Intelligence Management in the Americas 

Russell G. Swenson

and

Carolina Sancho Hirane 

Editors

National Intelligence University

Washington, DC

June 2015
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

ii

This anthology, Intelligence Management in the Americas, brings together the perspectives of 22 authors from 

across the Americas. They outline and assess the status and 

promise of intelligence oversight legislation and actions, 

and develop various arguments for preserving the best aspects of intelligence autonomy.

The goal of the NI Press is to publish high-quality, valuable, and timely books 

on topics of concern to the Intelligence Community and the U.S. government. Books published by the NI Press undergo peer review by senior officials 

in the U.S. government as well as outside experts.

This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense. Throughout the manuscript, 

statements of fact, opinion, or analysis are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of their respective offices, departments, or 

governments. Authors of NI Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, 

provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. This academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest 

of furthering debate on key issues. This publication is subject to Title 17, 

United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and 

may not be copyrighted.

How to order this book. Everyone may download a free electronic copy of 

this book from our website at http://www.NI-U.edu. U.S. government employees may request a complimentary copy of this book by contacting us at: 

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ISBN 978-1-932946-43-7

Library of Congress Control Number 2012948533 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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EDITORS’ PREFACE

In any country, intelligence institutions by definition form a first line of defense to protect citizens and their system of government. This book centers 

on strategic intelligence, a function whose purpose is to identify national-level 

threats, risks, and opportunities with respect to state security and public or 

citizen security. 

Since the 1980s, responsibility for the management of a good part of state intelligence in the Americas has shifted from the hands of military and police 

establishments toward systems or communities with greater participation by 

civilians. Civilian intelligence entities specialize in addressing particular state 

needs and bring integrated attention to all the issues that might affect a country’s national interests, including internal security. Adequate intelligence management now depends on the development of professional ethics, in addition to 

public intelligence laws and judicial oversight, to provide adequate supervision 

and control over intelligence activity.

This book addresses the present and future context for managing the intelligence function in the Western Hemisphere. This purpose obligates the authors 

to identify, highlight, and analyze the post-Cold War path of intelligence management, and to recognize successful experiments in its application. Authors 

consider the political, social, technological, and economic environments where 

this cognitive and operational discipline makes it mark. 

This book builds on the observations and findings made in two earlier books. 

The first book focused on the development of professionalism during the democratic transition in the region, and the status of this aspect of intelligence at the 

beginning of the third millennium.1 The next book examined the concept of 

national intelligence culture as a product of and spur to interaction between the 

“political class” and intelligence institutions in many countries of the region.2

This third book continues the thematic approach as it examines intelligence 

management options that could be adopted by governments of the region. The 

authors and editors identify management challenges, examine best practices 

that may be exportable, and point out management issues yet to be addressed. 

This publication features the work of authors who are experienced academics or 

government officials. Collectively, they aspire to understand and improve the 

management of intelligence across the region. 

INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The relationship between editors and authors is often mutually rewarding, 

and that collaborative ideal accurately describes the preparation of this particular project. Each of the authors has developed insights that reach well 

beyond their previous work to portray best practices, some already in place 

and others attainable and applicable to intelligence management at any scale. 

In addition to their appreciation of the authors’ perseverance and patience, 

the editors would like to acknowledge the advice and assistance of manuscript 

reviewers (some of whose comments are presented in the book). In particular, 

we acknowledge Cathryn Thurston, NIU vice president for research, for her 

long-standing support of this project, and George Clifford, managing editor 

of the NI Press; Larry Hiponia, director of the NIU Center for International 

Engagement and his staff; Donna Wilson and Denise Hodges for their layout 

and design skills; and Andres Gonzalez Vargas, professor at the Universidad 

Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Bogota, Colombia, for artwork reproduced in the Alvaro 

Venegas Gonzalez essay. Finally, we are indebted to Julia Famularo and Andres de Castro Garcia for proofreading assistance. As always, any errors of 

commission or omission in this product are the responsibility of the editors. 

INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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Table of Contents

Editors’ Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Introduction 

Management of National Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

—Russell G. Swenson

Section One—Intelligence Oversight in Democratic Context: 

Legislative, Ethical and Legal Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Commentary on Section One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

—Marco Cepik

Intelligence Laws in Peru and Latin America—Historical, 

Legal, and Institutional Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

—Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta with 

Arturo Medrano Carmona

Intelligence Laws of North, Central, and 

South America (Table) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

—Liza Zuniga

Watching the Watchers: Oversight of Intelligence Services 

in Democratic Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

—Joanisval Brito Goncalves

Status of Oversight over Intelligence Services (Table) . . . . . . . . . 79

—Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

Ethics and Intelligence: Review of European and North 

American Experience and Its Application in Latin America . . . . . 83

—Carlos Maldonado Prieto 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

viii

Human Rights and Intelligence Ethics: Case Studies 

from Cinema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

—Moira Nakousi Salas and Daniel Soto Muñoz

Intelligence, Communications Media, and 

Political Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

—Manuel I. Balcazar Villareal

Section Two—Intelligence Management within the 

Executive Branch of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Three commentaries: 

Presidential Decisionmaking Process and Intelligence—

Exploring an Open Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

—Guillermo Holzmann

Improving Producer-Consumer Relationships at the 

Executive Level: A Continuing Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

—Manuel I. Balcazar Villareal

Between Fear and Need: An Essay on Historical 

Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

—Jorge L. Jouroff

Strategic Intelligence Requirements for the Security of 

Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

—Mariano Bartolome

Economic Intelligence: An Examination of Its Status

in the Andean Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

 —Alvaro Jose Venegas Gonzalez

Intelligence Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

—Dan Elkins

Table of Contents continued
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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Changing Paradigms in Military Intelligence—Civil Affairs 

Operations and the Threat of Militarily Capable 

Criminal Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

—G.M. Capo and M. A. Duarte

Intelligence Cooperation in the Framework of the Union 

of South American Nations (UNASUR): 

Possibilities and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

—Carolina Sancho Hirane

Section Three—Intelligence Community Management of 

Privacy and Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Two commentaries: 

Intelligence Community Management of Conflicting

Privacy and Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

—Jose Manuel Ugarte

Comments on the Essays in Section Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

—Thomas C. Bruneau

Institutional Challenges in the Integration of the Brazilian 

Public Security Intelligence System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

—Priscila Carlos Brandao

Intelligence–from the Prison Environment to the 

National Security System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

—Liza Zuniga Collado

Intelligence Autonomy, Accountability, and Internal 

Security: Foundations for Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

—Russell G. Swenson and Zulia Yanzadig Orozco Reynoso

Table of Contents continued
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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Section Four—Managing Intelligence Integration: 

A Challenge for Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

Commentary: Intelligence Education and Integration: 

A Symbiotic Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

—Anne Daugherty Miles

The Education of a Strategic Intelligence Professional: 

Fulfilling National Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

—Jose Gabriel Paz

Managing Intelligence Information for Multinational 

Cyberspace Security—Approaches by the 

United States and Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353

—Robin M. Rogers

Harnessing Security Sector Intellectual Capital: Transforming 

Advisor Situational Awareness into Sociopolitical

Understanding in a Smart Power Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377

—William S. Brei, Nathalie J. Frensley and 

Killaurin O. Roberts

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409

—Carolina Sancho Hirane 

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499

Table of Contents continued
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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1. Notable Intelligence Legislation, 1999–2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

2. Intelligence Laws of North, Central, and South America . . . . 48

3. Status of Oversight over Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

4. Typology of Forms of Government and Their 

Intelligence Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

5. References to Human Rights in Latin American 

Intelligence Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

6. Sources of Tension between Intelligence Activity and 

Human Rights Protection Exemplified in Selected Films . . . . . 111

7. Ideas That Nurture the Concept of Unique Identities . . . . . . 117

8. Two Components of Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

9. Guidelines for Collaborative Action by a Strategic 

Economic Intelligence Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

10. Intelligence Resource Summary Spreadsheet . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

11. Characteristics Differentiating Military, Police and 

Strategic Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

12. Members of the Intelligence Community

 or System in each UNASUR Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

13. Possibilities for Intelligence Cooperation 

in UNASUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

14. Schematic Synthesis of Suggestions for National 

Intelligence Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

15. Academic Attributes of Strategic Intelligence 

Educational Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

16. Form for Curricular Evaluation (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

17. Form for Evaluation of Job Performance (Example) . . . . . . 345

List of Tables 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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18. Instructions for Personal Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

19. Form for Evaluation of Knowledge (Example) . . . . . . . . . . 349

20. Form for Summary of Individual 

Evaluation (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

List of Tables continued
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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1. Intelligence Autonomy vs. Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2. Information Fields for National Decisionmaking . . . . . . . . . . 11

3. Intelligence and Citizen Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4. Intelligence Integration Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

5. Principal Justifications for Inhuman Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

6. Wow! Enough risk for today. Also enough for tomorrow . . . . 182

7. Is that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

8. Hi boss, this time I think there’s some news. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

9. Mexican Navy Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

10. Members of the Mexican “Zorros”—Special Police . . . . . . . 308

11. Mexican Federal Police Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

12. Outline of an Academic Evaluation Process for 

an Educational Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

13. U.S. Government Cybersecurity Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

14. Brazilian Government Cybersecurity Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

15. The Advising Mission’s Complex 

Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

16. Bridging the Gap between Situational Awareness 

and Understanding in a Hypothetical Security 

Sector Reform Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

List of Figures

INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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Management of National Intelligence

Russell G. Swenson 

“Think back, my dear; think back. We all become spies as children; 

that’s the only way we know to make sense of the world.”

—Amanda Cross, An Imperfect Spy, p. 224.

The essays in this book examine the democratic context of intelligence management across the Americas, where, increasingly, judicial and legislative 

oversight complement an ethical and professional commitment to professional practice. Intelligence contributes to public security, civilian and military 

planning, and even economic well-being. A civilian intelligence director from 

Mexico outlines this range of intelligence interests and responsibilities:

Threats (present dangers) and risks (potential dangers) come 

not only from the so-called enduring themes of national security or from external sources, but also from the economic, 

social and political realm, and even the natural environment. 

Phenomena such as demographic trends, migration streams, 

social cohesion and inequalities, the informal economy, our 

delayed attention to the knowledge society and global warming, are all part of the new national security agenda.3

Intelligence can engage a country’s civilian leaders and streamline the implementation of smart diplomatic, military, economic, and internally focused 

public security policies. The same Mexican intelligence official points out the 

unmistakable foresight that intelligence can bring to the public administration of national security issues:

This way of looking at threats and risks lends itself to preventive thinking: how to disarm the risks associated with 

these themes, through a suitable system of indicators that 

would allow us, first, to identify and measure each potential 

danger to the components of national security (state, territory, population, constitutional order, democratic institutions, etc.), and second, to warn the various parts of the 

federal government, in a timely and appropriate fashion, to 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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allow it to act opportunely. In this way, national security 

becomes a government-wide concern.4

The government-wide nature of national security, encouraged and sustained 

by intelligence, implies the existence of a broad range of state applications 

for this ancient government function, across numerous executive ministries 

or departments. At the national level strategic intelligence exists alongside estimative intelligence. In his essay on the foundations of state intelligence, an 

Ecuadorian observer explains the parallel concepts: 

Strategic intelligence addresses concrete and immediate issues, and it is proactive. Intelligence assessments are oriented 

toward prevention and they deal with long-term objectives. 

These two concepts are complementary and may be applied 

to any area of government concern, whether economic, political, social, financial or of any other sort.5

Beyond national strategic and estimative intelligence designed for presidents 

or prime ministers, ministerial or departmental intelligence also addresses 

truly strategic problems. As an example, we can point to the Operational 

Management Center of the System for the Protection of Amazonia 

(CENSIPAM).6 As a permanent member of the Brazilian Intelligence System 

(SISBIN), CENSIPAM produces intelligence for SISBIN members across 

the Brazilian government. The often transnational risks and threats in the 

Amazon region present challenges to more than one Brazilian ministry. By a 

commonly employed definition, such multifaceted problems have strategic 

scope.7 Another example comes from a unique description and analysis of 

intelligence decisionmaking within the “Threat Finance Cell” of Allied Forces 

in Iraq.8 This cell hosted personnel from several U.S. Cabinet organizations, 

including the Armed Forces and the Treasury Department. Analysts in this 

unit made decisions of strategic consequence as a result of the capable guidance 

they provided to operational forces. These examples also illustrate the need for 

strategic intelligence in environments far removed from a national capital. 

Even in the most globalized societies, the state intelligence apparatus focuses 

increasingly on the domestic environment. A country’s internal environment 

exhibits social, psychological, and economic trends that, whether recognized 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

3

as such or not, influence and reflect security conditions in the rest of the 

world. 

Security challenges with local and international effects include cybercrime; 

violent acts of terrorism; trafficking in drugs, arms, and human beings; contraband, money laundering, and piracy. The security tool most subject to citizen 

oversight, and well-suited to bringing knowledge to bear on these challenges, 

is government intelligence. Certainly, some states with global political and 

economic concerns, like the United States and China, devote resources at an 

astonishing scale to look outward and obtain knowledge and influence. Yet, 

government intelligence now largely examines the internal environment. This 

can be confirmed from the organizational diagrams of intelligence services 

worldwide, which often give administrative priority to internal order.9

An emphasis on individual, personal, or citizen security accompanies this 

internal orientation and makes careful management of the intelligence function necessary. The democratic rule of law, which has replaced the former 

“security state” associated with preserving the power of oligarchical or strongman rule in much of the region of interest, depends on identifying and ensuring the human rights of individuals. These developments suggest some 

pertinent questions. Has there been a reorientation of intelligence services as 

democratic institutions have regained a foothold in most countries? Has the 

combination of internal supervision and external oversight of intelligence, 

along with the occasional and highly public application of potentially influential international human-rights conventions, been enough to end the use 

of intelligence as a punitive instrument by executve branch officials against 

unwelcome challenges by individual citizens? 

In carrying out the role that by definition includes advising elected officials at 

the highest levels, those in charge of the intelligence function bear the responsibility of cultivating and achieving a profound understanding of near- and 

mid-term issues and the accompanying opportunities for appropriate executive action. In the present work, authors will refer to some of these issues, but 

the aim of this book is not to catalog security threats or suggest how they may 

be resolved. Instead, it offers an exploration of the concepts, methods, and 

organization of intelligence in order to understand it as a sociopolitical and 

economic phenomenon subject to well-informed management efforts in the 

nation-states of the region. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

4

Authors suggest that effective intelligence management will facilitate the exchange of information among the intelligence services of a government and 

among international counterparts. Political support that encourages such 

exchanges can help reduce, and perhaps prevent, the most dangerous acts 

of transnational criminal networks. Reaching this goal will depend not only 

on the professionalism of government bureaucrats, but also on the political 

class’s ability to apply well-considered options to resolve key tensions in the 

intelligence management environment. 

Four Echelons of Intelligence Management

The four sections of the book each address distinct intelligence management 

viewpoints easily distinguishable by their scale of responsibility. The first section explores the status of checks and balances among executive, legislative and 

judicial branches of government, as they apply intelligence oversight on behalf 

of a country’s citizens. On a smaller institutional scale, the second section focuses on the management choices available to the executive branch itself. The 

third section moves on to the options available to intelligence services in managing the tension between privacy and security. Finally, individual intelligence 

services, with the opportunity to educate their personnel and integrate analytic 

communities of interest, come under review in the last section. 

1. Intelligence Oversight in Democratic Context: Legislative, Judicial, and 

Executive Branch Checks and Balances 

Key concepts: Intelligence autonomy, national intelligence laws, judicial rules, 

and responsibility to citizens

Any government that exerts concentrated power, whether considered authoritarian or not, can employ either their civilian or military intelligence services 

as “political police.” Examples appear in all reaches of the hemisphere, highlighted by President Richard Nixon’s attempted use of the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up his administration’s involvement in the Watergate 

break-in10 and the use of blackmail by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori’s 

intelligence chief to influence public officials.11

With the region’s transition to democratic regimes in the late 20th century, 

one can begin to assess whether the management of various aspects of the national intelligence enterprise may also have become more democratic. Some 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

5

studies have addressed this question with respect to Argentina, Brazil, and 

Peru, and for the region’s European relatives Portugal and Spain.12

Matei and Bruneau find that a serious reluctance on the part of policymakers 

(presidents and other senior political leaders) to get involved with intelligence 

reform issues leads to incomplete or hasty fixes to improve intelligence efficiency and ensure accountability. Policymaker reluctance to address comprehensive intelligence management stems from several factors. Two of the most 

important are a lack of strong public interest in administrative decisions and 

a siumultaneous unwillingness by policymakers to be associated with agencies historically tied to human rights violations. The politicians’ preference 

for distancing themselves from intelligence management allows either new 

or legacy intelligence personnel greater latitude to press for the freedom of 

action and prerogatives they enjoyed in earlier authoritarian or laissez-faire 

bureaucratic arrangements. Furthermore, political leaders may at any time 

find it useful to collaborate with military intelligence organizations whose actions are not specifically made accountable by laws and regulations.13

Matei and Bruneau point out that incentives for reform of intelligence management can come from multiple quarters. One source stems from international pressure to conduct successful multilateral peace operations (Brazil’s 

leadership of Haitian peacekeeping). Another arises from a clear awareness 

of serious threats (Brazil’s attention to organized, violent crime). Still another 

comes from having insufficient intelligence to prevent high-profile crises (Argentina’s being surprised by the Buenos Aires terrorist attacks of 1992 and 

1994). Additionally, in 2004, the Peruvian media publicized various intelligence scandals (e.g., illegal wiretaps, selling of classified information by intelligence personnel), which led to executive and legislative-based restructuring 

of the national intelligence system, and to new intelligence personnel regulations. In Spain, as in Peru, legislative and judicial initiatives have followed 

media activism with respect to security and intelligence. In those countries, 

too, the executive branch through the Ministry of Defense has engaged in 

intelligence-related outreach activities with civil society. Matei and Bruneau 

conclude, however, that “[w]hile the perception of intelligence has admittedly 

changed within academia, it has yet to change among Spanish citizenry.”14

In Portugal, the legislature has separated the production of national security, 

threat-related, preventive internal intelligence from police information. The 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

6

latter, in contrast, addresses criminal prevention and suppression through 

police action. In practice, this neat distinction does not account for overlapping realities.15 It also does not allow for the use of new approaches to 

criminal intelligence. However, the division remains in place to aid legislative 

and judicial branch opportunities to distinguish national intelligence activities, which operate through secrecy and are to be subject to external oversight 

and control, from the more transparent criminal process involving police and 

courts. This divisive management strategy reduces the incentive for information sharing between the intelligence services and the police establishment, 

and encourages resource competition. Political wariness of intelligence secrecy, embedded in law, extends to disallowing the intelligence services from 

conducting surveillance or intercepting communications inside of Portugal, a 

prohibition likely to change in order to promote the international credibility 

of Portuguese intelligence in the eyes of foreign agencies who wish to collaborate on difficult cases involving transnational security and criminality. Portugal’s overextension of controls on the actions of intelligence services calls for 

a more suitable management strategy where external controls do not interfere 

with the efficacy of intelligence services.

Another intelligence management issue with implications for public security 

involves the concept of intelligence ethics. An ethical sensibility by intelligence professionals, whereby thoughtful decisions must be made about who 

or what should be targeted, by what means, and under what circumstances, 

by definition appears where specific laws or regulations are not in place to 

determine what choices are to be made. The clearest path to defensible intelligence ethics lies in the answer to the question “How is the information 

being sought logically related to the principles (if any) spelled out in existing 

intelligence laws or regulations?”16 If the principles are not supported, then 

the information should not be collected or sought. In the absence of relevant 

laws or regulations in any one country, practitioners may consult the array 

of less specific international human rights covenants, conventions, and treaties. At times, international standards may be effective moral and even legal 

substitutes for national guidelines.17
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

7

Intelligence Autonomy vs. Oversight

Executive Branch 

Implementation of laws, 

judicial review and 

creation of regulations

Judicial ProceduresReview of impending

intelligence actions

Practitioner

Independence,

with ethics derived from

1) Direct responsibility

2) International codes of 

behavior

Legislature/LawsAccountability to

citizens

Figure 1

Source: Created by the author.

If a government fails to put in place and enforce appropriate laws and regulations, then the responsibility for deciding how to carry out duties that can 

easily infringe on individual privacy or even human rights, as defined in international codes of human behavior, falls to the intelligence practitioner. In 

this case, only the practitioner can be held accountable for unethical behavior. 

Therefore, under a rule-of-law regime, a powerful incentive exists for intelligence practitioners to support the enactment of intelligence laws and regulations. Ironically, an intelligence professional often accomplishes duties in a 

more robust manner when intelligence laws or regulations do exist.18 Nonetheless, this zeal could be compromised if laws were to demand an extreme 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

8

degree of public transparency about a country’s intelligence procedures to the 

point where analysts or collectors grow unwilling to risk taking action in the 

typically incomplete information and decision environment.

When intelligence practitioners do adopt an ethical approach to their work, 

it amounts to another justification for decisionmaking autonomy in the intelligence services. A good measure of autonomy allows an individual and an 

agency to build a reputation for sound, independent judgment. The expression of sound and independent judgment by an intelligence service improves 

its international reputation among professional counterparts who may seek 

help in tracking or neutralizing targets or gathering evidence for prosecuting 

a suspect. International intelligence collaboration reaches a deeper level of 

interpersonal exchange as countries with experience in countering internal 

threats, often overlooked in the past, offer new training cadres for others 

facing similar challenges.19 The prestige of a country’s intelligence services 

can become a public and popular measure of its own prestige and superficial 

attractiveness—whether positive or not—particularly if its intelligence or spy 

culture comes to be featured in films.20

Appropriate management can bring about trust in a country’s intelligence services among all branches of government and the citizenry, as well as among 

international observers, and contribute to the ideal circumstance whereby 

improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence activity does 

not detract from the individual or collective enjoyment of human rights. In 

brief, suitable intelligence management practices promote human rights. One 

observer has examined the competing arguments of pro-order and pro-civil 

rights coalitions in the region and suggests that intelligence and police internal 

affairs remain untouched areas of reform. He goes on to explain how reform 

efforts can be harnessed by advocacy networks to mobilize public opinion and 

establish greater accountability for intelligence and police functions. In turn, 

intelligence and police operations can be seen as complementing the protection, rather than the reduction, of individual human rights.21

The integrity of intelligence practitioners remains a concern, but legislative, 

judicial, and executive branch oversight and supervision mechanisms almost 

everywhere across the region help to guarantee and maintain that integrity. 

Naturally, these mechanisms do not work perfectly, just as the legal and ethical 

principles embodied in any law or regulation may not be enforced uniformly 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

9

and strictly. To maintain the integrity of the entire intelligence workforce, 

intelligence workers or professionals may occasionally need to release information on illegal practices to independent authors or news organizations so 

that public pressure can help steer the intelligence services back to approved 

practices.22 The unauthorized or unintended release of sensitive information 

to print or electronic news media occurs frequently enough so that cautionary, pre-publication procedures can be established between government agencies and leading media enterprises to limit harm to intelligence capabilities or 

to public accountability.23

An insider may carry out the responsibility to maintain the integrity of intelligence services by publishing a fictionalized account of actual practices in 

an essay or a novel, or as the premise for a cinematic production.24 This storytelling approach can accomplish the broader goal of educating the public 

and informing public officials with oversight and supervisory responsibilities 

about the motivations driving compliance and noncompliance with legal and 

ethical norms. 

In the first section of this book, six contributions outline the institutional 

equities and the personal incentives at play in charting the tension between expressions of intelligence autonomy and external oversight. Some authors document the tortuous process of creating intelligence laws, which have become 

a common expression of external oversight, while others convey the central 

importance and viability of autonomy expressed through an ethical approach 

to intelligence work. The authors also address the noticeable constraints on 

intelligence actions brought on by judicial proceedings and by evidence of a 

continued negative public perception of this ever-present government function. A final commentary on the responsibility of the news media to shift attention from operational aspects of governmental intelligence to its legitimate 

strategic purposes eases the transition to the next section. 

2. Intelligence Management within the Executive Branch of Government 

Key concept: Effectiveness of academics and other information entrepreneurs vs. 

professional civil and military services in informing democratic leaders

Although a typical military commander expects trustworthy intelligence input into decisions, a civilian leader in a democracy learns to trust advisers 

who have helped him or her win the election. Without an opportunity to 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

10

build preelection trust with the new political leader, a country’s intelligence 

services may be at a disadvantage in gaining this trust even after the election. 

This idea is reinforced by the research of a political scientist.25 In her research, 

this investigator was able to obtain information from a survey instrument 

completed by government officials in the United States and the United Kingdom. Her results showed that in both countries, leaders used information 

from nongovernment sources as frequently as government information, even 

in making decisions related to the country’s foreign policy. In contrast, an Israeli author contends that political leaders in democratic regimes tend to rely 

mainly on assessments from their intelligence services in making decisions 

with respect to international issues.26 These studies may not apply to decisions on internal security, where leaders are sure to receive counseling from 

interested parties from inside and outside of government circles, and where 

intelligence advisers may lack the combination of objectivity and expertise to 

make their own voice heard.

Another more recent paper suggests that time-sensitive input from government 

intelligence specialists may not reach a senior policy official’s desk because specialists simply lack the time to absorb the flood of open-source information 

related to the unique, isolated nuggets of information available directly from secret sources. Further, the author finds that the typical reliance on secret sources 

reduces the analyst’s ability to “clarify issues such as climate change, energy 

security, global financial stability or food assurance.”27 At the same time, the 

author notes that senior political leaders may not even incorporate the occasional balanced assessment provided by government intelligence services into 

their decisionmaking process. Instead, they may “prefer the drama and clarity 

of a single-source report to the careful nuances” of any balanced assessments 

that might be available.28
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

11

Information Fields for National

Security Decisionmaking

Nongovernmental 

Advantages

Goverenment

Intelligence 

Advantages

Ability to shape and move

public opinion

Can keep sources secret

Breadth of coverage

Ability to plant information 

and probe sources

Ability to keep information

secret builds trust

Direct ties to decisionmakers 

and executive operations

Opportunity to carry on 

debate with decisionmakers

Security Decisions

Figure 2

Source: Created by the author.

Whether the product of a formal body of intelligence professionals or of a 

diplomatic mission, strategic assessments made by government advisors likely 

have greater weight than the judgments, opinions, and recommendations—

however well informed—of journalists, experts, or friends of policymakers. 

Government officials have generally direct access to those who make decisions 

and establish policy. They also have access to the forces, whether civilian, military, or mixed, that carry out the chosen policy.29 Access to secret information 

sources gives government officials another advantage. To the degree that they 

can maintain secrecy, officials will gain the confidence of a decisionmaker. Additionally, by virtue of the capabilities of any country’s intelligence services, its 

functionaries can expect to have information collected under covert or clandestine conditions to confirm, or preferably refute, a working hypothesis. This 

capability includes the opportunity to plant false information, leading the intelligence target to reveal plans and intentions. Finally, decisionmakers expect 

that government officials will not leak sensitive information, not a difficult 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

12

guarantee for an intelligence professional to fulfill, as trustworthiness remains 

a central value of intelligence culture. 

An enduring theme of intelligence management involves the nature of the 

relationship between the highest elected officials of a particular government 

and the intelligence personnel who provide assessments and judgments on 

key issues. Practitioners often ask themselves whether to develop empathy 

with the official they inform or advise. Should they empathize with that official’s vision of the world and of the issue at hand? Or should they maintain a 

psychological and substantive distance from the official? By maintaining that 

distance, an intelligence professional may make himself or herself less likely 

to collude with the public official. 

Some observers and intelligence practitioners recommend against maintaining 

a psychological distance from the public official charged with deciding a policy 

or action. Robert Gates, later Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and 

Secretary of Defense, wrote about his experiences as National Security Advisor 

in the administration of President George H. W. Bush. He discovered that the 

tendency for Intelligence Community personnel to hold White House officials 

at a distance did not accomplish positive results.30 Intelligence officials often 

consider “working too closely with” high-level decisionmakers (that is, taking into account their policy objectives) an invitation to politicization, where 

either side adjusts assessments or selects information to justify already-chosen 

policies. Yet, Richard Betts finds that working closely with senior political officials holds benefits so long as intelligence “does not misrepresent but packages 

information in a way that prevents it from being shunted aside as irrelevant.”31

Another author calls for officials on both sides to go beyond thinking of intelligence as policy-neutral “information support,” and instead acknowledge its 

direct role in providing “decision advantage”: Intelligence yields a decision 

advantage through responsible, evidence-based rhetorical persuasiveness.32

Two current U.S. government officials explain why policy-oriented intelligence should not be discounted. Kerbel and Olcott recognize the idea that 

high-level officials will use all sources of information, many of them from 

outside the government. In their experience, responsible senior officials often 

welcome personally presented intelligence judgments that teeter on the brink 

of recommending a policy. High-level officials appear especially eager to learn 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

13

the intelligence professional’s view of the likely results of the recommended 

course of action.33 This point of view runs squarely against the tradition in 

the U.S. Intelligence Community, originally promoted by Sherman Kent, of 

maintaining intellectual distance between a “pure” intelligence judgment and 

the less-pure political world. The approach suggested by Kerbel and Olcott, 

though not yet widely employed, could bring about a fundamental change 

in the way intelligence personnel approach the principal decisionmaking 

officials of the United States.34 The U.S. Intelligence Community already 

employs “adversarial briefing” to improve communication between an intelligence functionary and the responsible official. It consists of a series of meetings attended by the responsible official and two intelligence personnel who 

take contrasting positions on an issue of interest in a debate format. This 

technique gives intelligence personnel another decisive advantage over competing information sources in terms of their potential influence on securityrelated policy decisions or actions. 

Economic threats and opportunities have become a central intelligence concern 

because no country can escape their international expression.35 Globalization 

means that foreign influence has internal manifestations. The Financial 

Intelligence Units of the Egmont Group, an international nongovernment 

entity, already confront money laundering activities in several countries of 

the region.36 The spread of financial crimes and economic threats of a more 

general nature suggests the further development of economic intelligence 

capabilities. 

A French author asserts that a national government serves as a country’s ultimate guardian against economic threats, even when it holds membership in 

a formal, multinational economic alliance.37 A provocative book pinpoints a 

series of historical events that created the fundamental shape of today’s world 

economic relationships.38 Can government functionaries responsible for economic intelligence assessments identify “future history” trends and events of 

transcendental importance at the national level? Or will decisionmakers rely 

on assessments by financial industry experts whose long-term loyalty to government interests may be doubtful? Recognized experts can work in, or even 

create, offices or agencies for economic intelligence. If they are willing to engage in economic intelligence analysis over many years, they will have given 

proof of their loyalty to the well-being of the state and its citizens. A sound 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

14

management approach would challenge analysts to understand economic affairs through large-scale exploitation of open-source information. 

The absence in recent years of wholesale dismissals of seasoned intelligence 

functionaries across the region serves as a positive indicator of wise management. Such abrupt dismissals have taken place in the United States, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Colombia.39 The loss of individual experience 

by definition reduces institutional knowledge. In the end, management of 

intelligence services through careful executive branch decisions can ensure a 

comprehensive, corporate understanding of security issues and the means to 

address them through accountable government resources.

The five essays in the second section of this book explore some of the intelligence management opportunities that await executive branch officials in the 

Americas. Each of the authors points out how intelligence practitioners can 

take advantage of existing or potentially innovative communication strategies 

to help national leaders expand national and citizen security. 

3. Intelligence Community Management of Privacy and Security Issues 

Key concept: Use of police intelligence vs. national intelligence institutions to address internal security issues

The same motivations and trends that have resulted in an increasing range of 

government intelligence offices and agencies can create long-lasting obstacles 

to the integration of intelligence communities. With its new Department of 

Homeland Security, the United States has expanded but not yet integrated its 

intelligence capabilities. Outside of the national level, the cities of New York, 

Dallas, and Los Angeles have developed notable police intelligence capabilities. The adoption of intelligence methods by police forces has become a tool 

for crime prevention. The police focus on crime prevention is a function of 

criminal activity becoming less random; that is, it has become a more organized phenomenon. The organized nature of criminal groups implies that 

their activities are planned, a development that gives an opening for the use of 

preventive methods by the police. This preventive approach toward threats is 

similar to that of the national government, but notably without any collaboration with national intelligence agencies.40 In an environment of abundant 

resources, instead of integrating their efforts across a community, intelligence 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

15

organizations proceed independently to collect information relevant to local 

needs in a bureaucratic and geographic sense. 

In combination with the expansion of government intelligence agencies in 

the United States, a perceived “wall” has inhibited the exchange of information and assessments between the world of police intelligence and national 

security intelligence.41 This wall has never existed as a formal, legal barrier to 

the exchange of information or intelligence.42 It was, and remains, an artifact 

of the political nature of the intelligence function. From the beginning of 

the “war on terrorism,” an error of omission, as in the failure to prevent the 

attacks of 9/11, has prompted intelligence leaders and outside observers alike 

to blame the “system,” rather than assigning blame to the errors of individuals or of particular intelligence agencies. If a system problem does exist, then 

adjustments to the system may improve performance. For example, given 

the separation between police security and national security, what arrangements would promote the exchange of intelligence information between the 

national security elements and local police? Are informal exchanges among 

intelligence practitioners enough to overcome the divisive elements of the 

system? 

A diplomatic police official provides an initial, positive reply to this question. 43 He explains that the police forces of countries worldwide now often 

agree to share local information with their foreign counterparts, particularly 

if that information has value for prosecutions. So much cooperation exists, 

in certain cases, between U.S. diplomatic police and their foreign counterparts that local officials can decide to share information without obtaining 

prior approval from their own national officials.44 This reality also reflects 

the political distance typically maintained between local police and national 

authorities in any country. 

Yet what do we know about the occurrence and consequences of this type 

of information sharing within a country? Given that informal exchanges do 

occur, how can we develop and manage an information structure and practices to take greater institutional advantage of informal, personal relationships 

among intelligence personnel? That is, can we build institutions to advance 

internal and external national interests through the informal exchange of security information, to include its synthesis into intelligence? 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

16

One answer to the last question appears in hybrid forces that take a militarystyle approach to internal security, but that at the same time have police powers. These hybrid forces also emphasize safeguarding citizen rights through 

legal police procedures. Two examples of this institutional innovation are the 

U.S. Coast Guard and the Argentine Gendarmeria Nacional.

45 However, local police operate principally on the basis of human intelligence, rather than 

using the more technical collection disciplines like signals intelligence or imagery intelligence common at the national level. Even though there may be 

a need for national information to combat transnational criminal activity 

in one locality, national intelligence organizations often choose not to share 

information with local police. This is because community police typically 

do not reciprocate by sharing information about local issues, even when the 

information may also be of national concern.46

A continuous and intrusive national police operation would be required to 

gather, coordinate, and act on information collected from across an entire 

country. Such a pervasive presence would remind residents of the reviled “security state” approach taken by earlier, authoritarian governments. In democratic societies, “national security” is a concept remote from daily life and also 

something over which citizens seem to have little or no power.47 In recently 

authoritarian countries, the concept will have negative associations. Could a 

marked increase in intelligence resources for provincial and city police, within 

the context of a decentralized policing and information-gathering paradigm, 

build capabilities to address national or transnational criminality, without 

reminding citizens of the political police of the “security state”?

Figure 3 illustrates the comparative advantages for citizen security offered by 

national police or intelligence services that become involved in ensuring internal security. Each of the five points of comparison is presented in the same 

order in each column. As a comment on the last of the five points, national 

involvement in local affairs is often unwelcome. However, visible adherence 

to international norms, required of national security forces as they attempt 

to gain or maintain a positive public perception in the international environment, may offset any corruption found in local citizen security institutions. A 

positive international image can increase a country’s opportunities for securing international security resources. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

17

Police Intelligence

National Intelligence

Intelligence and Citizen Security Citizen Security Concerns

● Extensive 

technical 

resources

● National 

criminal

databases

● Military or

paramilitary,

martial law

● Entrée to data 

on organized 

crime

● International 

visibility

● Vulnerability 

of private 

communications

● Freedown of 

association

● Local law 

enforcement

● Prison security

● Trustworthy 

public officials

● Few technical

resources

● Knowledge 

of local 

social 

landscape

● Public spaces

unpatrolled

● No prison 

intelligence

● Local police

corruptible 

by political

bosses

Figure 3

Source: Created by the author.

Community policing, increasingly known to practitioners as intelligence-led 

policing, may offer a reasonable alternative to a centralized, national approach 

to developing intelligence information for internal security.

Today, police reform advocates throughout Latin America 

seek to respond to demands for public safety by promoting community policing models. Although it is ill suited to 

carry[iing] out the organizational heavy lifting that fighting 

transnational criminal organizations requires, such advocates argue that community policing helps to demilitarize, 

democratize, and decentralize law enforcement institutions, 

putting an operational emphasis on agents in-the-field judgment and greater control over the use of force.48
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

18

The development of preventative intelligence also implies that it will be used 

for some purpose. Local police could lose the trust of the communities they 

serve if their information were to be added to a national criminal database, 

rather than being used for the clear benefit of locals. This possibility may 

help explain why national databases, such as Mexico’s Plataforma Mexico

and Brazil’s Sistema Nacional de Informações de Justiça e de Segurança Pública

(INFOSEG), have been slow to incorporate information from local police 

or other security organizations. Nonetheless, as local criminality blends 

with national- or international-scale criminal enterprise, opportunities for 

provincial or city intelligence to become institutionalized also increase. An 

ilustrative case comes from Mexico. 

The northeast Mexican state of Nuevo Leon recently adopted a law specifically penalizing the activity of “lookouts” used by drug-trafficking organizations to spy on police and military activity. The law may threaten the freedom 

of action of the traffickers.49 The federal structure of the Mexican government offers each state the opportunity to develop similar laws to reduce the 

incidence of impunity. The Nuevo Leon measure targets local “employees” 

of trafficking organizations, and signals a notable community investment in 

the rule of law. The degree to which this law and others like it are enforced 

will determine whether the foundational rule-of-law concept applies to daily 

community life. 

Community policing, including intelligence-led policing, experiences local 

political influence, or “corruption.”50 A leading expert on community policing in Latin America explains the process:

Citizen-based security initiatives are often hobbled by the 

citizens themselves. Neighborhood councils and patrols 

become co-opted by neighborhood commissioners, by 

drug traffickers, or by program directors who channel 

funds to their friends.... Most communities are deficient 

in the cohesion, finances, and experience needed to form 

durable groups that can consistently identify the causes of 

insecurity—much less break down the fear, distrust, and 

violence that characterize their relationships with the police. 

As economic trends continue filling poor urban areas with 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

19

newcomers, even established neighborhoods have difficulty 

maintaining community organizations, in turn limiting the 

knowledge and information that reach the police.51

The same author asserts that in Mexico City, fully 70 percent of police protect businesses, rather than acting on behalf of local government authorities 

and the public at large by patrolling a “beat” in public spaces.52 Similarly, 

another long-time observer of regional criminal justice tendencies notes that 

in Argentina, unpatrolled public spaces outside of “gated communities” continue to grow in size and level of violence.53 To the degree that these findings 

represent the geography of policing in the region, the lack of police circulation in public spaces offers little opportunity and even less incentive for local police to gather information useful in preventing or prosecuting crimes. 

These observations, together with political co-optation of police activities in 

individual cities and provinces, reduces community willingness to provide 

information to the police. Unless legislative and judicial activism becomes 

more widespread and effective, local police should not be expected to contribute meaningfully to the perceived or actual improvement of internal or 

citizen security. 

One would expect the largest cities of the region to have the resources and 

public visibility to promote an effective, if not efficient, police-based intelligence enterprise. However, outside of the intelligence force of New York 

City,54 with its international reach, and Rio de Janeiro’s police intelligence 

force popularized in the film series Tropa de Elite, there is little evidence that 

urban police forces have reached the level of intelligence professionalism or 

integrity expected of national or federal police forces. New York City likely 

has the most expansive police intelligence establishment of any city in the 

hemisphere. Yet, critics point to its limited capability for analysis, and in 

contrast with national intelligence agencies, it has only ad hoc guidelines on 

what information to collect.55 Unrestrained information collection against 

Muslims by New York City’s Police Intelligence Division has been widely 

publicized and strongly criticized by human rights organizations as well as by 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation.56 The FBI’s domestic intelligence operations, in contrast to those of the New York City Police, must observe strict 

civil liberties guidelines.57
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

20

Several options exist for the improvement of intelligence management as it 

affects citizen or public security. “Social intelligence” capabilities at the national level can be combined with the detailed knowledge of local community 

political officials or community police. This approach is explored in essays 

on Mexico and Guatemala in this third section of the book. Another essay 

addresses the need for generating intelligence in a country’s prison system, 

where one might expect to gain useful perspectives on the operating details 

of organized criminal enterprises. A combination of national intelligence information resources and local familiarity with the hallmarks of criminal franchises could lead to a more effective form of exploiting information-collection 

opportunities in penal institutions. Finally, one essay explores the pervasive 

influence of military intelligence conventions in Brazil, a reminder of the 

obstacles to achieving integration of intelligence institutions. 

4. Managing Intelligence Integration: A Challenge for Intelligence Services

Key concept: Information sharing across government, together with public transparency, allows for the integration of the “deep knowledge”of intelligence professionals with societal values. This ideal is promoted by developing robust professional 

intelligence education, promoting public/private collaboration in cyberspace, and 

engaging in field experiments of information sharing among advisory personnel in 

a multinational international engagement environment.

Intelligence integration typically refers to the collaboration expected among 

the disparate agencies, offices, and organizations that make up a country’s 

intelligence system or community. However, this restrictive vision masks a 

larger view of integration. The larger concept of intelligence integration envisions ways to combine intelligence information with “open” information 

to bring about improved security decisions and actions across a society. The 

formation and eventual maturation of this approach depend on initiatives 

taken by the intelligence services themselves, albeit with the support of politicial authorities. Traditional intelligence services severely restrict access to 

and analysis of classified information to a select group of individuals who 

voluntarily subject themselves to monitoring for trustworthiness and compliance with confidentiality norms. Therefore, only those individuals and their 

respective organizations can monitor the flow of information and make the 

decision to share it with other agencies, so long as laws and regulations have 

provided them the bureaucratic freedom to do so. Legislative and executive 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

21

attention to the “responsibility to share” information across government entities and beyond typically appears only after egregious failures by intelligence 

entities to detect and prevent politically powerful events.58

The three essays in this section illustrate how an intelligence system or community, through its own management decisions, can address a society’s security needs. It can do so by going beyond the traditional approach intelligence 

agencies have taken, moving away from a restrictive view of national security 

and defense and toward promoting the well-being of a society. 

National intelligence services often have an institution—a civilian, graduatelevel school—that is unique in allowing practitioners to step back from their 

routine work to contemplate the place of intelligence in their society and 

how to improve its performance. It appears that intelligence education institutions can influence, through their curricula and the skills of the faculty, 

other, larger intelligence institutions in the armed forces and the civilian intelligence services of a state. That is, intelligence schools do not simply mirror 

the practical experiences of students and their home organizations. Instead, 

at their best they imagine and illuminate the social and technical phenomena 

of national intelligence from a broad and even theoretical perspective, always 

with an eye to carrying out experimental and applied research. 

National intelligence schools, either civilian or military, figure prominently in 

the intelligence history of some countries.59 We also know that intelligence 

practitioners from friendly countries attend classes or participate fully in the 

programs of some intelligence schools.60 However, we do not know the nature and extent of personal and professional interaction in the intelligence 

schools that regularly host foreign students. It may be that such schools are 

fostering a broadly based understanding of how best to manage this government function across the entire region. An essay on intelligence education in 

this section points out that some national intelligence schools enroll students 

from a cross-section of society, including individuals with legal, commercial 

and various academic backgrounds. 

Cybersecurity is a natural concern of intelligence services, as the security and 

integrity of economic activity as well as defense capabilities now depend on 

the invulnerability of digital communications. The institutional framework 

for this relatively new sphere of intelligence activity is not yet well established 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

22

anywhere. The responsibility to identify and even prevent attacks offers fertile 

ground for integrating private-sector with public-sector information capabilities, as well as civilian and military intelligence competencies. 

Although intelligence involvement in cybersecurity may worry individual 

citizens, they face an even more pervasive threat of invasive penetration by 

private-sector individuals and institutions. Where privacy is most valued and 

expected as a human right, namely in private and familial communications, 

vulnerability to loss of privacy is greatest. Although one might blame government eavesdropping for the loss of privacy in personal communications, 

clearly Facebook, Google, and other social media have the greatest opportunity and perhaps the greatest incentive to take advantage of personal information for their own benefit. At the same time, less-pervasive government interception and use of private communications is seen as a greater threat because 

of the government’s near-monopoly over legal coercion.61 The continued use 

of Facebook, Google and similar services by millions of users suggests that the 

benefits obtained in the form of easier personal information-gathering and 

communication still outweigh concerns over those enterprises’ exploitation 

of the user’s private worlds. Yet, any invasion of privacy by a country’s intelligence services is challenged as unjustified, even though the work responds 

to public laws and the legitimate needs of individual political leaders. The essay on cybersecurity in this section suggests that despite collusion between a 

country’s intelligence services and its communications enterprises, the ethical 

and legal integrity of intelligence officials allows them to justify the government’s “nonprofit” work on behalf of public security. 

In some contexts, practitioners cannot identify their work as “intelligence.” 

An example comes with the implementation of the “Smart Power” approach 

to U.S. foreign policy. Smart Power enlists non-military sources of influence 

to achieve foreign policy objectives. In the example developed for this section, collaborative development of democratic institutions in a challenging 

advising environment has fostered a new approach to information handling 

outside of the formal reach of intelligence activity. This new type of information organization and its corresponding operating procedures constitute an 

alternative to traditional, threat-oriented intelligence. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

23

Intelligence Integration Models

● Schools a platform for

internal and international collaboration 

● Schools foster an 

intelligence 

community — a 

symbol of integration

● Schools create a 

forum for discussion 

of institional 

efficiencies

● Intelligence a natural 

leader in cyber security 

● Cyber security concerns

pervade private and

public, military and 

civilian sectors

● Vulnerability and 

pervasiveness of digital 

communications bring 

existential threats to a 

society

● Smart Power reduces 

exclusivity of 

intelligence

● Smart Power induces 

information integration 

with operations

● New organizational 

forms and procedures 

created to perform the 

intelligence function

Whole-ofGovernment 

approach

Cyber security 

as spur to

integration

Role of 

professional 

school

Figure 4

Source: Created by the author.

Intelligence services, like any bureaucratic organization, have an interest in 

self-preservation and growth. To achieve those ends, they need to demonstrate their value on a daily basis. Not only that, but they also need to demonstrate the superiority of their products over those of potential competitors 

in anticipating and meeting the needs of official users of information and 

assessments. Competitors include news media, academic professionals, public 

and private research centers, and any group with ready access to pertinent 

information that can be verified. Uniquely, intelligence services are obligated 

to demonstrate their readiness to understand and expertly advise on how to 

engage emerging threats and opportunities. 

To remain relevant and dependable, all intelligence services face the challenge 

of identifying and hiring already well-educated and trustworthy prospective 

employees, providing stable career paths through technical training and the 

development of deep target knowledge, and then continuously educating 

their workforce through world-class professional development programs. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

24

Both postgraduate intelligence education and an intelligence focus on public 

cybersecurity have the potential to integrate the efforts of government and 

nongovernment security institutions and their personnel. At the same time, 

in the contemporary military environment where individual officers from 

advanced countries are expected to invent a credible process for advising local, 

high-level national officials on the design and implementation of accountable 

national security institutions, one finds a requirement for rapid innovation 

and integration of information gathering in a bilateral or multilateral 

environment. 

The function of information gathering and handling cannot always be labeled 

“intelligence” because of local and international sensitivities and even legal 

restrictions on the activity. However, personal interactions in the context 

of gaining and processing useful information for national security purposes 

serve the same purposes as national or strategic intelligence. Thus, field-based 

advisor teams create and manage an integrated approach to multilateral 

information handling and analysis, which may also be called multilateral 

intelligence. 

Layout of the book

Each of the four levels of intelligence management is addressed by essays in 

this collective work. To introduce each section, well-qualified observers and 

participants from across the Americas bring their expertise to bear as they 

place each set of essays into academic and professional perspective. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

25

Section One

Intelligence Oversight in a Democratic 

Context: Legislative, Ethical, and 

Legal Dimensions 

INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

27

Commentary on Section One

Marco Cepik

The essays that make up the first part of this book address the legitimacy of 

national intelligence systems, and in particular explore the legal apparatus 

that regulates, controls and oversees intelligence. The essays also examine the 

philosophical context of intelligence, as it contributes to the development of 

a professional ethos within government services. 

Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta and Arturo Medrano Carmona examine 

how the Peruvian legal framework has contributed to the evolution and institutional design of that country’s intelligence system. They also give brief 

attention to other national experiences in the region. The essay explores legislative history from an empirical perspective. Among the most interesting are 

Law 29915/2012 and Legislative Decree 1141/2012, aimed at strengthening 

the connections between security, defense, and intelligence, as well as the 

proper role of the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (DINI). 

Joanisval Brito Goncalves expertly addresses the variety of controls that can 

be applied to intelligence in Brazil and other countries, particularly Canada. 

The author’s opinion of the Brazilian Law on Access to Government Information (Law 12527 of 2011) reflects the concern tbat government officials have 

about this law as a matter of principle. However, that opinion overlooks the 

problemlatic lack of a fundamental, empirically and theoretically informed 

debate about governmental secrecy and the public right to information like 

the conversation that has taken place over the past two decades in the United 

States. 

Carlos Maldonado Prieto examines ethics in intelligence through an appropriate analytic framework. His opinions and perceptions are informed by close 

observation of Latin America and Eastern Europe institutional developments. 

This author or others could dig deeper into the relationship between intelligence and international law, only briefly addressed in the present essay. This 

relationship underlies any discussion of a potentially universal set of ethical 

norms for intelligence. In particular, the question of political assassinations 

could be framed as part of the relationship between those undertaking covert 

actions and the governmental offices responsible for intelligence oversight. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

28

The author wisely highlights the ethical significance of treating intelligence as 

a public service in the contemporary world. 

In “Human Rights and Intelligence Ethics: Cases from Cinema,” Moira Nakousi Salas and Daniel Soto Muñoz explore the problem of carrying out intelligence activities within a democracy. In a democracy, the intelligence requirement to prevent or repress a threat conflicts with the social costs of restricting 

individual rights and freedom. As the authors point out, the film industry has 

explored this dilemma in some well-known works. Drawing on three of those 

works, they stress the need to ensure that methods of intelligence and counterintelligence adhere to judicial and ethical frameworks. The authors explore 

three scenarios: the violation of the right to privacy by East German political 

police in The Lives of Others (Das Leben der Anderen) (2006); the impunity 

of a common criminal employed by a security agency during military rule in 

the Argentine film The Secret in Their Eyes (El secreto de sus ojos) (2009); and 

especially, the examination of whether a terrorism suspect should be tortured 

in the 2009 film Unthinkable. 

Together, the four chapters of this section represent a thoughtful approach 

to the legal, ethical, and political aspects of intelligence management in the 

Americas.

Marco Cepik serves as associate professor at the Federal University of Rio 

Grande do Sul (UFRGS, Brazil, http://lattes.cnpq.br/3923697331385475). 

He is also director of the Center for International Government Studies (CEGOV, www.cegov.ufrgs.br). Contact: marco.cepik@ufrgs.br. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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Intelligence Laws in Peru and Latin America—

Historical, Legal, and Institutional Evolution

Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta

with 

Arturo Medrano Carmona

“The third article [by Luis Iberico] highlights the communitarian promise of a society that takes its destiny into its own 

hands by reinventing the State and its services.”62

—Fernando Cocho Perez

Prologue

As of 27 January 2012, the Peruvian National Intelligence Service (SIN) 

would have been in place for 52 years as the country’s principal, civilian, 

high-level political/strategic organization. However, on 14 September 2000, 

it was dismantled because it had performed or subcontracted intelligence services for partisan political ends. 

Introduction

This essay examines the origins and evolution of Peru’s successive national 

intelligence laws and their shortcomings. It also highlights parallel legal developments in Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia, 

as these countries move toward the oversight and control typical of a democratic intelligence framework. This typical framework features three types of 

external control: congressional or legislative,63 judicial,64 and economic or 

financial.65

The essay asks where the region stands with respect to the continuous tension among executive, legislative and judicial branches where intelligence services operate under the rule of law. Centralization tendencies provide greater 

autonomy to the executive branch and its intelligence organizations, while 

decentralization brings greater external oversight from the legislative and judicial branches.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

30

Diego Navarro Bonilla reminds us that “intelligence has historically been associated with the idea of secrecy.”66 Despite that secrecy, this essay explores 

how this government function can be improved within a democratic context 

by examining issues ranging from the academic background of intelligence 

professionals to the nature of democratic control mechanisms.

Origins of Government Intelligence in Peru

The establishment of Peruvian government intelligence began with military 

intelligence units in the armed forces. By the end of the 1950s, army generals 

had created an intelligence service and an intelligence school whose graduates 

dominated the development of Peruvian intelligence through the succeeding decades. Given their affinity for the French military, the army absorbed, 

among other ideas, French concepts of “security, development, and pacification.” The French later imparted a counterinsurgency mindset as a result of 

their experiences in the Algerian War of Independence.67

As part of its decade-long institutional modernization, the Peruvian Army 

established a strategic intelligence organization, the nominally civilian National Intelligence Service (SIN). An executive order (un-numbered) created 

the SIN on 27 January 1960. Another, complementary executive order on 

30 September 1960 set forth additional guidelines for the institutionalization of the SIN within the governmental apparatus, identifying its makeup 

and authorities. One part of this executive order articulated the relationship 

of the SIN to other government ministries.68 The use of executive orders to 

establish and regulate intelligence activities reflects Peruvian legal practice.69

As Victor Garcia Toma states, executive orders “are concerned with the more 

general aspects of how ministerial and inter-ministerial activity is regulated 

at the national level. They establish and oversee the organization and functioning of national public service institutions, together with the activities of 

these entities.”70 Garcia Toma suggests that national intelligence constitutes 

a “public service,” and its inclusion in the name of the “National Intelligence 

Service” dates from this executive order. 

One can view the Peruvian National Intelligence Service as a product of the 

Cold War, with its focus on fighting communism and counterinsurgency. 

Cold War nomenclature characterized intelligence institutions across the region: the SIDE and SFICI in Argentina and Brazil, respectively (1946); the 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

31

DFS of Mexico (1947); and the SIC-DAS of Colombia (1953). Later, Venezuela would follow with its DISIP (1969), supported strongly by the United 

States and its own intelligence agencies during the democratic government of 

President Rafael Caldera (COPEI).71

None of the executive orders from 1960 anticipated the emergence of restrictions on government intelligence. However, it should be pointed out that 

these mandates were only initial efforts to deal with intelligence institutions 

and their function. They appeared in the wake of the Chinese (1949) and 

the Cuban (1959) revolutions, and as irregular, insurgent, and revolutionary 

aspects of internal conflict were growing in the region. The executive order of 

27 January 1960 refers to that environment:

The complexity of the problem that our National Defense 

now faces makes necessary the establishment of special organizations so as to better accomplish the obligations that 

the Constitution and our laws place on the President of the 

Republic.

The order established that, as a subordinate entity within government, intelligence produces a product for a privileged consumer or decisionmaker. Actions by the decisionmaker, in turn, take place within boundaries established 

by the constitution and relevant laws.

Evolutionary Developments in Peruvian Intelligence 

Legislation: 1960–1970

Leaders began to employ the Peruvian National Intelligence Service for political purposes in the 1960s, during the democratic regime of the Popular 

Action President Fernando Belaunde. The SIN worked with the Ministry of 

Government and Police in 1965 to impound Marxist books and pamphlets. 

This was done to combat the influence of pro-Castro guerrillas who were 

operating in Peruvian territory under an insurrection model exported from 

Cuba. Of course, Army intelligence also focused on the insurrection. In fact, 

the predominant role of military intelligence, especially within the army and 

marines, manifested itself in a military coup d’etat on 3 October 1968. Army 

intelligence drove the coup, with no participation by the SIN. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

32

Two top officials of the SIN reacted to the coup very differently. Its leader, 

General Carlos Linares Molfino, resigned his position because of his close ties 

with the constitutional President Fernando Belaunde. His deputy, Colonel 

Eduardo Segura Gutierrez, yielded to the military putsch and later became 

the head of the SIN.

On 25 March 1969, the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, 

headed by General Juan Velasco, issued Organic Law 17532 of the President 

of the Republic. Its article 2 subordinated the SIN directly to the president 

of the republic.

Finally, Law 19351, which amended the executive order of 30 September 

1960, explained how members of the National Intelligence System (SINA) 

should coordinate with each other. However, this law failed to address the 

issues of accountability, democratic controls, supervision, or oversight of 

intelligence.

Laws promulgated in the 1960s remained in effect through subsequent political regimes. An action by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968–1980) promoted this continuity. Law 19351 of 1972 put in place a 

legal “theory of continuity,” whereby laws enacted during the military regime 

would not expire when Peru returned to democracy. This law remained in 

effect well beyond the return to democracy in 1980. Legislative Decree 270, 

article 29 finally superseded this law on 10 February 1984.

The War against Terrorism: 1980–1990

In 1980, the Peruvian Communist Party-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) started a revolutionary, unconventional war against the Peruvian state. The PCPSL employed various criminal methods and prompted a thorough review of 

counterinsurgency plans. The counterinsurgency plans of the National Intelligence System were among those reviewed.

Law 23720 of 1983 gave the executive branch the power to make decisions 

with respect to intelligence. The Peruvian Congress thus exerted no influence over intelligence management. The executive branch took action to 

improve the structure and aims of national intelligence with decrees 270 

and 271. The first refined the National Intelligence System (SINA), and the 

second addressed the SIN itself. These decrees appeared during the bloody 
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33

and no-holds-barred insurgency, at a time when the SIN was led by a Navy 

official. The Senior Intelligence Council, created by decree in 1972, pushed 

for the adoption of the measures as a way to build a positive association between intelligence and democracy. 

Testimony from later SIN leaders reveal unsuccessful efforts in 1984 to reform and improve intelligence laws. Gustavo Gorriti Ellenboghen, a Peruvian 

journalist, writer, and opinion leader, devotes an entire chapter of his book on 

the Sendero Luminoso72 to the country’s intelligence services in the 1980s. The 

chapter, “Conclave of the Blind: The Intelligence War,” analyzes the failures 

of the SIN and of the entire intelligence system in its fight against terrorism. 

He criticizes in particular the use of intelligence by police within the Ministry 

of the Interior. Furthermore, he finds that the SIN of the 1980s experienced 

years of bureaucratic stagnation. The military continued to dominate national 

intelligence during the first Alan Garcia administration (1985–1990) as two 

army officers led the SIN during his regime. 

The Political Police (Andean Stasi) and the 

Predatory State: 1991–2000

With the aim of reorienting Peruvian intelligence, the Alberto Fujimori 

administration introduced dramatic changes to the National Intelligence 

System in 1991. The instrument used was the highly controversial legislative 

decree 746, designed by the office of the Legal Advisor to the SIN (OTAJSIN). Longtime employees of the intelligence agency from the 1960s as well 

as the 1980s also participated in drafting the decree.

The legislative decree attempted to create an intelligence agency resembling 

Cold War intelligence services of Eastern Europe. Thus, one can think of this 

edition of the SIN as an Andean Stasi, from the name of the infamous East 

German intelligence enterprise.73

The justification for this intelligence design rested on its “centralized unity of 

command,” and it became known as the “centralized management model.” 

The model aimed to stem fragmentation of the National Intelligence System, 

a problem dating back to 1984. In retrospect, and “in contrast to the secret 

services of other democratic countries,” the Peruvian SIN of the 1990s “was 

the leading institution in the power politics of the state.”74 Luis Piscoya 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

34

Salinas, a lawyer and analyst for today’s National Strategic Intelligence 

Directorate—Internal Affairs of the National Intelligence Center (CNI), has 

critiqued the centralist model of Peruvian intelligence.75 The CNI itself has 

not escaped his criticism. 

The collegial Senior Intelligence Council (CSI) remained valuable for its role 

in interagency coordination. However, the new lineup of intelligence institutions in 1991 and 1992 excluded the council. The CSI had held the SIN in 

check until this time. But now the SIN was in charge of all of intelligence—

like the SAVAK of the Shah of Iran or the political police of the respective 

communist parties of the Eastern Bloc. The SIN was everywhere.76 The capture of terrorist leaders in 1992, 1993, and 1994 contributed to reinforcing 

its image as a successful model of centralized intelligence. It appeared clearly 

superior to the error-prone institutions of the 1980s, which were subject to 

more outside regulation. In addition, the centralized model brought into 

question the less centralized military approach, which had predominated 

during the 1980s. 

In the 1990s, the SIN contributed decisively to the creation of the so-called 

predatory state.77 Article 21 of Legislative Decree 746 (11 December 1991) 

revived the philosophy of Cold War Eastern European intelligence.78 In the 

following year, a civilian self-coup originated by Alberto Fujimori brought on 

the promulgation of Legal Decree 25635. It was similar to the 1991 decree, 

except for some cosmetic changes.79

The Collapse of the National Intelligence Service (SIN)

Alberto Fujimori at one point asserted that the SIN was the best intelligence 

service in the world. However, he fell from power because he could neither 

control the SIN nor build his own political legitimacy. The SIN of the 1990s 

provided the key evidence that brought down the Fujimori administration. 

On September 14, 2000, Congressman Luis Iberico and others revealed the 

infamous Kouri-Montesinos videos unearthed from deep within SIN archives. The videos documented the SIN’s bribery of elected officials on behalf 

of the Fujimori administration. The impact of this event destroyed the SIN 

and the authoritarian political regime that had employed the intelligence services precisely for the regime’s self-preservation.80
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

35

Alberto Bolivar Ocampo, who was a SIN employee in the 1990s—along with 

the author—describes the organization: 

Between 1990 and 2000, Alberto Fujimori and Vladimiro 

Montesinos transformed Peruvian intelligence into a very 

efficient, internally focused political espionage machine, 

with control over communication channels and individual 

and collective spirits, totally subverting legitimate intelligence ends ... the armed forces and national police became 

the chief threat to national security in Peru ... as inside the 

country, intelligence carried out work that was foreign to its 

true purposes ....81

The Fujimori administration deactivated the SIN by an executive order and a 

special law (PL 461-2000/CR). The special law became standard Law 27351 

in October 2000. Article 6 of this law expressly repealed Law 25635 of 1992. 

The Fujimori administration tried to maintain control of state intelligence 

in 2000. Mediation between the government and its opposition imposed by 

the Organization of American States forced the administration to create a 

new legislative proposal. This proposal (258-2000/CR) called for a National 

Intelligence Office, although the law was erroneously presented as an “organic” law rather than as a standard statute.82 The proposal suggested the 

establishment of a Consultative Council for Intelligence to coordinate the 

efforts of the National Intelligence System. This proposed council resembled 

the abandoned Senior Intelligence Council that existed from 1984 to 1991. 

This initiative to sustain the SIN involved two urgent decrees (18 and 46, 

February and April 2001) in a final effort to allow the continued production 

of intelligence for the administration. 

Improvements Attempted: 2000–2012

Successive political administrations undertook initiatives aimed at reconstructing the Peruvian intelligence system, ultimately without success.83 The 

attempts failed despite honest and well-intentioned intelligence leadership in 

three consecutive administrations: those of Accion Popular in the transition 

period (2000–2001), Peru Posible (2001–2006), and APRA (2006–2011).
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

36

The Peruvian human rights and racial discrimination ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo)84 took note of the turbulence and in 2001 formulated proposals for an intelligence service with democratic controls. It sought to avoid 

the intelligence excesses impinging on human rights.85 The proposals came 

from the ombudsman’s Group for Constitutional Affairs, which sent a version of them to the Intelligence Working Group set up by the Organization 

of American States in Lima. This group recommended certain safeguards for 

incorporation into a future intelligence law. The group also suggested that a 

congressional committee be responsible for intelligence oversight and control. It further stipulated that the National Defense Committee for Internal 

Order was not the appropriate place for that responsibility. 

Based on five legislative initiatives by the transitional administration of Valentin Paniagua Corazao, Peruvian Law 27479 (2001) put in place the National 

Intelligence Council (CNI) and the National Strategic Intelligence Directorate (DINIE). For the first time, Peruvian intelligence was regulated by an 

ordinary law promulgated by the Congress of the Republic. The law (article 

36) began to address congressional oversight of intelligence.86 The oversight 

was limited to reviewing budget execution by the intelligence services. The 

legislation bore a striking similarity to Decreed Law 25635 of 1992, which 

had established the intelligence-centric, predatory state.87

Meanwhile, the executive branch instituted an “Annual Operational Plan,” 

now known as the “Annual Intelligence Plan,” which the congressional committee would check and approve, and then oversee in its implementation 

phase. Other elements of intelligence supervision provided for public transparency, safeguarding of information, and implementation of the concept of 

secrecy,88 together with regulations on the handling of classified information. 

A Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information (2002) reinforced 

these principles.

In 2002, the Harvard University program in Peru, Justice in Times of Transition, convened in Lima. The journalist Juan Velit, director of the National 

Intelligence Council, presided. A working group prepared a report titled 

“Recommendations for the Reform of Intelligence in Peru in Light of the 

Experiences of Other Countries of the World.” The project brought together 

international experts to study the strengths and weaknesses of intelligencerelated legislation generated in democracies. Some participants pointed out 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

37

the inadvisability of having a law covering intelligence operations in Peru that 

was essentially a copy of the infamous Laws 25635 and 27479 of 2001.89

This was not the only sign of a reversion to the authoritarian state of 1991. Article 9 of the 1991 Law 27479 stated: “Both the private and public sector will 

provide to the National Intelligence System (SINA) any information needed 

for national security and national development.” It did not specify how the 

SINA would obtain the information presumably necessary to ensure national 

security. Article 9 of this law reflected the influence of Legislative Decree 746 

of 1991, in particular article 21, which established the information-collection 

tactics of the political police in communist Eastern Europe, such as the East 

German Stasi, the Romanian Securitate of Nicolae Ceaucescu, or the NKVD

(precursor to the KBG) of Joseph Stalin in the former Soviet Union.

Politicians and intelligence leaders chose not to change the prevailing treatment of intelligence services. They did not develop public regulations to guide 

the application of Law 27479 of 2001. Even in the new, democratic regime, 

the detailed implementation of the intelligence law would remain secret. 

Starting in 2002, various legal initiatives attempted to modify and improve 

Law 27479. The interest of legislators in reorienting the legislation was finally 

evident. A new presidential administration in 2003 continued the trend toward forging a new legal basis for intelligence. Initiatives emerged from several congressional committees, including National Defense, Internal Order, 

Intelligence, Alternative Development, and Countedrugs, to discuss issues 

that in the end might be incorporated into drafting a new national intelligence law. 

The Ministry of Justice took a detailed approach to judicial control of intelligence operations. In addition, a special committee from the executive 

branch, acting through Resolution 097-2004-PCM,90 developed the concepts of democratic control of intelligence, its legitimation, transparency, and 

accountability.91 This committee drafted new intelligence legislation that envisioned a Strategic Intelligence Agency (AIE). The executive branch adopted 

the plan. The draft legislation applied regulatory principles to intelligence 

and laid out a structure for an independent congressional committee to address the intelligence function. However, in the end this initiative failed.92
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

38

The Peruvian Congress enacted the National Defense and Security Law 

(28478) in 2005, giving legislative approval to the intelligence system (SINA). 

Chapter 3, article 14 of the law notes that “the National Intelligence System 

is a part of the National Defense and Security System and is to produce intelligence and carry out those counterintelligence activities that are required for 

National Security. It [SINA] will operate under its own law and implementing regulations.”

The National Intelligence System Law (28664) was promulgated in January 

2006, establishing the National Intelligence Directorate (DINI).93 The law 

included a provision for judicial control of intelligence “special operations.” 

The definition of “special operations”94 avoided the use of emotive words like 

“intrusive,” “clandestine,” “invasive,” and “covert.” In addition, Chapter 3, 

article 20 of the law explained in detail the judicial procedures for the execution of special operations:

● For the judicial control of special operations, the Supreme Court 

of the Republic is to assign two senior Justice officials for each case.

● Special operations require judicial authorization from one of the

assigned Justice officials. The entire process will remain classified as 

secret.

● Requests to conduct special operations are made by the Executive 

Director of DINI to one of the senior Justice officials.

● When national security is endangered, and time does not permit

preauthorization, the Executive Director of DINI may authorize a 

special operation, but must still seek approval of the Justice official,

who within 24 hours can validate the request or order its immediate 

termination.

● The decision of the Justice official with respect to authorizing 

special operations is binding on all organizations, public and 

private, that may be associated with carrying out the operation, 

and all requirements for handling classified information must be 

observed.
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● The request to conduct a special operation by the DINI, and the 

decision by the Justice official, are to be carried out within 24 

hours, and are to be carried out by direct, personal interaction 

among those specific individuals.

● In the case of a negative decision by the senior Justice official, the

appellant has the right to appeal the decision to the relevant court, 

which must resolve the decision within 24 hours. 

The new intelligence law contained another notable stipulation: that the decision of the senior Justice officer to approve or deny special intelligence operations would not apply if the Peruvian Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF-Peru) 

were involved.95 This provision was included to prevent the Peruvian Justice 

Ministry from restricting the functional, technical, and administrative autonomy of the UIF-Peru. The UIF-Peru solicits, receives, and analyzes information through Suspicious Activity Reports.96

The new law also called on the Peruvian Congress to create a Select Intelligence Committee that would exercise intelligence oversight independently 

from National Defense, Internal Order, Alternative Development, and Counterdrug Committees. Article 21 specifies the obligations of the Select Committee on Intelligence in such detail as to require an insider’s understanding 

of congressional rules. Article 22 establishes the makeup of the committee: 

five or seven permanent members, either newly appointed or incumbent, with 

each new Congress. No backup or substitute members are allowed. Committee sessions are conducted in secret only if circumstances so dictate. 

The leak of information from a component agency of the National Intelligence System, the Naval Intelligence Directorate, challenged the efficacy 

of the new intelligence law.97 The cases known as MARTE-DINTEMAR 

(2007) and BTR (2009) infringed on the legal obligation to safeguard secrets 

during the handling of classified information.98 The leaks occurred as military personnel undertook intrusive information activities while employed by 

private intelligence entities. The BTR case involved retired military personnel, but the activity undermined the principle that only the state has the right 

to obtain and deal with classified information.99
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

40

The Select Committee for Intelligence created a working group100 under the 

leadership of Congressman Jose Urquizo (Nationalist Party). The Congress 

approved the group’s report.101

Errors in Juridical and Institutional Processes Subsequent 

to the 2006 Intelligence Law

The Select Committee for Intelligence committed several errors during the 

2006-2007 legislative season. The committee’s first error was to consider itself 

a consumer or user of the intelligence product. The committee asked for “Information Notes,” “Intelligence Notes,”102 and “Special Intelligence Studies” 

from the National Intelligence system even though the legislative branch does 

not make decisions based on these reports. The committee legitimately oversees the intelligence system at the policy level, and debates and promulgates 

intelligence-related legislation. 

The Select Committee also erred by contractually employing a set of advisers from the armed forces. Although supposedly expert in intelligence, 

these advisers lacked legal skills and an understanding of parliamentary practices. An example of the unfortunate results appears in the language of bill 

2563/2007-R.103 The bill contains some regressive proposals, to include:

● A legal formulation that proposed a vaguely defined “Central 

Directorate” for the National Intelligence System within the 

National Intelligence Directorate, reminiscent of the 1992 legal 

framework that gave unlimited intelligence license to Fujimori and

Montesinos. 

● Introduction, without explanation, of the term “covert actions,” a 

concept beyond the scope of existing law. In addition, the bill refers 

to “reserved funds” in a way that appears to confuse this old concept 

with the new procedures for carrying out and funding special 

operations.

● A mixture of concepts related to the Select Committee, made without regard to congressional rules, which lay out both the principles 

and actions to be taken by congressional committees.
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41

Not all aspects of congressional activity on intelligence matters are so regressive. The secondary set of committees responsible for intelligence legislation 

(National Defense, Internal Order, Alternative Development, and Counterdrugs) prepared a well-designed bill in 2010. Their bill (2563) corrects some 

aspects of intelligence law. Both proposed bills, sponsored by the Select Committee for Intelligence, were to be debated by a plenary session of Congress.

These developments show that parliamentary procedures and military interests figure prominently in the evolution of intelligence organizations and intelligence legislation, as various changes to the status quo are proposed and 

challenged. 

Growth of Intelligence Control and Oversight in 

Latin America and Spain

Judicial control and congressional oversight provisions of the 2006 Peruvian 

intelligence law grew from earlier intelligence legislation created by Brazil, 

Argentina, and Chile.104 By 2006, a broad regional foundation for intelligence law and legislation had emerged (see Table 1).

Table 1

Notable Intelligence Legislation, 1999–2005

Country Law Name of Agency Year

BRAZIL Law 9883 Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) 1999

ARGENTINA Law 25520 Intelligence Secretariat (SI) 2001

SPAIN Organic Laws 

Number 2 and 

Number 11

National Intelligence Center (CNI) 2002

CHILE Law 19974 National Intelligence Agency (ANI) 2004

MEXICO National Security 

Law

Center for Research and 

National Security (CISEN)

2005

GUATEMALA Legislative 

Decree 71-2005

General Directorate for 

Civilian Intelligence (DIGICI)

2005

Source: Compiled by the author. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

42

Some common elements appear in national intelligence laws in the region. 

The elements include an imposition of external control over the intelligence 

services; the initiation of political checks and balances among all branches of 

government in applying external control; and an application of principles of 

public transparency and accountability. At the same time, expanded public 

accountability for government actions and greater transparency of intelligence 

management have shed light on and promoted the professionalization of this 

peculiar government function.105

Improvements in Public Control of Intelligence Across the 

Region Since 2006

Since the promulgation of the Peruvian national intelligence law in 2006, a 

series of legislative proposals in various countries point to more effective oversight and supervision of intelligence activities.106 In some cases, executive 

branch budget processes reinforce the external controls applied by legislatures 

and judicial bodies. Budget processes can bring change to intelligence services 

through financial rewards and penalties.

Panama

Executive Decree 9, promulgated on 20 August 2008, reorganized the National Defense and Public Security Council and created the National Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS).107 Title 5 of the measure established 

legislative and judicial control over intelligence services. Although rescinded because of irregularities in its promulgation,108 the decree nonetheless 

contributed to recent comparative law in the region because it established 

the principle of “prior judicial approval” of legal measures that affect citizen 

rights. Judicially preapproved intelligence operations cannot be challenged or 

used as evidence in judicial or administrative court proceedings.

Colombia 

On 5 March 2009, Law 1288 established rules to strengthen the legal framework for intelligence and counterintelligence, permitting those organizations 

to carry out duties in accord with the national constitution.109 Chapter 3, article 13 of this law addressed intelligence control and supervision, specifying 

congressional oversight by a “Congressional committee to oversee intelligence 

and counterintelligence activities.”110 The law remained in limbo, however, 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

43

because of procedural disputes. Two supplementary laws (bills 189-2009 

and 195-2011) would create a legal basis for ongoing intelligence activity 

in the country, pending the resolution of uncertainties with respect to Law 

1288.111

By November 2011, a new Colombian National Intelligence Directorate 

(DNI) began to carry out intelligence activities, with the specific exception of 

“police” activities.112 In addition, a DNI inspector general will ensure compliance with the law, examine the efficiency and efficacy of intelligence operations, and guarantee fulfillment of congressional committee stipulations.113

Ecuador

Ecuador replaced its legal framework for national security, the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI), by abrogating the National Security Law of 1979. 

On 15 May 2008, the Rafael Correa administration created a “Commission 

for the investigation of Ecuadorian military and police intelligence services.” 

The intent of this investigation was not to pit military or paramilitary against 

civilians, but to address the problem exposed by the “Angostura incident”114

wherein unauthorized links were discovered between those services and foreign intelligence organizations.

Executive Decree 1768, of 8 June 2009, created the National Secretariat 

of Intelligence (SENAIN), and the new Law for Public and State Security 

(Number 35 in the Official Registry, 28 September 2009). This last statute 

established rules for judicial authorization of “covert operations” in information collection and a plan for accountability to the National Assembly 

(Congress) by the SENAIN leadership and the highest authorities of implementing agencies.

Uruguay

In Uruguay, Representative Jose A. Amy (Colorado Party) presented a bill 

in June 2010 calling for the establishment of a congressional “Committee 

for the Supervision of Intelligence Services.” Article 4 of the bill introduces 

specific principles115 that intelligence officials should follow in collecting and 

handling information. The obligation to maintain secrecy is stated in article 

5. The committee will follow rules for plurality and proportionality, and will 

include all political parties represented in the legislature. The bill’s statement 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

44

of purpose specifies how the proposed intelligence law, for which no antecedents exist in the country, be developed. Political and technical participants 

will define sensitive aspects of national defense and security and ensure democratic protections of citizens. 

Venezuela

Venezuela’s attempt in 2008 to impose a controversial intelligence law, derisively labeled the “rat-out law,”116 had so few constitutional and legal protections that the Chavez administration rescinded it. In its wake, Decree 7453 

of June 2010 created a new intelligence organization, the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN).117 SEBIN replaced the political police of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP). Intelligence laws of 

the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez resemble those of 

1990s Peru, under Alberto Fujimori and his intelligence director, Vladimiro 

Montesinos.118 The resemblances extend to aspects of style, background, and 

format.

Bolivia

Since early 2010, Bolivia has wrestled with how to create a Plurinational 

Intelligence Directorate (DIDEP) as a new type of organization to support 

political-strategic decisionmaking. A preliminary version of the measure envisioned an internal auditor. The plurinational Congress would oversee operational intelligence activities through a special committee, and the Bolivian 

comptroller would address intelligence administrative tasks. Fundamental 

civilian rights and protections would be guaranteed, and intrusive actions by 

intelligence services would not be permitted without judicial authorization. 

As a nominally civilian organization, the DIDEP would end the tradition of 

having the police and armed forces carry out all intelligence activities. 

Conclusion

To answer the central question posed in this essay, the application of external 

controls (congressional, judicial and economic-financial) in Latin American 

has produced a decentralized model of intelligence. Peru’s intelligence Law 

28664 reflects the tendency toward decentralization. However, an innovation in Colombia may indicate a concurrent, centralizing tendency. There, 

an inspector general for the new National Intelligence Directorate provides 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

45

intelligence services with an opportunity to acquire some operational autonomy through the expedient of internal oversight. Autonomy contributes to a 

centralized model of intelligence activity. 

The evolution of the centralized model, as well as decentralizing control and 

oversight mechanisms, has coincided with fewer violations of human rights 

by intelligence services. External control mechanisms have brought intelligence activities in line with democratic tendencies and values. This result is 

due mainly to intelligence system reorganizations across the region.119

Accompanying the reorganization of intelligence agencies, special executive 

or legislative commissions have institutionalized democratic reforms. The 

commissions have had some success in creating external controls over intelligence activities.120 External controls ensure due attention to human rights, 

make judicial authorization of “special operations” standard practice, and establish democratic oversight of individual intelligence agencies. The commissions have allowed public discussion and systematic debate, thereby ensuring 

“social control”121 by democratic constituents and collective public opinion. 

Peru continues to face narcotrafficking, remnant terrorism,122 and organized 

crime. Managing the tension between decentralized intelligence and intelligence autonomy remains a requirement for the effective work of preventive, 

secret services. 

Addendum

In December 2012 the Peruvian government promulgated Legislative Decree 

1141 on the Strenghening and Modernization of the National Intelligence 

System (SINA) and the National Intelligence Directorate (DINI). The Peruvian congress had granted the executive branch authority to draft legislation for the reform of the National Security and Defense System. Following 

similar initiatives in 1984 and 1991, this arrangement continued legislativebased regulation of all the country’s intelligence agencies. The congress also 

designed, debated, and approved the earlier intelligence laws, Ordinary Laws 

27479 of 2001, and 28664 of 2006. 

The idea of authorizing the executive branch to design intelligence legislation 

came from a recommendation by the Congressional Intelligence Committee.123 It originated with the first Congress (2011–2012) of the 2011–2016 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

46

congressional period, under the committee leadership of Congressman Jose 

Urquizo Maggia (of the ruling Partido Nacionalista/GANA PERU). In January 2012, Urquizo presented a package of five legislative proposals to modify 

existing Intelligence Law 28664.124 All of the proposals were incorporated 

into the new legislative decree. 

The new legislative decree, with its 6 titles and 43 articles, leaves intact the 

public or “democratic” controls exerted by legislative and judicial authorities.125 The principles that guide intelligence activity also remain in place, 

extending the letter and spirit of the preceding Law 28664 of 2006. Decree 

1141 similarly follows the lead of its antecedent law in presenting a glossary 

of intelligence concepts (in article 2) to improve the operation of the intelligence system and to establish the duties and responsibilities of each of the 

entities that make up the system. In this way, the decree follows the innovative Argentine Intelligence Law 25520 (2001). 

Another feature of the new decree appears in its Title 5, “Measures for the 

Protection of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Personnel” (articles 38, 

39, 40, and 41). These measures build on Bill 724/2011-CR, which proposed 

to “guarantee the physical integrity and security of personnel who participate in intelligence and counterintelligence activity.” This bill was presented 

in Congress on 19 January 2012. Given their sensitive work in collecting 

human-source information (HUMINT), intelligence personnel benefit from 

specific legal protections. In Latin America, these safeguards also appear in 

Panama (Decree 9 of 2008), and in Colombia (Law 1288 of 2009).

Peruvian intelligence operates in a historically complex environment, characterized by both advancements and setbacks. With its new law based on a legislatively backed decree, the country has added a new wrinkle to intelligence 

oversight in the region.126

Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta.

Lima, Peru, January 2013.

Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta is a Peruvian lawyer, with a master’s degree in 

international political economy (Universidad de Belgrano, Buenos Aires). He 

is a graduate of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), Washington, D.C., and has completed postgraduate coursework in Spain (political 
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science, international law). He is a former director of National Foreign Intelligence (CNI), 2001; former congressional adviser for the National Defense, 

Internal Order, Intelligence, Alternative Development, and Antidrug Committees; and for congressional investigatory committees (2002–2007). He 

has also served as director (2007-2009) of the National Intelligence School 

and faculty member (2007–2011). Additionally, he has served as an associate 

member of the Institute of International Studies of the Pontíficia Universidad 

Católica del Perú. He has participated in conferences on peace, security, defense, and intelligence in Quito (FLACSO), Brasilia (Brazilian Association of 

Defense Studies), and Rio de Janeiro (Social Cooperation Agency-Brazil and 

SIPRI-Switzerland). Gomez has also served as a member of Task Force–Peru 

Group, in the Cooperation and Regional Security Program of the Friedrich 

Ebert Foundation. He is an author for the anthology Inteligencia Estratégica 

y Prospectiva, published by FLACSO-Ecuador (2011), and Cuestiones de Inteligencia en la Sociedad Contemporánea, published by Spain’s Ministry of Defense (2012). Email: Andres_gotorrer@yahoo.es. 

Arturo Medrano Carmona, a Peruvian, holds a politial science degree from 

the Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal and is a research assistant there. 

He is also a graduate of the Peruvian Advanced Studies Center (CAEN). He 

has participated in the online strategic game Nation Lab, organized by the 

U.S. Southern Command for CAEN. He is a specialist in administrative law 

and administrative procedures, Lima Law College. 
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Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America

Liza Zuniga

Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America

1. Countries with an Intelligence Law and Intelligence SystemCountry Law Legal Definition of Intelligence Principal Organizations

Argentina Law 25520, enacted 3 December 2001. National Intelligence 

Law.

National intelligence is activity involving the collection, compilation, systematization, and analysis of specific information about actions, threats, risks, and conflicts that affect the exterior and interior security of the Nation (Law 25520, Article 1).

a) Secretariat of Intelligence, in the Office of the President.b) National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence, in the Ministry of Public Security.c) National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence, in the Ministry of Defense .

Brazil a) Law 9883, 12 July 1999, established the Brazilian Intelligence System, created Brazilian 

Intelligence Agency, along with state agencies. b) Decree 3695, 21 December 2000, created Public Security Intelligence Subsystem. c) Decree 4376, 13 September 2002, set up the organization and functions of the Brazilian Intelligence System.

The activity having as its purpose the collection, analysis and dissemination of knowledge, inside and outside the national territory, about actions, and situations having immediate or potential influence over governmental actions or decisions, or the safety and security of the society and the state (Law 9833, Article 1, Number 2).

a) Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), principal organization, subordinate to Brazilian President. b) Brazilian Intelligence System, made up of nine Ministries (through separate organizations), plus a Comptroller, ABIN, Operational Command Center of the Amazon Protection System, and the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Brazilian President. 

Canada CSIS Act, 1984. Security intelligence is information formulated to assist government decision makers 

in developing policy. 

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), lead agency for national security, reports to parliament through the Minister
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

1. Countries with an Intelligence Law and Intelligence SystemCountry Law Legal Definition of Intelligence Principal OrganizationsCanada Regardless of the source of intelligence, it 

provides value in addition to what can be found in other government reports or in news stories. Intelligence conveys the story behind the story.

for Public Security. Other agencies: Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security and Bureau of Economic Intelligence within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Communications Security Establishment, Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch, Criminal Intelligence Service, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Border Services Agency, Chief of Defence Intelligence.

Chile National Intelligence System 

Law 19974, 27 September 2004, created the National Intelligence Agency. 

The systematic process of collection, evaluation, and analysis of information for the purpose of producing useful knowledge for decision making (Law 19974, Article 2).

a) National Intelligence Agency; central organization subordinate to the Minister of the Interior and Public Security. b) Defense Intelligence Directorate of the National Defense Staff. c) Intelligence Directorates of the Armed Forces. d) Directorates or Headquarters of Intelligence of the Forces of Public Security and Order. 

Colombia Law 1621, enacted 17 April 

2013. National Intelligence Law.

Intelligence and counterintelligence develop specialized organizations, using human or technical means, to collect, process, 

The Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) is responsible for producing intelligence estimates for the national government. This Council is made up of: 
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

1. Countries with an Intelligence Law and Intelligence SystemCountry Law Legal Definition of Intelligence Principal OrganizationsColombia analyze and disseminate infomation, with 

the objective of protecting human rights, preventing and combating internal or external threats to the democratic way of life, to security, and to national defense, and complying with other objectives of this Law (Law 1621, Article 2).

a. The Minister of National Defense.b. The Senior National Security Advisor.c. The Vice-Minister of National Defense. d. The Chief of Joint Intelligence, representing the Commanding General of the Armed Forces. e. The Chief of Intelligence of the Army, representing the Army Commander.f. The Chief of Intelligence of the Navy, representing the Navy Commander. g. The Chief of Intelligence of the Air Force, representing the Air Force Commander. h. The Director of Police Intelligence, representing the Director General of the National Police. i. The Director of the Financial Information and Analyisis Unit, or his delegated representative.j. The Director of any other intelligence or counterintelligence organization authorized by by Law to carry out these activities. 
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

1. Countries with an Intelligence Law and Intelligence SystemCountry Law Legal Definition of Intelligence Principal OrganizationsColombia The organizations that carry out intelligence 

and counterintelligence activities are those subordinate to the Armed Forces and the National Police, the Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF), and the other organizations designated by law. 

Ecuador Executive Decree 1768, 8 June 

2009, created the Intelligence Secretariat. Law on Public and State Security, 28 September 2009. 

The activity of gathering, processing, and analyzing specific information on threats, risks, and conflicts affecting national security. Intelligence information supports security-related decision making (Article 14 of the Law on Public and State Security).

The Secretariat of Intelligence is the lead office of the National Intelligence System. It is made up of:  a) Military Intelligence Subsystem, for national defense. Police Intelligence Subsystem, for internal security.  b) Internal Security Management Office of the President of the Republic. c) Other intelligence organizations to be created or included in the future.  d) Other institutions and organizations that have or produce information of interest for the purposes of ensuring state security.
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

1. Countries with an Intelligence Law and Intelligence SystemCountry Law Legal Definition of Intelligence Principal Organizations

Guatemala Decree 71, of 2005. Law for the 

General Directorate for Civilian Intelligence (DIGICI), and Decree 18 of 2008, Framework Law for the National Security System.

