Filed 4/30/14 P.v . Blount CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MARLON J. BLOUNT, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B244982 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. MA053263) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Daviann 

L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed with directions. 

 Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Timothy 

M. Weiner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

___________________________________ 
2

During a domestic dispute Marlon J. Blount prevented his fiancée from calling the 

police by pulling the phone out of the wall and strangling her. He pleaded no contest to a 

reduced charge of non-forcible witness dissuasion (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(1))1

 in 

return for dismissal of other counts. The trial court sentenced him to six years in state 

prison, issued a 10-year protective order (§ 136.2, subd. (i)), and imposed a $400 

domestic violence fee (§ 1203.097). On appeal, he contends the protective order and 

domestic violence fee were statutorily unauthorized. Respondent concedes both points 

and we agree. 

DISCUSSION 

I. The 10-year protective order was unauthorized 

Appellant contends the protective order was unauthorized. Respondent concedes 

the protection order must be set aside because appellant was not convicted of a crime of 

domestic violence. We agree. 

Section 136.2, subdivision (i) provides, “In all cases in which a criminal defendant 

has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence as defined in Section 13700, the 

court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant 

from any contact with the victim.” Section 13700 defines domestic violence as “abuse 

committed against . . . a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person 

with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement 

relationship.” (§ 13700, subd. (b).) “Abuse” is defined as “intentionally or recklessly 

causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another.” (§ 

13700, subd. (a).) 

Here, appellant did not stipulate to the use of force or violence in intimidating the 

witness. He pleaded to the lesser crime of non-forcible witness dissuasion. (§ 136.1, 

subd. (b)(1).) Therefore, appellant was not convicted of a crime of domestic violence 

1

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
3

within the meaning of section 13700, and the subdivision (i) protective order was 

unauthorized.

II. The domestic violence fee was unauthorized 

Appellant contends the $400 domestic violence fee was unauthorized because he 

was not granted probation. We agree. 

Section 1203.097 provides for “[a] minimum payment by the defendant of four 

hundred dollars ($400)” where “a person is granted probation.” (§ 1203.097, subd. (a).) 

A section 1203.097 domestic violence fee may be imposed only if the defendant is placed 

on probation. Here, appellant was sentenced to a six-year prison term with no probation. 

Therefore, the domestic violence fee was unauthorized. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to issue an amended abstract 

of judgment to omit the $400 domestic violence fee and 10-year protective order. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 CHANEY, Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 JOHNSON, J. 

 MILLER, J.*

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.