-07-327-CR 

					      02-07-328-CR

VERNON RAY SPAW A/K/A VERNON SPAW	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Vernon Ray Spaw entered open pleas of guilty to burglary of a habitation and felon in possession of a firearm, and he pleaded true to the deadly weapon finding and to the repeat offender notice.  The trial court accepted his pleas and subsequently assessed punishment at forty years’ confinement for the burglary offense2 and ten years’ confinement for the felon in possession of a firearm offense.3  In three points, Spaw now appeals these convictions.  We affirm.

	Spaw’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion.  In the brief, counsel avers that, in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous.  Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California4 by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief.  We gave Spaw the opportunity to file a pro se brief, and he has filed one.5

	As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is frivolous.  See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.).  Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.  See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).  Because Spaw entered an open plea of guilty, our independent review for potential error is limited to potential jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of Spaw’s plea, error that is not independent of and supports the judgment of guilt, and error occurring after entry of the guilty plea.  See Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

	We have carefully reviewed the record, including the sealed presentence investigation report, counsel’s brief, Spaw’s pro se brief, and the State’s brief.  We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit.  We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.  See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); accord Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  We therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

						PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, LIVINGSTON, and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 31, 2008
#### STATE ex rel. Guy HOLMES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 98-KH-1053.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 8, 1998.

In re Holmes, Guy;—Plaintiffs); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “M”.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., not on panel.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                              91
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   20,821
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (366)
<INVENTORY>                                     60,068
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                81,439
<PP&E>                                          12,533
<DEPRECIATION>                                    (746)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 113,864
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           74,227
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             7
<OTHER-SE>                                      29,741
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   113,864
<SALES>                                         59,946
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                59,946
<CGS>                                           35,903
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,338
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   (99)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              (3,360)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,246
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (3,981)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,265
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,265
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.87
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.86


</TABLE>
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KANEKA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

SKC KOLON PI, INC., SKC, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2018-1313, 2018-1399

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California in No. 2:11-cv-03397-JGBRZ, Judge Jesus G. Bernal.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

ANTHONY J. DAIN, Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch LLP, San Diego, CA, argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also represented by RAYMOND K. CHAN, DAVE 

DEONARINE, JOHN CHRISTOPHER JACZKO, FREDERICK K.

TAYLOR. 

 J. MICHAEL JAKES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by CHARLES 
COLLINS-CHASE, MINDY EHRENFRIED; CHARLES HYUK SUH, 

Reston, VA. 

 ______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT 

 

 March 15, 2019 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

 Date Peter R. Marksteiner

 Clerk of Court
| Ø | Contract      number: Shenyinsun Zongzi 001; |
|--------|----------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Maximum      amount of credit facilities to be provided: RMB 150    million; |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Term:      from February 13th,      2009 to February 12th,      2010. |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Remedies      in the event of breach of contract include adjustment of the credit      amount, suspension of credit, imposition of punitive interest and overdue      interest, an increase of guarantee deposit and the call back of loan      principal and interest beforematurity. |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Procedure      on using the comprehensive creditfacility |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Declaration      and promise of the Debtor |
|--------|--------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Right      and Obligation of the Debtor |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|

| Ø | Right      and Obligation of the Creditor |
|--------|-------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Guaranty |
|--------|----------|

| Ø | Effectiveness,      Modification and termination ofContract |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------|

| Ø | Disputation      settlement |
|--------|-----------------------------|

| Ø | Validity |
|--------|----------|

----
(Reap. Dec. 9644)

#### Masonite Company of Canada, Ltd. *v.*United States

Entry No. 5357, etc.

(Decided March 22, 1960)

*Bharretts, Paley & Carter*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Rao, Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule C, attached to this decision and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between counsel for the parties hereto that the merchandise covered by the appeals for reappraisement listed on Schedule 0, hereto attached and made a part hereof, consists of Masonite Presdwood, Panelwood, and similar products exported from Ganada during 1957.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that there is no foreign value, export value or United States value, as those terms are defined in section 402 (c), (d) and (e), respectively, of the Tariff Act of 1930, for such or similar merchandise and that the costs of production as defined in section 402(f) of said Act for the respective products marked A, and checked JFO by Examiner John F. Chilton on said invoices, is stated on Schedule A hereto attached and made a part hereof, and said costs of production for the respective products marked B and cheeked JFO by Examiner John' F. Chilton on said invoices is stated on Schedule B hereto attached and made a part hereof.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that these appeals for re-appraisement be submitted on this stipulation.

On the agreed facts, I find cost of production, as that value is defined in section 402(f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the merchandise here involved, and that such values were for the respective products marked A and checked JFC, by Examiner John F. Chilton, on the invoices covered by said appeals, as stated on schedule A, attached to this decision *622and made a part hereof, and for the respective products marked B and checked JFC, by Examiner John F. Chilton, on the invoices covered by these appeals, as stated on schedule B, hereto attached and made a part hereof.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6041

THERESA MARIE WASHINGTON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

PATRICIA L. HUFFMAN, Warden, F.C.C.W.;

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District

Judge. (CA-02-152-3)

Submitted: February 20, 2003 Decided: February 28, 2003

Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Theresa Marie Washington, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Thomas Judge,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Theresa Marie Washington, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal

the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the

magistrate judge and denying relief on her petition filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final

order in a habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2254 petition

solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will

not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and

(2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have

reviewed the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the

district court that Washington has not made the requisite showing.

See Washington v. Huffman, No. CA-02-152-3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 19,

2002). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
3

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
No. 45257.

#### Protest 33069-K of Q. W. Lung Co. (Boston).

Opinion by

Evans, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise consists of drugs • sliced the same as those the subject of *Oy Wo Tong*v. *United States*(C. D. 372). The claim at 10 percent under paragraph 34 was therefore sustained.