Although the law does not include a definition of intelligence as such, it asserts that DIGICI has among its responsibilities, “to plan for, collect and obtain information, to process and systematize and analyze it, thereby transforming the information into intelligence.” (Decree 71-2005, Article 3).

National Intelligence System is part of the National Security System, and is made up of:a) Secretary of Strategic Intelligence.b) Office of Civilian Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior. c) Intelligence Office of the General Staff for National Defense of the Ministry of National Defense. 

Honduras Legislative Decree 211-2012, 

15 April 2013, created the National Directorate for Research and Intelligence (DNIE) as an independent, nominally civilian organization responsible to the National Security and Defense Council. The decree also established a National Intelligence System, with a policy-level Strategic Intelligence Committee.

The DNIE protects the rights and freedoms of citizens and residents, prevents and counters internal and external threats against constitutional order, and implements public policies in defense and security as established by the National Security and Defense Council.

DNIE coordinates the National Intelligence System and chairs its Strategic Intelligence Committee. System members include:a) Honduran Armed Forces;b) Honduran National Police;c) Secretary of State, Office of International Relations;d) Financial Information Unit.
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

1. Countries with an Intelligence Law and Intelligence SystemCountry Law Legal Definition of Intelligence Principal Organizations

Perú Legislative Decree 1l41, 11 December 2012.

Law 28664 of 2006.

Activity comprising a systematic process of collection, evaluation and analysis of information, for the purpose of producing useful knowledge for decision making. (Legislative Decree 1141, Article 2). 

The National Intelligence System (SINA) is a part of the National Security System, and is made up of:a) National Intelligence Council.b) National Intelligence Directorate.c) General Directorate of Multilateral and Global Affairs of the Foreign Relations Ministry.d) Defense: Second Division of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces; Intelligence Directorate of the respective Armed Forces. e) Interior: General Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior (DIGIMIN) and Intelligence Directorate of the National Police (DIRIN).
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

1. Countries with an Intelligence Law and Intelligence SystemCountry Law Legal Definition of Intelligence Principal OrganizationsUnited States

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Public Law 108-485. Executive Order 12333, 1981; Executive Order 13355, 2004; and Executive Order 13470, 2008. 

National intelligence is information gathered within or outside the United States, that A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one United States Government agency; B) involves threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security

National Security Council, Director of National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, National Counterproliferation Center. Intelligence Community Organizations: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Department of State (INR), Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard Intelligence.

Uruguay A proposed law is being debated 

in the Uruguayan congress.* It is expected that the law will create a Secretary of National Strategic Intelligence, reporting directly to the president of the republic.

Intelligence acts on information developed in compliance with the principles of protection and defense of national, strategic interests.

The National Intelligence System will encompass the Secretary of National Strategic Intelligence and the Ministries of Defense, Interior, International Relations, and Economy. 
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

2. Countries with Laws Affecting Information and Intelligence Agencies Country Law Role of Civilian Intelligence 

Organization

Organizations

Costa Rica

Law 7410 of 1994-General Police Law, and Executive Decree 23758 of 1994 address National Security and Intelligence Directorate. 

The National Security and Intelligence Directorate will carry out intelligence operations that allow the collection and subsequent analysis of information as necessary.

Department of Police Intelligence of the Public Force. National Security and Intelligence Directorate.

El Salvador

Decree 554, 20 September 2001. Law of the State Intelligence Agency. 

The responsibility of the Agency is “to inform and advise the president of the Republic on intelligence issues related to meeting national development objectives, the security of the state, and the viability of democracy” (Decree 554, Article 5).

State Intelligence Agency, subordinate to the President of El Salvador. Center of Police Intelligence, or the National Civilian Police. Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. 

Mexico National Security Law, 2005. The purpose of CISEN is to produce strategic, tactical and operational intelligence 

that preserves the integrity, stability and survival of the Mexican state, supports governability and reinforces the rule of law. Its role is to warn of and propose preventive measures to dissuade, thwart and neutralize risks and threats that aim to harm the territory, sovereignty, constitutional order, freedoms and democratic institutions of Mexicans, as well as the economic, social and political development of the country. 

The Center for Research and National Security (CISEN) is a civilian organization subordinate to the Office of the President. The Federal Police, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force all have intelligence offices.
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Table 2 – Intelligence Laws of North, Central and South America (continued)

2. Countries with Laws Affecting Information and Intelligence Agencies Country Law Role of Civilian Intelligence 

Organization

Organizations

Panamá Law 15, 14 April 2010. It created the Ministry of Public Security (Law 9 of 2008 was repealed 

in 2010.)

None To be determined by Ministry of Public 

Security.

Paraguay Pending law (as of July 2014) 

will create a “national intelligence system.”

Unknown To be determined.

Venezuela Decree 6865, 11 August 2009; 

Decree 8792, 31 January 2012; and other pending decrees to bring clarification to original decree 6068 of 14 May 2008.

The purpose of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) is to plan, formulate, direct, control, and execute civilian intelligence and counterintelligence policies and activities. It actions will be based on principles of honesty, participation, promptness, efficacy, efficiency, transparency, social responsibility, leadership in respecting human rights, ethics, political pluralism, and complete submission to law (Decree 7453, Article 2).

SEBIN is subordinate to the People’s Ministry for Interior Relations and Justice. Intelligence branches of the Joint Bolivarian Armed Forces are subordinate to the People’s Ministry for Defense.

Source: Liza Zuniga, with contributions from the editors. * An Uruguayan newspaper report of 4 June 2013, “Actividad de Inteligencia estará regulada por ley,” available at http://www.republica.com.uy/estara-regulada-por-ley/, is the source for the law’s expected provisions as summarized here. 
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Watching the Watchers: Oversight of 

Intelligence Services in Democratic Regimes

Joanisval Brito Goncalves

“When oversight has been capable and constructive, it has been a major 

asset to the IC [Intelligence Community]. When degraded or misused, 

it has been an albatross around the neck of the intelligence agencies.”

—Marvin Ott

International Journal of Intelligence 

and CounterIntelligence (Winter 2003)

Introduction

In modern democracies, government intelligence confronts existing threats 

and identifies opportunities to protect states and their respective societies 

from future threats. To attain national objectives, high-level decisionmakers 

need assessments of the kind offered by intelligence services. 

Intelligence is not an agreeable activity for democratic states. According to 

Jose Manuel Ugarte, “it is not a commonly accepted activity, even if it is done 

on a daily basis and oriented outwardly; however, it does address the most 

important questions in foreign policy, economics and defense. Internally focused intelligence addresses threats capable of destroying the State and the 

democratic system.”127 A dilemma exists about the role of intelligence in 

democratic regimes: How can one reconcile the tension between the pressing 

need for secrecy in intelligence affairs and the equal need for transparency in 

government operations?

Democratic societies that experienced authoritarian periods in the recent past 

(such as Latin America and Eastern Europe) now need to ensure that security 

and intelligence organizations observe democratic principles on the domestic 

scene. Those principles dictate that intelligence services avoid arbitrary actions and renounce any attempt to abuse the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.128

How societies address the dilemma of transparency versus secrecy is an indicator of the degree of development of democracy in the society.129 In mature 
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democracies, the dilemma is by definition resolved through effective and efficient mechanisms of oversight and internal control, and especially, external 

control exercised by the legislative branch. 

This essay seeks to analyze the relationship between intelligence activity, as 

developed in democratic regimes, and the various mechanisms developed for 

its control. The essay will address basic aspects of oversight and control of 

intelligence practices and the practical mechanisms available in a democracy 

to carry out those goals. The experience of various countries in developing 

legal and institutional guidelines for effective oversight will be explored. First, 

elements of what some call “the spy game” require brief explanation. 

The Intelligence Tool

Although as ancient as human existence itself, the intelligence function remains largely terra incognita to outsiders. The lack of knowledge contributes 

to the permanent tension between secrecy and transparency. This matters 

when the resolution of national security issues depends in part on how the 

public perceives intelligence activity.130

For classroom purposes and sometimes for operational reasons, the subject 

matter of intelligence falls into three branches: intelligence (collecting 

and analyzing information to produce knowledge); counterintelligence 

(protecting one’s own knowledge and neutralizing hostile intelligence agents); 

and intelligence operations (secret and intrusive means to obtain protected 

information).131

Intelligence services deal with information, and information (knowledge) creates power. Therefore, a leader who wishes to manage official business smartly 

and powerfully will make good use of intelligence services.132 When this happens, whether in a democracy or an authoritarian regime, intelligence services 

themselves can become powerful. Intelligence services may at times apply 

their power in arbitrary fashion, even targeting the very state and society they 

are designed to protect. 

Issues Related to the Control of Intelligence133

One of the foundations of a democratic regime is the exercise of citizen control (direct or indirect) over institutions and agents of the state. The Brazilian 
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jurist Meirelles associates democratic regimes with the application of efficient 

and effective “public administration” mechanisms.134

According to Meirelles, public administration exercises control through vigilance, guidance, and “correction that one government branch, department or 

authority exercises with respect to the bureaucratic behavior of a counterpart 

in another branch of the same government.”135 The term “internal control” 

refers to that applied by departments within a branch of government (as exercised by the Corregidor-General of the union in the administrative system of 

Brazil, or the auditor general or inspector general in Anglo-Saxon countries). 

In the present study, “external control” is that carried out by organizations 

outside of the executive branch,136 namely the legislative or judicial branch. 

Additionally, the concept of external, popular control, refers to the right of 

an individual citizen or the collective citizenry to oversee the actions of the 

state.137

From the Anglo-Saxon perspective, “control” and “oversight” are distinct 

concepts. Whereas “control” refers to the daily acts of administrative management within the executive branch, “oversight” (fiscalização) is linked to the 

powers of the legislative branch to look into whether the executive (that is, 

the administration) has carried out its responsibilities in accordance with legal and constitutional principles.138 The term “control,” as used in the AngloSaxon world, would translate to supervisão (supervision) in Portuguese.

 “Accountability” has meaning for both control and oversight of intelligence. 

In the Portuguese-speaking world, this word pertains to the idea of “rendering accounts.” In the realm of Anglo-Saxon public service, “[a]ccountability 

is an information process whereby an agency is under a legal obligation to 

answer truly and completely the questions put it by an authority to which it 

is accountable (for example, a parliamentary intelligence oversight committee).”139 No exact translation or equivalent term in Portuguese encapsulates 

the Anglo-Saxon concept of accountability.140 This detail contributes to the 

manner in which Brazilian society has traditionally addressed the management of public affairs.141

Insofar as control involves setting legal limits by which an administration 

must abide, fiscalização refers to the legitimate power of certain institutions 

and authorities to certify the administration’s compliance with the judicial-
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normative framework, to include the principles that guide the administration 

itself.142 The principal source of power in a democracy—the citizenry—drives 

the concept of accountability. This is true no matter what accountability may 

mean to public officials who must render an account of their own actions or 

of the actions of the entire administration collectively.143

Another Anglo-Saxon term—“review”— refers to a type of control carried 

out ex post facto. This essay considers “control” a generic term, and “oversight” 

a type of control carried out through a particular administration’s tenure. A 

“review,” in contrast, always occurs in retrospect. In terms of external control 

of intelligence carried out by the legislative branch, oversight is more common 

among presidential systems, while recurring reviews predominate in parliamentary systems.

In countries with recent authoritarian governments, the adjustment of the 

state’s security services to a democratic regime depends on the development of 

efficient and effective mechanisms to control their activities. Control mechanisms not only reduce abuses by security services, but also modify organizational culture and the perception that civil society has of these institutions, 

their agents, and their activities. 

Control of intelligence activity starts with legal directives but extends to the 

implementing institutions. The legal framework for control ranges from constitutional provisions for individual rights and guarantees and general limitations 

on the actions of governments, to laws and executive orders. Implementation 

depends on the internal rules of government organizations, codes of ethics, 

instructions and directives applied by respective intelligence agencies. 

Each intelligence agency or office has its own means of internal control. Managers at the different hierarchical levels are responsible to ensure that intelligence personnel act in conformance with legal and constitutional norms, 

and in compliance with organizational directives.144 Even in the most senior 

executive branch offices, far from the environment of intelligence agencies, 

control is exercised by inspectors-general and by the minister to which the 

intelligence services are subordinated. 

Beyond the internal control exerted within the executive branch, external 

control can be exercised by the judicial or legislative branches, or by an 
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independent institution (in Brazil, for example, by the public prosecutor—

ministério público). External control guarantees some balance among the 

three government branches, especially in presidential systems, by virtue of 

checks and balances. Finally, institutions of civil society—the press, civic 

associations, and other organized groups— exert “citizen control.” Individual 

citizens also contribute to control. They can act by accusing intelligence 

services of irregularities or by appealing directly to the judicial system to seek 

redress for violations of citizens’ rights. 

Control of intelligence activities, then, can take place in any of four domains 

or levels : 

● Agency-level 1 (internal to a particular intelligence agency);

● Internal-level 2 (carried out within the executive branch by nonintelligence entities of the administration and by the state ministry 

to which the intelligence agency is subordinated); 

● External-level 3 (exerted by the judicial branch, the legislative branch, 

or an independent entity such as the public prosecutor in Brazil); 

● Popular-level 4 (the responsibility of individual citizens or civil society organizations). 

Difficulties in the Control of Intelligence

Glenn P. Hastedt identifies secrecy as an impediment to intelligence oversight 

and control.145 Intelligence practitioners cannot reveal their activities (and 

sometimes not even their organizational affiliation) to the public. To do so 

would make them vulnerable to counterparts from other countries, to their 

adversaries, and mainly to their own operational targets.146

Hastedt also maintains that intelligence resembles an artisanal craft more 

than a methodical science. Hence, intelligence professionals demand autonomy in making analytical decisions, in planning and conducting intelligence operations, and in interpreting data. They have little confidence in 

the knowledge or competence of their “controllers” (consumers), especially if 

the latter or their advisers have not routinely interacted with the intelligence 

community. 
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Employees of organizations that engage in control or oversight of intelligence 

need to have knowledge (and even better, practical experience) in the realm 

of intelligence. This experience makes it likely they will know how to identify 

irregular behavior among intelligence personnel and agencies. Those who are 

to hold intelligence services accountable should know what questions to ask.

Hastedt notes with concern the disinterest of politicians in intelligence. There 

is consensus among the authors who study this topic that “intelligence does 

not win votes,” but it can cause an election to be lost.147 Therefore, politicians 

prefer not to be involved in the business.148 This explains the reluctance of 

some legislators and even executive branch officials to become involved in intelligence affairs, which can lead to the absence of control or to its dilution.

Hastedt points to another problem in the control of intelligence: the fact that 

those involved have differing opinions about “the problem of intelligence.” 

Whereas some see control as necessary to prevent intelligence services from 

engaging in illegal activities, others accept the idea that intelligence officials 

do not see certain actions as illegal, in view of what is at stake—namely, national security.149

Another analyst argues that however difficult the environment for control of 

intelligence, there must be some control, although not to the degree that it 

presents an obstacle for intelligence activity, which after all is essential to the 

state.150 Intelligence remains a safeguard for national security, and ultimately, 

for state survival.151 Beyond this, although control of intelligence may be 

imperfect, one cannot speak of a consolidated democracy if its intelligence 

services are not subject to oversight and control by elected governments.152

In terms of external control, especially as carried out by the legislative branch, 

intelligence becomes legitimate only when oversight officials become capable 

evaluators of these secretive governmental information organizations. This 

observation points to one of the several paradoxes of intelligence control. 

Paradoxes of Control

Marina Caparini explores the variety of paradoxes inherent to the control of 

intelligence activity.153 Four aspects of the relationship between intelligence 

and its controllers give rise to this paradoxical framework, no matter the type 

of public administration under examination. 
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The first paradox stems from the dependence of the controller on information furnished by the intelligence entity. Those who intend to control intelligence activity have to know what to ask to carry out their responsibility. Yet 

outside observers have little opportunity to develop the necessary, detailed 

knowledge. Politicians thus depend on the information supplied by the same 

intelligence services they pledge to oversee.154 In the United States, this problem makes congressional oversight difficult, as Zegart shows in her recent 

work on external control of intelligence services.155

She identifies two institutional deficiencies among congressional oversight 

authorities: limited expertise in the area and uncertain power over intelligence agency budgets. It is as if the intelligence world were hidden by an 

invisible cloak, or, to quote Max Weber, “unelected agency officials invariably 

know more about their own organization and its policies than the elected 

representatives who oversee them.”156 She lists other deficiencies: the lack 

(or low number) of persons in Congress who have served in the Intelligence 

Community, even among the advisory staffs of the intelligence committees; 

and in general a lack of familiarity with this secretive activity. Finally, no 

independent groups exist in the Intelligence Community who could provide 

assistance to the legislators as they attempt to exercise control. The dependence of Congress on the information supplied by the intelligence services 

themselves is, then, absolute.

A second paradox appears when a controller becomes a significant advocate 

for, or a determined adversary of, the controlled. Either condition can have a 

great impact on the flow of information. An antagonistic relationship creates 

communications barriers and makes control more difficult. When controllers go too far in accommodating the controlled, oversight does not occur. 

This paradox may resolve itself with the maturation of democratic institutions, particularly if public servants become conscious of their role in oversight and apply democratic values to their work. However, ethical culture 

has to emerge to the point of changing institutional practices, never a simple 

process. Change comes slowly because intelligence oversight rarely interests 

legislators. Attention to intelligence oversight evokes negative emotion from 

voters as it diverts legislators’ attention from more palpable issues that directly affect the lives of the electorate. 
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Another issue arises from the dichotomy of “functional control” versus “institutional control.” Usually, oversight and control are accomplished as an 

institutional mandate; that is, the entities responsible for control oversee a 

range of institutions and not the activity itself. However, national security 

functions, including intelligence, are carried out in diverse agencies and departments of government. Institutional control risks leaving some agencies or 

departments without oversight. To resolve this problem, Whitaker suggests a 

reorientation from institutional to functional control. In this way, oversight 

would be accomplished in light of the activity of interest, irrespective of the 

organization that actually carries it out.157

Caparini’s final paradox grows from excessive secrecy, which can lead to uncontrolled release of sensitive information. The paradox rests on three points: 

1) secrecy promotes intelligence success, a public good; 2) restrictions on 

access to information inhibit public debate and social control initiatives; 3) 

intelligence services tend to “indiscriminately over-classify” or “overvalue” the 

knowledge produced, the sources used, and even the raw data collected, as 

they resist declassification of documents. All of these points reduce transparency and can lead to an “erosion of discipline” among intelligence officials.158

Excessive restrictions on intelligence disclosure commonly generate an increase in intelligence leaks. Justifications for leaking range from a real preoccupation with illegality and the violation of democratic principles to personal 

interests (motivated, by example, by the individual’s financial difficulties, discontent with an institution, or internal rivalries). Leaks are usually made to 

the press, as a guardian of transparency. 

Even in the United States, where congressional oversight has a long history, 

legislators have little access to documents and knowledge produced by or 

in the possession of the Intelligence Community.159 Zegart points out that 

the most important oversight organization, the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO), the equivalent of the Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas) 

of some Latin American countries, has been prohibited from undertaking 

audits of the Central Intelligence Agency and of other intelligence agencies 

on the grounds of protecting national security. This occurs despite the GAO’s 

having more than 1,000 employees with access to top secret documents, and 

more than 70 authorized to review information at the highest level of classification—sensitive compartmented information (SCI). Legislators themselves 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

65

have limited access to these documents and their staff members may not 

access documents or knowledge held by the Intelligence Community. Thus, 

external control in the United States remains severely limited. 

Oversight Principles Applied to Intelligence Activity

Each country of the region has its own distinct intelligence system and a 

mechanism for control and oversight suited to its culture and political traditions. Thus, Peter Gill asserts that it is not correct to suggest that states may 

simply choose to adopt a method of control existing elsewhere; political institutions cannot simply be transplanted from one system to another.160

Rather than simply copying an institutional model for oversight, a country should identify general principles and then implement particular procedures suited to its system of governance. According to Manuel Ugarte,161 a 

thoughtful control of intelligence rests on responses to the following questions: What is to be controlled? Why, and for what reasons, is it necessary to 

control intelligence activity? How and by what means can control be exerted, 

and with what objectives? 

Gill presents some general principles of control that apply to three of the four 

domains cited earlier: 1) agency, 2) internal (managerial) within the executive 

branch, and 3) external. 

The first general principle asserts that managerial control and external oversight 

apply to all domains, except where popular control is exerted by citizens. Thus, 

where external oversight of individual intelligence agencies occurs (typically 

in congress), managerial control also takes place (for example, when Congress 

pre-authorizes an intelligence operation or approves resources for it).

A second general principle declares that whoever produces intelligence cannot engage in oversight of the activity. This does not mean that those who 

engage in intelligence operations should not consider the legality of their 

operations with respect to individual rights and freedoms. Beyond any established legal boundaries, deeply rooted ethical principles remain indispensable 

to guiding the actions of intelligence institutions. However, Gill considers it 

“naive to believe that ministers or officials will be able to subject their own 

actions to effective oversight.”162
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

66

A third principle recognizes the obligation of those responsible for the oversight of intelligence services to establish clear behavioral standards and rules, 

and to make them available to the public without compromising security. 

These norms and standards (codes of conduct, directives, guidelines) become 

increasingly detailed as the focus of control moves to the internal environment of particular intelligence agencies. Judicial systems based on the Romano-Germanic legal tradition, in particular, require a normative framework. 

Brazil and other Latin American countries share this legal tradition.163 Without clear laws to guide and limit the actions of intelligence and security services, the risk of abuses is high in these systems. The risk of abuse elevates the 

importance of making these norms known to all citizens. 

A fourth principle is related to political control of intelligence. Here, each 

“passive” official answers to an “active” official who sits at a higher level, and 

in the case of intelligence oversight, this chain begins inside individual intelligence agencies. For example, an intelligence agency or service (level 1) is 

passive with respect to the external control that an active (level 2) executive 

branch organization exerts. These hierarchical relationships fit comfortably 

with parliamentary systems, where a clear sequence exists in the transfer of 

authority from Parliament to the executive branch (Cabinet), and from there 

to the administrative bureaucracy. These relationships do not apply so clearly 

to presidential governments. Also, a level 1 organization is subject to simultaneous control by entities not only from level 2, but also levels 3 and 4.

A fifth principle requires that each controlling entity report to the executive 

authority at its own level. As Gill explains, an oversight office external to 

an intelligence agency must report to the ministry responsible for control 

at that level. In South America, the authority of one branch of government 

to control another, and the responsibility of the administration in power to 

be accountable to the ultimate source of power over state activities—the citizenry—often remains unresolved. It is not surprising that the Portuguese 

language has no word equivalents for the concepts of “accountability” and 

“enforcement.”

The last principle identified by Gill highlights the need for broad cooperation between the organizations that control intelligence at different levels. 

This need becomes evident when there exists an intelligence community 

(a network164) that is controlled institutionally rather than functionally. 
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67

When controlling organizations cooperate and exchange information, they 

strengthen their oversight capability by acting as one. Without cooperation, 

oversight quickly fragments and becomes less effective. An effective control of 

intelligence networks depends on a networked approach to oversight, which 

is to say, the application of functional oversight.165

Gill’s final observation is that organizations exercising control and oversight 

should have access, at least potentially, to all the information produced by 

intelligence and security services. That information should include details of 

specific intelligence operations. Only in this way can the bureaucratically “active” entities definitively complete their obligations. This ideal arrangement 

would signal an acceptance of the essence of “accountability.”

Approaches to the Control of Intelligence Activity 

This section examines some of the intelligence oversight practices now in 

place across the region. They may contribute to developing a legal framework 

for intelligence here or elsewhere. The author has drawn on familiarity with 

political and intelligence systems in Canada, the United States, and Western 

Europe, as well as some knowledge of the new democracies of Eastern Europe. Some examples also come from Latin America, where the administrative control of intelligence continues to gain strength.166

Separation of the Intelligence Apparatus into Different

Organizations 

An important practical mechanism to enable control, according to Thomas 

Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski,167 is to divide the apparatus into different agencies, so as to prevent a single entity from having a monopoly on 

the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence. Typically, then, 

civilian and military organizations, police, and prosecutors, as well as distinct 

domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, share the responsibility of carrying out the function. Many countries, among them the United States, Israel, 

France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, and Russia, distinguish 

between external intelligence services and separate, internal security services.

Need for Institutional Clarity

The purpose of the intelligence agency or service needs to be clearly defined 

and limited to actions that can be explicitly detailed. All actions should relate 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

68

to serious threats to national security.168 The territory for which each organization bears responsibility should also be defined, and its sphere of action 

outside of the national territory or jurisdiction should be accompanied by 

corresponding safeguards.169 In countries with post-authoritarian regimes, 

legal and institutional guarantees deserve full public notification to prevent 

or stop inappropriate uses of the security or intelligence apparatus, to include 

the use of the intelligence apparatus against political opponents. 

Accountability of Intelligence Service Leaders

The choice of who should lead the intelligence services matters because that 

individual will bear the responsibility for ensuring that the organizations 

conform with democratic principles and expectations. The legislature should 

establish a process for approving the nominee, as well as for specifying the 

professional credentials of candidates for the office. The factors that would 

disqualify a candidate from obtaining the post or remaining in it should 

also be identified. More than one member of the cabinet (or administration) 

should participate in the choice of candidates for intelligence director. Opposing legislative or parliamentary voices should also participate in approving 

the nominee. All this (especially the criteria for nomination, designation, and 

removal of the director) should be specified by law to avoid undue pressure 

on the director once he or she attains the office, and to ensure that the leader 

not act in an inappropriate or abusive manner.

Rules for Intelligence Data Collection, Handling, and Eventual 

Release to the Public

Democratic control of a security and intelligence establishment involves the 

collection of data, the production and handling of intelligence, and the use 

and disposition of information archived by the intelligence services. Regulations that restrict the use of current information and of intelligence archives 

should extend to the collection and handling of information about the private 

and intimate life of individuals. Further, rules need to guide the retention of 

information, the use of and access to archived information, and its ultimate 

destruction. Rules also need to address adherence to any international principles covering the protection of information, and provide for periodic audits 

to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

69

Brazilian legislation covering access to intelligence information underwent 

significant changes in 2012. Law 12527, the Law on Access to Government 

Information (LAI), notably addresses public access to classified information.170 Produced under the Third National Plan for Human Rights, the 

LAI emerged in parallel with the Truth Commission established to verify 

instances of human rights violations committed between 1946 and 1988 

(bracketing the period of military rule, 1964–1985). The LAI adopted a 

strongly revanchist or vengeful approach. It gives little protection to state 

secrets because of a provision rescinding without review the “confidential” 

classification, making all of the information and documents created at this 

level available to the world through publication on the Internet. The LAI 

also establishes uncontestable, fixed periods for the release to the public of 

“reserved” documents (5 years), and “secret” documents (15 years). The law 

is more discriminating with respect to the release of “top secret” documents: 

they may remain classified for 25 years, with only one opportunity to contest 

their automatic release. If their release is successfully contested, they may 

remain classified for another 25 years.

Thus, any document produced or kept by the state can remain classified for, 

at most, 50 years. This means that all the data, intelligence, and any other official documents produced before 16 May 1962, should, after 16 May 2012, 

be released to anyone, with no specific justification or reason needed on the 

part of the requestor. Despite the popularity of this law in Brazil (even though 

the details of the law are not widely known or understood), a few critics do 

exist. The critics see the law as irresponsible in permitting unrestricted access 

to any and all information, including information that can compromise the 

interests of the state, putting it, or the society at large, at risk.171

Intelligence should not be excluded from the embrace of norms that protect 

and ensure the public’s right to information, except for aspects of secrecy that 

relate directly to national security. The judicial branch should be able to examine the conduct of intelligence organizations, to include their recourse to 

special powers. In the case of the Brazilian LAI, article 21 expressly establishes 

that “access to needed information cannot be denied to judicial or administrative guardians of fundamental rights” and that “intelligence or documents 

that reveal conduct suggesting misconduct by public officials themselves, or 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

70

by order of public authorities, involving the violation of rights, cannot be 

withheld from investigators.”

Certainly the implementation of laws governing access to information is not a 

simple matter. For example, in Mexico, the Federal Law on Transparency and 

Access to Public Governmental Information (published June 11, 2002)172

encountered a series of difficulties upon implementation. One difficulty was 

that it only regulated access to public, governmental information at the federal level, leaving the 31 states and the Federal District the task of producing 

similar regulations at the state and municipal levels.173

Special Handling Rules Needed for the Products of International 

Intelligence Exchanges

Intelligence is increasingly exchanged with foreign security services, as well 

as with international organizations. The receiving side promises to retain the 

information and use it while observing the same safeguarding regulations established by the national legislature of the country or international entity that 

provided it. In the Brazilian case, the Law on Access to Government Information, despite the fact that its article 36 establishes that “the treatment of secret 

information resulting from treaties, accords, or international agreements will 

abide by the norms and advice contained in those instruments,” does not 

spell out the handling requirements for classified documents produced as a 

result of the intelligence pursuant to any international agreements. This situation has led the International Relations and National Defense Commission 

(CRE) to suspend the negotiation of any agreements having repercussions on 

the security of sensitive information,174 and to recommend to the executive 

branch the renegotiation of all existing agreements of this kind.175 The Brazilian experience exposes the need for routine review of intelligence-handling 

practices to avoid international reproach. 

Establishing Rules for Executive Access to Intelligence 

To exert appropriate control over intelligence, executive branch officials need 

rules to guide their access to intelligence information. At the same time, it is 

also helpful for the leader of an intelligence organization to have access to the 

minister for whom he or she works. That minister, in turn, should be responsible for formulating security and intelligence policies. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) reports to the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

71

of the President of the Republic. Law 9883 of 1999 establishes, in its article 

9, that “any information or document produced about intelligence issues or 

activity, whether in draft form or fully in the custody of ABIN, may only be 

made available to those authorities who have a legal right to solicit the material, as established by the chief of the GSI.”176

Moving beyond Ad Hoc Congressional Notification of 

Intelligence Operations

The control of very intrusive intelligence activity appropriately requires preapproval by an executive branch authority, in accordance with any relevant 

laws. Also, the legislative branch warrants notification of sensitive intelligence 

operations already underway and it occurs mainly in presidential systems of 

government. A good example comes from the United States, where notification goes to the “Gang of Eight,” a group of representatives and senators who 

are credentialed for access to even the most intrusive and secretive operational 

activities carried out by intelligence organizations of that country.177

In the U.S. model, the president of the republic has the obligation to keep 

congressional intelligence committees completely and continually informed 

of all the most sensitive intelligence operations (covert actions), to include 

the decision to proceed with an action, and specifically before the action 

actually takes place.178 When the president considers a specific operation 

vital to the interests of the United States, he can limit the prior notification 

to the Gang of Eight and to any other leaders of Congress he or she chooses 

to inform.179 This occurred in the case of the exquisitely sensitive attack on 

the Osama Bin Laden compound in Pakistan.

Establishing Safeguards for Independent Mechanisms of 

Intelligence Control 

When control is exercised by an independent authority external to security 

or intelligence organizations, but part of the executive branch (such as an 

ombudsman or an inspector general), the official needs to meet legal and constitutional requirements for the position. Additionally, to ensure his or her effectiveness, the independent authority should not be subject to removal from 

the position during the designated time period, should have legal powers 

sufficient to oversee and manage issues in depth, and the acumen to evaluate 

arguments related to the practices and nature of intelligence organizations. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

72

The official should have authority to review the nature and application of any 

order, report, or decision that results from the process of oversight. The law 

should indicate the scope of this type of control, including to whom (or to 

what organization) the independent authority should report (for example, to 

the minister to which intelligence services are subordinated, to the controlling organization, or to the leader of the executive branch). 

These suggestions provide safeguards against potential ministerial abuses 

of intelligence oversight arrangements. The legislature should establish the 

rules, and provide guarantees against the politicization of intelligence services. Mechanisms for establishing viable safeguards include: 1) a legal determination that all the orders, directives, and requirements of the minister be 

written and made known to an external reviewing organization; and 2) a legal 

provision that the minister keep the leader of the opposing political faction(s) 

informed of his principal actions and orders with respect to the intelligence 

services. Clearly, these recommendations and others that might follow may 

appear Utopian, but if implemented, they could promote useful changes to 

the manner in which secret services are controlled.

Recognizing the Tension between Apolitical Intelligence and 

Tracking Internal Threats

Safeguards may also prevent a situation whereby the intelligence services operate in favor of the interests of one party or political group. They should not 

engage in collecting information about acts of protest or dissension, a normal part of the democratic process when carried out in accordance with the 

law. However, intelligence services should not refrain from tracking organizations that, although legally established, represent or could come to represent 

a threat to democratic institutions, to national security, and to the society, to 

include social movements or political groups that endorse subversion, promote institutional instability to obtain political objectives, or that try to take 

political power by force. Canada has developed a unique strategy to ensure 

public accountability for such groups who try to use legal protections to avoid 

intelligence surveillance.

Ensuring Openness of Legal Contests Involving Protection of 

Sensitive Information

The judge or tribunal assigned to receive complaints and to judge actions 

must meet legal prerequisites for holding that office. Once confirmed to 
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73

office, these individuals should not be removed from the position during the 

designated time period, and need full legal authority to issue mandates or any 

pertinent type of order to achieve the intended results of the oversight process. 

Even as secrecy may characterize some judicial processes, all parties to legal 

contests involving sensitive information will enjoy procedural transparency. 

In Brazil, criminal and civil legislation guarantees access to all proceedings 

in support of a sound defense strategy. The new LAI does the same for legal 

contests involving the protection of information.

Legislative Centrality in Developing and Applying Control and 

Oversight

Congress (or parliament) offers the choicest examples of external control from 

a public administration perspective, and this is especially true in the case of 

intelligence activity.180 In Brazil, congressional control of executive branch 

functions in general, and of the intelligence services in particular, are accomplished through three distinct instruments: required appearances before congress by ministers of the state,181 formal requests for information,182 and 

public hearings.183 Each of these three measures is constitutionally based, 

and each is commonly employed, although the first is generally used to exert 

individual control,184 whereas the latter two are oriented toward collective 

accountability. To control intelligence activity, from the time the law creating 

the Brazilian Intrelligence Agency was debated until the more recent crises 

involving intelligence institutions, such as the theft of laptop computers from 

Petrobras (Brazilian energy company) that may have contained sensitive information about Brazilian petroleum reserves, officials of the executive branch 

have been called to account in congress through public or private hearings, 

ministerial convocations, and formal requests for information.185

A congressional committee serves as an ideal vehicle to exert external control 

over an intelligence community as it reduces unnecessary confrontation with 

political interests. The committee can include representatives and senators 

or it can reside in just one of the two legislative chambers. Alternatively, two 

committees may be created, one in the lower chamber and one in the senate. 

In all cases, the committee needs a broad mandate, covering the entire set of 

intelligence organizations (including all departments and auxiliary activities 

and personnel). A broad mandate extends coverage to other, functional aspects 

of oversight: the legality, efficacy, and efficiency of intelligence, its budget and 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

74

accountability, and its compliance with national and international norms for 

the protection of human rights.

Legislation should mandate that congressional oversight bodies report only 

to Congress. This arrangement would help offset the influence of committee 

“subordinates” who act on behalf of the executive branch.186

Congressional oversight can focus on controlling the intelligence budget. 

Congressional organizations commonly have access to all intelligence budget 

documents, and they observe safeguards to deter leaks of classified information. Budgetary oversight of security and intelligence needs to obey principles 

of good government, with exceptions only as permitted or demanded by relevant laws. The most suitable approach to overseeing the intelligence budget 

joins the committee dedicated to intelligence oversight with the congressional 

budget committee. A strong legislature will exert full authority over budgetary matters, so that intelligence services may use resources only for specific, 

authorized purposes, and cannot transfer funds to a contingency account 

without legislative authorization.

All of the recommendations made here will certainly encounter resistance to 

implementation, with resistance coming from the organizations subject to 

oversight as much as from Congress itself. After all, congressional attention 

to oversight will insert representatives and senators into a politically delicate and disagreeable world with electoral repercussions. Rarely do legislative 

officials have an interest in intelligence activity, for various reasons.187 In 

political-juridical systems with a strong Romano-Germanic tradition, major 

transformations begin with legislation that assigns clear mandates to intelligence organizations, their overseers and managers. Difficult change requires 

serious political will. 

Pushing the Envelope: The Canadian Example of 

Independent Oversight

Canadian experience with intelligence control merits special attention for its 

pioneering approach. In 1984, this country created the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), a civilian service oriented toward internal security, 

but with an additional mandate to undertake foreign intelligence in defense 

of Canadian interests. The law creating CSIS (the CSIS Act) also brought 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

75

into being an independent organization, the Security Intelligence Review 

Committee (SIRC), to carry out external control and review (not oversight) 

of the service. The SIRC reports to the Canadian Parliament.

The CSIS law appeared at a point in Canadian history when citizens were 

questioning some responsibilities of their government, in particular the role 

of the state in safeguarding individual freedoms and rights. Only two years 

earlier, in 1982, a new constitutional law had created the Canadian Charter 

of Rights and Freedoms to protect civil liberties and individual rights. The 

CSIS Act brought changes to Canadian intelligence practices and to public perception of the intelligence services. The national intelligence culture 

changed as the public debated the mission of intelligence services and the 

prerogatives of the state in protecting the security of citizens. 

Simultaneously with the promulgation of the CSIS Act, parliament approved the Security Offenses Act, giving the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

(RCMP) jurisdiction over issues of national security related to law enforcement. At the same time as worries about terrorism were growing, there was 

also growth in the number of agencies or departments with national security 

and intelligence obligations. Government intelligence activities related to national security did not remain exclusively under the purview of the CSIS. 

The innovative CSIS Act made accountability, control, and review mechanisms explicit. The act dedicates all of its Part III—Sections 29 to 56 (of a 

total of 56 sections)—to the control of CSIS. The prerogatives and power of 

control reside in the executive branch of government as well as in parliament, 

where the SIRC operates. Part II of the CSIS Act (Sections 22 to 28) addresses judicial control of intelligence. Additional attention to accountability 

appears in other sections of the law as well. For example, the CSIS director 

must report to the minister of public safety, as well as to the SIRC, about any 

documents sent to the attorney general. The minister of public safety must 

also forward a copy of his directives to the CSIS director to the SIRC.188

Therefore, much of the law’s text (about two-thirds) attends to the different 

modalities of control of Canadian intelligence activity as conducted by the 

CSIS.189

The Security Intelligence Review Committee stands as the great innovation 

of the Canadian legislation. The SIRC mandate appears in Sections 38 and 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

76

39 of the CSIS Act. The SIRC conducts independent reviews of and regulates 

CSIS activities.190 It assures parliament and Canadian society at large that the 

national intelligence service remains in compliance with its mandate to guarantee the security of the state and to preserve individual rights and freedoms. 

To that end, the SIRC monitors and reviews the institutional objectives of the 

CSIS and investigates any claims or complaints against the service. 

The SIRC also ensures that CSIS observes the regulations and directives of 

the Ministry of Public Safety, and that the service not undertake its activities in an arbitrary, excessive, or unnecessary manner. At the same time, the 

SIRC prevents certain groups from using the protection of individual rights 

and freedoms as a shield to cover actions that threaten Canada or its allies.191

Finally, the SIRC can examine the reports of the CSIS inspector general to 

double-check the facts behind particular issues before presenting its own conclusions and recommendations about the activities of CSIS.192

The SIRC also investigates two kinds of complaints: those related to “any 

activities of the intelligence service,” and those indicating a decline in the 

trustworthiness of public servants, candidates for public office, or contract 

employees with the government.193 Accusations may also be addressed by 

ombudsman-like commissioners. Specific commissioners whose jurisdictions 

relate to security and intelligence are those for the Communications Security 

Establishment (CSE) and the RCMP.

Improving the accountability of national intelligence systems depends on the 

adoption of efficient and effective mechanisms for the oversight and control 

of intelligence activities. Naturally, not all of the suggestions presented here 

will fit a single model of government. 

Conclusion

Societies that have recently emerged from authoritarian periods often view 

intelligence with suspicion, fear, or even hatred. Intelligence services have 

often served as part of the repressive apparatus of a dictatorship. This relationship has distorted the subsequent perception of the intelligence role in the 

defense of state and society.

Structural problems in Latin America intensify the effect of paradoxes in 

the control of intelligence activity. These problems relate to an authoritarian 
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77

history in several countries, where the intelligence apparatus supported the 

governing authorities. In addition, the Romano-Germanic and positivist 

structure of judicial systems in much of Latin America dictate that changes can 

be made to intelligence control mechanisms only upon the implementation 

of new legislative frameworks. In this environment, two paths toward reform 

may be expected, neither of them very promising.

First, legislative inertia and insufficient societal interest in bringing pressure 

to bear on legislators mean that new laws in the area of intelligence cannot 

easily be advanced and approved. One consequence is that the issue of control 

remains without sufficient regulation, whereby existing laws permit only a 

low level of congressional control, and at the same time leave a great deal of 

discretionary power in the hands of the intelligence services.

A second scenario foresees that new laws, in practice, will have little effect. 

In this case, a superficial layer of legality limits enforcement of intelligence 

control measures by the judicial system. This has happened in Brazil, where, 

despite legal provisions for an external control organization in congress, the 

legislation has given insufficient support to the exercise of oversight. In addition, little political value comes from debating the control of intelligence 

services, resulting in correspondingly little involvement by legislators.

The fourth level of control over the secret services rests with the civil society, or 

the people. Popular control can involve organized groups of citizens (assembled, 

for example, in nongovernmental organizations, unions, or associations). On 

the other hand, a single individual may independently complain about the 

secret services. Popular control may come through freedom-of-information 

requests (facilitated by the Brazilian LAI, for example). The success of 

popular control measures directly reflects the level of democratic maturity in 

a country’s institutions. 

The exercise of oversight and control of the intelligence services does not 

occur automatically in a democracy. Even in the United States and Canada, 

where external control of intelligence services has become a decades-old tradition, questions remain about its effectiveness. Effective external control of 

intelligence requires sustained effort by legislators, a commitment they hesitate to make.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

78

Without exception, however, having the intelligence services under control, 

and especially under external control, remains democratically healthier than 

continuing without positive institutional arrangements for the guidance of 

this government activity.

Author’s Biography

Joanisval Brito Goncalves, a former intelligence officer with the Brazilian 

Intelligence Agency, now serves as a legislative consultant to the Federal Senate of Brazil, focusing on international relations and national defense. He 

also advises the Brazilian National Congress’s Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight (CCAI). He holds a Ph.D. in international relations from 

the University of Brasilia, and a specialist’s certification in national intelligence from the Brazilian National Intelligence School (ESINT). As a lawyer 

and university professor, he has more than a decade of professional experience in the study of intelligence. He teaches at the Minas Gerais Public 

Prosecutor’s Advanced School, the Army’s Military Intelligence School, the 

National Police Academy (of the Department of Federal Police), the Brazilian Legislative Institute, and the Federal District’s Advanced School of Law. 

His publications include Atividade de Inteligência e Legislação Correlata and 

Políticos e Espiões—o controle da atividade de inteligência, both published by 

Editora Impetus. The ideas and opinions expressed here are exclusively those 

of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the organizations 

with which he is associated. He may be contacted at: joanis@senado.gov.br or 

joanisval@gmail.com.
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

79

Status of Oversight over Intelligence Services

Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

This table refers only to legislative and judicial procedures in place to oversee 

or control the domestic actions of intelligence services. 

Table 3

Status of Oversight over Intelligence Services

Country Legislative Provisions Judicial Provisions

Countries with legislative and judicial oversight over all intelligence services

Argentina National Defense Law 23554 

(1988)194; Bicameral Intelligence Committee of Congress, Law 25520, title VIII, 

articles 31-41

National Intelligence Law 25520 

(2001), Article 5

Brazil Bicameral Committee on 

Intelligence (CCAI).

Judges must authorize any sort of 

telephone tap conducted by police 

forces.

The judiciary branch receives complaints against secret services.

Public prosecutor controls the police forces, but a debate remains over 

whether the public prosecutor has 

powers to control just the criminal 

investigation or if these powers can 

be extended to police intelligence.

United States Intelligence committees in 

both houses of Congress 

since 1976

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

(1978), with amendments

Countries with only judicial oversight over all intelligence services

Colombia Bicameral Intelligence 

Committee in Congress

None 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

80

Table 3

Status of Oversight over Intelligence Services (continued)

Country Legislative Provisions Judicial Provisions

Countries with only judicial oversight over all intelligence services

Costa Rica (only 

has national police; 

no military)

None Decree 23758 (1994), Chapter 3, 

Article 13, withdrawn in 2005.

Countries with oversight, but not over military intelligence services

Canada Security Intelligence Review 

Committee (1984–present) 

Independent; reports to 

Parliament

Canadian Security Intelligence 

Service Act (1984), Part 2

Chile Intelligence committee in 

the lower house of Congress

Law 19974 of 2004. Judges authorize special procedures for collection of information by intelligence 

services. 

Ecuador Special committee or 

Congress

Law on public and state security of 

2009. Judges authorize special procedures for collection of information 

by intelligence services.

Guatemala Special committee of 

Congress

Decree 71 (2005), Article 4

Honduras None Supreme Court will review accusations of invasion of privacy by the 

National Directorate of Research 

and Intelligence. 

Mexico Bicameral Intelligence Committee of CongressNational Security Law (2005), Title 

3, Chapter 2

Panama (no 

provisions for 

oversight at present; see details in 

next columns)

Special committee of 

Congress (until Law 8 

of 2008 was repealed in 

2010)

Law 8 of 2008, Title 5, Chapter 

2 (but now repealed)

Peru Bicameral Intelligence Committee of CongressArticle 20.2 of Law 28664 (2005)
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

81

Table 3

Status of Oversight over Intelligence Services (continued)

Country Legislative Provisions Judicial Provisions

Countries with no legislative or judicial oversight over intelligence services 

El Salvador None None

Nicaragua None None

Paraguay None None

Uruguay (law being 

debated in Uruguayan Congress 2013-

2014)

None None

Venezuela None None

Source: Compiled from various sources by the editors. 

These characterizations of the comparative status of oversight over intelligence services are not definitive, but only indicative of tendencies. Bureaucratic measures can from time to time be taken in any country to accomplish 

political-military objectives through intelligence capabilities. When a country 

hosts several intelligence agencies, and when emergency or war-like conditions prevail, the operations of one or another of the agencies may escape 

direct oversight. For example, although military intelligence remains nominally subject to oversight, intelligence-led operations against terrorist targets 

abroad, in which even U.S. citizens have been killed, raise the question of 

whether these actions ordered by the U.S. president as commander in chief 

should be subject to review or approval by legislative and judicial branches.195 If the same actions were carried out as a covert action by the Central 

Intelligence Agency, then congressional intelligence committees would have 

to be informed beforehand.196 As further evidence of how oversight provisions shift continually, amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act of 1978, in particular the Patriot Act (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004), have relaxed the provisions of the 1978 Act, eliminating the requirement that non-U.S. persons be acting on behalf of a foreign 

power in order to be targeted by U.S. intelligence collectors anywhere within 

the United States.197
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

82

Effective intelligence oversight depends on the operation of checks and balances among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches: executive oversight 

alone is no oversight. Civilian authority over joint military services provides a 

touchstone for oversight. Where the armed forces remain independent from 

each other, and not under joint civilian supervision, military primacy in intelligence decisions continues. The pervasive primacy of military intelligence 

means that only where an intelligence community or intelligence system includes civilian as well as military intelligence services, where system members 

are not legally free to make their own decisions with respect to intelligence 

targeting, and legislative oversight is in place, does there exist the possibility of effective oversight over military intelligence. A comparative study of 

military intelligence oversight in the Americas concludes that military intelligence primacy gives way to civilian oversight only when the armed forces 

experience a notable failure to accomplish their national mission.198
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Ethics and Intelligence: Review of European and North 

American Experience and Its Application in Latin America

Carlos Maldonado Prieto

Introduction

The feasibility of applying ethical principles to intelligence activity poses a 

question of great importance currently, as well as for the future of professional 

intelligence practice. Although some pessimists see only contradiction in pairing ethics and intelligence, scholars and intelligence community professionals 

around the world continually demonstrate the validity of a meaningful connection between the two.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States, and the related wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, have revealed an operational intelligence environment 

where ethical principles have seemed not to apply. The excesses committed by 

intelligence agents in the “Global War on Terrorism”—whether through the 

irregular detention of suspects without trial in Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib, 

through confinement in secret jails abroad, or the torture of suspects by political police in Arab countries allegedly under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency—have not only brought on political disapproval but have also 

raised serious moral questions. Somewhat surprisingly, the strong rejection of 

these practices by political leaders, academics, and intelligence practitioners 

themselves has translated into a reexamination of intelligence behavior.

At the same time, in Eastern Europe and Latin America, regions that have 

been able to overcome the authoritarian political regimes of the waning years 

of the Cold War, intelligence reform moves ahead. This reform includes 

drafting and implementing laws to regulate intelligence activity, developing 

professionalism among intelligence practitioners, introducing legislative and 

judicial mechanisms of control, and initiating accountability among the intelligence services.

Through an academic discussion of ethics in intelligence and the exploration 

of some national experiences in intelligence reform, this essay will address the 

feasibility of an ethical or “deontological” code of behavior in intelligence like 
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that in other professions such as medicine, law, or engineering. The essay will 

also comment on appropriate elements of a prospective ethical code.

Conceptual Definitions

Ethics by definition examines the value of conscious human actions freely 

engaged in; that is, those actions over which the individual exercises some 

degree of rational control. Ethics not only examines how or why acts are committed; it also seeks to assert a judgment as to whether the acts are good or 

bad. Ethics asks what actions appear morally correct, how a moral system can 

be rationally justified, and how it can then be applied to the various aspects 

of one’s social and personal life. In daily life, ethics represents a way to reflect 

on moral choices and to identify the reasons why a particular moral system 

may be preferable to its alternatives.199

Some observers claim that an ethical proposition reflects the norms espoused 

by a philosophy or a religion, whereas morality reflects how strongly individuals feel toward the social values of a group. In practice, however, the 

two concepts remain indistinguishable and equivalent. The nuance that does 

distinguish one concept from the other appears with practical application. 

That is, ethical judgments will remain theoretical, while morality arises from 

the practical application of those judgments. Additionally, morality is based 

on the values imposed by our conscience, which in turn are based on learned 

customs or rules. Therefore, morality is neither absolute nor universal, given 

that its expression depends on the customs in a given region, just as ethics 

cannot have absolute validity because of its hypothetical basis. 

Deontology, the study of morality, refers to the branch of ethics that addresses 

the foundations of “the ought,” or moral norms. Deontology exists to consider the set of moral obligations or duties felt by professionals in particular 

fields. Deontology is also known as the “theory of the ought.”

Professional deontology thus refers to the principles and rules that regulate 

or guide the conduct of practitioners. These norms determine the minimum 

behavioral requirements for professionals. Professional bodies generally establish norms for their own field, and codify norms as written rules. The 

bodies also control in some way the acceptance of new members into the 

professional ranks, often through a requirement to demonstrate adequate 
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accomplishment of tasks associated with the profession. Today, practically all 

professionals have developed their own codes of conduct, including physicians, lawyers, and journalists, among others. To promote and maintain compliance with these “deontological” codes, many professions depend on the 

existence of professional schools. The norms included in a code of conduct 

apply to all members of the profession in question. The norms are guidelines 

whose purpose is to ensure that a particular activity is carried out in a correct, 

efficient, and suitable manner.

Ethical or moral standards need to be especially solid for professions that 

operate on behalf of the state, because of the possible repercussions of injudicious viewpoints and actions. This holds true for the military and for law 

enforcement officials, including police, judges, prosecutors, and similar professionals. By extension, officials of an intelligence community also need to 

think and behave prudently, given that their profession originated principally 

from within military organizations. Beginning in the 19th century, ethical 

standards were introduced in the military profession to humanize warfare, 

to preserve the life of the wounded and of war prisoners, and to safeguard 

the physical safety of the noncombatant population. These ethical concepts 

gained wide applicability through the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 

1929, and 1949. Additionally, in 1948, the United Nations proclaimed the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which among other things declared 

the inviolability of civil and political rights for individuals and prohibited 

torture and degrading treatment. 

Intelligence Ethics and the “Global War on Terrorism”

The September 11, 2001 attack on the United States and the subsequent 

invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 have become associated with the apparent failure of the U.S. Intelligence Community to prevent the terrorist acts. 

Equally, the intelligence services’ large-scale violation of ethical principles in 

the name of President George W. Bush’s “Global War on Terrorism” have 

evoked criticism in many circles. Notably, several U.S. Intelligence Community practitioners and some academicians associated with it have voiced “insider” criticism, allowing us a deeper appreciation of these phenomena.200

It is not merely coincidental therefore that 2006 saw the formation of the 

International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA) in Washington, DC. This 
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organization has held conferences in the United States and United Kingdom, 

bringing together specialists from the Anglo-Saxon world, Israel, France, 

India, and other countries. Since 2010, the organization has published the 

International Journal of Intelligence Ethics.

201

Some studies of intelligence ethics confirm the view that U.S. intelligence 

professionals have long resisted the idea of subjecting themselves to ethical 

principles. This stance likely appears among intelligence personnel of all of 

the countries involved directly or indirectly in the Cold War. An illustrative 

example comes from Thomas Braden, an ex-CIA agent, who in 1967 published the suggestive article “I’m Glad the CIA Is ‘Immoral’.” In the view of 

Allison Shelton, his attitude likely arose from his participation in the contest 

with the Soviet Union, where any weakness among the participants would 

have meant defeat.202 A similar viewpoint comes from federal judge Richard 

Posner, who recently observed, “Intelligence is the second oldest profession, 

and the one with fewer morals.”203 According to this style of calculated thinking, which corresponds with the “realist” approach to international relations 

and “just-war theory,” intelligence serves the purpose of supporting national 

security, with every other consideration subordinated to that end. Shelton 

notes that, in contrast, the ethical thinking associated with the philosophy of 

Emmanuel Kant emphasizes moral absolutes.204

Shelton also identifies an unsettling paradox in intelligence ethics: Although 

“it is a fact that most (if not all) intelligence activity has a legal basis in the 

United States, those activities directly violate or ignore international law and 

the laws of other countries. My view is that U.S. intelligence activity becomes 

paradoxical when that country at the same time takes on the role of champion of democracy across the whole world.”205 

Two observers from the United States, Tony Pfaff and Jeffrey Tiel, spot a permanent tension between “ethical moderation” and “intelligence efficacy.”206

At what point may one override ethical principles, and is that decision affected 

by our being at war? An illustration of this dilemma comes from the issue of 

officially sanctioned assassination. In peacetime, assassination appears clearly 

wrong and immoral, whereas in wartime it seems acceptable. The same may 

be said about the use of deception (an agent using a false identity) or about 

lying. Both are morally reprehensible, but sometimes justifiable, depending 
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on operational needs. Other activities, such as inciting illegal actions, bribery, 

blackmail, and stealing, provide similar examples. The authors conclude that 

because the work of intelligence professionals is indispensable to the national security duties of the state, espionage is 

itself a derivative moral obligation. This means we should 

dispense with the idea that somehow the work of the intelligence professional is not compatible with the dictates 

of morality. But since the road to hell is paved with good 

intentions and lines do get crossed, it becomes imperative 

to establish moral boundaries, so intelligence professionals 

can execute their duties in clear conscience. This is not only 

good for the professional; it is good for the profession, and 

given the profession’s importance, for the nation as well.207

From a different point of view, a well-known Central Intelligence Agency 

analyst and Soviet Union expert with 24 years of experience,208 points out 

that presidents of the United States are guilty of having politicized the agency 

over the course of three decades. Since the administration of Jimmy Carter, 

no one has attempted to reform this organization. In this analyst’s opinion, 

four problems have contributed to the downward path of the Intelligence 

Community: 1) militarization of intelligence that has translated into dependence on the priorities of the Pentagon (Defense Department); 2) a lack of 

effective congressional oversight; 3) the illegal actions of the CIA’s National 

Clandestine Service, a unit created in 2005 and responsible for paramilitary 

special operations; and 4) the community’s and CIA’s mistake of not speaking 

(inconvenient) truths to the country’s political leaders.209

Despite the thrust of these suggestions for improvement, Presidents Franklin 

D. Roosevelt and George W. Bush did engage in efforts to learn and apply lessons from the intelligence failures at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Twin Towers of 2001, and Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan 

prohibited government employees (CIA agents) from engaging in political 

assassination abroad. 

President Ford based his decision prohibiting assassination on the findings of 

the U.S. Senate’s Church Committee. The committee investigated assassination attempts against Fidel Castro of Cuba, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, 
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Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and General Rene Schneider of Chile. These episodes occurred during 

the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. The Church Report 

condemned these abuses: “We consider that [political] assassination violates 

fundamental moral precepts of our way of life.... We reject absolutely any 

notion that the United States should justify its actions by the standards of 

totalitarians.”210

President Ford signed an executive order that prohibited assassinations. Jimmy Carter did the same in 1978 and Ronald Reagan followed suit with his 

Executive Order 12333 in 1981, which continues in effect. However, none 

of the executive orders defines assassination. One can infer that the first executive order in this chain was influenced by the Church Committee Report, which expressly condemned assassination or attempted assassination of 

foreign political leaders hostile to the United States. Even so, we cannot be 

certain of the meaning of assassination in the executive orders because none 

of the three presidents offered public comments explaining their orders.211

Politicization of intelligence offers additional examples of ethical dilemmas. 

Politicization refers to an anomalous relationship between a political leader 

and intelligence personnel that, in an ideal world, should be professional and 

apolitical. Discussion of this phenomenon has centered on the political manipulation used to justify and begin the second Gulf War. The supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction by the regime of Saddam Hussein led 

to the war.

From an insider’s perspective, Goodman accused the CIA of allowing politiciziation. He claimed that its most experienced office chiefs and analysts violated all the rules of the analysis process in helping the Bush administration 

build its case for the invasion of Iraq. “There are filters in the directorates of 

intelligence and operations to prevent the introduction of fabrications into 

finished intelligence products, but managers and analysts ran through a series 

of red lights.”212 This meant that President Bush used erroneous reports of 

Iraqi purchases of uranium (yellowcake) in Niger to justify his assessment 

presented in the State of the Union address in 2003. The same type of error occurred with the supposed connection between the Iraqi regime and 

al-Qaida and the legend about the existence of weapons of mass destruction 

in Iraq, using the fantasies spread by the Iraqi National Congress.
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Widespread Absence of an Ethical Code for

Intelligence Practitioners

The politicization of intelligence is not an exclusively U.S. phenomenon. The 

German observer Erich Schmidt-Eenboom has revealed transgressions carried out by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Germany (BND), illustrating 

that other mature democracies are not free of illicit practices that compromise 

professional ethics. He considers that 

the need for the State to put a brake on the autonomy of intelligence agencies is based on a false impression heightened 

by the sensationalist press, which suggests that intelligence 

services often act behind the back of the government, pursuing their own ends. In fact, this occurs only in exceptional 

cases.213

He maintains that “supervision of subordinates by intelligence leaders is intentionally laissez-faire by those in the Chancellor’s office. In this way, they 

try to interfere as little as possible in the efficiency of the intelligence services, 

and tend to look the other way when the services overstep their legal limits.”

The same author exhaustively explores infractions, errors, abuses, and illegalities committed by German intelligence. Among the most serious vices 

discussed:

a. In the case of intervention in the conflict in what was Yugoslavia: 

The BND tried to supply weapons to Croatian forces in 1994, 

mocking the United Nations arms embargo, and also cooperated 

with the Kosovar terrorist group UCK;

b. Spying on and infiltrating legal political parties: After 2006, the 

Internal Intelligence Service (BfV) increased the breadth of surveillance of political parties, using intrusive methods. Targets included members of Parliament of the ultra-right (NPD) and the 

leader of a leftist party, Oskar Lafontaine. This activity occurred in 

the 1990s when the Green Party was watched and even infiltrated. 

Schmidt-Eenboom asserts that this activity was initiated on behalf 

of traditional political parties to maintain the existing party system;
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c. Observation of journalists and scientists: The nuclear physicist

Klaus Traube was illegally targeted for surveillance by the BfV in 

1975; the BND intercepted telephone calls of the writer Günther 

Wallraff in 1976; the BND has continued to target journalists;

d.Cooperation with regimes that have violated human rights: In 

the fight against terrorism, the BND has not hesitated to cooperate with countries—mainly Arabic—that systematically employ 

torture;214 and

e. Cooperation with Nazi war criminals: Intelligence archives have 

revealed that Klaus Barbie, the “Butcher of Lyon,” in 1966 

cooperated with the BND from his refuge in Bolivia. This war 

criminal wrote 35 reports on political topics—including possibly 

German arms sales to South American countries—that were paid 

for by the BND. Further, the BND knew the location of another

Nazi criminal, Adolf Eichmann, eight years before Israeli agents 

kidnapped him in Argentina in 1960.215

Emergence of Codes for Ethical Intelligence Practice

The development and acceptance of a code of ethics for intelligence may 

depend on whether practitioners in an intelligence community consider their 

business a professional occupation. If they do consider this line of work a 

profession, then the fact that almost every profession has a code of ethics that 

imposes certain behavioral limits on professional practice becomes germane 

to intelligence professionals. Still, some authors believe that intelligence does 

not need a code of ethics; others believe that it does.

One author who denies the need for an explicit code is Stefan Brem, who 

works in the Federal Office for Civil Protection in Switzerland, and whose 

views represent the European model of multiple, external controls on intelligence activity. Brem considers it sufficient to have clear rules and regulations, quality external control, professional accountability, and institutional 

transparency. He cites five key recommendations contained in the “ten commandants” adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 

in July 2002. Compliance with these five recommendations would mean that 

no intelligence service could be accused of engaging in behavioral excesses or 

violations of a professional ethic. The five are:
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a) Prohibition on arbitrariness: respect for human rights, avoiding 

all forms of discrimination or racist treatment, and appropriate 

supervision of processes;

b)Legality of antiterrorist steps: all the measures need to be legal, 

and when they impinge on human rights, the measures must be

defined precisely and their severity must be in proportion to the 

desired ends;

c) Absolute prohibition of torture: torture and all degrading treatment must be avoided, particularly during the arrest phase;

d)Provisions for the collection and processing of personal information: these procedures need to be covered by internal laws, their 

depth and breadth must be proportional to the desired ends, and 

they must be overseen by an independent authority; and finally 

e) Measures that interfere with the privacy of persons—such as 

forced entry for searches, telephone intercepts, the use of undercover 

agents, and others—need to be addressed by law, with potential 

review by a judge, and the use of force needs to be proportional to 

the ends sought.216

Still in Germany, Schmidt-Eenboom argues that a code of ethics would reinforce political controls of the intelligence function, thereby reducing or 

preventing violations of professional ethics. He has suggested the creation of 

an inspector general for the intelligence services, an office that would act as 

an institutionalized investigative body in the Office of the Federal Chancellor. The very existence of this institution would have a beneficial effect on 

the daily activity of the intelligence services by reducing arbitrary, internal 

punitive measures. A good illustrative example already exists: A parliamentary 

representative of the Defense Ministry is fully empowered to ensure that the 

human rights of soldiers are not violated.217

The majority of authors consulted, not only from the United States and Germany but from numerous other countries, appear inclined to establish some 

form of professional ethics code for intelligence agencies. Brian Snow offers 

an example of a ethics code for intelligence. Snow worked for 34 years as an 
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analyst for the National Security Agency of the United States. According to 

Snow, the code should contain at least 11 behavioral standards:

a) First, do no harm to U.S. citizens or their rights under the

Constitution;

b)Uphold the constitution and the rule of law; we are constrained 

by both the spirit and the letter of the laws of the United States;

c) Expediency must never be an excuse for misconduct; 

d)We are accountable for our decisions and actions and support

accountability processes to ensure our adherence to these 

principles;

e) Statements we make to our clients, colleagues, overseers, and the 

U.S. public will be true, and structured not to mislead or 

unnecessarily conceal in any way;

f) We will seek to resolve difficult ethical choices [in a way favorable 

to] constitutional requirements, the truth, and our fellow 

citizens;

g)We will address the potential consequences of our actions in 

advance, especially the consequences of failure, discovery, and

unintended consequences of success; 

h) We will not make decisions that impose unnecessary risk on

innocent parties;

i) If an action might result in harm to our citizens, we will seek

authorization from a national authority external to the agency that 

is in the chain of command;

j) Although we may work in secrecy, we will behave so that when our 

efforts become known, our fellow citizens will not be ashamed of

us and of our efforts;

k) We will comply with all public and international human rights 

agreements that our nation has ratified.218
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In 2010 Spain’s National Intelligence Center (CNI) prepared an ethics code 

for its practitioners.219 A few months later, the country introduced judicial 

preview, whereby any act of internal surveillance or internal communications interception required approval by a competent judge. The provision for 

external control brings Spain’s approach into alignment with that of many 

Western intelligence services.220 The Spanish ethics code includes a principle 

forbidding active participation in partisan politics by CNI employees, and 

imposes severe sanctions against leaking information. The code of ethics appears to have been ready for activation for several years. The delay reflects the 

considerable resistance among practitioners to its imposition. Spanish intelligence officials expected that the guidelines could reduce the effectiveness of 

their service.221

Some observers believe that an intelligence community should have a professional ethos, a more inclusive and profound concept than a list of items in 

a code of ethics, and a phenomenon that cannot be imposed from outside. 

According to Albert Pierce, a professor at the National Defense University 

in Washington, DC, an ethos is concerned more with “who you are” than 

with “what you do.” A professional code of ethics may derive from and be 

developed from an ethos, but it deals only with what one does. An ethos is 

organic, in the sense that it needs to develop through a bottom-up, then a 

top-down bureaucratic process within an intelligence organization. In summary, an ethos needs to grow through introspection within an organization, 

taking into account its professional functions, its role in national security, and 

its nature as both a service to the public and to the state.222

Ethical Intelligence Reform in Eastern Europe

and Latin America

Intelligence reform has remained a key issue in the democratization of formerly socialist countries, and the redemocratization of Latin America. The 

debate about professional ethics and political-institutional control of intelligence in the United States and Western Europe has contributed to the reform 

impulse in the new democracies and provided models to emulate or modify. 

Intelligence reforms established in Eastern Europe and Latin America derive 

from intelligence ethics discussion cited earlier in this essay.
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An Ethical Transformation: Intelligence as Public Service 

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reorientation of Eastern 

European countries, the repressive social control instruments of these oneparty states were dismantled. In the case of the intelligence services, these 

countries had to confront the classical challenge of “democratizing intelligence”223 by finding a suitable balance between efficiency and transparency 

and profoundly transforming a function that for decades epitomized antidemocratic practices. Among the transformations: a) a doctrinal change, 

which recognized that intelligence had now abandoned its primary role in 

defending the socialist state, and had become a public service susceptible to 

public scrutiny and external control; b) a behavioral change, involving the establishment of a legal framework respecting laws and avoiding insertion into 

or interference in political processes; and c) an institutional change, whereby 

the intelligence community organized itself in a fashion commensurate with 

the size of the country and its specific needs, with specialized personnel and 

managers, and operating with confidence and political independence.224

Across Eastern Europe, old intelligence agencies disbanded or underwent reform, laws identified specific agency functions, and government committees 

introduced executive and judicial controls. In Poland, for example, the Committee for Special Services began to oversee the new agencies from its base 

in the Committee of Ministers. In 1991, the Czech Republic, following the 

British model, established the Council for the Coordination of Intelligence 

Services. Hungary, in addition to instituting executive, parliamentary, and judicial controls, installed a public defender and a Commission for the Protection of [private] Information. Slovakia’s new Information Service, in existence 

since 1993, only engages in analysis—and it may not detain individuals.225

Public Service Ethos Easily Subverted

Reform of intelligence services typically does not proceed smoothly. Serious 

problems such as nepotism, corruption, clientelism, and blackmail continued 

to afflict Eastern European countries even as these countries began to join 

the European Community.226 Most of these countries have joined NATO, 

become part of the European Union, and identify with the Eurozone and the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Additionally, 

the more developed Eastern countries—Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hun-
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gary, Poland, and the Czech Republic—enjoy membership in the exclusive 

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 

In Latin America, intelligence services similarly continue to suffer from serious ethical problems and political interference.

There is evident tension between the function of intelligence 

and democratic life in these countries. The intelligence services cultivate secrecy, often do not respect citizens’ rights, 

and violate their privacy. These tendencies conspire against 

the legitimacy that this essential government function 

should have.227

Furthermore, today’s political or partisan approach to intelligence merely repeats history. Political clientelism converts intelligence agencies, along with 

other organs of the state, into booty or plunder for certain factions of political parties or governing coalitions. In extreme cases, the intelligence services, 

with their history of providing useful political tools (clandestine intercepts, 

selective espionage, paid informant), become political police in the service of 

a particular government and against the political opposition.228

Creation of New Intelligence Agencies to Institutionalize 

Behavioral Reforms

The process of intelligence reform has produced advances and reversals in step 

with the political realities of each country. Some early advances occurred in 

the Southern Cone and Brazil once the military dictatorships disappeared. In 

their wake new intelligence agencies emerged in Brazil (Brazilian Intelligence 

Agency, 1999) and in Chile (Directorate of Public Security and Information 

and National Intelligence Agency, 1993 and 2004, respectively). In Argentina, 

reform led to the reinvention of an existing agency. Other episodes of reform 

have appeared more recently, accompanying the demise of an authoritarian 

government in Peru in 2001; a security crisis in Ecuador in 2008; corruption 

scandals and illegal intelligence activity in Colombia beginning in 2005; and 

a seismic political shift, in the case of Mexico after 2000.

The Colombian case involving the Administrative Department of Security 

(DAS) stands out as the most dramatic example of intelligence reform. 

Reform came after a prolonged process of institutional deterioration. DAS 
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directors, managers, and workers were accused of assassinations, inappropriate 

arrangements with paramilitary and guerrilla groups, and wiretaps—the 

famous “chuzadas”—of judges, politicians, and journalists, among several 

other crimes. A special commission for reform established in 2005 produced 

no viable change. The DAS, in place since 1953, was then dissolved and 

replaced by a new organization in 2011. The new agency became known as 

the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI). According to the director of 

MI6, the British foreign intelligence service, the new Colombian agency will 

receive specialized support from British intelligence services.229

As Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos tersely noted, “[I]t is sad but 

true: change in intelligence services arises from crises. And we need to know 

how to take advantage of crises.” The new entity will not involve just a change 

in name because “this agency will be something completely new, something 

that has never before existed in this country: a civilian agency dedicated exclusively to intelligence work.” He added that the DNI “will not have the 

authorities of the judicial police,” branding as insane the idea that intelligence 

would engage in detention of individuals, a practice evoking the dark days 

of the Southern Cone dictatorships. He added that “this agency will work 

silently for the common good,” and pointed out that “we are looking for professionalization through a new professional career in intelligence.”230

The Colombian Congress in 2011 also approved a new intelligence and counterintelligence law that expressly guarantees respect for human rights. Its article 4 notes that 

the function of intelligence and counterintelligence will 

be restricted to a strict interpretation of the Constitution, 

Colombian laws, International Humanitarian Rights and 

International Human Rights law. In particular, the function of intelligence will be limited by the principle of the 

rule of law, which guarantees the protection of the right to 

one’s honor, one’s good name, personal and family intimacy, 

and to due process. No intelligence or counterintelligence 

information may be obtained for reasons other than: a) to 

ensure the attainment of the essential purposes of the State, 

the viability of democracy, territorial integrity, sovereignty, 
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security and defense of the Nation; b) to protect the democratic institutions of the Republic, as well as the rights of 

persons resident in Colombia and of Colombian citizens at 

any time and place—especially the right to life and personal 

integrity—in the face of threats such as terrorism, organized 

crime, narcotrafficking, kidnapping, arms trafficking, munitions, explosives or similar material, money laundering, and 

other similar threats.231

Similarly, article 37 declares that the long-standing principle of “due obedience”232 will not be accepted 

in those cases where the public servant possesses information 

related to the commission of genocide, extrajudicial killings, 

torture, forced relocation, forced disappearance, large-scale 

sexual violations, crimes against humanity, or war crimes 

committed by a public servant. Public servants in intelligence agencies can report criminal activities of which they 

have knowledge either directly or through a representative 

of the intelligence agency, in such a way that their security 

and integrity is respected, along with the [usual] protection 

of sources, means, and methods.233

Ecuador provides a second case worthy of analysis. Although in this country there did not exist the massive political repression that characterized the 

Southern Cone and Brazil, excesses nevertheless did occur in the 1980s. A 

Truth Commission investigated the violations of human rights committed 

from 1984 to 2008 by members of the armed forces, national police, and 

other agencies of the state related to the area of national defense and internal 

security, including intelligence agencies. The commission verified a total of 

456 victims, the majority of them aggrieved between 1984 and 1988, the 

period coinciding with the presidency of Leon Febres Cordero and with the 

period of maximum activity by the guerrilla group Alfaro Vive Carajo!

234

As a result of the 2008 Colombian attack against the FARC camp situated in 

Ecuadorian territory, an official commission was set up to explore the facts 

behind the episode. Among its findings:
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The lack of prompt action by the Ecuadorian intelligence 

agencies to notify the country’s political leaders, the serious 

nature of the events on national territory, and the evidently 

keen knowledge of the events by Colombian intelligence, 

brought the highest levels of the Ecuadorian government to 

decide that there existed an intentional withholding of information orchestrated by foreign intelligence agencies.235

As a consequence of this crisis the government dissolved the National Intelligence Directorate and replaced it with the National Intelligence Secretariat 

(SENAIN) in 2009. However, its slow and weak institutional development warranted criticism—it did not detect beforehand the police rebellion that shook 

the country in September 2010—and it has had a high turnover of directors, 

who have alternately been civilians, then military retirees, and vice-versa.236

International Promotion of a Professional Intelligence Ethos 

In the peculiar case of Chile, with democracy in full bloom in 1993, the navy 

confiscated all copies of a book written by Humberto Palamara, a retired navy 

officer, and put him on trial. This exemplified the difficulties encountered in 

the transition to democracy. The author in question sought the protection 

of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.237 That court in 2006 ruled 

that Chile had violated Palamara’s rights by having applied prior restraint, 

having violated the guarantee of due process upon illegitimately subjecting 

Palamara to military jurisdiction, and having violated the right to private 

property by denying him the use and enjoyment of his intellectual creation. 

Beyond paying compensation and allowing the publication of the confiscated 

book, Chile had to bring its military justice up to international standards. 

Military justice now must limit itself to those crimes committed by military 

personnel on active duty, and ensure that no civilian be subjected to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. 

In his book, finally published in 2006—in compliance with the court’s ruling—Palamara severely criticizes the military’s violations of human rights, 

including the use of military intelligence services in antisubversive warfare, 

and asserts the need for certain ethical boundaries:

It seems to me that so long as [military] intelligence lacks a 

code of ethical conduct to guide the actions of individuals 
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who work in this field, it will remain vulnerable to satisfying 

the special interests of corrupt leaders, and it will thus be 

held back from achieving the prestige of becoming a profession. Until this situation changes, intelligence should be 

considered simply an activity or an occupation that brings 

together specialists in the different roles needed to carry out 

intelligence.238

Far more than one individual among the many practitioners of intelligence 

need to adopt an admirable ethical stance. An enduring expression of moral 

and ethical responsibilities depends on the power of collective opinion expressed in a multilateral or international convention. In this precedent-setting 

case, Chile has shown a commitment to accepting the decision of a multilateral legal body in the Palamara case, which may signal a further evolution of 

intelligence ethics. 

Conclusion

This brief review of crimes or excesses committed by some intelligence services 

suggests three categories that account for the diversity of these phenomena:

a)Individual: This category includes robbery, espionage, sale of 

sensitive material, and extortion for cash. Such individual acts 

may respond to disciplinary steps taken by security offices, such as 

internal affairs offices, or by the judicial system;

b)Institutional: These include acts committed by the intelligence 

services as a product of excessive jealousy, autonomy, and 

corporatism, generally in an effort to gain greater recognition, to

gain the upper hand in bureaucratic competition with other 

agencies, or even as a result of opposition to the approach being 

taken by the political authority. These, by definition, take place 

without the consent of the political authority, although it often 

remains difficult to determine whether that authority has 

knowledge of the institutional excesses; and

c) Political: These amount to a type of institutional excess, 

distinguished by being ordered by politicial authorities. They may

include fabrication of evidence and generally involve the
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persecution of opposing politicians, journalists, judges, or other 

politically irritating individuals or organizations.

Combatting the crimes or excesses in the last two categories requires methods 

distinct from those used against individual acts. The three types of crimes or 

infractions described here occur commonly around the world. In effect, no 

country is free of these afflictions. Differences do exist from place to place in 

the level of impunity allowed, however. 

Even with the full implementation of ethical precepts and their acceptance by 

intelligence personnel, there will likely always remain areas of behavior not 

subject to control. When a political authority orders or consents to excesses, 

for example, control becomes less feasible. The possibility for control seems 

remote in cases of political persecution or spying on bothersome individuals 

or organizations within the country, whether opposing politicians, journalists, judges, or environmental leaders. These excesses call for the invention of 

mechanisms to avoid their occurrence. 

This essay asked whether ethical violations and behavioral excesses require a 

professional code of ethics for intelligence organizations, or whether a powerful system of external control might suffice. An optimal solution would 

employ both approaches. Intelligence services could develop or adopt professional ethical standards like those described in this essay, and they could apply 

recommendations for acceptable behavior that come from external, international organizations such as the Council of Europe or the Organization of 

American States (OAS). 

Additionally, a professional ethos would add a highly personal element for an 

intelligence service to define “who we are.” An ethos should emerge organically from within intelligence organizations, thereby demonstrating its centrality to professional practice. Once incorporated into intelligence practice, 

an introspective ethos may reinforce professional development by ensuring 

fair, merit-based selection of personnel; establishing a career path from entry 

until retirement; maintaining career incentives and support of continuous 

professional improvement; and establishing precise and rigorous rules for performing the various jobs available during all stages of an individual’s career.
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There exists no universal code of ethics for intelligence, nor anything even 

approaching such a universal code. The Spanish example discussed earlier 

demonstrates one of the main reasons why this is the case: The imposition 

of an ethics code awakens natural resistance from within the intelligence services. However, a code offers clear benefits to intelligence services through its 

ability to improve the image of intelligence in public opinion. The challenge 

of creating a code of ethics for intelligence requires patience, common sense, 

and persuasive argument. 

Legislators and politicians can intervene to promote the development of a 

code of ethics. Legislators have thus far generally avoided involvement in 

intelligence matters, but in this instance, they could couch their involvement 

in terms of the protection of human rights and personal privacy. Legislation 

oriented toward the control of the intelligence services should include penalties to deter those who might commit crimes and excesses by disregarding 

widely acknowledged professional ethical standards. 

Politicians also bear some responsibility to influence ethical behavior among 

the state’s intelligence personnel. Every intelligence service, whether operating inside a country or abroad, should be able to count on the example and 

guidance of the leader of the executive branch. A political leader should protect the intelligence services, giving them clear and limited missions to promote efficiency. At the same time, the leader needs to prevent unacceptable 

behavior by identifying clear guidelines that cannot be ignored or crossed. 

With this guidance, the intelligence services will not have to face the difficult 

task of deciding for themselves how far they can go to fulfill their mission 

on behalf of political leaders. If the political leader manipulates the work of 

intelligence agencies for his or her own ends, which can be at odds with the 

well-being of the state and of the society, then the remedy for this tendency 

lies with the electorate.

Politicians also bear the responsibility of appointing capable leaders of the 

intelligence services and identifying their expectations of the appointee. 

It is not enough that intelligence chiefs demonstrate expertise in security, 

diplomacy, terrorism, and similar topics; they must also have impeccable 

moral standards and unreproachable character. Their leadership of intelligence 
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organizations will establish de facto standards for the professional activity of 

their subordinates.

Where a truly empowered civil society stands guard against threats to citizen 

rights, the independent press and other organizations have an obligation to 

scrutinize politicians and intelligence services. Intelligence-related crises that 

have ended in reforms or new legislation have usually come to public attention through accusations by journalists and other social activists.

The intelligence services themselves can improve their image by complying 

with one of the greatest concerns of contemporary society—that intelligence 

personnel act responsibly and periodically engage in transparency. The English-speaking world knows this as “accountability.” A variety of options exists 

to demonstrate accountability, from delivering an annual report on activities 

and budgetary details to congress, to broadcasting intelligence intentions (its 

ethos) to the public through web pages or other means of dissemination. 

Ethics contributes to the daily work of intelligence agencies around the world. 

Every aspect of intelligence, whether analysis or operations, benefits from observing solid ethical principles. In some agencies, intelligence ethics codes will 

appear; in others, ethical guidelines will suffice. Either approach will lead this 

government function, whose work always raises questions, along the path to 

respectability and legitimacy.

Author’s Biography

Chilean Carlos Maldonado Prieto holds a degree in history from MartinLuther-Universität, Halle, Germany. He also earned a master’s in defense 

policy from the Chilean Army War College. In the United States, he has 

served as an academic fellow at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 

and Cooperation (WHINSEC) and has participated in courses and seminars 

organized by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). Maldonado’s publications include El Prusianismo en las Fuerzas Armadas Chilenas: 

Un estudio histórico, 1885–1945 (Santiago: Documentas, 1988) and La Milicia Republicana: Historia de un Ejército Civil en Chile, 1932–1936 (Santiago: 

Servicio Universitario Mundial, 1988). He has also published articles on intelligence, the history of the armed forces, military service, and police issues 

in German, Canadian, Chilean, U.S., Japanese, Peruvian, and Swiss journals. 

Email: cmaldona99@gmail.com.
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Human Rights and Intelligence Ethics:

Case Studies from Cinema 

Moira Nakousi Salas

and 

Daniel Soto Muñoz

Intelligence and the Rule of Law

The rule of law in Latin America dates to the region’s 19th-century national 

independence movements. The new republics adopted a liberal European 

philosophy with limits to the exercise of government power. Although the 

anthropomorphic state retained the undisputed sovereign right to make decisions and issue mandates within national territory,239 it accepted limits to its 

own actions. The main limit to its power came from honoring the concept of 

individual human rights.240

The executive branch remained responsible for public well-being and for carrying out functions basic to the survival of the collective society. The state’s 

former focus on legitimizing the use of force against citizens gave way to 

greater governmental concern for citizens. The use of force has, since independence, been the last resort of governments to ensure citizen compliance 

with laws. Government now uses force to guarantee public security in the face 

of internal and external threats.241

From the beginnings of the modern state, the main concern of governments 

has been the exercise of sovereignty, and in particular, maintaining a balance 

between security and freedom. For most of the 20th century, the concept 

of security exclusively meant state security. Systematic violations of human 

rights were justified as unfortunate but unavoidable to ensure the security 

of the state. By the end of the 1990s, concepts of “human security” and 

“multidimensional security” emerged, changing the security focus to 

individuals.242

The film Unthinkable or El día del juicio final, the central focus of this study, 

offers a raw portrait of issues in public security policy. In a democracy, the 

need to prevent or repress a threat conflicts with the social costs of restricting 
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104

individual rights and freedoms.243 The extreme scenario asks whether official 

actions that might benefit an entire community, but that take away the most 

basic rights of some individuals, can be justified. The film’s director places the 

viewer on the side of innocent victims. This perspective avoids the dilemma 

facing intelligence: how to guarantee the security of residents without severely 

restricting freedoms.244 This essay will go beyond the approach used in the 

film by exploring the unavoidable choices facing intelligence professionals 

operating under the rule of law.

A focus on the rule of law by security forces helps ensure public well-being but 

may put an individual’s right to life and freedom of action at risk. In an alternative view, security serves as a tool to guarantee the more important, individual 

human rights.245 Every political regime develops its own interpretation of these 

views, and applies them to its intelligence agencies. Whereas in democratic regimes, intelligence exists precisely to affirm individual freedoms, in totalitarian 

regimes, security becomes an ideology that places intelligence agencies at the 

service of powerful interests bent on restricting individual human freedom. 

Additionally, under the rule of law, all institutions, including the intelligence 

agencies, face restrictions. Intelligence exists to prevent the development of 

threats to security. It does not have a deliberative role in the conduct of the 

state. However, in ideological (totalitarian) regimes, in bureaucratic dictatorships, and at times even under democratic governments, the discovery and 

punishment of “internal enemies” becomes a priority.246 In any of the three 

regime types, intelligence services may reflect this urge to repress potential 

dissidents.247 Intelligence services have an opportunity to dispense with this 

internal security role by shifting their allegiance to democratic norms. 

The film industry offers interesting examples of these three models of government and their respective public security faces. The Lives of Others (Das Leben 

der Anderen) explores the implacable and persistent violation of the right to 

privacy, including intimacy, in East Germany. The political police, the Stasi, 

used this invasive tactic against dissidents who opposed the communist regime of the German Democratic Republic.248 The Argentine film The Secret 

in Their Eyes (El secreto de sus ojos) deals with the impunity enjoyed by a common criminal who worked for a security agency during the years of military 

rule.249 Burn After Reading follows the traumatic retirement of Osborne Cox, 
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forced to end a long career as an intelligence analyst in the United States.250

(See Table 4.)

Table 4

Typology of Forms of Government and Their Intelligence Agencies

Government Type Agency Type Film 

Totalitarianism Political police The Lives of Others by F. von 

Donnersmarck (2006)

Authoritarianism Independent security agency The Secret in Their Eyes by J. 

J. Campanella (2009)

Rule of Law Intelligence system Burn After Reading by the 

Coen brothers (2008)

Source: Developed by the authors, following Gonzalez, Larriba, and Fernandez, “Servicios de 

Inteligencia y Estado de Derecho,” in Jose Luis Gonzalez Cussac, coord., Inteligencia (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), pp. 284–287. 

Setting the Stage: The Film Unthinkable

The scene: A detainee admits to having planted three nuclear devices in different urban centers across the country. In a video, the individual declared that 

the three bombs will go off simultaneously four days from now. Authorities 

have learned that the devices could cause between six and ten million deaths. 

The detainee refuses to volunteer information that would allow deactivation 

of the devices, or the evacuation of potential victims. Under the rule of law, is 

it legal and moral to consider torturing this individual to save the lives of millions of residents? This is the dilemma posed in the 2009 Gregor Jordan film 

Unthinkable (Spanish-language title El día del juicio final), and the central 

question for intelligence professionals to consider.251

Intelligence and Human Rights

In this scenario, television broadcasts are reporting on the search for a fugitive 

accused of assassinating a policeman and kidnapping two children. Authorities release his photo and ask the public to help find him. The counterterrorism unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Los Angeles begins 
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its own investigation, but for a different purpose than that presented to the 

public. Special agent Helen Brody receives an order to investigate one hundred possible suspects linked to the fugitive. The order is from headquarters. 

She has support from the FBI and local police to find and detain these persons. The suspects all have ties to radical Islamist terrorist cells operating in 

the United States. 

Intelligence services normally have authorization to take actions that may restrict individual rights and freedoms. Intelligence laws typically allow agencies to monitor persons of interest, intercept personal communications, and 

employ undercover agents and informants. Intelligence services with police 

powers can also enter and search private spaces, can search individual persons, 

vehicles, and luggage and can detain and arrest individuals who pose a threat. 

The rule of law stipulates that these actions be taken only on an exceptional 

basis, under certain circumstances, and always subject to oversight and control by executive, legislative, or judicial officials. Therefore, these special procedures are usually carried out by police forces under judicial supervision. 

Not unlike intelligence personnel, police officials generally refrain from disclosing actions taken and releasing information so obtained. 

Latin American intelligence systems operate under laws that explicitly acknowledge the need to preserve constitutional order. These laws oblige intelligence agencies to use information-collection methods that comply with 

constitutional requirements. The laws also include language obligating intelligence officials to respect individual human rights. (See Table 5.)

Table 5

References to Human Rights in Latin American Intelligence Laws

Country Intelligence Law Articles Date of 

Constitution

Relevant 

Constitutional Sections

Argentina 25520 of 2001 3, 4, and 5 1994 8, 14, 15, 18, 20, 33, 75 

No. 22, 23, 24, 86

Brazil 9883 of 1999 1.1 1998 1, 4.II, 5.XLI, 

LXXVII.1, 17

Chile 19974 of 2004 3, 4 and 

34.c

1980 1, 5 section 2, 19.
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Table 5

References to Human Rights in Latin American Intelligence Laws (continued)

Country Intelligence Law Articles Date of 

Constitution

Relevant 

Constitutional Sections

Colombia 195 of 2011 2, 4, 14, 

15, and 24

1991 11–41, 91–95, 118, 

164, 214, 222, 277, 282

Ecuador Official Law Registry No. 35 of 20094, 19, 23, 

30, and 33

2008 10, 11, 18, 27, 41, 51, 

57, 58, 66, 83, 93, 156, 

158, 163, 171, 384, 

398, 416, 417, 423, 

424, 426, 428, 436

Mexico National Security 

Law of 2005

25 and 31 1917 2.A.II, 2.B.VIII, 

21, 102.B

Peru 28664 of 2005 3 and 4 1993 1–3, 14, 44

Venezuela Official Gazette 

38940 of 2008

10 and 24 1999 1-3, 19–31, 46, 55, 76, 

132, 152, 261, 271, 

272, 278, 280, 281, 

326, 337, 339, 350

Source: Compiled by the authors.

To avert conflict between the interests of the state and of individuals, intrusive 

actions by intelligence services must meet tests of legitimacy posed by domestic and international human rights law. International norms that guide intelligence and counterintelligence activities also regulate police investigations.252

The following cinematic examples illustrate the application of the norms in 

five contexts. Table 6 will highlight the tensions between special collection 

activities and international human rights law at play in each of the five areas. 

Surveillance and Lookouts

Surveillance (seguimiento) includes physical or technical maneuvers that allow 

the agent to maintain a previously selected target under continuous observation, whether in person or by remote means. A lookout (vigilancia) observes 

activity at a given location. 

When a target operates in public spaces, and is not aware of being observed, 

that individual’s rights suffer no apparent curtailment. However, the 

possibility that the state might save the information obtained does affect an 
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individual’s legal rights. The degree of the effect increases if the state targets 

private or intimate life. In that case the state may be overstepping the bounds 

of “predictability.” 

Uninterrupted state observation of daily activity may create in the target a 

sense of having restricted freedom of movement253 or limits on the right of 

association.254 Continuous observation can even affect the presumption of 

innocence by altering the burden of proof with respect to eventual criminal 

charges.255

The film The French Connection features extended surveillance by the policeman Jimmy “Popeye” Doyle, who targets all those who may be “connected” 

with the French smuggler Alain Charnier. The surveillance employs a variety 

of techniques, with varying results, and extends across much of New York 

City in the course of targeting and uncovering criminal participation.256

Intrusive Measures Targeting Communications 

Disruption or interception of communications can involve capturing mail in 

the postal service system, wiretapping, or systematic monitoring of communications media with remote recording. 

These intrusive measures raise the possibility of arbitrary state involvement in 

the privacy and intimacy of individuals. A citizen’s right to privacy and intimacy implies the obligation of the state to be aware of the inviolability of the 

home, family communications and relationships, and the right of individuals 

to develop their personality.257

The international “Code of Conduct for Officials Responsible for Law Enforcement” addresses the right to privacy.258 The code’s article 4 declares that 

“information of a confidential nature that law enforcement officials possess 

will be kept secret until their duties or judicial needs require otherwise.” The 

code applies equally to intelligence officials.

In The Lives of Others, a corrupt minister of the German Democratic Republic 

insists that the Stasi acquire and record all private communications, including those of an intimate nature, inside of the home of a dissident playwright. 

Minister Hempf’s motivations are not purely political and the Stasi’s intense 

monitoring of communications between Georg Dreyman and his girlfriend 

greatly affect their public and private life.
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Undercover Agents, Infiltrators, and Informants 

Undercover agents hide their official identity to obtain information for intelligence purposes. When they make their way into criminal or terrorist organizations, they become infiltrated agents. Informants do not belong to the 

intelligence services and supply useful information, usually in exchange for 

money. 

These three types (undercover agents, infiltrators, and informants) present 

some legal problems for intelligence services because of their secret identities. 

Secrecy complicates any process for determining source validity in the course 

of proving that crimes have been committed. This hinders the prosecution 

as well as the defense. Defenders of the accused, for example, cannot depose 

anonymous witnesses. Thus, secrecy compromises legal due process.259

The use of informants also presents some ethical problems. Informants often 

have a link to criminal activity, and are motivated to gain protection from the 

state. In addition, any contact they have with officials remains secret. Informants bring some risk to the security and justice system because they may use 

their criminal ties to commit crimes with impunity, or they may encourage 

others to commit crimes using the same information they share with officials. 

Additionally, secrecy and payments for information can incentivize official 

corruption.260

The Departed does not depict the world of intelligence services, but it presents 

situations related to undercover agents, infiltrators, and—unexpectedly—

informants. The policeman William “Billy” Costigan Jr. infiltrates the 

criminal organization of Francis “Frank” Costello. At the same time that he 

works to unveil the structure and operations of this mafia organization, he 

has to identify a “mole” who has maneuvered his way into the police Special 

Investigations Unit.261

Entering and Searching Locked Premises and Physical 

Searching of Persons

Police gather intelligence by entering and searching locked premises, also 

known as “house search” or “domicile search.” A house search occurs when 

the homeowner has not voluntarily consented to a search of the premises, and 

it constitutes a clear violation of the principle of home sanctity.262 Sanctity of 
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the home guarantees due process because it allows a resident to ward off the 

illegal collection of incriminating evidence.263

The physical search of persons, vehicles, or luggage, also called “requisition,” 

targets an individual to find objects and information useful for a criminal 

investigation. The individual rights and freedoms at play in this case are the 

same as for searching locked premises. The sex of the agent doing a body 

search must be the same as that of the individual being searched264 and 

should be done in a private setting to maximize the dignity and decorum of 

the person being searched.265

The Green Zone266 views intelligence from the perspective of armed conflict. 

It focuses on the difficulties of taking individual rights into account in an occupied zone. The film illustrates how intelligence can influence the design and 

implementation of military and police operations. In the storyline, military 

personnel carry out most of the special procedures for collecting information. 

The film reveals that successful collection of information depends on having 

clear judicial rules for applying or withholding force during an intelligence 

operation. An officer faces the always-difficult field determination of whether 

“law enforcement” (human rights) rules apply to a situation, rather than the 

less specific rules of international humanitarian law (conduct of hostilities). 

Deprivation of Liberty

Government authorities can choose any of various legal paths to deprive detainees of their liberty. They may detain a suspect for a flagrant crime (generally known as “arrest”); they may detain by judicial order or at the request of 

an administrative official; and they may confine a suspect after sentencing. 

They may also “institutionalize” a person for health reasons, or “intern” them 

for precautionary reasons related to public safety. Deprivation of personal 

liberty can be carried out in public or private establishments, and a principal 

characteristic is that the detainee loses freedom of movement. 

All the reasons for deprivation of individual liberty, including those applied 

by police intelligence officers, must take into account the subject’s right to 

personal integrity and humane treatment.267 The most important guarantees 

ensure that the subject, immediately after apprehension, knows the reasons 

for his or her detention, appears before a judge without delay, and has a 
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judgment rendered in the case within a reasonable period.268 During the 

entire length of detention, the subject must be treated humanely, with the 

dignity due any human being.269 These principles demand that the detainee 

not be subjected to “legitimate” physical or moral torture, or be exposed to 

inhuman or degrading interrogation techniques. 

The most serious challenge to safeguarding human rights comes with the 

application of “preventive” detention. Preventive detention brings to mind 

the abusive interrogation of suspects thought to have terrorist associations. 

The Battle of Algiers270 recreates counterintelligence operations carried out 

by France in the Algerian War of Independence. Colonel Mathieu begins to 

restrict the residents’ liberty of movement, and later carries out random detentions and employs brutal interrogation techniques. The purpose of these 

actions is to find out who may be leading the National Liberation Front.

Table 6

Sources of Tension between Intelligence Activity and Human Rights

Protection Exemplified in Selected Films

Intelligence Activity Judicial 

Controversy

Norms in Conflict Film Examples

Surveillance and 

Lookouts

Presumption 

of innocence

Universal Declaration 

(art.11), International 

Covenant for Civil 

and Political Rights 

(ICCPR) (art.14), 

American 

Convention (art.8)

The French 

Connection

by W. Friedkin 

(1971)

Intrusive Measures 

in Communications

Right to privacy, 

honor, and dignity

Intrusive Measures in 

Communications

Universal Declaration 

(art.12), American 

Convention (art.11)

The Lives of Others

by F. von 

Donnersmarck 

(2006)

Undercover Agents, 

Infiltrators, and 

Informants

Right to depose 

witnesses

Universal Declaration (art.10), ICCPR 

(art.14), American 

Convention (art.8)

The Departed by M. 

Scorsese (2006)
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112

Table 6

Sources of Tension between Intelligence Activity and Human Rights

Protection Exemplified in Selected Films (continued)

Intelligence Activity Judicial 

Controversy

Norms in Conflict Film Examples

Entering and 

Searching Locked 

Premises and Physical Search of Persons

Right to personal 

security and 

freedom

Universal Declaration 

(arts. 3 and 11.2), 

ICCPR (art.9, 11, 

14, and 15), American Convention (arts. 

5, 7, 9, and 10)

The Green Zone by P. 

Greengrass (2010)

Deprivation 

of Liberty

Personal integrity

 and humane 

treatment

Universal Declaration (art.5), ICCPR 

(art.5), American 

Convention (art.5), 

Convention against 

Torture, Body of 

Principles for the 

Protection of 

Detained or 

Imprisoned Persons

The Battle of Algiers

by G. Pontecorvo 

(1966)

Source: Compiled by the authors.

Weighing the Actions of Officials in Unthinkable

Whether actions taken by officials in Unthinkable conform with international standards of behavior cannot be answered definitively. The film does not 

pause to consider the judicial implications of the inhumane treatment of the 

terrorist bombing suspect. It does prompt viewers to consider the real-life 

implications of security officers’ decisionmaking in future national emergencies. For example:

a) At the beginning of the film, FBI Special Agent Phillips shows Special 

Agent Brody a dossier accidentally sent from the CIA to the FBI. It 

contains a photo of Humphries (a person of interest at that point) obtained by illegal CIA surveillance. The CIA does not have the authority 

to collect information on U.S. citizens; it may only obtain information 

related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.271
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b) Later, Phillips and a colleague break into Humphries’s house, without 

judicial authorization. When they need help, two other agents come to 

their rescue, detain Humphries, and search the house. 

c) The FBI declares that it has information about individuals who may have 

links to domestic terrorist activities. The legal limits to using the data set 

remain unknown. The mission appears clear: “We need to interrogate 

their families, their friends, their colleagues at work, every potential terrorist link in their life over the past nine months, and we need to do it 

now!” In reality, such large-scale detentions would stand out as arbitrary 

and illegal. 

d) Authorities detain the presumed terrorist, Younger-Yusuf, and keep him 

at a secret location. He has not yet been told the legal reason for his detention. Originally detained for having a “suspicious attitude,” the interrogators seek his self-incrimination. Younger-Yusuf’s captors apparently 

have no intention to bring him before a judge within a reasonable time 

frame. Officials orchestrating his detention have failed to comply even 

minimally with international obligations for handling detainees. 

Intelligence and Torture

The scene: Authorities have detained Steven Arthur Younger, alias Yusuf Atta 

Mohamed, for 24 hours. He had surrendered to local police, and confirmed 

having planted three nuclear devices. No one saw him planting the devices, 

and no one knows their location. Counterintelligence has confirmed he participated in the theft of radioactive material some years before, and that he 

knows how to deactivate bombs, including nuclear arms. The armed forces 

have control of this emergency situation as part of their responsibility to “suppress any insurrection, illicit association, or conspiracy.” Until this moment, 

Younger-Yusuf has been treated appropriately: no beating, but some exposure 

to heat, cold, sleep deprivation, noise, bright lights, and threats of violence. A 

government representative instructs Henry Harold Humphries, alias “H,” to 

inflict increasing pain on Younger, with the intention of gaining the information that may save the lives of millions. 

By definition, torture inflicts serious physical or psychological pain and 

suffering on a subject.272 Modern thought objects to the practice, while 
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114

international law and all penal codes forbid its use.273 Nonetheless, if 

violating the rights of a few individuals may benefit society as a whole, moral 

and judicial restraint may not prevail. Unthinkable casts restraint aside in 

dramatizing a “ticking time-bomb” scenario.274

Certain factual assumptions support the use of torture in this scenario: 

an explosive device set to detonate automatically at an unknown location; 

likelihood of numerous victims; detained suspect declines to cooperate. 

These assumptions taken together may justify torture to obtain information. 

Some proponents of torture recommend judicial regulation to avoid its 

indiscriminate use. 

Each of these assumptions, however, appears readily refutable. 

First, only if someone has seen the suspect plant the bombs do we know for 

sure they exist. In that case, the locations would be known. The detainee has 

incriminated himself, has given information about his activities in a video, 

and has maintained silence during the first few days of detention. This series 

of events never occurs in real life. If police were to accept such claims at face 

value, they would detain dozens of people each day. After torturing perhaps 

hundreds of suspects, officials might find an explosive. 

A second objection arises from the idea that no known torture technique allows one to inflict increasing levels of pain or humiliation. Violence against 

an individual that meets the definition of torture has dangerous effects on 

those subjected to it, on those who inflict it, and on those who witness it, no 

matter its “intensity.” 

The expectation that a torture victim will reveal accurate information with 

the infliction of just enough pain further undermines the validity of the film’s 

scenario. A sense of urgency generally accompanies depictions of torture. Unthinkable differs from the normal bomb scenario in devoting four long days 

to mistreating the suspect: asphyxiation with a plastic bag, castration, beating 

with a cane, prolonged sessions of hanging, electric shock, fingernail pulling, 

brass knuckles, irritants sprayed into the ears, tooth extraction without anesthesia, long-duration immersion in water, forced observation of a homicide, 

and the threat of the same against the detainee’s children. Viewers see these 

disturbing episodes while listening to Beethoven’s sonata for piano Opus 13 
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(Sonata Pathétique), interrupted by Helen Brody’s more humane treatment of 

Younger-Yusuf.

Intelligence does employ interrogation to elicit information, but not in a ticking time-bomb scenario. In accord with human rights principles, the rule of 

law typically leads to the designation of torture as a crime. The barbarity of 

torture as an intelligence tool fits only the corrupt institutions of dictatorial 

political systems. A Chilean author whose work275 created controversy has 

claimed that “a dirty war is not doctrinally part of the activities that intelligence is supposed to perform.”276 He adds that the institutionalization of 

torture became one of the characteristics of the Chilean dirty war. This disrespect for the life and dignity of individual citizens deligitimized the prevailing 

“national security” doctrine. He also points out that torture, no matter the 

method used, always occurs without ethical justification, and that evident 

respect for life and human dignity “distinguish a criminal from an honorable 

person.” Palamara’s simple reasoning appears conclusive. 

Intelligence Management

The scene: Younger-Yusuf’s actions create a general sense of mistrust, vulnerability and defenselessness among his captors. The state’s intelligence system 

has proved incompetent, the FBI’s specialized team unable to connect the detainee with terrorist groups operating inside the country. Additionally, neither 

the CIA nor other agencies of the intelligence community have detected that 

a former military man who left the service harboring profound resentment has 

joined forces with hostile intelligence agencies. Amid these failures and uncertainties, it falls to Harold Humphries, alias “H,” to use torture to confirm the 

existence of the bombs, and to learn where they have been planted. 

Unique Identities

The origin of human torture remains unknown. Who first made the coldblooded and calculated decision to inflict inhuman pain on another person? 

How can groups of people, organizations, and state apparatuses institutionalize so abominable a practice? What allows the person who inflicts the pain to 

minimize its importance? 

Violence has claimed millions of victims throughout the history of warfare 

and interpersonal aggression. Political, religious, ethnic, or gender differences 
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explain much of the violence. But in other cases the explanation rests simply 

on hate generated by “enemies”277 who see themselves as common, decent 

individuals. 

Humans naturally and automatically categorize things. Assigning things to 

categories facilitates the process of understanding complexity in received 

information. The process allows one’s mind to adapt to an environment 

conceptually and behaviorally. Even young children make choices and put 

objects, situations, or persons into categories. The eagerness to place things 

into groups, which emphasizes the common attributes of a set, also highlights 

the differences among groups. 

Social categorization also tends to exaggerate one’s differences vis-à-vis

the individuals placed in other groups. At the same time, we minimize 

the differences in our own group. We thus arrive at “endogroups” (us) 

and “exogroups” (them). Within the endogroup, spontaneous attraction 

predisposes us positively toward fellow members through a process called 

“gratuitous discrimination.”278

In the first moments of Unthinkable, the antagonist records the video in 

which he reveals the existence of the nuclear devices. He appears as a “regular 

guy,” although a little nervous. We learn his true identity, revealed by his 

Arabic name, as he begins to describe his twisted scheme. From that point 

onward, this young and disturbed man leaves our endogroup, converted into 

a threat. 

Being in a group or being aware of one’s social category reinforces “the emotional and values-oriented significance of belonging.”279 Feelings of warmth, 

strength, protection, and pride arise and generate a new resource—social capital. Building social capital engenders solidarity, militancy, and consistency in 

the group.280

The loyalty and favoritism of the endogroup do not oblige members to express hostility toward the exogroup. Hostility does emerge when a threat (real 

or imagined) arises to confront the group’s identity. In the view of his captors, 

Younger-Yusuf represents a clear threat because he has already shown himself 

capable of killing. More than 50 people died in a mall bombing attributed 

to him. Younger-Yusuf presents himself as a potential martyr, persecuted and 
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threatened with death by the government.281 To the detainee, governmental 

authority continuously threatens the Islamic world.

Government intelligence agents in Unthinkable operate in small, strongly 

indoctrinated and well-equipped teams. They all proudly and prominently 

display corporate identification badges and accessories—Helen Brody has to 

rearrange her clothing to hide her firearm as she crosses a street. Military officials show off deep procedural knowledge and their efficiency in executing 

orders from superiors. The film’s dialog reinforces the participants’ sense of 

belonging to separate endogroups. 

The illusion of a unique identity or “singular affiliation,” easily cultivated and 

only weakly suppressed, can become a powerful incentive to inflict violence 

on another group, and it is the point of departure for persecution, torture or 

extermination.282 The concept of an enemy emerges from the mistrust of or 

threats made toward the exogroup. An enemy emerges, whether real, imagined, or intentionally introduced.283 A sininster enemy justifies any actions to 

thwart him, and at the same time reinforces one’s own identity (See Table 7.) 

Table 7

Ideas That Nurture the Concept of Unique Identities

Causes Type of Singular Affiliation

Superiority of the Endogroup Ethnocentrism. Chosen group, privileged by 

nature, or called to a sublime mission. 

Feeling of Injustice Belief in the existence of unacceptable outrages 

and humiliations that affect the group’s territory, rights, and freedoms. 

Vulnerability Real or perceived vulnerability to the other 

group.

Mistrust Only bad things can be expected from the other 

group. This may be collective paranoia or a real 

history of grievances. 

Mistrust Only bad things can be expected from the other 

group. This may be collective paranoia or a real 

history of grievances. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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Table 7

Ideas That Nurture the Concept of Unique Identities (continued)

Causes Type of Singular Affiliation

Defenselessness Collective perception of loss of control, dependence, and helplessness that lead to insurgency 

and confrontation. 

Goals and Objectives The greatness for which the endogroup is destined justifies any means toward that end.

Source: Compiled by the authors and based on Amalio Blanco Abarca, “La Condición de 

‘Enemigo’: El Ocaso de la Inocencia,” in Manuel Cancio Melia and Laura Pozuelo Perez, 

coords., Política criminal en vanguardia: Inmigración clandestina, terrorismo, criminalidad organizada (Navarra, Spain: Editorial Aranzadi SA, 2008), pp. 296 and 297.

To his captors, Younger-Yusuf belongs in a suspicious category: born in the 

United States, he grew up in Islamabad and speaks Farsi and Arabic. Although a U.S. citizen, he belongs to another group, the same group as those 

whose photos appear in the FBI list of terrorism-related suspects. His photo 

appears next to those of Arabic suspects in the “wanted list.” Torturing this 

suspect becomes a state-supported action. His captors ignore the detainee’s 

nationality, thus depriving him of his basis for a personal identity. Brody tries 

to argue against torturing this citizen turned “illegal combatant,” but a senior 

authority overrides her argument: “That’s who he was yesterday, but today he 

has no country.” 
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From Misgivings to Inhumanity 

Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people

 can be led to carry out extraordinary cruelties.

—Albert Bandura284

The most brutal personalities in Unthinkable live routine lives. “H” for example, 

a good husband and father, inflicts great pain and suffering on a captive subject. 

Special agent Brody confronts Rina, H’s wife, and reproaches her for living with 

such a man. Rina replies, “Normal? Let me tell you something. I lost my first 

family in Bosnia. Three men came into my house. They violated me in front of 

my family and then they killed everyone in the family. They killed my youngest 

child last. These were my neighbors. They knew me. They were very normal 

men.” Rina is beautiful and gracious, but fragile because of the unthinkable 

events in her past. H asks Brody, “Did she tell you the rest of the story? What 

happened when her town was retaken and they captured these three men? She 

killed their wives and children in front of them. And just as our troops arrived, 

she killed the three guys. She was arrested and placed in my custody.” 

Standards of morality normally depend on self-regulated behavior, but some 

psychological mechanisms delink behavior from morality. Bandura refers 

to “unhooking” or selective moral “abdication.”285 Childhood behavior responds to external rules and social sanctions. Through socialization, each 

person adopts moral standards as a guide to behavioral self-control. Morality has two components: one component inhibits—giving one the power to 

refrain from behaving inhumanely; the positive component drives a person 

to behave humanely. People look to “do the right thing” so as not to subject 

themselves to self-depreciation. 

Moral standards do not remain invariable. Activation or selective deactivation 

of personal control, influenced by the social environment and psychological 

factors, allows the same person to behave differently in different situations. 

Individuals do not normally act unacceptably unless they have somehow been 

able to justify the action. Moral justification allows reprehensible conduct 

to become personally and socially acceptable without the need to transform 

one’s personality or values. Redefined morality allows one to undertake reproachable actions free of auto-censure. 
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In Figure 5 we see the potential junctures where moral self-control can be 

lost, thereby allowing the justification of inhuman behavior. 

Perpetrator Reproachable

behavior

Injurious

effects > > > Victim

- Sees himself

 as victim

- Shows obedience

 to authority

- Moral 

 justification

- Advantageous

 comparison

- Use of

 euphemisms

- Minimization,

 negation, or

 reinterpretation

 of consequences

- Dehumanization

- Attribution of 

 blame

- Distancing

Shifting of responsibility

Dilution of responsibility

Figure 5 Principal Justifications for Inhuman Behavior

Source: Compiled by the authors, adapted from Albert Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, no. 3 (1999), p. 194. 

Often, the perpetrator or author of violence considers himself or herself a 

victim: humiliated, defeated, or treated unjustly. This gives the individual an 

excuse to attack, whether in self-defense or as a form of reprisal. Obedience to 

authority and participation in a group effort also spread the responsibility for 

the action. Reproachable conduct legitimizes itself by appealing to the idea of 

reciprocity against the actions of the enemy. Because the honor or survival of 

the group can be at stake, the “morality of results” begins to rule; that is, the 

end justifies the means. Language helps to soften the meanings of the transgressions, with euphemisms like “defense,” “cleaning,” “incident,” “collateral 

damage,” and “retire.” Denying or minimizing actions taken, or discrediting 

evidence, distorts the meaning of one’s actions. One may keep a victim at a 

physical distance (facilitated by modern weapons) or build psychological distance by assigning the status of being different, a traitor, or unfaithful. If one 

removes the victim’s humanity by resort to a label such as parasite, animal, or 

the name of a sickness, the action may seem beneficial or even necessary. 
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In this film the authorities did not anticipate the catastrophic threat and feel 

embarrassed. As a result, the detainee arbitrarily loses his freedom. One must 

obey the central authority: “The high command believes that everyone should 

do what we believe best for our country and its people.” The presence of a highlevel civilian, a government official, removes responsibility from the military 

commanders. General Paulson gives orders to Colonel Kerkmejian, and he to 

his soldiers. But the civilian judge does not have a supervisor, and the FBI agent 

remains only an observer. The government operation represents a collective 

effort, carried out by a lone individual (H). The torture appears unacceptable, 

and perhaps illegal, to some officials. However, they all agree that if the devices 

detonate, the legal basis for the republic’s existence and the rule of law will 

also have been lost.286 H sees torture as a tool to obtain information, and the 

only way to overcome weakness and fear. His euphemistic reformulation of the 

issue justifies the inhuman treatment because only results matter. 

Conclusion

Intelligence management has the obligation to apply public ethics. The 

“ought,” for an intelligence official acting on behalf of a state operating under the rule of law, rests on respect for the dignity of the individual. The 

professionalism of intelligence services implies the existence of a sound and 

value-based legal foundation. Capable, internal intelligence management will 

reduce the growth of “distrusted identities” that encourage poorly considered 

actions in crisis situations. 

The film Unthinkable or El día del juicio final updates the classic “ticking 

time-bomb scenario.” This scenario sets forth the possibility—or necessity—

of extracting information using a variety of brutish methods to save the lives 

of innocent people. A deep analysis of the film and of the environment of 

police intelligence finds the film’s assumptions highly misleading and far from 

realistic. Further, a psychological interpretation of the film demonstrates that 

torture remains unjustifiable as a tool for gathering useful information even 

in crisis situations. 

Some films do offer useful insight into state intelligence practices. They also 

lend themselves to theoretical and practical interpretation. Both theoretically 

and practically, intelligence and counterintelligence methods require adjustment to judicial and ethical frameworks to ensure respect for human rights. 
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Filmography

CONTACTO EN FRANCIA (The French Connection), [DVD]. William 

Friedkin, United States, D’Antoni Productions, Schine–Moore

Productions, 1971. (104 min.)

EL DIA DEL JUICIO FINAL (Unthinkable), [DVD]. Gregor Jordan, 

United States, Lleju Productions and Films and Sidney Kimmel

 Entertainment International, 2009. (97 min.)

EL SECRETO DE SUS OJOS (The Secret in Their Eyes), [DVD]. Juan Jose 

Campanella, Argentina, Tornasol Films, Haddock Film, 100 Bares, 

Telefe and others, 2009. (129 min.)

QUÉMESE DESPUÉS DE LEERSE (Burn After Reading), [DVD]. 

Joel and Ethan Coen, United States, Bronx Community College, 

University Avenue at West 181 Street, Bronx, New York City 

and others, 2008. (96 min.)

LA BATALLA DE ARGEL (Battle of Algiers), [DVD]. Gillo Pontecorvo, 

Italy and Algeria, Igor Fil y Casbah Film, 1966. (121 min.)

LA CIUDAD DE LAS TORMENTAS (The Green Zone), [DVD]. Paul 

Greengrass, United States, Universal Pictures, Studio Canal y 

Relativity Media, 2010. (115 min.)

LA VIDA DE LOS OTROS (The Lives of Others), [DVD]. Florian Henckel 

von Donnersmarck, Germany, Wiedermann and Berg Filmproduktion, Bayerischer Rundfunk, Arte and Creado Film, 2006. (137 min.)

LOS INFILTRADOS (The Departed), [DVD]. Martin Scorsese, United 

States, Warner Bros. Pictures, Plan B Entertainment, Initial 

Entertainment, 2006. (151 min.)

An earlier version of this essay appeared in Las jornadas de derecho publico 

2012, published by the Pontificia Universidad Catolica of Valparaiso, Chile.
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Authors’ Biographies

Dr. Moira Nakousi Salas practices clinical psychiatry and serves as a member 

of Chile’s Film Rating Council. Email: moira.nakousi@gmail.com.

Daniel Soto Muñoz teaches and conducts research at the Carabinero Academy of Police Sciences (ACIPOL) of Chile. He also serves as a legal consultant 

on human rights and humanitarian law. Email: dansotocl@yahoo.es. 

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Intelligence, Communications Media, and 

Political Discourse

Manuel I. Balcazar Villarreal

Effective oversight of intelligence in the democratic context depends on the 

development of a trusting relationship between those who carry out this governmental function and the political elite, insofar as those elites represent the 

rights and interests of citizens. To promote the relationship, mass communications media could highlight the strategic importance and legitimate uses of 

intelligence. This has not happened despite a wealth of opportunities. 

In these first years of the 21st century the Western Hemisphere features a 

complex security environment with internal political crises in various countries. The growth of democratic governance coincides with somewhat greater 

attention to intelligence services in the region’s political discourse. However, 

even as intelligence has gained attention among the media, and political leaders refer to it more frequently, confusion reigns about the real nature of the 

phenomenon. Neither the media nor politicians use the term “intelligence” 

in a way that accords with its meaning in the eyes of specialists in academia 

or in relevant governmental organizations. 

Media often allude to intelligence organizations as security institutions, highlighting their achievements, particularly in “capturing criminals.” This tendency may reflect the selective release of information by intelligence directors 

who seek a positive public image and favorable institutional positioning. This 

leads to an avoidance of serious public debate about intelligence. Examples 

may be found in press reports of the capture of presumed drug traffickers in 

Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico.287

Unauthorized disclosure of classified material and insider revelations by active 

or retired intelligence personnel also link intelligence with communications 

media. Most often, these incidents occur as a result of someone’s resentment 

toward an organization, their frustration over the internal allocation of resources, or career progression issues. Although leaks do not occur frequently, 

they have serious repercussions for intelligence organizations, especially because an individual familiar with an organization’s operations can fine-tune 

the disclosure to enhance institutional damage. 
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Although intelligence leaks might be spread by various communications media, the public often ignores the information. Exceptions occur when leaks 

concern specific threats such as dangerous criminals, “evil” terrorists, or “disturbed people.” Individuals who fit these categories already receive ample attention by the communications media and have gained public notoriety. 

The foregoing examples illustrate the media’s propensity to deal with intelligence topics mainly in operational terms. Political officials take the same 

approach, and often use the term “intelligence” in speeches as a synonym for 

an investigation with results suitable for public consumption. Police forces as 

well have begun to pass on to the communications media selected details of 

successful intelligence operations in criminal cases. However, police typically 

do not share with the media examples of crimes prevented by intelligence actions, or preventive actions taken to reduce crime rates. This perhaps indicates 

that strategic intelligence thinking remains uncommon among police forces. 

The communications media do publish police press releases that emphasize 

intelligence “actions” taken to reduce criminal activity. These police operations reveal the capture of weapons, ammunition, persons, vehicles, and communications equipment. Meanwhile, we learn little about initiatives taken to 

monitor or impede financial transactions within or between criminal organizations. Again, if such stories were to appear, the public would see that intelligence capabilities have moved toward the strategic application of technically 

and operationally complex operations.

Despite the conceptual confusion that surrounds the treatment of police intelligence in the communications media, a clear link exists between the media 

and the interests of police chiefs. A chief may be able to construct a political 

career, increase police budgets, or outmaneuver other security agencies by 

emphasizing the operational view of intelligence. The operational emphasis 

helps a chief create a public perception of professionalism and lead the public 

to expect more from intelligence than current capabilities allow.

These circumstances repeat the experience of mid-20th century Central and 

South American countries. Then, police forces used investigative resources for 

the political purpose of establishing stability and social control. The circumstances coincided with a limited development of intelligence services, with 
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an emphasis on its operational rather than strategic side. Physical capabilities 

took priority over analytic capacity.

A persistent focus on the operational rather than the strategic side of intelligence has generated an empiricism that favors an operational perspective 

within organizations. In many countries, incoming leaders of the intelligence 

services perpetuate this tendency because their familiarity with intelligence 

comes from the aforementioned, selective media reporting.

Media and intelligence interests also converge when political espionage yields 

a compromising conversation or reveals incriminating video of a political 

figure. Although government intelligence cannot legitimately target political 

figures, public scandal ruins careers. The targets of political espionage face 

the challenge of trying to explain private actions that have now been made 

public. 

Revelations from illegitimate espionage tend to gain traction in the media and 

therefore spread across a society. As this occurs, a distorted perception of intelligence emerges. A skewed treatment of intelligence by the media overlooks the 

potential of strategic governmental intelligence. Further, the distorted perception of intelligence generated by the empirical approach of intelligence organizations and reinforced by the media affects how political elites incorporate 

intelligence in public affairs discourse and the creation of public policy. Political 

elites consider operational rather than strategic intelligence the society’s optimum choice for confronting particular risks or threats. 

These circumstances create a challenge for the management of intelligence 

in the new century. In aggregate, they reinforce bureaucratic inertia in the 

intelligence services. As a result, those services exhibit a limited capability to 

improve and professionalize their work. 

The principal means of reversing this dysfunctional process among intelligence, the media, and political discourse depends on the media’s willingness 

to establish links with academic researchers who can review specialized literature on intelligence to place government press releases and reports in context. 

Researchers can also question and evaluate the statements and proposals of 

political leaders to reduce public confusion about the nature of legitimate 

governmental intelligence.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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Manuel I. Balcazar Villarreal holds a master’s degree in public administration 

from the Instituto Nacional de Administracion Publica (INAP-Mexico). He 

has attended security seminars at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the National Defense University, Washington, DC, and participated 

in a crime prevention seminar at the University of Chile. He was an invited 

participant in the U.S. Department of State’s 2008 course on international 

organized crime. Later, he served as Deputy National Security Director in 

the office of the President of Mexico. He now serves on the faculty of the 

Universidad Iberoamericana, where he teaches in the national security program. His publications include La influencia de las maras en México: un problema de inteligencia gubernamental (INAP, 2007) and Inteligencia Estratégica 

en el Contexto Mexicano (Tecnológico de Monterrey, 2012). Email: ibavil@

hotmail.com.
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Section Two

Intelligence Management within the Executive 

Branch of Government

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Presidential Decisionmaking Process and 

Intelligence—Exploring an Open Question

Guillermo Holzmann

Overview

This review essay identifies the purpose and nature of national intelligence 

products in Latin America, and stands as part of the author’s separate, larger 

effort to examine institutional biases and defects in the products of a national 

intelligence system. These products contribute to a decisionmaking process 

where presidents face basic challenges to political development. 

Introduction

Globalization reduces a society’s opportunity to grow and develop if it does 

not learn to adapt economically and politically. Adaptation requires a redefinition and broadening of national interests beyond those classically expressed 

in official documents.288 Identifying and analyzing traditional and new challenges over a timeframe that reaches beyond an individual presidential term 

gains legitimacy with participation by the society’s elites. At the same time, 

this approach requires understanding and acceptance by the society at large. 

The developed country perspective on structural change and globalization 

differs from that of developing countries. For Latin America, the process of 

globalization demands that leaders confront not only lingering problems 

from the 20th century (poverty, inequality, ideological confrontation between 

capitalism and communism, and the permanent search for social development, among other things), but also the challenge of inserting their country 

fully into the international environment. This challenge calls for opening a 

country’s markets to outside forces. It means that a good government must 

align itself to an environment that prizes stability and governability.289 The 

requirement for adaptation directly impacts decisionmaking processes at the 

national executive level. A national leader has to respect accrued social and 

political debts while at the same time establishing a future policy direction 

through anticipatory, opportunistic decisionmaking. 

A state’s ability to influence future scenarios by processing and manipulating information has become an essential element of 21st century political 
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management. These abilities allow the state to affect threats and opportunities into the future. Sophisticated information handling brings national and 

foreign, state, nonstate, and private interests into the chaotic democratic decisionmaking process.

Latin American countries display notable differences in degree of development and levels of growth. Although they all fit into the general category of 

developing countries, Brazil has become a regional power. The status of an 

emerging country depends on its ability to create and consolidate political, 

economic, and social conditions commensurate with its national interests. 

One may reasonably suggest that most Latin American countries face challenges similar to those of the regional powers, but they do not share an elevated socioeconomic and political baseline. Countries that share strategic 

challenges and objectives also need to share in an examination of their strategic intelligence production. 

Any country adjusting to globalization needs a national intelligence system. 

The system needs to create products worth serious consideration as inputs to 

the national decisionmaking process. To accomplish this objective, a country 

needs to integrate its different intelligence organizations by specifying what 

each brings to the table. Intelligence activity in a democratic regime needs 

limits. Political regulation can ensure adequate controls and procedures for 

the intelligence system. 

Each state in the region has created, modernized, or transformed an intelligence system oriented toward satisfying the needs of its own leader. In the 

wake of the Cold War, intelligence organizations continued to define internal 

or external threats as “enemies,” thereby highlighting the military character 

of intelligence. States now face political, economic, and especially conceptual 

obstacles to establishing a suitable intelligence system. This is particularly true 

for “emerging” countries. Sound presidential decisionmaking requires systematically constructed intelligence organizations, where military and police capabilities remain necessary but insufficient to address new security scenarios. 

The Intelligence-Policy Relationship

The states of Latin America have adopted different evolutionary pathways 

to their present set of organizations and systems of intelligence. Some derive 
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from an academic or think-tank tradition, which translates to their following 

a “Sherman Kent” model. Many have a strong military intelligence influence. In other countries with a long or strong history of dictatorship and human rights violations, intelligence organizations have a political or ideological 

tone.290 In general, the public remains wary of the intelligence “culture.”291

Since the 1980s, each country has developed and modified its intelligence 

institutions to meet democratic aspirations, as expressed in legislation and 

in civilian control. In some cases, a country has also created an intelligence 

organization designed to support the political leadership. Unresolved issues 

in intelligence management include the question of coordination among 1) 

those who produce intelligence, 2) the various decisionmakers who would use 

the intelligence, and 3) proponents of intelligence autonomy vs. executive direction of the intelligence establishment. Imposing efficient institutional and 

functional linkages (integration) in intelligence allows a country to gain a relative advantage in dealing with harmful events, seizing opportunities, and neutralizing risks and threats at the highest levels of governmental operation.

For intelligence to build an effective and productive relationship with its ultimate users requires that information and analysis be timely, professional, and 

believable. A national decisionmaker receives information and advice from 

numerous other advisers and from think tanks, whose purpose is to influence 

decisionmakers and to advocate certain decisions or simply raise arguments 

to defend particular interests.

A central point is that the intelligence producer needs to know the stance of 

the decisionmaker on an issue so as to deliver input suited to the needs of 

the moment and meaningful for longer-term objectives and priorities. At the 

same time, because of its nonpartisan nature, and its focus on state objectives as expressed by each political administration, intelligence input should 

receive special attention over other sources of advice. 

A thoughtful decisionmaking process and a suitable institutional framework 

for intelligence remain a rare combination in the region. A fully functioning 

intelligence system includes clearly demarcated levels of operation, democratic controls, and adequate resources. When these conditions are met, intelligence operates under the guidance of the highest office holders of the state, 

and the system escapes the excessive growth of activity by basic intelligence 
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organizations like those of the military or police. In the absence of a highlevel, professional civilian intelligence organization, these basic organizations 

fill the void by developing not only tactical and operational intelligence, but 

also strategic and national intelligence, which has the effect of devaluing their 

principal roles and functions and delegitimizing the idea of a functioning 

national intelligence system.

For democratic countries with a weak adaptive capability and weak interagency coordination, intelligence usage at the highest political level tends to 

settle into some combination of the following patterns:

1. Personalized and politicized intelligence promotes an official’s remaining in power by neutralizing potential political adversaries or justifying 

short-term political action. 

2. Intelligence focuses on the control and neutralization of social conflict 

or risks, and on ensuring that the current administration remains in 

power.

3. Political intelligence capabilities exclusively serve the government leaders. Other intelligence organizations fulfill their function with differing 

degrees of autonomy, performing tasks that do not necessarily coincide 

with objectives supported by the government in power.

The tendency to assign “politically trustworthy people” rather than the most 

capable professionals to analytic teams impedes a system’s ability to take advantage of long professional experience, to incorporate best practices, and to 

engage in an ethical approach to intelligence employment on behalf of its 

users at the policy or political level.

With political trustworthiness a prerequisite for carrying out analysis, intelligence adopts a short-term focus. This focus shortchanges the construction of 

scenarios and the identification of domestic and international change factors 

that affect the country’s security interests. This situation creates a paradox: 

Producing intelligence with a short time horizon may help political leaders 

make reactive decisions in response to current events, but a failure to produce 

intelligence on issues with a longer time horizon will reduce the likelihood 

of meaningful contributions to issues of greater importance to the long-term 
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success of that same political administration. This approach amounts to a 

deprofessionalization of strategic intelligence capabilities of the state, and a 

denaturalization of the functions and roles of intelligence organizations at 

the different levels of the system. The inevitable result: a lack of continuity 

in the decisionmaking process at the strategic level, and greater costs from 

constantly changing intelligence management practices.

These circumstances undermine the relationship of intelligence agencies with 

counterpart organizations in friendly countries. The absence of mediumand long-term analysis impedes a professional exchange of information and 

analysis on topics of common interest to any two parties. The result is more 

frequent, informal exchange involving only individual agencies and a growing delegitimatization of the intelligence system because of the correspondingly low standards of professionalization. The implications are many, and 

although it is not necessarily an express concern of political decisionmakers, 

a reduction in the international legitimacy of the intelligence system reduces 

its ability to serve the national interest as an interlocutor on international 

issues.292

Producers of strategic intelligence (at the national or presidential level) do not 

tend to play a foundational role in the leader’s decisionmaking process either 

in terms of national strategy or national security. In fact, one may even question whether decisionmakers at this level have the ability to use intelligence 

products. The many questions raised by this observation call for an audit of 

the process of making strategic decisions.

We need more precise studies of the linkage between intelligence and policy 

to understand the difficulties inherited from offending political situations 

of the past, and to identify future challenges. In each country of the region, 

civilian and military specialists have added to the understanding of intelligence and its implications for policy. Nonetheless, the existing bibliography 

remains sparse.293 Important variables to be addressed include the characteristics of the intelligence system, its coordination and guidance, and the 

ethical and professional standards of its personnel. These variables also relate 

to challenges in personnel recruitment, methods of analysis, and the ability 

to generate anticipatory scenarios. Intelligence culture needs to spread to the 

presidential level through a specialized intelligence bureaucracy in that office. 

It is important that this bureaucracy be maintained over time so that it can 
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manage a policy conversation with intelligence organizations, especially with 

the system’s coordinating entity. 

A student of intelligence bureaucracy, Ohad Leslau, has reviewed the role of 

intelligence in the national decisionmaking process at three levels: individual, 

organizational-bureaucratic, and the state.294

At the individual level, he examines how the psychology of specific decisionmakers and intelligence producers influences the prevailing format of an intelligence product. How may an intelligence producer’s psychological profile 

influence information analysis methods and the decisionmaker’s perception 

and use of the product? Some analysts develop intelligence as a professional 

endeavor and others provide political intelligence. The first type, cautious 

and methodical, offers a technical and professional opinion, without regard 

to political considerations. Analysts of the second type give greater weight to 

factors that define the political scenario facing the decisionmaker. An adviser’s 

ability to relate to the leader’s immediate environment promotes a fluid and 

trustworthy relationship with the leader. 

Organizational-bureaucratic studies follow from the theoretical work of Graham Allison.295 Work reviewed by Leslau finds that intelligence organizations play the same role in government as other state agencies or institutions. 

An intelligence product exerts influence proportional to the status and prestige of the intelligence agency, as judged by government officials. If an intelligence organization operates close to power and decisionmaking centers like 

the secretary of state, secretary of the interior, or the office of the president, 

its influence in the decisionmaking process will be greater than that of other 

agencies.296

Research at the presidential level relates three variables to the influence of 

intelligence in the decisionmaking process. They are 1) the type of regime, 

2) the seriousness of the threat being faced, and 3) the “intelligence culture.” 

Not surprisingly, an intelligence product has greater influence in foreign policy decisionmaking within democratic regimes than in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian leaders tend by definition to blend or confuse 

national interests with their own political objectives. The North Korean case 

offers the clearest contemporary example. In a democratic regime, when the 
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central values of the state come under threat, intelligence becomes a dominant factor in the decisionmaking process. 

Leslau finds that existing studies have difficulty in measuring and explaining the influence of intelligence on national decisionmaking. They fail to 

develop measurable variables from which one might learn when and how 

intelligence products actually influence presidential decisionmaking. He argues that such variables can be identified, given the variety of sources and 

levels of analysis that contribute to intelligence products for national leaders. 

Leslau also finds that research typically focuses on single, specific cases or a 

single decisionmaker, leading to unsubstantiated generalizations wrung from 

the unidimensional findings. A more systematic examination of presidential 

decisionmaking would take into account that intelligence products designed 

for executive use feed into the different levels of government. Few products 

receive presidential attention. 

In Latin America, the underdeveloped presidential institution typically includes an underdeveloped office of intelligence. The absent office of intelligence contributes to a lack of relevant input for strategic management of the 

state and of the government itself. This structural weakness can be addressed 

by a permanent organization installed at the presidential level to analyze information or intelligence and generate strategically relevant options that go 

beyond the perceived, short-term needs of the successive governments. Intelligence management in the executive branch of government remains weak in 

organizational, structural, procedural, and professional terms. 

Nevertheless, as a country inserts itself into the international environment, 

robust interagency coordination and an intelligence system with a set of specialized organizations beyond those of the military and police become mandatory for effective political leadership. Legislators also have the opportunity 

to mandate strategic intelligence products and a government-wide framework 

for institutional integration and intelligence management. 

Some Thoughts on the Essays in Section Two

The essays in this section will foster debate about intelligence management 

issues in the region. In suggesting areas for continuous improvement in the 
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region’s intelligence systems, the authors open doors to new mechanisms for 

executive oversight of national intelligence bureaucracies. 

Mariano Bartolome examines the challenges for strategic intelligence in South 

America. He recognizes the persistence of traditional views of conflict derived 

from the “realist” school of international relations. The principal axes of interest lie in defensive military capabilities, and more recently, in organized 

crime. Asymmetric challenges, especially terrorism, narcotrafficking, and trafficking in persons, complicate the strategic assessments that guide national 

development. Ultimately, his essay explains why any country in the region 

not only needs to have in place a mature intelligence system, but one that 

yields products specifically oriented toward national leaders.

Alvaro Venegas explores government economic intelligence, with a focus on 

Colombia. He recounts the lack of savvy management of the country’s economic security in various historical episodes, and argues for a more broadly 

conceived intelligence system. His proposal envisions the development of an 

integrated system for economic intellligence, with both horizontal and vertical connections across government and beyond. The system would optimize 

information processing and would focus on anticipatory intelligence and 

counterintelligence products. This proposal deserves careful consideration 

because of its thoroughness and because of the necessary political and social 

adjustments required for its implementation. 

Dan Elkins addresses one aspect of executive branch intelligence management 

rarely taken into account: He recommends a substantive dialog between intelligence resource managers and congressional representatives on budgetary 

and programmatic matters. The dialog would include a discussion of prospective resource tradeoffs among intelligence personnel, budgets, and the missions of intelligence organizations. Elkins identifies the tools, language, and 

practices that contribute to an efficient, transparent discussion of resource 

allocation. The author’s points rest on his considerable personal experience. 

In Latin America, the implementation of some of his ideas would contribute 

to the needed professionalism in intelligence activity. 

Mario Duarte and Grisel Capo address an issue that will require a good deal 

of professional reflection about the evolutionary status of intelligence in Central America. Their essay argues for the rejuvenation of civil affairs operations 
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as part of the changing military intelligence paradigm needed to confront 

militaristic, criminal threats in the region. They analyze the application of the 

intelligence function, and particularly the value of military intelligence resources, in states with weak security institutions, prominent social problems, 

and a structurally inadequate approach to addressing transnational organization crime. Although the particular need in Guatemala may be different from 

that in other countries, the approach proposed by the authors depicts social 

intelligence as a facet of economic development. Their new idea employs an 

intelligence methodology to support strategic planning, where intelligence 

products are oriented toward consumers who have a variety of crime prevention as well as defense objectives. This essay will generate some controversy 

because it links internal defense with public security, and accepts the use of 

intelligence for broad purposes. Despite the authors’ titular claim, a question 

remains whether social intelligence generated by a military organization constitutes a real paradigm change. 

Carolina Sancho Hirane examines the possibilities for intelligence cooperation 

within the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). She suggests how 

UNASUR members might emulate some aspects of the European Union’s experience in intelligence collaboration. She points out the problems facing intelligence services when they attempt to cooperate, especially in the absence of 

a tradition of sharing information or analysis within a democratic framework. 

For intelligence cooperation to succeed requires expertly shaped government 

agencies, together with a convergent political vision among prospective partners in sharing. These requirements further imply that the traditional threat 

orientation of intelligence should be combined with an orientation toward 

identifying opportunities and handling risks. 

Merely having intelligence organizations in place does not ensure the creation 

of useful products for decisionmakers at the highest levels of government. 

Having an intelligence system in place also does not suffice. Every intelligence 

agency by definition produces or should produce useful information. However, one must always ask who the user of that information might be. Intelligence agencies offer little value without guidelines in place to promote quality 

analysis and to generate products that suit consumer priorities. Judicial and 

legislative controls and regular financial audits also play a part in underwriting the efficacy of national intelligence. 
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Latin American national intelligence exhibits several deficiencies, some of 

them addressed by the essays in this section. First, strengthening the culture 

of intelligence among the political elite, and especially among those in government positions, will promote debate and improve proposals to employ intelligence wisely. The best proposals will aim to resolve strategic or structural 

problems, rather than the short-term issues facing individual governments. 

Second, a permanent advisory staff would allow for periodically drafting detailed presidential directives to adjust the intelligence bureaucracy.297 This 

staff could review the proposals by Bartolome, Venegas and Elkins, for example. This ideally placed, professional staff organization can also produce and 

tailor intelligence for the presidential decisionmaking process, independent 

of any other useful information that comes to the president. It is also where 

appropriate criteria for intelligence efficacy and efficiency can be paired with 

political, economic, and judicial needs in a normative framework. 

Chilean Professor Guillermo Holzmann holds a master’s degree in political 

science, and is a doctoral student in American studies, with a specialization 

in international relations. He teaches at the Universidad de Valparaíso de Chile 

and the Universidad Adolfo Ibañez de Chile. He also serves as director of the 

Nodo Chile de Escenarios y Estrategias (EYE), was a founding member of Centro Latinoamericano de Globalización y Prospectiva, and participates in the Red 

Latinoamericana de Prospectiva. He has also served as associate director of the 

Instituto de Asuntos Públicos, and as creator and coordinator of the curriculum 

for Metodología de Análisis de Inteligencia at the Universidad de Chile. He has 

advised the International Development Bank’s Program for the Intelligence 

Education of Customs Officials. He regularly appears as a commentator on 

national and international radio and television programs. He also serves as director-member of ANALYTYKA Consultants. Email: guillermo.holzmann@

gmail.com; guillermo.holzman@uv.cl. 
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Improving Producer-Consumer Relationships 

at the Executive 

Level: A Continuing Challenge 

Manuel I. Balcazar Villareal

Intelligence services always prefer a good relationship with those who seek 

out and use their products. Contentiousness in this relationship arises from 

the different environments in which each “side” operates. The environment 

and circumstances in which the two sides interact can give rise either to greater mutual understanding or to a conflicted and inefficient process in which 

both sides blame each other and intelligence cannot fulfill its main role of 

decisionmaking support. 

Organizations and Policies

Although they both perform public service, intelligence producers and consumers represent different social environments. Whereas most producers develop their careers within intelligence organizations, in which secrecy and 

discretion are hallmark doctrinal principles, politicians mature in a public, 

open environment with unending dialog and social interaction. 

These differing origins highlight a principal difference between their two 

worlds and affects the relationship between producers and consumers. In 

contrast with politicians, intelligence services tend to have a well-developed 

organizational culture that favors the consideration of long-term, strategic 

issues. Naturally, this cultural preference distances them from an interest in 

short-term political concerns and the daily crises facing politicians. Politicians nonetheless expect their intelligence services to help resolve daily issues 

because they attribute extraordinary, even if mythical, capabilities to the intelligence services. 

In further contrast with intelligence officials, politicians usually espouse partisan social ideologies, a response to election mandates to resolve particular 

social needs. In some cases, because of their background or career aspirations, 

politicians choose to have little or no dialog with national intelligence officials, which can lead the former to develop their own approaches to problems 
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without regard to intelligence input, thus inhibiting the effectiveness of the 

intelligence services. 

Differences in Time Management

Time management by intelligence officials differs radically from that of politicians. Although intelligence officials, operating within their organizations, 

have a sense of history and permanence, a political leader can count on only 

four or six years in which to exert direct influence, and seemingly even less, 

given the enduring nature of many national problems. This condition confers 

on intelligence producers and their organizations a sense of transcendence, 

and perhaps a certain feeling of autonomy with respect to problems, given 

that they are not required to solve them. After all, such problems can take 

on political, social, or media overtones that are generally de-linked from the 

production of intelligence. Political leaders have a greater sense of urgency as 

they take on crises or national emergencies that need to be resolved quickly. 

In this environment, it is normal for consumers to request products that address specific problems. This approach means that producers have to adopt a 

short or medium-term focus, thereby diverting them from being able to fully 

develop a strategic intelligence capability in the national context. Additionally, political leaders tend to operate with an eye to resolving problems quickly, 

in light of their full daily agendas. In this setting, intelligence organizations 

constitute only a part of a politician’s broad information environment, and 

consultation with intelligence occurs mainly in emergency situations involving security, diplomatic or humanitarian issues.

All this means that national, and even strategic, intelligence capabilities remain devoted to tactical- and operational-level concerns. Intelligence organizations do gain some attention when they prepare responsive products in this 

environment, but their preferred strategic focus remains comparatively unused. Little space exists for strategic intelligence products because they do not 

help win elections. A politician typically finds it difficult to capitalize politically on the strategic decisions that might be recommended by intelligence. 

Perceptual Dilemmas

The main problem in smoothing the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers lies in the perceptions and expectations each side has of 
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the other. It seems that there are more missed opportunities for approaching 

each other than there are realized opportunities. 

At times, producers may overly accommodate consumers, given that the budget and health of intelligence organizations depends on the resource decisions 

made by politicians. For example, intelligence may always agree to a politician’s demand for products, without giving due attention to the feasibility, 

impact, or utility of the product in the eyes of the ultimate decisionmaker. 

An eagerness to meet a request for a particular product may not support 

professional development of intelligence capabilities because it makes those 

dedicated to the production of intelligence appear as “minions” or “accessories” to the power needs of the consumer, rather than professionals dedicated 

to producing relevant products. 

When consumers and intelligence producers communicate and enjoy mutual 

confidence, a greater opportunity exists for the creation of useful and valued 

products. On-time delivery and good production qualities play a central role in 

gaining the interest and attention of a decisionmaker in a particular product. 

The perceptions of intelligence held by a particular consumer can help or 

hinder intelligence bureaucracies. This observation extends to other government offices beyond the executive branch. The legislative branch, in providing 

checks and balances to executive power, can bring about or update national 

policy to protect the independence of the intelligence services. However, a 

legislature may also put in place a restrictive information policy that in the 

long term may only reduce national intelligence capabilities. 

Uncertainties on the part of consumers and producers always lend a contentious air to the producer-consumer relationship. If producers do not receive 

useful feedback they will not know whether their products were useful in decisionmaking. Consumers rarely know how much detail they could or should 

know about an issue, a consideration that becomes more critical as the operational level of intelligence becomes more prominent. Naturally, a remedy for 

some uncertainties lies in improving communication and mutual confidence. 

Resolving One Dilemma

Modernizing the concepts and principles that apply to intelligence organizations might bring a broader, cross-cutting (transverse) perspective to the 
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function. That is, intelligence may usefully expand its scope to interact with 

state governments and public offices beyond the security and defense sectors. 

This would create a “second generation” of intelligence to transcend the traditional paradigm of the 20th century, with its centralized focus. It may be 

that a transversal focus would help strengthen intelligence culture and give 

it a more solid, socially relevant foundation to reduce the distance between 

producers and consumers. This broader focus should automatically result in 

a more strategic approach to producing intelligence. Such products could 

resonate with the aspirations of politicians who have a mandate to improve 

lives across a whole country. 

Conclusion

Of the components of the intelligence cycle, exploitation and dissemination 

may have the greatest impact on the relationship between producers and consumer. By temporarily interrupting the cycle at these junctures, the process of 

constructing intelligence products confers value to this relationship.

Improving the relationship between consumers and producers calls for mutual learning and continuous upgrading of intelligence capabilities. In support 

of these objectives, both sides have the opportunity to adopt a modern and 

professional approach to the management of intelligence.

Manuel I. Balcazar Villarreal recently served as Deputy National Security 

Director in the office of the President of Mexico. 
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Between Fear and Need: An Essay on 

Historical Interpretation

Jorge L. Jouroff

The Need for Information

The worldwide globalization process, which does not foresee the end of history 

but its continuation, gives rise to the same problems we have seen historically, 

but in another form and at the worldwide level. The information revolution, 

and in particular the use of the Internet, have made more information publicly 

accessible than ever before, and at an exponential rate of increase.

The avalanche of information and the need to understand the world call for 

two countermeasures: ensuring information quality; that is, knowing how to 

select relevant information; and applying an appropriate analytic methodology or conceptual framework.

New technology brings plenty of information to our attention, but we need 

to know its meaning, just as any science must know how to understand its 

data stream. Analysis transforms information into intelligence for elected 

leaders to make decisions. The inherent complexity of analysis argues that 

the practice of making decisions need not be based on intuition or supposed 

“evident truths,” but on real knowledge. Strategic intelligence, in its various 

dimensions, provides real knowledge.298

Like all intelligence, the strategic variety also presupposes the accumulation, 

systematization, and management of knowledge. Strategic intelligence necessarily involves a time period greater than the tenure of one government. 

It brings some stability to an intelligence system. Stability has a different 

meaning in different historical periods, but always involves a certain political 

consensus.

Knowledge Management

If we accept the idea that a government should guide, and not only manage 

state affairs, objective knowledge of social processes appears indispensable. 

The production of scientific knowledge presupposes not only the gathering 

of data, but its interpretation through an ordering process that allows us to 
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understand the world. Possible tendencies in the development of scenarios 

become predictable with that understanding, and guide us toward best possible outcomes. 

Systematic, long-term, and patient information gathering and analysis distinguish strategic intelligence as a form of knowledge production. Knowledge has 

value for advising not just successive governmental administrations, but more 

permanent elements of government as well.

The Democratic System of Government

A democratic system needs to maintain a certain equilibrium among the 

branches of government to guarantee its continuation. The mishandling of 

power through secret, unilateral, behind-the-scenes decisionmaking characterized the era of empires. Intelligence in the same era did not escape this 

malaise. Today, greater transparency and civilian control exemplify power 

sharing among the branches of government and can create public confidence 

in political and institutional actions. The possibility of failure in the application of checks and balances raises the eternal question: Who controls the 

controllers?

Self-governance or control mediated by the ethical perspective of government 

officials provides one possible answer to this question. Ethical actions derive 

from education and from the responsibility that comes with decisionmaking 

autonomy within the specialized information and intelligence services. This 

possibility has been tried with little success in Uruguay.

Another answer to the question would rely on strengthening institutional 

controls. From executive branch control of its agencies to legislative control 

of the same agencies, oversight (a term perhaps more suitable than “control”) 

tries to establish a balance between the needs of the government and the 

guarantee of individual freedom. The concept of oversight implies that intelligence agencies benefit the state and society at large, rather than only acting 

on behalf of successive political administrations.

The democratic process dictates that whoever supervises government activity 

needs to understand the full context of that activity. This proviso helps stabilize the precarious balance between necessary secrecy and the protection of 

democratic rights and freedoms.
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An implied equilibrium exists between the democratic system itself and its 

ability to convince various actors of the societal value of stability. Oversight 

of intelligence helps maintain stability among the branches of government. 

However, in order to build effective state agencies, the government’s need 

for information will from time to time prevail over the fear of governmental 

action. 

Latin Americans fear autonomous intelligence agencies, given such agencies’ 

repressive role in 20th-century Southern Cone dictatorships. Importantly, 

these situations resulted from political decisions, and not from decisions by 

agencies that “went rogue” or became autonomous, although the risk of that 

happening always exists. In that era, decisions were made by political actors, 

first by civilians and then by military officials who were acting as national 

decisionmakers.

The democratic vision can prevail when intelligence activity is held in check, 

even as the rights of the intelligence system itself are respected. Government 

does require a strategic perspective from new or redesigned intelligence 

agencies. 

Brief Comments on the Substantive Essays

This book contributes directly to the debate about intelligence in a democracy, without succumbing to the taboos of earlier years. It completes the contribution of two earlier works on the professionalization and democratization 

of intelligence in the Americas.299

The essays in this second section of the book demonstrate the variety of ways 

in which the management of intelligence agencies has developed, with attendant problems and solutions. At the same time, it manages to address 

issues in a way that goes beyond the individual concerns or nationality of the 

numerous authors. 

Strategic Intelligence

The Argentine Mariano Bartolome begins his essay with a stirring observation: With only minor exceptions, no real strategic intelligence production 

exists in all of the Southern Cone. He points out that in the era of dictatorships, intelligence likewise existed only for operational purposes. This does 
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not mean that intelligence personnel could not produce strategic intelligence, 

only that the government did not invite their input to decisionmaking. 

The problem of poorly developed strategic intelligence relates to its definition. Bartolome acknowledges three competing definitions from the Argentine experience. Intelligence becomes strategic in three different situations: 1) 

when the product depends on inputs from other, separate organizations or 

agencies (military organizations, for example, in the case of civilian-produced 

strategic intelligence); 2) when the product addresses issues of medium- or 

long-term concern; and 3) when the product takes on particular importance 

or relevance. To simplify the concept, strategic intelligence informs a country’s highest-level decisionmakers and transcends immediate circumstances to 

identify long-term threats and opportunities, whether existing or potential.

Brazil offers a good example. This country’s national development traces to 

the so-called “Sorbonne School” of authors who thought of their country in 

geopolitical terms. This perspective was projected particularly by Travassos 

and by the military men Golbery Da Couto e Silva and Meira Mattos.300

Similar initiatives appeared in Argentina and Chile.301 In Chile, naval 

officials engaged in geopolitical thinking, but in contrast with Brazil, this 

country did not have the material basis for transformng such thinking into 

physical and political reality. Southern Cone geopolitical thinking took place 

in consonance with global power shifts. With its continental proportions and 

persistent geopolitical outlook, Brazil became identified with this school of 

thought. It also combined short-term with long-term planning, starting with 

the 1964 military coup and continuing to the present. Bartolome notes that 

Brazil has continued its geopolitical thinking and has put in place a set of 

strategic-level governmental agencies.

Although only the larger and more powerful countries have developed a 

framework for strategic intelligence, globalization makes it a useful tool for all 

countries. Paraguay and Uruguay have begun to reshape their defense and intelligence sectors with an eye toward establishing strategic thinking. As noted 

in Bartolome’s essay:

Strategic intelligence provides a fundamental tool for the 

modern state to prevent, combat, and neutralize transnational threats. These threats “require enhanced understanding, 
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information and analysis, presented in a timely and efficient 

manner to policy framers who can then make the best decisions.” Luis Alberto Sallaberry, head of the Brazilian intelligence agency (ABIN), summed up the role of intelligence 

as “strategic counsel” to the president of the republic.

The advisory role underlines the idea that strategic intelligence fulfills an analytic rather than operational purpose. 

Latin America does not enjoy an abundance of highly trained human resources, but it does have the capability to develop human intelligence and 

to structure interagency cooperation inside of each country and regionally 

to optimize intelligence capabilities. The organizational framework for intelligence production affects those capabilities. Bartolome captures these effects 

succinctly: “Whatever shape cooperation may take will be influenced by the 

structure of the intelligence organizations involved. Do the agencies in a community engage in collaborative tasks, or alternatively, do they form a system 

where a lead agency exercises control over cooperation or collaboration?”

Typically, several intelligence agencies operate within a single country, but 

not as a coordinated system or community. A community suggests something 

beyond the mere existence of a set of agencies, to include coordination and 

complementarity, as well as interconnections among the constituent parts. A 

community also suggests the existence of an information collection plan at 

the national level, with attention to defined priorities.

Another question to resolve is whether an intelligence system can maintain 

continuous coordination, or whether the coordination will require an arrangement whereby one particular agency will become the “lead” organization. The various alternatives and their implications are now under discussion 

in legislative chambers across the region.302 The debate about intelligence 

organization design or redesign can also involve the areas of defense and security, with repercussions for a variety of government organizations, to include 

the possibility of their resubordination. 

The essay by the Colombian Alvaro Venegas addresses government economic 

intelligence, or “the knowledge resulting from collection, compilation, evaluation, dissemination and protection of information related to national and 
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international economic phenomena and actors.” He expressly differentiates 

economic intelligence from economic espionage. Economic intelligence requires the formation of governmental analytic teams as a way to contribute to 

decisionmaking at the national level.

He expands the classic intelligence cycle of collection, analysis and 

dissemination by adopting a theory of intelligence developed by Jennifer 

Sims. Sims adds the functions of anticipation and manipulation to the 

cycle to incorporate the concept of outwitting and weakening the adversary. 

Venegas concludes that “Sims offers a systematic means of measuring success 

in intelligence activity, and for evaluating an intelligence case study.”

The Venegas essay aims to make the value of economic intelligence apparent 

to government decisionmakers. His essay demonstrates to any reader that 

intelligence should not limit itself to the classic or traditional concept of “security threat,” but instead encompass a country’s economic health. Intelligence can help identify opportunities and sketch possible scenarios to ensure 

economic health. 

Dan Elkins, an experienced practitioner, presents a careful and pragmatic 

outline of steps toward achieving accountable financial management of intelligence resources. His approach presumes the existence of a sophisticated 

resource management system, like that of the United States. Latin America 

has no equal in terms of resources devoted to the intelligence mission. Thus, 

his concepts conform only to the North American reality. Still, he is able to 

solidify for everyone the idea that financial resources management treats an 

intelligence budget as a “numerical expression of policy preferences.” Elkins’s 

“business” approach to financial management decisionmaking for now remains at odds with typical practices in the southerly latitudes. 

If South American bureaucrats prove themselves able to apply his method 

adaptively, and not merely copy it, they will have implemented his artful 

guidance. Elkins’s four levels of financial management guidance correspond 

precisely with the governmental management levels Goncalves identified in 

the first section of the present work: 1) agency—internal to a particular intelligence agency; 2) executive—carried out within the executive branch by 

nonintelligence entities of the administration and by the department or ministry to which the intelligence agency is subordinated; 3) external—exerted 
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by the judicial branch, by the legislative branch, and/or by an independent 

entity; and 4) popular—where the concerns of individual citizens or civil 

society organizations are addressed.

Elkins also distinguishes between effectiveness and efficiency. South Americans are accustomed to measuring success by the outcome of a mission, regardless of the costs that go into achieving it. Elkins poses a series of questions 

whose answers indicate both effectiveness of operational success and efficiency

of budgetary management. Efficiency applies to the use of appropriated and 

obligated funds. Together, effectiveness and efficiency bring continuity to the 

management of intelligence. As Latin American countries continue to build 

or redesign their intelligence systems, incorporating experiences from outside 

the region should prove useful. 

Grisel Capo and M. Duarte write about the historic antisubversive role of a 

Guatemalan military civic-information program in the mid-20th century. It 

contributed to the government’s strategy to win popular support. The program ended with the establishment of a military dictatorship. The authors 

show how the civic-action program began as a specialized intelligence effort 

to study the social conditions of the population. Although it operated under 

the banner of the infamous “national security doctrine,” the program aimed 

to prevent violence. 

The authors propose that the Guatemalan government reinvent this early experience by applying social intelligence against new threats such as narcotrafficking. They suggest that police responsibility for prevention of violence in 

local communities be reallocated to the armed forces, given the elevated level 

of social tension that now exists. 

Carolina Sancho Hirane of Chile traces nascent intelligence cooperation 

within the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The emergence 

of intelligence cooperation has to contend with the variety of national establishments, each with different missions. Nonetheless, two realities spur cooperation: growing globalization obliges each country to share information, and 

most countries share the same threats and challenges.

Cooperation depends on regional agreements and alliances to make it 

viable. Regional and bilateral cooperative agreements at times overlap with 
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arrangements sponsored by international organizations. Two subregional 

alliances operate in this way: the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) 

and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN).

Sancho Hirane compares the status of intelligence cooperation in the European Union (EU) with that of MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR features nascent cooperation in criminal intelligence, which she distinguishes from antiterrorism 

cooperation. She points to the American Police Community (AMERIPOL) 

and the Latin American and Caribbean Community of Police Intelligence 

(CLACIP) as candidates to spearhead the deepening of intelligence cooperation, although she notes that the influence of these two multilateral organizations on governmental intelligence cooperation lacks strength because their 

cooperation does not take place as part of a political process. EU intelligence 

cooperation, in contrast, has grown because of a convergent political environment. Post-World War II customs unions and mutually beneficial industrial 

development combined with a U.S.-sponsored European alliance (NATO) 

to create a framework for cooperation. The alliance involved mutual defense 

policies and therefore, intelligence cooperation. All of this occurred despite 

the changing missions of intelligence through time, precisely because the idea 

of a united Europe remained in place.

Because unique national interests do not disappear in the midst of common 

interests that stem from globalization, cooperation can and should be widespread but never absolute (or unlimited, as Sancho Hirane says). Cooperation 

in intelligence includes not only the exchange of information but also the capability to work together for the sake of common interests. In Latin America, 

the process of intelligence cooperation that began with bilateral agreements, 

and that has evolved through MERCOSUR and more recently, UNASUR, 

remains stable and under construction.

Jorge L. Jouroff studied economics in the Department of Economic Sciences 

and History at Uruguay’s Universidad de la Republica. He has served as a representative on the Central Program Committee of the Frente Amplio political 

party, and as member and adviser to the committees on national defense and 

citizen security of the Uruguayan Congress. He has been director general of 

the Secretariat of the Ministry of the Interior and has worked in the office 

of the President of the Republic for the National Emergency System. He 

has also worked as general manager of SEMEJI (special justice program for 
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juveniles) and served as an adviser to the United Nations Development Program. Presently, he is a professor at the Police School for Advanced Studies 

(Escuela Policial de Estudios Superiores). He is also a private-sector consultant. 

His work includes the book Public Security and Human Rights [Seguridad 

Pública y Derechos Humanos] (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 

2005) and an essay on “Intelligence and Culture: A Proposal for Uruguay,” 

in Democratización de la función de inteligencia (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009). Email: admijor@adinet.com.uy and 

jorgejou@yahoo.com.

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Strategic Intelligence Requirements for the 

Security of Latin America 

Mariano Bartolome 

Introduction

In South America, national intelligence receives little attention from social 

scientists. In the author’s home country of Argentina, with the exception of 

Ugarte’s work, the few academic works address police or tactical intelligence 

and business intelligence.303 Because of this inattention, citizens remain ignorant of what intelligence is, and have only a distorted collective image of 

what it can be. 

A predominantly negative perception of national intelligence certainly comes 

from state intelligence organizations across the region having operated in the 

1980s as instruments of the country’s authoritarian regimes. These organizations led the way in violating the civil rights of individual citizens. 

The democratization that began across South America about three decades 

ago has facilitated civilian control over intelligence organizations, to include 

the training and education of specialists and the design of a professional career path for those who remain employed as state functionaries. Nonetheless, 

the region lacks a political culture to sustain the legitimate role of intelligence 

in democracy.304

Despite the consolidation of democracy across much of South America, a 

distorted view of intelligence remains in place. This view sees agencies using 

publicly funded human, financial, and material resources to achieve goals 

associated with short-term objectives of the regime in power rather than in 

support of national interests. Further, in the popular imagination, intelligence organizations remain exempt from the application of controls and the 

corresponding accountability characteristic of a healthy democracy.305

Intelligence-related news feeds these perceptions, as when the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) began, without judicial authorization, to intercept 

telephone conversations of the president of the republic and members of the 

Supreme Court.306 In Venezuela the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN) 

made the news for intimidating and harassing European legislative officials 
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who had come to this Caribbean nation to monitor the transparency of national elections and the freedom of expression of communications media not 

aligned with the government.307 SEBIN, under the guidance of Cuban intelligence specialists, also allegedly intercepted emails of thousands of Venezuelans and their countrymen living in Miami. Intelligence collection targets 

included activists, newspaper reporters, military officials, Venezuelan diplomatic officials working abroad, and known opposition leaders.308 The most 

notable case occurred in Colombia, where the Administrative Department 

of Security (DAS) took part in internal espionage against dozens of congressional officials and officials of the opposition Polo Democrático and Partido 

Liberal, as well as judges and civil society leaders. Of three DAS ex-directors 

prosecuted for internal espionage, one received 25 years in prison.309

A careful definition of intelligence would establish the reach and limits of 

the concept and combat negative perceptions of intelligence based on poorly 

informed judgments. A recent definition declares that intelligence “supplies 

processed information in a timely and useful fashion about a specific situation, and optimizes the decisionmaking process.” In other words, intelligence 

activity provides a consumer not only information, but also some specific insight that allows a reduction in uncertainty, thereby facilitating the decision 

process.310 Specific acts of compilation and analysis build an informational 

pyramid from a base of raw data to an apex of well-considered knowledge.311

When this process refers to the actions of a government, one can employ the 

labels “national intelligence” or “state intelligence,” terms widely understood 

and agreed to across South America. However, any consensus disappears with 

the introduction of the term “strategic intelligence.”

State intelligence activities exhibit extreme differences across South America. 

The differences arise from the nature of organizations involved (including police agencies); the degree of control over intelligence by the legislative branch; 

the relationship of the judicial branch to intelligence (in restricting intrusive 

intelligence actions); and degree of military participation in internal intelligence activities.312

What makes intelligence “strategic”? From the author’s Argentine experience,313 the adjective applies in three different situations. First, when the 

intelligence product depends on inputs from other, separate organizations or 
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agencies, as when the organization charged with strategic intelligence production lacks the capability to gather the needed information, instead depending 

on intelligence created previously by institutions that make up the intelligence system or community. Second, when the product addresses issues of 

medium- or long-term concern; and third, when the product takes on particular importance or relevance. Strategic intelligence informs a country’s highest-level decisionmakers and transcends immediate circumstances to identify 

long-term threats and opportunities, whether existing or potential.314

Given their diverse environments, not all South American countries produce 

strategic intelligence. Even among countries that do, the product may not be 

so labeled, and the institutions responsible for it display notable differences 

from one another. 

The particular characteristics of strategic intelligence activity in South America influence the approach taken in the present essay, which addresses the 

following question: What explicit and implicit requirements exist for strategic 

intelligence efficacy in any South American country? 

The Dynamic Security Environment of South America

South America takes two approaches to security, depending on the analytical lens employed. From the traditional, Westphalian point of view, security 

questions center around inter-state dialog, and the military plays a key role. 

This model avoids the truly multidimensional nature of the security phenomenon. The security environment appears much less peaceful when viewed in 

nontraditional or unconventional terms. 

Three traits characterize unconventional threats: nonstate actors take the lead; 

they do not always use violence to carry out policies; and when they do employ violence, it occurs outside of the traditional formats of Clausewitzian 

logic. That is, conflict becomes asymmetric or heterogenous. Heterogeneity 

develops through a process of “securitization,”315 defined as “strategic uncertainty” or the “globalization of fear.”316 

When dangers or threats have no clear origin and no territorial or political 

limits, the perception of insecurity becomes permanent, touching all individuals in a society. As a function of their scale of operations as well as their complexity, terrorism and organized crime dominate the South American scene, 
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and their identities and actions blend together. As an example, the Peruvian 

Sendero Luminoso (SL) turned from terrorism to narcotrafficking in the mid1990s, but then reverted to their original practice of armed action in the 

Valleys of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (VRAE). They also confirmed their 

transnational nature by extending operations outside of Peru as they began to 

engage in bank robberies in Bolivia and sell drugs in low-income suburbs of 

Buenos Aires.317 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) also 

conduct complex transnational criminal operations. Evidence for this claim 

comes from information found on personal computers retrieved by Colombian forces in the March 2008 raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador.318

Other groups in the region whose goals and operational capabilities remain 

unclear also resort to violence. Among them are the Revolutionary Cells of 

the Mauricio Morales Brigade in Chile; the Carapaica Revolutionary Liberation Movement of Venezuela; and especially, the Paraguayan Popular Army 

(EPP). The EPP includes prior members of the Patria Libre party, and though 

they adhere to Marxist-Leninist principles, their actions center on obtaining 

money by kidnapping prominent cattlemen.319

According to the Organization of American States, criminal violence has attained the status of a “pandemic” that annually costs the region’s citizens more 

than $16 billion in U.S. dollars. Although the region holds only 8 percent 

of the world’s population, it accounts for more than 40 percent of homicides and almost 70 percent of the planet’s annual total of kidnappings for 

money.320 A nongovernment organization that specializes in urban violence 

finds that 24 of the 25 most violent cities in the world are in Latin America. 

The list is headed by the Honduran city of San Pedro Sula, with a homicide 

rate greater than 159 cases per 100,000 inhabitants.321

Each criminal organization in Latin America exhibits a different level of intensity. The illicit production and trafficking of drugs stand out as especially 

intensive activities. The region produces the entire world’s supply of cocaine 

in addition to marginal amounts of heroin and cannabis. The United Nations 

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) claims that the land area devoted to 

the illegal cultivation of coca amounts to about 149,000 hectares (368,000 

acres—about the area of a typical county in the United States—although 

of course the dispersed distribution of the coca-producing fields makes that 

comparison misleading. Of this total, 41 percent is in Colombia, a percentage 
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similar to that in Peru, with Bolivia accounting for the remaining 20 percent. 

Of course, the cocaine produced by these three Andean countries represents 

only a small share of worldwide illicit drug production. Although the value of 

the region’s illicit commerce can only be estimated, the UNODC calculates 

the street value of South American cocaine as between $75 and 100 billion 

annually.322

This transnational narcotrafficking scourge and the violence that accompanies 

it continues to expand. Beyond FARC and Sendero Luminoso involvement, 

“emerging criminal groups” of Colombia (known as BACRIM) and criminal 

cartels of Brazil have entered the picture. The government of Colombia categorizes BACRIM as a new, armed enemy of the state. Narcotrafficking remains the foundation of their criminal activity, today involving about 7,000 

recruits, about the same as the FARC.323 The crime cartels of Brazil, meanwhile, operate in the favelas of important cities. From those strongholds, they 

manage drug trafficking, with active interest in prostitution, gaming, arms 

trafficking, contraband, and extortion. Sao Paulo’s Primer Comando de la 

Capital (PCC) and Rio de Janeiro’s Comando Vermelho (CV) have become 

especially notorious. 

Arms trafficking in Latin America also creates a clear transnational impact. 

The Center for Defense Information of Washington, DC estimates that up 

to 80 million weapons—half of the world’s illegally transferred arms—are 

in circulation in Latin America.324 Illegal arms flow to South America from 

diverse source countries. Some come from parts of the former Soviet Union 

(especially Eastern Europe); some come from other parts of Europe. To a 

degree, these pathways reverse cocaine-trafficking routes to the Old World. 

Entry points are usually the port cities of Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, 

and especially Nicaragua. Arms transferred illegally from military and police 

arsenals across the region add to the totals. They are stolen from government 

stockpiles or purchased directly from government officials. 

Illicit transfers add variety to the inventory of arms in the hands of terrorist and criminal groups operating in South America. The arms range from 

handguns and submachine guns to modern rocket launchers such as the Saab 

Bofors AT-4 (which have been captured from the FARC). Various 5.56 mm 

and 7.62 mm assault rifles join MAG-30 Russian antiaircraft machineguns 

and RPG rocket launchers. Sendero Luminoso uses rocket launchers to down 
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military helicopters. The capture of worldwide arms merchants Monzer alKassar and Viktor Bout, in 2007 and 2008 respectively, allowed us to understand the levels that this illegal trade could attain in South America when 

international mechanisms for detection and interdiction fail: Strela-II and 

Igla portable antiaircraft missile launchers (MANPADs) of Russian origin 

now complement the FARC arsenal.325

Although South America plays only a marginal role in human trafficking, 

it remains an especially vile scourge. Human trafficking sends people from 

South America to North America (the United States and Canada), Europe 

(especially Spain, Italy, and France), as well as to Asia (Japan and Korea).326 

Strategic Intelligence and the Security Challenge

in South America

Public policy will benefit from optimized strategic intelligence. Strategic intelligence can prevent,327 combat, and neutralize transnational threats. These 

threats “require enhanced understanding, information and analysis, presented in a timely and efficient manner to policy framers who can then make the 

best decisions.”328 Luis Alberto Sallaberry, head of the Brazilian intelligence 

agency (ABIN), summed up the role of intelligence as “strategic counsel” to 

the president of the republic.329 In general, the countries of South America 

have begun to acquire an adequate strategic intelligence capability. 

Paraguay offers an example of this trend. President Lugo ordered defense 

modernization and a review of its responsibilities, including creating an organization suitable for carrying out strategic intelligence. Responding to this 

presidential directive, for the first time the Defense Ministry established an 

intelligence curriculum for the armed forces. The coursework aimed to prepare military personnel to combat organized crime activity by the Paraguayan 

Popular Army and others. In inaugurating the intelligence course, General 

Lezcano Davalos, director of the Senior Strategic Studies Institute (IAEE), explained that “[t]he purpose of this course of study is to professionally prepare 

the specialized human resources needed to confront emerging threats.”330

In Uruguay, the National Defense Law of 2010 has reinforced the push for 

modernization. This law provides a framework for actions by the General 

Staff of the Defense Ministry (ESMADE), as well as for the police-oriented 
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National Information and Intelligence Directorate (DNII) of the Interior 

Ministry. The leader of ESMADE now has the duty to use intelligence capabilities to alert political authorities about threats to the well-being of the state. 

Those intelligence capabilities reside in the National Directorate for State Intelligence (DINACIE), created in 1999 within the Defense Ministry. Among 

other things, ESMADE is to monitor narcoterrorism, large-scale migration, 

health epidemics, threats to the natural environment, trafficking in humans 

and human organs, the breakout of conflict generated by social inequality, the 

increase of marginalized populations, arms trafficking, large-scale electronic 

funds transfers, the transport of toxic waste, technological terrorism, and industrial espionage.331

The DNII’s chief officer has acknowledged that the production of strategic 

intelligence now constitutes its main mission. In the eyes of the DNII, strategic 

intelligence identifies risks and threats to the liberties and rights of citizens, the 

well-being of the state, and the stability of democratic institutions. This type 

of intelligence contributes to a government strategy that minimizes or avoids 

risks to the interests and sovereignty of Uruguay.332 Curiosly, the head of the 

DNII believes that his institution owns the requirement, even as DINACIE, 

by most readings, has the obligation to produce strategic intelligence for the 

country.333

The internal espionage scandals that surrounded Colombia’s Administrative 

Department of Security (DAS) resulted in its dissolution by President Juan 

Manuel Santos. The new agency replacing the DAS is the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI). As a civilian institution under the authority of the 

president of the republic, the DNI, in contrast to the old DAS, carries out intelligence and counterintelligence functions only. This specialization should 

allow for the development of a strategic intelligence perspective. The DAS’s 

other functions have been transferred to other state institutions. The Technical Investigatory Corps (CTI) of the attorney general’s office, the Ministry of 

the Interior, the Ministry of International Relations, and the National Police 

now employ thousands of reassigned DAS employees.334 Many of the former 

DAS employees provided VIP protection and immigration control.

It remains difficult to envision a single, typical strategic intelligence model 

for South American countries because of the heterogeneous intelligence institutions across the region. However, the present review finds some common 
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ground in four basic conditions that need to be met by strategic intelligence 

institutions in South America, if those organizations expect to address the 

transnational threats that cloud the security horizon. 

1. Recapitalization of human intelligence (HUMINT) will certify its importance even as technological advances boost the value of signal and image 

sources—both mainly satellite-based. Limitations and prerequisites do exist for 

capturing signals or obtaining images through technical means and can be overcome by human sources. Images and signals collected by technological means 

have intrinsic value, but remain insufficient for assessing the political meaning 

of information. HUMINT information often provides the data necessary for 

imparting a critical understanding of the principal independent variable in any 

analysis at the strategic scale. HUMINT is generally the best way—and sometimes the only way—to obtain information about actors who make decisions 

within a restricted circle. Small groups can develop plans in a secretive and selfserving way, penetrable only by long-term intelligence operations.335

Colombian experience in combating the FARC illustrates the importance 

of an adequate HUMINT capability, complemented by signal and image 

intelligence. Some examples include the takedown of Raul Reyes (Operation 

Phoenix-March 2008); Jorge Briceño (Operation Sodoma-September 2010); 

Alfonso Cano (Operation Odysseus-October 2011); and the rescue of expresidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt (Operation Jaque-June 2008).

The controversial Operation Phoenix grew from a complex intelligence operation. Intelligence preparation began in February 2007, when the Colombian 

National Police activated seven special groups. The groups acted separately 

to locate each member of the FARC Secretariat. One of these teams moved 

to Putumayo, near Ecuador, because of Reyes sightings there. Patient intelligence work began to yield results when an undercover agent gained the 

confidence of a security team protecting the insurgent chief. 

Accumulated knowledge of Reyes’s location and activity indicated the imminent creation of an insurgent camp on the Ecuadorian side of the border. 

Colombian agents obtained and monitored the satellite telephone number 

used by the guerrilla group, and fixed the camp’s location. The Colombian 

Air Force launched laser-guided bombs, followed by helicopter-borne army 

and police commandos.336
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2. To counter transnational threats, strategic intelligence requires two types of 

institutional cooperation: 1) between institutions or agencies within a state, 

and 2), between two or more countries, either directly or within the framework of an international organization. In the first environment, intelligence 

analysis requires shared interdisciplinary interpretations to capture the complexity of an issue.337 This helps limit analytic distortions that can arise from 

allegiance to traditional viewpoints or groupthink.338

Intelligence cooperation reflects the structure of the organizations involved. 

Do the agencies in a community engage collegially, or does a lead agency 

exercise control over cooperation and collaboration?339 The degree of centralization in an intelligence system also represents an important variable. 

South American initiatives contribute to the deepening and optimization of 

interagency cooperation in intelligence. Three concrete examples come from 

Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay. 

Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez’s administration created the post 

of national intelligence coordinator in the office of the president of the 

republic. The coordinator has access to all information available to the state’s 

intelligence organizations.340 An ad hoc commission in Ecuador found 

that the Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces Joint Command had 

demonstrated weak intelligence capabilities in 2008 because of the lack of 

coordination among military elements. The report generated structural reform 

in Ecuador, highlighted by the creation of the National Intelligence Secretariat 

(SENAIN).341 Colombia then created a National Security Council, reporting 

directly to the president of the republic. It coordinates the intelligence work 

of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Relations, Interior, and Justice.342

Security in any country is now a shared responsibility among friendly states. 

The United Nations also promotes cooperative action in international security.343 A cooperative approach to global security rests on three pillars: that 

today’s threats do not recognize or respect national borders; that the sources 

of threat are interconnected; and that they need to be confronted simultaneously on the national, regional, and global levels. No one state can make itself 

invulnerable to unconventional threats by trying to protect its own population 

and remaining unconcerned about the consequences for its neighbors.344
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Peru leads the region in adopting the concept of shared security. When Mexican criminal cartels became more active in Peru, the executive branch fostered intelligence cooperation between Peruvian agencies and their Mexican 

counterparts.345 The Peruvian government also pressed for international intelligence cooperation at a Lima meeting of the Chiefs of Organizations Responsible for Combating Illegal Drug Trafficking in Latin America and the 

Caribbean (HONLEA). At the meeting, the Peruvian President urged the 

creation of cooperative mechanisms for the region’s intelligence systems to 

stop the international transfer of narcotrafficking.346

The Triple Frontier region also offers a concrete example of multilateral cooperation in strategic intelligence. Following the Argentine terrorist attacks 

of 1992 and 1994, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay established a Tripartite 

Command to improve security in the Tri-Border Region through police and 

security cooperation among the three countries. Later, Uruguay and Chile 

also participated as invited members in ongoing cooperative efforts against 

narcotrafficking, contraband, document falsification, illegal funds transfers, 

trafficking in humans, and terrorism. 

An “intelligence roundtable” spearheaded regional cooperation. By 2006 it 

had evolved into a more formal Regional Intelligence Center. Team leaders 

of intelligence units from these countries worked together in the center to 

share sensitive information and coordinate covert operations. By thwarting 

illicit business activity, the Tripartite Command intended to force terrorist 

and criminal organizations to disband their cells and networks in the region, 

and to move on to other locations.347

Together with the Tripartite Command, 15 Joint Coordination Units (UCCs) 

operated at specific points along the borders between Argentina, Paraguay, 

Brazil, and ultimately Uruguay. These units continue their work, staffed by 

police or other security forces deployed along both sides of the border. The 

chiefs of each unit carry out the daily information coordination. Like the 

units associated with the Tripartite Command, the UCCs exchange information to prevent and control local transborder criminal activity as well as 

organized crime.348

Five years after the first multinational security initiative in the Tri-Border 

Region, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay formed the “3+1 Group,” with the 
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United States as the fourth member. This development added a global perspective to a cooperative endeavor that until this time had a glocal profile.349

Its purpose was to exchange information about terrorism and organized crime 

in the region, to share points of view, and to develop mutual confidence 

with respect to intelligence targets. The multilateral effort has also focused on 

developing a preventive strategy toward crime.350 The Regional Intelligence 

Center mentioned earlier increased the level of cooperation among the four 

countries, especially through targeting international terrorists’ logistics and 

financing. 

The 3+1 arrangement shows the importance of multilateral intelligence cooperation with extraregional actors. Another innovation came to light at 

the fifth summit of the Latin American and Caribbean Police Intelligence 

Community in 2010.351 There, the Mexican government offered to share 

its Plataforma México with this community’s members. This large database 

contains the “Combined Criminal Information System” for all of Mexico. 

The offer promoted the concept of a continent-wide fight against organized 

crime, spurred by the expansion of Mexican-based criminality to other parts 

of the region.352

3. High-quality intelligence products for decisionmaking must account for 

complex scenarios.353 The value of any strategic intelligence product comes 

from its offering more than the analysis of an issue and the projection of its 

probable evolution. It needs to contribute to the design of realistic, alternative 

pathways toward the decisionmaker’s objectives.354 Meeting this expectation 

depends on the status of two earlier conditions: high-quality HUMINT and 

fluid interagency and intergovernmental cooperation. 

The ability of strategic intelligence to understand, prevent, and manage new 

threats also rests on a renewed application of academic disciplines and fields of 

knowledge that in other eras have had only marginal importance. Anthropology, history, the comparative study of religions, and sociology, among other 

disciplines, have regained utility for strategic assessment.355 Many aspects of 

the issues high on the contemporary international security agenda remain nontransferable from one region or country to another. The factors that contribute 

to interstate conflicts or transnational threats force us to avoid generalizations 

and inappropriate application of culturally based standards. The strength of 

cultural factors also limits the applicability of historical analogies.356
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Open Source intelligence (OSINT) continues to improve its worth for strategic analysis and assessment. A focus on open-source exploitation brings 

greater appreciation for specialized information from various sources and in 

different formats. As part of the mixture of OSINT sources, “outsiders” or 

individuals with deep knowledge of specific topics provide new and valuable 

points of view to the intelligence matrix. Their inclusion also contributes to 

a more certain reduction of the cognitive distortions that often accompany 

analysis. 

An example of a high-quality analytic product based on HUMINT, interagency cooperation, OSINT, and outsiders comes from Colombia, where the 

Ministry of Defense produced its “Defense and Security Statistical Summary 

2003–2009” as a public reference document. The document records the government’s fight against criminality and terrorism over this seven-year period. 

It also presents data and identifies trends for selected crimes (kidnapping, for 

example), terrorism, narcotrafficking, and other forms of organized crime. 

According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, publishing this document 

improved data handling and storage, the design and application of analytical methods, tracking and evaluating the actions of officials, and notably, 

the process of decisionmaking within the ministry and at the political level. 

Furthermore, it promoted the interaction of government with the academic 

world, so that academia could participate more readily in the design of public 

policy for security and defense.357

4. Production of strategic intelligence rests on an ability to imagine future 

scenarios focused on medium- and long-term trends rather than only reporting on current, pressing issues. Nongovernment organizations have for 

decades produced such predictive assessments. They vary from confidential 

reports on momentous issues to strategic appraisals available to the public. A 

recent contribution to this genre bears the title “The Next 100 Years.” In it, 

the futurist George Friedman envisions scenarios for the second half of the 

current century.358

Far from being a resource reserved for academics or business people, strategic 

intelligence practitioners use medium- and long-term assessments to reduce 

the margins of uncertainty that confront decisionmakers. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) of the United States, a government organization 
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coordinated by the Director of National Intelligence, analyzes and assesses 

international issues for the highest levels of the executive branch. In 2008, 

the NIC published an openly available study of the principal issues driving 

the international agenda.359

Strategic intelligence can produce forward-looking analyses of nontraditional 

threats that weigh on Latin American societies. It can sound an alarm and 

contribute to the creation of contingency plans for appropriate actions.360 In 

that context, medium- and long-term intelligence estimates promote steady 

and coherent national security and defense policies and strategies. When those 

policies continue beyond one political regime, governments can contend with 

the scourges of terrorism and narcotrafficking.361

Conclusion

South American security issues remain susceptible to two different interpretations. Realist theory focuses on established relationships among Westphalian 

states, and emphasizes the military dimension of national power. Low levels of 

conflict define the region’s political geography. Strong institutions such as the 

South American Defense Council (CDS) reinforce this interpretation.362

The other interpretation finds that asymmetric threats imposed by nonstate 

actors better characterizes the South American security environment. Two 

asymmetric, transnational threats stand out for their scale and seriousness: 

organized crime and terrorism. Geographically, they take advantage of the 

gray areas wherever fragile governance exists. 

Great differences in the intelligence institutions and systems of the region 

make it difficult to propose a specific “best model” of strategic intelligence 

to address asymmetric threats. Nonetheless, strategic intelligence production 

anywhere in the region rests on four pillars: first, adequate attention to and 

use of human sources, even as more technological intelligence-collection options become available; second, a high level of interagency and intergovernmental cooperation, especially when common interests exist on particular 

issues or in geographical areas; third, generation of a high-quality product, 

suitable for use in high-level decisionmaking; and finally, the ability to create medium- and long-term predictive scenarios to guide high-level political 

decisionmaking.
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Putting these pillars into place will require political leadership and adequate 

management of intelligence organizations. Political leaders can enact 

intelligence laws attuned to the present environment. Such laws disassociate 

intelligence activity from repressive state behavior, and establish adequate 

mechanisms for democratic control and respect for individual rights and 

liberties. Intelligence organizations can impose deep changes to their 

organizational frameworks, operational doctrine, and professional preparation 

of personnel. They can also improve their association with other parts of the 

society, especially the academic sector. 

Author’s Biography

Mariano Bartolome holds a doctorate in international relations from Argentina’s Universidad del Salvador (USAL), with postdoctoral work in international security for the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research 

(CONICET). He also earned a master’s degree in sociology from the Science 

Academy of the Czech Republic. He serves as a professor at USAL, the Universidad de Buenos Aires, and the Universidad Nacional de Lanús. Additionally, 

he serves as graduate director of public security policy at the Universidad de 

Morón. Email: marianobartolome@yahoo.com.ar. 
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Economic Intelligence: An Examination of 

Its Status in the Andean Countries

Alvaro Jose Venegas Gonzalez

“Among Western countries the fight against global terrorism will increasingly need to be carried out on economic terrain. This is one 

of the areas that requires greater state intervention and a reduced 

role of the market and of political actors with vested interests.”

 —George Magnus, Senior Economist, Swiss Bank Corporation (UBS)

“A prudent man sees danger and takes refuge, but 

the simple keep going and suffer for it.”

—Proverbs 22.3

The Proposal

This essay proposes to enlarge the strategic scope of intelligence. It will show 

how this government function can address the contending economic interests at play in a country’s internal and external security environment. The 

essay argues that strategic intelligence should discern or anticipate economic 

challenges to the state and allow it to survive and perhaps prosper in the 

international system. To illustrate how economic challenges may unfold, the 

essay documents one Andean country’s use of its energy resources, ideological 

infrastructure, and illicit commerce to impact the security of its neighbors. 

The author employs the Theory of Adaptive Realism to examine how the 

intelligence process can bring a strategic economic perspective to public decisionmakers at the highest level.363

The Scenario

As the international economic context has changed, governments in the region have become vulnerable to challenges from above and below. 

If bankers and international finance are eating away at 

states from above, terrorists and drug traffickers challenge 

state power from below. They make use of technology and 

of international networks to act around and through states, 
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pursuing their objectives by trying to compel states to acquiesce or by eluding the control of states.364

More than two decades ago, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, economist and exPresident of Colombia, pointed out that “[a]s bad as are the terrorist attacks, 

even worse are the [unremarked] attacks on private and public assets.”365 Given 

this warning, one wonders how this country could not have been prepared to 

prevent the long-running scourge of attacks on economic targets. 

The economist Moises Naim, originally from Colombia, affirms that market 

reforms of the 1990s debilitated government control of borders.366 The reforms also incentivized criminal organizations (pseudo-companies) to erode 

national economies through illicit markets in arms, drugs, human beings, 

intellectual property, and money. The weak efforts by states to anticipate the 

intentions and actions of these nonstate actors allows them to operate in a 

gray zone between legal and illegal transactions. 

Presently, governmental intelligence and counterintelligence agencies do not 

have the capacity to undertake the collection, analysis, and transmission of 

actionable economic information. Should the private sector, which enjoys the 

freedom of action to address this problem from a specialized and dynamic 

perspective, perform this function? The author does not believe so. If private 

intelligence were to acquire privileged economic information from countries 

with which there exist political differences, then one could imagine a conflict 

of interests. In the absence of clear legal boundaries and state regulation, it 

would seem difficult for private consultants and investigators to resist using 

that information for the benefit of their own interests. 

Further, any private counterintelligence activity that reduces the capability 

of a competing foreign intelligence service can give rise to a conflict between 

countries and even armed conflict, thereby unduly affecting the entire home 

country. 

A Spanish author qualifies these points: 

[I]n relation to those functions that are considered “inherently governmental,” although it has to be admitted as a 

general rule that private enterprises should not engage in the 
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[intelligence] function, in practice, recourse to the private 

sector may become necessary in some cases.367

Intelligence should be a competitive tool that protects national interests in 

times of either shortage or abundance. Economic security benefits from development and growth, with healthy labor unions and socially responsible 

corporations. Private and corporate influence on government policies should 

not detract from the state’s ability to promote the common welfare. 

Government-based civilian intelligence specialists in international economics, business, and finance can bring practical and revealing results. They can 

unite open sources of information with the product of intelligence collection, 

transmission, anticipation, and the degradation of opponents’ efforts (counterintelligence), as envisioned by the theory of adaptive realism.

Taking all this into account, what should be the objective and methods of a 

working group within the government bureaucracy that intends to achieve 

the goals of strategic economic intelligence? 

Background to a Theoretical Perspective

Definition of Strategic Economic Intelligence

Knowledge from collecting, compiling, evaluating, disseminating, and protecting available economic information creates strategic intelligence. Economic information pertains to national or international phenomena that 

present a challenge or an opportunity for the promotion or protection of 

national interests. It remains distinct from economic espionage, or “clandestine and illegal activity carried out by a foreign government and/or a private 

company to access privileged information about the economy of a country, 

for the purpose of obtaining an economic advantage.”368

The region requires legislative initiatives to establish penal codes for economic 

crimes. Official documentation of illegal economic activity remains uncommon but necessary to spur legislative action. As noted by a Peruvian observer, 

“Economic crimes here are not accorded social rejection as in Europe, and 

therefore penal law for economic criminals does not exist here.”369 If lawbreakers in the economic realm were labeled as a type of “enemy,” or a source 
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of danger to be neutralized in any way possible, then they would become 

legitimate intelligence targets.

In economic terms, intelligence seeks to point out areas of weaknesses in the 

protection and maintenance of a state’s production capacities, employment, 

and development policies. It also aims to promote the survival of the state in 

the international system. Thus, intelligence supports economic policy implementation by learning the intentions of international economic competitors; 

analyzing economic tendencies and negotiations; and advising politicians on 

the “rules of the economic game” (bribes, lobbying, boycotts, blockades, embargoes) as practiced by competitors. 

Principles of Strategic Economic Intelligence

Government knowledge of economic activity in the Andean countries, including aspects of business and finance, remains inadequate. An exception is 

Venezuela. As the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez noted, The Directorate of Intelligence and Preventive Services, now the Bolivarian National 

Intelligence Service, in the past

was a repressive, contentious body. Its officials were out in 

the streets on motorcycles, shaking people down, threatening 

them, but the new agency is there to conduct economic intelligence, on an international level—state intelligence.370

Ecuador, another country if the region, has a limited capability to undertake 

financial intelligence operations. It can do little to prevent or detect or prevent the laundering of assets or the financing of terrorism. It has neither a 

state policy nor a strategic plan to prevent money laundering and to combat 

the financing of terrorism. In 2010, the international Financial Action Task 

Force blacklisted Ecuador for its lack of money-laundering laws.371

Academics and practitioners have written little about the nature and purpose 

of strategic economic intelligence. However, a few Spanish academics have 

addressed their country’s economic intelligence scene. According to this literature, economic intelligence focuses on how the management of clandestine 

and confidential human resources affects national economic security. This 

approach stands in contrast to the nature of economic intelligence envisioned 

by the present paper. In the Andean region, economic intelligence would 
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rely on a system for observing, monitoring, and exploiting open sources, like 

“business intelligence.” Business intelligence often seeks out foreign sources, 

and takes advantage of information obtained by means of espionage carried 

out by the secret services of the state.372

Despite economic reforms that have accompanied market liberalization in 

the Andean region, and the correspondingly greater exposure to international 

rivals, economic intelligence capabilities have lagged. For the Spanish, as well 

as for the Andean region, addressing the applied problem of strategic economic intelligence will benefit from combining two approaches: one representing the public interest—which is intelligence—and the other representing the private world—the discipline of economics. 

Intelligence and Economics: 

How May Their Practitioners Become More Alike?

The work and the interests of an intelligence practitioner and an economist 

usually appear very different and incompatible. Citizens tend to understand 

the work of an economist, who deals with public data and generally enjoys 

public and social recognition. In addition, 

[A]t first glance, economists and intelligence analysts seem 

to operate in separate spheres, one dealing with economic 

problems, the other investigating security matters. The economist works with overt data, while the intelligence analyst’s 

data may be secret. The economists’ estimations are based 

on quantitative and formal methods, while the intelligence 

analyst often makes assessments based on speculation and 

“gut feelings or instinct.”373

The professional behavior and capability of economists seems to rest on the 

ample theoretical development of their academic discipline. That is, any 

economist can support a policy argument by referencing the results of experiments in public policy (using public data resulting from economic policies 

put in place at some time in the past), thereby contributing to economic 

theory and its ethical application. 

On the other hand, the specialist in intelligence sets out a less legitimate point 

of view because data have necessarily been less examined, personal experience 
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guides assessments, and individual practitioners typically produce inferences 

from incoherent and sparse data points. 

Few government employees in Colombia, whether economists or intelligence 

analysts, enjoy prestigious educational backgrounds, use leading-edge technology, have systematic knowledge, or exhibit a tendency to follow suitable protocols. Economists, in particular, need sophisticated training and education: 

Those who hold only a bachelor’s degree in economics are 

not employed to diagnose and treat the main “economic ills” 

of the country.... To reach the level needed for such employment, one must acquire advanced degrees, and preferably a 

Ph.D. in the United States.... What we do know is that 

economics departments in universities are proliferating, and 

producing more graduates who are not prepared to work in 

decisionmaking centers.374

This factor promotes a “culture” of using intuition over reason, a less than 

ideal basis for contributing to the decisionmaking process. 

Qualified economists can base their assessments on well-documented, theoretically sound procedures. Intelligence analysts typically cannot do so. Would 

the application of a theory of intelligence to the problems of economic competition in the Andean Area improve the professional capacity and credibility 

of a strategic economic intelligence team? 

Theoretical Application—Sims’s Theory 

of Adaptive Realism 

The responsibility to confront international opponents is not a new government function and intelligence exists to guide the effort. Jennifer Sims understands intelligence as the useful knowledge resulting from the collection of 

information, its analysis and its dissemination in support of the cause of decisionmakers, leading to advantageous decisions with respect to their rivals.375

Sims’s theory offers the best available approach to support the present investigation. The theory identifies four critical functions: collection, transmission, 

anticipation, and manipulation (the last to influence and damage the opponent’s intelligence capabilities).376 It offers the systematic and measurable 
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means to evaluate success in economic intelligence activities, as illustrated 

below in two Colombian case studies.

Empirical Vision: Strategic Economic Intelligence in 

the Colombian Political Decisionmaking Process

Case Study 1: External Security

Background: the Venezuelan parastatal—PDVSA—showed interest in buying 

the Colombian gas company Ecogas and its network for distributing 45 percent of the country’s natural gas. PDVSA also showed interest in owning the 

refinery in the port city of Cartagena. These moves logically complemented 

the gas and crude oil pipeline that PDVSA hoped to construct through Colombia to transport fuels from Venezuela to Panama, according to the exPresident of PDVSA, Luis Giusti.377

These developments worried Colombian subject-matter experts and political 

leaders. It could mean surrendering control of this strategic economic sector 

to Hugo Chavez’s political objectives. Because of the highly charged ideological environment, Chavez was making use of the strategic weapon of oil 

diplomacy to develop the Bolivarian Revolution and fortify his leadership in 

Hispanic America.378

According to [Juan Manuel] Santos [ex-minister of defense 

and today President of Colombia], the intentions of the 

Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, to invest in the petroleum sector and in Colombian gas can be “dangerous” because more than an economic interest, a political motivation 

is perceived ... natural gas benefits thousands of Colombian 

users and in the case of some political contretemps with 

Chavez, he could simply turn off the “key” to the provision 

of fuel and bring harm to the nation.379

In addition, PDVSA activity extended beyond economic activity to affect foreign policy, international economic relations, external alliances, and national 

defense policies from a markedly anti-imperialist perspective. PDVSA acquisitions spearheaded Venezuela’s execution of an aligned security and defense 

policy that would involve its armed forces.380
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These potentially alarming developments masked an even larger problem. 

Colombian police see illicit border commerce as mere “contraband,” and its 

perpetrators as simple “criminals.”381 Borders create opportunities for smuggling rings, allow global networks to damage a national economy, corrupt the 

police, and undermine institutions.382 Border controls might be iron-clad, 

but illicit commerce in goods, services, and manpower will still exist on one 

side of the border because some public servants in key positions will allow it 

to continue. They will decide to defend the lucrative illicit commerce of the 

criminal networks rather than enforce controls. New centers of criminal, economic power emerge as a result. One center occupies the border area between 

Venezuela and Colombia:

There is a lot of illegal contraband along the frontier between 

Colombia and Venezuela that involves drugs, gasoline, and 

automobiles. Even though the Triple-Frontier region where 

Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina come together is better 

known as a Latin American center for contraband, the border between Colombia and Venezuela is perhaps even more 

porous and sees vast quantities of cocaine and other basic 

products ... and even if they [criminal groups] do not have 

a national agenda like the AUC [United Self-Defense Forces 

of Colombia], they understand that their power grows and 

criminal enterprises prosper whenever they have good connections with local political leaders.383

Intelligence evaluation: The authoritarian Chavez focused his agents’ attention 

on economic forces, natural resources, and the process of industrialization 

and international trade in Colombia. The knowledge he obtained could forge 

an economic weapon for potential “warfare,” given that strategic surprise can 

occur in the economic sphere as well as the military realm.

The French economist Frederic Bastiat describes the scenario where illicit 

border commerce has operated for years: “When merchandise is not allowed 

to cross borders, soldiers will” or “if cotton, sugar and rice can cross borders, 

then terrorists may not be able to do so.”384 Strategic planners understand 

these maxims, which were seen when Venezuela restricted business with Colombia and at the same time strengthened its military apparatus along the 

boundary as a dissuasive force to affect the choices of the weaker state.385
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The decision process: Colombia and Venezuela have for some time experienced 

strained economic and commercial relations. In this environment, civil officials, private consultants, and commercial development funds saw value 

in gathering relevant information and impressions from foreign diplomats. 

Their aim was to identify strategic sectors at risk of being acquired or of being 

interfered with by the Venezuelan government.386 Colombian government 

and private officials sought to use intelligence practitioners to collect data 

and anticipate how political actions may affect investments, capital funds, 

and foreign trade. 

Intelligence officials who use information to anticipate and contain the intentions of opponents act in accord with the premises of adaptive realism. 

Among Colombian civil servants and industrialists who occupy positions of 

political and economic leadership, most have little experience in the world of 

intelligence. Still, the purpose of intelligence in business, politics, or sports is 

well understood: to secretly obtain advantageous data on an opponent’s plans, 

capabilities, behavior, and the relevant context.387

Unquestionably, politically powerful officials should be able to make choices 

and produce decisions quickly and confidently. The value and the knowledge 

of strategic intelligence officers, their anticipatory function, and the nature of 

problems best addressed by state intelligence all remain less certain. A poor 

understanding of intelligence contributes to high levels of uncertainly among 

political leaders as they make decisions about its management. Naturally, they 

hesitate to accept input to their decisions from those whose knowledge may 

be deeper than their own. To do so would be to admit what they do not know, 

or acknowledge how little they do know.

Case Study 2: Internal Security

Background: Harm came to a large number of Colombian citizens in 2008 

when they mistakenly placed confidence in money schemes (pyramids) offered 

in southern departments of the country (Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo). Illicit practices had boosted the economic power of drug trafficking there, and 

the Uribe administration declared a state of social emergency. The declaration 

of emergency permitted more thorough investigations and stiffened penalties 

for such practices. The government aimed to recover and refund money and 

improve the business climate in the affected regions. 
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Compatriots: The crime of massive and illegal acquisition 

of money, by whatever means, whatever the fiction behind 

which it hides, is a crime against the economic and social order, and generates deep social disturbances ... and generally 

missing money means robbery, because these organizations 

are not monitored by official institutions, and in addition 

do not satisfy the requirements of the law, and it all amounts 

to a serious social disturbance.388

Colombian authorities knew that one FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia) front engaged in illegal financial activities, even though the 

organization’s overall leaders disapproved:

Although the story varies, authorities have been revealing 

in recent days the contents of what appears to be the computer of “Edgar Tovar,” head of front 48 of the FARC, who 

is wanted for breaking the law in Putumayo. As everyone 

knows, David Murcia Guzman, the brains of [the holding 

company] DMG, had its epicenter in Puerto Asis and it was 

from there that it began to expand its business.... Police 

report that the computer, found during Operation Strength, 

which took place this past 20th of January, held the list of 

sanctions from the secretariat of the FARC against this group 

for having invested 15 thousand dollars (about 30 million 

pesos) in DMG, without the authorization of what they call 

the General Staff.389

Evaluation of intelligence: The illegal practices of these “businessmen” placed 

state security at risk because of the large number of people affected. Public 

perceptions of fraudulent investment opportunities led to increased insecurity and lawlessness. 

The governor of Putumayo, Felipe Guzman, alleged to 

President Alvaro Uribe that the FARC would be taking 

advantage of the discontent felt by people because of 

the pyramid schemes, and would set them against the 

government. Guzman reported that since this past Sunday 

the FARC has used explosives, has intimidated farmers, and 
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has distributed pamphlets to influence the inhabitants of the 

regions most affected by the pyramid schemes.390

The image of the Colombian government suffered more when Eduardo 

Sarmiento, dean of the economics department of the Colombian School of 

Engineering, informed the press that the government “was entangled” in a 

semantic discussion of whether they were pyramid schemes, “when what they 

needed to do was simply to check account balances, to recognize that liabilities exceeded assets and that there was great risk.”391

The decision process: The government did not have clear knowledge of the 

situation as a result of unclear data, information, evidence, and assessments. 

The intelligence services did not assess the full implications of the fraudulent 

economic activity because of its relatively arcane, specialized nature. The exMinister of Revenue Juan Camilo Restrepo declared, “I believe that there 

was unwarranted delay on the part of the Government in taking preventive 

measures. The problem of the pyramid schemes was there to be noticed for 

more than a year, or year and a half.”392

The absence of clear strategic economic intelligence assessments for national 

decisionmakers prevented political leaders from reaching an early understanding of the situation. As a result, they failed to make the timely decisions that 

could have prevented political embarrassment. 

Bringing Doctrine to Strategic Economic Intelligence: 

Applying the Critical Functions of Adaptive Realism 

A casual observer may conclude that criminal threats to national economies 

cannot be eliminated or readily reduced. However, practitioners realize that 

a combination of preventive intelligence and counterintelligence actions can 

diminish potential crimes in the economic sphere, as these crimes often take 

place in the gray area between legal and illegal activity. Pertinent, anticipatory 

information contributes to bringing better administrative or penal decisions 

to the fight. This part of the essay outlines how a strategic economic intelligence unit might address a government’s need for timely assessments. 

The first Colombian case study cautions us to weigh the potential effect of 

economic intelligence activity on the country’s relations with its Andean 
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neighbors. Overzealous actions could undermine mutual confidence or 

paralyze diplomatic efforts and endanger economic relations. Some Andean 

countries have enough economic and political differences so that a single, 

intelligence-related misstep could bring on active hostilities. 

This base of understanding permits the systematic implementation of Sim’s 

four critical intelligence functions to 1) internal finance and 2) international 

trade. Intelligence and counterintelligence cannot cover problems that might 

arise along the entire economic spectrum; comprehensive coverage remains 

an unrealistic expectation because of the magnitude and diversity of national 

economies. 

Information about some of the Andean countries will not be available to 

an economic intelligence team because of its confidential or secret nature. 

Incomplete information makes this essay realistic in reproducing the analytic 

environment familiar to intelligence professionals. It should also bring realism to the illustrative application of Sims’s theory to the work of strategic 

economic intelligence. 

Collection of Information

In accordance with Sims’s thinking, strategic economic intelligence must 

count not only on open sources of information, but also on human-resource 

intelligence. Through diplomatic legations, commercial representations, and 

public and private companies, a select group of reliable and experienced intelligence agents would gain access—by espionage, if necessary—to economic, 

commercial, and financial data using the full range of methods and sources 

of intelligence. An independent economic intelligence team would attract 

economists and commercial experts as well as commercial and international 

finance specialists. Team members would build familiarity with economically 

influential institutions and international power brokers and gain access to internal circles. Access to these key players would allow the intelligence team to 

obtain, process, and disseminate data on targets of interest. The Colombian 

newsmagazine Semana characterizes the typical intelligence specialist: 

The majority of secret agents are quiet and discrete, able to 

infiltrate high diplomatic, governmental or business circles 

without creating a lot of suspicion. Under the protection of 
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covers that range from exchange students to industrialists, 

from tourists to employees of multinational enterprises, the 

great majority would not use a weapon to secure their objectives. To the contrary, one of them declared to Semana that 

his mission more resembles being a data processor dedicated 

to compiling valuable information, processing it, and then 

giving it to his government.393

A concrete example of human-source intelligence collection on economic issues appeared in the newspaper El Espectador: 

The indicted ex-Director of Intelligence Fernando Tabares 

reported new details to the court. He claimed that the Embassy of Venezuela in Colombia had 80 civil servants who 

were intelligence agents for the Chavez government, and 

that the DAS [Administrative Department of Security] had 

discovered their orders from the Venezuelan Directorate of 

Intelligence [DISIP]. In this way, we discovered that some 

economic entities, the military, and even Colombian politicians were penetrated.394

This evidence shows how counterintelligence activity can contribute to gathering economic intelligence in areas vital to national security. Economic intelligence in this case emerges as a byproduct of the continuous observation 

of Venezuelan intelligence activity in Colombia. Venezuela can undertake 

wide-ranging intelligence operations and therefore potentially outmaneuver 

its rivals because of the financial power accruing from its oil industry. 
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Figure 6. Wow! Enough risk for today. Also enough for tomorrow.

Source: courtesy of Andres Gonzalez.
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Anticipation

Economic intelligence practitioners accomplish anticipation in two ways. 

First, their collection of information needs to remain independent of the 

preferences of or the preapproval of political officials. Second, they need to 

develop an ability to warn intelligence customers about unexpected competitors or new adversaries.395

To determine how well intelligence specialists perform the anticipatory function, one needs to evaluate whether they have risked going beyond the usual 

“current intelligence” approach. Have their assessments sometimes disagreed 

with the view held by decisionmakers, even though consistent with their policy objectives? The specialists’ role is to identify new adversaries and alert political officials to the threat they may pose to the country’s business and finance 

communities or its international economic relationships. At the same time, 

intelligence specialists need to protect sources and methods of intelligence in 

order to reduce their own vulnerabilities. Effective specialists in strategic economic intelligence anticipate the challenges and opportunities that political 

decisionmakers often ignore. Their alerts also extend to those who might be 

excluded from the policymaker’s closest circle of economic advisors. 

Some of the difficulties highlighted in the case studies resulted from the actions of other countries; others originated from unwise remarks by influential 

domestic actors. Thus, Colombia did not anticipate the commercial crisis 

with Venezuela in part because of Venezuela’s actions with respect to foreign exchange. Acting in their own interest, the Venezuelans brought some 

Colombian exporters to the brink of insolvency by delaying delivery of payments.396 Likewise, trade union leaders of ANALDEX (Colombia’s National 

Association of International Commerce) and ANDI (National Association 

of Colombian Businessmen) made imprudent remarks about the coup d’etat 

that temporarily removed Chavez from power in April 2002. Their comments 

later led to some Colombian companies’ being denied permission to establish 

operations in Venezuela.397

Additionally, after the Colombian Army swooped down on FARC leader Raul 

Reyes in Ecuadorian territory, relations between Colombia and Ecuador deteriorated. The Ecuadorian government decided to impose foreign-exchange 

safeguards against Colombia in July 2009 as part of its monetary policy.398 In 
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this way, Colombian commercial exchanges began to be affected by international political developments. If Colombia had discrete emissaries who could 

have obtained data to anticipate these events, the security of Colombia and 

its commercial interests in Venezuela and Ecuador may not have been placed 

at risk. 

As a result of their having to address multiple problems simultaneously, highlevel decisionmakers naturally resist uninvited changes to their policy agenda. 

Decisionmakers may reject new information that is not consistent with their 

priorities as a result of a parochial vision of the world, or in the case of economic intelligence, because of competing private interests. 

Transmission 

Once an adversary and its capabilities are identified, the question becomes to 

whom and how to transmit that information. Communication requires confidence between the intelligence service and the decisionmaker. A measure of 

that confidence lies in the ability of the intelligence service to deliver valuable 

information with utility for decisionmaking. 

When intelligence maintains independence from a decisionmaker, rival 

sources of information may emerge and the transmission of intelligence can 

decay or fail. Excessive closeness or friendliness with the decisionmaker may 

lead to overlooking or accepting his or her errors. For that reason, Venezuelan 

President Chavez used two intelligence services (domestic and Cuban) to arm 

himself in the event of a break in the relationship with one of the two agencies. Having two agencies at his disposal also extended his vision and hearing, 

giving him time to act and avoid errors.399 Cuban interference in Venezuelan 

internal affairs led to considerable resentment even among Chavez supporters. 

According to Americo Martin, former guerrilla and Venezuelan politician, 

[a]t this time, Cuban activity is multiplying in the military 

environment, as well as in intelligence and counterintelligence. It is a powerful, ideological penetration. Members 

of militia groups, professional military personnel, and hundreds of leaders are being trained in Cuba.... Chavez sees 

dissidents as enemies, or at the least, he blames them for the 

assassination of public figures and coup planning. He has 
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no confidence in his followers, requires absolute loyalty, and 

only feels secure when surrounded by Fidel’s emissaries.400

Like Chavez, any decisionmaker has the opportunity to gather intelligence 

from competing sources. In the civilian world, this information often comes 

from powerful people rather than from public opinion. Still, any decisionmaker will want to extend his eyes and ears through an intelligence service 

that evaluates the data collected in his name. Intelligence services remain subject to mechanisms of accountability and monitoring that guarantee loyalty 

to a cause and to policy. This perspective received attention in a Caracas newspaper, with intended irony:

When I say a people without a memory, I mean that Venezuelans forget the bilateral accord with Havana that permits 

Cuban state security police personnel to undertake police 

work and espionage in Venezuela. When I say ungrateful 

people, I mean the lack of gratitude by Venezuelans for the 

control exercised by the Cuban Security Department (G2), 

for their intelligence services, for identification and immigration services, for public registry and notary services, all of 

which look out for the citizen, his identity, personal documents and property.401

This commentary illustrates that a political leader’s security perspective 

(Chavez’s support for Cuban intelligence operators in Venezuela) was not 

shared by citizens at large. Indeed, a trusted confidant would prove his or 

her worth to a political leader by transmitting an alert about the open but 

creatively masked dissent of opponents. 
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Figure 7. Is that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Source: courtesy of Andres Gonzalez.

Counterintelligence

In a globalized and competitive world, countries can readily justify engaging 

in unlawful espionage. Similarly, they employ counterintelligence measures 

to reduce the efficiency of opponents’ intelligence services. Simply put, counterintelligence exists as a response to intelligence activity. 

Adaptive realism suggests that where security interests face off against one 

another, there are two ways to make an advantageous decision. One is by 

collecting the best information on the activities of the adversary; the other 

is by distorting the opponent’s information while protecting one’s own information (counterintelligence). The latter approach has two components, 

defensive and offensive, as indicated in the table. 
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Table 8

Two Components of Counterintelligence

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Defensive: Information protection achieved for one 

service by blocking information collection by another 

service. 

Passive form (preventive): includes the use of stakeouts 

and surveillance, safehouses, deserters, interrogations, 

spies, etc. 

Active form (operative): attracts the attention of spies, 

provokes and deceives the hostile service, forces revelation of hostile methods using distractive decoys. With 

this approach one looks to demonstrate a totally hostile 

approach to suspicious individuals or organizations. 

Offensive: Its purpose is not to block the operations of 

the opponent, but to change or to break the intentions 

of the adversary by playing with his mind. It defends 

one’s own operations and distorts the information gained 

by the opponent. Also, it obtains advantages for oneself 

through mechanisms that allow the manipulation or the 

biasing of the intelligence capabilities of the other side, 

impacting its activity and its prospects for survival. 

Passive form (preventive): involves deceptive practices or 

camouflage; features people with fake titles or people with 

an interest in establishing empathy or “friendship” that 

has as its hidden aim obtaining sensitive information. 

Active form (operative): uses double agents and deception. That is, an agent leads the adversary to false judgments through double agents. Disinformation hides 

specific activities, such as the information interests and 

intentions of one’s own service, and deflects the attention of an opponent’s espionage toward other targets of 

lesser value. 

Source: Compiled by the author.

Two counterintelligence examples involve Venezuelan intelligence activities 

in Colombia. In the first, the subject of interest was a military intelligence 

practitioner. 
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Jose Gregorio “Cheo” Guzman arrived in Colombia in 2003 

as an official of the embassy of Venezuela, with the supposed 

job of facilitating business between entrepreneurs of both 

countries. Although his position was not at the highest rank, 

within a short time entrepreneurs and politicians realized 

that this was Chavez’s man in Bogota. Known as a zealous 

member of the Motherland for All party in Venezuela, he 

was also known for being very near [Chavez’s] Miraflores 

Palace, although he maintained a low profile.402

The idea that “in just a short time industrialists and politicians realized that 

this was Chavez’s man in Bogota” set the stage for “defensive-active” counterintelligence activity by the Colombian side. 

The second example of Colombian defensive counterintelligence activity involves irregular economic behavior in support of the Chavista expansionist 

policy. This evidence emerged as a result of the pressures brought by envoys of 

the Bolivarian government, who had explicit orders to use the private resources of the business known as Monómeros Colombo Venezolanos to finance people 

and organizations supporting the Bolivarian movement in Colombia.403

In the purely internal security realm, an example of active and passive, offensive counterintelligence comes from the experiences and testimony of a 

sergeant major of the Colombian Army of Colombia. His exploits occurred 

in the 1960s. Working undercover and adopting fictitious identifies, deceit, 

manipulation, and other mechanisms, he influenced the will, information, 

and actions of rural brigands. These criminals, like others now, strengthened 

their finances through extortion and “taxes,” accompanied by the support of 

wealthy proprietors or politicians of note in the provinces.404
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Figure 8. Hi boss, this time I think there’s some news.

Source: courtesy of Andres Gonzalez.

Summary 

The effective operation of a strategic economic intelligence team depends on 

public officials’ ability to recognize and leverage the functions of intelligence. 

To that end, Colombian national Law 195, article 4, Part C, declares that 

intelligence and counterintelligence information can be obtained for the purpose of protecting natural resources and the economic interests of the nation, 

a finding that recognizes the role of intelligence agencies in protecting investments, commerce, economic development, and therefore national economic 

security.405

As illustrated by the foregoing examples, systematic application of the principles of intelligence and counterintelligence by the secret services and other 

organizations responsible for monitoring economic phenomena may lead 

to recognizing threats and opportunities and safeguarding national security. 

Table 9 distills some guidelines for the management of an economic arm 

within the intelligence services with the objective of fortifying an intelligence 

community.
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Table 9

Guidelines for Collaborative Action by a Strategic 

Economic Intelligence Team

Sims’s 

Functions

Economic Intelligence 

Team Activity

Participating 

Organizations

Collection of

Information

Identify key economic actors, their reputation, their 

investments and capacities. 

(Financial situation, expansion plans, and extent of 

international economic and 

commercial relations.) 

National Planning Office

Revenue and Banking 

(Office of Financial Information and Analysis and 

Directorate of Taxation 

and Customs) 

Have the sourcing of estimates, analysis, and investigative reports reviewed by academics and private and public 

consultants who are active on 

the economic scene. 

Ministry of Commerce, 

Industry and Tourism 

Ministry of International 

Relations

Collect and compile information related to the insertion 

of illegal armed groups and 

corrupting agents active in 

economic circles.

Ministry of 

Mines and Energy

Trade Unions – National 

Council of Trade Unions 

and Chambers of 

Commerce Monitor national and international economies through 

the Web and specialized subscriptions. 

Anticipation

Anticipate illegal exchanges 

through black markets and 

opportunities for corruption. 

Work with experienced professionals who can assess risks 

to national economic interests operating outside the 

country. 

National Planning Office

Revenue and Banking (Office of Financial Information and Analysis and Directorate of Taxation and 

Customs) 

Ministry of International 

Relations
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Table 9

Guidelines for Collaborative Action by a Strategic 

Economic Intelligence Team (continued)

Sims’s 

Functions

Economic Intelligence 

Team Activity

Participating 

Organizations

Transmission

Make risk assessments and 

threat warnings available to 

key players in the national 

economy as well as to international business and finance 

entities. 

National Planning Office

Trade Unions – National Council of Trade 

Unions and Chambers of 

Commerce

Counterintelligence

Neutralize intelligence operations of hostile actors that 

threaten the strategic infrastructure and national economic security. 

Watch over urban and rural 

areas where there are projects underway with high environmental and land value 

impacts. 

Operate in areas where there 

is no open information and 

where the private sector cannot operate. 

Address special information 

requirements. 

Revenue and Banking 

(Office of Financial Information and Analysis and 

Directorate of Taxation 

and Customs) 

Ministry of Commerce, 

Industry and Tourism 

Ministry of Agriculture

Source: Compiled by the author.
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Strategic Economic Intelligence and the 

National Intelligence Community

Economic development provides the essential foundation for achieving 

national security objectives. Strategic economic intelligence teams aim to 

dismantle the support structures of those who operate outside of the law 

and anticipate attacks against critical economic infrastructure. Engagement 

with terrorist activity occurs primarily at the operational level. However, terrorism in Colombia combines all forms of fighting and employs economic 

warfare to attack strategic economic infrastructure (dams, pipelines, highways, airports, electrical transmission systems, etc.). This targeting by illegal 

groups requires cooperation between governments and investors to protect 

the interests of all parties. The protection of oil pipelines in Colombia offers 

an example of how economic intelligence can mesh with internal and external strategic interests.406

Colombia does already have one economic intelligence institution with a strategic focus. The Egmont Group has since 1995 coordinated the establishment 

of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in various countries. The Colombian Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF) exchanges information with the 

other FIUs to fight money-laundering crimes and the financing of terrorism.407

The UIAF, as part of the Colombian intelligence community, operates as an 

intelligence and counterintelligence unit at the operational level, but within an 

international, strategic framework. It detects and prevents the laundering of assets and the financing of terrorism through centralization, systematization, and 

analysis of information. Its personnel are both well-educated and specialized: 

77.6 percent work as professionals, and 54.7 percent have undertaken advanced 

study at the master’s level.408

Accomplishing the work of strategic economic intelligence in an information 

society depends on building alliances with private business to gain access to 

the information required by the UIAF. This approach makes the monitoring 

and pursuit of suspicious activities an inevitable part of the healthy growth 

of the state and the economy, rather than its being seen as a conspiratorial 

practice. 

Illicit commerce in Colombia has maintained a constant presence through 

the history of the country. A 2011 law directs the intelligence community to 
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combat the problem.409 the National Directorate of Taxation and Customs 

(DIAN) must exchange information with the Regional Office of Intelligence 

Liaison (RILO). RILO operates as a worldwide customs network to handle 

data on illicit economic activity. 

On the other hand, Colombia lacks appropriate political and legal tools to 

monitor illegal aspects of economic activity more comprehensively. A Conpes

(National Social and Economic Policy Council) initiative,410 inserted into 

the National Development Plan and titled “The Communal State: Development for 2006–2010,”411 attempted to consolidate gains made in public 

security. The Conpes document does not address civilian intelligence institutions because of the persistently poor internal practices exhibited by DAS. A 

new approach to the role of intelligence and counterintelligence in Colombian public security may soon appear in the National Development Plan.412 

Disciplinary differences between economics and intelligence make it difficult for intelligence to interpret, in advance and with accuracy, a variety of 

economic phenomena that impact national security. To combat this problem 

requires the creation of a specialized analytic unit that collaborates with the 

intelligence community.413 Appropriate analytic training can foster a better 

understanding of weaknesses in current efforts by economic analysts, businesses, and financiers who engage in the comparative and systematic analysis 

of information. Brighter lights can illuminate the obscure realm between legal 

and illegal commerce where terrorist networks, organized crime, and corrupt 

public and private entities now operate with impunity.414

As economic intelligence gains legitimacy as a contributor to government action and international relations decisionmaking, knowledge-based collaboration between economists and intelligence analysts can positively contribute to 

the generation of effective public policies. 
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A Strategy to Broaden the Horizon 

of National Intelligence

Everyone, it appears, now agrees that the methods of commerce are displacing 

military methods—with disposable capital in lieu of firepower, 

civilian innovation in lieu of military-technical advancement, 

and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases.

—Edward Luttwak415

If a state exists to protect the life and property of its citizens, then actions 

taken to prevent damage to national economic interests, even before the true 

nature of a potential threat is known, have validity. The broad and continuing 

economic warfare described by Luttwak affects more than tangible interests; 

it affects the daily life of citizens. Still, the state must balance a concern for 

security with respect for civil liberties and human rights. How can a strategic 

economic intelligence team adjust itself to this revised paradigm?

It can begin by taking note of the perceptions of intelligence held among 

those outside the state establishment. For example, an official of Colombia’s 

Ideas for Peace Foundation suggests that, 

[i]n the middle of the DAS scandals, it has gone unnoticed 

that in spite of recriminations that muddy the debate, the 

government as well as the opposition agrees on an undeniable 

reality: “Colombia needs spies.... And everyone also agrees 

that vital decisions of the State need to be well-informed, 

and that the process of obtaining data necessarily involves 

espionage.”416

His comments support an integrated and collaborative network among agents 

of the state and of civil society (economic unions, academics). The network 

would promote formulation, feedback, and peer review of ideas for carrying 

out the functions of intelligence identified by Sims. The challenge lies in 

developing a type of strategic economic intelligence team that can create a 

binding alliance among all these actors. Somewhat surprisingly, building such 

alliances may be less complex than expected. Extensive ties already appear to 
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exist between the government and economic actors in formulating foreign 

policy: 

Both the business and academic sectors are relevant to the 

decisionmaking process. Members of the first group, one after another, come into play as individual representatives of 

specific businesses or as representatives of national conglomerates. At times, too, they assert collective interests through 

unions or Chambers of Commerce. The economic power 

of these groups allows them to press for certain decisions 

and policies, both at the national and international levels, 

although their participation depends on the political winds. 

In contrast, the academic sector is more diffuse and tends 

to distrust governmental actions. However, academicians 

also consider that proposals by the government generally 

remain rhetorical, without real impact on nongovernmental 

groups.417

The launch of an economic intelligence entity may also spur the creation 

of similar capabilities among nongovernment organizations. Information 

and knowledge synergies between the state’s offices and civil society may be 

supplemented by the emergence of competition between private and public 

economic assessments as a basic element of national security. 

Rather than adopting the reactive techniques of monitoring or planning tactical operations, a strategic economic intelligence team needs to build futureoriented warning capabilities. Further, legal collection and dissemination of 

information needs to extend to private economic circles as well as public 

organizations. In short, economic intelligence needs to alert both public and 

private players about the various threats and challenges posed by actors who 

are opposed to the aims of the state. Finally, analysts must avoid any involvement with local “potentates” and concentrate on developing indisputable 

professionalism. 
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Author’s Biography

Alvaro Venegas Gonzalez, a Colombian, graduated from the College of Economic and Social Sciences of the Universidad de La Salle in Bogota. He practiced the art of intelligence in the now-defunct Administrative Department 

of Security. He advocates strengthening the incipient national intelligence 

culture in Colombia. His work has appeared in Aquimindia, the journal of 

the Administrative Department of Security; in Aainteligencia, an online Chilean journal; and in Nova Et Vetera, Colombia’s public administration journal. 

Email: aljovego@hotmail.com.
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Intelligence Resource Management

Dan Elkins

Other authors in this book have noted the oversight role of national legislatures in exerting budgetary control of intelligence agencies. The capability of 

legislatures to accomplish oversight rests on the ability of staff advisers and 

elected officials to understand how the objectives of each agency fit within 

a national intelligence system. Specialists in resource management in each 

agency have the obligation to maintain a dialog with subject-matter experts 

in their agency to prepare appropriate budget plans and proposals for review 

by the government’s funding officials, whether in the executive or legislative branch. Resource management specialists and intelligence professionals 

can derive real resource management benefits from continuous interaction 

with colleagues not only within their agency, but also with their counterparts 

across an entire intelligence community, in the same way as substantive intelligence practitioners benefit from daily interaction with their counterparts as 

they pursue intelligence targets and plan operations. 

The author of this essay has familiarity with the resource management and 

budgetary processes of the Intelligence Community of the United States. The 

principles and practices he has observed and applied in the U.S. also suit any 

country whose intelligence agencies are accountable to citizens and government oversight offices. This essay acknowledges all levels of accountability, as 

identified in the Goncalves essay: 1) agency—internal to a particular intelligence agency; 2) executive—carried out within the executive branch by nonintelligence entities of the administration and by the department or ministry 

to which the intelligence agency is subordinated; 3) external—exerted by the 

judicial branch, by the legislative branch, and/or by an independent entity; 

and 4) popular—addressing the concerns of individual citizens or civil society 

organizations. The practices that allow resource management specialists and 

substantive intelligence professionals to accomplish internal resource management within intelligence agencies are of particular interest here, but the 

breadth of the intelligence community means that accountability for those 

practices extends across much of the executive branch. 

Three sets of professionals can benefit from reading this essay: 1) practitioners of the resource management processes and practices explained below; 2) 
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“functional” professionals who conduct or manage intelligence and related 

activities (collection, analysis, production, security, intelligence training, information management); and 3) intelligence supervisors with broad resource 

management responsibilities. 

Effective and Efficient Use of Resources

The success of an organization’s efforts to secure sufficient resources may well 

depend on its track record in the effective and efficient use of resources already acquired. An organization’s resource management office documents requirements and takes the lead in efforts to satisfy them. However, everyone in 

the organization bears the responsibility to ensure effective and efficient use 

of resources. 

Measuring Effectiveness and Efficiency 

of Resource Utilization

Definitions. To be effective, an organization must make satisfactory progress 

toward the accomplishment of its goals and objectives. Regardless of the specifics, the primary mission of any intelligence organization is to satisfy its 

customers’ needs, that is, to get the right quantity and quality of intelligence 

to customers in a timely, usable fashion. This is true whether the customers 

are national-level policymakers, battlefield commanders, planners, or others. 

To also be efficient, an organization must satisfy these customer needs in a 

cost-effective, expedient, highly productive manner, with minimal waste of effort 

or resources. While effectiveness is measured by results achieved, efficiency is 

gauged by the manner in which the results are achieved. Effectiveness directly 

impacts mission accomplishment, while efficiency directly impacts the cost of 

accomplishing that mission.

An organization can be effective, even without efficiency, when ample resourcing prevails. But with tight budgets, few organizations can long tolerate 

unchecked inefficiency. This situation usually forces the diversion of scarce 

resources from crucial operations to keep inefficient operation(s) going. Personnel may also work harder than usual, but cannot do so indefinitely.

Measurement criteria. To measure the relationship between available resources and mission accomplishment one may pose a series of questions. The best 
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questions address effectiveness and efficiency, as well as whether additional 

resources may resolve obstacles in the way of achieving those goals. With the 

assumption that the organization under scrutiny performs only intelligence 

functions, there exists a limited range of possible answers to each question. 

The meaning of each answer will be explained. 

Question 1. Has the organization properly identified its customers? Most 

organizations would answer in the affirmative. Although an organization may 

remain unaware of some potential customers, it has to identify at least one 

valid customer who needs its products and services. Customers need not be 

policymakers or warfighters (the ultimate consumers of intelligence). Instead, 

a customer may simply be another intelligence organization with a need for 

information.

A negative response to this question raises a red flag. Any intelligence 

organization that has not properly identified its customers will face resource 

reductions during austere times and may not survive periods of severe 

retrenchment. 

Some readers may argue that an intelligence organization’s mission remains 

more important than its customers. They will say that an agency’s effectiveness depends solely on whether it accomplishes its mission(s). This is true 

only to the extent that the original mission remains valid. Policies and priorities of political leaders and military commanders undergo constant change, as 

do the needs of intelligence consumers. Only to the extent that customers still 

need the intelligence specified by a mission statement can an organization’s 

effectiveness be measured by mission accomplishment.

Corollary to Question 1. The need to keep the customer list up to date

rivals the basic value of knowing the identity of one’s customers. This 

list must reflect continuous changes, as organizations are created, disestablished, renamed, reorganized, or consolidated.

Question 2. Has the organization determined what its customers need? Even 

without knowing exactly what its customers need, an organization might 

happen to provide usable intelligence. The organization will more likely waste 

valuable time, effort, and resources producing intelligence of little or no use to 
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any customer. By failing to identify a clear need for its output, an intelligence 

organization may render itself vulnerable to reductions or elimination.

Corollary to Question 2. As with the previous corollary, an up-to-date 

list of each customer’s needs will prove vital to an effective intelligence 

operation. 

Question 3. Is the organization satisfying its customers’ needs? This question 

focuses on effectiveness. Assuming the organization has identified its customers and knows what those customers need, its effectiveness depends on the degree 

of success it has in satisfying those needs. Customer feedback offers the only way 

to determine how to answer the question. Adjustments based on useful feedback enhance effectiveness. 

Question 4. Is the organization satisfying its customers’ needs in a costeffective and efficient manner? Although efficiency may not matter so much 

in periods of plentiful resources, it becomes critical as budgets tighten. Differences between effectiveness and efficiency reflect different points of view:

● The customer judges the effectiveness of an intelligence organization. The 

intelligence organization itself feels the effects of its efficiency. The officials who review and approve the organization’s funding proposals are 

the ultimate judges of its efficiency as they evaluate its utilization of 

resources. 

Analyzing the responses. Each of the four questions deals with a specific 

aspect of an intelligence organization’s performance in identifying and satisfying its customers’ requirements. One can summarize the implications of 

positive and negative responses to these questions as follows:

Answers to all four questions YES

● From a resource management perspective, the organization is successful 

and should occupy a strong competitive position for securing and keep

ing the resources it needs.

Answers to Questions 1–3 YES

Answer to Question 4 NO
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● The organization’s effectiveness is not in question. But in a resourceconstrained environment, the organization’s lack of efficiency needs 

remedial action. 

Answers to Questions 1 and 2 YES

Answers to Questions 3 and 4 NO

● This case requires further study. The organization must determine why

valid customer requirements have not been met and take remedial 

action.

Answer to Question 1 YES

Answers to Questions 2–4 NO

● The organization must work with its customers to develop and maintain

the currency of any requirements list. Once that is done, it must assess its

capability to meet these needs and the degree of efficiency in doing so.

Answer to Question 1 NO

● In not knowing its customers or their needs, the organization suffers a 

poor competitive posture with respect to securing new resources and

keeping what it has.

Factors that can hinder effectiveness and efficiency. If the organization has 

determined that it knows its customers and their needs, but is unable to satisfy these requirements, an effort must be made to ascertain the underlying 

causes of this weakness. Although many potential reasons exist for this failing, 

shortfalls generally result from one of three conditions:

● Leadership/managerial shortcomings: poor planning, personality conflicts, 

political infighting, lack of communication, inappropriate or counterproductive policies, inefficient procedures, poor morale, strained employee 

relations, hostile working environment, etc.

● Structural weaknesses: unworkable organizational framework, confusing 

chains of responsibility, cumbersome and inefficient internal operations, 
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awkward physical layout of facilities, unsafe or physically uncomfortable 

working conditions, inadequate interface with external entities, etc

● Resource deficiencies: shortages of operating funds, equipment, or manpower. Whether real or perceived, most organizations cite this condition 

as the major cause of their inability to meet customer needs.

Overcoming Ineffectiveness and Inefficiency

Seeking remedies. Turning from problems to solutions, not all remedies suggested here can or should involve additional resources. Often, an organization 

has all the resources it needs to solve its problems, but its leaders either remain 

unaware of the true nature of these problems or lack the will to to fix them. 

Some remedies require external advisory or financial assistance. 

Leadership or managerial remedies. This type of problem—usually driven by 

personalities, bureaucracy, or institutional culture—typically requires internal 

resolution. The organization’s leaders need to risk making the changes needed. 

Personnel at all levels must be willing to participate in the change process, 

whether the remedial steps were mandated through in-house measures or recommended by outside management consultants.

Organizations suffering from leadership and managerial problems often ignore the obvious and insist on seeking solutions through the budget process. 

However, those who review these organizations’ requests for additional funding may well be skeptical that money will solve the problem. In such cases, 

they will undoubtedly scrutinize the requests carefully and expect to see sound 

evidence of exactly how additional funds may help resolve the problem.

Remedies for structural problems. Structural problems can be caused by 

forces that are either internal, external, or a combination of the two. Requests 

for additional dollar or manpower resources to address internal or external 

problems gain strength from the establishment and maintainance of an intelligence architecture that outlines current and desired capabilities, organizational roles and missions, functional relationships, and other features of an 

all-inclusive “master plan” for intelligence. Some architectures overlap because 

they address issues that require cooperation and interaction among multiple 

organizations, commands, and agencies. By working together to solve problems of common concern, a number of individual organizations can form 
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symbiotic relationships. They can pool their resources, act as sounding boards 

for each other’s ideas, and share any benefits from these efforts. Communitywide coordination of architectures brings greater efficiency and effectiveness 

than isolated efforts by each organization.

Budgetary remedies. If an organization determines that its ineffectiveness is 

truly resource-related, the budget process would be an appropriate avenue 

for seeking a remedy. Additional dollar and manpower resources could be 

pursued through programming and budgeting efforts. Dollar resources could 

also be sought, in the near term, through reprogramming actions or a request 

for supplemental funding. The organization’s resource managers and personnel assigned to the offices suffering the shortfall work together to develop 

the project description, supporting justification, and funding profile to be 

included in the proposal. Once the proposal has been finalized and submitted 

for consideration in the program and budget build process, the resource managers will follow it through the appropriate resource management system. 

This path will ideally lead all the way to the inclusion of the desired resources 

in an approved national budget.

In the United States, acquiring resources through the budget process usually requires a minimum of two years. Alternative sources of funds require a 

less time-consuming and less difficult process. Alternative sources include: a) 

“sweep-up” money made available during the year to cover unfunded requirements (UFRs), b) reprogramming actions that bring in additional resources, 

and c) supplemental appropriations. Each of the three can provide shortterm funding, but none could be expected to resolve a shortfall that requires 

sustainment over many years. Funds received through the second and third 

sources generally fill specific requirements that have already been identified 

by the time the money arrives. The pursuit of resources to satisfy ongoing 

requirements will be discussed later in this essay. 

Budget Proposal Management

Whether an organization is seeking funding for a new requirement or compiling its input for an annual budget submission, required documentation 

for a single new requirement or for each item in the annual submission will 

have the same basic components. These components are: a) a clear description 

of what is needed and how it will be developed and employed, b) why it is 
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needed and what can happen if the requirement is not met, and c) a resource 

summary that projects costs over the years needed to satisfy the requirement. 

An effective proposal will be readily understood by all those who read and 

review it. The more one understands how to simplify the development and 

marketing of a funding proposal, the greater the chance for success in acquiring needed resources. Vague and incomplete language can undermine a funding proposal. The following paragraphs outline how to develop a high-quality 

funding request with all the necessary ingredients.

Tailoring the request to the audience 

Project descriptions and justifications must be appropriate for all links in the 

approval chain through which the proposal travels. The higher the reviewer 

in the approval chain, the greater the likelihood he or she will lack the background or expertise to understand technical details and specifications (see 

later material on how to handle this situation). A project involving a tactical 

military intelligence asset will address different concerns than a more strategic need. The review process typically involves both military and civilian 

officials. Each group naturally has a different set of backgrounds, expertise, 

and concerns.

Developing and articulating a concept. A good proposal first identifies exactly 

what is needed and how the project will fit into an ongoing operation, if and 

when it is approved and fielded. Anticipating the project’s impact on existing 

workloads, equipment, space, and facilities requires the preparer to engage in 

two types of thinking: 1) comprehensive and 2) strategic (or programmatic). 

Comprehensive thinking. Those who engage in this type of thinking consider the full scope of the need—not just its basic ingredients, but all resources 

required. They consider supplies, equipment, furnishings, services, construction or renovation of facilities, travel, training, etc. Comprehensive thinking 

also weighs potential trade-offs that can affect costs and project feasibility. 

Tradeoffs to consider include purchase vs. lease and the use of contractors 

vs. new manpower (and in the case of new manpower, whether it should be 

military or civilian). This type of thinking allows the drafter to anticipate 

anything that could possibly force adjustments to the concept of operations 

once the project is underway.
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Strategic / Programmatic thinking. Here, one considers the mid- and longterm budgetary implications of the need, beyond the initial costs of implementation. Long-term needs include replacements, spares, maintenance, and 

the recapitalization of major equipment and systems in future budget years. 

By thinking strategically, one strives to: a) anticipate all costs associated with 

fielding a capability, b) minimize the likelihood of cost overruns during implementation, and c) ensure that the capability being established will meet or 

exceed expectations.

Drafting the Proposal

No matter the particular format used by an organization, a funding proposal 

contains four components: a program description, a justification, an impact 

statement, and a funding profile. 

Program Description. The narrative should begin with a brief list of the resource categories to be acquired, such as manpower (military billets, civilian 

positions, and contractor support); supplies, equipment, furnishings (mainframe computers, computer workstations, printers, servers, consumable supplies, communications equipment, light tables, and office furniture); services

(system and software design and development, intelligence collection and 

analysis, training of personnel, curriculum development, consulting services); 

construction or renovation of facilities; and finally, anything else to be funded 

through the project, such as travel and per diem expenses, purchase of software licenses, leasing of communications lines, and flight hours for airborne 

reconnaissance missions. The program description will also indicate the intended purpose of each resource. It should be comprehensive yet concise, with 

an implementation schedule and major milestones. An effective explanation 

demonstrates programmatic thinking.

The description should avoid technical jargon and overuse of acronyms, be 

internally consistent, and fit the numbers in the funding profile (to be described below). If technical details might be useful to some in the approval 

chain, this information should appear in a separate paragraph in the narrative, in an appendix or in an attachment. 

Justification. The justification identifies the underlying mission need and explains the impact of non-approval. Mission need refers to identifiable goals 
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and objectives to be supported by the proposed capability, and indicates how 

the project will respond to higher-level guidance directed at the organization. 

The body of the justification explains how the project expects to satisfy the 

mission need. An effective justification convinces reviewers that the project 

represents the best of all alternatives that might be offered to accomplish the 

mission.

Impact Statement. Whereas the justification explains the adverse impact of 

not funding the project, an effective impact statement explains its implications or ramifications for national security, support to warfighters, or some 

other high-level concern. The impact statement emphasizes why reviewers 

should care about those implications. In some instances, the statement may 

highlight the failure to take advantage of a measurable dollar, manpower, or 

time savings if the project is not approved. 

Funding Profile. This resource summary of the project’s financial and manpower costs appears in a spreadsheet. The top portion shows financial costs 

by fiscal year and the bottom section indicates manpower figures (in whole 

numbers of military billets and civilian positions). The example in Table 10 

shows resource categories used by the United States Department of Defense. 

Table 10

Intelligence Resource Summary Spreadsheet

Categories FY 2 FY 3 FY 4 FY 5 FY 6

O&M

Procurement

RDT&E

MilCon

MilPers

Total Costs

Officer

Enlisted

Civilian
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Table 10

Intelligence Resource Summary Spreadsheet (continued)

Categories FY 2 FY 3 FY 4 FY 5 FY 6

Total Manpower

O&M=Operation and Maintenance; RDT&E=Research, Development, Test 

and Evaluation; MilCon=Military Construction; MilPers=Military Personnel.

Source: Compiled by the author.

An explanation of costs will alert reviewers to the factors behind the figure 

in each block. Careful explanations of multiple expenditures in the same category may save a proposal from arbitrary reductions, as reviewers can gauge 

the impact of not funding a particular item.

Marketing the Proposal 

Creating a viable funding proposal requires considerable effort. The requester 

cannot leave the fate of even a clear and properly constructed proposal to 

chance. The requester needs to “work the system” by arranging as much exposure as possible for it as the larger organization’s program and budget are 

formulated. Only the proposal’s originator knows the project’s value to the 

mission and the organization. 

Marketing takes place at all organizational levels, as branch supervisors vie 

for acceptance of their respective project concepts. Division supervisors, in 

turn, compete to gain favor with higher-level officials as part of the deliberation and decisionmaking process. Some organizations extract facts and figures 

from written proposals for summary in “quad sheets” or “quad charts” for use 

at prebriefings, briefings, and decision briefings. These tactics aim to cull the 

few real gems from disparate, competing proposals, to improve the chances of 

funding the most deserving projects.

Budget Principles for Supervisors or Office Directors

Resource Responsibilities of Supervisors 

Supervisors routinely provide resource managers much of the data and 

justifications for program and budget build. Whether they realize it or not, 
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all supervisors in intelligence organizations have certain resource-related 

responsibilities as described below.

Defending existing resources. The budget process deals not only with the 

pursuit of future resources, but also the defense of those currently on hand. 

In periods of declining or flat budgets, the only way to fund anything new 

is to “take it out of hide.” This forces organizations to offer items in the current program-of-record as compensation for later funding of some of the new 

items proposed in their budgets. Thus, managers must always be prepared to 

defend their assigned resources to keep them from being used as bill payers. 

The same preparation will prove useful when they have to provide input to 

data calls referred to as “what-if drills.” In these drills, supervisors show what 

they expect would happen to their operations if their budgets were cut by 

some arbitrary figure, such as 5 or 10 percent. A knowledge of the basics of 

the budget process can be helpful even to those who do not foresee a need to 

seek additional resources. 

Filling unfunded requirements. All organizations strive to obligate as much 

of their budget as possible each fiscal year to avoid losing unobligated budget authority. This prompts mid-year and end-of-year execution reviews, designed to find any budget authority that will likely not be obligated by the 

end of the fiscal year. “Excess” money can be “swept up” in these reviews and 

diverted to unfunded or underfunded projects. Competition for “sweep-up” 

money generally involves a process similar to the annual program and budget build (though usually on short notice). Those who can quickly produce 

funding proposals that demonstrate a critical need for resources stand to gain 

some of this excess money. 

Manpower and personnel management. Supervisor responsibilities at various 

levels of intelligence organizations include manpower resource management. 

In this role, supervisors: a) periodically identify staffing shortfalls that can be 

addressed in the program build, thus ensuring personnel levels adequate to 

cover the workload; b) review billet and position descriptions to ensure they 

accurately reflect the duties of incumbents; and c) participate in the planning 

and implementation of reorganizations. Supervisors also manage activities 

that affect the productivity of the workforce.
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Management of space and equipment. Supervisor accountability for the 

condition of assigned work spaces and equipment often brings resource implications. Examples include funding for maintaining space and equipment, 

buying replacement equipment, and renovating workspace. 

Contracting. Supervisors play a key role in arranging for contracts for the 

purchase of goods and services. They provide much of the information used 

to prepare the statement-of-work or statement-of-objectives that will accompany the request-for-proposal to be issued to vendors interested in bidding on 

contracts. A good deal of this information can be extracted from the project 

description in the original funding proposal. 

Implementation of Spend Plans. Most supervisors use a “spend plan” as a 

management tool to maintain a running balance of available budget authority as the fiscal year progresses. This tool helps ensure the availability of funds 

at any given time to meet anticipated and unanticipated needs during the 

year. It alerts managers to potential shortfalls that may require additional 

funding or curtailment of some planned activities. Supervisors can measure 

how efficiently and effectively their subordinates manage their budgets by 

tracking commitment, obligation, and expenditure rates reflected in the subordinates’ own spend plans.

Tying Everything Together

The author’s work experience certifies the value of combining comprehensive 

with programmatic thinking to give life to the foregoing budgetary principles. Every intelligence supervisor and office director needs to develop a 

working familiarity with his or her home country’s apparatus and processes 

for resource management. These same officials also need to develop an appropriate style of negotiating the unavoidable bureaucratic politics that accompany the competition for adequate funding of intelligence programs. They 

need to know how to engage counterparts who control the allocation of personnel and space (facilities), the use of occasionally contracted services, and 

other resources that can impact their ability to accomplish assigned missions 

and responsibilities. Finally, to meet effectiveness as well as efficiencicy goals, 

supervisors and office directors always need to relate resource management 

plans and decisions to the substantive side of the intelligence enterprise. 
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Epilogue

Effective funding proposals and the use of specific criteria for measuring a 

proposal’s effectiveness can help both the preparing offices and reviewing officials. Efficiency and effectiveness of resource use needs the full attention of 

everyone in the chain of resource management because the ultimate source 

of funding and the reason for the existence of a national security and intelligence system are one and the same—our fellow citizens. 

Author’s Biography

Dan Elkins, a retired U.S. naval intelligence officer and nationally recognized 

expert on intelligence resource management, has experience in cryptology, 

imagery intelligence, resource and manpower planning, reserve management 

and coordination, and intelligence training and education. He has offered 

resource management courses at the Defense Intelligence College and its successor institutions (now the National Intelligence University) and the Joint 

Military Intelligence Training Center (now the Academy of Defense Intelligence) in Washington, DC. In February 1995, he founded DWE Enterprises, 

a consulting firm for the management of intelligence resources, and subsequently served as a faculty member of The Intelligence and Security Academy. 

Mr. Elkins has trained well over 10,000 U.S. Intelligence Community and 

Defense Department personnel, including congressional staffers, personnel 

from two national laboratories, and employees of a number of corporations. 

Mr. Elkins holds a B.A. in Spanish (1975) and an M.B.A. in finance (1980) 

from what is now the University of Massachusetts at Lowell. He is the author 

of the 2004, 2006, 2010 and 2014 editions of Managing Intelligence Resources

(DWE Press), the nation’s most authoritative consolidated reference on intelligence and defense resource management for the intelligence and defense 

communities. Email: dwelkins2@cs.com.
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Changing Paradigms in Military Intelligence—

Civil Affairs Operations and the Threat of 

Militarily Capable Criminal Groups 

G.M. Capo

and

M.A. Duarte

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” 

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Introduction

In Latin American countries, the absence of a state presence in underdeveloped, remote areas, coupled with the growth of corruption and infiltration 

by criminal groups, poses a continuing problem. Diminished capabilities of 

the armed forces and other public security institutions allow organized crime 

and drug cartels to flourish. Remote areas without a national institutional 

presence tend to fall under the control of nonstate actors who often develop 

power structures parallel to those of the state.418

The level of sophistication, technical competence, and overall capability of 

criminal groups in the region compels governments to consider them military 

entities by type and capability. With their equipment and tactical proficiency, 

their mobility and transborder reach, they constitute a totally operational 

army. The poor economic and fiscal capability of some countries in the region to finance their armed forces, and vestigial prohibitions and embargoes 

on military aid, obligate Latin American countries and their military establishments to find new means with which to confront well-financed criminal 

groups. 

This scenario should be viewed as an opportunity for paradigmatic change. It 

provides an opportunity to rethink the use of military forces in national counternarcotics strategy. In place of a focus on the use of arms and its associated 

advanced technology, the military can apply intelligence to social problems 

in a way that permits the army to protect populations at risk. The military 
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can develop intelligence in geographical areas of interest to narcotraffickers by 

gaining a nuanced understanding and analysis of the residents’ sociocultural, 

psychological, and economic needs and desires. In this way, armies of the 

region could establish themselves as the chief government representatives in 

remote areas at risk. They would gain the information and knowledge needed 

to bring aid and development to these communities. “Social intelligence” 

would thus give the armed forces an enduring capability to deny or at least 

hinder criminal groups from insinuating themselves into remote communities.419 Could this paradigm usher in an effective strategy to break the economic power of transnational criminal networks?420

Background

The 1995 Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America and 

the 1996 Guatemala Peace Accords initiated the country’s pathway to democracy and its institutional transformation. It also instilled a new concept 

of security in the Central American region, centered on the protection and 

well-being of individuals. 

A 1996 Agreement on Strengthening Civilian Power and the Role of the 

Army in a Democratic Society421 demilitarized Guatemalan society and 

brought on a new National Security System (SNS). However, 12 years had 

passed before the Framework Law for the National Security System (Decree 

18-2008) finally allowed the state to confront security challenges through 

coordinated actions at the highest levels of government.422

The Framework Law established the SNS and a National Intelligence System 

(SNI). Both operate under a democratic security paradigm primarily focused 

on the protection of individuals.423 Together, the treaty, peace accords, and 

framework law offer theoretical support and legal authorization for government action and provide a pathway for social intelligence. 

More recently, the Guatemalan National Security Council outlined a strategy 

for how the country can prevent and counter various risks and challenges to 

the state in a National Security Policy document.424 The Advisory and Planning Commission (CAP)425 then presented a strategic security agenda and 

plan to complement the principles and strategic objectives outlined in that 

document. Together, these documents embody Guatemala’s security strategy. 
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By extending the model of democratic security in its preventive form, orienting the state’s actions, and establishing the fundamentals for a continual 

evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness through planning, these recent documents are historically transcendent. The National Security Policy has established a strategic direction for intelligence. Social intelligence implements one 

aspect of that strategy.426

Consequences for the Armed Forces

Given the lack of an explicit separation between military and police spheres 

of operation, the Guatemalan Army can at any time take action to preserve 

internal security. The armed forces for an extended period have not been used 

to defend the state or its citizens against external foes. A 2012 Protocol for 

Inter-Institutional Engagement (Accord 285-2012) addresses army support 

to civilian security forces and updates the authority of the army as an actor in 

internal security.427

The prestige and capability of the armed forces suffered from an Army Modernization and Transformation Plan (No. 3-“H”-01) of 2004. The plan imposed a drastic personnel reduction, but the projected “modernization” never 

took place. The Guatemalan Army shrank from 27,000 soldiers to 15,500. 

The transformation plan considered the new number reasonable in view of 

the personnel complement of other armed forces in the region. The plan 

negatively impacted not only the military institution but national security 

itself. The state lost its ability to maintain a dissuasive presence throughout 

the national territory. 

Meanwhile, the Peace Accords and Agreement of 1996 had set the course for 

the creation of the National Civilian Police (PNC). The PNC replaced the 

National Police, an organization that had failed to address societal needs under a democratic regime. Decree 11-97 established the PNC and charged it to 

“protect the life, physical integrity, and security of persons and their property, 

ensure their free exercise of rights and freedoms, and prevent, investigate, and 

fight crime, thereby preserving public order and public security.”428 From 

the start, this police force has experienced serious deficiencies. In particular, it 

has not established a permanent presence throughout Guatemalan territory, 

thereby facilitating the incursion and implantation of criminal elements and 

organized crime groups in several parts of the country.
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The PNC has three responsibilities: prevention of crimes, investigation of 

crimes, and maintenance of public order. Although it has been addressing 

its deficiencies by developing reform initiatives, the society at large has not 

recognized this progress.429 The weaknesses of the PNC result from organizational deterioration and lack of coordination during the transition period 

from one government to the next. A study measuring the confidence of citizens in societal institutions on a scale of 0 to 100 found that political parties 

in Guatemala earned a rating of 36.1, congress a 41.9, and the PNC only a 

34.9. In contrast, churches (Evangelical and Catholic) received the highest 

ratings at 64.0 and 70.2, respectively, while the army nearly equaled those 

with 59.5 points.430

Police weaknesses place the force in a vulnerable position as citizens question 

its legitimacy and credibility. A special Presidential Commission formed to 

correct the problems faulted weak professional development of the force as 

the chief reason for the inadequacy of police reform.431 A notable deficiency 

appears in teaching and learning the requirements of a criminal justice system. 

Inadequate development of criminal investigation capability begins with police training but extends to the entire National Civilian Police operation.432

Any comparison of army capabilities with those of the PNC would find that 

only the national military organization possesses the human and material 

resources needed to ensure citizen security in the face of militarily capable 

organized crime and drug-trafficking groups. Only the army can prevent the 

incursion of criminal elements and allow for long-term socioeconomic development of rural populations. The army lacks only a strategy for collecting 

preventive social intelligence information and knowledge within a democratic, rule-of-law model.

Civil Affairs in Guatemala—Unique in Latin America

A Guatemalan civil affairs doctrine first apeared in 1955, when a Governing 

Accord (Army General Order No. 17-17) created the Army Public Relations 

Department within the Ministry of National Defense. During the 1960s 

and 1970s, Guatemalan civic action projects followed models based on U.S. 

Army doctrine. In 1971, the first Civil Affairs Operations Manual advocated 

developing a closer relationship with and obtaining greater support from the 

public.433
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Civil affairs focused on the country’s internal situation, but reflected the international Cold War environment. The United States, seeing a rapid advance 

of communism in places relatively near U.S. territory, put in place a grand 

strategy to contain the advance of this ideology. The strategy —known as 

the “National Security Doctrine”—was imposed on and accepted by Latin 

American armies, giving them an identity and the sense that military institutions were responsible for the destiny of their respective nations. 

In the 1950s, the first national intelligence services of the modern era also 

appeared in the region. They focused on the internal environment in each 

country. In the 1960s, under the influence of the National Security Doctrine, 

the region’s intelligence systems grew in personnel, technology, specialization, and budgets. The idea behind the Pentagon’s strategy, that the “internal 

enemy” had penetrated all spheres of society, led the intelligence services to 

strengthen themselves further and to extend their reach into new areas. Cold 

War-era “social intelligence” began to operate in political, economic, and social spheres, as well as in the military realm.434

Civil affairs units in Guatemala operated under doctrinal principles originating in Taiwan, whereby the so-called “political war” saw the winning of 

territory as less important than winning the minds of the people.435 That is, 

strategic advantage comes not from success on the field of battle but from 

understanding the fabric of society. Prosecuting a political war does not imply a non-violent approach. Rather, any violence should remain limited. The 

avoidance of direct military confrontation would hopefully advance the desired political outcome.

The 1980s became the most critical decade for the internal Guatemalan 

conflict. Ideologically focused campaigns became “psychological operations.” 

The Office of Civil Affairs emerged within the General Staff of National 

Defense (D-5) and appointed the first civil affairs officers. These officers 

conducted psychological and propaganda operations. In conjunction with 

these operations, “social intelligence” appeared as a means to understand 

social conditions that might create friction among population groups, and 

to guide the use of preventive measures. In 1983, the first 11 Civil Affairs 

and Local Development Units operated in the principal military zones of the 

country.436 
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In retrospect, social intelligence epitomized the army’s changed approach to 

tactical situations, where minimum force was to be used against localized 

resistance. An analysis based on the information provided by the Civil Affairs 

Units about each village, town, and city guided the unit’s response to inhabitants’ needs. Social intelligence collectors explored each population center 

to acquire knowledge and an understanding of conditions and causes that 

favored the growth of conflict; that is, social intelligence detected potential 

discontent. These preventive units linked all the information they acquired in 

their areas of interest to the army’s intelligence system. All the resources of the 

Civil Affairs Units were, in effect, oriented toward social intelligence. 

Civil Affairs Units in the Guatemalan Army had more fully trained and experienced specialists than any other country of Latin America. The Guatemalan 

Army served as the permanent site for the Subcommittee on Civil Affairs associated with the Annual Conference of the American Armies. However, in the 

force restructuring of 2004, these units were demobilized. In their place, the 

School of Public Relations began to operate under the Regional Peacekeeping 

and Peace Operations Training Command. The school prepares Guatemalan 

Army and selected foreign officials for work in civil affairs and psychological 

operations. Its graduates focus on civic improvement projects, local development, and giving advice to community groups and working committees, as 

well as maintaining institutional ties to the population.437

Although the School of Public Relations and the Office of Civil and Military 

Relations of the General Staff of National Defense, together with the Manual 

for Civil Affairs (ME-20-02, authorized in 2011), have modified the doctrine for new army missions and scenarios, civil affairs lacks the personnel, 

materiel, and leading technologies of past decades. The main explanation lies 

in the reduction of army personnel, which affected civil affairs capabilities. 

The decision to reduce the military apparatus also undermined adequate geographic coverage of the country by military units. During the years of internal 

conflict, military units deployed throughout the country, and especially in 

zones of conflict. Six of the fourteen military zones were deactivated in the 

2004 retrenchment.

The government now innovates by creating specialized brigades and interinstitutional task forces. Of two brigades created in 2012, one focused on environmentally “protected areas” like the Laguna del Tigre in the Petén and on 
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the eradication of clandestine runways used by narcotraffickers. A new military police brigade began work in the municipios of Guatemala City. Starting 

in June 2013, two more new brigades deployed to address border security. A 

brigade of marines monitored the beaches and inlets of Atlantic and Pacific 

coasts. An Army High-Mountain Brigade began extensive patrols to control 

and eradicate the planting and harvesting of opium poppies and to reduce 

field laboratory production of illegal synthetic drugs. An interinstitutional 

task force initiated work with the National Civil Police, the attorney general, 

and the Tax Administration. It aims to reduce contraband commerce, narcotrafficking, and arms trafficking along the border with Mexico. 

These actions are having limited impact. Criminal groups have greater resources in technical and materiel terms than state security organizations. The 

preventive Community Relations Intervention Division438 of the National 

Civilian Police cannot yet deploy widely enough to address security problems 

in remote areas. In October 2012, when security forces tried to resolve a 

social protest in the Department of Totonicapán area known as the Cumbre 

de Alaska, six deaths occurred. The operation brought to light a lack of coordination combined with a lack of information and intelligence.439 Across 

the larger region, countries do not have a financially sustainable capability 

to continue a direct-action, frontal battle of attrition against drug trafficking and related transnational organized criminal groups.440 Armies have very 

limited resources or do not receive useful levels of international technical and 

materiel support. 

A “proof of concept” demonstration of the utility of social intelligence could 

alert citizens to the value of preventive information in augmenting the state’s 

scarce security resources. Gaining the reciprocal assistance of local populations 

would further assist the state’s capability against internal and transnational 

threats. 

An Altered Paradigm—Civil Affairs-Based 

Strategy for Prevention and Defense 

Militarized drug cartels have vast capital resources, illicit arsenals, command 

and control equipment, and armored vehicles for tactical mobility. They 

have become war-fighting entities with solid military capabilities.441 This 

reality demands a renewal of armed forces and other security institutions’ 
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capabilities. Any new or altered strategy should facilitate an efficient and 

respectful relationship among the armed forces, government, and citizenry. 

To address the criminal threats that endanger the country’s inhabitants and 

threaten the stability of governmental institutions, the authors have proposed 

a program of civil affairs-led military operations. The operations will have the 

flexibility and power to carry out preventive, intelligence-based actions. The 

program coincides with the country’s strategic objectives. Similar programs 

exist in Colombia and Peru, where Civil Affairs Units (generally with U.S. support to local military units) have played an important role in the fight against 

cartels and transnational organized crime groups. However, those programs 

only respond reactively to criminal groups who seek competitive advantage 

over the state in addressing the vulnerabilities of local populations.442

In contrast, the authors’ proposal for Guatemala, and possibly for neighboring countries, establishes a program that takes advantage of the multidisciplinary capabilities of the state. It uses the institutional structure of the armed 

forces and remains within the existing legal framework. The recommended 

approach supports a positive, preventive relationship between the armed forces and civilian authorities, and with the population in general. The authors 

expect that planning, support, and implementation of activities, operations 

and projects will promote the development of disadvantaged populations, 

thereby reducing criminal exploitation of their vulnerabilities.

Inter-institutional task forces, where police and military officials cooperate 

and share responsibilities, have a limited purpose suitable to particular times 

and places. Civil affairs units operate as a part of a larger institution, have 

a defined mission centered on prevention, and generally have a permanent 

structure. Military personnel of civil affairs units are soldiers first, and their 

mission is to support their commander and certain civilian institutions, although they are not part of the latter. The principal task of civil affairs personnel is to obtain information about a local social environment to verify 

intelligence reports or to contribute to military intelligence or the national 

intelligence system at large. Civil affairs units operate exclusively within the 

armed forces. When civil affairs personnel no longer support a military commander, any civilian organization that might need their services can employ 

them, but as civilians.443
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The authors propose the programmatic use of military civil affairs operations, 

led by intelligence teams, to focus on understanding the social environment 

at risk. Civil affairs teams can engage local populations in a collaborative 

effort to avoid or deny the penetration of communities by narcotraffickers. 

Simultaneously, the teams can manage and improve the image of the army 

and the central government. The intelligence-based, civil-affairs approach 

identifies local problems, prioritizes them, and finds solutions. The best solutions will come from suggestions offered by those who live in the places at 

risk. Social intelligence builds and depends on reciprocal collaboration with 

everyday individuals and officials in diverse localities. 

In Guatemalan defense ministry terms, any entity supported by sufficient resources, organization, and intentions to challenge the state’s attainment of its 

fundamental objectives constitutes a threat. Narcotrafficking and organized 

crime, in that order, pose the most serious challenge to Guatemalan security. 

The minister of defense believes that neither has yet risen to the level of a 

threat because neither has the capability to oppose conceptually or ideologically the national objectives of Guatemala.444

Not all Guatemalan communities susceptible to criminal influence are actually targeted by the narcotraffickers. Instead, they target only those communities in locations of strategic criminal interest. Narcotraffickers give financial 

support to projects that benefit citizens in those areas. They often cooperate 

with local Municipal Development Councils (COMUDES) or Community 

Development Councils (COCODES).445 Narcotraffickers gain social status 

by building hospitals, roads, and bridges quickly without bureaucratic impediments. Although they may not yet have become a threat, narcotrafficking 

and organized crime remain among the chief concerns of political figures in 

the country. 

For the Guatemalan army, and for countries with a similar social environment, 

civil affairs units can be a “secret” weapon and a source of power. The modus 

operandi of social intelligence enables information collection without 

reference to an “intelligence operation.” Its mission is to observe, analyze and 

communicate social details related to the prevention of crimes and violence—

nothing more and nothing less. The centerpoint of civil affairs strategy is the 

concept of “minimal force.”446 The civil affairs hosting of a social intelligence 
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capability signals the army’s intention to support local actions and institutions 

on a continuing basis. Although civil affairs operations do not totally renounce 

the use of force, they can best act as “shock absorbers” for the local population 

when confrontations or conflicts occur. 

The army is well suited for implementing a social intelligence program for 

two reasons. First, this institution typically has a real and reinforceable presence throughout the country. Second, it typically possesses a more robust 

organizational capability than other state institutions. 

Some individuals or groups in Guatemala may remain unprepared for the authors’ proposal, or will simply not find it acceptable. They may see it as a shift 

toward greater militarization or re-militarization of the National Security System. Discussion of Guatemalan military policies always elicits strong and antagonistic opinion. The shadow of internal armed conflict of decades past has 

not yet faded. Additionally, the generally conservative, slow-to-change armed 

forces hesitate to accept new cognitive or behavioral paradigms. Nonetheless, 

the authors know that the armed forces identify with the democratic values 

and beliefs of the society of which they are part. Many citizens understand 

military values and even identify with them. Yet the military as a professional 

organization stands apart from making hasty or vengeful judgments and can 

readily refrain from damaging involvement in local politics. The authors’ 

proposal expects the armed forces to serve the national political purpose of 

democratic security through respect for the rule of law and human rights and 

a focus on the protection of the individual. 

In 2012 the High Command of the Army received and accepted the authors’ 

proposal.447 Preparation of personnel to implement the program soon followed. Even though a similar program existed in relatively recent Guatemalan 

history, the legal basis, operating principles, doctrine and purposes of the 

new program differ substantially. Authoritarian or arbitrary methods were 

applied in Guatemala by earlier civil affairs units, with little or no protection 

of human rights. Today, a state-centric vision has evolved to an ethno-centric 

approach that favors the protection of individuals and families. 

Summary

The authors recommend social intelligence as an alternative to the traditional 

military intelligence approach to internal security in Guatemala. Only the 
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armed forces have the capability to confront criminal groups that themselves 

have real military capabilities. Civil affairs units of the army offer an appropriate home for social intelligence activity. Civil affairs units can be effective 

in undertaking public security activity because the military enjoys a better 

public perception than any other public security force in Guatemala. Also, 

only the military can deploy anywhere in the country for an extended period 

and perform in strict compliance with a national doctrine, under a constitution and with supervision by elected civilian authorities. 

This proposal does not seek to expand the influence of the armed forces at the 

cost of restricting the authorities of the National Civil Police. Instead, it seeks 

to reactivate and strengthen a capability of the Guatemalan military structure 

that was dismantled in 2004. The army’s civil affairs units cannot usurp the 

functions of civilian security forces. To do otherwise would expand the mission of the army to areas of responsibility that remain exclusively civilian. 

The authors also do not suggest the use of force by the civil affairs units 

although they have the right to its use. Instead, civil affairs development of 

social intelligence will simultaneously promote the aims of national development and the aspirations of rural communities across the country. Finally, 

the ability of this proposal to renew the prominence of civil affairs depends 

on strengthening the superstructure of the army and the National Security 

System. 

Epilogue

Editor’s note: Following the acceptance of this essay, the authors submitted an addendum to their work, in which they describe an implementation 

model for social intelligence in Guatemala.

System for Humano-Social Understanding (SES-H)

The SES-H model offers a multidisciplinary management, analysis and evaluation tool for the holistic understanding of designated regions in Guatemala. 

It will benefit development projects and help maintain peace in rural and 

urban areas. Implementaton of the model does not depend exclusively on 

the armed forces, although institutional support from the army may help in 

some situations. The model aims to reinforce inter-institutional coordination 

so that state and local authorities and private industry will make long-term 
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investments in local communities. The model aims to strengthen citizen participation and guarantee long-term human development in targeted regions. 

The model recognizes that the army’s civil affairs units exist to anticipate 

and find solutions to security problems within the country. The authors also 

recognize that successive governments have found it difficult to carry out 

sustainable and long-lasting programs for community development in the 

regions where a state presence has declined or been lost. When government 

institutions are absent, the resulting lack of authority and control negatively 

impacts the life and property of individuals, democratic institutions, the rule 

of law, and human rights.448 In addition, the lack of problem-solving government services and programs means that the affected communities seek 

other, informal or illegal ways to obtain services. This process creates a culture 

of illegality among citizens. A culture of illegality corrupts community life 

and brings violence, abuse, and the denial of services as a means of enforcing informal authority. The SES-H program can anticipate the emergence of 

conflicts associated with this syndrome. 

Basic Aspects of the Model

Functional areas

The SES-H model integrates information about a specific geographic area 

from six functional areas. The synthesized information allows a team to 

achieve deep understanding of the social, cultural, economic, and historic 

complexities of an area and its population. The six functional areas are: 

● Geographic space 

● Local background and history

● Social interactions

● Local culture

● Political forces

● Economic dynamics.
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Management

● Board of Directors

Provides for coordination, control, and general management of the SES-H 

team 

● Analysis

Component for fusion, analysis, and dissemination of information 

● Collection

This approach depends on a deployed field component, made up of teams responsible for collecting information in the designated geographical area. Each 

team includes a chief and six specialists, one for each functional area. 

Personnel

Because the SES-H model emphasizes management and analysis, personnel 

at all levels require experience and professional development suitable for the 

respective functional areas. Military or governmental experience can be beneficial in some instances. Members of the Board of Directors require certification in management, analysis, and collection. Personnel working in analysis 

need a strong work ethic, a concern for detail and familiarity with all available tools for analysis. Finally, field information collectors need experience in 

each of the six functional areas of concern to the holistic effort. In addition, 

given the supreme difficulty in finding capable individuals who know each 

local area in detail, the team should seek out a trusted local adviser for each 

deployment. 

Application 

The authors monitored the activity of an SES-H team fielded to a holistic 

development area in rural Guatemala, and advised the military commander 

responsible for the corresponding security task force located in the capital 

city. They expect the establishment of a more autonomous SES-H team in 

the rural northeast. 
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Biographies of the Authors

M. A. Duarte, a doctoral candidate in strategic security at the Universidad 

de San Carlos de Guatemala, holds an MBA from Rice University with a 

focus on strategy. He also earned a BS in industrial engineering from the 

University of Houston. He has worked on national security projects with 

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of 

Defense. He authored AHORA: Evitando los riesgos de una sociedad insegura

(Grupo Litopogra, 2009) and now heads the Office of Monitoring and 

Communication at the Technical Secretariat of the Guatemalan National 

Security Council. Email: andresdugar@gmail.com.

Grisel M. Capo, a doctoral candidate in strategic security at the Universidad 

de San Carlos de Guatemala, earned a master’s degree in international relations with a focus on international cooperation from the Universidad Rafael 

Landívar de Guatemala and a bachelor’s in international relations from the 

Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay. She is a graduate of the 

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Perry Center) in Washington, DC 

and has studied civil-military operations at Fort Benning, Georgia. She has 

authored several articles on intelligence themes. Presently, she serves as a consultant on external security to the Advisory and Planning Commission of the 

Guatemalan National Security Council. Email: griselcapo@hotmail.com.
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Intelligence Cooperation in the Framework of the Union 

of South American Nations (UNASUR): 

Possibilities and Limitations 

Carolina Sancho Hirane

“Axelrod, speaking about cooperation,

begins with a key question: “Under what

conditions will cooperation appear in a world

of egoists, without a central authority?”449

“European countries are increasingly accepting

that risks and threats today are not different for each

country, but they are transnational, and that shared

risks can only be addressed by a common approach.”450

To explore the possibilities and limitations of intelligence cooperation within 

UNASUR451 this study will identify the elements required for its effective 

development. One compound question will guide this examination: “What 

are the obstacles to effective intelligence cooperation in UNASUR, and how 

may they be overcome?” The answer to this question will represent the minimum requirements for cooperation to be effective. 

Intelligence cooperation does take place among many countries that make 

up UNASUR, but considerable room exists for qualitative and quantitative 

improvement of cooperation within its framework. Intelligence cooperation 

occurs under formal or informal circumstances as member countries seek the 

capability to prevent consensually defined dangers to their security. At this 

time, no formal mechanism for intelligence cooperation exists in UNASUR.

The essay begins with an exploration of intelligence cooperation theory. A 

review of the relevant academic literature, to include typologies ascribed to 

the phenomenon, will develop an understanding of its basic elements and 

their applicability to the question of managing intelligence cooperation in 

UNASUR.452
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Theoretical Aspects of Intelligence Cooperation

National intelligence agencies and programs engage in both cooperation and 

competition with those of other countries.453 States resist intelligence cooperation because they prefer not to subject their own intelligence agencies 

to foreign requirements. They also resist because they face the already difficult question of how much information each country should collect on its 

own population and how much should be exchanged among its own executive agencies. In this environment, having to decide how much information 

should be exchanged with foreign agencies may appear too daunting. Nonetheless, interagency relationships and exchanges do occur as a normal part of 

bureaucratic process in any country, and every country learns to handle the 

question of how individual intelligence services can best process and disseminate information they obtain.454

New threats pose challenges to security agencies, and in order to improve 

their efficiency they may need to share information and/or operations with 

foreign services. To create, deepen and improve these international ties is one 

of the chief ways to meet the threat posed by terrorism, organized crime, 

and narcotrafficking. Those ties require thoroughgoing cooperation to be effective, but a capability to manage the information flow and coordination 

required to address mutual threats requires time to develop and must accommodate the different ways agencies interact with one another. 

Intelligence cooperation within the framework of multilateral organizations 

is not a new phenomenon. For example, the idea of a United Nations intelligence service emerged in North America near the end of the Cold War.455 

But because of internal tensions that the proposal generated within the UN, 

it did not gain traction.

Thus, the idea of intelligence cooperation in multilateral organizations is a 

recurring theme in how public safety worldwide might be ensured against 

transnational threats.456 Academic publications frequently address the issue. 

Some countries have an urgent need to engage in intelligence cooperation to 

reduce their vulnerabilities and take advantage of opportunities, especially 

with respect to international terrorism. Reinforcing the value of intelligence 

cooperation against transnational threats such as terrorism, one author advises that 
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the U.S. Intelligence Community, together with other intelligence services, need to work on creating a database that 

identifies and tracks foreign combatants, their known associates and spiritual mentors. If this database had been created during the Cold War, the United States would have 

been much better prepared for the subsequent terrorism 

campaign of al-Qaida.457

The former director of the UN Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 

in Iraq, Hans Blix, has experience with intelligence cooperation. His commission interacted with national intelligence services to provide background 

information and data that contributed to national reports on subjects of multilateral interest. He found that the commission could not rely exclusively 

on information or intelligence from individual countries because they have 

interests different from those of the multilateral organization. However, his 

UN organization did not and does not have sufficient information tools to 

meet its objectives and has no alternative but to accept information from 

individual countries, and on that basis, take a stand.458

As he reflected on the best structure for effective information cooperation 

within multilateral organizations, Blix determined that the formation of a 

multilateral intelligence service with agents or officials from national intelligence services would lead to its having little international credibility. This 

is because, from the point of view of the international community, national 

intelligence services are simply acting through rather than for the multilateral 

organization, negatively affecting its professional image. This issue remains 

even when positive steps have been taken to improve multilateral intelligence 

capabilities.459

The participation by national intelligence service officials in a multilateral 

organization can be a first step toward building an atmosphere of cooperation 

in the organization’s early stages. Intelligence officials with ties and allegiance 

to the multilateral organization itself can initiate a second step in that direction as they advise the organization’s leaders on issues of strategic interest. The 

experience of the United Nations in peace operations demonstrates the limited utility of the intelligence function within that multilateral organization, 

which still does not field its own cadre of intelligence specialists.460
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UNASUR could extrapolate some examples of intelligence cooperation from 

other multilateral organizations, but has not yet done so.461 The Argentine 

observer Ugarte does point out, however, that one of the specific objectives 

of UNASUR’s South American Defense Council (CDS) is “to promote the 

exchange of information and analyses about the regional and international 

[security] situation, for the purpose of identifying the factors that can affect 

regional or world peace.”462 Ugarte further notes that the CDS’s Center for 

Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) recognizes the relevance of strategic analysis and strategic intelligence for several of its areas of responsibility.463

Intelligence cooperation under the auspices of UNASUR is therefore feasible, 

pending a careful review of its possibilities, limitations, and the manner in 

which it may be carried out. A necessary condition will be for its benefits to 

outweigh any drawbacks for the actors involved. Pulido makes the interesting point that “if the relative gains obtained by each state from the process of 

intelligence cooperation do not in the long run produce a clearly evident improvement in the relative position of some countries over others, or even the 

perception of such an advantage, then the cooperation may be effective.”464

The academic study of intelligence as a theoretic and applied discipline may 

contribute to multilateral cooperation in the region.465 Academic study can 

advance the analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities on behalf 

of the countries that make up UNASUR. Discussion and understanding of 

these aspects of South American security can become the basis for thoughtful 

management of common, multinational actions. 

Typologies of Intelligence Cooperation

Intelligence cooperation, understood as the “willingness and ability of diverse organizations and intelligence professionals to work together to achieve 

common objectives,”466 “is never without limits, no matter how strong the 

alliance between countries, or among the set of countries engaged in cooperation.”467 With these basic ideas in mind, cooperation may be categorized 

across three dimensions:468

A. Degree of formality of interaction, across a continuum from formal 

to informal. Informality corresponds with the absence of accords, 

agreements, or acts that would identify explicit institutional interests 
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in exchanging information between intelligence services. In practice, 

formal arrangements for cooperation are often discounted in favor of 

more flexible ways to engage, regardless of existing, formal treaties. 

Similarly, formal, permanent and very close cooperation, clearly a rarity, 

requires a strong commonality of interests and foreign policies between 

or among participating countries. An example of formal cooperation 

occurs when the agents or representatives of one service temporarily 

join another country’s intelligence service.

B. Number of actors involved; that is, either a bilateral or multilateral relationship. Not surprisingly, on a worldwide basis, intelligence cooperation 

is mostly bilateral. Multilateral cooperation, considerably rarer, presupposes a strong alliance and generally strong ties among the participating 

countries.

C. Substantive activities in which partners engage. Three spheres of activity 

dominate intelligence action, each defined by respective targets of interest. These spheres correspond with the three great needs that are addressed 

by any country’s intelligence services: military intelligence, strategic intelligence, and police or criminal information.469 The table below does 

not acknowledge overlap among the spheres. Naturally, a more nuanced 

depiction would allow for less clear-cut distinctions. For example, in Mexico, the armed forces and by extension, military intelligence, both have 

interest in narcotrafficking, a criminal activity that is usually the responsibility of the police. A similar situation may be found in Colombia. 

Table 11

Characteristics Differentiating Military, Police and 

Strategic Intelligence Services

Military Intelligence Police Information Strategic 

Intelligence

Chief target Threats Crimes Threats and crimes

Asset 

protected

Borders Public order State security

Threat origin Exterior Interior Interior - exterior
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Table 11

Characteristics Differentiating Military, Police and 

Strategic Intelligence Services (continued)

Military Intelligence Police Information Strategic 

Intelligence

Product 

provided

Instrumental Instrumental Final

Purpose of 

its action

Preventive-reactive Preventive-reactive Preventive

Judicial 

mechanisms

No Yes Sometimes

Source: Antonio Diaz, Miguel Revenga, Oscar Jaime, and Rafael Martinez, “Hacia una política europea de inteligencia,” Revista Política Exterior (Spain) XIX, no. 106 (August 2005).

Diaz additionally identifies three levels at which multilateral intelligence cooperation may occur:

1. Through cooperation at the macro level, based on international agreements or treaties. This level implies that multilateral agreements have 

the purpose of establishing a framework for the exchange of information 

or even other forms of cooperation that may take place between intelligence services; 

2. Cooperation in operational practices and processes takes place at the 

meso level. Cooperation at this level involves the standardization of 

methods of communication and creation of reports, the timing and 

periodicity of meetings, and the regulation of permanent contact with 

liaison officials; 

3. Cooperation at the micro level refers to the conduct of individual investigations or actions such as provision of information with respect to 

specific cases. As an illustration, “Decisions will often be made on an ad 

hoc basis at relatively low organizational levels to resolve concrete situations as they arise.”470

To summarize, typologies of intelligence cooperation can be viewed from 

different perspectives, according to the level of formality at which it is 
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institutionalized, the number of actors (countries) that participate, the 

spheres or subject matter areas in which it takes place, and the bureaucratic 

levels at which it takes place. Taken together, the various perspectives allow 

us to identify the density of intelligence cooperation in different geographic 

areas covered by any agreements. 

Limitations and Possibilities for Intelligence Cooperation

South American intelligence cooperation in multilateral organizations has 

historical roots in the East-West conflict.471 Intelligence cooperation between 

South American countries and the United States rested on ideology, that is, to 

prevent communism from being a viable political option in the region. The 

region has not seen major changes in the realm of intelligence cooperation 

since that era, despite the emergence of the Community of Andean Nations 

(CAN), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), and expanded 

MERCOSUR.472

U.S. hegemony continues through various initiatives to share information 

and intelligence, whether through offices or organizations headed by the 

United States, or through the Organization of American States.473 The opportunity to improve the level of mutual confidence grows as South American 

intelligence officials get to know one another more directly than usual under 

the auspices of organizations such as the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 

Commission (CICAD), the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), 

or the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). In the same 

way, the basis for intelligence cooperation between and among South American services may grow in other venues where intelligence specialists and their 

supervisors get to know one another. 

The European Union (EU) offers positive experiences in intelligence cooperation through multilateral organizations that address common threats. For 

example, the European Police Office (EUROPOL) and the European Situation Center, among others, show the feasibility of multilateral cooperation in 

intelligence. The next section examines the EU experience in intelligence cooperation. That experience illustrates the range of possibilities for cooperation 

once the minimum requirements for its success are met. Those requirements 

include a convergence of security, defense and foreign relations policies, along 
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with some homogeneity in the security practices of intelligence agencies and 

the professional capability of their officials. 

The European Union and Intelligence Cooperation 

European arrangements for intelligence cooperation originated primarily as a 

way to avoid situations that might lead to devastating armed conflict among 

the Europeans themselves. These arrangements began with the multilateral 

control of the main elements of the arms industry, steel, and coal (European 

Coal and Steel Community), in the early 1950s. In 1993 Europe achieved 

a transcendental milestone when the European Union (Maastricht) Treaty 

went into effect. Today, the EU counts twenty-eight countries from across the 

whole continent as members. 

The EU’s construction of an intelligence capability, through committees, 

working groups and monitoring installations, has been a long-running enterprise, both gradual and meticulous. Another aspect of the EU’s approach 

to cooperation has played a vital role in its activities: Each cooperative act, 

exchange of information, and any participation in the EU’s various communitarian organizations occurs on a totally voluntary basis. In other words, no 

member state feels obligated to agree with or participate in any type of EU 

initiative. 

The U.K. Parliament, and the EU itself, have established guiding principles 

to achieve successful cooperation in intelligence. The British identify four 

principles: 1) confidence in human-source intelligence; 2) awareness that intelligence and politics are intrinsically linked; 3) agreement that intelligence 

ethics are important; and 4) a need for joint intelligence capabilities to be 

accessible to all cooperating partners. The EU has developed five principles to 

guide intelligence cooperation: 1) solidarity among the states of the EU; 2) 

voluntary contributions by each state; 3) clear understanding of the terrorist 

threat and full use of available threat analyses; 4) coordination among the 

institutions that have the common objective of combating terrorism and collaboration with appropriate partners; and 5) respect for the appropriateness 

and effectiveness of the other four principles.474

The cooperative process of identifying threats faced by the continent has become a central theme in European political, social, and cultural discourse. 
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The process strengthens the EU’s fundamental political will to cooperate. 

Multilateral cooperation also responds to the idea that today’s transnational 

threats are not geographically circumscribed; that is, they are global. They 

range from Islamist terrorism, illegal migration, cybercrime, and organized 

crime to climate change, piracy, food shortages, resource security, disease, 

and pandemics.

Confronting these threats contributes to the economic security of the continent. Regional economic instability can endanger “European interests,” as 

pointed out by William Shapcott, former director of the EU Situation Center 

(SitCen), a strategic analysis organization.475 The EU has adopted a continuous intelligence-based review and analysis of several themes: 1) military 

security; 2) economic security; 3) internal security (terrorism, chiefly radicalism or extremism); 4) technological security; 5) operational security during 

peace talks and during periods of military tension; 6) counterespionage; and 

7) information security.476

Impetus for Strategic Intelligence Cooperation

An early push for EU interstate intelligence cooperation came from the Club 

of Berne, created in 1971. This club each year brings together the intelligence service directors of all EU member countries to establish an agenda for 

continental security cooperation. In 1999, it began to address terrorism, interception of communications, encryption, and cyberterrorism. Since 2000, 

additional questions related to the role of intelligence agencies in European 

integration have been added to the agenda.477

European Union Intelligence Analysis Center (EU IntCen) 

The Situation Center became the EU’s first permanent organization designed 

for strategic intelligence analysis. It was created in the 1990s under the banner of the Western European Union (WEU), a defense and security organization formed by the member states of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization. In the words of its founder, the Situation Center “produced 

intelligence analysis in support of European policies.”478 Its mission remains 

the same today, but its name has changed to the European Union Intelligence 

Analysis Center (EU IntCen).
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Since 2011, the EU IntCen has been part of the European External Action 

Service (EEAS).479 It provides intelligence analysis, early warning, and situational awareness to the High Representative of the EU, as well as to the EEAS 

itself and to various EU decisionmaking bodies.480 The EU IntCen synthesizes civil and military intelligence in real time and it can go operational in 

crisis situations. Operationally, it safeguards the internal security structure of 

the EU, and strategically it helps ensure a supranational, European viewpoint 

by uniquely addressing the variety of threats that affect the EU. It accomplishes this objective by taking into account the threat data that the different 

national intelligence services of the states choose to make available to it.481

Some national intelligence services resisted sharing information with the 

Situation Center. That is why only some countries sent liaison officers to 

the center. Notably, the intelligence services of some member countries lack 

precisely the joint vision that permeates the central organizations of the EU. 

The SitCen did arouse suspicions at the political level in 2010 when the European Parliament ordered a study to learn how to improve the surpervision 

of its activities. Until that time, the SitCen had acted without any democratic 

controls.482 However, with its conversion in 2011 to the EU IntCen, and its 

advising the High Representative of the EU, it gained prestige. 

A European Intelligence Agency

The creation of a supranational EU intelligence agency is under discussion. 

The debate peaked with terrorist attacks like those in Madrid (2004) and 

London (2005). Even the European Parliament, when it launched an investigation into the alleged Echelon collection activities,483 observed that “it is 

inconceivable that the intelligence services should be the last and only area 

not affected by the process of European integration.”484

The idea of a European intelligence agency arose in the 1960s when a few 

NATO officials suggested the establishment of a more coordinated way 

to share intelligence in Europe. However, suspicions of the Cold War and 

rivalries between the United States and France quashed the idea.485 After 

the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea appeared again, but in an academic 

environment. The academic vision of an European agency expected it would 

“coordinate and analyze information submitted by other organizations and 
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foreign intelligence services, and only eventually would it be able to collect its 

own information.486

Smaller and less developed states, such as Austria, Belgium, Greece, and Ireland, have promoted the idea of a European intelligence agency.487 Those 

countries have several times raised the possibility of such an agency. However, 

evidence now suggests that there will be no European intelligence agency 

because the larger countries, especially Germany, Spain, France, United Kingdom, and Italy, known in intelligence circles as the G5, place more trust in 

their own national intelligence capabilities and doubt the positive effect of a 

supranational organization. They feel that it would only duplicate national 

efforts and subsidize the intelligence agencies of the weaker countries. Other 

asymmetric factors add to the doubt. Only eight of the twenty-eight member 

states of the EU have a foreign intelligence service. Further, the main intelligence focus of Nordic countries but not of others is in the area of police intelligence. These uneven organizational and functional characteristics across the 

region increase the difficulty of intelligence sharing.488

Today the EU presents an interesting if not completely convincing model 

for cooperation in many spheres of intelligence. Although as a model, EU 

intelligence cooperation is still evolving, one can clearly see evidence of cooperative activity at the meso and macro levels, as defined by Diaz.489 The 

EU operates with a relatively advanced level of intelligence cooperation as 

a result of its harmonization of security and defense policies, as well as the 

high-level coordination of those policies. Some of these practices may come 

to enlighten potential cooperative relationships in intelligence among the 

UNASUR countries. 

A Basis for Intelligence Cooperation in UNASUR

Ugarte remarks that “no institutional mechanisms for intelligence cooperation have emerged in UNASUR, nor does any existing intelligence cooperation rest on the integrative impulse of this organization.”490 However, at least 

four motives argue for potential intelligence cooperation in the UNASUR 

framework. 

The first motive comes from the existence of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities 

to the security of member countries, together with feasible opportunities for 
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intelligence cooperation suggested in UNASUR’s foundational document. Its 

paragraph “q” calls for

[c]oordination among the specialized organizations of 

the member states, in keeping with international norms 

to strengthen the fight against terrorism, corruption, the 

worldwide problem of drugs, human trafficking, trafficking 

in small and light arms, transnational organized crime and 

other threats, as well as disarmament, non-proliferation of 

nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and demining; experience among many South American countries 

in intelligence cooperation may be brought into play under 

UNASUR.491

Three other paragraphs in the same document indicate an interest in defense 

cooperation: s) “... the exchange of information and experience in defense 

matters,” together with t) “cooperation to strengthen citizen (public) security,” and u) “sectorial cooperation as a way to deepen South American integration through the exchange of information, experiences, and professional 

development.”492

A second motivation for intelligence cooperation in UNASUR comes from 

the existing intelligence capability of each South American country. In general, most countries are already capable of intelligence cooperation in each of 

the three categories of military intelligence, police intelligence, and strategic 

intelligence.493 The table below reveals which countries have well-developed 

intelligence systems.

Table 12

Members of the Intelligence Community or System 

in each UNASUR Country

Type of 

Intelligence 

Country

National 

Agency

Military 

Intelligence

Police 

Intelligence

Foreign

Relations

Financial 

Intelligence

Argentina X X X

Bolivia X X

Brazil X X X X X
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Table 12

Members of the Intelligence Community or System 

in each UNASUR Country (continued)

Type of 

Intelligence 

Country

National 

Agency

Military 

Intelligence

Police 

Intelligence

Foreign

Relations

Financial 

Intelligence

Chile X X X

Colombia X X X X

Ecuador X X X

Guyana X X

Paraguay X X

Peru X X X X

Surinam X X

Uruguay X X X X

Venezuela X X X

Source: Compiled by the author, 2013. 

A third motive relates to the idea that all the countries of South America have 

experience in cooperation in at least one of the classic spheres of military, police, or strategic intelligence. All these countries, to a greater or lesser degree, 

engage in some form of intelligence cooperation, especially of the informal 

variety. Although this cooperation does not take place under the framework 

of UNASUR, its member countries all have experience in its practice. 

In the realm of strategic intelligence, the Ibero-American Forum of Intelligence Service Directors meets periodically in various countries of the region.494 Chile hosted the forum in 2003 in Viña del Mar. The forum reinforces the first two elements of the three-part knowledge-confidence-cooperation 

continuum that leads to intelligence cooperation. 

For police intelligence, the Latin American and Caribbean Police Community 

(CLACIP) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 

provide an impetus for intelligence cooperation among countries of the region 

through the direct exchange of information as well as through conferences, 

seminars, professional development courses, and the collaboration that goes 
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238

into producing documents that standardize certain police procedures.495

Chile, for example, participates actively in these exchanges to the point of 

appointing officials specifically as liaison officers with these two groups. In 

particular, Carabineros de Chile and the Policía de Investigaciones de Chile

engage with CLACIP and INTERPOL. 

With respect to military intelligence, South American countries together with 

the United States participate in the South American Information Sharing 

Network (SURNET), underwritten by the U.S. Southern Command of the 

U.S. armed forces.496 Similarly, various symposia or conferences have been 

held under the auspices of the U.S. Southern Command, where the chiefs 

of defense intelligence and invited specialists (to include some Europeans) 

have met to discuss regional intelligence initiatives. Chile hosted one of these 

meetings in 2011, with others in Brazil (2012), and Guatemala (2013). 

Two additional multilateral organizations are active in South America. One is 

the South American Financial Action Group (GAFISUD), and the other the 

Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (RILO). The purpose of GAFISUD is 

to work toward the development and application of a 

worldwide strategy to combat money laundering and 

terrorist financing.... The effort includes support for the 

establishment of money laundering as a serious crime, the 

development of legal systems to investigate and judge those 

crimes, and the establishment of systems of notification 

about suspicious transactions and the promotion of 

reciprocal judicial assistance.497

GAFISUD aims to support the professional development of individuals involved in suppressing money laundering and to identify regional factors that 

need to be taken into account in applying measures against this phenomenon. South American GAFISUD members are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 

Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.498

The Regional Intelligence Liaison Office is 

a worldwide network for the exchange of information between and among custom’s authorities everywhere, which 
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brings together data related to illicit activities and which 

operates under the authority of the Worldwide Customs 

Organization.... It is also supported by the Customs Enforcement Network, which is an information system that 

provides information about the seizure of merchandise and 

controlled items from customs offices around the world.499

RILO maintains national points of contact in world regions where it is active. These exist in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, 

Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 

A fourth motive for intelligence cooperation derives from the experience 

in intelligence cooperation held by multilateral organizations that operate 

in distinct geographic regions, especially the Common Market of the 

South (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). 

In MERCOSUR, “an institutionalized mechanism for public security and 

criminal intelligence has been created.”500 It operates through 

opportunities and organizations within the Conference of 

Ministers of the Interior of MERCOSUR (RMI), where the 

implementation of a multinational group for criminal analysis has been discussed... although other than the existence 

of some informal mechanisms, permanent and institutionalized cooperation in intelligence in MERCOSUR and the 

expanded MERCOSUR has thus far been limited to counterterrorism intelligence, and to a lesser degree, some aspects 

of criminal intelligence. MERCOSUR has not yet created, 

even in the realm of criminal intelligence, an institutionalized mechanism to deal with organized crime.501

In the case of the Andean Community of Nations, intelligence cooperation 

“unlike in MERCOSUR, has taken place in an environment where public 

security and national defense have been conflated.”502 Ugarte explains that, 

as a result, 

intelligence cooperation within CAN has been organized 

around certain crimes, especially narcotrafficking and arms 

trafficking, with participation by the armed forces in some 
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240

aspects of internal security and without the benefit of an 

institutional framework for intelligence cooperation.... This 

type of cooperation, in the absence of institutionalization 

and political control, evolved over time into region-wide application in the Latin American and Caribbean Police Intelligence Community (CLACIP) and the Police Community 

of America (AMERIPOL).503

There are advantages and disadvantages to the approach taken by CAN, but 

it is not the purpose of the current essay to evaluate this option, but rather to 

describe situations as observed. 

Still, CLACIP-AMERIPOL 

could embody a sound basis for institutionalized cooperation 

in criminal intelligence in all the countries of Latin America 

and the Caribbean. If this cooperation does come about, it 

would be of inestimable value in the fight against organized 

crime. For this to occur would require that a formal treaty 

among the participating countries be signed, together with 

the creation of administrative organizations and a means 

of control. In this sense, the European Police Community 

(EUROPOL), an organization that AMERIPOL has sought 

in some ways to imitate, could be a suitable model.504 

The possibility of intelligence cooperation becomes clear when one recognizes 

that Latin America and the Caribbean have “passed from the old, almost 

exclusively hemispheric approach to cooperation through increasingly subregional structures, and from the old style of cooperation based on the EastWest conflict to intelligence cooperation based on public security.”505

The following table indicates the likelihood that intelligence cooperation will 

emerge in each of the three realms we have examined. For defense and military 

intelligence, cooperation can develop under the auspices of the South American 

Defense Council (CDS) as it addresses cyberattacks, disaster assistance, and 

protection of natural resources, which are all established areas of interest. 

The CDS, in promoting defense cooperation, reinforces the possibility for an 

exchange of information among member countries. Information exchange 
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241

can take place in defense intelligence despite the lack of common security and 

defense policies in UNASUR. Those common policies may be a sufficient, 

but not necessary, condition for defense intelligence cooperation to occur. 

An additional possibility is for UNASUR to develop a common database that 

feeds on data supplied by member countries, that is then consulted by South 

American countries, and that is administered by the directors of defense 

intelligence from across the region, thereby replicating the SURNET model. 

Table 13

Possibilities for Intelligence Cooperation in UNASUR

Type of Intelligence

Possibilities, according to the 

Treaty creating UNASUR

Military 

intelligence

 Police 

information or 

criminal

 intelligence

Strategic 

intelligence

q) Coordination among specialized 

organizations of the member states

X X X

s) Exchange of information and 

experiences in the defense realm

X

t) Cooperation in strengthening 

public security

X

u) Sectorial cooperation as 

a mechanism for deepening 

South American integration

X X X

Source: Compiled by the author

Intelligence cooperation in military intelligence circles may be brought about 

through training courses, which can be extended to defense civilians, as well 

as through advanced courses in defense policy, which are already presented by 

the South American Defense Council. The courses would be especially helpful if they addressed intelligence not only as part of security studies, but also 

in terms of how the function is expressed in each of the UNASUR member 

countries. 

At the same time, analytic techniques can be oriented to identifying and examining just what member states have in common, which in the South American 

Defense Council framework would translate to identifying common external 
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threats. The incorporation of intelligence as a phenomenon deserving of study, 

and as a focus of professional development, was debated in Colombia in 2012 

during the regular meeting of UNASUR ministers of defense. 

For police or criminal intelligence, cooperation may be mediated by UNASUR’s 

South American Council for Public Security, Justice and Coordination of 

Actions against Transnational Organized Crime.506

Strategic intelligence cooperation can be brought about especially through 

regular, sponsored meetings of national intelligence service chiefs. The IberoAmerican Forum of Intelligence Service Chiefs, as noted earlier, offers one 

possibility. This group meets to discuss topics of concern to the respective 

chiefs of state. Two themes commonly appear: specific problems in any one 

leader’s country that affect other countries for which the impacts and possible 

conflict scenarios may need to be recognized and anticipated. In this light, 

several other states may be involved, which would validate the extension of 

cooperation to the multilateral sphere. 

Still another spur to intelligence cooperation appears when potential participants learn how it may help them handle threat scenarios that arise outside 

the geographical space of South America, but that nonetheless may affect it 

seriously. Examples could include the economic crisis of the EU, the deceleration of Chinese growth, possible war between North and South Korea, effects 

of the Arab Spring, or a cyberattack against the critical infrastructure of some 

South American country or against one or more countries outside the region 

with which there is an important exchange of goods or services.507

One best practice found in the EU that may be replicated in the UNASUR 

region relates to the EU IntCen. This institution makes it possible to monitor 

events using the services of subject-matter experts from outside the intelligence services. The purpose of this institution within UNASUR would be to 

anticipate and detect potential regional crises, or international crises farther 

afield, that would benefit from a preventive approach. This approach may 

allow UNASUR members and a particular region to avoid a crisis, or at least 

bring thoughtful management to the conflict. 

The reports generated by an intelligence center modeled on the EU IntCen 

could be supplied to all those responsible for strategic, police, or military 
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intelligence across the UNASUR region. The issues taken up by such a center 

would have been identified as of concern by heads of state, and it is to these 

individuals that an intelligence center would periodically report. The reports 

would also likely reach other specialized intelligence organizations.

Factors Affecting International Intelligence Cooperation

If at the present time, “institutionalized intelligence cooperation in support 

of international relations, international security and defense is at odds with 

diverse national interests, diverse ideas of security and defense, and persistent 

and important differences in foreign policy, even though it seems that these 

problems may be resolved in the medium term,”508 then those factors that 

limit intelligence cooperation need to be addressed with the aim of promoting the institutionalization of intelligence cooperation as standard process. 

This essay will now explore these factors by referring to intelligence cooperation in a generic sense rather than in terms of any specific implementation 

by a country. However, some specifics will be examined in each important 

sphere of intelligence activity when those specifics are of particular relevance 

to the argument. 

A lack of counterpart intelligence institutions in some pairs or sets of countries constitutes one limitation of intelligence cooperation. This situation 

amounts to having no interlocutors to facilitate communication, or to send 

or ask for data, information, or intelligence. It also impedes such tasks as carrying out a criminal investigation, conducting detailed intelligence analysis, 

or conducting a joint military operation. 

Although most UNASUR countries do have intelligence organizations that 

cover the strategic, military, and police areas, some do not. This does not 

imply the total absence of some sphere of activity in any given country. However, intelligence cooperation becomes difficult when one country’s coverage of strategic intelligence or police intelligence remains undeveloped. The 

fact that cooperation does occur throughout the region should incentivize all 

countries to upgrade deficient capabilities. 

Each country in a potential cooperative network needs to have the capability 

to vet or confirm the validity of its own information, and to determine the 

reliability of the source. Otherwise, incorrect information may reduce others’ 
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244

confidence in the originating state’s contributions and further intelligence 

cooperation. 

Ugarte suggests that “the traditional [intelligence] focus on another country 

and its intelligence capabilities as a probable enemy, even when it may also be 

an ally, makes cooperation difficult.”509 This scenario appears in some UNASUR member states that have experienced serious interstate conflict with 

neighbors. Nonetheless, most countries recognize the possibility of “more information being available than what one agency can collect by itself” and that 

“globalization has been an essential force in changing the nature of organized 

crime into a more transnational phenomenon.”510 Those considerations produce an immediate need to strengthen intelligence cooperation, even if common threats remain an insufficient condition to bring about cooperation. 

Information received through intelligence cooperation cannot substitute for a 

country’s own unique ability to collect information and generate intelligence 

for political leaders. However, the limited capabilities of any given country’s 

own services justify international intelligence cooperation when additional 

information can confirm or deny hypotheses or scenarios about potentially 

dangerous situations.511

Institutionalization of the intelligence cooperation process depends on participant countries having passed through the knowledge-confidence-cooperation 

continuum. Informal intelligence cooperation does exist in both police and 

military spheres across South America. But it is cooperation without institutionalization, and “without the consolidation of an informal network, police intelligence will not be successful.”512 Intelligence cooperation becomes 

institutionalized when backed by a formal treaty signed by the president, 

ratified by the National Congress, and subjected to controls by government 

entities that operate independently of the organizations that engage in intelligence cooperation.513

If an elevated level of public corruption exists in a country, and/or there is a 

perception that it exists in the intelligence services, especially in the opinion 

of those in other national intelligence services, then international cooperation 

in intelligence will be low as a function of low confidence. The same outcome 

occurs when high personnel turnover afflicts an intelligence service. High 
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personnel turnover has occurred frequently in UNASUR countries and reduces 

the professionalism of individual practitioners and the service itself.514

Consolidating the Advantages of Intelligence Cooperation

Improving or deepening intelligence cooperation in the region requires a shift 

from informal to more formal, institutionalized relationships among agents 

and agencies. An institutionalization of cooperative processes offers certain 

benefits that lead to greater cooperation. It would bring a higher level of 

security to the exchange of information as record-keeping would require accountability for both sides in an exchange. The need to elevate the image 

and trustworthiness of an intelligence service among potential international 

partners would argue for improved training and education. These benefits of 

institutionalized cooperation should not overshadow or suppress benefits arising from informal contacts with counterpart services. That is, formalization 

of relationships and processes should not replace existing, informal exchanges 

of information, but rather complement and deepen those relationships. 

As Ugarte points out, “the establishment of a formal and permanent mechanism for [intelligence] cooperation requires additional provisions for maintaining secrecy, the development of common classification standards and 

counterintelligence measures, and at least occasional meetings among liaison officers and other direct participants.”515 In the absence of any of these 

requirements, the extent of cooperation among UNASUR members will 

remain limited. Meanwhile, separate intelligence cooperation agreements 

among members will continue, but beyond the auspices of UNASUR. 

South American countries do not yet have general agreements in place for 

intelligence cooperation under the UNASUR framework. The possibility has 

been discussed often in various meetings, but intelligence cooperation has 

not become part of the formal multilateral agenda. All member countries do 

field intelligence organizations, and they all have some experience in intelligence cooperation within the framework of other multilateral entities active 

in the region. To broaden and deepen intelligence cooperation will require 

overcoming a set of limitations, including especially the need to harmonize 

UNASUR members’ foreign and defense policies, a task that remains for the 

future, but that remains achievable. 
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Conclusion

This study identifies four reasons to expect greater intelligence cooperation 

within the framework of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). 

The first motive arises from the fact that common threats to its members have 

been spelled out by UNASUR’s Foundational Treaty. That most member 

countries have developed capabilities in police, military and strategic intelligence constitutes a second reason to expect greater cooperation. Another 

motive stems from the idea that member countries already have some experience with intelligence cooperation in multilateral organizations (RILO, 

GAFI and CLACIP). Finally, several member countries have gained experience in intelligence cooperation in support of public (citizen) security in the 

multilateral environments of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of 

Nations. Taken together, these findings suggest that member countries are 

ready to move on to more formal intelligence cooperation within the framework of UNASUR. 

Informal cooperation in intelligence does occur among intelligence organizations of most South American countries. Police intelligence cooperation 

exists in CLACIP, the Police Intelligence Community of Latin America and 

the Caribbean; and in the realm of strategic intelligence, it occurs in the 

meetings of the Forum for Directors of Ibero-American Intelligence. Military 

intelligence cooperation takes place across the region through the SURNET 

database administered by defense intelligence directors and the U.S. Southern Command. The ongoing identification of common threats by UNASUR 

members, together with police, military, and strategic intelligence cooperation (even if mainly on an informal basis), indicate that South American 

countries have a sound basis for advancing toward more formal intelligence 

cooperation within the UNASUR framework. 

European Union experience demonstrates what is achievable in 

institutionalizing multilateral intelligence cooperation. A situation center 

following the European model could be appropriate and necessary for 

UNASUR. This center would, as in Europe, advise the highest national 

political authorities of UNASUR member countries and provide a place 

for the fusion of strategic, military, and police intelligence. Intelligence 
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cooperation could promote scenario analysis and crisis prevention for issues 

and areas where UNASUR may have strategic interests. 

Educational institutions show promise in standardizing the professional development of intelligence specialists. Schools promote the consistent application of terms of practice and of analysis techniques, opening the way for 

future joint research and operations against organized criminal activity or 

common crimes. 

The creation of interoperable databases will allow for real-time exchange 

of information on topics of mutual interest to specialists in the UNASUR 

countries. This will happen as member countries make progress along the 

three-part continuum of knowledge, confidence, and cooperation. Presently, 

multilateral intelligence operates at a point between the first and second elements of that range. The main limitation to progress in cooperation is a lack 

of confidence at both the personal and institutional levels. Low self-esteem 

among intelligence personnel coincides with frequent scandals, high turnover, and a stream of individuals who leave the services—including those 

who go to jail. These realities impede the development of the greater level of 

confidence needed to achieve cooperation. 

Formal and informal cooperation in intelligence are distinct phenomena, and 

one should not be substituted for the other. Agreements that try to limit 

informal international contact between officials and services will reduce the 

overall level of cooperation because any coordination mechanism between 

services will be negatively affected by such strictures. 

Informal cooperation may constitute a positive first step toward institutionalized cooperation between national intelligence officials as well as among senior UNASUR officials. The acceleration of intelligence cooperation in both 

areas would benefit from having the topic on the agenda of regional meetings. At this time, the weak initiatives in intelligence cooperation have not 

borne much fruit. Improved leadership can bring about the desirable results 

previewed in this essay. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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Author’s Biography

Carolina Sancho Hirane leads the intelligence program at the Chilean National Academy of Strategic and Political Studies in Santiago, where she offers courses at the undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate level. She has 

taught “Analysis of Contemporary International Conflict” at the School of 

Government and Public Administration of the University of Chile, as well 

as “Peace Process Construction” in the international relations curriculum of 

the University of Santiago de Chile. She holds the professional title of public 

administrator from the University of Chile’s School of Government, with 

specialization in political science and public administration, and is a doctoral 

candidate with the University of Zaragoza (Spain). Email: csanchohirane@

yahoo.com.; csanchohirane@yahoo.es.
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Section Three

Intelligence Community Management 

of Privacy and Security Issues

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Intelligence Community Management of 

Conflicting Privacy and Security Issues

Jose Manuel Ugarte

“There are those employed in the intelligence security community of this 

country ... who feel that they have a license to operate freely outside the 

dictates of law and otherwise to orchestrate as they see fit. Public officials at every level, whatever their position, like any other person, must 

respect and honor the Constitution and the laws of the United States.”

—Judge Barrington Parker516

Individual Rights, Privacy, and Intelligence

The essays in this section describe and assess the challenges to individual privacy that arise from the practice of intelligence. Intelligence practices naturally conflict with the enjoyment of individual rights. The nature of this conflict 

in a democratic state differs from that in a totalitarian environment, just as 

the practice of intelligence differs from one state to another.517 As the author 

has noted elsewhere,518 intelligence activity often contradicts the expectation 

that a democratic government will act transparently. Intelligence in fact seeks 

to eliminate a target’s expectations of privacy. 

The concepts of “bounded action” and “control” describe measures used to reduce or bridge the contradiction between maintaining government transparency and allowing instrusive intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence 

address threats from other states and from domestic organizations that wish 

to change the system of government through illegal means, or to threaten officials in their legitimate exercise of authority. In particular, a democratic state 

needs to bound or control the use of intelligence inside the country itself. 

A democratic state demands legitimacy and efficacy from the institutions of 

government and should view the control of intelligence organizations and 

their activity as a natural consequence of that demand. The author believes 

that in a fully democratic system the protection of privacy does not conflict 

with the security interests of intelligence agencies. Intelligence professionals 

recognize in principle that their own actions can serve to protect the rights 

of individuals. 
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Appropriate controls or limits to intelligence activity offer the byproduct of 

protection of privacy. The constitutions of most states of the Americas recognize this idea, and article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights 

establishes that “everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his 

dignity recognized” thereby avoiding “arbitrary or abusive interference with 

his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful 

attacks on his honor or reputation.” The Convention on Human Rights also 

specifies “the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 

attacks.”519 National legislation often includes additional measures to protect 

individual privacy beyond the protections afforded by controls and limitations over domestic intelligence actions.

Specific Bureaucratic Tools for the Protection of 

Individual Privacy

The protection of individual rights benefits from any country’s requirement 

that certain intelligence actions be approved or disapproved by authorizing 

bodies. The requirements typically apply to the means and procedures for 

intercepting communications, whether by telephone, facsimile, or any means 

of voice or data transfer over distance, to include electronic mail. In addition, 

the requirements may apply to recording or any other form of acquiring private conversations, whether in a public setting or private dwelling. They usually extend to any means of pursuing or monitoring individuals. Naturally, 

these requirements apply only to the country’s own intelligence services. 

Control of intrusive means of collection chiefly aims to verify the reasons 

set forth by intelligence organizations for proceeding with the activity. If the 

collection is allowed to proceed, controls then ensure a minimal level of intrusiveness.520 The judicial branch usually implements any controls over the 

monitoring of individuals. There are two variants of judicial control of intrusive intelligence actions. In the first, control is exercised by regular judges and 

courts, as in Canada and Argentina. The second arrangement involves special 

courts as set forth in U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 36, Subchapter I, §1803. 

This approach expedites the authorization of electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes, as set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

(FISA). In some countries, the authority to execute the interception of communications is given over to an intelligence agency itself. This is the approach 
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specified in Argentine Law 25520. In contrast, under Chile’s Law 19974, the 

civilian intelligence agency (ANI) must make requests to intercept communications to the appropriate police agency, which executes the interception and 

then reports the results of the operation to the ANI director.521

Comprehensive or “organic” intelligence laws establish control over intelligence activity, but do not contain specific provisions for protecting the privacy of individuals. Examples include Brazilian Law 9883, Colombian Law 

195/20,522 Democratic Security Law 750 in Nicaragua,523 and the Framework Law of the National Security System of Guatemala.524 In the Brazilian 

case, the 1988 constitution contains a provision that guarantees the inviolability of communications, whereby only the judicial branch may intervene, 

and then only for purposes of criminal investigation or court proceedings, 

under procedures established in Law 9296 of 1996. This law limits communications interception to serious criminal cases, and occurs only under police 

jurisdiction. The interception of communications for intelligence purposes 

remains unaddressed by the Brazilian legal system. 

Other intelligence laws across the region do establish guidelines for controlling the intrusiveness of intelligence activity, but they vary considerably in 

their level of specificity. Some may simply establish authorization requirements for the interception of “communications,” as in the case of Argentine Law 25520. In contrast, Chilean Law 19974525 requires authorization 

for “special procedures for obtaining information.” It itemizes the collection 

of information from documents sent through the postal service and the use 

of electronic listening or recording (including audiovisual) devices. Surprisingly, the Chilean statute grants the heads of military and police intelligence 

services the power to use undercover agents and informants without judicial authorization. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Act establishes in 

great detail exactly what activity is subject to judicial authorization. Beyond 

required authorization for the interception of communications, the list includes obtaining any information, record, document, or anything at all as 

a result of search, entry, removal, examination, extraction, making copies, 

gaining access, or recording in any manner, or installing, maintaining, or 

removing anything, thereby covering definitively almost all possible means of 

undertaking intrusive actions.526
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The protection of personal data from intelligence exploitation has yet to be 

addressed in Latin America. Intelligence laws generally do not include references to protecting personal data, even though most countries in the region 

have legal and constitutional ways of addressing the issue. Colombia’s Law 

195/2011 does have limited provisions for protection of personal data. The 

executive branch enforces its provisions, and individuals have no opportunity 

to correct, update, or delete personal data. Personal data receive much more 

comprehensive protection elsewhere.527

Commentary on the Essays in Part Three

Priscila Brandao

The essay by Priscila Carlos Brandao offers an analysis of issues surrounding 

the management of the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN), and within 

SISBIN, the Public Security Intelligence Subsystem (SISP). 

This essay addresses a reality common in the region: civilian intelligence agencies have wide-ranging domestic as well as foreign intelligence and counterintelligence powers. Brazil’s agency (ABIN) bears the responsibility to produce 

all the knowledge necessary to advise the president of Brazil.528 SISBIN—of 

which ABIN is the central agency—handles criminal intelligence (Brazil labels it “public security intelligence.”) When the Intelligence System for Public 

Security (SISP) was created, ABIN became its (unsuitable) central agency 

as well. This was corrected when the National Secretariat of Public Security 

(SENASP-MJ) became the central agency for SISP. However, many agencies 

from outside the realm of public security remained in the SISP fold. 

The SENASP-MJ created a Special Council for the Public Security Intelligence Subsystem (CE-SISP) for the purpose of developing norms for domestic intelligence activity. Again, council members were from intelligence 

organizations with little or no knowledge of public security or criminal intelligence.529 Public-security intelligence organizations from individual Brazilian states and the Federal District were included as an afterthought, but did 

not have a vote in the council.530

The author also identifies the persistence of doctrinal concepts similar to those 

prevailing in the Cold War as another problem common to Latin America. 

Doctrinally, military intelligence agencies have several missions, among them 
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the maintenance of internal security. Even as police forces increasingly fight 

organized crime using a “criminal intelligence” approach, civilian and military intelligence agences have also ventured into this domain.531

Brandao draws attention to two other phenomena peculiar to the Brazilian 

intelligence system. One is the weakness of the General Coordinator of Intelligence (CGI). The CGI has few human resource and material capabilities with which to carry out its functions as a central office of the SISP. The 

second concerns the lack of specific legislation and rules to govern public 

security intelligence.

ABIN and armed forces opposition to developing intelligence doctrine for 

public security (even though it was ultimately adopted) demonstrates how 

civilian and military intelligence agencies in the region continue to push for 

keeping and even increasing their role in addressing organized crime. As a 

result, there is only a slow development of criminal intelligence by police 

authorities across Latin America. Only three countries, Argentina, Chile, and 

Guatemala, have criminal intelligence agencies. In Argentina, this agency is 

the National Office of Criminal Intelligence of the Argentine Federal Police 

and in Guatemala, the Directorate of Civilian Intelligence of the Ministry of 

the Interior.532

This rich essay illustrates the misapplication of intelligence methods, norms, 

and procedures—including an excessive use of information classification. The 

methods and procedures appropriate to national government or state intelligence are inappropriate for effective criminal intelligence.

The solution to the problems that Priscila Brandao points out will come 

through the development of criminal intelligence law and doctrine. The 

UK’s National Intelligence Model (NIM) presents an interesting doctrinal 

innovation. The Association of Chiefs of Police of England and Wales developed 

the NIM doctrine specifically for police and public security activity.533

Rather than encouraging compartmentalization and excessive classification, 

the NIM stimulates the exchange of information among participating 

police institutions. It accomplishes this on three levels: local, regional, and 

national-international and promotes the creation of standardized intelligence 

products as well as standard operating procedures. The success of the National 
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Intelligence Model has led to the formation, within EUROPOL, of a similar, 

European intelligence model.534

Liza Zuniga Collado

Liza Zuniga Collado suggests the need for “prison intelligence” in Chile and 

across the region. She also offers an analysis of legislative actions in Latin 

America that have yet to refer to prison intelligence. 

Chile’s Gendarmerie has the responsibility to monitor prisons and keep track 

of released prisoners.535 Its Department of Prison Research and Analysis 

“studies and analyzes information about prison security.” Additionally, it “collects and processes information on prison security for the purpose of supporting decisionmaking by prison authorities.”536

Chilean practice combines prison intelligence with criminal intelligence. Soon 

after redesignating the Ministry of the Interior as the Ministry of the Interior 

and Public Security in 2011, Chile also created the Center for the Strategic 

Analysis of Crime (CEAD).537 This criminal analysis538 body539 examines information generated by the leading institutional members of the penal system: 

the Gendarmerie of Chile, Carabineros of Chile, the Investigative Police, and 

the Public Prosecutor of the Justice Ministry. Their information populates the 

National Integrated Electronic Services Database, a Unified Criminal Information System. The system includes a National Public Security Observatory 

and an Office of Criminal Analysis with analysts from the Ministry of the 

Interior and Public Security, the Gendarmerie, Carabineros, and Investigative Police. This Office of Criminal Analysis carries out spatial, temporal, individual, and environmental analyses and explores criminal modus operandi. 

The identification of crime patterns and trends yields data for a new Unified 

Database of Criminal Information and facilitates the suppression and prevention of crime. 

The Chilean prison service not only provides database information but also 

its own analysts, thereby fully participating in the creation and exploitation 

of criminal information. Something similar occurs in Argentina, where the 

Federal Prison Service has an intelligence organization, the Prison Intelligence Department, which submits information to the National Directorate 

of Criminal Intelligence, an intelligence agency assigned to produce criminal 
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intelligence. As this approach is taken up by other countries in the region, 

prison intelligence will become an important tool in the fight against crime. 

Intelligence laws in the region do not address the role of prison intelligence. 

The intelligence laws of most other countries also do not, to the author’s 

knowledge.540 This is not to deny the importance of prison intelligence in the 

prevention of crime, or its role in ensuring adequate channels of communication between police and representatives of national or strategic intelligence. 

Intelligence legislation in the region does address both internal security and 

national defense issues. Attention to prison intelligence in the legislative process can advance public debate and lead to systematic improvements.541

Russell Swenson and Zulia Yanzadig Orozco Reynoso

This essay examines the effect of a country’s intelligence activities on the 

rights of its individual citizens in the context of international intelligence 

cooperation and coordination. The essay analyzes an article by legal scholar 

Elizabeth Sepper.542 Sepper warns of the negative consequences for human 

rights that emerge from autonomous decisionmaking by intelligence officials 

as they exchange information across national boundaries. She explains that 

this international exchange of information among intelligence officials has increased since September 11, 2001. She argues against the establishment of ties 

between the intelligence services of hegemonic countries and countries that 

may obtain inaccurate and unreliable information through torture. Sepper 

proposes various ways in which international law might reestablish control 

over intelligence agencies that engage in cooperation with their counterpart 

agencies around the world. She argues for establishing professional practices 

and ethical standards and for increasing international cooperation not in state 

or national intelligence, but in criminal intelligence. 

Swenson and Orozco argue that international law has little coercive effect 

and that autonomy of decisionmaking within intelligence services exists as an 

inherent aspect of the activity. They also point out that international acculturation, or the transmission of behavioral norms by leading states, produces 

compliance with international behavioral norms. 

In this reviewer’s opinion, only limited control of international intelligence 

collaboration is possible because treaties or accords concerning intelligence 
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are state secrets and the intelligence obtained as a result of these agreements 

remains hidden from public view. If a country were to ignore these rules, not 

only would the interests of the originating country be placed in jeopardy, 

but the receiving country would be discredited as a trustworthy intelligencesharing partner. The lack of a coercive effect in international law is not a 

central impediment to this problem of control. Each intelligence official is 

accountable to the laws of his own country in the exercise of his or her public function.543 No legal immunity exists for intelligence officials’ actions in 

their own country, or for their actions in a foreign country, unless they enjoy 

diplomatic immunity, or are covered by immunity agreements. 

The present author shares Sepper’s skepticism about the efficacy of transmitting the standards and norms of intelligence behavior from leading countries 

to those with which they interact, in particular with respect to the observance 

of human rights, even though standards and norms in other areas may be 

positively influenced. The interests of a country that needs additional intelligence tends to determine what intelligence activity is acceptable. The examples presented by Sepper speak eloquently of this truism. 

Intelligence controls can be improved. In an important insight, Sepper notes 

that many countries with sophisticated intelligence controls have one or more 

intelligence organizations that continue to operate without effective controls, 

usually military intelligence organizations or other entities within a defense 

ministry. Although intelligence treaties or international memoranda of understanding cannot be made available to the public, treaties are subject to 

legislative ratification. These agreements need to be carefully debated in secret 

sessions of congress. Agreements not subject to legislative oversight need to 

be considered and probed by authorities who have internal and external oversight over intelligence practices. 

The construction of an institutionalized, subregional environment for cooperation in criminal intelligence founded on the EUROPOL model, and able 

to address the diversity of challenges and needs of each subregion of Latin 

America, whether through UNASUR for South America, or in combination 

with a supporting organization at the hemispheric level, would constitute a 

basis for an effective effort against organized crime and terrorism in the region. Such a development in Latin America would contribute to overcoming 
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the risks of intelligence and information sharing and cooperation discussed 

by Sepper. 

Jose Manuel Ugarte holds a doctorate from the Universidad de Buenos Aires 

(in administrative law), and serves as a specialist in administative law and 

public admistration at that university. He also serves as professor of administrative law at the Universidad Católica de Santiago del Estero. He teaches in 

the master’s degree program of the Universidad Abierta Interamericana, and 

specializes in the field of defense management at the Universidad Nacional de 

Tres de Febrero and the Argentine Escuela de Defensa Nacional. Email: manuguart@gmail.com.

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Comments on the Essays in Section Three

Thomas C. Bruneau

As anyone realizes who knows how intelligence agencies actually work in 

newer democracies, it is hard to be definitive about anything beyond their 

formal structures. In the absence of empirical data, these chapters seek to 

convey a certain sense of how the structures and processes of intelligence 

bureaucracy play out in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 

The essay by Brandao demonstrates that although Brazil has been engaged in 

a decade-long effort to create a new intelligence system around the Brazilian 

Intelligence Agency (ABIN), the “system” remains redundant, overlapping, 

and opaque. The armed forces intelligence system survived and still has “a permanent internal security role” even though the National Information Service 

(SNI)—the intelligence arm of the military dictatorship that governed Brazil 

between 1964 and 1985—was eliminated in the early 1990s. As Brandao 

points out, ABIN does not have the legal authority to intercept phone calls or 

Internet communications, but must rely on the Federal Police for these fundamental sources of intelligence. In my view, this limitation greatly reduces 

the ABIN’s effectiveness and may be a cause of unending scandals, as this 

agency tries to compensate for that lack of authority.

The chapter by Swenson and Orozco draws heavily on an article by Elizabeth 

Sepper in the Texas International Law Journal (Fall 2010). Sepper criticizes widespread, uncontrolled international intelligence sharing. The authors explore the 

context for intelligence sharing and the legal bases for certain intelligence activities. In terms of how intelligence can contribute to public security, they draw 

lessons mainly from the experience of Mexico. Looking more specifically at the 

Mexican Federal Police, they find that its competence and abilities, as a function of the resources made available to it, varies from state to state within that 

country, and that intelligence-based improvements to citizen security at the local level will depend on finding ethical ways to integrate national, even military, 

intelligence capabilities into preventive police action, perhaps even in advance 

of a nationwide legal framework for doing so.

The contribution by Zuniga argues for collecting intelligence in the prison 

environment as a legitimate, even if experimental, part of improving the 
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management of information-gathering practices in the national justice system. In reviewing the legal framework for intelligence activities in different 

countries, she finds that a weak legal basis for intelligence collection in Chile 

and the majority of the region’s countries leaves much room for bureaucratic 

innovation. An accountable initiative in expanding the role of prison intelligence amounts to one such justifiable innovation.

What comes across in these three essays are several points that we at the 

Center for Civil-Military Relations have found to be common or typical in 

our work in several new democracies. These include the following: the need 

to rely on all imaginable sources of information to begin to say anything at 

all about the intelligence function; the absence of, or ambiguous, legal bases 

for the intelligence function; an unclear division of labor between different 

intelligence agencies, including between the military and civilian agencies; 

and ambiguity in who precisely does what, and to whom the final intelligence 

product is provided. 

These studies also suggest that an additional challenge lies in how to define 

and measure the effectiveness of intelligence agencies. These are challenges 

that anyone interested in intelligence must deal with, although we may guess 

that it can never be accomplished in a very satisfying manner. 

Thomas C. Bruneau serves as distinguished professor of national security 

affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he 

manges the program for Latin America and teaches short courses on intelligence reform for the Center for Civil-Military Relations. His most recent 

book, coedited with Cris Matei, is The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military 

Relations (2012). Email: tbruneau@nps.edu.
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Institutional Challenges in the Integration of the 

Brazilian Public Security Intelligence System

Priscila Carlos Brandao

This essay assesses a decade of work toward integrating the Public Security 

Intelligence Subsystem (SISP) into the larger Brazilian Intelligence System 

(SISBIN). An analysis of bureaucratic reform efforts and intelligence information handling inform the author’s proposals to improve the difficult process of intelligence integration.

Intelligence Legitimacy and Efficacy in Brazil

Clear definitions of intelligence organizations and procedures can help an 

intelligence system govern itself, in the context of larger systems of which it 

it a part. Therefore, the definition of intelligence itself deserves close attention.544 Although no confusion exists about the definition of intelligence in 

doctrinal terms, in practice Brazil’s weak implementation of public security 

doctrine collides with a persistent military intelligence role in domestic security. The resulting bureaucratic uncertainties play a role in reducing the protection of basic civil rights as the government’s involvement in public security 

increases. 

The political and technical management of intelligence also depend on finding an operational definition acceptable to citizens and government officials 

alike. Although intelligence activity acquires its own “institutionality” and 

legitimacy as a state function, the definition of its goals remains a function of 

the political priorities of successive governments. Although intelligence serves 

the state, the particular government in power establishes its priorities. An intelligence plan serves as a guide to what actions may need to be undertaken. An 

efficacious plan has some degree of flexibility, in step with the typical uncertainties of intelligence.

As Brazilian strategic studies specialist Domicio Proença pointed out in a 

dialogue with the author, to govern intelligence we need to know what intelligence is, what it is for, whom it serves, what it costs, what protection it is 

accorded, the limits and controls to which it is subjected, and how it has been 

employed.545 These issues cannot and should not be resolved independently 
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or even collectively by the agencies that make up the intelligence system. Instead, policies established in the political environment need to be reflected in 

each agency’s goals and purposes. 

Acknowledging that an intelligence system is governed from the outside does 

not diminish the importance of internal managers. They must have more 

than administrative knowledge: They need specific professional knowledge 

and an ability to manage resources and priorities effectively. Effective intelligence resource management meets sensible production deadlines and requires 

the joint effort of those who govern and those who manage. An ability to 

weigh what is politically satisfactory against what is professionally required 

helps to achieve this management ideal.546

Intelligence in the Public Security Domain

The political science debate surrounding the legitimacy of criminal (police) 

intelligence in the democratic context reflects widespread doubts about how 

to override or separate public security from public repression: 

As a key to ensuring governability, the formulation and implementation of policies established to handle the problems 

associated with public security should override the simple, 

reductionist view of security = police forces or security = repression, and instead embrace a common effort where security policies and criminal policies are conjoined in the social 

framework.547

The complexity of conducting internal intelligence activities needs to be 

made clear. Relevant international literature suggests that internal intelligence divides readily into two areas. First, security intelligence, or domestic 

intelligence, as it is known in the United States, identifies potential threats to 

the security of the state. Second, criminal intelligence, known in the United 

States as law enforcement intelligence (LEI), supports investigative police 

functions and the provision of public order and criminal justice. In Brazil, 

security intelligence and criminal intelligence are conflated in the definition 

of public security intelligence. More than a simple taxonomic issue, mixing 

the two reduces efficiency in the management of intelligence systems and 

intelligence performance.
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In Safety Has a Solution (2006), Luiz Eduardo Soares diagnosed the state of 

public security in Brazil and identified two principal problems: weak management and obsolescent corporative structures.548 He found that an enterprise 

management model would be necessary but insufficient to manage public 

security. Public security management also involves “knowing the problem 

that needs to be addressed; planning what is going to be done; evaluating 

what was done; identifying successes and failures, and monitoring the entire 

process.”549

Soares points out why public security institutions require reform: 

Our police institutions are viscous and slow operations, not 

at all intelligent or creative; they do not value police personnel or prepare them adequately. They do not plan or evaluate 

what they do, they do not learn from their mistakes because 

they do not identify them, they are not familiar with the 

context of issues where they carry out their duties (policemen, individually, know very well; the police as an institution knows nothing). They do not cultivate the respect and 

confidence of the population ... they commit an immense 

number of crimes, when their task is to prevent crimes or to 

bring perpetrators to justice.550

Soares takes into account several factors: 1) managers of security organizations often have neither appropriate academic preparation nor knowledge in 

the administrative area; 2) administrative positions do not have a requirement 

for basic competence and trust; 3) public security institutions tend to be resistant to change; and 4) corporatist institutions do not cooperate; instead, 

rivalry and nasty disputes mark their relationships.551

Beyond the rivalry issue, Soares finds that structural problems also make 

institutional cooperation difficult. No standardized system of professional 

communication exists among agencies, which reduces data sharing for public 

security intelligence purposes. Each police force has its own way of training 

personnel with tailored courses; no common curriculum exists. Each police 

force also has its own way to classify information, making the interaction 

process more difficult. No national system organizes these institutions, which 

behave as isolated units and rarely cooperate. Even among the police forces 
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under the control of the Ministry of Justice—the Federal Police and the Transit Police—little dialogue exists. In light of this unruly scene, Soares asks: how 

could it be possible to create a professional culture in an efficient system, supported by a specialized, professional language that can be shared?552

Soares’ concerns of 2006 remain valid today: how to bring a healthy process 

of change to the public security system in Brazil. Some needs include effective 

planning, professional development, systematic evaluation, ensuring that professionals are rewarded, and that procedures and control mechanisms themselves are evaluated. The present essay therefore asks: What practical proposals 

for the intelligence field might address problems and strengthen reform and integration in public security information services? This does not imply that reform is 

not possible or is not already underway, despite slow progress. Before offering 

some specific proposals, the essay will review the current institutional scene to 

find any evidence of consistent reform supportive of a less corporatist system. 

Institutionalization of the Public Security

Intelligence Subsystem 

Brazil initiated its Public Security Intelligence Subsystem in 2000, with the 

civilian intelligence agency ABIN as the central agency for the system. ABIN 

held responsibility for foreign intelligence as well as internal intelligence. A 

dispute between the Ministry of Justice and the Institutional Security Cabinet 

about legal definitions of intelligence soon led to a new decree, which made 

the National Secretariat for Public Security of the Ministry of Justice the central institution.553 Article 1 of the new decree required the Public Security 

Intelligence Subsystem “to co-ordinate and integrate all public-security intelligence activities across the country, as well as to support decisionmaking in 

federal and state governments with intelligence information.” Articles 2 and 

3 called on the Intelligence Subsystem’s member organizations “to identify, 

follow and evaluate real or potential threats to public security and to produce 

knowledge and information in support of actions to neutralize and restrain 

criminal acts of any nature” (Article 2, §3). This vague guidance provided 

only a weak orientation to the subsequent debate about doctrinal and regulatory issues in public security intelligence. 

As the central agency, the National Secretariat for Public Security oversaw 

the Federal Police and the Transit Police within the Justice Ministry; various 
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agencies of the Treasury department; of the Ministry of Regional Integration, and of the Ministry of Defense. Two agencies subordinated to the Institutional Security Cabinet, ABIN and National Anti-Drug Secretariat, also 

joined the circle. Additionally, the National Secretariat for Public Security 

presided over civilian and military police554 of the 26 states and the Federal 

District—the relationship with military police being administered through 

mutual agreement. 

In late 2001 the secretary of public security (whose office is responsible for the 

integration of intelligence operations) sponsored the first national seminar on 

public security intelligence.555 Participants agreed that the Intelligence Subsystem provides analytical tools to identify the nature of criminal activity and 

to develop a profile of perpetrators and victims. The subsystem also assists in 

the solution of police investigations and supports public security planning and 

management by providing data, information, and knowledge.556 Seminar 

participants found that few states have formal intelligence systems, reinforcing the need to adjust or standardize existing security structures. Professional 

personnel lack certain equipment needed to perform intelligence activities. 

Finally, the absence of public security doctrine contributes to inefficiencies in 

intelligence and counterintelligence.

With the placement of sociologist Luis Eduardo Soares as head of the Public 

Security Secretariat in 2003, some integration of public security intelligence 

occurred. He created the post of general coordinator of intelligence and improved the professional development of personnel.557 In partnership with 

national subject-matter experts, the secretariat offered the first public security 

intelligence course oriented to the needs of state-level officials. The course offered professional tools with a sophisticated delivery.558

Praised by some, but criticized for its “academic orientation” by others, this 

initial course sowed the seeds for greater interaction, albeit informal, between 

the component agencies of the public security system. It led directly to the 

creation of the Criminal Intelligence Institute (INTECRIM) and the Brazilian Chapter of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA). However, Soares’ dramatic departure that same 

year and the new secretary’s indifference to the course consigned it to near 

oblivion.559
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During the tenure of Luiz Fernando Corrêa (2003/2007) as national secretary of public security, the development and approval of public security 

intelligence doctrine by the Intelligence Advisory Board proceeded slowly. 

Representatives of the states sought a legislative reform initiative that would 

fully involve the states in public security intelligence. Their initiative did 

move forward and received approval in April 2005.560 However, it did not 

gain further political buy-in when presented to the Brazilian Congress as a 

modification of Law 3695. The low priority accorded intelligence then and 

now in political circles (notwithstanding that intelligence is presented as the 

solution to all the problems of public security) brought the further development of doctrine to a close. 

Doctrine development ended at a critical stage—when the interaction of system members was up for discussion. To show a positive return on financial 

and political investment in two periods of debate, the general coordinator 

summarily ended the second phase of debate and approved the National Doctrine of Public Security Intelligence (DNISP) without an agreement to make 

it public. The third and final phase came with approval of the DNISP by the 

Special Advisory Council on 22 July 2009, under the purview of Secretary of 

Public Security Ricardo Balestreri.561 Balestreri’s tenure in the administration 

of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was marked by a political posture more explicitly 

“preventative” than that of his predecessor. This posture served to keep the office from being held hostage by any political pact among the states to further 

reform public security intelligence. 

The Office of the General Intelligence Coordinator under Balestreri exhibited 

a penchant for political compromise and promoted an effective implementation of the new doctrine. Between 2008 and 2009 it transformed the criminal 

information database known as the National Information System for Justice 

and Public Security (INFOSEG) into the Network of National Integration of 

Information of Public Security (RENISP). Access to the revitalized network 

became easier with the use of encrypted pen drives. The General Intelligence 

Council during the Lula administration also created the National Council of 

Chiefs of Intelligence Agencies (CNCOI).562 This move allowed greater state 

involvement in public security intelligence matters. 

The General Intelligence Council has managed important steps toward institutionalization of the Intelligence Subsystem, although the results were less 
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than hoped for. Its policies for professional development and system integration were neglected as it coordinated security plans for the Soccer World Cup 

(2014) and the Olympic Games (2016). 

Public Security Intelligence: Doctrine and Concept

Public security intelligence has the responsibility to provide accurate information for preventive police operations, street patrols, and criminal investigations.563 However, an empirical challenge has been to understand that police 

intelligence produces knowledge rather than evidence of crimes. Intelligence 

documents are normally classified or highly restricted, and those who carry 

out intelligence are sworn to secrecy. Their information must be declassified 

to be used as evidence. Doing so carries the cost of revealing sources and 

methods or the identity of agents. Furthermore, differentiating the nature of 

and responsibility for pre- and post-crime intelligence remains an unresolved 

dilemma. 

Despite the regulation of telephone tapping by Law 9296 (July 1996), police 

intelligence collection remained unregulated. Only with the approval of the 

National Public Security Intelligence Doctrine in 2009 did police intelligence 

collection have to take place within the scope of a criminal investigation. 

Police now may use special techniques to obtain nonpublic data with judicial 

pre-authorization, but only if there exist indications, evidence, or proof that 

someone has committed a crime. 

Brazilian national legislation has not yet granted needed authority to public security agencies. In contrast to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States, which after the September 11, 2001 attacks started to accumulate 

new and greater domestic intelligence and criminal intelligence capabilities,564

the Brazilian Federal Police and ABIN do not have the authority to collect 

and analyze information from intelligence penetration of suspected terrorist 

groups in the country. The Federal Police can only take intelligence measures 

after a crime such as arms trafficking or money laundering has occurred. The 

principles of legitimacy and proportionality support a proactive counterintelligence capability in Brazil. The continuing absence or insufficiency of intelligence authority explains military and ABIN reluctance to support the creation 

of a specific doctrine dedicated to public security intelligence.
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In contrast with these restrictions on civilian or federal police intelligence activity, the Brazilian Constitution specifies that the military can act in defense 

of law and order as a secondary mission. The military’s concept of “internal 

enemy” still influences the performance of military intelligence activities. Although internal security is not part of current defense policy, civilian governments have made little effort to clarify which situations or actors should be 

defined as threats, or to establish the difference between internal defense, 

security, and defense of the rule of law. 

The defined roles of the Ministry of Defense range from policing the borders, 

guaranteeing order, and providing public and national defense, to guaranteeing electoral process and civil defense. The breadth of these roles dilutes the 

ability of military intelligence to carry out its function, since its human, technological, and budgetary resources are far less than needed.565 At the same 

time, the various expectations make the military services a flexible agent when 

the state cannot carry out its goals through other agencies. 

Chapter XVI of Regulation 7364/10 assigns the armed forces the 

responsibility to enforce law and order “when appropriate.” The regulation 

aims to preserve public order, protect the civilian electoral system, promote 

national development and civil defense, combat crime in the border regions, 

and ensure the integrity of the natural environment.566 The military services 

ignore the “when appropriate” caveat in favor of the more expedient “upon 

the initiative of any of the military services.” They interpret the regulation as 

granting a permanent internal security role to the armed forces. 

The chief tenet of the old National Security Doctrine was that confict is 

continuous. This view of conflict has persisted in the military organizations 

as part of the logic of state security, to the detriment of personal or public 

security. The prestigious and widely read magazine Carta Capital divulged 

(October 19, 2011) excerpts of a document titled “Campaign Manual—

Counterintelligence.” It reveals unequivocal evidence of this military mentality 

as it shows how linguistic expressions are manipulated to legitimize and justify 

military action in the internal sphere. A counterintelligence manual can be a 

good thing, given the presence of pseudo-nongovernment organizations that 

engage in biopiracy and other pernicious crimes. But the manual’s definition 

of “adversarial elements” raises questions: 
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Social groups and movements, non-governmental organizations, and even governmental bodies, of an ideological nature 

or not—acting in the country and the exterior—or independent actors, radical elements or those associated with them, 

who defend radical and revolutionary changes, exceeding, in 

their political-ideological, religious or ethnic character, the 

limits of institutional legality within the democratic Rule 

of Law, and whose illegal procedures can come to compromise 

public order and even the internal order of the country.

567

The manual’s language legitimizes armed forces actions when internal adversarial forces exceed the limits of institutional legality, or when their actions compromise public order. In doing so, it clearly ignores the principle of 

proportionality. By these guidelines, the actions of the Landless Movement 

(Movimento dos sem Terra) or strike actions by Post Office laborers cannot be 

handled by the largely civilian public security agencies. One must ask why 

these actors would be monitored even by civilian intelligence agencies in a 

country operating under democratic rule of law. Intolerance of adversarial 

opinions characterizes an authoritarian state, and the application of policies 

reflecting the National Security Doctrine leads to inappropriate management 

choices in the security and defense realm.568

When Brazilian armed forces prioritize internal security, they expend their 

power on a secondary mission. This approach undermines the otherwise 

steady growth of Brazilian influence on the international scene. The country does need an intelligence doctrine that will enable it to address foreign 

espionage and terrorism (a phenomenon distinct from the military concept 

of subversion).569

Police Intelligence and Public Security

The legal rules concerning the admissibility of evidence apply to investigative 

intelligence analysis as well as to police inquiry. Police intelligence produces 

knowledge that confirms evidence, certifies indications, or substantiates the 

results of tests to identify perpetrators of crime. Yet its work is not confined 

to the investigation of evidence. Police intelligence analysis participates in an 

information feedback system that unleashes a cyclical process of knowledge 

production. From the moment new information is collected and new analyses 
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are produced, the probability of new investigations increases, successively 

transforming investigative analysis into strategic analysis. According to 

Monica Lacerda, “the product of the analytical process is combined into a 

database and is used to forecast and prevent undesirable events, in this way 

acting not so much as investigative, but preventive, police intelligence.”570

Public security officers do not have clear guidelines for the admissibility of 

evidence from intrusive searches for denied data. Uniformed officers rather 

than investigative police sometimes engage in preventive public security intelligence operations focused on crimes and serious disturbances of the public 

order at the strategic level. This creates a problem because uniformed officers 

train only for tactical or operational situations. This problem also affects police operations in noncriminal environments where public security managers 

have to make a variety of autonomous decisions without the benefit of clear 

rules. 

The effective management of public security intelligence rests on restraining 

the use of intrusive methods and improving the capabilities of analysts. A 

positive step in that direction depends on maximizing the production of 

intelligence based on open sources and creating accessible, well-organized 

databases. 

Practical Proposals for Intelligence-Based Public

Security Reform

Public security intelligence managers in Brazil have the opportunity to improve performance by institutionalizing informal exchanges of information 

among different agents and agencies. Informal exchanges already take place 

on an everyday basis in public security agencies of all types. 

In The Blue Planet, Michael Bayer shows why a failure to capitalize on 

informal exchanges of data between police agencies across the world degrades 

the worldwide campaign against terrorism: “formal relationships are helpful, 

informal relationships are powerful.”571 According to the author, certain 

characteristics inherent to police agencies make them a powerful instrument 

against complex crime and, by extension, against terrorism: 1) police have 

the ability to adapt, adjust, and act quickly, in the sense of finding answers 

to issues or situations that demand immediate action572; 2) a feeling of 
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fellowship or belonging exists between police agencies, because they have a 

common mission—maintenance of law and order—and common enemies—

criminals—as a stimulus (Bayer sees the positive side of police allegiance, the 

“culture of the badge,” as the factor promoting cooperation between similar 

agencies)573; 3) the capillarity of police agencies adds another positive factor. 

Capillarity allows policemen to act at the various levels (state, federal, local), 

and in the widest variety of places (metropolises, villages, boroughs, ghettos). 

Police cooperation transcends religions, ethnicities, political preferences, and 

other dividing factors that could make cooperation impracticable. Capillarity 

drives the interaction described in The Blue Planet. Investigative “knowhow” combined with informal contacts give police an unrivaled capacity “to 

connect the dots”574; 4) police possess independence in relation to centers 

of power. This distinguishes police from intelligence services, which are 

themselves agencies of power in governments. Political independence allows 

the autonomy necessary for police to carry out missions of any kind.575

These factors represent a set of necessary conditions for the exchange of information, but are not sufficient to make it happen. A smooth exchange of 

information between police and among their agencies requires mutual confidence as the basis for any circulation of information. According to Bayer, 

two factors promote confidence: a feeling of belonging, and reciprocity.576

In order for information to circulate informally, either preliminary contact 

between individuals in different agencies must have already occurred, or a 

well-founded expectation exists that a policeman can count on help when 

needed—an officer will always help his colleague. 

Why should data exchange occur on an informal basis? First, information 

from informal sources enriches data already available in bureaucratic channels. Second, slow bureaucratic information exchange reduces the necessary 

agility of police agencies. When information sharing takes place in a formal 

environment, it has to be written down, transmitted, registered, analyzed, 

debated, evaluated, approved or disapproved over days, weeks, or months. 

The exchange of information between police officers, done “cop you cop,” can 

take only minutes—the time for a phone call or fax. 

Bayer’s findings address the informal interactions between agencies of 

different countries—agencies that do not compete directly for power, budget 

or influence. Such interaction can serve as a behavioral goal for Brazilian 
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police agencies and as a reference point for the establishment of an extensive 

police network for gathering data of certain types—what Bayer labels a 

“dragnet.” Police as well as intelligence officials in Brazil know the value 

and importance of compiling and having access to certain databases; that 

is, they are aware of the need for a multidirectional flow of information. 

However, various factors keep police agencies from cooperating with each 

other. Bureaucratric turf battles, a negative aspect of corporatism, detracts 

from the ideal of cooperation. 

To understand the potential for greater information exchange in the Brazilian public security system, one must address two questions: Who encourages 

and controls the circulation of information, and what information can be 

shared? The National Secretariat for Public Security bears the responsibility 

to integrate the work of Public Security Intelligence Subsystem organizations. 

It already coordinates the system of intelligence information exchange known 

as the National Public Security Information Network. However, exchanges 

on this network obey a formal logic, guided by a doctrine that regulates requests for information, guides the creation of Relints (intelligence reports), 

and imposes dissemination restrictions on classified information. The associated lack of agility calls for the development of new intelligence architecture 

whereby agencies that wish to share sensitive information would have that 

information validated and approved for exchange rapidly under the auspices 

of a unique protocol. 

Bayer finds that a culture of over-classification of information inhibits the 

exchange of information for public security purposes. This remnant of Cold 

War thinking feeds intelligence agency turf wars. Further, when information 

becomes classified, interest in it increases, along with its overall vulnerability 

to disclosure.577 Brazilian classification rules apply specifically to investigatory information or intelligence related to crime prevention or reduction.578

But how can one determine which information related to criminal conduct 

realistically needs to be classified, and which may be circulated to other agencies for legitimate purposes? Bayer suggests that information not be classified without a concrete probability that disclosure of the knowledge would 

damage national security.579 Although the term “national security” remains 

nebulous, information should not be classified to: a) cover up a violation of 

the law, an error, or administrative inefficiency; b) prevent discomfort to a 
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person, organization, or agency; c) reduce competition between agencies; or 

d) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection 

in the interest of national security.580 Bayer further suggests that a “sensitive 

but unclassified information” label for police intelligence data would stimulate more secure transmission of data. The risk of such information being 

leaked to the public is low because criminal information is protected from 

disclosure by criminal law.581

Public Security Intelligence Subsystem administrators can develop training 

courses to foment a culture of organizing and sharing public security information through accessible databases. Students from a wide variety of public 

security organizations would find colleagues with whom to develop personal 

ties and the mutual confidence conducive to information sharing for crime 

prevention and resolution. 

Assessment and Forecast

How well integrated is Brazil’s Public Security Intelligence Subsystem? The 

chief integrating mechanism, the 2009 National Doctrine for Public Security Intelligence, has yet to be fully implemented. The doctrine has not yet 

been fully implemented even in the federal police force.582 Standardization 

of language and procedures would coincide with the adoption of integrative 

concepts and values such as information sharing. Working-level cooperation 

does not take place among the public security intelligence systems of the individual Brazilian states, either formally or informally through social networks. 

The continuing lack of a common professional vocabulary suggests the absence of management interest in promoting interaction between the corporative agencies that make up the subsystem. Brazil lacks a good understanding 

of the role of its basic public security intelligence components, undermining 

any suggestion for appropriate political actions and resource management 

decisions to improve its integration in line with democratic principles. 

The standardization of concepts and techniques for public security intelligence does not by itself guarantee the capillarity or integration of the subsystem. A broader dissemination of information and intelligence products 

requires mutual trust and a commitment to change the culture of information classification among multiple agencies. Recent international experience 

demonstrates that the useful sharing of sensitive information can occur in a 
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formal manner as well as through informal but professional social networks. 

Regardless of the route chosen, knowing who is to produce information and 

what particular expressions mean, as well as instilling confidence among the 

security institutions, are minimum requirements to ensure that information 

exchange does occur. 

The Public Security Intelligence Subsystem, created in 2000, has not been 

able to facilitate the desired interaction between and among its distinct, 

corporatist organizations. Among the challenges identified by intelligence 

managers and operators in the period immediately following the creation of 

the subsystem,583 most remain to be addressed: designation of appropriate 

authority, professional development, efficient management, standardization, 

and cooperation. Only two of the problems initially identified have been 

cured: new doctrine has been created and approved, and an internal communications network has been put in place, capable of safely transmitting classified information. The National Network for Public Security Information, 

created with the intention of meeting this need, is not yet widely used. Where 

a lack of trust and cooperation still reign, personal and informal solutions are 

still seen as the best option. 

Despite the ongoing, popular discussion of the need to produce more and 

better information on crimes and criminals, Brazil has yet to achieve the specialization and expertise to generate what in other countries is called intelligence-led policing.584 The production of knowledge in police work, as well 

as in the criminal system, in the broad sense, depends on the synergy among 

technological gains made possible by information technology and communications infrastructure, the quality of information databases, and the wealth 

of information embodied in operational activity itself (both preventive and 

investigative). 

The development of a system of public security intelligence in Brazil requires 

a careful review of its activity by public security stewards. They need better 

knowledge of how the system operates, and they need to promote its integration, attitudes toward cooperation, professional development, and especially 

an unpretentiousness among managers so as to preserve advances already 

made. Beyond the existing public security intelligence doctrine, generating 

a more comprehensive national intelligence policy should be the country’s 

highest priority. 
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Brazil also requires a review of the legal mechanisms regulating the collection 

of intelligence information by the police as well as by other national intelligence agencies. The Brazilian civilian intelligence agency, ABIN, does not 

have authority to intercept communications of any type. If an intelligence 

system expects to deal with hard targets and obtain protected or denied information, how can the chief strategic intelligence agency not have the authority 

to carry out standard intelligence and counterintelligence functions? Table 

14 suggests some current answers to that question and recommendations for 

improving management efficiency. 

Table 14

Schematic Synthesis of Suggestions for 

National Intelligence Improvement

Criterion for Efficacy Current Situation Suggestions

Establish clear definition 

of the concept of intelligence, widely understood and accepted by 

those whom it serves. 

Conceptual ambiguity Specify the relevant arenas for 

intelligence action (defense, 

public security, international 

relations), delimiting the areas of responsibility for each 

component of the intelligence 

community. 

Define who governs 

(oversees), who manages, who executes, and 

how governance is to be 

done.

Ambiguity over the roles 

of civilian, military, and 

police in the production 

of knowledge: threat to 

privacy and other civil 

rights

Define the specialty of each 

organization in the intelligence system, taking into account its essence, its place in 

the system, and its purpose. 

Spell out how each aspect of intelligence governance will be handled: 

planning, professional 

development, evaluation and assessment of 

professionals.

Waiting for the construction and approval 

of a national intelligence policy

Approval of the national 

intelligence policy, to guide 

planning and set goals for 

each organization in line with 

policy objectives. 
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Table 14

Schematic Synthesis of Suggestions for 

National Intelligence Improvement (continued)

Criterion for Efficacy Current Situation Suggestions

Standardization Waiting for the public 

release of the National 

Doctrine for Public Security Intelligence

Arrange meetings, create applied academic courses to 

promote greater interaction 

among intelligence community organizations, and standardize terminology. 

Efficient management Errors are not corrected 

because they are not 

detected; absence of effective communication 

between “castes” in the 

intelligence service. 

Heal the fracture between 

intelligence operators (who 

know a lot) and managers, 

with whom operators do not 

often exchange ideas. 

Information sharing Exclusive corporate or 

private custody of information

a) Institutionalize informal 

procedures for information 

exchange through increased 

personal interaction among 

colleagues (can be accomplished by the National 

Secretary of Public Security 

through security protocols);

b) Promote a culture of information sharing to reduce 

hoarding. 

Source: Compiled by the author.
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Author’s Biography

Priscila Brandao holds a Ph.D. in social sciences from the State University 

of Campinas (2005), and has done postdoctoral work in governance and 

governability in counterdrug trafficking (U.S. National Defense University) 

and in intelligence professionalization (University of Burgos/Spain). Since 

January 2006 she has served as adjunct professor at the Federal University 

of Minas Gerais (UFMG). She specializes in history, with an emphasis on 

contemporary political institutions, and has interests in military dictatorship, intelligence community affairs, the Brazilian civilian intelligence agency, and criminal intelligence in Latin America. She serves as a consultant to 

the federal government and some state governments in the area of criminal 

intelligence and heads the research division of the National Council of Scientific and Technological Development—governmental intelligence. She is 

also the coordinating director of the UFMG Center for Strategic Studies of 

Government Intelligence. Her publications include SNI and ABIN (Rio De 

Janeiro: EDFGV, 2002) and Secret Services and Democracy (Niterói: Impetus 

Publishing Company, 2010). For her complete resume see: http://lattes.cnpq.

br/5546418263728807.

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Intelligence—from the Prison Environment 

to the National Security System

Liza Zuniga Collado

Introduction

Why should a country develop intelligence in a prison environment? Why 

would prison intelligence have strategic value? How can one manage intelligence activity in this environment? These questions shape the following 

examination of two public security areas—prisons and intelligence. These 

seemingly unrelated realms are linked by the emerging role of intelligence in 

public security. Although routine use of the intelligence function in national 

incarceration systems remains for the future, opportunities for its development already exist in various Latin American countries. The ideas presented 

here aim to promote a debate about the simultaneous management of prisons 

and intelligence.

One can begin to answer these introductory questions by recognizing the 

implications of security system reform in the 1970s. In those years a set of related security organizations, each operating in its own sphere of competence 

but also cooperating with others in the network, came to embody the “security system” concept. In this network, minimal but vital coordination among 

organizations would allow for the maturation of each security institution in 

complementary fashion. Presently, prison systems often function as a set of 

“human containers”—isolated places designed to carry out criminal policies 

and judicial decisions. This essay applies the decades-old, collaborative security system idea to argue for the maturation of prison systems through their 

adoption of an intelligence function linking incarceration institutions with 

other elements of a state’s overall security system. 

Latin American intelligence systems depend on laws (see Table 2), official 

definitions of their activities, and a variety of organizations to carry out a central function of any national security system. Countries of the region fall into 

two groups: 1) those that have been able to discuss and enact intelligence laws 

and develop intelligence communities; adopt ethical principles of conduct; 

arrange for external oversight to limit and control intelligence activity; and 

collaborate with a network of organizations from different areas of society; 
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and 2) a second group of countries that shows little or no tendency to adopt 

those measures. All countries of the region do have in common the persistent 

concept of intelligence as a strategic or political function, as a military specialty, and as a police tool. 

This essay discusses the preconditions that might allow for or encourage the 

development of prison intelligence. A crisis environment in the prison systems of the region makes the insertion of intelligence capabilities in these 

institutions a difficult proposition. However, the addition of an intelligence 

capability would give prison administrators an opportunity to integrate their 

operations with the national security system, a long-postponed administrative goal. The idea of integrating intelligence services with the prison system 

may seem ambitious in view of the precarious state of prisons in the region. 

It will be possible to do so to only as the prison system begins to overcome 

multiple deficiencies. 

Cooperation as the Basis for a Multidimensional 

Security System

Holistic security systems emerged in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, as countries in that region responded to the need for reform and reorganization of 

their security institutions. The idea of a holistic system applies to other contexts as well. Countries undergoing rapid development or that have reached 

full development apply the concept as a means of improving the quality of 

their institutions. The need for political reconfiguration in Latin America 

differs from that in Eastern Europe because each region has experienced distinct types of conflict. Latin America has undertaken a series of post-dictator 

military reforms in a “third wave of democratization.” The majority of these 

reforms aim to reestablish civilian political leadership over the armed forces 

and to separate police work from military duties, making both these institutions compliant rather than deliberative bodies.585 Some security elements, 

including judicial reform, remained unaddressed in early reform efforts. Thus, 

prison services in the last two decades have suffered the results of increasingly 

punitive criminal policies. Longer sentences and more crimes of record, without the counterweight of an incarceration policy for the prison system, deprive more inmates of their freedom. Prisons receive more prisoners, some of 

them violent offenders from organized crime groups, but not the additional 
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personnel or infrastructure to handle the inmate population. This situation 

holds across all of Latin America with subtle differences from place to place. 

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) 

broad concept of national and public security helps answer why prison services should be incorporated fully into a country’s security system. The OECD 

finds that “the security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. A wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security.” For the OECD, the “security 

sector” includes

all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—

working together to manage and operate the system in a 

manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and 

sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes 

to a well-functioning security framework.586

From this definition there follow two reasons to incorporate prison administration into the security sector. The first is that all the actors are to be included, 

whether they be primary actors (such as the armed forces, the police, the 

intelligence services), actors of an administrative or oversight nature (ministries, legislative committees, financial administrators), actors associated with 

the administration of justice (penal institutions, courts, human rights commissions) or nonstate actors (such as private security services). The system 

of incarceration constitutes a part of the sector, although not as a central 

actor in the same way as the armed forces or police. The second element 

justifying the incorporation of prison administration into the security sector 

is that a security system contributes to good governance and to accomplishing 

daily security objectives. This suggests that the security sector contributes to a 

country’s governability, as security permits the development of broad human 

capabilities in a society. 

The concept of governability has been developed and defined in security 

terms by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: democratic 

governability in public security (seguridad ciudadana) terms is the institutional 

ability on the part of legitimate authorities to design, implement, and evaluate 

policies for the prevention and control of crime and violence.587 Three 

points about governability should be highlighted: 1) the concept assumes 
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a democratic system, where civil authorities are in office as a result of free 

elections; 2) it focuses on the idea of public security; that is, security that 

goes beyond that provided by the traditional services such as the police, and 

implies for citizens a more holistic concept of security; and 3) the concept 

also implies the employment of preventive measures, to go along with the 

traditional prosecutorial approach. The last point is particularly important in 

the prison environment. Although the penal system seeks to control those who 

have already broken the law, preventive policies and tools remain appropriate 

as a way to reduce recidivism. 

Even as Latin America has moved toward adequate public security policies 

with community participation, has adopted prevention programs of all types, 

and has undertaken police reforms, its prisons have remained essentially unchanged. A few improvements have come from individual efforts and isolated 

programs. Police and judicial establishments do not consider prison administration an equal player in the criminal justice system. Prison administrators 

are viewed as “jailkeepers” and not professional justice employees.588 Another 

reason for the neglect of prison personnel is that governments do not benefit 

politically from demonstrating that they are capable of developing an incarceration system that respects human rights. Decisionmakers believe that 

sending more people to prison, without considering what takes place within 

the institution, remains the best way to respond to citizen demands for greater security. This approach has acquired the label “punitive populism.”589 

Latin America has adopted the concept of human security as a part of multidimensional security, whereby security institutions exist within a system. 

The origin of this thinking about security in multidimensional terms lies in 

the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Declaration on Security in the 

Americas (2003), which maintains that 

security in the Hemisphere is multidimensional by nature 

and encompasses traditional as well as new threats, concerns, and other challenges to the security and the priorities of the States. Security contributes to the consolidation 

of peace, integrated development and social justice, and is 

based on democratic values, respect, the promotion and defense of human rights, solidarity, cooperation, and respect 

for national sovereignty.590 
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This regionally accepted concept bears similarities to the idea of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP), and 

in particular by the governments of Canada and Japan, at the beginning of 

the 1990s. The UNDP concept focuses on individuals and on integrative 

tendencies and multidimensional themes in public affairs. It emphasizes multilateralism and cooperation in the security dimension as well as in other areas 

of development.591

If security has multiple dimensions, and if the threats we face are themselves 

of diverse origins, then the organizations charged with confronting these 

threats also need to be diverse and multiple. A country cannot rely only on 

only one or two institutions to protect its people. Prisons address both common and organized delinquency, and can develop intelligence not only about 

inmates, but also about the leadership and operation of their criminal organizations. Intelligence can contribute to improving the management of prisons 

by providing the unique data to help administrators make optimal use of all 

existing information. Intelligence information allows prison administrators 

to improve their own security and gives them insights to share with other elements of the security community. In this way, administrators can move from 

a passive to a more active role in the national security system. 

The Intelligence Function and the Prison Environment

Strategic intelligence provides information for decisonmaking and for planning. The intelligence production process itself requires planning and development of systems and methods to collect information and to administer the 

intelligence organization itself. The same planning process applies to many 

security environments, although strategic intelligence has principally been 

associated with national defense. Today, the business world incorporates and 

applies the principles of intelligence production, and correspondingly, an intelligence community now needs to include economic and social issues in its 

purview to protect a country’s citizens. 

Intelligence treats criminal behavior as a social phenomenon with security 

implications. Intelligence analysis thus enables a society to address this dynamic 

phenomenon through strategic planning. Such planning can guide preventive 

actions by police and social workers to address offenders who constantly 

seek new avenues of criminal advantage. The United States first employed 
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intelligence capabilities in the 1950s and 1960s to monitor gang activity 

that directly challenged the security of penal institutions. Prison officials 

slowly developed trained groups to carry out monitoring as an intelligence 

activity.592 Today, the coordinated efforts of criminal gangs within the prison 

establishment—especially evident in Central America—signal the increasing 

need for intelligence monitoring within these institutions. 

Most police organizations in Latin America now incorporate intelligence capabilities directly in small, specialized units, as a formal division of police 

organizations, or indirectly through crime prevention and investigation units. 

In contrast, prison administrators have typically not yet incorporated intelligence into their repertoire of security tools. They limit themselves to maintaining control over inmates or managing programs for reinserting prisoners 

back into society. Prison intelligence remains an area of public administration 

lacking empirical research, and therefore decisions regarding its use rest on 

generalizations reported in the press. The lack of empirical research contributes to the considerable differences that exist between the real experience of 

prison life and what is popularly imagined. A problem arises when decisionmakers have access only to the imagined reality. 

Intelligence capabilities should be employed in the prison environment for 

two reasons. First, when prison administrators coordinate with other security institutions, the security system gains governability and effectiveness. The 

contribution of prison administrators to a country’s security comes from their 

having custody of the inmate population. The social dynamics among this 

population reveal power relationships and provide indicators of disorder and 

conflict.593 Prison personnel serve as the eyes and ears of intelligence analysts 

because of their daily contact with prisoners.594 Although a prison is the most 

powerful symbol of the state’s power to punish, at the same time it exists as 

proof that the state has failed to include all citizens in an integrated body 

politic. This fact makes it indispensable to consider prisons an integral part 

of a country’s security institutions. No better place exists to observe the social 

interactions that might inform the development of public policies suited to 

the control and reduction of criminal groups. 

The second reason for adding an intelligence component to the prison 

environment comes from its utility in administering the facility. Intelligence 

contributes to planning future actions, making changes in policies, and 
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anticipating events (such as riots and escape attempts) that might threaten 

security within the institution. Prison personnel require adequate training 

to keep a watchful eye on inmates. Informal arrangements between prison 

personnel and inmates can be a good source of information and can also 

help to maintain order in the facility. These arrangements can alleviate 

tensions, reduce imperfections in procedures, keep the most disruptive 

prisoners under control, and reinforce the status of leaders among the inmate 

population.595 Systematic collection, evaluation, and analysis of information 

makes intelligence well suited to the prison environment, where decisions by 

administrators have a direct effect on the security of prisoners and employees. 

Intelligence has value beyond the institution as well, in monitoring, 

identifying, and documenting information about gang members or criminal 

organizations and collaborating with external officials, whether police or 

other justice officials. 

Intelligence Legislation and the Opportunity to 

Build an Integrated Security System

A state’s monopoly on the use of force allows it to defend against external 

and internal threats, maintain public order, and provide justice for citizens. 

The effectiveness of each of these functions depends on the intelligence function. The judicial branch has the opportunity to exercise control over intelligence—deciding, for example, the appropriateness of particular means of 

information collection. Judicial branch organizations that administer prisons 

can also produce intelligence. It is erroneous to consider the judicial branch as 

an entity concerned only with the control and oversight of intelligence. Some 

countries have corrected that error through intelligence legislation.596 

Across the region, some intelligence laws are more complete than others. The 

more comprehensive laws include basic definitions and an indication of what 

institutions make up the intelligence system, their respective roles in the system, and a description of control and oversight mechanisms (see Table 3). In 

some other countries of the region, executive orders or decrees refer to an intelligence community but do not go beyond that nominal level of attention. 

In Argentina, article 13 of intelligence Law 25520 (2001) stipulates that the 

Intelligence Secretariat can “[r]equire all the organizations of the Executive 

Branch to share the information needed to carry out its functions.” This 
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provision promotes the exchange of information and intelligence between 

officials of the prison system and the national intelligence system of Argentina. 

Nearly a decade later, Argentina’s National Security Ministry was assigned “to 

deal with the production of intelligence and information that is [also] the 

business of armed forces and the police.”597 That is, this ministry itself has 

a role, together with the police whose work they coordinate, in carrying out 

intelligence activity. The internal security system thus coordinates all judicial 

branch activity, but the law fails to specify coordination with the prison 

system at the national or provincial level.

Chile’s Law 19974 (2004) establishing the National Intelligence Agency 

(ANI) also failed to mention the participation of the Gendarmeria (the organization charged with the administration of prisons) in the set of institutions that make up the national intelligence system. As in Argentina, the 

law addresses military, strategic, and criminal intelligence—the latter the responsibility of the forces of order and security; that is, the police. Additionally, the law declares that the ANI may require that the Gendarmeria share 

information related to ANI activities, and the Gendarmeria must comply 

with the request. Criminal intelligence, understood as “police intelligence,” 

“includes the processing of information related to the actions of individuals, 

groups, and organizations that in any manner affects or can affect public 

order and internal public security” (article 22 of Law 19974). These organizations or groups often continue operating from within prisons, and therefore 

the Gendarmeria can contribute continuously as a formal and direct part of 

the national security system, and not just when the ANI demands it. If the 

Gendarmeria were to carry out intelligence in an institutionalized fashion, it 

could make a substantive contribution to the national security system. This 

possibility is specifically mentioned in the 2004 law. 

The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), attached to the office of the 

president of the republic, is to “plan, carry out, coordinate, supervise, and 

control intelligence activities of the government” (article 3 of Law 9833 

[1999]). This law specifies that any federal governmental organization that 

directly or indirectly produces knowledge of interest to intelligence, and 

especially those entities responsible for external defense, internal security, 

and international relations, will be part of the national intelligence system 

(article 2). This approach leaves the membership door open to the Ministry 
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of Justice’s Department of National Prisons. In Decree 3695 (December 

2000), the Brazilian government created the Public Security Intelligence 

Subsystem, encompassing the Ministries of Justice, Treasury, Defense, and 

National Integration, together with the Institutional Security Cabinet of the 

president of the republic. The Intelligence Subsystem reports to the National 

Secretariat of Public Security of the Ministry of Justice. The executive 

organization for the subsystem is its Special Council, whose members are the 

national secretary of public security (presiding); one representative from the 

intelligence organization of the Federal Police and one from the Highway 

Police; two representatives from the Treasury Ministry; two from the Defense 

Ministry; one from the Institutional Security Cabinet of the President; one 

from Civil Defense; and one from ABIN. The Department of Prisons has no 

representative on the Special Council. 

Peru’s director general of intelligence in the Ministry of the Interior 

(DIGIMIN) coordinates and centralizes intelligence related to internal order, 

public security, organized crime, and new, transnational threats. Although 

Peru’s intelligence law (2005) does specify that political, economic, and social 

issues are the province of the non-military elements of the system, it labels 

neither the Ministry of Justice nor the National Prison Institute as parts of the 

national intelligence system. 

The 1996 Guatemalan Peace Accords restricted army intelligence to activities in the defense environment. A 2005 law made the director general of 

civilian intelligence (DIGICI) responsible to protect against organized crime 

and common crimes. DIGICI also protects the political, economic, social, 

industrial, commercial, technological, and strategic interests of the country; 

that is, its area of concern lies in internal environments, criminal intelligence 

among them. The DIGICI, together with the National Civilian Police and 

the director-general of prison centers, reports to the minister of government, 

an arrangement that would lead one to expect some level of coordination 

among these organizations. However, despite the DIGICI’s charge “to gather 

and centralize information coming from the organizations subordinate to the 

Ministry of Government,” coordination remains minimal because no document yet defines the roles and responsibilities of each of these organizations. 

Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa declared in 2009 that the National Intelligence System (SNI) will operate under a new National Intelligence Plan.598
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Ministerial Accord number 26 states that the Secretariat of Intelligence, as 

the lead organization of the national system, plans, guides, and coordinates 

intelligence collection, processing, and production. The SNI encompasses 

military intelligence for national defense, police intelligence for internal protection, and the president’s Internal Security Management Unit. The accord 

also notes that “other intelligence agencies that may be created or added in 

the future” will participate in the SNI, along with “other institutions and 

agencies that have or produce information of interest to the overall security 

of the state.” In brief, the decree ignores prison intelligence, although it leaves 

open the possibility that new agencies may emerge and become part of the 

SNI. For now, the SNI includes only military and police intelligence, with 

coordination accomplished by the Secretariat of Intelligence. 

Colombia’s statutory Law Number 1621 (2013) presents definitions, limits, 

purposes, functions, and principles that regulate intelligence and counterintelligence activity. The law posits an “intelligence community” with a civilian 

organization to coordinate its work. A Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) reviews issues related to the security and defense of the state. It also coordinates 

intelligence and counterintelligence and ensures cooperation among the different agencies that carry out those functions. Members of the JIC include 

the Ministry of National Defense, the chief adviser on national security, the 

national vice-minister for national defense, the chief of joint intelligence (representing the commanding general of the armed forces), the chiefs of intelligence of the army, navy, and air force, the director of police intelligence, the 

director of the Financial Information and Analysis Unit, and the “director of 

any other intelligence or counterintelligence organization brought into being 

by law to carry out these activities.” The 2013 law also specifies that public 

and private entities can cooperate with intelligence and counterintelligence 

organizations, and that if the information requested is legally protected from 

release, the intelligence organizations and private or public entities can create 

mutual agreements to accomplish the exchange of information. In short, even 

this detailed approach ignores the intelligence role of the Colombian prison 

system, although the rationale for its inclusion seems clear. 

Nicaragua has neither an intelligence law nor an intelligence system. The 

National Civilian Police and the National Prison System both report to 

the Ministry of Government, but no formal arrangements exist for these 
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institutions to engage in coordination. The National Civilian Police has 

an intelligence unit among its “national specializations.” This unit reports 

directly to the Defense Information Directorate. 

Costa Rica offers another example of a country without an intelligence law. 

Here, the law that regulates police forces (enacted in 1994) addresses intelligence incidentally by establishing the Directorate of Intelligence and National 

Security (DIS) as the national security information organization serving the 

president of the republic exclusively. However, the DIS does not appear in the 

organizational diagram of the police; instead a Department of Police Intelligence appears under the Operations Directorate of the police. Because Costa 

Rica does not have armed forces per se, the intelligence entities under the 

police umbrella are the only intelligence agencies in the country. The 1994 

law does not prescribe where or how intelligence can or should act, instead 

only stating that it is to “detect, investigate, analyze, and communicate to the 

President of the Republic or to the Minister of the President, information 

needed to prevent developments that may imply risks to the independence 

of the country or its territorial integrity, or put in danger the stability of the 

country and its institutions.”599 In the wake of a scandal over the use of sensitive information by DIS for extortion purposes in February 2011, the Costa 

Rican congress debated whether to revoke the authority of this directorate. 

In Honduras, Legislative Decree 211-2012 (2013), created the National Directorate for Research and Intelligence (DNIE) as an independent, nominally 

civilian organization responsible to the National Security and Defense Council. The decree established an intelligence system, but prison intelligence has 

not yet become a part of it. 

Bolivian political leaders see a need for an intelligence law. A proposed bill 

calls for greater centralization and control over intelligence activity through 

the creation of a Directorate of Intelligence for the Plurinational State 

(DIDEP). Beyond the intelligence work carried out by military and police 

authorities, DIDEP envisions bringing the capabilities of five executive 

branch entities together to create strategic intelligence: the Ministries of 

International Relations, Economy, Autonomy, Development Planning and 

the Fight Against Corruption. The legislation also seeks to address “internal 

control” of intelligence activities through the Plurinational Assembly, and 

to carry out external control through the Supreme Defense Council. Once 
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again, the proposed legislation makes no mention of potential information 

and intelligence collaboration between the Bolivian prison system and the 

DIDEP community. 600

In Uruguay, after numerous congressional debates about how to establish an 

institution for coordinating state intelligence, and after the executive branch 

itself proposed a bill in congress to establish an intelligence law,601 in November 2011 both chambers of Congress approved a special commission to write 

a national intelligence law.602

Uruguay and Costa Rica have ongoing legislative debate about institutional 

arrangements for the intelligence services. This development marks a positive 

response to intelligence-based scandals or at least improper use of intelligence 

information. Congressional debates about intelligence in a democracy constitute an opportunity to improve mechanisms for the coordination and control 

of intelligence activity. Even so, access to intelligence information typically 

remains “limited to those who directly control the system. The general public 

is excluded, along with academia, and often, even elected representatives of 

the people do not have access.”603 For this reason, but also because strategic 

intelligence often involves public policy formulation, intelligence can and 

should be discussed in public forums.604 This does not mean that intelligence 

information itself needs to be made public. Congressional and public debates 

instead address what institutions and what areas of national life appear suitable for intelligence activities, potentially including areas beyond the traditional military and police environments. 

Preconditions for the Emergence of Prison Intelligence

There are several reasons why it seems desirable to include national prison 

systems in the circle of organizations that carry out intelligence activities. In 

practice, though, few Latin American countries leave open—even indirectly—

the possibility of collaboration between prison intelligence and a national 

intelligence system. Countries where collaboration appears possible include 

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala. Although 

national laws increasingly address intelligence activity, the conceptual 

challenge of including prison system perspectives in intelligence systems 

remains unmet. Existing studies depict the unseemly nature of the prison 

environment in Latin America.605 Leaving aside any indecorous comments 
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about that environment, the present essay will now explore three deficiencies 

that impede the integration of the intelligence function into the prison 

environment, and the flow of information from that environment into the 

national intelligence system: 

a) Deficiencies in prison infrastructure: Inmate crowding exists alongside deteriorating physical facilities. “Prisoner 

stacking” breeds poor sanitary conditions, high levels of violence and too little spatial segregation of inmates according 

to the nature of their crimes. These conditions make security 

and control difficult for prison personnel. Further, the conditions facilitate the spread of criminal behavior, including 

the commission of crimes inside the facility. Intelligence collection becomes difficult but increasingly needed, given the 

overwhelming disorder that generates continuous tension. 

Riots, fires, hangings, and other violent acts can break out 

at any time. It is an environment where prison guards have 

to negotiate with prisoners to maintain some degree of order. Informal agreements spur disrespect, putting everyone’s 

security at risk. Even under such deplorable conditions, an 

information and intelligence mechanism can channel information to local decisionmakers so that prison managers can 

prevent the worst outcomes. 

b) Insufficient professional preparation: To maintain a 

dialog with counterparts in military, strategic, and police 

intelligence, prison officials need improved professional 

training and education. Often, their training is too brief—a 

matter of months; in other cases, prison officials are former 

police officers who, following a brief orientation to the 

prison environment, are placed on the job; in still other cases, 

personnel receive no training whatsoever. A truly professional 

preparation for prison personnel would familiarize them 

with principles of public security, criminology, intelligence, 

strategy, law, and public administration, among other 

subjects. Although the breadth of this preparation may seem 

excessive, it would increase the likelihood of an appropriate 
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integration of this specialty with the larger security system 

of the country.

c) Insufficient security controls: On top of the control problems that accompany prison crowding, a wholesale lack 

of appropriate technology makes it difficult to address the 

problem. Equipment to block mobile telephone signals, 

metal detectors, and drug detectors would bring a reduction 

of crimes committed from within the facility. They would 

also improve visitor monitoring.

It may be that Latin America has favored an over-centralized approach to 

prison administration. Too much centralization may impede a process of 

periodic, subregional or provincial experimentation that tests the value of 

applying intelligence in this environment. The Latin American approach appears quite different from that typical in the United States, where prison officials can choose not only to apply intelligence practices within their facility, 

but also to collaborate or exchange information with intelligence organizations across the country. The Regional Information Sharing System Program 

(RISS) and the Joint Intelligence Sharing Initiative between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of Prisons help prevent violence 

and safeguard public and institutional security.606

Institutional modernization can begin with a review and update of regulations, laws, and decrees surrounding the mission and functions of prison 

administration, with an eye to creating a security system that involves collaboration among a variety of institutions. Any new regulations should consider establishing professional schools for those whose responsibilities involve 

prison security and overall prison operation. 

Modernization should build a clear distinction between personnel responsible for prison security and those charged with the reinsertion of inmates 

into society. This approach would help ensure a better allocation of budgetary resources, since funds tend to flow toward the security function at the 

expense of social reinsertion programs. An intelligence unit or department 

would best be housed in the offices dedicated to security and control of each 

prison, to promote continuing collaboration with police and other judicial 

branch entities. 
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With a clear approach to prison management, improved physical facilities, 

an adequate level of security, and a more professional staff, one should expect greater integration of prison management with a national security system. National stakeholders would come to consider prison intelligence an 

indispensable addition to existing police capabilities. However, coordination 

needs proactive participants, as it occurs only sporadically and in response to 

specific requests from national police or military intelligence organizations. 

Further, prison system personnel need adequate professional preparation to 

earn the respect of national security system representatives. Otherwise, any 

coordination that does occur will not likely produce the desired results, and 

the incarceration system will not attain the important position it warrants in 

a modern, collaborative, security system. 

Conclusion

Returning to the questions posed in the introductory paragraphs, the essay 

showed that prison system institutions can create the strategic intelligence 

needed to position themselves, through information and intelligence sharing, as key participants in maintaining long-term security and an informed 

administration of justice. Intelligence operations carried out in the prison 

environment can detect new types of criminal activity and discover how they 

may be orchestrated. A strategic use of intelligence will allow for an improvement in the administration of prison facilities and will generate additional 

interaction with external institutions such as the police and the judicial system as a whole. 

In strategic terms, the integration of prison systems with other elements of 

a national security system through shared intelligence perspectives will bring 

a greater capability to achieve overall national security objectives. If one 

considers that a security strategy consists of aligning ends, ways, and means 

in collaborative fashion toward accomplishing a particular goal, then prison 

intelligence has value insofar as it provides the means to promote collaboration 

and bring more and better information to bear on the ultimate goal of public 

security. This strategic vision of prison intelligence will allow administrators 

to escape a more traditional outlook in two ways: prison administrators will 

no longer consider information from inside their facility as being relevant 

only to them, and other elements of the national security system (armed 
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forces, police, and the judicial system generally) will begin to see prisons as 

equal, valid, and legitimate counterparts in their daily work. 

Effective intelligence management can bring positive change to inhuman and 

hardly secure conditions in a country’s prison system. Meeting that goal depends on having personnel trained in the production of intelligence information, and having in place better prepared and well informed prison guards 

and administrators. For all this to come about, those in charge of managing 

a country’s prison system, as well as the managers of its security and defense 

systems, need to see prison security and national intelligence personnel as 

peer partners. They also need to develop common mechanisms for understanding each other by communicating through intelligence sharing, thereby 

improving overall risk management. 

From the overview of intelligence laws in this essay, one can see that the 

countries of Latin America (Central and South America) are far from bringing 

prison intelligence into the fold of national intelligence systems. Even the 

newer laws that reflect the modern face of intelligence have not moved in 

this direction. Instead, they preserve traditional military and police visions 

of intelligence, although they tend to leave open the possibility of accepting 

other organizations into national intelligence communities at a secondary 

level. In view of high levels of public insecurity and complex manifestations 

of organized crime, legal institutions require improvements in management 

and overall professionalism. Both tactical and strategic intelligence need 

attention. Information for short-term use in criminal investigation and 

intelligence operations needs to accompany assessments useful for longterm planning and for identifying systematic problems. The full range of 

intelligence capabilities will facilitate the management of security resources in 

prisons as well as in the world beyond prisons. 

Author’s Biography

Liza Zuniga Collado holds a master’s degree in political science, with emphasis in international relations, from the Pontificia Universidad Católica of Chile. 

Email: llzuniga@uc.cl.
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Intelligence Autonomy, Accountability, and 

Internal Security: Foundations for Oversight

Russell G. Swenson

and

Zulia Yanzadig Orozco Reynoso

“O would some Power the small gift give us to 

see ourselves as others see us!” 

–Robert Burns, “To a Louse,” verse 8.

The kinship felt everywhere among intelligence officers promotes international information sharing. However, the same clannish sentiment can contribute to an unprofessional worldview. Luckily, practitioners can develop 

greater professionalism by reflecting on their own societal role through the 

insights of astute observers from outside the intelligence fraternity. 

The Texas International Law Journal offers one outsider’s insights on intelligence sharing practices in a way that affirms the wisdom of Robert Burns’s 

poetic line.607 Any practitioner will recognize that direct exposure to a foreign culture allows one to see familiar turf from a fresh and newly appreciative perspective. Learning a foreign language builds an understanding and 

appreciation of the nuances of our own language. If professionalism means 

knowing enough about the institutional, social, and cultural environment 

in which one works to be aware of when one is promoting the society’s wellbeing and abiding by the principles embedded in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, then these truisms apply to the authors’ 

reading of Elizabeth Sepper’s law journal article. 

Sepper recognizes that extensive international intelligence-sharing networks 

can govern themselves, but they remain insufficiently accountable for their 

actions. She notes that intelligence sharing among nearly all the world’s 

intelligence services depends on personal, informal relationships rather than 

the formal authority of enduring, legal frameworks. This approach reduces 

the viability of internal accountability and external oversight as intelligence 

autonomy circumvents democratic safeguards established by domestic law 

and international treaties. Sepper explains how intelligence sharing within 
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the framework of international law might become more accountable to 

governments and international legal norms. 

The following review essay derives from the authors’ reflection on Sepper’s work 

and their own familiarity with the U.S. and Mexican intelligence systems. 

Environment of International Intelligence 

Information Sharing

Several factors have combined to propel the development of extensive bilateral relationships and occasionally multilateral networks dedicated to sharing 

information between intelligence services. Informal relationships for intelligence sharing exist even among ideologically disparate countries. The U.S. 

Central Intelligence Agency maintains over 400 information-sharing arrangements with foreign intelligence organizations (an average of more than two 

per country), and Britain has 120 such ties.608 The urgent needs of World 

War II promoted the phenomenon, with the Office of Strategic Services, precursor to the CIA, as ringleader. 

The post-Cold War intelligence environment brought other factors into play. 

Information technology allows illicit organizations to develop quickly, increases 

their ability to take action, and allows them to remain highly mobile. The licit 

world applies the same technology to gather clues about the location and nature 

of illicit activity.609 International intelligence sharing responds to the worldwide demand for those clues. The idea that national services are not equally 

effective in all spheres of the intelligence function creates another basis for the 

international exchange of intelligence information. Deficiencies in humansource intelligence (HUMINT), for example, undermine U.S. proficiency in 

technical intelligence collection capabilities.610 Such disparities encourage one 

country to share information from a potent intelligence collection discipline 

with another state whose data collection expertise lies in other areas. 

Where intelligence information exchange between two prospective partners 

does not stem from an historical relationship, useful data exchanges may depend on another rationale. The economic concept of “relational contracting” 

explains why neither side in a prospective trading relationship has sufficient 

incentive to renege on a contract or to deceive the other. In a hierarchical 

intelligence relationship, where a more powerful state exerts some oversight 
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over the intelligence activities of another state, relational contracting reduces 

the likelihood that shared information will be deliberately incorrect or inaccurate.611 The relationship between U.S. and Colombian intelligence services 

in counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations illustrates the principle. 

Within formal networks like NATO (for military intelligence) or the signal intelligence agencies of the English-speaking United Kingdom, United 

States, Canada, and Australia/New Zealand (UKUSA), intelligence sharing 

takes place under the auspices of specialized government agencies rather than 

under the eye of foreign-policy institutions like the U.S. Department of State 

or a foreign ministry. Independent decisions by intelligence officials to initiate or break off information sharing are not subject to public or democratic 

oversight. In the U.S. Intelligence Community, the president approves covert 

(deniable) intelligence actions and must report them promptly to the select 

committees on intelligence.612 Sepper worries that no similar requirement 

applies to other intelligence management decisions or activity.

Although it may be possible for governments to exert controlling pressure 

over their own civilian intelligence services through relational contracting, 

the general absence of an extraterritorial application of laws means that the 

international environment remains essentially lawless.613 On this stage, human rights can be violated with relative impunity, especially through secretive 

and deniable actions of intelligence organizations. 

The scrutiny applied to U.S. intelligence has brought to light a type of human 

rights violation in the international environment that may occur routinely. 

A long-time scholarly observer of the Intelligence Community notes that in 

his presence, reminiscing intelligence officials recalled occasions in unidentified countries where the Central Intelligence Agency had “recruited local police chiefs to jail local citizens on trumped-up local charges until the citizens 

would ‘sing’ to CIA officers about what mattered to the agency (but did not 

matter so much to the local police chiefs).”614 This example fits within the 

context of international intelligence collaboration and sharing, although it is 

not an example of information sharing. It does exemplify the unconstrained 

environment of international intelligence operations. 

Sepper’s concern that intelligence services bring unwanted notoriety to their 

respective states through ill-considered actions prompts her to suggest that 
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the legal establishment has a substantial stake as a societal arbiter of intelligence practices. 

The Legal Establishment as Arbiter of Professional

Practice in Intelligence

Legal scholars examine the nearly infinite variety of citizen interactions. They 

explore the rules governing those interactions and the relationship of existing 

laws to societal norms. Sepper explores the extranational behavior of public 

officials whose actions as employees of intelligence agencies seem beyond the 

reach of national legal systems. Whereas intelligence practitioners maintain 

that professional ethics can guide their actions even in the international environment, Sepper sees ethics as an insufficient substitute for laws—formal 

laws would better reflect the long-term interests of society. 

Sepper distrusts international intelligence and information-sharing relationships that rely on ethical decisions to achieve congruence with societal norms. 

A penchant for independence among intelligence practitioners coincides with 

a lack of transparency. The lack of transparency in turn stems from a chain 

of decisions that favors secrecy. The chain begins with special protection of 

shared information, a step taken at the insistence of the originating intelligence service. If shared information becomes widely or publicly known, it 

may be traced to the original sources. Recipients of shared information cannot be trusted if they allow collection methods or the identity of individual 

informants to be inferred. 

Special protection is afforded shared information to promote the level of trust 

needed for future exchanges. To be trusted by other intelligence services is 

the sine qua non underlying future exchanges of useful information. Sepper 

documents the reasons for her distrust of international information sharing by 

showing how intelligence services can capitalize on nondisclosure agreements 

to evade legal constraints protecting a country’s own citizens from being the 

target of communications intercepts. One example of the misuse of a partner’s 

trust is when U.S. intelligence services allegedly watched domestic Norwegian 

targets, whom the Norwegian police were prohibited from observing.615

A tendency for intelligence services to become less transparent as they 

extend their autonomy defies democratic expectations or norms. Even the 
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discovery of historical actions undertaken by a country’s intelligence services, 

made possible through formal declassification procedures, becomes more 

difficult if foreign information was involved.616 Sepper notes that a hesitancy 

by practitioners to expose intelligence sources and methods to discovery 

through the court system hinders the ability of public media to monitor 

government actions.617 Intelligence services have an incentive not to share 

information from abroad even with sister agencies in their own country. This 

practice increases the vulnerability of a country’s population to the actions 

of dangerous international groups. In the U.S., retrospective investigation 

into the information environment prior to the 9/11 attacks reveals several 

instances where such information was held too closely within the externally 

oriented agencies of the Intelligence Community, contributing to the success 

of the terrorist attacks.618

Legal scholars approach the application of societal norms to the international 

environment from the embryonic baseline of international law. International 

law has benefited from the creation of international conventions, to which 

most countries voluntarily adhere.619 However, a general lack of enforcement 

mechanisms tied to these conventions means that the threshold for 

accountability among government agencies remains unmet.620 This lack of 

enforceable accountability, except in cases where two states agree to international 

jurisdiction to resolve disputes, means that under international law, just as for 

intelligence agencies operating in the international environment, peer pressure 

is the chief recourse to signal appropriate behavior among peers. Supranational 

laws or agreements cannot yet enforce restraints on intelligence actions. 

Legal scholars like Sepper seek to bring intelligence agencies and their international sharing agreements and activities into the circle of behaviors 

sanctioned by societal norms. However, the continuing lack of enforceable 

accountability for even the existing international conventions argues for a 

different approach to restraining intelligence activities. The variety of nondemocratic behaviors exhibited in international intelligence-sharing practices 

calls for a serious exploration of alternative strategies to achieve democratic 

accountability and oversight of intelligence practices in internal as well as 

international environments. 
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Maintaining a Tradition of Decisionmaking 

Autonomy within Intelligence Services

Tennis players know the value of participants themselves making out-ofbounds calls in a non-refereed game. Even though the opponent makes the 

in or out call, both players recognize that the player closest to the location of 

the ball has the best opportunity to make the correct decision. Furthermore, 

each player recognizes a good reason not to cheat—building a reputation for 

personal integrity in the tight circle of good players. Similarly in the national 

intelligence services, with the credibility of a source or the validity of information on the line, the agent in the field or the all-source analyst managing a 

desk, and not the president’s national security adviser or a congressional oversight committee, becomes accountable for evaluating a decisive intelligence 

input. Additionally, for tennis players as well as intelligence practitioners, 

rarely are individual decisions made without the on-looking, interested eyes 

of at least a few spectators or colleagues. An ethical outlook toward professional accountability grows from awareness of and participation in collegial 

and conditional legitimization of one’s actions and decisions. The evolution 

of this awareness has contributed to the invention of a new, English-language, 

international journal on intelligence ethics.621

The recognition and observance of professional ethics support the continuation of substantial autonomy of decisionmaking in the intelligence services, 

to include the realm of international information-sharing practices singled 

out by Sepper as ripe for a more formal and broadly based accountability. 

By definition, intelligence services occupy and act in the niche between the 

information needs of a society’s political leaders and difficult-to-obtain, incomplete sources in both domestic and international territory. In this politically charged and uncertain information milieu, intelligence decisionmaking 

autonomy forms the backbone of independent, objective assessments that in 

turn support the independent operation of an agency.

The existing tradition of decisionmaking autonomy in intelligence services 

originated in the military environment. In relatively compartmented and hierarchical military organizations, intelligence is designed and expected to take 

the lead ahead of logistics, operations, and even planning, especially in preparing for strategic decisions. A camaraderie develops among practitioners of 
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military intelligence who share secrets denied even to their operational brethren. The clubbishness augments their autonomy, as they set themselves apart 

from the “unwashed” who are not privy to secrets, nor to the sources and 

methods that generate the secret knowledge. The exclusivity and separateness 

derived from military intelligence, as it contributes to a sense of exclusivity, 

extends to foreign liaison arrangements where national (largely civilian) agencies such as the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) operate with extensive 

professional autonomy.622

Sepper contends that a process of acculturation, rather than the threat of 

punitive sanctions, explains why intelligence agencies in developing countries 

tend to conform to the standards of behavior professed by leading international intelligence services. Various authors whose work she reviews explain 

that “shaming” and “shunning” among the members of a relatively small and 

cohesive group like the intelligence fraternity bring effective negative pressure. 

Positive incentives include “displays of public approval.”623 Sepper contends 

that the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, have acculturated their partners to relatively arbitrary standards of behavior.”624 The UK 

appears highly sensitive to foreign disapproval of the professional competency 

of their intelligence services, evidenced by the effort to prevent publication of 

a retired assistant director’s exposé of illegal and incompetent actions within 

the UK’s civilian, internally focused MI5.625

Politically powerful states like the U.S., through the actions and reputation of 

their intelligence agencies, can acculturate existing partners and aspiring partners (with or without financial and training incentives) toward the use of the 

polygraph to vet practitioners, toward the acceptance of “counterterrorism” 

as a catchall term for criminal and some ideologically oriented political activity, and finally, toward the favored development and employment of national 

security agencies (military intelligence as well as internationally oriented, civilian intelligence agencies) rather than domestic or even international police 

institutions.626 Thus, it is not external “control” exerted by judicial, legislative, or executive powers that brings intelligence decisionmaking into compliance with an international norm, but rather a social process of acculturation 

to the standards espoused by leading, powerful states.

One caveat to internal accountability among intelligence services needs to be 

acknowledged: Accountability among national security intelligence services 
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exists as a series of immediate decisions, and not as a long-term or necessarily 

consistent process. The achievement of greater consistency requires greater 

concern for long-term trends embodied in political ideas and ideals with 

worldwide reach. Foreign intelligence services tend not to represent the ideals 

of their respective countries because civilian agencies in particular are relatively 

new institutions, dating only to World War II, and in their current state, only 

to the end of the Cold War. The sense of immediacy that surrounds intelligence 

service accountability stems from a necessary focus on the actionable future 

rather than across the sweep of history, making them more or less isolated 

from the mainstream base of ethics and accountability where laws embodying 

the evolutionary zeitgeist of the society have been developed and applied 

based on popular will and political process. Therefore, out of concern that 

national security intelligence personnel and institutions be more thoroughly 

accountable and subject to legalistic oversight, this essay will now explore a 

universal and nationwide security institution with decisionmaking autonomy 

in information collection for intelligence purposes. This instititution also 

embodies the behavioral and attitudinal norms of a broad spectrum of its 

respective society. 

The Police Intelligence Model for Professional 

Accountability and Oversight

The ascendance of the “public security” concept to replace “national 

security,” the increasing popularity of community-based policing, and the 

advent of intelligence-led policing in various parts of the world all signal 

a greater integration of local with national interest in personal safety and 

civic responsibility.627 Michael Herman, a leading observer of international 

intelligence issues, asserts that “[w]hile only one state (or coalition of states) can 

win a war, trade contract, or border dispute, most states benefit from reduced 

drug trafficking or terrorism—it is not a zero-sum game.”628 Could the same 

insight apply to the scene inside one country? For this observation to hold 

true for any particular country alone, it must exhibit an equal application of 

measures to improve public security across the national territory. Otherwise, 

given the mobility of sophisticated criminal organizations, criminal activity 

endangering public security can erupt where it is not actively suppressed. As 

immortalized by the “Western” television and movie genre, bringing “law and 

order” to the frontier depended on local community demand for a dependable 
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sheriff, backed by regionally deployed federal marshals. This model makes 

community-based and intelligence-led police the new and essential “lawmen” 

on the information frontier where tensions between criminal activity and 

public security demand resolution. Organized criminal entities will also have 

discovered the synergy of intelligence-led planning and community-based 

recruitment in their own operations. 

Sepper alleges that if intelligence practitioners were to allow their practices to 

be scrutinized by the justice system in their respective countries, then “[a]rrest 

and prosecution of suspects, instead of detention and torture ... would check 

abuses and engender public support.” She further recommends “[t]reating 

terrorist violence as a criminal act—to be handled through legal systems in 

accordance with the law, democracy and human rights.”629 With the terrorism label, the U.S. intelligence system has acculturated itself and partners 

toward keeping domestic counterterrorism and worldwide actions against 

ideologically motivated behavior outside of the legal system where police, 

prosecutors, and judges operate.630 Intelligence officials fear the exposure of 

sources and methods during court proceedings. Sepper contends, however, 

that “courts are adept at finding creative solutions to protect information 

while allowing for an effective defense.”631 She adds that “[t]he involvement 

of courts has several distinct advantages. It advances Western intelligence’s 

interest in accuracy and the pursuit of truth, which facilitates the protection 

of democratic states, a task at the heart of these agency’s missions.”632

One result of the tendency to keep national security intelligence separate 

from police circles and legal systems is that police agencies have had to develop informal, international networks of information exchange that rely on 

the individual willingness and ability of government officials to share sensitive information without the benefit of formal approval by senior officials.633 

Because of its informal and off-the-record nature, this approach can result 

in continued underfunding of law enforcement activity compared to the resources lavished on national security/intelligence institutions that accept and 

act within the framework of “counterterrorism.” 

The counterterrorism approach to illicit or outlandish behavior gains public 

support when reviled, key figures are killed or captured. Additionally, comparative underfunding of law enforcement detracts from Sepper’s recommendation to employ intelligence-led police agencies and the criminal justice 
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system against all targets, whether ideologically motivated or not.634 Because 

Sepper’s approach would nonetheless support the twin aspects of accountability: 1) transparency and 2) being subject to negative or positive sanctions, a disconnect or contradiction (not merely tension) exists between too few resources 

being obligated to satisfy the society’s normative priority for public security 

through its legislative and judicial framework, and the abundance of resources 

available to the national intelligence services, which lack accountability. 

Figure 9. Mexican Navy Team

Source: Photo by Zulia Orozco.

As an exercise in reducing this discontinuity, a new law in the Mexican state 

of Nuevo Leon represents a rare subnational initiative that should assist the 

criminal justice effort against narcotrafficking groups who employ halcones 

(lookouts) to spy on police movements.635 The new state law for the first 

time establishes criminal penalties for those who serve as lookouts during 

operations staged by narco-traffickers in the state. This legal resource will 

back up any effort by police intelligence operatives to identify and question 
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at least those who engage in this form of local collaboration with criminal 

groups. The threat of imprisonment may encourage the identified lookouts 

to provide further information about criminal activity. At present, this initiative is limited to one state in Mexico, but if successfully implemented it could 

signal a turnaround in the tendency for new resources to be directly mainly 

to national-level public security forces.

At this juncture, one may ask whether intelligence-led police agencies observe 

internal accountability precepts in their decisionmaking. Because police institutions are thoroughly embedded in the justice system of a country, and 

because their collection of evidence must pass the threshold of open, oral, 

and adversarial court procedures, this route to information use does offer the 

transparency that defines an important aspect of accountability. To satisfy 

the second aspect of accountability, positive or negative sanctions must come 

into play. The U.S. cultural affinity for the use of the counterintelligence 

polygraph constitutes a negative sanction for the personnel of U.S. military 

and civilian intelligence agencies, and it is being passed on to intelligence 

partners. In Mexico, for example, polygraph has been employed as a “confidence test” administered even to veteran police employees.636 Its use may 

extend to ensuring that human rights are not violated by officers of the law in 

the course of collecting and using intelligence information. Intelligence-led 

policing can thus address both aspects of accountability. 
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Figure 10. Members of the Mexican “Zorros”—Special Police

Source: Photo by Zulia Orozco.

Community-oriented, paramilitary police agencies that employ disproportionate violence are subject to the criticism of adopting an aggressive militarystyle ethos. The militarization of police agencies has a potential counterpart 

on the national and international level: the policialization of the military. 

Policialization may be thought of as a tendency for the military to reduce the 

use of overt force. An example of this approach from an intelligence perspective comes from intelligence-led U.S. operations in Iraq and elsewhere.637 

In the words of one participant, operatives of the Joint Special Operations 

Command have begun to use less coercive interrogation methods to gain 

information from low-level detainees, who are then released if their information proves useful and accurate. 

If a central purpose among internally deployed military personnel is to exercise their intelligence capabilities by developing informants as they build 

community relationships, then the potential for the military to adopt a less 

forceful approach becomes feasible. A military led by intelligence to sharpen 

the blunt instrument of national security forces should not be an unexpected 

development, given the tradition of intelligence being the acknowledged lead 

element among the specialized military functions. This scenario could become a model for local police integration with national intelligence capabilities mediated by military or national, civilian institutions.638
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The Mexican Federal Police plays a preventive intelligence role across the 

country.639 It has all the necessary resources to develop its own investigations. Research undertaken by the authors reveals that the most advanced 

state police in Mexico (in the state of Queretaro) maintain database information that allows them to generate preventive intelligence. That information allows police organizations to compare crime data and take proactive 

steps; however, most state institutions responsible for public safety (such as 

the states of Yucatan or Zacatecas) have deficiencies of trained staff, and the 

agents fear exercising their institutional role because the Mexican government 

cannot ensure their long-term security against organized crime.640

Recent developments in Mexico offer a case study of how local police information gathering has been usurped by military forces. In several localities in Mexico, military forces have uprooted local police establishments. An 

interview by one of the authors with a local police official who worked in a 

municipality where the military has taken control of security, reveals some of 

the dynamics accompanying the contest between local and national security 

and intelligence institutions. The police official said that despite their having the technological equipment necessary to inform the federal government 

of criminal activity through the Plataforma Mexico (the principal database 

on organized crime), administrative authorities of the municipality expressly 

forbade adding comments or uploading information about serious situations 

such as shootings or kidnappings to the platform. The rationale for this approach was based on fear.

According to the interview subject, police administrative authorities feared 

two scenarios, the first of which became a fact:

1. Fear that the federal government would send more troops

 to the area, and / or

2. Fear that the federal government would not send financial 

 resources for public security programs such as the Public

 Security Assistance Fund (FASP) and Subsidies for Public 

 Security in Municipalities (Subsemun).

However, after personal reflection on the potential consequences and 

administrative reprimands that could result from such negligent actions, 
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the administrative staff changed their mind and decided to allow entering 

information about all situations into the database. The interview subject 

confirmed that given the violent situation, military personnel took complete 

control of local police facilities in 2011. According to the agent, police officers 

were relieved of duty without argument, and are now in line to be trained 

under a certification program, even as the military remained responsible for 

the safety of the location.

From a citizen’s perspective, public safety in Mexico has deteriorated. In reality, this is a matter of perception, as the data show a variable picture. According to the Citizen’s Institute for the Study of Insecurity, public trust in the 

police force, compared to trust of the army, is relatively low.641 Survey results 

speak of distrust and even a broken police/community relationship, evidently 

because of the opacity, corruption, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness of police 

work that includes the hazardous specialty of police intelligence.

Figure 11. Mexican Federal Police Team 

Source: Photo by Zulia Orozco.
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A condition for police intelligence to succeed as part of an authentic, community-oriented security agency, assuming the existence of budgetary parity 

with national security institutions, will be the society’s evolution toward independent, adversarial courts and successful prosecutions. The best intelligence 

information comes from participants who inform government authorities of 

future criminal actions; therefore, developing witness-protection-style programs for whole families would show prospective informers that informing 

is not a death sentence. Especially in a society where extended families can 

be targeted for reprisal, protecting the identity of undercover informants is 

central to the prosecution process. In the absence of human intelligence assets 

being able to penetrate the closed circles of native criminals,642 the best available alternative is “technical intelligence”—the proved capability of communications interception to provide relatively unimpeachable court evidence. 

The product of technical intelligence does not reveal the identity of the collector, even if some details that lead to effective collection by this means were 

to be provided by “insider” informants. Those individuals can remain unknown and unidentified in court. A likely scenario would be for an informant 

to emerge in the aggrieved locality, and for the technology for collecting and 

processing communications intelligence to be a state or national resource. In 

this scenario, the ethos of the community and the resources funded by representative government come together to distill the individual and collective 

preferences of the citizenry, thereby bringing to life the ethical ideal of having 

intelligence activity tied to the society’s values. 

Discovering a Preferred Model for Democratically 

Flavored Accountability and Oversight for Intelligence

As spelled out by legal scholar Elizabeth Sepper, the outsized autonomy 

of international intelligence-sharing practices calls for redress to protect 

democratic ideals. The present authors’ review of her work from a government 

intelligence perspective moves from an examination of the validity of her 

argument that the legal system can wisely arbitrate a reduction in the autonomy 

of intelligence services, to an evaluation of alternative approaches to achieving a 

suitable level of intelligence oversight and accountability. Intelligence oversight 

exists within a legal framework designed and implemented by legislative 

and judicial branches in a functioning democracy. Accountability involves 

openness on the part of professional intelligence agencies to inspections of 
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their practices and the application of negative and positive sanctions to their 

work, notably including the application of budgetary priorities. 

The desire by legal scholars to arbitrate the conduct of intelligence activity, 

at least on the international level, does not match the need to bring 

accountability to intelligence practices. This is chiefly because no dependable 

mechanism yet exists for exerting sanctions against international intelligence 

sharing practices. Intelligence-led police agencies can achieve authentic 

accountability, and because they are embedded in the judicial system, they 

have a natural orientation to the rigors of legally oriented oversight. 

A different version of this essay appeared on the Web site of the Institute for Security and Democracy (Insyde), a Mexican security studies center, at http://www.

insyde.org.mx/shownews.asp?newsid=708. 

Authors’ Biographies

Russell G. Swenson served from 1988 as professor, and from 1995 through 

2008 as director of applied research at the National Defense Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence University). He also directed the NDIC 

Press from its inception in 2006. He has authored or edited numerous publications on intelligence process (http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/press.html). In 

earlier years, he worked as intelligence analyst and linguist in the U.S. Air 

Force and as associate professor of geography at Western Illinois University. 

He holds undergraduate degrees from the University of Kansas (geography, 

Spanish, Latin America area studies) and from the University of WisconsinMilwaukee (master’s and doctorate in geography). He was awarded the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement, and in retirement he continues to 

collaborate with officials and researchers in the field of strategic intelligence. 

Email: drintel2@yahoo.com.

Zulia Yanzadig Orozco Reynoso holds degrees in law and sociology from the 

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). She has worked with 

the Mexico City-based Institute for Security and Democracy (INSYDE) on 

several projects, among them civil monitoring of police and security Forces 

in Guerrero state, the role of an independent police auditor, and the creation 

of an index of transparency and police accountability. In the latter project 

she collaborated with representatives of the 32 state police organizations of 
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Mexico. Zulia is currently a United Nations consultant on citizen security in 

Latin America and a doctoral student at UNAM. Email: zulia.orozco.pnud@

gmail.com. 

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Section Four

Managing Intelligence Integration: 

A Challenge for Intelligence Services 

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Intelligence Education and Integration:

 A Symbiotic Relationship

Anne Daugherty Miles

Intelligence agencies face the continuous challenge of integrating their efforts 

to become a more capable community. For example, a real or perceived “wall” 

inhibits the exchange of information and assessments between the world of 

police intelligence and national security intelligence. Additionally, functional 

and geographic separation can lead to or exacerbate differences in organizational culture and/or technology that impede the desire to collaborate. Sometimes these obstacles can be partly overcome with legislation. In the 1980s, 

for example, the U.S. Congress addressed the critical need to integrate service-specific cultures by passing legislation known as the “Goldwater-Nichols 

Act,”643 which mandated and rewarded “jointness” and required “joint professional military education.” The clear link between education and jointness transformed and integrated the existing system of professional military 

education. 

Jose Paz’s essay, “The Education of a Strategic Intelligence Professional: Fulfilling National Expectations,” focuses specifically on the link between education, integration and innovation. He suggests that a joint or holistic approach 

to intelligence education brings about the integration and innovative thinking needed to address pressing problems such as cybersecurity. Paz argues for 

intelligence education that provides “deep knowledge” and is career long. In 

addition, he believes that academic freedom must exist “along with room 

for creativity, interaction and energetic inquiry.” In short, he sees education 

as the vehicle for learning to think critically, to question assumptions, and 

to hone skills of abstraction and analysis. The educational requirements and 

opportunities he envisions could help to increase public trust as intelligence 

practitioners become more widely perceived as intelligence professionals.

Increasingly, the problems threatening citizen and national security in our respective nations need the collaboration of many disparate players in holistic, 

thoughtful, strategic, short-term and long-term analysis. What better place is 

there to hone such skills and develop a network of life-long friendships than 

intelligence graduate institutions—especially if they bring together players 

from not only the defense, intelligence, and law enforcement communities, 
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but also from academia and business? Paz’s essay suggests that these institutions offer a perfect place for parallel public and private universes to intersect. 

Although many intelligence education institutions opt for classrooms closed 

to those without badges, Paz argues for openness. “Although secrecy is appropriate when and where prescribed by law, it cannot extend to the academic 

world.” He would save secrecy for the training environment, and use openness in education venues to shine a light on the big problems of the day—

arguing that those problems need the collective wisdom of a nation’s best and 

brightest: “Secrecy is neither necessary nor appropriate for academic success, 

especially in view of the idea that today most intelligence is developed from 

open sources....”

As Swenson’s introductory essay to this book suggests, we have come to depend 

on accurate and timely intelligence for “public security, civilian and military 

planning, and even economic well-being.” So pervasive is the requirement, 

and so great is the threat, that the need for true integration of all sources of 

“intelligence”—public and private—appears immediate and imperative. That 

message pervades Robin Rogers’s essay on cyberspace security, the second essay 

in this section. In his essay, “Managing Intelligence Information for Multinational Cybersecurity—Approaches by the United States and Brazil,” Rogers 

brilliantly encapsulates the need for an integration of cyber incident information across all levels of government and all levels of public and private domains. 

He reminds us that cyberattacks happen daily, integration is necessary, and 

“the essential ingredient of this coordination is sharing information–whether 

proprietary information, law enforcement information, or intelligence information.” Cybercrime acts as an “intermestic”644 issue, presenting both a domestic and international security challenge, therefore involving many players 

in government security. 

The Rogers essay builds on essays in the first three sections of this book that 

point out many roadblocks to sharing information. He reminds us that obstacles include uncertainty over what to share, institutional “territorialism,” 

issues of trust, and concerns about potential abuse of civil liberties and human rights.645 Other obstacles to information sharing are more a result of 

institutional separation—both geographic and functional. Rogers adds the 

observation that “these obstacles are compounded when countries need to 

share intelligence information with each other.” 
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The other two essays in this section provide practical advice about how to 

overcome obstacles to information integration between countries—to include 

the knotty problem posed by Rogers. The Paz essay offers an education-based 

solution while Brei et al. suggest a team construct. Both solutions depend on 

achieving some measure of collaborative interaction, together with integrated 

and innovative thinking. 

Harnessing Security Sector Intellectual Capital: Transforming Advisor Situational 

Awareness into Sociopolitical Understanding in a Smart Power Environment, by 

Brei, Frensley and Roberts (three veterans of the International Security Assistance Force campaign in Afghanistan) demonstrates how an advisory mission to promote the development of national-level governmental institutions 

requires an innovative information development and handling philosophy 

to deal effectively with host-nation counterparts. They explain how the team 

construct they created overcame the limiting legal and organizational strictures normally associated with formal intelligence operations. Their ability 

to transform the outlook of the advisor corps from “situational awareness” 

to an Afghan-centered social-political understanding depended on blending 

the depth and breadth of pertinent information from both U.S. and Afghan 

Ministries of Government. They would agree with Paz’s desire for openness 

and they write about the ways in which they encouraged and maintained 

relationships built on trust. They believe that the team construct they created 

“captures the insights generated by its different components at the operating 

level and forges those insights into shared corporate knowledge across the 

organization.”

Brei et al. argue that “all security sector advising missions are smart power 

initiatives.” By that they mean that the advisory mission they supported was 

a “soft power” piece of a larger “smart power” strategy that included elements 

of both “hard power” (associated with military and economic “sticks”) and 

“soft power” (diplomatic and humanitarian “carrots”). Investing resources in 

alliances, partnerships and institutions provides a critical ingredient for “soft 

power” as defined by Joseph Nye and others. Their essay illustrates the direct 

relationship between the adoption of teaming concepts and the success of soft 

power initiatives. 

Read together, these three essays illustrate the intelligence value of education 

and integration. Rogers sees both as necessary ingredients to solving big 
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problems such as cyberspace security. Paz believes integration encourages 

innovation, which in turn benefits from community-wide educational 

institutions. And finally, Brei et al. describe an integration process in which 

the act of integrating intelligence educates not only its consumers but also its 

producers. Brei et al. even suggest that a major goal of intelligence integration 

should be the creation of “intellectual capital”—knowledge forged from the 

“raw intellectual material generated by individuals.”

Lt Colonel (USAF, Retired) Anne Daugherty Miles holds a Ph.D. in American Government from Georgetown University and began service on the National Intelligence University faculty in 1995. Her specialties include resource 

management and the policymaking process, both taught within the framework of U.S. domestic and international politics. In 2009, Miles served as a 

congressional fellow on the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, and in 

2010, as a legislative assistant to a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Her award-winning essay, “Professional Intelligence Education,” is 

available on the International Association for Intelligence Education website. 

Dr. Miles joined the Congressional Research Service in 2014. Email: amiles@

crs.loc.gov. 
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The Education of a Strategic Intelligence Professional:

Fulfilling National Expectations

Jose Gabriel Paz

“Dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet; sapere aude, incipe.” 

(He who has begun is half done. Dare to be wise; begin!)

—Horacio, “Epistularum liber primus” Epistle II

Introduction

The most significant human endeavor is the transmission of knowledge. The 

validity of this observation rests on the idea that the human species cannot 

transmit enough information genetically to provide for the social development of individuals.646 Thus, education has become indispensable to the existence and subsistence of humankind. 

Education begins in the familial environment and continues in the larger 

social context. It starts in the preschool years, and continues beyond “graduation,” encompassing retraining, certification, and self-education. This variety 

of educational venues allows the individual to improve quality of life and 

workplace capabilities through continuous study.647

This lifelong aspect of education takes on considerable importance in the 

professional development of individuals engaged in knowledge work, where 

certain societal and institutional functions require substantive expertise. Education gains importance as a phenomenon when it involves the preparation of 

individuals for key national functions like strategic intelligence, where complex and specialized work must be done. 

This essay aims to identify some of the factors that help ensure the high-quality formal education of intelligence professionals. It also offers some practical 

advice about how the value of that education may be measured. 

Institutional Responsibility for the Education of 

Professional Intelligence Personnel

The professionalization of a strategic intelligence organization requires clear 

mission objectives and an institutional culture rooted in principles and 
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values. The achievement of these ideals depends on the availability of stable 

and specialized bureaucrats, products of a rigorous recruitment and selection 

process. A candidate for employment must have a university-level education 

and a technically adequate resumé. Of equal importance, the candidate must 

see the possibility of career advancement corresponding to his or her abilities, 

supported by the employer’s objective evaluation of the employee’s merits. 

No longer the automatic product of an empirical or practical on-the-job 

learning process, professionalization grows from the ability to make knowledgeable judgments about rapidly changing circumstances. Thus, individual 

intelligence professionals require both technical expertise and familiarity with 

the highest level of postgraduate social analysis—in brief, deep knowledge. 

An intelligence organization cannot avoid the requirement to undertake continuous institutional improvement and to search for high-quality prospective 

employees. Those candidates need to be educated in reputable institutions 

that refine native abilities and develop needed skills, and that instill in the individual values and habits respectful of laws and of human rights. In addition, 

prospective employees require an ethical conscience and skill in critical thinking, together with loyalty, a love of country, and of the profession itself. 

Intelligence organizations of every country should ensure that their professional employees maintain high academic standards in their official work. 

Other appropriate goals: that ongoing professional teaching and learning take 

place within the context of the organization; that it take place in an institution of higher education (either using the organization’s own educational 

resources of those of other educational institutions); that professional studies 

be carried out at the postgraduate level; and that arrangements be made for 

retraining or recertification through a program of continuing education. 

For education to be offered at the level required, academic freedom must be 

combined with room for creativity, interaction, and energetic inquiry. It may 

appear that these traits conflict with the secrecy demanded in the professional 

context. Although secrecy is appropriate when and where prescribed by law, 

it cannot extend to the academic world. “Secrecy is neither necessary nor appropriate for academic success, especially in view of the idea that today most 

intelligence is developed from open sources available to everyone. Only a tiny 
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proportion of intelligence activity involves information obtained through 

special means.”648

The concept of open education should prevail insofar as it refers to a curriculum offering a variety of topics appropriate to formal intelligence education. 

Open education may also refer to participation in intelligence education by 

those with a wide range of professional responsibilities in a given country.649

Openness in education holds value because

publicly funded intelligence schools can no longer restrict 

themselves only to the professional preparation of their own 

intelligence analysts and agents or counterintelligence managers, but need to broaden their horizons by accepting and 

educating other public servants about the processes and culture of intelligence. Among them should be members of congress who serve on intelligence committees and, especially, 

their legal and technical advisors. Often, legal education and 

knowledge of congressional lawmaking procedures, or experience in congressional oversight, should be complemented 

by knowledge of intelligence and national security. The 

same approach should be taken with respect to judges and 

other officials of the judicial branch of government, especially those who authorize special operations in intelligence. 

Additionally, intelligence education should be extended to 

various other administration of justice officials.650

Educational Needs of Intelligence Personnel

Strategic intelligence analysts are responsible for the knowledgeable handling 

of a surpassing variety of topics and situations. These can include national 

and international politics, political and economic rivalries among states, 

education issues, strategy, technological advances, environmental problems, 

crimes, energy questions, scientific and space research, operations research, 

conflicts anywhere, hazardous substance handling, threats to national 

security, transportation issues, critical infrastructure protection, agricultural 

production security and more. Concepts now in technological development 

that will soon be used to obtain, store, and process the key information 
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required for decisions at the highest level also demand the attention of a 

strategic intelligence analyst. Analysts thus need to be superbly qualified in 

an academic sense. 

A strategic intelligence system exists “only to serve its client or consumer, 

normally a president or cabinet ministers—and always a small group.”651 

Therefore, an analyst’s work is exceptional by virtue of providing indispensable knowledge for the decisionmaker’s basic understanding, for adjusting 

strategy, for the adoption of measures to intervene in or influence objective 

realities, and for the development of information or disinformation operations for security and national defense.652

In practice, the intelligence analyst should 

observe the background of events, carefully review the great 

issues facing a country and the world, bring into play any 

historical phenomena that remain in play, discover trends, 

define new approaches to unanswered questions, pull aside 

the veil of deceit that accompanies simplistic answers, and 

outline possible futures.653 

Technological instruments do not produce either knowledge or intelligence. 

Information can be gathered and manipulated with technological assistance, 

but knowledge creation depends on an inevitably human process.654 In 

addition, no technological tool yet exists for the effective management of 

knowledge: Existing tools can only be understood and used in the frame 

of reference dictated by technical methods for knowledge management.655

Therefore, the great value of analysts rests on their intellectual capabilities, 

their accumulated tacit knowledge, and their ability to manipulate helpful 

technical tools.656

In sum, only an appropriate education at the highest level and the development of technical skills allow a professional to apply scientific research 

methods, engage expertly in rigorous analytic thinking, and bring depth to 

knowledge. Additionally, the educated professional will know how to manage collection tools that will allow him or her to understand and disentangle 

hidden aspects of reality. 
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Higher Education and Educational Excellence

Selective, systematic postgraduate work prepares personnel in scientific, 

technological, and humanistic fields, building the type of “transcendental” 

knowledge needed by intelligence professionals. Higher education in South 

America meets the need for specialization or professional preparation by offering three categories of academic degree: a specialization (a graduate degree), 

the master’s, and the doctorate.657 Happily, the requirements associated with 

these degrees are relatively uniform across the Americas.658 An additional 

specialized degree common in the region is the Diplomado. A candidate with 

credentials at that particular level of study can be evaluated on the basis of 

the prestige of the institution attended, the academic quality of its program 

of study, and the associated requirements. 

The administration of academic degrees requires that one have knowledge 

of educational processes, direct experience in university teaching, experience 

in guiding a particular educational program, and knowledge of institutional 

management. Of course, an administrator must also hold academic degrees 

in a recognized discipline. It is also desirable that the administrator of an 

institution where intelligence professionals are prepared be familiar with the 

particular needs, professional profiles, and all elements, even of a technical 

nature, suitable for the education of a professional in the field. Additionally, 

all academic officials, to include administrators and faculty, as well as technical personnel, should have expertise in the field of intelligence. 

The education of intelligence professionals must be guided by faculty with 

advanced academic degrees. The faculty also needs to be permanent and stable, so that classroom instruction and academic advice is not in the hands of 

“panelists” or “guest lecturers.” The curriculum also needs to be systematic, 

and not a series of courses and seminars with no clear pedagogic and cognitive connection among them. Such inconsistencies reveal a lack of curriculum 

planning and a dependence on “volunteerism” characteristic of a bureaucracy 

unfamiliar with educational administration. 

In many countries, the institutions that take on the education of intelligence 

professionals do not adhere to the standards for formal education prevalent 

in their own society. They are often not accredited, and do not offer academic 
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degrees that are recognized by their respective national educational systems. 

An educational institution that lacks mechanisms for academic control and 

evaluation is deficient in terms of the quality of teaching and learning. This 

condition also reduces the institution’s ability to improve the intelligence system’s articulation and integration with the real needs of the state.

When poor bureaucratic or corporative decisions impede the development 

of a “culture of institutional evaluation,” an educational entity suffers selfperpetuating poor practices and educational staleness. The lack of an external 

review of the institution’s purposes, efficacy, efficiency, and capabilities further degrades the quality of its services. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, 

a state’s financial support system typically continues to operate automatically 

from year to year, maintaining subsidies for the traditional lineup of educational services, without linking the state’s annual financial commitment to 

the quality, productivity, and actual results of the educational activity.659

Intelligence Education Structures across the Region

It might appear that the ideas expressed here about academic quality are 

difficult to put in practice, but several alternative paths exist to achieving 

educational excellence in the formation of professionals suited to the task 

of intelligence. In fact, some countries do make use of traditional highereducation institutions as the best alternative for the professionalization of 

government personnel.660

Countries of the region accomplish professional education in intelligence in 

one or more of these three modes: 1) the intelligence organization carries out 

its professional education using its own, autonomous academic structure; 2) 

the intelligence organization has its own academic institution, but some educational management takes place in external academic institutions; and 3) the 

intelligence organization places the entire educational process in the hands of 

an external academic institution. In this last case, the external institution can 

be either a university or an educational institution managed by the armed 

forces. 

The different approaches to professional education chosen by intelligence 

organizations from across the entire region are described below. Important 

differences exist in the institutional structures used, the academic level 
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employed, and the educational quality applied. By examining the table 

presented as Annex 1, the reader can more readily compare the main 

differences among countries and between military and civilian entities in 

terms of whether the schools are accredited, offer postgraduate education, 

and feature open access to civilians or foreign military students. 

a. ARGENTINA

The Argentine Secretary of Intelligence operates the National Intelligence 

School (ENI). The ENI takes a mixed approach to intelligence education, as 

it uses an agreement with the Universidad de la Plata to offer a joint master’s 

in strategic intelligence for the 21st century. The school operates within the 

Argentine higher-education system and it offers a general education combined with specific interdisciplinary methods useful for private or public intelligence work. The school accepts anyone interested, whether they are part 

of the intelligence community or not. The agreement between ENI and the 

Universidad de la Plata was suspended in 2013.

The National Intelligence Law of 2001 (Law 25520) spurred the growth of 

the country’s intelligence education structure as a part of the national education system. Article 29 specifies that the ENI’s academic offerings be subject 

to validation by the Ministry of Education, in accordance with the laws and 

regulations in effect. Additionally, article 30 encouraged ENI to collaborate 

with universities and think tanks. 

The Instituto de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas, a joint services institution 

under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also offers an accredited degree—a specialization in strategic intelligence analysis. This school accepts civilians as well as 

military applicants. 

b. BOLIVIA 

Bolivia’s National Intelligence Office (DIE) serves as a strategic intelligence 

agency. It is primarily staffed by military personnel, but does have some civilian participants. The DIE does not have its own educational institution, but 

the Army Intelligence School provides education for most personnel. 

The Army’s “General Joaquín Zenteno Anaya” Intelligence School offers 

Diplomados in strategic intelligence and strategic information. This school 
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educates military, police, and civilian personnel with a focus on future-oriented 

data analysis methods. Any Bolivian with an obligation to use information or 

strategic intelligence to advise the decisionmaking process in public or private 

organizations and institutions may attend the school.

The Army’s “Marshal Andrés de Santa Cruz” General Staff and Command 

School offers a master’s in strategic intelligence, oriented to civilian as well 

as military personnel. It aims to improve a student’s ability to analyze and 

produce strategic intelligence through the application of an integrated vision 

of national security and defense. 

c. BRAZIL

The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) has its own educational element, 

the Escola de Inteligência (ESINT)—successor to the Escola Nacional 

de Informações (EsNI). ESINT bears responsibility for the professional 

preparation of civilian and military, federal and state public servants whose 

organizations are bound together in the Brazilian Intelligence System 

(SISBIN). ESINT offers specific training programs, courses, and seminars to 

meet SISBIN needs. 

The Senior War College offers an advanced intelligence course (CSIE), oriented toward the preparation of civilians and senior officials of the armed 

forces. This course allows civilian officials affiliated with federal SISBIN agencies to carry out strategic intelligence functions. 

d. CHILE 

Chile does not have an educational institution within its National Intelligence Agency (ANI). ANI personnel obtain specialized professional education through universities and armed forces educational institutions.

Since the end of the 1990s, several intelligence educational programs have 

emerged in Chile. Some have been discontinued and others have been absorbed into other disciplinary programs related to defense and security. Until 

2009, the University of Chile offered a Diplomado in analytical methods for 

strategic intelligence under the auspices of its Department of Political Science 

and Public Affairs Institute. It had the objective of enabling professionals 

to contribute to decisionmaking processes in public and private institutions 
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through the production of strategic intelligence. The program focused on 

educating professionals, undergraduates in their last year of study, and military and police personnel responsible for analysis or intelligence. 

The Army War College (ACAGUE) also developed a master’s in military science with a three-part specialization in strategic intelligence. The first part 

coincided with the military science program. The second took place in the 

University of Chile, under its Diplomado in strategic intelligence. When these 

first two parts were completed, a mentoring program guided students in writing a thesis. 

With the University of Chile’s (and ACAGUE’s) intelligence studies program 

in hiatus, the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE)—

a senior educational institution under the Ministry of National Defense—

offers a Diplomado titled “The Intelligence Function in the Contemporary 

State,” with the objective of promoting a national intelligence culture and 

demonstrating the importance of intelligence to the entire society. 

Chilean intelligence education, whether in official government institutions 

or in universities, has professionalized the field, and has attracted the interest 

of Chile’s academic community, setting the intellectual stage for expansive 

intelligence studies. 

e. COLOMBIA

The Intelligence and Public Security Academy of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) for many years offered specialized professional intelligence education. However, the Special Report of the DAS Commission in 

2006 questioned its curriculum, the quality of its faculty, and the lack of an 

external review process.661 At the end of 2011, a new National Intelligence 

Agency replaced DAS, and the academy was left in limbo. 

The Colombian Army operates the “Brigadier General Ricardo Charry Solano” School of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (ESICI). It is a universitylike institution that in 2002 gained accreditation by the National Ministry of 

Education. It has maintained its accreditation through self-evaluation and external review. It engages in intelligence education, professional development, 

and specialized training of armed forces personnel, civilians, and national and 
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international agencies. The ESICI offers a master’s in strategic intelligence and 

forecasting (futurology), as well as various specializations and Diplomados, and 

it has plans to develop other master’s degrees and even a doctorate.662

The Nueva Granada Military University also offers a Diplomado in strategic 

intelligence. It seeks to educate public and private officials, members of the 

armed forces, officials of the National Police (active and retired), employees 

of various security agencies, university students, academicians, and anyone 

interested in the study and analysis of strategic issues. 

f. ECUADOR

In 2009, with the adoption of Public Security Law 1768, Ecuador replaced earlier 

intelligence institutions with the National Intelligence Secretariat (SENAIN), 

which reports directly to the president. As the lead element of the National 

Intelligence System, SENAIN prevents or neutralizes risks and threats to the 

state by producing and conveying political-strategic intelligence to national 

policymakers. Although SENAIN plans to establish a new intelligence school 

for the professional education of its personnel, most personnel obtain their 

orientation to intelligence through military intelligence training centers. 

g. GUATEMALA

National Security Law 18-2008 establishes Guatemala’s rules for coordinating the activities of internal and external security and intelligence institutions. The law also created the National Security Council, which oversees the 

National Institute of Strategic Studies in Security (INEES). This institute is 

responsible for coordinating and supervising the professional education and 

creation of expertise among public servants who attend the different governmental institutions that specialize in security training and education. The 

institute is charged with certifiying the professional quality of government 

personnel and equality of opportunity in government employment and career 

progression. It also oversees the establishment of a professional career system 

for all the organizations that make up the National Security System.

Government Accord 413-2008 regulates the State Intelligence Secretariat 

(SIE). Its article 46 created the Office of Professional Development and 

Scholarships, an administrative bureau charged with the education and 
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development of the professional, technical, and administrative cadre of the 

SIE. The same office is also responsible for developing the strategic plan for 

the professional development of SIE personnel. The National Institute of 

Strategic Studies in Security participates directly in the training and education 

of intelligence personnel.

h. MEXICO

Early in the 1980s, the Defense College (CD) and the Navy Advanced Studies Center (CESN) began teaching intelligence at the strategic defense level. 

From its start in 1989, the largely civilian National Center for Research and 

Security (CISEN) initiated the education and professional development of 

intelligence personnel through a course in national defense and a program in 

strategic studies. CISEN added numerous diplomados, courses, workshops, 

and seminars (which in many cases had nothing to do with intelligence).663

Students were from CISEN and other national security organizations.

When the broad academic offerings proved inadequate to meet the CISEN’s 

own needs, the organization began to consider the creation of a new educational structure. 

Researchers and analysts require a specialized education in 

intelligence and counterintelligence and in Mexico no school 

offers that type of curriculum; even the topic of security is 

practically unknown in the universities of the country. The 

culture of national security is in in infancy in Mexico. This 

means that the Center has to be self-sufficient in educating 

its personnel.664

On 16 April 2009, Mexico’s official newspaper published the “Accord by 

which the Intelligence School for National Security (ESISEN) is established.” 

The accord defined ESISEN as an educational institution with an academic 

specialty in civilian intelligence for national security. It also declared that 

ESISEN’s educational plans and programs would be subject to approval by 

the secretary of education. 

Even though ESISEN initially accepted as students only government employees who work for intelligence or other national security organizations, it 
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is expected that at some time the academic program will be available to the 

general public. ESISEN seeks to promote research, reflection, and a culture 

of interest in intelligence and national security issues among not only government institutions but among the country’s citizenry. Through its technical 

resources, CISEN plans to make available to the school and to outside researchers various bibliographic references, documents, and other unclassified 

materials.665

The Technological Institute of Monterrey has since 2008 offered a research 

program in strategic intelligence within its Graduate School of Public Administration and Public Policy. This program has the purpose of studying 

and developing concepts and methodologies in intelligence, disseminating 

research findings, and promoting the adoption and institutionalization of the 

knowledge generated. This program also offers a course in the development 

and administration of strategic intelligence systems. 

i. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

Despite its status as an international organization, the OAS offers an educational program to develop expertise in strategic intelligence. The program 

is presented in the Regional Antidrug Intelligence School of the American 

Community (ERCAIAD), earlier named the Andean Regional Antidrug 

Intelligence School, established in 1999. This specialized Inter-American 

Commission for the Control of Drug Abuse (CICAD) center operates in 

Bogota, Colombia. It offers academic training in strategic and operational 

intelligence. Students mainly come from intelligence services, police, and 

other institutions involved in the fight against drug trafficking in the countries of the Andean Intelligence Group—Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 

Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Other students come from Spanish-speaking 

OAS member countries.

The school presents mobile training courses and professional seminars in 

many countries of the region. Experts from France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as other OAS members and international 

organizations such as INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs 

and Crime (UNODC) share their experiences. One course has a strategic 

intelligence title: “Logical structure of analysis and estimation for narcotraf-
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ficking in the hemisphere to 2020.” ERCAIAD’s educational program has 

undergone a process of independent academic evaluation, ensuring its academic quality.

j. PARAGUAY

In Paraguay, the Intelligence Office (DI) of the Ministry of the Interior and 

the Office of Policy and Strategy (DIE) of the Ministry of Defense both have 

strategic intelligence responsibilities. The personnel of both offices receive professional training and education mainly through armed forces institutions. 

The Institute of Advanced Strategic Studies (IAEE) has the responsibility to 

develop the strategic intelligence course of study (CIE), which is presented as 

a specialized diplomado. The IAEE is a public sector higher-education institution under the Ministry of Defense. Armed forces personnel currently teach 

the strategic intelligence courses to civilian intelligence community personnel 

and also to high-level state officials. The diplomado assists graduates in fulfilling their duties in intelligence agencies or related organizations. 

CIE faculty includes instructors from the Argentine Army, provided through 

a cooperative agreement with the Argentine Ministry of Defense. These instructors participate alongside Paraguayan officials from diverse institutions 

such as the Anti-kidnapping Prosecution team, the Secretary of Money Laundering Prevention, the Technical Department for Special Customs Surveillance (DETAVE), and the Human Rights Commission. 

k. PERU

Peru’s National Intelligence School (ENI) is part of the National Intelligence 

Office and offers courses and seminars at various levels. The school’s senior 

strategic intelligence course is oriented toward the professional development 

of employees of the National Intelligence Office, employees of other offices 

of the National Intelligence System, and the personnel of other public, nonintelligence organizations. Public Law 28664 regulates the operation of the 

National Intelligence System and requires that any nominee to become director of the ENI must possess at least a master’s degree. 

The Center for Advanced National Studies (CAEN) in Lima offers a diplomado in strategic intelligence for politicians, government employees, business 
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people, various professionals, military and police officials, and military attaches. As the most senior defense school in Peru, CAEN operates within the 

Policy and Strategy Office of the Defense Ministry. CAEN offers degrees in 

defense studies at the bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral levels. 

The Peruvian Institute of Public Policy, through an agreement with the Greater National University of San Marcos, offers a graduate specialization in strategic intelligence and democracy for active professionals, students in their last 

undergraduate year, and military and police personnel who work in the areas 

of analysis or intelligence. 

l. UNITED STATES

Many institutions of higher education offer strategic intelligence courses and 

programs, some within the various security agencies of the federal government. A few civilian universities or professional schools offer intelligence degrees at the undergraduate or graduate level. Principal institutions include 

Loyola University of Maryland, Mercyhurst University (of Erie, Pennsylvania), the Institute of World Politics, and the Naval Postgraduate School. 

The National Intelligence University (NIU) was formed in August 2011 

from the expansion of the National Defense Intelligence College.666 It is 

an institution of higher education with a research component, and exists 

to provide professional education to personnel of the National Intelligence 

Community, which includes intelligence specialists of the armed forces as 

well as civilians from the community’s member agencies. The U.S. Congress 

authorized NIU to confer university degrees in government intelligence, and 

the institution is accredited by The Middle States Association of Colleges 

and Schools. Three degree programs are offered: a bachelor of science in 

intelligence, master of science of strategic intelligence, and master of science 

and technology intelligence.

The Central Intelligence Agency maintains the Center for the Study of Intelligence, an office that promotes study, debate, and understanding of the role 

of intelligence in this North American society. Sherman Kent founded the 

center’s professional journal, Studies in Intelligence, in 1955.
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m. URUGUAY

The National Intelligence Office (NIO) operates under the Uruguayan Ministry of Defense and does not have its own formal educational capability. 

NIO professional education and training takes place in purely military environments.

The Uruguayan Army’s Military Institute of Advanced Studies (IMES) offers a strategic intelligence course within the army’s educational system. The 

course contributes to the curriculum of active-duty, senior military personnel who are enrolled in the institute’s general staff or basic intelligence programs. The strategic intelligence course is also available to NIO personnel and 

anyone engaged in some way with the country’s intelligence organizations. 

This educational center has since 2001 maintained official recognition as a 

university-level institution. 

The Center for Advanced National Studies (CALEN), also within the Ministry of Defense, plans to initiate its own strategic intelligence course.667 This 

course will bring professional education to analysts of the Uruguayan intelligence community. The course will form part of a suite of educational offerings that will eventually lead to a master’s degree in national defense. 

n. VENEZUELA

Decree 7453 of 1 June 2010 established the Bolivarian National Intelligence 

Service (SEBIN). This civilian intelligence organization has responsibity for 

internal and external intelligence, in addition to counterintelligence activities. 

It is part of the Ministry of People’s Power, in association with the Ministries 

of Interior and Justice. SEBIN’s academic structure includes the Center for 

Intelligence Studies (CEI), which has the mission of designing, planning, carrying out, and supervising educational and training activities and programs. 

Most of its courses are at the basic level and are limited to intelligence personnel. Most training and education of civilian intelligence personnel is accomplished in the academic organizations of the armed forces. 

The Ministry of People’s Power also offers military intelligence courses 

at various levels through the Bolivarian Military University of Venezuela 
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(UMBV).668 These courses are directed at military personnel and members 

of state security organizations. The UMBV hosts the Joint War School of the 

Bolivarian Armed Forces (earlier known as the Center for Advanced Military 

Studies), the “Brigadier General Daniel Florencio O ́Leary” School of Intelligence and Psychological Operations of the Bolivarian Armed Forces, and the 

“Grand Marshal of Ayacucho Antonio Jose de Sucre” Institute of Advanced 

National Defense Studies (IAEDEN). 

Summary

The foregoing survey of intelligence educational frameworks across the region 

reveals differences from country to country with respect to the institutional 

approach adopted and the level of academic recognition attained. Even in 

those cases where an institution has achieved official recognition, the quality 

of its educational outcomes remains unknown. In order to gauge the academic quality of the teaching and learning experience in any country, systematic 

evaluation procedures need to be in place to appraise the human-capital effects of an individual employee’s educational background. This essay will now 

present an academic evaluation model tailored to government intelligence 

employees. The illustrative model should apply to the assessment of educational outcomes in intelligence organizations across the Americas. 

Evaluating the Academic Preparation of 

Intelligence Personnel

An evaluation procedure requires carefully designed norms and objectives. 

Evaluation allows one to have a clear idea of how an institution performs 

across its sphere of action: its capabilities, its strengths and weaknesses, and 

the improvements that need to be made in techniques, procedures, and quality of personnel so as to attain desired objectives. Evaluation should be carried 

out continuously within an organization. 

An evaluation plan identifies objectives, establishes what needs to be evaluated, who will evaluate whom, and what type of information needs to be 

collected. Further, a plan defines the purpose of the evaluation, establishes 

indicators and evaluative criteria, and specifies how to access and use the 

results. Finally, a plan addresses the preparation and dissemination of reports 

together with guidelines for the implementation of changes as required. 
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The evaluation process allows managers to identify the appropriate academic 

requirements for the organization’s personnel, to include training and education. For the process to remain valid, representative, and useful, all personnel 

in the organization need to be evaluated. Evaluation can be accomplished 

with psychometric tests, work samples, observation, interviews, questionnaires, and any other procedure suitable for collecting data. In all cases, the 

means employed to collect data need to be relevant, valid, well-established, 

verifiable, and comparable. 

A general evaluation model for an educational institution seeks to establish 

the degree of influence that education may have on the professional qualities 

of an employee. Objective measures of quality, such as the academic degrees 

held, may correlate with an individual’s ability to apply knowledge, their efficiency, and their overall ability to perform analysis. A useful model of evaluation will help the evaluator determine the nature of any such correlations.

Figure 12 depicts a four-part evaluation process: a) curricular evaluation; b) 

evaluation of work performance; c) evaluation of personnel by interview; and 

d) evaluation of knowledge. 
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Determination 

of strategies, 

methods, 

techniques, and 

instruments 

Evaluation of

job performance 

EVALUATION PLAN

OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR EVALUATION

Curricular 

evaluation 

Evaluation by 

personal 

interview 

Evaluation of 

knowledge

Summary of individual evaluation

Report of institutional evaluation

Determination 

of scores and 

application 

of evaluative 

criteria 

Final results of 

an analysis of 

all evaluation of 

individuals

Figure 12: Outline of an Academic Evaluation Process for an 

Educational Institution

Source: Created by the author.

a. Curricular evaluation begins with the construction of scales that link 

knowledge, aptitudes, professional practices, techniques, and abilities to 

the academic titles, degrees, diplomados, certificates, and other proof of 

education and training undertaken. These associations are then evaluated 

in terms of the tasks performed by the individual, using a point system to 

evaluate each criterion. The evaluator will complete an evaluation form 

(see Annex 2) that allows for generation of partial scores for each element 

of education and professional development. Calculating the sum of partial 

scores yields the final result for this part of the evaluation process. 

b. The evaluation of work performance allows one to correlate the employee’s 

tasks and required skill set with the quality of completed work. Evaluative 

criteria for job performance need to reflect individual and institutional 

factors in the employee’s productivity. The evaluation can be carried out 
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by the employee’s immediate supervisor using criteria from the job description, with the performance evaluation for each job element depicted 

by a point system on an evaluation form (see Annex 3). 

c. Evaluation by personal interview should prove useful in testing the jobrelated level of knowledge of employees, and can reveal the employee’s 

level of performance in relation to his or her level of formal education. In 

a professional and institutional sense, the interviewing official can determine whether a link exists between academic accomplishments and the 

employee’s career progression in the organization. The interviewing official should determine the importance of each factor with respect to the 

needs of the organization, and should document his or her opinion, taking into consideration impressions and salient aspects of the information 

obtained during the interview. All documentation should be distilled into 

the final evaluation form (see Annex 4).

d. The evaluation of knowledge determines whether the employee has command of basic subject matter, as well as more specific knowledge linked 

to his or her job responsibilities. This can be accomplished with a test or 

questionnaire that allows the reviewer to inquire about issues related to the 

organization, methods and tools employed in the job, and a wide variety 

of everyday knowledge with which a professional should be familiar. The 

advantage of a questionnaire is that it creates written answers, takes relatively little time, and can be completed by many individuals at the same 

time. However, a questionnaire needs to be designed carefully so as to 

obtain useful information suitable for later evaluation (see Annex 5). 

To bring the process of evaluation to a conclusion, the results obtained from 

the curricular review, job performance, personal interview, and knowledge 

evaluation need to be standardized through a point system and ranked by appropriate criteria. In this way, one can give greater weight, as appropriate, to 

any particular evaluative criterion. The results captured in the forms already 

noted in Annexes 2 through 5 can be consolidated in a final summary evaluation (see Annex 6). The final report covering the entire process will benefit 

from cross-tabulating the data from separate evaluations with those of the 

entire organization, yielding a product that will allow an overall appreciation of any linkages between the academic and professional qualities of the 

institution’s personnel. Cross-tabulation can also contribute useful insights 
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into the limitations of available human capital and indicate whether further 

professional development may be needed. 

Conclusion

Intelligence organizations benefit from building human capital. The author is 

not alone in endorsing the practice of maintaining a professional school within the intelligence bureaucracy in any given country. In-house intelligence 

schools can convey specific knowledge and students can explore sensitive topics in depth in the context of a strategic vision.669 Additionally, in-house 

schools can seize the opportunity to improve the functioning of the country’s 

intelligence system through exploratory discussion and research, and by classroom discussion of professional experiences. The most advanced intelligence 

schools profit from a direct link with a country’s higher education system and 

comply with curriculum review processes necessary for academic accreditation. These institutions illustrate what institutional excellence can achieve. 

In some countries, a strong military influence in strategic intelligence education 

has coincided with a particular approach to professional development, whereby 

criteria for professionalism in a substantive sense have been replaced by rankconscious tendencies and conditions more appropriate to career progression 

unique to purely military organizations. Nonetheless, some military-based intelligence education institutions are recognized by their country’s higher education system. In these schools, civilians as well as military students—and even 

the public at large—tend to have access to the school’s programs. 

The advent of intelligence studies under the auspices of a civilian university 

increases the likelihood of high-quality education for current or prospective 

intelligence practitioners. The Peruvian specialist Alberto Bolivar Ocampo 

observes that “[a]n aspect of intelligence that may be considered very advanced 

for the region ... is the availability of intelligence courses at universities. This 

development should overcome any remaining fears about universities being 

able to deal academically with a topic vital to safeguarding any country’s 

national interests.”670

An Ecuadorian observer notes that linkages between intelligence organizations and the academic world should be strengthened for the benefit of intelligence systems:
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[T]he capacity and potential of institutions of research and 

higher education are undeniable, thanks to the information 

they have available or that they can obtain through their institutional network of experts. In particular, they constitute 

a fundamental source of research in the area of strategic intelligence. The importance of these centers is linked to their 

transparency and academic freedom. The significance of 

these advantages is borne out by the information they produce (or that they have the capability to produce), especially 

as a result of the links they maintain with other universities 

and particularly with foreign institutions. Importantly, academic freedom favors the improvement of analysis, and better analysis improves the opportunity to create and provide 

high-quality advice.671

Intelligence education in universities brings a degree of democratization 

to strategic intelligence: it becomes more accessible to the academic world 

through discussion and publication. This process drives research in the field, 

the further development of “think tanks,” and the production of theory—or 

its operational twin, “doctrine”—all of which permit the growth of an intelligence culture. 

Individuals who work in the world of strategic intelligence require a broad 

spectrum of knowledge and knowledge in depth, in consonance with the 

elevated responsibility and complexity of their job. Hence, their education requires a correspondingly solid academic foundation. In order for intelligence 

professionals to reach a high level of knowledge and expertise, we cannot simply measure the number of courses or Diplomados accumulated. Instead, we 

need to insist that professionals maintain their excellence through a continuous relationship with the academic world and its Specialization, Master’s and 

Doctoral degrees. This vision has long been sought by many in the field, even 

as they have been frustrated by the constant budgetary vicissitudes that have 

been an economic impediment to long-term planning. The lack of legislative 

initiatives has also played a part in suppressing opportunities to engage in this 

ideal approach to intelligence education.672

No matter what knowledge and academic titles an intelligence professional 

may have, he or she will always face two choices: engage in continuous 
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learning, or accept the onset of gradual but irreversible irrelevance. An 

intelligence organization should ensure that its personnel not get caught up in 

intellectual or academic inertia because knowledge quickly loses its currency, 

and educational laziness leads quickly to ignorance. 

Author’s Biography

Jose Gabriel Paz, J.D., Ed.M., directs the Geopolitical, Defense and Security Research Institute of the Universidad del Salvador (USAL, Argentina); 

the master’s degree program in hemispheric defense and security (USALInter-American Defense College), Washington, DC; and the master’s degree 

in defense and security, Central America (USAL-National Defense College, 

Honduras). He teaches courses in geopolitics, international organizations, international terrorism, and transnational threats at USAL. He also serves as 

adviser to the Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies of the 

Chihlee Institute of Technology of Taiwan. He has completed postgraduate 

work in strategic intelligence at the Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG, Argentina); in politics (ESG, Argentina); in national security (Galil College, Israel); 

and in instructor training (U.S. Army). His publications include Bases normativas para el establecimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacional, volumes 

1 and 2 (Editorial Universidad Libros, 2000) and numerous articles, among 

them: “El ambiente antártico y las amenazas a la seguridad ambiental global,” 

Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia, Buenos Aires, Vol. I, Number 1, 

2003. Email: paz.jose@yahoo.com. 
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Annex 1 (Table 15)

Academic Attributes of Strategic Intelligence Educational Institutions

Country Civilian 

education

center

Accreditation PostgradOpen 

access#

Military 

education 

center

Accreditation PostgradOpen 

access##

Argentina ENI x x x IIFA x x x

Bolivia ECEME x x

Brazil ESINT x ESG x x

Chile UChile

(*)(**)

x x x ANEPE x x

Colombia Undetermined(**)ESICI x x x

Ecuador (**)

United 

States

Several 

universities

x x x NIU x x

Guatemala INEES(**)

Mexico ESISEN x CD and 

CESN

x

Paraguay IAEE x x

Peru ENI x x CAEN x x

Uruguay IMES x x

Venezuela CEI(**) UMBV

(*) Through the Chilean Army War College. 

(**) Program status uncertain or discontinued.

# For civilian institutions, the “open” designation signifies participation by personnel from across the 

government and by non-government professionals. 

## For military institutions, the “open” designation signifies participation by foreign military professionals. Exceptions are Peru, where CAEN is open to civilian government personnel as well as to 

the public at large, and Uruguay, where the IMES is open to civilian government personnel.
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Annex 2 (Table 16)

Form for Curricular Evaluation (Example)

Name: .................................................................................. CLASSIFICATION

Job Description: ....................................................................................................

Organizational Element:...................................................................................... 

Date of Entry ....................................................................................................... 

Educational 

level

Type of degree or academic title Scale Number 

of 

activities

Subtotal 

of 

points

Postgraduate Doctorate 100 pts

Postgraduate Master’s 80 pts

Postgraduate Specialization 60 pts

Undergraduate Four-year or greater 

university degree

50 pts

Undergraduate Less than four-year 

university degree

40 pts

Technical Technical education 30 pts

Professional 

development

Diplomas, Certificates, and 

Warrants for activities of more 

than one year’s duration

30 pts

Professional 

development

Diplomas, Certificates and 

Warrants for activities of six 

months up to one year

20 pts

Professional 

development

Diplomas, Certificates and 

Warrants for activities of less 

than six months duration

10 pts

Total points

OBSERVATIONS: ________________________ ________________________

Accomplished by:________________________ Date:_____________

(The information included in this form is for the purpose of illustration only)
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Annex 3 (Table 17)

Form for Evaluation of Job Performance (Example)

Name: ............................................................. Job Description: .................................................. 

Date of Entry: ............................................. ...................... ............... CLASSIFICATION 

Total Points Obtained Assignment of Grades 

(Select the grade that reflects the quality as

indicated in the instructions) 

A excellent

B good

C acceptable

D poor

E unsatisfactory

EVALUATION 

FACTORS

Unsatisfactory Poor Acceptable Good Excellent

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

JOB-RELATED 

KNOWLEDGE Consider 

the subject’s mastery of 

and familiarity with 

the duties of the job.

8

Has neither 

knowledge 

nor ability 

for the job.

16

Knows job, 

but does not 

master it.

24

Knows duties 

and carries 

them out 

satisfactorily. 

32

Knows duties 

and excels every 

day in carrying 

them out. 

40

Understands 

duties thoroughly and 

demonstrates 

exceptional 

capabilities.

COMPLIANCE WITH 

RULES

Consider subject’s mastery 

and familiarity with the 

rules that apply to the job. 

8

Does not adjust 

to rules and 

lacks familiarity 

with them. 

10

Limited 

compliance 

with rules.

12

Displays 

satisfactory 

compliance 

with rules. 

14

Complies 

with rules and 

understands 

them well. 

18

Exceptional 

compliance 

with rules 

and great 

comprehension of them. 

RESPONSIBILITY

Consider the subject’s 

ability to quickly resolve 

difficult situations.

8

Requires continuous supervision because of 

frequent errors.

12

Requires 

frequent 

supervision. 

20

Requires 

occasional 

supervision.

28

Requires supervision on certain 

occasions.

30

Does not 

require 

supervision.

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS

KNOWLEDGE

Consider the subjects’s 

academic knowledge 

in relation to his job.

8

Has severe lack 

of academic 

knowledge.

16

Has limited 

academic 

knowledge 

and does not 

apply

it.

24

Has academic knowledge 

and applies 

it in limited 

fashion.

32

Has sufficient 

academic knowledge and often 

applies it.

40

Has exceptional knowledge and 

applies it well 

to the job. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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Annex 3 (Table 17)

Form for Evaluation of Job Performance (Example) (continued)

ABILITY TO ASSESS 

INFORMATION

Consider the subject’s ability to convey knowledge, 

ideas, and suggestions. 

8

Finds it difficult 

to analyze issues

and draw 

conclusions.

16

Often has difficulty in analysis 

and conveying 

ideas. 

24

Fully analyzes issues 

as assigned. 

32

Satisfactorily

analyzes all 

the issues 

related to job

40

Excels in analyzing issues 

related to job 

and evaluates 

with accuracy. 

ANALYSIS 

Consider subject’s use of 

intellectual abilities for 

systematic analysis

of information. 

8

Lacks capability 

to do analysis.

12

Displays 

limited ability 

to do analysis.

24

Carries

out analysis 

adequately. 

32

Has an elevated 

capability to 

do analysis.

40

Analytical 

capability is 

exceptional.

PERFORMANCE FACTORS

ABILITY TO 

COMPLETE TASKS

Consider subject’s performance of his duties. 

8

Slow to complete 

tasks and often

does not finish 

them.

16

Completes 

tasks to get 

them out of 

the way.

24

Completes 

tasks 

satisfactorily.

32

Shows desire to 

accomplish tasks.

38

Eager to 

address tasks.

QUALITY OF 

COMPLETED WORK

Consider subject’s 

application of knowledge, experience, and 

attention to detail. 

8

Often commits 

errors and work 

is unsatisfactory.

16

Work has 

limitations; 

needs 

improvement.

24

Work accomplished 

acceptably. 

32

Accomplishes 

work with care 

and attention 

to detail. 

40

Exceptional, 

high-quality 

work; 

improves 

continuously. 

AMOUNT OF WORK 

COMPLETED

Consider the volume 

of work the subject 

typically accomplishes. 

4

Little work 

accomplished.

8

Less than optimal amount 

of work 

accomplished.

16

Acceptable 

quantity of 

work accomplished.

20

Makes an effort 

to complete 

extra work.

24

Continuously 

strives to increase amount 

of work 

accomplished.

OBSERVATIONS: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------

Completed by:________________________ Date:_____________

(The information included in this form is for the purpose of illustration only)
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Annex 4 (Table 18)

Instructions for Personal Interview

Use of the interview guide:

To prepare yourself for the interview, review the specific personnel forms, and develop the 

set of general and specific questions to be asked during the interview. In the interview guide, 

establish the number of questions to be generated and prepare additional, pertinent questions. Proceed in accordance with the interview guide, using the introductory questions for 

each area and other selected questions. Mix questions and statements and use comfortable 

phrasing to reduce the appearance of this being an interrogation. Present the questions in 

condensed form to save space. 

Use of the subject evaluation section:

Evaluate the subject on the principal factors using your own judgment. When the interview 

is complete, convert your notes into a formal evaluation. As you do this, determine the 

importance of each factor in light of the work requirements. You should document your 

impressions and the most relevant information points in the spaces labeled “comments,” 

“notable qualities,” “weak points,” and “overall summary.” Pay particular attention to the 

notable qualities and the weak points that relate to the critical requirements of the job. Then, 

transfer your evaluation of the subject on each factor to the summary evaluation table. 

INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Tell me about your intelligence work experience from your first job to your present position. I’d like to know for each job what you did, what you liked about it, what you didn’t 

like about it, your salary, and any special achievement. 

2. What level of academic degree do you have? Have you been able to apply your academic 

work to your job? 

3. What knowledge from your academic study has been of most use for your job? What 

knowledge should you have to make yourself more useful to the profession? 

4. Can you give me one or two examples of how your academic knowledge was useful in 

your job? 

5. Does your academic knowledge allow you to work more effectively than others who work 

with you but who do not have a similar academic preparation? 

6. Do you think the organization in which you work values the academic credentials that 

you have? Have you experienced greater professional growth as a result of having the academic qualifications you do have—are they reflected in promotions, recognition or increased salary? 

7. Do you think a correlation exists between academic degrees held by an employee and 

his or her ability to work well with other government employees, with academics, or with 

counterparts in other countries? 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

348

Annex 4 (Table 18)

Form for Personal Interview (Example) (continued)

I. General information CLASSIFICATION 

Name: ................................................................... 

Job Description: ................................................................... 

Date of Entry: ............................ 

Ii. Personal interview

CRITERIA: 

Presentation, up to10 points : 

(Measures activity and personality)

Security and Persuasiveness, up to 20 points : 

(Measures comprehension and ability)

Rationality, up to 10 points : 

(Measures analytical ability)

Adaptability, up to 10 points : 

(Measures suitability for work) 

Knowledge, up to 20 points : 

(Measures specific knowledge in relation to the workplace)

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

III. Evaluator’s considerations

Comments: .............................................................................................

Notable qualities: ................................................................................ ( )

Weak points: ...................................................................................... ( )

Overall summary: ...........................................................................,.......

Points: ....................................................................................................

ASSIGNMENT OF GRADES

(Select the grade that reflects the overall summary)

A excellent

B good

C acceptable

D poor

E unsatisfactory

Completed by: _______________________ Date: _____________

Signature of Subject: ..........................................

(The information included in this form is for the purpose of illustration only) 
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Annex 5 (Table 19)

Form for Evaluation of Knowledge (Example) 

Name: ............................................................................................. CLASSIFICATION 

Job Description: .........................................................

Date of Entry: ....................... 

Reply to the following questions: Points

1 Is strategic intelligence a science or an art? Explain your opinion.

2 What technological tools for knowledge management are you

familiar with? Describe them. 

3 What is the current concept of national security?

4 What are the ethical foundations of the profession? Provide examples.

5 Describe the significance of “strategic surprise” in a diplomatic sense.

6 How is a country’s national culture related to national, strategic 

intelligence?

7 In light of prevailing legal norms, what are the characteristics, attributes, 

and limitations of the organization to which you belong? 

8 What is the function of the Fourth Department of the General Staff 

of the People’s Liberation Army of China?

9 What relationship exists between strategic intelligence and strategic 

opportunities?

10 Dialogic, recursive, and hologramatic principles are part of a particular 

way of thinking about problems. Identify and describe this way of 

thinking.

Total points

ASSIGNMENT OF GRADES

(Select the grade that reflects the 

overall score) 

A excellent

B good

C acceptable

D poor

E unsatisfactory

OBSERVATIONS: 

Completed by:________________________ Date:_____________

(The information included in this form is for the purpose of illustration only)
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

350

Annex 6 (Table 20)

Form for Summary of Individual Evaluation (Example) 

General information CLASSIFICATION 

Name: ................................................................... ...................... 

Job Description: ........................................................................... 

Date of Entry: .............................................................................. 

I. Curricular evaluation 

POINTS EARNED: ...........................................................................................

II. Work performance 

POINTS EARNED: .......................................................................................... 

III. Personal interview

POINTS EARNED: .......................................................................................... 

IV. Evaluation of knowledge

POINTS EARNED: .......................................................................................... 

FACTOR VALUE

1

2

3

4

Subtotal

Final point total from individual evaluation process: 

Assignment of grades

(Select the grade that 

reflects the overall score)

A excellent

B good

C acceptable

D poor

E unsatisfactory
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Annex 6 (Table 20)

Form for Summary of Individual Evaluation (Example) (continued)

OBSERVATIONS: --------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Completed by:_______________________________________ Date:_____________

(The information included in this form is for the purpose of illustration only)

Source: All Annexes/Tables compiled by the author.

INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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Managing Intelligence Information for Multinational 

Cyberspace Security—

Approaches by the United States and Brazil

Robin M. Rogers

“The legal and policy entanglement in cyber is far,

far more difficult than it is in some of the other domains.” 

—William Lynn III673

Setting the Stage

Every day, news reports claim that some government, company, or group of 

citizens has been “attacked” through cyberspace. Cyberspace can be a dangerous place, but sensationalized reports can evoke a response out of proportion to the actual event. Cyberspace attacks do threaten national security, 

economic security, and even personal security. Some persons responsible for 

cyberthreats act on their own; some act as part of a criminal gang or political 

activist group; and some act as agents of a foreign power—either to conduct 

espionage or “military operations.”

Intelligence managers can take advantage of coordinated efforts among the 

private sector, law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities to 

defend cyberspace. Information sharing, whether from proprietary, law 

enforcement, or intelligence soures, contributes the essential ingredient 

for coordination. Obstacles to sharing information include uncertainty 

over what specific information to share and what can or should be shared. 

These obstacles are compounded when countries need to share intelligence 

information with each other. 

From an intelligence manager’s perspective, this essay reinforces the 

importance of information sharing, first by exploring the role of common 

terminology and language conventions, then highlighting the threat that 

actors in cyberspace pose to national, economic, and personal security. 

Actions taken by the U.S. and Brazil to respond to the cyberthreat illustrate 

the challenges to intelligently managing intelligence information. The essay 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

354

concludes with an exploration of potential improvements in cybersecurity 

information handling policies and practices. 

Coming to Terms with the Cyberspace Threat

Merely describing the threat can become a vexing problem. Intelligence managers regularly use terms from very different cultures—from the worlds of 

military, intelligence, and law enforcement specialists. Additionally, various 

private-sector cultures (including the Internet industry), news-media cultures, and even cybersecurity cultures all use different terms to describe the 

same thing—be it an unremarkable event or an impending threat. Conversely, representatives from these cultures may use the same term to describe very 

different things. 

A logical place to start this exploration is to define cyberspace itself. In the 

United States alone many different definitions coexist. The Cyberspace Policy 

Review described it as the “globally-interconnected digital information and 

communications infrastructure”674 Yet that very document further defines 

cyberspace as “the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.”675

An information technology (IT) website defines it as a “metaphor for describing the non-physical terrain created by computer systems.”676 Another site 

from the Czech Republic uses similarly fuzzy terms: “Cyberspace is currently 

used to describe the whole range of information resources available through 

computer networks.”677

Bypassing other characterizations of cyberspace, this essay will employ a more 

precise definition: “Cyberspace is an operational domain whose distinctive 

and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information 

via interconnected information-communication technology (ICT)-based systems and their associated infrastructures.”678 It may seem that this definition 

uses too many words to describe a “virtual” entity. One reason to use it is that 

it can apply to many of the cultures mentioned earlier. It applies to things—

“electronics” and “systems” and “infrastructures”—and touches on the way 

people “exploit” those things to create and use information. The definition 

stops just short of including information itself as part of cyberspace.679
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Defining cyberspace helps us to understand what happens there. This essay 

focuses on two of the negative things that happen within that space: attack 

and intrusion. Paraphrasing one online source, “A cyberattack is deliberate 

exploitation of computer systems, technology-dependent enterprises and networks. Cyberattacks use malicious code to alter how a computer is set up 

to handle logic or data, and can result in data compromise or cybercrimes, 

such as information and identity theft.”680 Though this definition may serve 

some of the communities mentioned above, it does not work as well for military or intelligence communities because an “attack” of any sort may lead 

to military action, including war. In this essay a “cyberattack” is the use of 

cyberspace to disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or manipulate information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 

themselves.681

Law enforcement organizations, such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), use a concept more inclusive than “attack”—they prefer the term 

“cyberintrusion.”682 Although the FBI does not provide a standard definition, by implication cyberintrusion refers to “accessing a computer (or network or system) without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by 

means of such conduct obtaining information.”683 This definition focuses on 

gaining unauthorized access. Though the U.S. National Institute of Standards 

and Technology does not specifically use the term “cyberintrusion,” it does 

refer to “network intrusion” and also uses that term to refer to unauthorized 

access to networks.684

Private computers, networks, or systems685 may convey or contain classified 

national security information. In other cases, that private information may be 

intellectual property or proprietary. In still other cases, the private information may be personal account information, email, or photos.

In the latter two cases, the cyberintrusion constitutes a cybercrime. In the 

first case (stealing classified or other national security information) the action 

should be considered cyberespionage. Espionage is a crime as well; the difference between cyberespionage and cyber crime generally determines which 

organs of government bear the responsibility for protecting against the act 

or prosecuting those who commit the act. Law enforcement organizations 

typically have responsibility for deterring and prosecuting cybercrime. Counterintelligence organizations, which may be part of law enforcement, military, 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

356

or intelligence communities (in any combination) usually handle cases of 

cyberespionage.

In thinking about intelligence information that supports national efforts to 

defend against the threat of hostile operations in cyberspace, whether an attack or an intrusion, understanding who is responsible for defense becomes 

important. Intelligence organizations need to be familiar with the information needs of the organizations they support. The need to work with both 

counterintelligence and law enforcement organizations introduces additional 

cultures, and therefore additional information needs, to the responsibilities 

of the intelligence manager.

The idea of “attribution” similarly concerns any intelligence manager responsible for supporting cybersecurity efforts. Attribution determines “the identity or location of an attacker or an attacker’s intermediary.”686 Identity would 

include personal identifying information, such as a name, identity number, 

account information, or alias. The location may be either virtual or physical. 

Note that the citation also mentions intermediaries—those entities through 

which an attacker (or intruder) passes on the way to the target. Intermediaries 

may be witting or unwitting; determining their complicity adds to the task of 

establishing attribution.

The variety of sources cited for the few definitions mentioned above reminds 

the intelligence manager of the many cultures with an interest in defending 

cyberspace. Sharing information among these various cultures in such a manner that it can be understood by the recipient as well as the originator presents 

a challenge. An intelligence manager would certainly know that differences in 

language (Portuguese/English) and culture (Brazilian/United States) affect information sharing. How to achieve a common understanding of the concepts 

used to characterize threats from hostile cyberspace operations also demands 

a manager’s attention. 

Recognizing Cyberspace Threat Concepts

All too often, a threat in cyberspace is equated with an effect created there. 

To avoid this confusion, intelligence managers, like managers in other cyber 

communities, can disaggregate the concept with a standard threat formula: 

intent + capability = threat. By this formula, anyone with the capability to 
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cause a negative effect must also have the intent to use that capability in order 

to become a potential threat. 

The Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) illustrates how a tool can allow an actor 

to change from being a potential to an actual threat. Used for legal purposes, 

the LOIC is a tool that tests how well a network can stand heavy activity 

loads. Used as a cyberattack weapon, it can overload networks to the point 

of making them crash, thus creating a denial of service. The LOIC is free to 

download and a YouTube video shows viewers how to use it.687 This means 

that virtually every person using the Internet can gain the capability to conduct a cyberattack or cyberintrusion. Capability is not a limiting factor.

In cyberspace, intent requires a nuanced understanding. A botnet688 capability allows a person to remotely control many other computers (or even networks). Gaining control of computers is generally a cyberintrusion, unless the 

owners of the controlled computers have consented to being controlled. Either way, the resulting botnet represents a capability. The person controlling 

the botnet may want to cause a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. 

Or he may intend simply to use the botnet to facilitate unauthorized access 

to other computers, information, or networks. In the first case, the effect is 

a cyberattack. In the second case, the effect constitutes a cyberintrusion. A 

cyberintrusion may have occurred when the botnet was simply created. The 

threat in both cases is the actor, not the effect.

Given that understanding, intelligence managers may either provide or gain 

information about three categories of threats. The first is the state actor; the 

second a nonstate actor; and the third a lone actor. As experience has shown, 

these categories are not exclusive—an actor operating in one category may 

also operate in another. An actor’s allegiance complicates an intelligence manager’s decision to share information about threats in cyberspace: once personal attribution has been established, is it possible to draw a connection to 

a larger set of actors?

For many years, private cybersecurity companies, together with government 

IT, law enforcement (LE), and intelligence organizations ranked nation-state 

actors as the top cyberthreat. In many ways, this characterization remains accurate. The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, US-CERT, claims 

that nation state 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

358

programs are unique in posing a threat along the entire 

spectrum of objectives that might harm U.S. interests. These 

threats range from propaganda and low-level nuisance web 

page defacements to espionage and serious disruption with 

loss of life and extensive infrastructure disruption. Among 

the array of cyberthreats, as seen today, only governmentsponsored programs are developing capabilities with the 

future prospect of causing widespread, long-duration 

damage....689

Even out-of-date estimates indicate that more than 120 countries have or are 

developing cyberattack or intrusion cybercapabilities.690

Some nondemocratic states may use their capabilities against what they perceive as internal threats, whereby their intent affects the nature of the threat. 

Other state actors use cyberintrusions to gather national security information. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, confirmed in 2012 that 

China employed cyberintrusions to gather classified information from U.S. 

Department of Defense computers and systems.691

Nonstate actors appear in many varieties. Cybercriminals, motivated by greed, 

may come to mind first. Cybercriminals tend not to engage in cyberattacks, 

except in cases of extortion. Cybercriminals conduct intrusions mostly to 

obtain data or access to financial account information. Such activity may target individuals within one country, although the Shadowcrew “organization” 

conducted intrusion operations on a global scale from 2002 to 2004, stealing 

credit information or identities of individuals from numerous states.692 A 

publication by PricewaterhouseCoopers Brazil Ltda identified cybercrime as 

the second-leading criminal activity in Brazil in 2011.693 The Internet security company Norton, in its Cybercrime Report for 2011, pegs the total net 

cost of cybercrime in the United States for 2011 at $139.6 billion, while the 

net loss worldwide was $388 billion.694

Most cybercrime in leading countries occurs in the private sector, with private individuals as common targets. Cyberintrusions against national security 

targets (classified information, information held either by governments or by 

government contractors) are usually not the work of cybercriminals, but are 
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sometimes conducted by nonstate actors such as patriotic hackers operating 

from China or hacktivist groups such as Anonymous or Lulzsec. 

An example of nonstate actors conducting cyberintrusions appears in the “face 

off” between Chinese patriotic hackers and those from the Philippines over 

fishing rights off Scarborough Shoal (or, as the Chinese refer to it, Huangyan 

Island). Chinese patriotic hackers, protesting against the Philippine government after its Navy tried to arrest Chinese fishermen for illegally fishing in 

the area, disrupted Philippine government websites. These actions came not 

from Chinese government offices, but from Chinese patriotic hackers acting 

on their own.695 Though these “patriotic hacker” nonstate actors certainly 

engaged in criminal behavior, they generally do not do so for criminal gain.

Hactivists make up another nonstate group that poses a threat of hostile action in cyberspace. Although hacktivists have been conducting intrusions for 

several years, the threat they pose has become almost equal to that of some 

state actors even if their motive is different. Wired magazine has reported 

that hacktivists outperformed cybercriminals in 2011.696 The cybersecurity 

company Kaspersky placed the rise of “hacktivism” as the top new threat for 

2011.697 Hacktivists such as the Anonymous and Lulzsec groups have the attention of both law enforcement and national security communities. 

Anonymous operates as an amorphous collection of individuals who seek to 

protest what they consider objectionable, such as the Church of Scientology, 

or the efforts to stop Wikileaks.698 Their protests may appear in the form 

of directed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, where a particular site, server, 

or computer is inundated with either email or requests to the point of shutdown. Other protests involve defacing a website; they often replace information or images with claims about their own abilities. Other cyberintrusions 

steal information such as account owner’s names, emails, or other personal 

information. These protests generally occur at a global scale. Much of this 

group’s activity could be considered cybercrime as it is directed against private 

organizations.699 Anonymous claims to have disrupted the websites of various British government organizations, an action that crosses the threshold 

from criminal to national security threat activity.

Lulzsec is a much smaller group of individuals (hacktivists) who have less defined goals (or no goals at all beyond having fun creating mayhem), but who 
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use the same tools as Anonymous to express their views through cyberspace. 

This group claims responsibility for various intrusions and attacks. Known 

intrusions include theft of user and administrative data from Sony websites. 

The motivation in that case was to demonstrate the company’s faulty cybersecurity.700 Lulzsec also claims to have used DDoS to attack various Brazilian 

government websites,701 the website of an FBI-affiliated organization called 

Infraguard,702 and the publicly accessible website of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.703 Like Anonymous, Lulzsec can pose a challenge to both law 

enforcement (the intrusion into Sony and Infraguard) and national security 

communities (the attacks against the Brazilian and U.S. government sites).

A third source of hostile action in cyberspace is the individual actor—sometimes called a hacker. An example of a lone actor is Kevin Mitnik, once described as one of the most wanted computer criminals in the United States.704 

Mitnik was accused of gaining unauthorized access to a number of computer companies and systems and stealing the credit card information of over 

20,000 people worldwide. Mitnik claimed that his motivation in all of his 

hacking activity was to “learn, not to cause harm.”705 

An attack (such as a DDoS) may be seen as a criminal act or as an act subject 

to the Law of Armed Conflict, thus inviting a military response. A tool used 

to carry out a DDoS attack may be the same tool used to deny customers access to their bank accounts or to deny a military commander access to his deployed forces. Yet the appropriate response to the use of that tool should vary 

dramatically. Legal and policy decisions (both national and international) 

should determine the response. Intelligence managers, law enforcement officials, or private cybersecurity firms should be able to provide information 

useful to the necessary legal and policy decisionmaking. 

An intrusion poses similar challenges, but intelligence managers face even 

more uncertainty with respect to sharing information about this action. Both 

attacks and intrusions start with a threat actor gaining unauthorized access to 

a system or network. In some cases the tools and vulnerabilities used for an 

intrusion also generate an attack. Determining the intent of the threat actor becomes the key to differentiating one from another, and sometimes the 

determination cannot be made until the attack (or intrusion) has occurred. 

Since the action itself should determine the response, it sometimes remains 
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361

difficult to know if law enforcement or military defense forces should be responsible for prevention or incident response.

The Intelligence Manager’s Assessment of Cyberthreats

An effective intelligence manager must have a set of requirements against 

which to work. Those requirements (some may call them information needs) 

will guide the manager in knowing against whom collection should be tasked 

and just as importantly, knowing who has expressed the need. Knowing who 

wants or needs the intelligence information can help one understand why the 

need exists, who else might want or need the intelligence information, and 

how (in what format) to deliver the information. 

Legal, academic, government information technology, and private-sector cybersecurity observers have provided differing opinions about who within and 

outside government should have responsibility for protecting against threats 

of hostile action in cyberspace. Questions that frame the debate include: 1) 

Who is responsible for protecting the nation’s national security information 

and critical infrastructure, and what is that infrastructure?; a corollary to this 

question is, Who will establish rules of engagement for offensive and defensive actions against cyber opponents?; 2) Who is responsible for protecting 

the infrastructure that societies find necessary now that their very operation 

relies on secure cyberspace, and just what is that infrastructure?; 3) Who is 

responsible for protecting intellectual property?; and 4) Who will protect access to private information associated with identity documents or bank accounts? Intelligence managers should not answer such questions—but they 

could benefit from knowing the answers so they can provide the appropriate 

level of information to those who are responsible.

This essay cannot answer all those questions, but as a discipline that has proactive information collection, information handling, and analysis at its core, 

and the responsibility to develop strategic assessments for national leaders, 

intelligence and its managers are favorably positioned to provide an initial 

understanding or net assessment of cyberspace conflict. Further, because the 

U.S. Intelligence Community has a strong program for assessing external as 

well as internal threats and opportunities, and one’s understanding of the 

familiar is often improved by reference to a less familiar, but similar set of 
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362

circumstances, this essay will examine the status of Brazil’s cybersecurity arrangements as a way to improve understanding of the U.S. situation. 

In 2001, the U.S. Congress recognized the need for protecting cyberspace 

when a new law found that “[p]rivate business, government, and the national security apparatus increasingly depend on an interdependent network 

of critical physical and information infrastructures, including telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, and transportation sectors.”706 That 

interdependent network is cyberspace. The World Bank reports that in 2010, 

75 percent of people in the United States, and slightly over 40 percent of the 

population of Brazil, were active in cyberspace.707

Many governments lease commercial communications lines, and even commercial devices. The U.S. military relies on some leased telecommunications 

lines708—and those lines are part of the cyber domain. Thus military and 

critical infrastructure data can easily be on or pass through the same bit of 

cyberspace as intellectual property information from a private company, or 

a private citizen’s bank account information. In the United States, personnel 

and agencies responsible for protecting cyber infrastructure include the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Commerce, as well as 

the overall Intelligence Community.709

Seven U.S. national cybersecurity centers support the intelligence, defense, 

civilian, and law enforcement/counterintelligence communities of the U.S. 

government. At least three of them also provide support and guidance to 

nongovernment users.710 Figure 13 shows the centers, which communities 

they primarily belong to, and their respective authorities and responsibilities. 

It also lists the functions carried out by each center. 

Note that these centers do not directly include any commercial or academic cybersecurity organizations or companies. U.S. CERT and the NCCIC 

(through, in part, regional and topical Information Sharing and Analysis 

Centers-ISACs) do provide information to the Internet industry and other 

private-sector entities, and the NCIJTF provides support to other law enforcement and regulatory agencies. Through coordination, any of the centers 

may provide information useful to the others. However, the NCCIC has the 

overall responsibility to coordinate information sharing. Representatives from 
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U.S. Government Cybersecurity Centers

Function:1. Analyzing cyberspace activity2. Collaborating with other centers3. Collecting information4. Investigating5. Monitoring activity6. Responding (this includes alertsmitigation, and other responses)

NCIJTF : National Cyber investigative Joint Task Force (FBI)IC-IRC: Intelligence Community Incident Response Center (DNI)NCCIC: National Cybersecurity and Communications IntegrationCenter (DHS)U.S. CERT: U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (DHS)NTOC: National Threat Operations Center (DoD/DNI)DC-3: Defense Cyber Crime Center (DoD)U.S. CYBERCOM: U.S. Cyber Command (DoD)

Responsibility/Authority:

Situational AwarenessGovernment/Private coordinationNational SecurityForeign intelligence

color coding: Intelligence Community

 Military Law Enforcement Other federal government/private sector 

IIII

U.S. CERT1, 2, 3, 5, 6

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

NCIJTF2, 3, 4, 5, 6

NCCIC1, 2, 3, 6

DC-3 

1, 2, 4

NTOC

1, 2, 5, 6 U.S. CYBERCOM 1, 5,6

I

I

I

IC-IRC

1, 2, 3, 5, 6

Figure 13. 

Source: Developed by the author. Data are from 2012.
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Figure 14. 

Source: Developed by the author. Data are from 2012. Brazilian Government Cybersecurity Efforts Function: 1. Analyzing cyberspace activity 2. Collaborating with other centers 3. Collecting information 4. Investigating 5. Monitoring activity 6. Responding (this includes alerts mitigation, and other responses) GSI: Gabinete de Segurança Institucional - Institutional Security Cabinet (Intelligence) CERT.br: Computer Emergency Response Team, part of CGI.br: Brazil Internet Steering Committee

CDCIBER: Center for Cyber Defense (MoD)National Police: Ministry of JusticeSERPRO: Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados 

(Ministry of Finance)

Responsibility/Authority:

Situational AwarenessGovernment/Private coordinationNational SecurityForeign intelligence

color coding: Intelligence Community

 Military Law Enforcement Other federal government/private sector 

IIII

National Police

1, 3, 4

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

CERT br1, 2, 3, 5, 6

SERPRO

5 CDCIBER 1, 5, 6

I

I

GSI

1, 3, 5
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the U.S. Department of State work in these centers to handle international 

aspects of cybersecurity.

An intelligence manager answering similar information needs for the government of Brazil also faces a complex challenge. Just as in the United States, 

many organizations provide cybersecurity for the government and society. 

Figure 14 shows some of those organizations, their functions, and their responsibilities. CERT.br, the Brazilian Computer Emergency Response Team, 

functions much like US-CERT.711 SERPRO, a public/private company, provides data processing for many of the civilian parts of the Brazilian federal 

government.712

The Brazilian Federal Police acts as the primary law enforcement organization for cybersecurity,713 although Brazilian state police also participate in 

cyberspace law enforcement.714 The Brazilian Federal Prosecutor’s Office and 

the Ministry of Justice handle prosecution of cybercriminal activity. These 

two have responsibilities similar to the U.S. FBI. The federal government’s 

Center for Cyberdefense (CDCIBER) protects the military and governmental network, as well as Brazilian information infrastructure as a whole.715

The Brazilian Army created and manages this organization, which has responsibilities similar to those of the U.S. Cyber Command. The Brazilian 

Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) serves a function parallel to that of the 

U.S. Intelligence Community. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), a 

civilian organization, operates within the GSI.716 Finally, the Department of 

Information and Communications Security (DSIC) provides cybersecurity 

for the Brazilian government’s executive branch.717

The illustrations of U.S. and Brazilian cybersecurity efforts highlight the 

overlapping interests of the various organizations responsible for addressing 

hostile action in cyberspace. Although some parallel structures exist, lines of 

communication and information sharing differ markedly. The lines are virtually nonexistent for Brazil, while the number of lines between U.S. centers 

may generate so much information sharing that the detection of repetitive, 

circular reporting can become a problem. 

In an interview, General Jose Carlos dos Santos, the commander of CDCiber, 

indicated he was working to establish close ties with GSI, as well as SERPRO.718

Such efforts are apparently not universal across all communities, however. 
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A civil police cyber expert, Emerson Wendt, commented that the Brazilian 

Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) simply receives information, and does 

not share it with other organizations with cybersecurity responsibilities.719

CERT.br, an organization subordinate to CGI.br, has responsibility for 

computer security incident reports in Brazil. Its role and authority in providing 

threat warning remain unclear, however.720

Like an intelligence manager supporting U.S. efforts to defend cyberspace, 

a Brazilian intelligence manager has the opportunity to anticipate and make 

sense of cyberthreats, taking into account the country’s disparate institutional 

arrangements established to handle various aspects of current and future cyberattacks and intrusions. A Brazilian intelligence manager faces a less complex information-sharing infrastructure than his counterpart in the U.S., it 

appears. 

Managing Cyberspace Security from an 

Intelligence Perspective

The illustrations of cybersecurity centers in the U.S. and Brazil give us some 

idea of the overlap of interests, authorities, and responsibilities encountered 

in defending cyberspace. Questions that surround an attack or intrusion are 

of course numerous, and include, among other things: What happened after 

unauthorized access was gained? Was something altered or stolen? Was it a 

repeat of an earlier event? Do we know the computer code (or tool) used? The 

intelligence manager should know the answers to many of these questions 

(and other related ones) so that he or she may wisely manage the intelligence 

actions needed to suppress ongoing incidents or to prevent future events. 

Intelligence agencies responsible for cybersecurity can expect to interact with 

the entire set of centers in their respective countries. The interaction requires 

a two-way exchange of information. 

A hypothetical scenario will help illuminate the dynamics of an actionable 

cyberevent in the context of the diverse institutional cybersecurity 

environment of Brazil and the United States. (To ensure that this scenario is 

clearly hypothetical, it will refer to countries A, B, C, etc., and individual or 

groups of cyberintruders 1, 2, 3, etc.) Suppose that a group of intruders (#1) 

gained unauthorized access to a government website of country A (and the 

databases linked to it). Once it gained access, the group started downloading 
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information as well as changing the website. The intruder group (a loose 

alliance made up of individuals from countries A, B, C, D) then sold or gave 

away some of the database information to other intruders (# 2, #3, and #4), 

in countries E and F. 

The changes to the website at first seemed nothing more than defacement, 

but government cyber investigators discovered that some data were destroyed. 

The defenders also found two programs the intruder group left behind. One 

would automatically log information about anyone who visits the website 

and send it to a server in country C. The other program would attempt to 

take control of any government computer whose user downloads a particular 

file. The government cyberdefenders were able to immediately deactivate the 

two leave-behind programs. 

Some of the databases contained personal information on government employees as well as private citizens. Some contained information used for government 

policy development, and some also contained information about government 

contracts with companies that support national defense, law enforcement, and 

a national health service. Finally, some of the databases contained system administrator data, including passwords that allow varying levels of access to the 

databases. Although nothing in any of the databases was marked “classified,” 

some of the government policy and contract information was and is “sensitive.” Government employees and private citizens would be concerned that 

their personal information had been accessed without authorization. 

Impetus to Share Cybersecurity Incident Information

Because this scenario involves a domestic as well as a foreign threat to country 

A’s government, to the private sector, and to private citizens, all of the communities discussed in this essay will need to learn enough to protect their 

future operations in cyberspace. As the discussion shows, each of the four 

communities (intelligence, military, law enforcement, and private sector)— 

which, for this essay, includes the entire Internet industry—will initially have 

only partial knowledge of the case. 

As key players, intelligence managers will want to know who intruded so 

that they could monitor for future activity of the foreign actors that make up 

intruder group #1, and of the other intruders—ideally to provide warning 

of future intrusions. They would want to know what happened—sufficient 
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details of the attack to allow them to look for other indications and associations that may help them understand why the intrusion occurred. The 

“what” in this case might be the tools and tactics the intruders used as well 

as the metadata about what information was in the databases. The actual 

information within the databases would probably be beyond the authority of 

intelligence managers to acquire, but may be accessible to counterintelligence 

organizations. Intelligence managers would want to know the “why” as well. 

This might give them a better picture or estimate of the level of the threat to 

national security. 

The military community, and in particular military intelligence, would be 

interested in the event for several reasons—not the least of which is the nature 

of the access to defense contract information gained by the intruders. They 

would also certainly be interested because the intruders destroyed data, meeting the definition of an attack. If the military community were responsible 

for a national CERT beyond its own networks, then the need for detailed 

information becomes even broader.721

The law enforcement (LE) community, and especially any specialized unit 

focused on developing intelligence, has perhaps the broadest information 

needs in this scenario. They need to know whom to prosecute and what evidence may be useful in court for developing a motive and leads for criminal 

prosecution. The LE community needs details about what happened so it 

can determine what laws have been broken. Since there are both foreign and 

domestic members of intruder group #1, the LE community would deal with 

both national and international courts in attempting to prosecute. The LE 

community need for information on all related intruders may depend on the 

cyber laws in country A. 

The private-sector community may seem to have the least diverse information needs in this scenario, but that initial judgment may be misleading. For 

example, who the intruders are may or may not be important from an immediate response viewpoint, but what happened and why certainly are. The private sector at large, and especially government contractors, would also want 

to know what was downloaded just as it would want to know what tools 

and tactics were used. What was downloaded would be important from an 

operational as well as a legal standpoint. Tools and tactics information would 

allow the private sector to be better prepared to protect networks within its 
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own purview. Depending on that purview (and the laws in country A), the 

cybersecurity offices of the private sector might also need to know some details about the personal information that was stolen, to be able to alert those 

individuals to the fact of the intrusion. 

Knowing what the various cybersecurity communities need to know, and 

why, remains the critical foundation for sharing intelligence information. It 

allows intelligence managers, who will tend to have the broadest overview of 

the incident, to know what information to try to gather—which can allow 

them to know what sources to look for and what methods to use to gain information from those sources. However, impediments do exist to the smooth 

and unrestricted gathering and sharing of information, even by national intelligence agencies. 

Impediments to Sharing Cyberintelligence Information

Just as intelligence managers have an obligation to gather and share a broad 

range of information, they also have an obligation to protect both the information they gain722 and the sources and methods used to obtain it. The 

second obligation can complicate meeting the first. The scenario above can be 

used to frame a discussion of some aspects of that complication.

An effective intelligence manager should ensure that his organization has legal access to a variety of sources of information. Some of that information 

may be openly gathered and thus may not be classified. Gaining information 

from other sources may require clandestine or covert methods. Sometimes 

the source of the information may determine the level of classification and 

even the way that information is handled. Sometimes the information itself, 

regardless of the methods used to gather it, will determine the classification. 

And sometimes, it is the combination of the two that may require a higher 

classification. In addition to the restrictions that come with classifying information, most intelligence managers will also face restrictions on sharing it 

widely, especially outside of an intelligence community. 

In the case of the scenario above, an intelligence agency may gather intelligence 

information about who was a part of intruder group #1, as well as the identity 

of intruder #2 and #3. This information may have come from sources and 

methods that require a medium-level classification as well as some sources 

that require the highest-level classification. The agency also may have gathered 
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information on the tools and tactics that the intruder group used. The tools 

and tactics information may have come from the highest-level sources; and in 

addition the information must be handled through special means. 

The point of classification and dissemination restrictions is to safeguard 

information, sources, and methods. Thus, only those with access to the 

appropriate security levels should be able to obtain the information. In most 

governments, high-level national security advisers or ministers would have the 

clearances and authorizations needed to see all the information on intruders 

#1, #2, and #3, plus the details of their tools and tactics. However, information 

at the highest levels of classification and authority may not be available to 

most members of the military, the LE, or private-sector communities. That is 

why cyberincident information should be handled by specialized intelligence 

units of the military and LE communities made up of individuals with highlevel intelligence information access, to ensure that all potentially relevant 

data are available in their respective operating environments.

In the absence of specialized military or LE intelligence personnel or units, 

what can an intelligence manager do to help satisfy the information needs of 

those without high-level clearance levels and additional authorizations? One 

approach to answering this is described in a U.S. Intelligence Community 

Directive: 

Utility is maximized when customers receive or are able to 

expeditiously discover and pull or request intelligence, information, and analysis in a form they are able to easily use 

and able to share with their colleagues, subordinates, and 

superiors. WMU [write for maximum utility] ensures intelligence, information, and analysis are produced in a manner 

to facilitate reuse—either in its entirety or in coherent portions—thereby enabling wider dissemination and enhancing its usability.723

The concept of WMU describes a goal rather than an action. Another section of the directive refers to “sanitization,” implying that it is one of the 

actions that may achieve the goal. However the directive does not define “sanitization.” Sanitization removes source or method information that originally 
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required marking/handling at a high security level, so that intelligence information may be reported at a lower security level. The directive does require 

that “[s]anitized products should never render facts or judgments in a manner 

inconsistent with their higher-classified version—facts, judgments, confidence 

levels, and probabilistic language must be congruent.”724 Keeping all this in 

mind, intelligence managers should be able to provide varying levels of detail 

about the activity described in the scenario, depending on the security access 

level of the intended recipient. This technique may apply both to national and 

to international sharing efforts.

An intelligence community may not have the authority to share intelligence 

information with the private sector. In the United States, most members of 

the Intelligence Community are authorized to share intelligence information 

only with other federal agencies.725 Any sharing with the private sector risks 

the appearance of favoritism if government information reaches only some 

representatives of the private sector. 

Sharing Cyberintelligence Information Internationally

Many countries have specific information-exchange agreements with others. 

Most are community-to-community agreements; that is, military-to-military, 

law enforcement-to-law enforcement, and intelligence to intelligence. With 

respect to the scenario presented, country A may have an agreement with 

country C to share information between law-enforcement communities, but 

not necessarily between intelligence communities. The private sector also 

shares information internationally. Of course, some parts of the private sector 

operate internationally, with interests and information gathering capabilities 

in many foreign jurisdictions. 

Many countries belong to multilateral organizations. In the illustrative scenario, all members belong to the Organization of American States (OAS), 

which has established information-sharing agreements involving a number 

of the communities discussed in this essay. Further, it has a cybersecurity 

strategy that outlines the importance of information sharing—not only sharing information about a threat, but also about cybersecurity practices within 

member states. This strategy was created by an OAS secretariat for legal affairs 

working group and specifically addresses the issue of trust:
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Since much of the information that CSIRTs [Computer Security Incident Response Teams] need to exchange is proprietary or otherwise sensitive, trust must be developed among 

the participants as an essential element of the hemispheric 

network. To build such trusted relationships, CSIRTs should 

be created to possess ... a secure infrastructure for managing 

sensitive information; the ability to communicate securely 

with stakeholders; and procedures to guard against inappropriate disclosure of information. Member states will always 

maintain the right to decide on the type of information that 

will be exchanged through their designated CSIRTs.726

This document, and the philosophy it embodies, closely parallels the approach suggested above, whereby within an individual country, specialized 

intelligence units in military intelligence and police intelligence organizations 

facilitate sharing of intelligence information about cyberincidents. 

Exploring Potential Improvements in Cybersecurity 

Information Sharing

National cyberspace security has become more than a “whole of government” 

issue—it is an all-of-the-nation concern, and as such poses severe challenges to 

those who need to share threat information, especially intelligence specialists 

and their managers. The intelligence community typically leads a country’s 

capability to monitor the foreign context in which criminally or ideologically 

based cyber capabilities and intentions take form. With this breadth of responsibility, it is only logical that the most thorough exploration of potential 

improvements in information-sharing policies and practices throughout the 

cyberdefense system would be undertaken from an intelligence perspective. 

The preceding discussion of intelligence information sharing about the threat 

of hostile action in cyberspace addressed current policies and practices—at least 

in general terms. But what if intelligence managers could influence those policies and practices? What might they choose to influence? The following points 

take into account the idea that some aspects of these recommendations may 

already be practiced, but have not yet been formalized or institutionalized.
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1. Build flexibility into the intelligence requirements process. In the United 

States at least, the formal intelligence requirements process works fairly 

well; it establishes a consumer’s needs and seeks to explain their importance, then prioritizes the needs. However, at times an intelligence service 

may legitimately discover something of great importance, but which has 

not yet been identified as a need. Intelligence requirements processes must 

be flexible enough to accommodate that prospect.

2. Consider whether the Intelligence Community should have authority to 

monitor the threat of hostile activity in cyberspace within the United 

States. Of course, the political contest between security and privacy or 

freedom will provide the ultimate answer to this question. Society itself 

will need to resolve where that balance is struck. Can an intelligence manager ethically and morally influence the society’s decision? Perhaps—if in 

no other way than by informing society of the threat and establishing 

trust. It does appear that the Intelligence Community, with its existing 

legislative and judicial oversight arrangements, can suitably exercise that 

authority.

3. Treat cyberspace as a culturally distinct domain. “Changing the culture” 

of information sharing within a bureaucracy is one of the easiest things 

to say and probably one of the hardest to accomplish. One of the things 

intelligence managers can do is to share as much as laws, policy, and regulations allow. Another thing intelligence managers must do is to explain, 

in understandable terms, why they can or cannot share. 

● What to share (and at what security level)? In the United States, current 

policy establishes what information must be classified, how it is handled, 

and who may see it. At issue, to some, is whether existing laws and rules 

are being appropriately applied to cyberspace-related intelligence. At least 

one authority finds that the role of intelligence in cyberspace needs to be 

defined and implemented differently. General Michael Hayden, former 

director of the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence 

Agency, recommends that we ask a series of hard questions about cybersecurity and the protection of information in this domain. For example, 

“What constitutes a 21st century definition of a reasonable expectation
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of privacy?”727 In that light, intelligence managers might benefit from a 

general reassessment of the concept of privacy and private information in 

cyberspace. As General Hayden says, “Google and Facebook know a lot

more about most of us than we are comfortable sharing with the 

government.”728

● With whom to share? An ever-increasing number of potential customers 

seek intelligence information on cyberspace threats. 

❍ Current restrictions forbid intelligence managers from sharing with

 certain subsets of customers (federal to state, local, or tribal sharing). 

 Good reasons support this approach for most intelligence (such as the 

 federal vs. state’s rights debate over who pays for or regulates what), but 

 for cyberspace threats, the situation is different. Physical boundaries 

 mean little in cyberspace, and the logic of symmetry suggests that a 

 sound defense against cyberthreats likewise should not be restricted 

 geographically through a differentiation between internal and external 

 threats. 

❍ Sharing intelligence information with members of the private sector

 is difficult to do, and may be forbidden. Some reasons for not sharing

 in this case seem understandable: the problem of how to avoid showing

 favoritism and the existence of differences in trustworthiness of some

 establishments over others. However, an important synergy will be 

 attained when intelligence managers can share equally with the private 

 sector and the federal government. U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein has

 encouraged President Obama to make changes in this area. She urged

 the creation of an executive order that would “direct the Intelligence

 Community and the Department of Homeland Security to provide

 as much information as possible to the private sector about cyberthreats, 

 including classified information.”729 The British Government Com-

 munications Headquarters has developed a program called “Cyber 

 Security Guidance for Business” to establish cooperative information

 sharing between British intelligence and the British private sector.730

❍ Sharing cyber-security information multilaterally, never an easy 

 prospect, should be greatly helped by a clarification of rules for internal 
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 sharing within individual countries. This objective can be understood

 and promoted by addressing the final question below.

4. Identify an existing intelligence, law enforcement, or defense agency or 

create a new one to centralize the security and defense of cyberspace across 

public and private domains. Currently, for anyone dealing with the threat 

of hostile action in cyberspace, knowing who is in charge of information 

collection, analysis, and cyber-threat identification and legal prosecution 

appears impossible, given so many national communities, each with different responsibilities and leadership. If intelligence managers could influence any executive branch policies and practices, they should recommend 

the establishment of a central authority for cyber defense. Whether it be 

the law enforcement, intelligence, or defense community, someone needs 

to be in charge. Laws, executive orders, policy guidance, and regulations 

need to act on this recommendation so that all communities can identify 

their role in defending the nation—and its allies.

In any country, the central entity would need three sets of authorities or 

responsibilities (or their equivalent): foreign intelligence, law enforcement, 

and regulatory (rule-setting). In the United States, an organization that already has this set of authorities and responsibilities is the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Perhaps that organization, in the way it manages its intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory responsibilities, could serve as a model for a cyberspace 

security organization. The Coast Guard was effective in combining intelligence capabilities together with law and regulatory enforcement responsibilities during the Prohibition Era in U.S. history, when a high volume of illegal 

alcoholic beverages entered the United States as contraband from near-shore 

vessels, an activity often coordinated by organized criminal groups.731

Equally as important, the central agency will need to establish and maintain 

trust among U.S. citizens: 

● Trust that personal privacy and national security can be complementary in practice, rather than always at odds as separate and competing 

deals. Society must determine that it can trust the government to

monitor certain activity in cyberspace, at levels that might at least

approach what the private sector currently monitors. The government (especially the agencies responsible for cyberspace security)
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376

must maintain society’s trust that it will protect privacy as established 

by the laws that society accepts.

● Trust that the government and the private sector can work together 

to share information. This too is a two-way street. Government must

trust the private sector to protect sensitive information. The private

sector must trust that the government will protect intellectual property and proprietary information. Both must trust that the other will 

use shared information for the purposes intended by law and policy.

Author’s Biography

Robin M. Rogers holds a master’s degree in strategic intelligence from the 

Defense Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence University) and 

another master’s in history from the University of Maryland. He served in 

the U.S. Air Force for 30 years, retiring as a colonel. Subsequently, in the 

Department of Defense, he worked in intelligence as an analyst and teacher 

of analysts before moving to a corporate policy position. As a faculty member 

at NIU, he has used his combined intelligence, cyber, and policy experience 

to develop the cyberspace operations curriculum for the University. Email: 

Robin.Rogers@dodiis.mil. 
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© This essay has been copyrighted, 2014. All rights reserved.

Harnessing Security Sector Intellectual Capital: 

Transforming Advisor Situational Awareness into Sociopolitical Understanding in a Smart Power Environment

William S. Brei

Nathalie J. Frensley

Killaurin O. Roberts

“[A]s this ‘Afghan Surge’ draws down and more financial and political constraints kick in, we’re going to have to seriously empower 

mentors as an organization. Their tactical social advantages with 

their counterparts will have to be fused into real operational impacts. Otherwise, the Alliance’s strategic goals will become a thin 

eggshell and the nations will just start pointing fingers.”

—NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) 

Commander’s remarks during Cigar Night, October 2010, Afghanistan

The OMLT commander’s informal remarks refer to the complexities facing all advising efforts, from district to ministerial levels, in the smart power 

environment of Afghanistan operations. These complexities, as we explain 

below, stem from both host- and donor-nation sovereignty issues that, on 

the one hand, intensify the need for greater sociopolitical understanding of 

host-nation partners, but on the other create obstacles and tighter restrictions 

to obtaining it. In this essay, we present the Sociopolitical Network and Behavioral Analysis Team (SNBAT) construct, employed in Afghanistan from 

2010 to early 2012, in support of a multinational effort, ministerial-level 

advising team tasked with building capacity and capability of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).732 We offer the SNBAT construct 

as a straightforward strategy and model for Security Sector Reform (SSR) 

advising missions to gain sociopolitical understanding of their host-nation 

counterparts in today’s politically charged smart power environments.

Particularly in a smart power multinational effort, we observe a tendency for 

the advised host-nation’s political relationships and actions to be relatively 

independent and autonomous, in line with their often-assertive statements 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

378

about maintaining sovereignty.733 As we explain below, understanding the 

social and political forces that affect a host nation’s security partners in such 

an environment is crucial for the success of SSR advising missions. In the 

past, intelligence organizations would have provided advising missions with 

this environmental information. However, as we further explain, application 

of the smart power approach has created circumstances that cause intelligence organizations to encounter tighter restrictions on their activities. Part 

of the reason for these restrictions stems from host-nation sovereignty considerations, but the difficulties of multinational intelligence coordination also 

contribute. Additionally, the politically sensitive nature of the advising mission itself prevents intelligence organizations from providing or appearing to 

provide secretive, in-depth sociopolitical information or analyses to advisors, 

for fear of losing the trust of host-nation partners. Thus, the advisor corps in a 

smart power environment needs to solve the problem of how to meet its own 

pressing situational understanding needs in a mission requiring face-to-face 

engagement with high-level representatives of the host nation. 

We address this problem within the framework of intellectual capital. Capturing, 

compiling, developing and preserving an organization’s intellectual capital are 

the means to transform it into a learning organization. The SNBAT strategy, 

in an advising mission context, is to apply strategic management of intellectual 

capital to enable an advising mission to carry out what have traditionally 

been military and civilian intelligence functions without the negative mission 

hazards that come with participating in a centralized intelligence bureaucracy. 

The nature of a SNBAT wholly and solely within the advising mission helps 

to ensure confidentiality of what are simultaneously personal and professional 

relationships for advisors, even as the team combines individual advisor 

information to create a coherent, bird’s-eye view of the advising mission’s 

sociopolitical environment. 

The authors draw from their experiences with the Afghan National Army 

Development (ANA DEV), a multinational ministerial advising element of 

the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A), to suggest how advising missions in smart power environments can create an organic intellectual 

capital management capability to capture, preserve, and coherently combine 

advisors’ sociopolitical insights and experiences and enhance mission effectiveness. By capably connecting the unconnected, capturing know-how in 
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context, delivering information and insights directly to the point of execution, and adopting a long historical view–the four elements of the ANA-DEV 

SNBAT’s intellectual capital development–sociopolitical understanding is 

created from advisors’ situational awareness. 

Smart Power and the Demand for Sociopolitical Analysis

in Military Advising Environments

U.S. Special Forces have historically carried out the responsibilities of advising foreign security forces. A recent consequence of the rise of smart power 

in U.S. foreign and national security policy is the increased participation of 

conventional forces734 in SSR advising, particularly at the national (ministerial) security force levels.735

Smart power “underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests 

heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand 

American influence and establish legitimacy of American action.”736 The 

smart power approach combines coercive and inducive “hard” types of power, 

on the one hand, with attraction and co-option “soft” types of power, on the 

other.737 Smart power’s emphasis on alliances, partnerships, and institutions 

necessarily requires viewing national sovereignty less in terms of relative gain 

(zero-sum, win-lose) and more so in terms of absolute gain (variable-sum, 

win-win).738

Security sector development–the full range of activities undertaken by a nation and its partners to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice 

to its citizens739–is a key smart power activity.740 Security sector reform reestablishes or reshapes “institutions and key ministerial positions that maintain 

and provide oversight for the safety and security of the host nation and its 

people” [our emphasis].741 Security sector advising, particularly at the ministerial level, emphasizes the soft side of smart power because advisors must 

“persuasively articulate suggestions to their ... counterparts” in lieu of “directly implementing changes necessary for SSR.”742 Indeed, “advisors’ success 

depends on their ability to convey recommendations in a manner that makes 

change acceptable to their advisees.”743

Smart power has three components: fusion of military, diplomacy and 

development powers,744 promotion of democracy and a market economy,745
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and participation in multilateral operations with increased United Nations 

engagement.746 Each component affects the operating environment 

of security sector advising. Security sector advising takes place in an 

environment of democracy promotion, typically where accountable and 

transparent governance has broken down and where democracy building 

may be unpopular with local power brokers. In Afghanistan, smart power 

multilateralism takes place within the NATO alliance structure, which in turn 

operates under a U.N. mandate. Various unique requirements747 complicate 

the command and coordination of multinational advising missions.748

Security sector development takes place in conflict, postconflict, and/or weak 

state environments in which host-nation military and civilian authorities are 

to coordinate plans and actions alongside international community military, 

diplomatic, and development officials who likewise are to coordinate their 

actions.749

Afghan Society

Afghan

 Security 

Forces

Afghan 

Government

Global 

Community Mandates 

Democracy Promotion

The Advising Mission’s 

Complex Operational

Environment

Advising Endeavors

International Commitments

Contributions

Security

Advising

Organization

Multilateralism

Diplomatic Restraints

Multinationalism

Restraints

Figure 15: The Advising Mission’s Complex Operational Environment

Source: Created by the authors.

Smart power expands the scope and level of understanding that ministerial 

security sector advisors need about the sociopolitical and behavioral environment in which they work. Some specific elements of that environment 

include: 
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● Their counterpart’s individual histories and their formal and nonformal relationships within the host nation’s security organization;

● The security organization’s history and formal and nonformal relationships within the wider governmental power structures, including

other government ministries and units; 

● The social history and relationships within and between societal 

groups, including civil society, economic, and religious actors.

The human face of these general requirements is illustrated in the following 

vignettes.

An advisor was frustrated about the amount of time a counterpart spent in meetings 

with individuals from outside the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Ministry 

of Defense (MoD). The counterpart had spent almost the entirety of his military 

career at one of the ANA’s training schools, starting prior to the Afghan-Soviet war. 

His career history gave him the unique ability to vet claims of former mujahidin 

who sought to join the ANA at credited rank based on earlier service prior to the 

Soviet-Afghan war. When this was brought to the advisor’s attention, it became 

clear that the general’s “social visits” to discuss events that happened more than 

three decades before were in fact very important duties for ensuring professionalism, given the loss of official records during Afghanistan’s many conflicts. This 

advisor also now realized that this general was a unique resource for understanding 

the history and evolution of ANA doctrine, maneuver, and training.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) insisted that a very wellconnected individual at the center of a high-profile scandal be removed from duty, 

and received assurances that would happen. An analyst outside of ANA-DEV wrote 

a widely circulated report alleging that one MoD leader was a participant in the 

scandal because of his apparent slowness in following through on those assurances. 

The analyst did not take into account that the MoD leader, of the same ethnicity 

as the individual to be removed from duty, was securing the support of clan elders 

for the latter’s removal and thereby preempting appeals to clan loyalties to reverse 

the decision. Moreover, the MoD leader and the individual to be removed were in 

different political factions within the ethnic group. Additionally, the analyst did 

not take into account that Afghan social norms prevent “firing” a colleague who is 

a peer in status or an ethnic compatriot; however, it is permissible to move them 

laterally to another position. 
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One counterpart had been demoted to a lesser position within the MoD a few years 

prior by the president, leading advisors to regard him as no longer a powerful player 

among the military leadership. The current advisor found out, however, that this 

individual was the senior elder of a historically influential tribe. Additional research 

suggested that throughout Afghanistan’s modern history a disproportionately high 

number of civil servants were drawn from this tribe. In this instance, the counterpart’s influential tribal status overshadowed and robustly compensated for what 

was a demotion only in office. 

Sociopolitical insight allows an understanding of reasons that may lie behind 

a counterpart’s actions that seem to have no purpose except to stall and delay. 

Such insight also points to the “influentials” who “can get things done” 

within an authority structure that remains obscure to an outsider. In short, 

advisors with deep understanding of the operating environment, as opposed 

to superficial awareness of culturally appropriate conventions of social 

engagement, are able to capitalize on social knowledge. 

Of Mice and Mousetraps: Understanding an Advising

Mission’s Unique Information and Knowledge 

Management Needs

Upon its inception, ANA-DEV assimilated several organizations that had 

over the previous decade contributed to advising and mentoring the Afghan 

Ministry of Defense (MoD).750 Advisor-produced individualized quarterly 

ministerial development plans (MDPs), with defined objectives, milestones, 

and measures of success, were established to monitor and evaluate progress 

toward professionalization of the Afghan MoD’s many assistant ministers’ offices, staff sections, and special units. 

As part of quarterly evaluations, advisors were expected to produce what were 

referred to as “Human Terrain Maps” about their counterparts. ANA-DEV 

advisors had a wealth of information and insights about the sociopolitical environment. However, advisors lacked information and analysis support to place 

or corroborate their insights into deep historical context and/or relationally 

into the social networks of the sometimes-changing contemporary political, 

social, or religious environments. Additionally, the “Human Terrain Maps” 

were restricted to one slide and structured to produce non-networked “ego” 

charts or Venn diagrammatic representations of very broad social grouping 
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information. Opportunities were lost to combine individual advisor awareness of the bits and pieces of their counterpart’s sociopolitical environment 

into a larger, more comprehensive advising mission organizational situational 

understanding of the Afghan MoD as a professionalizing security organization, as a security organization within a political governmental environment, 

and as a politically potent governmental security organization within Afghan 

society. 

Worse than the lost opportunities resulting from the “Human Terrain 

Mapping” shortcomings was the evaporation of advisors’ insights about and 

influence with their counterparts once their tours of duty ended. At the time 

ANA-DEV had no in-house knowledge management capability to capture 

and retain their unique sociopolitical and behavioral information. Without 

capture and retention of advisor information, a corporate body of advising 

knowledge could not be developed for second-, third-, and fourth-generation 

advisors. Afghan counterparts saw for themselves the overall lack of corporate, 

cumulated knowledge and recognized the weak, beginner’s level of awareness of 

their sociopolitical realities on the part of most new advisors. From the advisory 

perspective, to use a mouse and mousetrap analogy, ANA-DEV did not seek to 

capture and retain information for the sake of building a mousetrap database as 

would be the case for a formal intelligence organization; rather, ANA-DEV saw 

its advisors’ prospective intellectual capital as a means to build a more resilient 

and knowledgeable mouse in a turbulent and changing environment. 

The Uniqueness of Information from the 

Advising Relationship

Individual ANA-DEV advisors typically spent one year in Afghanistan. During that year, an advisor would spend between 15 and 40 hours per week with 

counterparts, depending on the closeness of the relationship. Sometimes advisors would travel with their counterparts. Some advisors built rapport based 

on the respect shown by having made an effort to advance beyond elementary 

proficiency in the Dari or Pashto languages. The ample time an ANA-DEV 

advisor spent with a counterpart typically provided tremendous visibility and 

opportunity to gain insights about a single individual’s decisionmaking and 

behavioral tendencies, shaped by historical events, political influence, and 

clique and factional memberships within the MoD and ANA, Government 
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of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and wider Afghan society. Few who 

serve in Afghanistan, including intelligence analysts working at the large forward operating bases, have as much visibility and contact time with senior 

Afghans as do the advisors to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

Ministries of Defense and Interior. 

An advisor’s daily work provided access to freely available yet singularly unique 

insights about their individual counterpart. For example, advisors sometimes 

worked with their counterparts on developing policies. MoD policies have 

both signatures and signature blocks. MoD ministers’ signature blocks can 

provide, to those willing to translate from Dari or Pashto, a complete name, 

from which it is possible to identify not only family but subtribal and tribal 

or clan affiliations, education accomplishments, preferred forms of address, 

and sometimes commands or offices held. In some cases the signature blocks 

contained statements about exploits or aspirations. Additionally, because signature blocks were self-written by the Afghan counterpart, they served as a 

“social presentation of self”751 in ways conventional resumes could not. 

The uniqueness of an advisor’s insight comes from gaining and holding a 

counterpart’s trust. This has two consequences. First, insights developed from 

an advising relationship makes them inherently sensitive, but not because 

of the nature of any given insight. Rather, advisor insights are inherently 

sensitive because if a counterpart perceives a lack of discretion on the part 

of the advisor, trust and respect in the relationship will erode. A second, related consequence is that a great many advisors, though eager to analyze the 

sociopolitical environment and their counterpart’s role in it, resist engagement with intelligence organizations out of concern for how the information 

embedded in their dialog will be used outside the advising mission. Many 

advisors at NTM-A self-identified as “correctors, not collectors,” and their 

avoidance of intelligence organizations intensified as the infamous Wikileaks 

episode unfolded. 

Unpacking the Problem: The Strategic Management 

of Advisors’ Intellectual Capital

When mentors and advisors, such as the OMLT Commander, asserted that 

“tactical social advantages ... will have to be fused into real operational impacts,” ANA-DEV leadership understood it to mean compiling an individual 
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advisor’s awareness and insights into a greater comprehensive understanding 

of MoD’s organizational, sociopolitical and behavioral environment. ANADEV leadership did not see the comprehensive understanding gap as a problem caused by advisors’ lack of learning and applying advising principles and 

techniques, initial country-specific knowledge, or experience in Afghanistan. 

Many uniformed service members who advised had multiple previous tours 

in Afghanistan. Many contractor advisors had spent three or more years in 

Afghanistan. ANA-DEV leadership highly valued the knowledge advisors 

brought from their predeployment preparation, including the extensive language and country-specific training given to Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands 

(APH) and the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA).752 Quite the opposite, ANA-DEV leadership, in the words of a Canadian colonel, saw that “too 

much unorganized, untapped advisor information, rather than too little, is 

preventing the advising mission from becoming a learning organization.” 

Since the rise of the knowledge and information economy in the mid-1990s, 

strategic management of intellectual capital and organizational learning have 

been recognized as central to an organization’s competitiveness and meeting 

its goals efficiently. The introduction of an influential volume on intellectual 

capital notes that 

[i]n part, management’s challenge is to orchestrate the transformation of raw intellectual material generated by individuals into intellectual capital–knowledge packaged in forms that 

can be invested directly in the same spirit as the firm’s hard 

assets... Organizations possess immense unstructured storehouses of informal know-how, which in the absence of intellectual capital programs is distributed in a haphazard fashion 

across the minds of individuals and a plethora of recording 

media such as memos, books, voicemail messages, paper files, 

and databases. And even less-tangible intellectual assets are 

embedded implicitly in the workings of the organization itself–in its culture and in its informal routines and processes. 

By more deliberately forming intellectual capabilities from 

this sea of unstructured intellectual material, management 

can more readily invest such capital in opportunities targeted 

to meet strategic knowledge requirements.753
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Intellectual capital and organizational learning are separate but related components of organizational adaptation to an unpredictable external environment. 

When a process for converting intellectual capability into organizational 

capital is in place, a learning organization may emerge. Such an organization 

facilitates learning by its members and continuously transforms itself.754 It 

does so by capturing the insights generated by its different components at the 

operating level and forging those insights into shared corporate knowledge 

across the organization. 

Strategic management of intellectual capital to foster a learning organization 

has three general characteristics. The first is “connect[ing] the unconnected,” 

by providing an informational foundation for “creating and linking communities...with similar interests and tasks.”755 In an advising context, this 

involves compiling each advisor’s insights and knowledge derived from each 

individual advising relationship into a mission’s overall understanding of the 

advising environment. When this is accomplished, advisors begin to improve 

their understanding of the larger systems and processes that constrain their 

counterparts’ actions. 

The second is facilitating “the capture of know-how in context ... [because 

organizations] pragmatically cannot ... require professionals to address general questions about their knowledge as a process outside normal workflows. 

[Organizations] need to build...knowledge that embodies the[ir] particular 

contexts....”756 Applied to advising, this means that a mission’s intellectual 

capital must have competencies and maintain currency of policy knowledge 

about the security institution, the advising process, and the interactions between the two as well as knowledge about the wider sociopolitical environment of the security institution. 

The third element of strategic management fosters a learning organization’s 

“capturing intellectual capital in context [and] delivering it directly to the point 

of execution. Well-formed, investible intellectual capital is of relatively little 

value unless it is delivered to where it is needed at the time it is needed.”757 For 

an advising mission, this third characteristic underscores the need for the intellectual capital capability to originate within and be dedicated to the advising 

mission in order to ensure its value for organizational learning. 
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An additional, fourth element that fosters organizational learning is compilation of the organization’s historical institutional knowledge in addition to its 

current knowledge. Different organizations have varying strategic goals and 

needs, with some, such as advising missions, having to be at the extreme edge 

of adaptation to external environmental changes. For advising missions, those 

changes can include domestic politics in the advisor’s home country, alliance/

coalition politics, and host-nation politics as well as the evolution of professionalization and capability of the counterpart security sector institution. In 

the highly uncertain environment of a security sector advisory mission, that 

mission’s organizational learning needs will most closely resemble those of 

organizations that face strategic renewal. A strategic renewal context places 

additional needs on a learning organization, requiring renewing “organizations [to] explore and learn new ways while concurrently exploiting what they 

have already learned.”758

For an advising mission engaged in assessing “normal” versus “abnormal” 

reactions to change in turbulent environments, its knowledge requirements 

demand that its capability to manage its intellectual capital take a relatively 

long historical view in contextualizing and compiling advisor knowledge. For 

this and the previous three reasons, it is most unlikely that an entity outside 

of the advising mission could successfully manage advisors’ intellectual capital in such a way as to contribute to reforming the mission into a learning 

organization. 

Building ANA-DEV’s Intellectual Capital: How an Advisor’s Situational Awareness Is Organically Transformed 

into an Advising Mission’s SocioPolitical Understanding

The central question ANA-DEV faced in becoming a learning organization 

narrowed to “How can an effective understanding of the MoD’s sociopolitical environment be created out of the situational awareness possessed by the 

combination of individual advisors, particularly in a context of abundant 

data and information?” Although similar questions are central to the work 

of many professions, including those of the academic and the development 

worker, perhaps not surprisingly this question has been intensively studied in 

the context of intelligence analysis itself. The United Kingdom Ministry of 
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Defence Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00 (JDP 2-00), “Understanding and 

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations” has grappled most directly with 

doctrinally answering this foundational question.759 Nonetheless, as explained below, the combination of advising’s unique needs and constraints 

on intelligence analysis prevents even this valuable emergent direction from 

meeting advising mission needs in smart power environments.

JDP 2-00 frames understanding as “refer[ing] to the acquisition and development of knowledge to gain insight (knowing why something has happened or 

is happening) and foresight (being able to identify and anticipate what may 

happen).”760 Achieving understanding demands our “developing the most 

inclusive perspective of an actor, group, environment, or situation.”761 Situational awareness, “the appreciation of what is happening, but not necessarily 

why it is happening”762 necessarily comes first, but it alone remains an insufficient step toward gaining understanding. However, we can observe that an 

“analysis of situational awareness provides greater comprehension (insight) of 

the problem.”763 With early comprehension of the problem, “judgment based 

on comprehensive insight”764 (in the sense of being able to estimate logical 

relationships between causes and consequences of the problem) can provide 

the foresight that leads to being able to identify anticipatory scenarios. 

JDP 2-00 distinguishes understanding from situational awareness by ascribing to understanding a “level of analysis and depth of comprehension that 

allows judgment to be applied effectively.”765 Applying this construct to an 

advising mission requires two minor modifications. These modifications apply to limitations of any analysis support from outside of the advising mission 

to meet the advising mission’s sociopolitical information and understanding 

needs.

First, when an advising mission engages with a ministerial institution, it is 

actually, through its many individual advisors, sequentially engaging with 

their respective individual counterparts. Consequently, advising mission contexts involve multiple counterparts who are socially networked or otherwise 

grouped among themselves but who each have an advisor with an exclusive 

focus on them. To understand the social networks and groups within the advised ministry, there is a need for an all-encompassing scope of comprehension–

a fusion of the insights of all advisors–in addition to the depth identified and 

emphasized by JDP 2-00. Scope of comprehension in addition to depth of 
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comprehension brings us back to the intellectual capital need to connect the 

unconnected and to take the long historical view. 

Second, JDP 2-00 places emphasis on identifying the appropriate level of 

analysis. However, for this construct to be relevant to an advising mission, 

there is the need for multiple levels of analysis to better understand the simultaneous ministry organizational, governmental and societal influences on an 

individual counterpart’s behavior. This corresponds to the intellectual capital 

principle of capturing know-how in context. 

Consequently, the application of JDP 2-00’s concept of understanding to an 

advising mission calls for increased attention to multiple levels of analysis and 

the greater spatiotemporal scope of comprehension that allows judgment to be 

applied effectively.766

The following diagram provides an example of the progression from initial 

situational awareness to understanding of the sociopolitical, relational and 

behavioral dynamics that affect a ministerial advising mission. 
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Situational 

Awareness

The appreciation of 

what is happening, 

but not necessarily 

why it is happening

“My counterpart 

is young, highly 

experienced and a 

brilliant general but 

says he won’t be 

promoted because 

of his ethnicity. The 

figures on Ministry 

ethnic balance 

show they are on 

track. Why is my 

counterpart 

worried?”

— question posed 

by a well-trained, 

insightful adviser 

who appreciates 

the situation and 

recognizes the 

need to obtain 

insightful understanding.

Foresightful

Understanding 

Being able to identify and anticipate 

what may happen

Ethnic Imbalance 

within age groups 

may mean that 

intergenerational 

mentoring between 

counterparts is 

not happening 

as needed for 

capacity-building to 

take hold.

Not factoring ethnic 

balance into advising assignments 

may mean unwitting reinforcement 

of ethnic imbalance 

in the Ministry. 

Judgment

Estimation of logical relationships 

between causes 

and consequences 

of the problem

Analysis 

Developing the most inclusive 

perspective on an actor, group, 

environment, and/or situation

Key Question: Is there a significant 

relationship between age and

ethnicity in the Ministry?

Multiple 

Levels of 

Analysis

Age by Ethnicity

Contingency 

Table

Ethnic Groups

A B C

Age by

your 

Groups

31-40 10 5 15

41-50 20 20 10

51-60 20 30 10

61-70 50 5 5

Multiple 

Levels of 

Analysis

Ethnic Balance % 

(Target 50/30/20)

A B C

Overall 50 30 20

31-40 Year Group 10 8 38

41-50 20 33 25

51-60 20 50 25

61-70 50 8 13

Comprehension:

Insightful Understanding 

Why something has happened or 

is happening

Relationship between ethnicity and 

age group is established (Chi-square = 

58.08, df=6, Yates Chi-square = 52.3) by 

analysis and the problem is comprehended: Although total aggregate 

ethnic balancing targets have been 

met, the Ministry remains ethnically 

imbalanced within age groups. 

Is this caused by 

• governmental 

interference in 

Ministry attempts 

at ethnic balance?

• societal tribal or 

clan influence on 

the military?

• leadership indifference to future 

officer cohorts?

• some other 

social dimension 

or factional influence that is being 

balanced in lieu of 

ethnic balance? 

➣

➣

➣

➣

Scope of 

Comprehension: 

All advisers’ 

information 

on age and 

ethnicity of their 

counterparts

Figure 16: Bridging the Gap between Situational Awareness and Understanding in a Hypothetical Security Sector Reform Problem

Source: Reflection on authors’ field experiences.
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In this hypothetical example of an emergent ethnic balancing problem within 

a security ministry, the first of five steps in bridging the awareness-understanding gap starts with a single well-trained advisor’s situational awareness item. 

The advisor’s counterpart makes a statement that the advisor recognizes as unusual when expectations are that ethnic balance policies are succeeding. The 

counterpart’s concern, given his qualifications and age, is recognized by the 

advisor as a possible problem due to the latter’s relationship with the counterpart and operational knowledge of the advising mission’s planning and milestones for ethnic balance. The advisor, because of proximity and relationship 

with the counterpart, is also making an expert assessment as to whether the 

counterpart’s concern is out of personal self-interest or a loss of confidence in 

the ethnic balancing component of professionalization and capacity building. 

(Intelligence) analysts outside of the advising mission, who do not have both 

the advisor’s detailed, expert knowledge of the relationship and the operational advising mission, are unlikely to recognize the counterpart’s statement 

as an indicator of a potential systemic ethnic balancing problem. Further, an 

outside analyst typically remains removed from the rapid tempo and quick 

adjustments that are an inevitable aspect of a fielded advising mission. 

The second step is analysis and it requires, as in all analysis endeavors, identifying the most inclusive perspective of an actor, group, environment, and/or 

situation in order to correctly identify the research question. In this example, 

the advisor recognizes the need to understand whether the counterpart is motivated merely by personal ambition only or by professional concerns about 

ideals of fairness and professionalism within ethnic balance policies. Answering the advisor’s question requires far more information than any insight 

gleaned through only one advising relationship. To develop the necessarily 

inclusive perspective requires a scope of comprehension that encompasses all 

advisors’ insights on their counterparts’ ages and ethnicities.767

This is easier said than done. Determining age of counterparts is not as 

straightforward as one might assume. Oftentimes, official biographies do not 

contain this information (although signature blocks–discussed above–can 

and do contain clues). Detailed knowledge of rank advancement patterns 

in the old army prior to security force assistance as well as knowledge of 

historical events–not always well known and documented in resources available in the West–are helpful to estimate age if an advisor feels it would be 
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inappropriate to ask confirming questions. Another complication is that the 

counterpart’s age of record in ministry records, which in some countries affects retirement and promotion status, may differ from actual age and be 

more important. A final–and the most important–complication is how to 

identify meaningful boundaries for bracketing age groupings. Militaries grow 

and cut their troop strengths as a matter of the “guns versus butter” domestic 

political competition for funding–as we are seeing in the United States today. 

Sometimes militaries have meaningful boundaries for age groupings based on 

military campaign eras–for example, in the United States, references to “Korea,” “Vietnam,” “Pre-9/11,” “Post-9/11” and others—are heavily laden with 

professional experience, career progression, and doctrinal emphasis meanings. 

Other countries’ militaries are no different. 

If it is difficult for advisors to grapple with these issues regarding counterpart age, it is even more so for analysts outside of the advising mission. This 

is because scope of comprehension–connecting the unconnected and taking 

the long historical view in an advising mission context–requires access to all 

advisors’ insights about all counterparts that advisors may not realize they actually have. Outside analysts, without having themselves acquired operational 

understanding of the advising mission, will not know how to help advisors 

realize their insights. A second problem lies in spatio-temporal depth of analysis, in that knowledge of locally published national, regional, and pre-reform 

army histories, along with understanding how to identify tribe and ethnicity 

subgroups and factions (such as from signature blocks as discussed above) 

and the ability to read the counterpart’s language are important for assisting an advisor in realizing and articulating the insights they do have about 

their counterpart. Depth of analysis–capture of know-how in context in this 

advising example–will be more narrow and specialized. In this hypothetical 

example, answering the “age question” will involve expert knowledge about 

the ministry’s personnel, promotion, and merit policies. 

The third step is comprehension, which yields insightful understanding. 

Comprehension is closely related to analysis but differs from it in that 

additional comparisons or data manipulations are carried out to better 

refine the understanding of why something has happened or is happening. 

Consider the tables in the diagram above. In this hypothetical example, the 

Age by Ethnicity contingency table was produced by aggregating all advisors’ 
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information about the age and ethnicity of their counterparts (and, when 

necessary, carrying out additional research to estimate age). However, these 

findings would not empower advising mission leaders with the insightful 

understanding of how this could occur, despite the overall totals meeting 

ethnic group percentage targets for balancing. To provide that insight, the 

overall ethnic balance proportions need to be compared with ethnic balance 

proportions broken out by age group. 

Getting to the step of comprehension in a ministerial advising context will 

often require the capture of know-how in context about functions that are 

far removed from the threat concerns of (intelligence) analysts outside the 

advising mission. In this example, the identification and understanding of 

ethnic imbalance being obscured by aggregate totals requires knowing about 

and having access to information on the ministry’s personnel, promotion, 

and merit policies and procedures. The expert source of that knowledge and 

information will in fact be the advising mission itself, which makes the outside 

analyst more dependent on the advising mission than the advising mission is dependent on outside analysis to produce comprehension. 

Understanding is achieved with the fulfillment of comprehension. However, 

comprehension’s insightful understanding is about why something is or has 

occurred. To anticipate what may happen beyond the initial occurrence requires the fourth step of judgment, by which we mean estimating the logical 

relationships between causes and consequences of the problem. 

A ministerial-level advising mission engages with a security-sector institution, 

which is an organization with internal dynamics affected by external societal 

and governmental dynamics (see the first diagram above). The advised 

security ministry organization will have multiple “constituencies” located 

within the multiple levels of the organization (soldiers, corps commands, 

subordinate commands, headquarters, etc.), the government, and the society. 

Consequently, a ministerial-level security sector reform mission needs 

multiple, simultaneous levels of analysis in order to consider all possible 

locations at which causes and consequences of the problem can occur. The 

fourth step of judgment, with its emphasis on multiple levels of analysis, makes 

possible foresightful understanding, the fifth and last step in progressing from 

situational awareness to understanding. Foresightful understanding refers to 

being able to identify and anticipate what may happen, given the logical 
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relationships identified between causes and consequences of the problem. 

As with judgment, foresightful understanding depends on multiple levels of 

analysis. However, analysts outside of the advising mission may be organized 

to focus their work at only a single level (strategic, operational, or tactical) 

rather than at multiple, nested levels. This could lead to systematic bias and 

result in overlooking a class of possible cause-and-consequence relationships 

and future outcomes that may be relevant to the advising mission. 

Additional Legal and Multinational Obstacles to 

Outsourcing Strategic Management of Advisors’ 

Intellectual Capital

At this point we examine two general types of obstacles that limit the ability 

of (traditional) intelligence organizations to support the sociopolitical analysis needs of a ministerial-level security sector reform advising mission. The 

first type occurs out of concern for compromising counterpart relationships, 

due to the suspicion associated with advisors interacting with intelligence 

personnel. If there appears to be regular consultation with known intelligence 

personnel, advisors can experience the advising mission hazard of becoming 

de facto human intelligence collection assets. There also exists a pervasive 

concern that information shared outside of the advising mission could end 

up in open channels (e.g., Wikileaks). 

The second type occurs because of the unique needs of a ministerial-level 

advisor. Even if intelligence organizations could legally support the advising 

mission, the authors have discussed above how and why ministerial-level advisors would be their most difficult customers to satisfy. Intelligence organizations’ resource and access limitations as well as the threat emphasis severely 

limit their abilities to support ministerial-level advisors. In Afghanistan, operational- and headquarters-level military intelligence resources are limited 

and judiciously applied only to supporting the ISAF mandate for security 

assistance in countering the insurgency. The Priority Information Requirements (PIRs)768 they respond to involve a tightly bounded definition of the 

threat–where it is, what it has and what it can do. Since ANA-DEV was 

focused on building capability and capacity in the Afghan security forces, 

and not concerned with the security threat directly, operational military intelligence was not positioned to address ANA DEV’s needs. 
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Legal and multinational constraints on the campaign create additional obstacles to intelligence organizations supporting the sociopolitical needs of 

ministerial-level advising missions. 

● Unique national information handling caveats and national intelligence

classifications hamper multinational actions and/or information sharing.

The simple existence of the U.S. Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A), a nationally exclusive organizational element 

initially separate from the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, operates

outside of the alliance to control national contributions and participation 

in the operation.769 With respect to intelligence classification, because of the 

ambiguous multilateral information-security environment, policies to clarify what information elements need protection could not be issued. ISAF 

lacked authority to impose a unified and coherent security classification

policy because the multilateral environment included both national voluntary and bilateral, Afghan government-accepted troop contributions that

fell outside of a unified NATO umbrella. 

● Some Afghan counterparts have spent time in the United States, become 

affiliated with U.S. corporations, and even married U.S. citizens. These

Afghans therefore fall in the category of “U.S. Persons” with legal protections against U.S. intelligence collection. 

● Most contractor advisors in Afghanistan are employed under Statements 

of Work (SOWs) that prevent them from providing advising-derived 

information to intelligence organizations.

● Most critically, Afghanistan is a sovereign ally and NATO Training 

Mission-Afghanistan’s mandate is subject to annual renewal by the U.N. 

Security Council. The U.S. Intelligence Community is legally restricted

in how it can collaborate with the sovereign government of an allied 

nation, and ISAF has limited roles, authorities, and responsibilities under 

United Nations Security Council mandates. 

In the advising domain, ANA-DEV was functionally a task force both in 

structure and because of the commander’s having Critical Information 

Requirements (CCIRs). Given the advising mission’s unique information 

analysis, knowledge management, and advising relationship protection and 
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preservation needs, most of those CCIRs could not be met from outside 

ANA-DEV if all alliance legal requirements were to be upheld. 

Solving the Problem

ANA-DEV leadership was keenly aware of the loss of advisor intellectual 

capital upon redeployment and moved to stem this loss of understanding 

and influence. The ANA-DEV command approved an initial proposal allowing the authors to work as a team to create an internal capability that would 

interview senior advisors to capture their insights and experiences, develop 

and refine this information with historical and cultural context, and then 

educate the advisors’ successors. This team served as an organic capability for 

capturing, analyzing, and holding the mission’s intellectual capital by creating “enhanced continuity” of advisor’s insights and influence. By fulfilling 

all four characteristics of strategic management of intellectual capital, this 

internal capability would facilitate the advising mission’s becoming a learning 

organization. The team was also tasked with developing standard operating 

procedures for managing, retaining and protecting advisor information of 

a sensitive nature for the advising relationship. In short order, this advisorstaffed research and analysis team would carry out additional duties, including developing factional studies and orders of battle for the MoD and general 

staff, creating “one-shot” research projects at leadership and individual advisor request as well as initiating a quarterly comprehensive survey of advisors’ 

insights into their counterparts’ attitudes toward security sector reform projects and initiatives. 

ANA-DEV did not view having an organic research and analysis capability as 

stepping uninvited into the intelligence playing field. Far from it, ANA-DEV 

as an operational advising mission was centrally concerned with avoiding any 

potential threat to the counterpart relationships. An organic research and 

analysis capability staffed by advisors under ANA-DEV’s operational control 

and with no reporting requirements to parent organizations mitigated all risk 

associated with an advising mission engaging with intelligence in a Smart 

Power environment for purposes other than force protection. 

To meet ANA-DEV’s needs, team members needed to be highly motivated 

volunteers from within ANA-DEV who enjoyed strong rapport with and trust 

of fellow advisors. They needed to have deep knowledge of Afghan culture, 
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politics, history, and language skills. Most importantly, team members needed 

to bring relevant analytical skills, knowledge of social science methods, and 

applied research experience to bear in analyzing and understanding each day’s 

novel developments. 

The concept required each member to challenge conventional wisdom, separate 

facts from opinions and assumptions, and continuously pursue new information and knowledge. All team members needed to have the same degree of 

access to officially protected information, and be highly knowledgeable of and 

strictly observant of relevant ethics codes and legal restrictions. After a month of 

surveying best practices, crafting standard operating procedures and interview 

protocols and instruments, and designing foundational products that could be 

regularly updated, ANA-DEV established the first Sociopolitical Network and 

Behavioral Analysis Team (SNBAT). 

The SNBAT was established as a dedicated, organic element within ANADEV and under the direct control of the ANA-DEV commander or his 

deputy. This direct control included requiring written authorization by the 

ANA-DEV commander for the distribution of any analysis products. The 

commander needed the SNBAT to be flexible and responsive to CCIR’s, 

which reflected the dynamic and highly fluid advising environment. SNBAT 

personnel actively participated in daily ANA-DEV advisor meetings and 

huddles not only as MoD advisors but also to anticipate upcoming and 

changing information needs. Since these meetings were typically closed to 

all but ANA-DEV advisors, the dedicated, organic relationship was vital to 

advisor acceptance of and cooperation with the SNBAT. 

Although ANA-DEV’s SNBAT was the first of its kind for ministerial advising, it was designed to address knowledge gaps based on best practices of prior 

efforts. While the SNBAT concept is embedded in an advising mission’s need 

for unique analysis support, the authors found the best models for balancing 

flexibility and commander control in how Analysis Control Teams (ACTs), 

“Augmented Military Transition Teams” (MiTTs) in Iraq, and Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs) were organized. The small, focused ACT 

could and did provide value in Iraq when brigade commanders directed them 

to focus where the “fog of war” was a potential hazard for the operation. The 

“Augmented MiTTs” in Iraq were able to fill information gaps after receiving 
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autonomy from their parent brigades. CoISTs are another example of using 

personnel organic to the operational mission to address knowledge gaps.770

Staffing the ANA-DEV SNBAT

ANA-DEV initially staffed the team by capitalizing on some of its Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands (APH) advisors. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Hands 

program has developed a cadre of civilian and military personnel with understanding of Dari or Pashto through four months of immersive language 

instruction, together with familiarization with “culture, religion, tribal dynamics, central and provincial government structures and processes, Afghan 

security structures and processes, among other subject matter expertise.”771

Later, when a founding team member redeployed, that seat was filled by a 

Ministry of Defence Advisor (MoDA). The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s MoDA program “is designed to forge long-term relationships 

that strengthen a partner state’s defense ministry. The program matches senior 

Department of Defense civilians with partner-identified requirements....

While deployed, the advisors exchange expertise with foreign counterparts 

in similar defense specialties.”772 MoDA training includes a comprehensive 

seven-week course that covers advisor training, Afghanistan cultural awareness and country familiarization, as well as Dari language instruction.773

Staffing the SNBAT with “Hands” and MoDA advisors made it feasible to 

keep the SNBAT under the ANA-DEV commander’s authority. In theater, 

“Hands” and MoDAs are “op-conned,” in that they are placed under the operational control of the commands to which they are assigned. The SNBAT 

team’s organic, op-conned status contributed to gaining trust and support 

from ANA development advisors and leaders, since no conflict of interest 

could arise with respect to a need to produce, share, or archive products or 

reports for promotion in or support of other chains of command. 

A key SNBAT activity was interviewing ANA-DEV advisors to capture their 

insights and benefits of experience. To be fully effective, in addition to capturing sociopolitical insights, the interview had to be an exchange of experiences 

and ideas that stimulated the guest advisor to recall and share valuable insights, share moments of cross-cultural understandings and misunderstandings, and to think through new interactional techniques that contributed 

to or would have improved rapport with their host-nation counterpart. To 
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ensure the interviews captured a two-way flow of information, SNBAT personnel had to be skilled in Afghan sociopolitical knowledge and ministerial 

advising and able to put fellow advisors at ease during the interviews. 

ANA-DEV Knowledge Management Data Handling

Knowledge management was a core SNBAT responsibility. Although advisors’ data are not typically threat relevant, they are potentially highly sensitive 

with regard to developing advising relationships. The team secured all data 

to ensure commander’s oversight, and exceed established tenant unit requirements in a manner consistent with the ethical obligation to maximize advisor 

safety. SNBAT regarded advisors as inherently “owning” their information 

and treated them as having originator control over their data, with that control to be “inherited” by their successors. This effectively placed advisors in 

control of the extent to which their data would be used in SNBAT products. 

After derivative products were produced, only the commander could designate their distribution and use. A cross-functional knowledge of theater 

data repositories facilitated the distribution of commander-directed release of 

SNBAT products. 

SNBAT knowledge management requires appreciation for librarianship. Advisors will often exchange books and articles they find helpful during their tours. 

The SNBAT office became the site of the advisors’ library, which SNBAT 

members expanded with purchases of locally published books, particularly history books. This feature grew in importance as the team learned more about 

different ethnic groups’ accounts of historical events, some of which differed 

sharply with conventional wisdom and official accounts. Also, understanding 

the complexities of Afghan political and social history in the pivotal 1960s 

and 1970s became crucial for understanding the formative events and social 

networks forged during the early careers of older Afghan MoD counterparts. 

ANA-DEV SNBAT Products

The primary rationale for creating a SNBAT is to maintain advisor continuity—to mitigate loss of the tactical social advantages, insights, and knowledge 

the departing advisor has developed over the course of an advising year. To produce the first advisor continuity brief required designing an interview instrument extensive in both scope and depth that would (a) capture the full scope 

of the advisor’s knowledge of and relationship with their counterpart and (b) 
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capture the advisor’s insights into their counterpart’s relationships within the 

MoD, within the Afghan government, and within wider Afghan society. 

The interview instrument was extensive, with over 38 pages of questions that 

typically took 5-6 hours. The length was necessary in order to capture the full 

range of the year’s advising experience. SNBAT interviewers initially thought 

advisors would resist and refuse to sit for the interview because of its length. 

However, despite some initial refusals, the SNBAT met its goal of successfully 

and fully interviewing most departing senior advisors after the first month of 

team operation. The breakthrough was the spread by word-of-mouth that the 

interview, though long, did a good job of capturing advisor experiences over 

the course of their advising year. The authors also found that SNBAT messaging allayed advisor concerns about being judged. The SNBAT never drew 

conclusions about an advising relationship on the grounds that each advising relationship was unique and an advising relationship’s success is at least 

equally in the hands of the counterpart. After a successful initial trial period, 

ANA-DEV leadership made sitting for the SNBAT advisor continuity interview mandatory for redeploying advisors. 

The SNBAT interview instrument had four sections: Evaluation of the Counterpart, Counterpart Interactions with Others, Counterpart Personal Life 

History, and Counterpart’s Office Location, Layout, Schedule, and Tempo. 

Within each section there were clusters of similar questions designed to help 

prompt advisor recall on a variety of subtopics. 

Two additional features of the instrument were particularly useful: a descriptive personality inventory, and descriptive means for an advisor to identify 

their counterpart’s cognitive/learning skill levels. These provided advisors 

with a standard lexicon for describing their counterparts. The authors inserted these features because information about counterpart personality traits 

and learning levels are very important for new advisors. Departing advisors’ 

answers to these questions established a baseline so future advisors could have 

a basis for comparison if there was concern about the counterpart’s cognitive 

or emotional state.

The SNBAT also leveraged social network analysis. Advising missions 

continually grow, change, and transition. Advised ministry counterparts may 

be newly appointed, promoted, retired, and/or laterally moved. Ideally, friction 
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and failure points should be identified before a partnered organization is 

stressed to absorb and implement institutional change required by the advising 

organization. With a social network analysis capability, the commander can 

identify relationships that may facilitate or strain the advising effort and 

facilitate or hinder the capacity for change within the partnered organization. 

This capability was the backbone for a second cumulative SNBAT product. 

The SNBAT produced an “order of battle” distinguished by identification 

and overlays of factions and informal social groups within the Ministry of 

Defense and general staff. The driving rationale for this product was recognition that informal influence often mattered as much as formal authority 

during the interim flux period of security sector reform when the advised 

security institution’s professional standards are being identified, codified, and 

propagated. Advisors were keenly aware of these different types of power774

and how influence could trump authority to the detriment of military professionalization. The SNBAT drew from advisors’ pooled insights to identify 

factional and social group sources of influence beyond broad ethnic membership categories. Both the advisor continuity brief and the order of battle required several months of intellectual capital accumulation before they started 

to provide a bird’s eye view of patterns and relationships.

A third SNBAT product initiative was a quarterly survey of advisors. This 

product was designed to indirectly capture attitudes and opinions within the 

MoD about advising mission policy initiatives and progress toward meeting 

those initiatives. The quarterly survey’s questionnaire was a mix of open- and 

close-ended questions that probed MoD attitudes toward current mission objectives and allowed advisors to note their counterparts’ emergent concerns. 

This survey differed from the Advisor Continuity brief by having a primary 

focus on the contemporary (with only limited historical content) and by being a total “snapshot” capture of attitudes in a relatively short period of time. 

ANA-DEV leadership and advisors thus had their first comprehensive understanding of attitudes and opinions in the MoD about current initiatives 

and emergent concerns analyzed within a context of sociopolitical factors and 

cleavages. 

Over time, the SNBAT started to receive requests for “one-shot studies.” The 

SNBAT fielded requests for information from advisors on many topics, including gender relations, traditional governance and dispute resolution, social 
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factions, civil society, social aspects of health and medical care, general history, religious social organization, differences in attitudes between Kabul and 

other areas, and others.

The SNBAT Life Cycle and Future Applicability of the 

SNBAT Concept

Security sector advising missions are not permanent. All advising missions 

seek to, in the words of a senior NTM-A leader, “work themselves out of a 

job.” As advisors work toward successfully concluding their mission, transitions and personnel changes will take place, including changes to organic 

capabilities such as the SNBAT. 

Near the close of 2011, NTM-A reorganized some of its subordinate 

commands, including ANA-DEV, in light of the new goal of transitioning 

security functions to Afghanistan National Security Forces by 2013. A few 

months later, ANA-DEV as a subordinate command ended its separate 

existence and merged with another. The ANA-DEV SNBAT, being organic 

to that command, ceased operating. The winding down of the ANA-DEV 

SNBAT was natural and rational: as an organic, dedicated capability to a 

command, when that command is reorganized or drawn down, the SNBAT 

follows those same organizational fortunes. Had the SNBAT remained in 

operation apart from the advising mission and under a rationale different from 

managing that mission’s intellectual capital, it would have veered improperly 

into the intelligence realm. As ANA DEV wound down, the ANA-DEV 

SNBAT’s entire organizational life-cycle went through a successful proof-ofconcept. By having done so, the SNBAT concept in its life-cycle entirety can 

be applied to other advising missions in the future. 

To that end, what can future advising missions, outside of NATO’s Afghanistan campaign, that wish to preserve and utilize their advisors’ intellectual 

capital, learn from ANA-DEV and its SNBAT? 

● All security sector advising missions are smart power initiatives. Smart 

power not only increases the need for sociopolitical understanding, but

also the scope and levels of needed sociopolitical understanding. 
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● Sociopolitical understanding of the advising environment is not simply 

adding individual advisor insights; advisor insights must be relationally

combined into a coherent, corporate body of intellectual capital. 

● Intellectual capital is not produced by a few sociopolitically astute 

advisors; rather, intellectual capital requires contributions from every person within the advising organization. 

● Advising missions must be proactive about compiling, analyzing, fusing

and retaining intellectual capital. If advising missions do nothing, advisor 

replacement cycles will cause time-driven cyclic exodus of intellectual 

capital that requires a substantial amount of time and interaction to 

rebuild–if it can be rebuilt at all. When organizations are proactive about 

their intellectual capital, they become learning organizations. 

● Strategic management of intellectual capital is an internal, organic 

organizational activity because intellectual capital is the critical component

for becoming a learning organization. An advising mission that outsources 

its intellectual capital management to outside organizations foregoes becoming a learning organization.

● Strategic management of an advising mission’s intellectual capital by 

outside organizations (especially by an intelligence organization) creates 

hazards including potential compromise of counterpart relationships, 

advisor hesitance to contribute to intellectual capital, counterparts who 

may be U.S. persons with legal protections against U.S. intelligence 

collection, and sovereignty issues. 

● Strategic management of an advising mission’s intellectual capital by 

outside organizations is doomed to failure in meeting the advising 

mission’s sociopolitical needs. Advising missions’ sociopolitical understanding is embedded in policy analysis and knowledge of the security 

institution’s capacity building. The expert source for these twin bodies of 

knowledge is the advising mission itself, which makes an outside analyst

more dependent on the advising mission that the advising mission is 

dependent on the outside analyst. 

● SNBAT members need to have strong rapport with, and be trusted by 

the advisor corps. All team members must have the same degree of access 
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to officially protected information, and, regardless of their position on the 

team, equally contribute to analysis. Each team member must be knowledgeable about the host-nation’s history, culture, politics, and society and 

have facility in a language. Additionally, team members must bring 

diverse advanced skills to the team and team members must recognize 

and respect those skills. 

● SNBAT team members need to be under the operational control of the 

advising mission commander and no other. The commander’s direct 

control must include control over the distribution of any analysis 

products. 

● Advisors maintain control over their data, with that control to be inherited 

by their successors. The SNBAT holds advisors’ data in order to ensure its 

handover from the originating advisor to the successor advisor. 

Conclusion: The SNBAT’s Indirect, Residual Benefits 

from an Intelligence Manager’s Perspective

Throughout this essay the authors have analyzed intellectual capital needs, 

problems, and the SNBAT solution from the perspective of commanders 

leading advising missions in complex smart power environments. The triad 

of increased needs for sociopolitical understanding, discretion in operational 

mission direct engagement with host nations for partnering, and organic 

strategic management of mission intellectual capital is not unique to advising missions. They are needs for any operational mission partnering with a 

host nation and will intensify in multinational campaign contexts. These are 

evolving consequences of smart power, and just as the rise of smart power has 

consequences for the operational side of security sector reform, it will also 

have consequences for the intelligence side. 

However, the authors’ explanation of why an advising mission’s SNBAT activities must remain apart and separate from traditional intelligence organizations 

does not mean that SNBAT activities existed in opposition to intelligence 

organizations or to their missions. Autonomy does not equate with opposition 

and indirect, residual benefits can accrue to intelligence. However, for that to 

happen will require that intelligence refrain from viewing SNBAT initiatives as 

a resource to absorb, subsume, or task. This will not be a challenge, as parallels 
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exist in which the U.S. Intelligence Community has indirectly, residually benefited from maintaining the autonomy and independence of non-intelligence 

research and analysis efforts.

With the increased value the Intelligence Community places on cultural analysis,775 it is becoming more difficult to distinguish the analytical products 

of several intelligence analysis specializations from academic publications or 

the development aid measurement and evaluation specialist’s baseline field 

studies. The waters become even more muddied when one considers that 

each profession’s products involve protection of the information analyzed, 

though in different ways. The intelligence analyst classifies the product within 

a system that tightly regulates who will have access. The academic is legally 

and ethically obligated to protect the identity of their collaborating research 

sources under U.S. federal human subject protection laws. The development 

measurement and evaluation specialist is required to carry out research under 

the principle of “do no harm.” However similar the products and imperatives 

to protect data may be, it is the organization within which and the audience/

customer for which the analysis is conducted that determines whether the 

research and analysis is an intelligence product. The Intelligence Community 

does benefit from openly and publicly available academic and development 

baseline studies. Intelligence managers recognize that attempting to absorb, 

subsume, or task the university academic or the development organization 

specialist would imperil those individuals’ ability to carry out research and 

contribute to the public knowledge from which the Intelligence Community 

also benefits. 

Although the indirect, residual benefits from a SNBAT initiative are different, 

seeking to absorb, subsume, or task an operational mission’s SNBAT would 

likewise imperil its ability to carry out research and analysis to produce 

those benefits. What are those indirect, residual benefits to the Intelligence 

Community?

● The first and foremost indirect benefit is fewer advising mission requests 

for information. An advising mission’s SNBAT initiative allows intelligence to focus on threat (its traditional strength). A SNBAT capability

does this by focusing on directly empowering advisors with knowledge, 

not on building a knowledge base they may not be able to directly access. 
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● A second benefit, particularly for the Intelligence Community’s increasing

focus on cultural analysis, is increasing the numbers of those with 

specialized sociopolitical subject matter expertise. SNBATs empower 

advisors by increasing the scope and breadth of their knowledge about the

relationships between the advised ministry, national government, and 

subnational government/commands. While advisors are “correctors, not 

collectors” these enhanced insights into individual and relational social,

political, and behavioral trends and tendencies are in a category of 

foundational knowledge comparable to the published academic insights 

open- and all-source intelligence analysts find useful and seek out. 

● A third benefit stems from security sector advising efforts to build the 

partner nation’s intelligence capabilities and capacities. This effort 

requires advisor staffing by individuals with intelligence backgrounds 

who are and remain under the operational command of the advising 

mission. The operational command requirement, for the safety of the 

advising mission, necessarily suspends that advisor’s relationship with any

sending intelligence organization for the duration of the deployment. 

However, the indirect benefits of foundational knowledge insights that 

such an advisor can gain and return with upon redeployment are far 

different from those that accrue to simply being “deployed forward” as a

sending organization’s analysis asset. True mentoring and relationship

building (as opposed to simply liaising) allows the individual unparalleled 

access to social, political, and cultural ontologies and ethnographic

knowledge. This is an invaluable human capital investment in the analyst

and one made possible by the advising mission’s strategic management of 

its own intellectual capital.

● A fourth benefit results from the SNBAT solution for protecting advisors’ 

sensitive information. Multilateral smart power environments yield 

multinational organizations that often move forward prior to establishing

unifying intelligence policies and guidance that single-nation operations

take for granted. With a SNBAT, advisor information can be protected

from undesired disclosure without defaulting to single-nation solutions 

inapplicable to an organization governed by international mandates. 
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Other indirect, residual benefits will undoubtedly occur to the reader. However, any of those benefits will accrue only through the autonomy of the 

advising mission’s SNBAT capability.

The authors have explained how smart power environments shape advising 

missions, their need for sociopolitical understanding, and constraints in 

meeting those needs. As smart power represents an evolutionary step in U.S. 

national security and foreign policy, so must its associated operational and 

intelligence efforts adapt. The ANA-DEV SNBAT is an illustration of how the 

authors’ successors may adapt organizationally to smart power environments. 

About the Authors

Colonel William S. Brei advised at the Afghan Ministry of Defense while 

serving in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program. He was the first and 

founding ANA-DEV SNBAT chief. During earlier deployments he served 

at Bagram Air Base in 2002 and as the director of the Mazar-e Sharif International Airport in 2005. He retired from the U.S. Air Force in 2012 after a 

28-year career. WSBrei@yahoo.com

Nathalie J. Frensley, Ph.D. advised at the Afghan Ministry of Defense while 

serving in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program. She was the first and 

founding SNBAT research director and second SNBAT chief. Previously, she 

was an associate research scientist at the Institute for Advanced Technology, the 

University of Texas at Austin. Corresponding Author. NJFrensley@gmail.com.

Major Killaurin O. Roberts advised at the Afghan Ministry of Defense while 

serving in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program. He was the first and 

founding SNBAT deputy for assessments. Previously, he served NATO as 

an ISAF theater fusion chief and served U.S. Forces as an operational intelligence mentor during both the Iraq and Afghanistan surges. Killaurin.Roberts@us.army.mil.

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Conclusion

Carolina Sancho Hirane

This book is the third in a series that began with Professionalization of Intelligence in the Americas. The latter, published in 2004, addresses the phenomenon of government intelligence from the perspective of public servants 

who are engaged in the professionalization of the function throughout the 

Americas. The work identifies the challenges facing professional development 

efforts, a chief concern of intelligence services at the time, and traces the paths 

chosen by various countries to arrive at that stage of development. 

The second book in the series, Democratization of the Intelligence Function, 

from 2009, examines how the reinstatement of democratic political systems 

in the region has affected the intelligence services. At the same time, the book 

addresses the effect of distinctive strategic intelligence cultures on the development of intelligence institutions. 

This book goes beyond the two earlier works in bringing a particular 

focus to the challenges that confront intelligence services as they carry out 

their responsibilities in an environment strongly influenced by forces of 

globalization. Threats to national and public security in each country have 

become increasingly similar to those of other countries of the hemisphere. 

Notwithstanding the wide variety of political, social, cultural, administrative 

and historical contexts represented in the region, intelligence services expect to 

operate transparently and within legal boundaries as they develop capabilities, 

expertise, and leadership consonant with their societal role. 

The question that has guided this academic work is “How can we address the 

challenges to intelligence management that arise from various quarters and 

at various levels?” The answer emerges from essays presented in four sections. 

Each set of essays explores several aspects of the challenges found at each 

level of intelligence management, beginning with societal and institutional 

oversight of intelligence, then addressing executive branch management options, continuing with intelligence system or community management of privacy and security issues, and concluding with professional self-management 

through intelligence integration opportunities. 
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The first section explores the legal framework within which intelligence services operate. More judicial regulation, a part of the democratic transition in 

the region, has increased external control of intelligence services. In addition, 

the region at large has passed through a learning process marked by intelligence scandals and unprofessional practices. Congressional or parliamentary 

oversight has only a brief history, but has grown through trial and error. It is 

clear that further improvement in oversight is needed, especially if one compares intelligence oversight to the more rigorous oversight exerted in other 

areas of public administration. 

One of the defining characteristics of intelligence is its operational secrecy. 

Secrecy allows intelligence to carry out its societal role, to meet its responsibilities and to accomplish its missions. However, secrecy runs squarely in 

opposition to the principle of transparency in a democratic political system 

where government acts on behalf of citizens. This is where one finds an unmistakable tension between efficiency in the management of a public service 

on the one hand, and that service’s legitimacy and transparency on the other 

hand. In this situation the overall quality of a democracy hangs in the balance. Adequate oversight would, under conditions of non-disclosure, allow 

non-intelligence public officials access to intelligence information, intelligence sources and methods, and knowledge of intelligence actions. Effective 

oversight stimulates and promotes responsible management within the intelligence services, so that they may make appropriate use of the decisionmaking 

latitude granted to them by the legislature. The countries of the hemisphere 

continue to make slow progress in the realm of oversight as, mainly through 

trial and error, they develop viable institutions for intelligence management. 

The greater autonomy granted to the intelligence services in comparison with 

other public services, especially in terms of their being able to operate in 

secrecy, emphasizes the importance of promoting and strengthening ethical 

behavior among intelligence employees. The difficulty of finding real-world 

examples to illustrate workplace ethics has been alleviated by the existence of 

several exemplary, popular films. The public at large has the opportunity to 

examine these productions and explore the opposing values that intelligence 

practitioners regularly encounter, among them questions of freedom, security, privacy and respect for human rights. The films often leave these questions 

without full resolution, therefore inviting viewers, whether private citizens or 
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intelligence officials, to engage in a discussion of ethical practice. In the long 

view, such discussion can bring concrete answers to ethical challenges. 

This practical approach to intelligence ethics emerges as one part of the answer to the book’s central question of how we might address the challenges 

that confront intelligence management. An ethical approach to intelligence 

practice can be reinforced in several ways. One option is to develop an ethical 

code of conduct, something that has not yet been accomplished in the region. 

Meanwhile, the intelligence services themselves, supported by suitable external oversight, can create incentives for the appropriate use of the autonomy 

and institutional secrecy they have been entrusted to employ.

Section two explores the role of the executive branch in managing the production and use of strategic intelligence. Although considerable prejudice 

and confusion surround these issues, there is consensus about what strategic 

intelligence should be able to accomplish. One author argues that economic 

phenomena deserve greater intelligence attention at the strategic level. Another author explains the relationship between intelligence and the budgeting 

process, an area too often ignored at the national level of executive decisionmaking. Directives issued from this level, for example, typically make little 

or no mention of the resource needs of the intelligence services. Under these 

circumstances, it falls to intelligence officials themselves to explain clearly and 

precisely the relationship of financial resources to information requirements 

formulated at the national political level, and to specify how those requirements translate into particular intelligence resources. 

The rise of international cooperation among intelligence services has become 

a particularly controversial aspect of executive branch intelligence management. Elected officials as well as the intelligence services themselves often 

view such cooperation with suspicion. Cooperation seems to place secrecy at 

risk and exposes an intelligence service’s vulnerabilities. Critics also feel that 

differences among countries are greater than their similarities, and that the 

importance of those areas in which countries compete prohibits them from 

developing a relationship built on similar interests. However, the increasing proliferation of transnational threats to security, as well as government 

statements recognizing common security threats, allow a more hopeful view 

of future progress toward intelligence cooperation in South America. This 

tendency is reinforced by the fact that each country of the region does have 
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experience in strategic, military and police intelligence, as well as a demonstrated ability to cooperate multilaterally in each of these areas. A remaining 

challenge exists in the lack of intelligence cooperation under the auspices of 

UNASUR, although such cooperation already takes place in other multilateral organizations in the region, and may be exported to UNASUR itself. 

The third section of the book explores how national systems or communities 

manage the tension between privacy and security in the course of daily intelligence activities. In principle, personal or sensitive information about citizens 

is private, and can be accessed only by authorized and justified exception to 

this principle. In the context of intelligence work, and wherever its activity is 

regulated by recently enacted laws, procedures have been developed to guide 

intelligence access to information about individuals. Typically, access depends 

on prior approval by a government office external to the intelligence services. 

However, these procedures have not always worked as expected; that is, as a 

reliable counterweight to the autonomy of those services—to keep them from 

accessing private information about citizens and making unethical use of the 

information. 

Existing information and communications technology, together with the 

widespread use of social communications media, make immense quantities 

of information available to the intelligence services, leaving in the past the 

problem of not having enough information, but introducing the challenge 

of processing the information—evaluating it, classifying it, and mainly, analyzing it. On the other hand, legitimate questions remain not only about 

intelligence access to this information, but also about how long it may be 

retained. In this new world, the classical principles that have guided acquisition of information about private citizens have been overturned, in the sense 

that information formerly was obtained on an exceptional basis, for a defined 

period, and with evident justification (that is, probable cause). The resolution 

of this problem now appears to require international consensus because the 

outcome of the debate will have consequences for most countries whose intelligence services are regulated by laws. 

From a national perspective, the requirement to devote greater attention 

to the development of the state intelligence function raises the question of 

which agencies should become members of an intelligence system or community. The need to define and create a framework for criminal and prison 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

413

intelligence, for example, calls for a review of what each potential element 

of a national system or community may contribute to the collective effort. 

Managers need to determine how strategic, police, and military capabilities 

may best relate to each other within the public security and national security 

contexts. Best practices and lessons learned about the growth of intelligence 

communities in the Americas and Europe need to be analyzed and modified 

as needed for application in South America. 

In addition, the issue of ensuring adequate interagency cooperation and coordination within an intelligence system or community requires a review of 

national legislation and agency accountability. The review can help ensure 

that cooperation and coordination are carried out in the intended fashion and 

for the intended purposes. At stake in this review is a determination of the 

very legitimacy and legality of these cooperative practices, together with the 

prospect of either gaining or losing international respectability and a positive 

public image as a result of having or not having in place an effective and efficient intelligence system. 

The last section of the book deals with three facets of integration management carried out by the intelligence services themselves. First, internal intelligence education serves an integrative function by ensuring that practitioners 

understand the operational role of each of branch of government, and gain 

familiarity with the contribution of all government organizations that collect 

and analyze information. Externally, intelligence professionals in the region 

have access to strategic studies or intelligence studies programs in universities. Internal intelligence education can accommodate classified material, but 

external education holds greater value for professional development when 

the comprehension of more general and multidisciplinary subjects requires 

debate and critical thinking. A few private institutions across the region have 

developed seminars capable of offering the detailed, expert coverage of sensitive topics suitable for specialists, but these programs are not exclusively for 

government intelligence practitioners. 

A second facet of intelligence integration involves the management of information and communications technology, important because this technology 

rules a good part of our daily personal regimen. Sometimes described as the 

fifth dimension of warfare but in reality much more than that, cyberspace 

is where people conduct much of their daily lives. It is also where national 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

414

boundaries are meaningless and anyone can operate essentially without limitation. This environment challenges those who intend to administer it or to 

manage its security issues. The nature of cyberspace gives full play to concepts like “glocal” and “intermestic,” as governments or private interests try 

to counter cyberattacks or the unlawful use of online information. An action 

taken on one side of the world using a server located there can effect changes 

in or even be lethal to a system located on the other side of the earth (a prime 

example being the control of nuclear reactors). Similarly, an attack on a web 

page may originate in any place in the world and bring serious consequences 

to local residents who wish to make use of the page. 

The huge quantities of available information require a review of how it may 

be accessed, the conditions under which it is accessible, and how that access 

may be controlled. The issues of information security and access to information in cyberspace for intelligence purposes require a suitable adjustment to 

current management deficiencies. One solution may lie in developing a legal 

framework to regulate intelligence access in a way that prevents abuse. Political legitimacy for intelligence access to information depends on the outcome 

of public debate. 

Another aspect of information integration involves the multilateral 

environment of political-military advising missions. In the case of U.S. 

advisors in Afghanistan, a field experiment illustrates how innovation in 

information integration can replace the traditional intelligence apparatus. 

Integrated information management can play a role similar to that of 

intelligence where traditional, unilateral intelligence capabilities remain 

unwelcome or unlawful. 

Democratic political systems and globalization make intelligence management in the hemisphere a complex task. Complexity arises from the variety of 

issues to be considered, the variety of actors involved, and the sensitive nature 

of the subject itself. No one person can bring about effective management of 

this governmental function. The task requires multidisciplinary effort. This 

book has sought to contribute to that undertaking. 
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415

References

1 Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, coords., Intelligence Professionalism in 

the Americas (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004), http://

www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Intelligence_Professionalism_in_the_Americas.pdf. 

2 Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, coords., Democratization of Intelligence (English excerpts) and Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El 

Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estratégica (Washington, DC: National 

Defense Intelligence College, 2009), http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Democratization_of_Intelligence.pdf and http://www.niu.edu/ni_press/pdf/Democratización_de_

la_Función_de_Intpligencia.pdf, respectively. 

3 Guillermo Valdes Castellanos, Director of the Center for National Intelligence 

and Security (CISEN) from 2007 to 2011, in CISEN: 20 Años de Historia—Testimonios (México: CISEN, 2009), p. 12. CISEN is the civilian intelligence agency 

of Mexico.

4 Castellanos, ibid, p. 13.

5 Fredy Rivera Velez and Katalina Barreiro Santana, “Inteligencia estratégica: algo 

más que curiosidad mediática o (in)discrecionalidad política,” in Fredy Rivera Velez, 

coord., Inteligencia estratégica y Prospectiva (Quito: FLACSO Ecuador & National 

Secretary of Intelligence, 2011), p. 37.

6 See the brief description of SENSIPAM on the main page of the System for 

the Protection of the Amazon (SIPAM) at http://www.sipam.gov.br/. Accessed 12 

August 2012.

7 See, for example, the definition of “national intelligence” in U.S. Public Law 

108—458, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, section 

1012, http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf. Accessed 14 August 2012.

8 J. Edward Conway, “Analysis in Combat: The Deployed Threat Finance Analyst,” Small Wars Journal (July 2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/analysisin-combat-the-deployed-threat-finance-analyst. Accessed 30 July 2012.

9 See Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, at http://

www.fas.org/irp/world/index.html. 

10 Richard Helms, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency

(New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 3-13.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

416

11 Clifford Krauss, “Tapes Spy Chief Left Behind Scandalize Peru,” New York 

Times, 3 February 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/03/world/tapes-spy-chiefleft-behind-scandalize-peru.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Accessed 1 August 2012. 

12 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

CounterIntelligence 24, no. 4 (Winter 2011/2012), pp. 656-691, and Maria do Ceu 

Pinto, “Portugal’s Intelligence Evolution in the Post-9-11 World,” International 

Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25, no. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 160-177. 

Matei and Bruneau also cover Poland, Romania, and Russia in their essay.

13 Gregory Weeks, “A Preference for Deference: Reforming the Military’s Intelligence Role in Argentina, Chile and Peru,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008), 

pp. 49-58. The author finds that of these three countries, only Argentina has placed 

military intelligence activities under civilian oversight. 

14 Matei and Bruneau, op. cit., p. 682.

15 Ceu Pinto, op. cit., pp. 165-167.

16 In the United States, for example, Executive Order 12333 (1981), in its part 2, 

spells out prohibitions on collection activity, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/

codification/executive-order/12333.html. In addition, individual parts of the Intelligence Community may have additional guidelines. For example, Procedures governing the activities of Department of Defense intelligence components that affect United 

States persons, December 1982, http://atsdio.defense.gov/documents/52401-R.html. 

Documents accessed 2 August 2012.

17 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Demanda en el caso de Humberto 

Antonio Palamara Iribarne (Case 11,571) against the Republic de Chile, 13 April 

2004.

18 Richard J. Aldrich, “Beyond the Vigilant State: Globalisation and Intelligence,” 

Review of International Studies 35 (2009), p. 900.

19 Richard J. Aldrich, ibid., p. 898. For an appreciation of the importance of informal information and intelligence collaboration among police forces, see Michael 

D. Bayer, The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence (Washington, DC: National Intelligence University Press, 2010), ni-u.edu/

ni_press/pdf/The_Blue_Planet.pdf. 

20 Aldrich, ibid., p. 900.
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

417

21 Claudio Fuentes, “Political Dimensions of Security Transformation in Latin 

America,” Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 40, no. 2 (March 2009). 

22 For example, see the anonymous Intelligence Community source for James 

Bamford’s, The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America (New York: Doubleday, 2008), p. 1. 

23 See Gary Ross, Who Watches the Watchmen?—The Conflict between National Security and Freedom of the Press (Washington, DC: National Intelligence University 

Press, 2011), http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Who_Watches_the_Watchmen.pdf. Accessed 

11 August 2012.

24 Two interesting examples are: Jesus Emilio Garcia Acosta, El Ave del Pantano: 

Una Novela sobre la Inteligencia Estatal—el Segundo arte más antiguo de la humanidad y el primero de los dioses (Bogotá: Editorial la Serpiente Emplumada, 2007) 

and Bravo Leon, El Espía Frances: Crimen, Corrupción y Tráfico de armas en Chile 

(Santiago: Origo Ediciones, 2011).

25 See, for example, the results of a study by political scientist Elizabeth A. Bloodgood, “What Do Decision-Makers Know?: The Sources and Evaluation of Information in Foreign Policy,” paper presented originally at the annual meeting of the 

International Studies Association, February 2003, in Portland, Oregon, http://www.

allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/4/5/6/pages64568/p64568-

1.php. Accessed 12 August 2012.

26 Ohad Leslau, “The Effect of Intelligence on the Decisionmaking Process,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 3 (Autumn 2010), 

pp. 426-448.

27 Stevyn D. Gibson, “Future Roles of the UK Intelligence System,” Review of 

International Studies 35 (2009), pp. 920-921. 

28 Gibson, ibid, p. 923.

29 See Richard J. Aldrich, op. cit., pp. 891, 896-898. The author points out that 

today, because of the close linkage of intelligence and operations, “secret services 

are doing less analysis and estimating and more ‘fixing, enforcing and disrupting.’” 

In this light, U.S. intelligence’s “rendition” of operatives to Guantanamo was as 

much about disrupting al-Qaida’s core structure as it was to extract information 

from them.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

418

30 Robert M. Gates, “An Opportunity Unfulfilled: The Use and Perceptions of 

Intelligence at the White House,” Washington Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 

35-44.

31 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 67. All of chapter 

4 is devoted to this theme. 

32 Nathan Woodard, “Tasting the Forbidden Fruit: Unlocking the Potential of 

Positive Politicization,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 (February 2013), 

pp. 91-108.

33 Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott, “The Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Synthesizing 

with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 4 (December 2010), p. 5-7. 

34 See David T. Moore, Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution

(Washington, DC: National Intelligence University Press, 2011), pp. 64, 66.

35 In 2009, for example, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence declared that 

“The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.” See Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, February 2009, 

p. 2, http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2012. 

36 See http://www.egmontgroup.org/. Gregory F. Treverton foresaw the relevance of 

nongovernment institutions in the realm of financial intelligence in his “Intelligence and the Market State,” Studies in Intelligence 10 (Winter/Spring 2001). 

37 Cedric Chaffaut, “La unión europea, la geoeconomía y el patriotismo,” Aainteligencia (edición impresa) 1, no. 3 (March 2008): 50-53.

38 William J. Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World (New 

York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008).

39 Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, Democratizacion de la Funcion de 

Inteligencia: El Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estrategica (Washington, 

DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009), p. Xxvi, www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/

pdf/Democratización_de_la_Función_de_Inteligencia.pdf. 

40 See Timothy Connors, “Putting the “L” into Intelligence-Led Policing: How 

Police Leaders Can Leverage Intelligence Capability,” International Journal of In-
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

419

telligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 237-245. Also 

Christopher Dickey, Securing the City: Inside America’s Best Counterterror Force—the 

NYPD (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009).

41 As documented in Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and 

CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).

42 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 172.

43 Michael D. Bayer, The Blue Planet, op. cit. 

44 Ibid., pp. 109-111.

45 See Kevin Wirth, The U.S. Coast Guard Programs Enters the Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007), http://www.

ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/The_Coast_Guard_Intelligence_Program%20.pdf; Eric Ensign,

Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 1920-1933 (Joint Military Intelligence College, 

2001), http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Intelligence_RUM_WAR.pdf; and Martin Edwin 

Andersen, “A Roadmap for Beating Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Organizations,” Joint Force Quarterly 62 (July 2011), p. 86, www.ndu.edu/press/latinamerica-transnational-criminal.html. Accessed 4 August 2012.

46 For example, see a review of local Mexican police practice in the SwensonOrozco essay in this volume, in the section on “The Police Intelligence Model for 

Professional Accountability and Oversight,” as well as the observations of James 

E. Steiner, in “Improving Homeland Security at the State Level: Needed—StateLevel Integrated Intelligence Enterprises,” Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 3 (October 

2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/

csi-studies/studies/vol.-53-no.-3/improving-homeland-security-at-the-state-level.html. 

Accessed 10 August 2012. 

47 Leslie A. Donovan, “Citizens as Intelligence Volunteers: The Impact of Value 

Structures,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 18 (Summer 2005), p. 241.

48 Andersen, op. cit.

49 Mario Villarreal Díaz and Juan José Rico Urbiola, “La penalización de las 

actividades de inteligencia hostil en los órdenes subnacionales de gobierno en 

México: el caso ‘Nuevo León,’” in Jose Julio Fernandez Rodriguez et al., Cuestiones de 

Inteligencia en la Sociedad Contemporánea (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Instituto 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

420

Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2011), pp. 175-185, http://www.portalcultura.

mde.es/Galerias/publicaciones/fichero/Cuestiones_inteligencia.pdf. Accessed 10 August 

2012.

50 For an example from Mexico, see Efrain Medina Valenzuela, “La inteligencia 

como herramienta facilitadora del trabajo policial,” AAinteligencia (March 2007), 

http://www.aainteligencia.cl/?p=220. Accessed 12 August 2012.

51 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in 

Latin America (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), p. 67.

52 Mark Ungar, “The Privatization of Citizen Security in Latin America: From Elite 

Guards to Neighborhood Vigilantes,” Social Justice 34, nos. 3-4 (2007), p. 23. 

53 Lucia Dammert, “La inseguridad urbana en Argentina: Diagnóstico y perspectivas,” pp. 283-315, in Fernando Carrión, ed., Seguridad ciudadana, ¿espejismo o 

realidad? (Quito: FLACSO Ecuador, 2002), pp. 301-307.

54 See Christopher Dickey, Securing the City, op. cit.

55 Jeff Stein, “NYPD Intelligence Detectives Go Their Own Way,” Washington 

Post, 10 November 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/11/nypds_

foreign_cops_play_outsid.html. Accessed 11 August 2012.

56 Mark Munson, “Assessing the New York Police Department’s Intelligence Efforts Targeting American Muslims,” Small Wars Journal (March 2012), http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-the-new-york-police-department’s-intelligenceefforts-targeting-america’s-muslims. Also see Small Wars Journal Editors, “NYPD 

Intelligence Division: The Homegrown Threat,” Small Wars Journal, August 2007, 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nypd-intelligence-division-the-homegrown-threat. 

Both items accessed 11 August 2012.

57 U.S. Department of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI 

Operations, 29 September 2008, http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.

pdf. Accessed 11 August 2012.

58 The 2001 “Patriot Act” (Public Law 107-56—Titles VII, VIII and IX) of the 

United States, enacted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, as well as the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458—Title 1, section 1016) are examples. Similarly, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, in 2008, 

began a major overhaul of the Ecuadorian intelligence system apparently as a result 

of his assessment of the uncoordinated Ecuadorian intelligence approach to the 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

421

Colombian incursion against a FARC base in Ecuadorian territory in March of 

that year. 

59 Russell G. Swenson, “Intelligence Education in the Americas,” International 

Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 108-130.

60 See, for example, the opportunity mentioned on the web page of the Intelligence 

School of the Army of Chile, http://www.escint.cl/ (under “Curso Extranjeros”), as 

presented on 11 September 2011. 

61 Katitza Rodriguez, “The Politics of Surveillance: The Erosion of Privacy in Latin 

America,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, 22 July 2011, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/politics-surveillance-erosion-privacy-latin-america. Accessed 11 August 

2012.

62 Fernando Cocho Perez, “Aprender la historia, comprender el entorno, saber 

para cambiar,” Inteligencia y seguridad: Revista de análisis y prospectiva, Madrid, no. 

8 (June-November 2010). Inserted material is from the present author. Luis Iberico 

is a Peruvian congressman.

63 “Congressional Control of Intelligence Services.... Democratic States have 

various instruments and procedures through which the executive branch renders 

accountability to the legislative branch on behalf of the intelligence services.... 

The means used vary from country to country, but generally they are linked with 

revelations of irregular or failed actions in particular cases. No general rules exist 

concerning the nature or limitations of such control, given the need that exists for 

knowledge of and administrative oversight of intelligence activities by democratic 

representatives in each country, as well as the continuing need to preserve and protect the secret aspects of intelligence products and activities, in addition to protecting the means or methods and sources of information used in its production,” from 

Miguel Ángel Esteban Navarro, coord., Glosario de Inteligencia (Secretaría General 

Técnica del Ministerio de Defensa de España, Imprenta Ministerio de Defensa de 

España, 2007), p. 66.

64 “Judicial Control of Intelligence Services.... Norms, procedures and organizations through which those who oversee the application of legal principles in general 

and the rights and liberties of citizens in particular act on behalf of intelligence 

services in carrying out their functions....” Ibid., p. 65.

65 “Economic Control of Intelligence Services.... Norms, procedures and organizations through which intelligence services render accountability for budget 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

422

expenditures and miscellaneous costs associated with the exercise of their official 

function....” Ibid., p. 65.

66 Diego Navarro Bonilla, ¡Espías¡ Tres mil años de información y secreto (Madrid: 

Plaza & Valdez, 2009), p. 122.

67 See Fernando Rospigliosi, Montesinos y las Fuerzas Armadas: Cómo controló 

durante una década las instituciones militares, first edition (Lima: IEP, December 

2000), pp. 70-73. Also see Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, Los militares y el poder—Un 

ensayo sobre la doctrina militar en el Perú: 1948–1968, first edition (Lima: Mosca 

Azul editores, 1983) and Dirk Kruijt, La Revolución por Decreto: El Perú durante 

el gobierno militar, Democracy and Armed Forces series, no. 9 (Lima: Instituto de 

Defensa Legal, 2008).

68 In both the 27 January and 30 September 1960 documents, the signature of the 

president of the republic appears, along with the opinion of several state ministers 

and the express approval of the Council of Ministers. 

69 A supreme decree is “a norm drafted and approved by the highest level of the 

Executive Branch, namely the President of the Republic...,” from Marcial Rubio 

Correa, El Sistema Jurídico: Introducción al Derecho, sixth edition, corrected and 

updated (Lima: Fondo Editorial Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1993), 

p. 140.

70 Victor Garcia Toma, La ley en el Perú: Técnica de elaboración, interpretación, 

aplicación e integración, first edition (Lima: Editorial Jurídica GRIJLEY, February 

1995), p. 49.

71 Acronyms, in their order of appearance in this paragraph, expand to Secretaría 

de Inteligencia, Servicio Federal de Informaciones, Dirección Federal de Seguridad, Servicio de Inteligencia Colombiana, Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, Dirección Nacional de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención, Comité de Organización 

Política Electoral Independiente (a political party).

72 Gustavo Gorriti, Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú (Lima: Planeta, 2008). 

73 This assertion by the present author is based on material presented in Dirk 

Kruijt and Maria del Pilar Tello, “De los reformistas militares a la dictadura civil: La 

política militar peruana desde los años sesenta hasta el presente,” in Kees Koonings 

and Dirk Kruijt, eds., Ejércitos Políticos: Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Construcción de 

la Nación en la Era de la Democracia, American Problems series, no. 17, translated 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

423

by Gabriela Ramos, first edition (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruvianos—IEP, 

2003), p. 97. 

74 Anna Funder, STASILAND: Historias del otro lado del Muro de Berlín (Madrid: 

Tempus, 2009), p. 73.

75 Luis Piscoya, “Inteligencia en el Perú: conceptos organizativos y manejo de crisis,” in various authors, Apuntes para una nueva visión de la Seguridad Nacional

(Lima: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos–IDEPE, 2004).

76 See Andres Gomez de la Torre, “Del SIN al CNI y la DINI,” in Andres Gomez 

de la Torre, comp., SIN Arcana Imperii: Inteligencia en democracia, first edition 

(Lima: Foro Libertad & Seguridad, 2007), pp. 93-94.

77 J. Patrice McSherry, Los Estados depredadores: la Operación Cóndor y la guerra 

encubierta en América Latina (Santiago de Chile: LOM ediciones, 2009).

78 “Article 21–National intelligence service personnel will certify their employment status with an identity card, which will facilitate access to all facilities, public 

and private. Managers of these facilities will allow access or face legal consequences, 

and will make information and any required assistance available to the agents for 

their mission accomplishment,” in Legislative Decree No. 746, Ley del Sistema de 

Inteligencia Nacional.

79 Dirk Kruijt and Maria del Pilar Tello, op. cit skillfully recreate this stretch of 

Peruvian intelligence history.

80 See Fernando Rospigliosi, Montesinos y las Fuerzas Armadas: Cómo controló durante una década las instituciones militares (Lima: IEP, 2000); Carlos Iván Degregori, 

La década de la antipolítica: Auge y huida de Alberto Fujimori y Vladimiro Montesinos

(Lima: IEP, 2001); Jane Marcus-Dalgado and Martin Tanaka, Lecciones del final del 

fujimorismo, Colección Mínima (Lima: IEP, 2001), p. 47.

81 Alberto Bolivar Ocampo, “Prefacio,” in Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, coords., Profesionalismo de Inteligencia en las Américas, revised edition (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004), pp. 11-12. Added material 

by the present author.

82 As specified by the national constitution, an organic law regulates certain sensitive matters. This type of law occupies a position between the constitution itself 

and ordinary laws. Generally, organic laws require absolute or qualified majority 

approval. See http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ley_Org%C3%A1nica. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

424

83 Andres Gomez de la Torre, “Perú: Frustraciones en los intentos por reconstruir 

su sistema de inteligencia,” in Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, coords., 

Profesionalismo de Inteligencia en las Américas, revised edition (Washington, DC: 

Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004), pp. 155-185.

84 The Defensoría del Pueblo is a governmental entity created by the Peruvian Constitution of 1993 to protect human rights in the country.

85 Defensoría del Pueblo, “La Reforma y el control de los Servicios de Inteligencia,” 

Revista de la Defensoria del Pueblo, Debate Defensorial, no. 3 (May 2001), http://

www.defensaydemocracia.org/uploads/2/0/5/7/2057202/defensoria-pueblo_reformacontrol-servicios-inteligencia.pdf. Accessed 12 February 2012. 

86 Law 27479, Ley del Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional (SINA), 11 June 2001. “Article 36- Oversight: The role of the Select Committee for Intelligence of the Peruvian Congress is to oversee the operation and execution of the budgetary resources 

of the National Intelligence Council, in accordance with constitutional norms, 

Congressional regulations, and existing legal requirements.” Temporary Provision: 

“The National Defense, Internal Order and current Intelligence Committees of 

Congress will carry out the functions of oversight until the creation of the Select 

Committee for Intelligence.” 

87 An extraordinary and perilous degree of similarity exists between Articles 4 and 

8 of Law 27479 (2001), and Articles 2 and 4 of Law 25635 (1992). Andres Gomez 

de la Torre, “Evolución reciente y contextos de la legislación de inteligencia: El caso 

del Perú,” in Laura Chamorro, ed., Sistemas de inteligencia comparados: Aportes al 

caso peruano, primera edición (Lima: IDEPE, 2010), pp. 37-116.

88 “The only justifiable secrecy for a State ... is that which not only imposes silence, but which also maintains a judicious reticence with respect to topics in which 

silence is advisable, even if it has not been strictly imposed. Loyalty to the public 

interest and allegiance to public officials and their associates requires the careful 

exercise of judgment about what is said and not said, even though it is often the 

case that there is no formal requirement to safeguard the information....” from Sir 

Henry Taylor, “The Statesman” (1836), reproduced in John Gross, Oxford Book of 

Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=lee

rarticulo&Article=111976. Accessed 8 February 2012.ra

89 See the previous work of Jose Manuel Ugarte, Legislación de inteligencia: Legitimidad 

y eficacia (Guatemala: Washington Office on Latin America and Asociacion para el 

Estudio y Promoción de la Seguridad en Democracia, 2000). Ugarte, together with 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

425

Jaime Garreta and Marcelo Fabian Sain, were the chief promoters and architects of 

National Intelligence Law 25520 (2001) in Argentina.

90 See Resolución Suprema No. 097-2004-PCM, Constituyen Comisión Especial encargada de implementar medidas aprobadas para la reestructuración del Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia, published in the official newspaper El Peruano, 22 March 

2004.

91 Peru, Ley del Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional y de la Agencia de Inteligencia Estratégica, http://www.idepe.org/pdf/proyecto_inteligencia.pdf. Accessed 12 March 2012.

92 For coverage of this topic, see Andres Gomez de la Torre, “Comisiones reformadoras de inteligencia: experiencias latinoamericanas recientes (2001-2009),” in 

Fredy Rivera Velez, Inteligencia Estrategica y Prospectiva, op. cit., pp. 185-186. 

93 Ley del Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional–SINA y de la Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia–DINI, Ley 28664, http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/28664.

pdf. Accessed 10 March 2012.

94 “Special Operations. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations that often 

intrude on some citizens’ rights, to protect against threats to national security, and 

requiring judicial pre-authorization to carry out.” In Ley del Sistema de Inteligencia 

Nacional—SINA y de la Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia–DINI, Ley no. 28664, 

Primera Disposición Complementaria, Glosario.

95 Law 28664, http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/28664.pdf. Accessed 

6 March 2012. The UIF-PERÚ participates as a member of The Egmont Group of 

Financial Intelligence Units. “The objective of the Egmont Group is to provide a forum for Financial Intelligence Units across the world to improve cooperation in the 

fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, and to promote national 

programs for doing so.” See http://www.egmontgroup.org/. Accessed 6 March 2012.

96 Through Law 29038, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Peru (UIF-PERÚ) was 

placed under the Superintendent of Banking, Insurance and Private Administrators 

of Pension Funds (SBS).

97 For background on the “MARTE-DINTEMAR” case of selling intelligence information, see http://www.desdeeltercerpiso.com/cat/carlos-barba/. Accessed 9 March 

2012. For the “BTR” case, see http://www.larepublica.pe/06-10-2011/caso-btr-gustavo-gorriti-cuenta-la-historia-de-los-correos-truchos Accessed 9 March 2012.
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98 See Chapter 2 of Law 28664, especially Articles 14, 15, and 16, and Chapter 3 

of title 2, especially Articles 20 and 21. 

99 See Articles 3 and 5 of Law 28664.

100 This working group was created under the auspices of congressional regulations, which have the force of law and regulate the activities and functions of select 

committees. 

101 This report resides in the archives of the Peruvian Congress.

102 According to the Strategic Intelligence Handbook of the SINA, information 

notes are to be prepared “in a precise, clear and concise format, answering the 

principal questions of What, Who, When, Where, How and Why or For What 

Purpose, and Intelligence Notes are the last step in information processing.” See 

Manual de Inteligencia Estratégica del SINA, Tomo I, Escuela de Inteligencia Nacional–ESIN, 1994, pp. 56, 74.

103 Bill 2563-2007-CR, modifying Law 28664, Ley del Sistema de Inteligencia 

Nacional–SINA y de la Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia–DINA, http://www2.

congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/TraDocEstProc/CLProLey2006.nsf. Accessed 6 March 2012.

104 On judicial control, see Brazil, Law 9883, art. 3, paragraph 1; Argentina, Law 

25520, Title VI, art. 18–22; Chile: Law 19974, Title V, art. 23–32. On congressional control, see Brazil, Law 9883, art. 6; Argentina, Law 25520, Title VIII, art. 

31–41; Chile, Law 19974, Title VI, art. 33–37.

105 On transparency of intelligence information, see items about the capture of 

“Artemio” Gustavo Gorriti, “Crepúsculo en la madrugada,” Caretas magazine, http://

www.caretas.com.pe/Main.asp?T=3082&S=&id=12&idE=1000&idSTo=0&idA=5

7237&NL=1 and “Cazando a ‘Artemio’,” Caretas, http://www.caretas.com.pe/Main.

asp?T=3082&S=&id=12&idE=1000&idSTo=0&idA=57238. Accessed 9 March 

2012.

106 On this theme, see the work of Jose Manuel Ugarte, “El control de la actividad 

de Inteligencia: Realidad actual y tendencias hacia el futuro—Un análisis centrado 

en América Latina,” paper presented at Santiago de Chile, Center for Hemispheric 

Defense Studies, REDES 2003; also see Andres Gomez de la Torre, “Servicios de 

Inteligencia y democracia en América del Sur. ¿Hacia una segunda generación de 

reformas normativas?,” Agenda Internacional, Año XVI, no. 27 (Lima: Instituto de 

Estudios Internacionales, Pontifica Universidad Catolica, 2009), pp. 119-130.
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107 Decreto Ley no. 9, 20 August 2009, http://www.gacetaoficial.gob.pa/pdfTemp/26109/GacetaNo_26109_20080822.pdf. Accessed 12 March 2012.

108 See Bill No. 26, 12 August 2009, http://www.asamblea.gob.pa/apps/seg_legis/

PDF_SEG/PDF_SEG_2000/PDF_SEG_2009/2009_P_026.pdf. Accessed 12 

March 2012.

109 On 5 March 2010, the Colombian Jurist Commission (CCJ) and the Reiniciar Corporation asserted the unconstitutionality of this law because of a series of 

missteps in the formation of the law, as well as in the wording of various articles 

in the law. A summary of this challenge to the law is at http://www.coljuristas.org/

Portals/0/S%C3%ADntesiseligencia.pdf. Accessed 29 November 2010.

110 For perspective on the Colombian espionage case and the unconstitutionality 

of the Law of Intelligence and Counterintelligence as declared by the Constitutional 

Court, see Alejo Vargas Velasquez, “La Inteligencia está de moda,” El Colombiano.

com (2010), http://www.elcolombiano.com//BancoConocimiento/L/la_inteligencia_

esta_de_moda/la_inteligencia_esta_de_moda.asp. Accessed 2 December 2010. 

111 Andres Gomez de la Torre and Raul Santiago Calle Pena, Inteligencia en los 

Andes: Avances y retrocesos (El Alto, Bolivia: Centro Andino de Estudios Estratégicos, July 2011), p. 6, http://www.resdal.org/producciones-miembros/inteligencia-enlos-andes2.pdf. Accessed 12 March 2012.

112 See “Agencia que reemplaza al DAS no será policial,” http://www.elpais.com.

co/elpais/colombia/noticias/agencia-reemplaza-das-sera-policial. Accessed 10 February 

2012.

113 “The National Intelligence Directorate will have an Inspector General who will 

oversee compliance with the law,” http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2011/Noviembre/Paginas/20111104_15.aspx. Accessed 9 March 2012.

114 “Angostura marcó un antes y un después en las FFAA,” Hoy.com, 15 January 

2009, http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/angostura-marco-un-antes-y-un-despuesen-las-ffaa-328808.html. Accessed 9 March 2012.

115 These principles are addressed in the cited bill: “Article 4—In the collection 

and handling of information, intelligence officials must ensure that their actions 

conform with the following principles: Legitimacy (full conformation with the law, 

with actions in line with an organization’s intrinsic responsibilities). Efficiency (appropriate relationship between available means and the quality and value of the 

intelligence product). Financial probity (appropriate sourcing and use of funds 
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428

allocated to the intelligence services, to include those for ‘black programs’). The 

strict observance of legality in those procedures that inevitably require invading the 

privacy of individuals. The strict observance of the principles of ‘need to know’ and 

‘need to share’ in the correct and complete execution of the functions (principles) 

defined above. Finally, ensuring that information not be used for the benefit of a 

particular person, private organization, or any political party.”

116 Decree 6067 (abrogated), with rank, value and force of law, of the National 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence System, Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela no. 38940, 28 May 2008. 

117 On SEBIN, see http://www.intelpage.info/servicio-bolivariano-de-inteligencianacional-sebin.html. Accessed 9 March 2012.

118 For more information, see Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta, “Comisiones reformadoras,” op. cit., pp. 190-191. 

119 This evolutionary or developmental path has passed through the following 

stages: “a) scandal; b) development and establishment of an evaluative/investigative 

commission; c) final report of a commission that included conclusions and recommendations, among them the need for a normative framework to reinforce the new 

approach; d) legislative bill, usually prepared by the executive branch (Ecuador, 

Costa Rica), and/or with inputs from other bills presented in congress (Peru, Colombia); and e) new normative framework with emphasis on intelligence laws that 

incorporate checks and balances with respect to the legislative branch relationship 

with intelligence services (external control) and judicial branch (parallel control),” 

cited in Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta, “Servicios de Inteligencia,” op. cit., p. 

127. Also see Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta, “Comisiones reformadoras,” op. cit., 

pp. 179-180. 

120 This theme is developed in Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta, “Comisiones 

reformadoras,” op. cit., pp. 177-196. 

121 “Social control is probably the most important of all, because it involves the 

independent scrutiny that the press, political parties, public opinion, academia, 

and think tanks can bring to bear,” cited in Carlos Maldonado, “Desafíos de los 

servicios de inteligencia en la región andina,” in Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta, 

comp., SIN Arcana Imperii. Inteligencia en democracia (Lima: Foro Libertad & Seguridad, 2007), p. 273.

122 For example, see Jose Julio Fernandez Rodriguez and Daniel Sanso-Rubert 

Pascual, “El recurso constitucional a las fuerzas armadas para el mantenimiento de 
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la seguridad interior: el caso de Iberoamérica,” Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado of the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas-UNAM, XLIII, no. 128 (MayAugust 2010), pp. 737-760. Also see Kate Martin, “Domestic Intelligence and 

Civil Liberties,” SAIS Review, XXIV, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004), pp. 7-21. In the 

Peruvian case, Bill 1374/2006-PE, and Report 17 on this bill, permitted the enactment of Law 29166, titled “Law establishing rules for the use of force by members 

of the armed forces in the national territory.” This law established the Peruvian 

legislative tendency to delegate to the armed forces those tasks related to internal 

order or support in the establishment of that order. See http://www.congreso.gob.pe/

ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/29166.pdf. Accessed 13 March 2012.

123 The executive branch was granted a period of 90 days to develop legislation 

strengthening and modernizing the National Security and Defense System (Legislative Decree 1141). See http://www.mef.gob.pe/contenidos/servicios_web/conectamef/

pdf/normas_legales_2012/NL20120912.PDF.

124 The proposals were: 721/2012-CR, 722/2012-CR, 724/2012-CR, 728/2012-

CR, and 730/2012-CR.

125 For the full text of the decree, see http://dataonline.gacetajuridica.com.pe/gaceta/

admin/elperuano/2012-11-12/11-12-2012.PDF. 

126 Theoretically, the Peruvian Congress could find the legislative decree unconstitutional, but barring such a development, the enactment of the decree remains in 

executive branch hands. 

127 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Controle Público da Atividade de Inteligência: a Procura 

de Legitimidade e Eficácia,” in Brazilian National Congress, Anais do Seminário 

Atividades de Inteligência no Brasil: Contribuições para a Soberania e a Democracia, 

6-7 November 2002 (Brasília: Agência brasileira de inteligência/Abin, 2003), pp. 

89-145.

128 Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence and Democratization: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies,” Occasional Paper no. 5 (Monterey, CA: The Center for 

Civil-Military Relations–Naval Postgraduate School, March 2000).

129 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State

(London: Frank Cass, 1994).

130 The word “inteligência” was incorporated into Brazilian doctrine at the beginning of the 1990s, following redemocratization, as a substitute for the term “informações,” which is more commonly used in the Portuguese language. The main 
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reason for the adoption of the new term was political, part of an attempt to ban 

terminology associated with the military regime. Another example is the disuse of 

the term “national security.” To be clear, “informações” is still used in Brazil, and 

is understood to be the equivalent of “intelligence,” but is not the same thing as 

“informação,” which refers to information gathered in relation to a particular issue. 

For more on these distinctions, see the author’s Atividade de Inteligência e Legislação 

Correlata, second edition (Niterói: Impetus, 2011).

131 Despite the fact that some authors who write about intelligence in Brazil write 

of “covert actions” and “clandestine actions,” these terms are completely alien to 

Brazilian intelligence doctrine; they are not used by intelligence professionals. In 

Brazil, one speaks only of “intelligence operations.” 

132 In antiquity, in his classic work on strategy, A Arte da Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: 

Bibliex, 2003), the Chinese general Sun Tzu (fourth century BCE) addresses the 

importance that generals and governors attach to employing spies. 

133 For more extensive coverage of the issues surrounding the control of intelligence activity, to include the topics addressed in the present paper, see the author’s 

Políticos e Espiões–o controle da atividade de inteligência (Niterói, Brazil: Impetus, 

2010).

134 Hely Lopes Meirelles, Direito Administrativo Brasileiro, twenty-first edition 

(São Paulo: Malheiros, 1996), p. 574.

135 Meirelles, ibid., p. 574.

136 Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello, Curso de Direito Administrativo, thirteenth 

edition (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2001), p. 212.

137 Meirelles, op. cit., p. 576.

138 Jans Born, “Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services: 

Lessons Learned from Comparing National Practices,” Connections–A Quarterly 

Journal, 3 (December 2004), p. 4.

139 Greg Hannah, Kevin O’Brien, and Andrew Rathmell, Technical Report: Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform, prepared for the United 

Kingdom’s Security Sector Advisory Team, (Cambridge, RAND Europe, June 

2005), p. 12.
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140 In the Anglo-Saxon world, the concept of accountability combines with ethics within intelligence services and therefore applies to the decisions of individual 

practitioners.

141 Curiously, another English term that has no direct counterpart in Portuguese 

is “enforcement.”

142 For more on the principles that guide Brazilian public administration, see 

Bandeira de Mello, op. cit., Chapter II; Meirelles, op. cit., pp. 82-87; also Fernanda 

Marinela, Direito Administrativo, fourth edition (Niterói: Impetus, 2010), pp. 26-

63.

143 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), DCAF 

Intelligence Working Group, Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight–A Practitioner’s View, DCAF Occasional Paper no. 3 (Geneva, July 2003), p. 1.

144 From the individual in charge of a particular operation to the director general, 

through the entire chain of supervisors of the office or department, everyone has 

the obligation to exert managerial control over his or her subordinates. 

145 “... the secrecy surrounding the intelligence function makes exercising control 

problematic.” From Glenn P. Hastedt, ed., Controlling Intelligence (London: Frank 

Cass, 1991), p. 13.

146 DCAF Intelligence Working Group, op. cit., p. 2.

147 “Even in old and stable democracies leaders often prefer ‘plausible deniability’ 

rather than access to the information required to control a potentially controversial 

or dangerous organization or operation. Logically this would be even more the case 

in newer democracies. First, the politicians may be afraid of antagonizing the intelligence apparatus through efforts to control it because the intelligence organization 

might have something embarrassing on them. Second, they may be afraid because 

the intelligence organization in the past engaged in arbitrary and violent actions 

and the politicians are not sure that a corner has been turned. Third, there are probably no votes to be won in attempting to control an organization that most people 

want to ignore.” From Bruneau, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

148 Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz, eds., Reforming Intelligence–Obstacles to 

Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), p. 13.
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149 Hastedt, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

150 Ugarte, “Controle Público da Atividade de Inteligência,”op. cit., p. 102.

151 Marina Caparini, “Challenges of Control and Oversight of Intelligence Services in a Liberal Democracy,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 

Forces, Conference paper presented at the Workshop on Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services, Geneva, 2002.

152 Bruneau and Boraz, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

153 Marina Caparini, op. cit.

154 Mary Sturtevant, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: One Perspective,” 

American Intelligence Journal (Summer 1992), http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/sturtevant.html. Sturtevant was a member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence.

155 Amy B. Zegart, “The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight,” 

Political Science Quarterly, 126, 1 (Spring 2011). 

156 Zegart, ibid., p. 9.

157 Reg Whitaker, “Designing a Balance between Freedom and Security,” in Joseph Fletcher, ed., Ideas in Action: Essays on Politics and Law in Honour of Peter 

Russell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 144-145.

158 Caparini, op. cit.

159 Zegart, op. cit. 

160 Peter Gill, “Security and Intelligence Services in the United Kingdom,” in 

Jean-Paul Brodeur and Dennis Tollberg, eds., Democracy, Law and Security–Internal 

Security Services in Contemporary Europe (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 4.

161 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Control público de la actividad de inteligencia: Europa y 

América Latina, una visión comparativa,” paper presented at international seminar 

on Post-Globalización: Redefinición de la Seguridad y la Defensa Regional en el 

Cono Sur, organized by Centro de Estudios Internacionales para el Desarrollo, in 

Buenos Aires, 2002.
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162 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State

(London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 251.

163 In Romano-Germanic judicial systems, an effective legal framework anchors 

the actions of public officials, because, in terms of public administration, “whatever 

is not spelled out in law, does not exist.” This significantly affects the discretion 

of officials in public administration. Further, specific behaviors of public officials 

need to be anticipated by legal disposition. Brazil’s judicial-legal system is not only 

bound to the Romano-Germanic tradition, but is also strongly influenced by nineteenth-century positivism. This means that private citizens can do whatever is not 

expressly prohibited by law. At the same time, in the public sphere, one can only do 

what is expressly authorized by law. Brazilian history exhibits “exceptional” regimes 

that legitimize their actions through the establishment of new legal frameworks. 

Thus, in Romano-Germanic systems, new laws and authorizations can come to 

support abusive actions by public officials.

164 Peter Gill, “A Inteligência, Controle Público e Democracia,” translation by 

Maria Isabel Taveira, in Brazilian National Congress, Anais do Seminário Atividades 

de Inteligência no Brasil: Contribuições para a Soberania e a Democracia, 6-7 November 2002 (Brasília: Abin, 2003), p. 70.

165 Gill, ibid., p. 79.

166 Among the sources for the synthesis presented here are the Council of Europe’s 

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces’ (DCAF) recently 

published works featuring case studies of the control of intelligence activities from 

around the world, and the practical experience of the author. More detailed information on approaches to and practices in intelligence control are available in the 

author’s book Políticos e Espiões–o controle da atividade de inteligência, op. cit.

167 Thomas Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The 

Challenge of Control in New Democracies,” http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/

pais/people/aldrich/vigilant/bruneau.pdf, pp. 16-17.

168 For an example, one may consult the web page for BfV, Germany’s domestic 

intelligence service, where the service identifies the threats it engages: http://www.

verfassungsschutz.de. Accessed 11 October 2011.

169 The difficulty of doing so appears, for example, in the U.S. intelligence system, 

with the division of responsibilities between the Central Intelligence Agency and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and limitations on the activity of the National 
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434

Security Agency. Despite improvements in the implementation of certain actions 

in the realm of counterintelligence, conflicts in jurisdiction, as noted by Mark Riebling, have not yet been resolved. See his Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and 

CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). 

170 To understand the full intent of the law, and of the decree that it implements, 

see https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/lei/l12527.htm (in 

Portuguese).

171 On this point, see Senator and ex-President of the Republic Fernando Collor 

de Mello’s comments on House Bill 41 (of 2010), which began the process leading 

to the Law on Access to Information (LAI), http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=96674 and http://joanisval.com/2012/05/26/aindasobre-a-lei-de-acesso-a-informacao/. Also please see the author’s technical comments 

on the law on his web page (www.joanisval.com).

172 For the Mexican Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública 

Gubernamental, see www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/doc/244.doc.

173 On this issue, see Mexico’s Access to Information Index, 29 April 2010, http://

www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/press/mexico-access-to-information-index.pdf, accessed 

20 May 2012, and Ernesto Isunza-Vera, “O Sistema Mexicano de Transparência e 

Acesso à Informação Pública Governamental” (text prepared for the regional seminar 

“Sociedade civil e as novas institucionalidades democráticas na América Latina: dilemas e perspectivas,” Brasília, 9-12 November 2008), http://www.inesc.org.br/equipe/

ivonem/MEXICO%20Acesso%20a%20informacao.pdf. Accessed 24 May 2012. 

174 According to Article 49 of the Brazilian Constitution, the National Congress 

has exclusive responsibility to “decide on treaties, accords or other international acts 

that involve duties or commitments that affect national heritage.” Thus, any treaty 

signed by Brazil must be submitted for review to the House of Representatives and 

the Federal Senate prior to being ratified.

175 The decision of the CRE that established the precedent grew from the report 

of Senator Aloysio Nunes Ferreira on Bill 238, of 2011 (originally Bill 46, of 2011), 

which approved the text of the accord between Brazil and Spain concerning the 

security of classified information, signed in Madrid 17 September 2007. The text 

of the report is at http://www6.senado.gov.br/mate-pdf/103774.pdf. Accessed 1 May 

2012.
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176 The text of Law 9883 is found at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/

L9883.htm (in Portuguese).

177 The “gang of eight” is made up of the chairman and vice-chairman of the intelligence committees of the House and Senate, and by the majority and minority 

leaders of both houses. 

178 National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Sec. 503 [50 U.S.C. 413b] (b) 

and (c).

179 On this topic, see “Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for 

Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R40691, 6 April 

2011, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40691_20110406.pdf (accessed 1 January 

2012), and “Gang of Four Congressional Intelligence Notifications,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R40698, 18 March 2011, http://assets.

opencrs.com/rpts/R40698_20110318.pdf (accessed 1 January 2012), both by Alfred 

Cumming.

180 See L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser, “Congressional Oversight of 

Intelligence: Current Structures and Alternatives,” Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress, RL32525, 14 March 2012, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/

RL32525_20120314.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2012. 

181 “Ministers are only rarely brought before full sessions of Congress.... Between 

1988 and 2004, there were 201 appearances in the House and 126 in the Senate—a total of 344 in 16 years, or fewer than one appearance per Member of the 

House, and fewer than 1.5 in the Senate, despite the perception that the House is 

the most activist in this regard.... Appearances by Ministers and other authorities 

before Committees, where this is a common practice, are not included.” Leany 

Barreiro Lemos, Controle Legislativo em Democracias Presidencialistas: Brasil e EUA 

em perspectiva comparada, doctoral dissertation (Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 

2005), p. 89.

182 “[Requests for Information] are made in written form and presented in a plenary session of both Chambers, where they are read and submitted to a vote, with 

approval by a simple majority. Requests for Information cannot contain a request 

for luck, advice, suggestions, counsel or questions about the purposes of the authority to whom it is directed; in all cases they must focus on the demand for documents. Refusal to comply with the request, or ignoring it for more than 30 days, as 

well as the provision of false information, is a crime.... Requests for Information, 

quantitatively speaking, are preferred [over forced appearances by a minister]: from 
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436

the promulgation of the Constitution in 1988 until 31 December 2004, 15,341 

Requests for Information came from the House of Representatives, and 3,097 from 

the Federal Senate, for a total of 18,438.” Lemos, op. cit., p. 87.

183 “Addressed in Article 58 of the Federal Constitution of 1988, public hearings 

are held as much to bring public attention to certain issues as to exercise control 

of intelligence activity, and are used exclusively to engage civil society entities such 

as unions or associations, and to acquire the testimony of certain authorities or 

citizens.” Lemos, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

184 “An incentive for the use of Requests for Information is their low cost.... They 

do not alter the status quo and, thus, Congress does not run the risk of moving 

public policies in unanticipated directions.... That is not to say that this approach 

is not a real mechanism of control. It can be a strategic instrument when it tackles 

sensitive issues, negotiates legislative actions, or allocates resources.” Lemos, op. cit., 

pp. 87-88.

185 To avoid unnecessary discomfort among executive branch officials, an “invitation” rather than a “demand” is extended for them to attend public or private 

sessions with Congress. Executive officials, at least in the intelligence area, tend to 

appear before congress without hesitation. On this issue, see Lemos, op. cit., and 

Maria Helena de Castro Santos, “Controles parlamentares e os militares no Brasil: 

audiências públicas e requerimentos de informações, 1995–2004,” in Mariana Llanos and Ana Maria Mustapic (orgs.), Controle Parlamentar na Alemanha, na Argentina e no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Konrad Adenauer, 2005), pp. 113-139.

186 This has already occurred, for example, in Canada, when a committee of parliamentarians (and not a Parliamentary committee or committee of Parliament) was created to oversee issues related to the security and intelligence community. This committee turned out to have limited effect, and in fact acted in consonance with the 

interests and point of view of the Prime Minister. On this issue, see Stuart Farson, 

“Parliament and Its Servants: Their Role in Scrutinizing Canadian Intelligence,” in 

David Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, eds., American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 225-258. 

187 On this topic, see Zegart, “The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence 

Oversight,” op. cit.

188 “6. (1) The Director, under the direction of the Minister, has the control and 

management of the Service and all matters connected therewith. (2) In providing 

the direction referred to in subsection (1), the Minister may issue to the Director 
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written directions with respect to the Service and a copy of any such direction shall, 

forthwith after it is issued, be given to the Review Committee.” CSIS Act, section 

6, (1), (2).

189 “The CSIS Act established, in law, a comprehensive regime for the security 

intelligence function in Canada: a civilian agency with no executive terms of reference; with clearly [and where appropriate, precisely] defined mandate and powers; 

subject to a rigorous, inter-related system of political and judicial controls; and, 

importantly, subject to independent, arm’s-length review. The centrepiece of that 

system for accountability, control and review was and is the unique combination 

of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and the Inspector General (IG)—the former reporting through the Minister to Parliament; the latter, 

in a more specialized but complementary way, acting as the “Minister’s ‘eyes and 

ears’ on the Service.” Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Backgrounder no. 17: 

Control, Accountability and Review, May 2005, http://www.csis.gc.ca/en/newsroom/

backgrounders/backgrounder17.asp. Accessed 25 February 2012. 

190 “The Security Intelligence Review Committee is the only body with the legal 

mandate and expertise to carry out ongoing, independent review of the activities of 

CSIS. SIRC was established under the CSIS Act (1984) to provide assurance to the 

Parliament of Canada and to Canadians that CSIS is acting in accordance with the 

law, policy and ministerial direction in the performance of its duties and functions. 

In doing so, SIRC seeks to ensure that CSIS respects the fundamental rights and 

freedoms of Canadians.” Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), SIRC Annual Report 2006–2007—An Operational Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence 

Service (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2007), p. 3.

191 “SIRC recognizes that the conduct of security intelligence agencies can prompt 

impassioned debate about whether the ends can ever justify the means. We also have 

first-hand knowledge that there are individuals who will seek to exploit Canada’s 

rights and freedoms in order to harm our country, our citizens and our neighbours 

and friends around the world.... SIRC recognizes that police and security intelligence agencies in the post-9/11 world must deal with daunting challenges, including globalized and technologically sophisticated terrorist groups. We also know that 

the relative safety that Canadians enjoy is thanks in large part to the efforts of these 

same agencies on our behalf. But the obligation to ensure public safety ought not 

to reduce in any way respect for the rule of law.” SIRC Annual Report 2006–2007, 

pp. v-vi.

192 “40. For the purpose of ensuring that the activities of the Service are carried out 

in accordance with this Act, and that the activities do not involve any unreasonable 
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or unnecessary exercise by the Service of any of its powers, the Review Committee may (a) direct the Service or Inspector General to conduct a review of specific 

activities of the Service and provide the Committee with a report of the review; or 

(b) where it considers that a review by the Service or the Inspector General would 

be inappropriate, conduct such a review itself.” CSIS Act, Section 40.

193 CSIS Act, Sections 41 to 46.

194 Article15 of the National Defense Act of 1988 distinguished concepts of national defense and internal security, and prohibited the armed forces from engaging 

in internal security issues through intelligence activity related to domestic policy 

matters. 

195 “Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” New York Times, 30 July 2012 

(updated), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html. Accessed 15 August 2012. Also see Spencer Ackerman, “How 

the Pentagon’s Top Killers Became (Unaccountable) Spies,” Wired Magazine, 13 February 2012, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/jsoc-ambinder/. Accessed 15 August 

2012.

196 Per U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, Public Law 

111–259, 7 October 2010, Section 326, Subtitle D, http://intelligence.senate.gov/

pdfs111th/111259.pdf. Accessed 15 August 2012.

197 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act applies only to intelligence operations by agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community inside of the United States. 

For an outline of the 1978 Act and its amendments, see the Center for National 

Security Studies site at http://www.cnss.org/fisa.htm. Accessed 15 August 2012.

198 Gregory Weeks, “A Preference for Deference: Reforming the Military’s Intelligence Role in Argentina, Chile and Peru,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008), 

p. 57.

199 “The term ‘ethics’ derives from the Greek word meaning ‘custom,’ and therefore ethics has often been defined as customary doctrine, especially by empiricists. 

For Aristotle, ethical virtues are developed through practice and are put in place 

to achieve a particular purpose, so that ‘dianetics’ may be thought of as rational 

‘social psychology.’ In the subsequent evolution of the concept, ethics has come to 

be equated with morality, and to refer to the study of moral philosophy.” Moreover, “just as ‘ethics’ derives from ήθος, ‘moral’ derives from mos, or ‘custom,’ and 

therefore the terms are often used interchangeably. In some languages, including 

Spanish, morality refers to the nonmaterial universe, so that unlike the physical 
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sciences, moral ‘science’ addresses anything not purely physical (such as history, 

politics, skills or abilities, etc.); that is, anything that is a product of the subjective 

spirit, as well as the subjective spirit itself. And, finally, morality is distinguished 

from immorality or amorality in the sense that whatever is found to be ethical is in 

conflict with what is not ethical or with anything that remains indifferent. Morality 

has value, whereas immorality or amorality are, respectively, without value or indifferent to value.” From Jose Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de la Filosofía, fifth edition 

(Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1964), vol. I, pp. 594-595, and vol. II, pp. 

232-233.

200 The list of authors is long. Many were or are members of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community. Others teach or conduct research in universities in North America or 

Western Europe, or are high-level officials of Western democracies. Some of them 

are cited in this work: Stefan Brem, Jan Goldman, Melvin Goodman, Albert Pierce, 

Erich Schimdt-Eenboom, and Brian Snow.

201 To date the IIEA has not, either in its conferences or its journal, included papers about Latin America. The present essay takes note of several publications from 

the IIEA’s professional journal.

202 Allison M. Shelton, “Framing the Oxymoron: A New Paradigm for Intelligence Ethics,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 1 (2011), p. 25. 

203 Jan Goldman, “Ethics Phobia and the U.S. Intelligence Community: Just Say 

‘No’, A Symposium on Intelligence Ethics,” Intelligence and National Security 24, 

no. 3 (2009), p. 374. This author, then a professor of the National Defense Intelligence College in Washington, DC, labels as “ethics phobia” the fear of contemplating the topic of ethical behavior. 

204 Shelton, op. cit., pp. 28-30. 

205 Shelton, op. cit., p. 26.

206 Tony Pfaff and Jeffrey R. Tiel, “The Ethics of Espionage,” Journal of Military 

Ethics 3, no. 1 (2004), pp. 11-14.

207 Pfaff and Tiel, ibid., pp. 14-15.

208 Melvin A. Goodman, author of the book Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and 

Fall of the CIA (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).
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209 Melvin A. Goodman, “Revamping the CIA,” Issues in Science and Technology Online (Winter 2001), http://www.issues.org/18.2/goodman.html. Accessed 22 

August 2012.

210 U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim 

Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20 November 1975), pp. 257-258, http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/ir/pdf/

ChurchIR_4_Findings.pdf. Accessed 23 August 2012.

211 Elizabeth B. Bazan, Assassination Ban and E.O. 12333: A Brief Summary, Congressional Research Service Report RS21037 (Washington, DC: CRS, 4 January 

2002), pp. 1-3.

212 Melvin A. Goodman, “CIA Failures of Tradecraft and Intelligence Prior to 

the Second Iraq War,” in Intelligence Ethics: The Definitive Work of 2007, Michael 

Andregg, ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Center for the Study of Intelligence and Wisdom, 2007, p. 32, http://www.gzmn.org/pdfonline/IntelligenceEthics2007-MA.pdf.

Accessed 23 August 2012.

213 Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, “Geheimdienste in Demokratien,” Welttrends: 

Zeitschrift für internationale Politik und vergleichende Studien 14, no. 51 (2006), 

p. 17.

214 Schmidt-Eenboom, ibid., pp. 14-23.

215 Schlächter von Lyon, “Nazi-Verbrecher Barbie war BND-Agent,” Der Spiegel, 

15 January 2011, and Michael Kimmelman, “50 Years After Trial, Eichmann Secrets Live On,” New York Times, 9 May 2011. 

216 Stefan Brem, “Special Ethics for Special Services,” in Intelligence Ethics: The 

Definitive Work of 2007, Michael Andregg, ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Center for 

the Study of Intelligence and Wisdom: 2007), pp. 11-13. All ten guidelines may 

be found at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/176C046F-C0E6-423C-A039-

F66D90CC6031/0/LignesDirectrices_EN.pdf. Accessed 23 August 2012.

217 Schmidt-Eenboom, op. cit., p. 24. 

218 Brian Snow, “Intelligence Community ‘Mission Ethics’: A Symposium on Intelligence Ethics,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 3 (2009), p. 385.
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219 “El CNI prepara un ‘código ético’ del agente secreto,” ABC, Madrid, 25 June 

2010. 

220 “El código ético de los espías estará listo en primavera,” El Confidencial Digital, 

Madrid, 7 March 2011. 

221 “El código ético del CNI,” El Confidencial Digital, Madrid, 12 January 2012. 

222 Albert C. Pierce, “The Value of an Ethos for Intelligence Professionals,” in Intelligence Ethics: The Definitive Work of 2007, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

223 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Explaining Failures and Successes in the Democratization of Intelligence,” Panel on Politics of Intelligence 

Governance, The European Consortium for Political Research’s General Conference, Potsdam, Germany: 10-12 September 2009, pp. 2-3.

224 Rafael Jose de Espona, “Los servicios de inteligencia en los países post-soviéticos,” Inteligencia y Seguridad no. 8 (2010), p. 77.

225 Julia Pulido Gragera, Los servicios de inteligencia rusos: Influencia de la nueva 

Rusia en el actual sistema de seguridad (Madrid: Centro Superior de Estudios de la 

Defensa Nacional, 2010), pp.138-143.

226 Matei and Bruneau, op. cit., pp. 15 and following.

227 Carlos Maldonado Prieto, “Desafíos de los servicios de inteligencia en la región 

andina,” in SIN Arcana imperii: Inteligencia en democracia, op. cit., p. 267.

228 Carlos Maldonado Prieto, “Dilemas antiguos y modernos en la inteligencia 

estratégica en Sudamérica,” Security and Defense Studies Review 9 (2009), p. 54.

229 “Creación de nueva agencia nacional de inteligencia recibe apoyo del bobierno 

británico,” Radio Santa Fe, Bogota, 9 November 2011. President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and his national security advisor, Sergio Jaramillo, met in London 

late in November 2011 with John Sawyer, director of MI6. See http://unidad-intellatinoamerica.webnode.com.ar/news/presidente-santos-crea-nueva-agencia-de-inteligencia-colombiana-con-apoyo-del-reino-unido-/. Accessed 23 August 2012.

230 “Colombia crea una nueva agencia de inteligencia tras haber liquidado anterior,” EFE (Spanish news service), 4 November 2011. 

231 Article 4 also notes that in no case will intelligence or counterintelligence 

information be collected, processed, or disseminated for reasons of gender, race, 
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442

national or family origin, language, religion, political or philosophical opinion, 

membership in a social, labor, or human rights organization, to promote the 

interests of any political party or movement, or to affect the rights and guarantees of 

opposing political parties. See Ley de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia de Colombia 

at http://colarebo.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/ley-de-inteligenia-y-contrainteligenciapdf.pdf. Accessed 23 August 2012.

232 “Due obedience” was traditionally understood in Latin America as a stipulation 

exempting from criminal responsibility those crimes committed in carrying out an 

order given by a superior in the military environment, and which the subordinate 

could not refuse to carry out. However, after the military dictatorships of the 1970s 

and 1980s, the legal environment changed radically by adopting the approach of 

international humanitarian law, which does not recognize due obedience as an acceptable reason for exempting an individual from criminal responsibility. 

233 Ley de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia de Colombia, http://colarebo.files.

wordpress.com/2011/05/ley-de-inteligenia-y-contrainteligencia-pdf.pdf. Accessed 23 

August 2012.

234 Fredy Rivera, “La Inteligencia ecuatoriana: Tradiciones, cambios y perspectivas,” in his Inteligencia Estratégica y Prospectiva, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

235 Rivera, ibid., pp. 59-60.

236 Carlos Maldonado Prieto, “La sublevación policial en Ecuador,” Revista Atenea Digital, 2 October 2010., http://www.ateneadigital.es/RevistaAtenea/REVISTA/

articulos/GestionNoticias_3055_ESP.asp, and Carlos Maldonado Prieto, “Desafíos 

para la Inteligencia Estratégica Latinoamericana,” Revista Atenea Digital, 26 November 2010, http://www.ateneadigital.es/RevistaAtenea/REVISTA/articulos/GestionNoticias_3432_ESP.asp. Both accessed 23 August 2012.

237 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Demanda en el caso de Humberto 

Antonio Palamara Iribarne (Caso 11.571) contra la República de Chile, 13 April 

2004.

238 Humberto Palamara, Ética y servicios de inteligencia (Valparaíso: Armada de 

Chile, 2006), pp. 65-66.

239 Giorgio del Vecchio, Crisis del Derecho y Crisis del Estado (Madrid, Librería 

General de Victoriano Suarez, 1935), p. 96.
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240 Jose Luis Cea Egana, “Estado constitucional de derecho, nuevo paradigma 

jurídico,” Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano, no. 11 (2005), pp. 

47-50.

241 See Norberto Bobbio, Estado, Gobierno y Sociedad: Por una Teoría General de la 

Política (México DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006), pp. 68-187.

242 See Lucia Meza and Daniel Soto, “Seguridad, Derechos Humanos y Democracia: ¿Un Nuevo Paradigma?,” Revista IIDH, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos 

Humanos no. 49 (2010), pp. 239-263.

243 Diego Torrente, Desviación y Delito (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2001), p. 

223.

244 Fernando Velasco Fernandez, “Democracia y Servicios de Inteligencia: Ética 

para qué?,” in Jose Luis Gonzalez Cussac, coord., Inteligencia (Valencia, Tirant Lo 

Blanch, 2012), p. 464.

245 Ibid., p. 474.

246 See Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), pp. 121-125. 

247 Jose Gonzalez Cussac, Beatriz Larriba Hinojar and Antonio Fernandez Hernandez, “Servicios de Inteligencia y Estado de Derecho,” in Jose Luis Gonzalez 

Cussac, coord., Inteligencia, op. cit., pp. 283-287.

248 Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck, La Vida de los Otros, [DVD], Germany, 

Wiedermann and Berg Filmproduktion, Bayerischer Rundfunk, Arte y Creado 

Film, 2006. 

249 Juan Jose Campanella, El Secreto de Sus Ojos, [DVD], Argentina, Tornasol 

Films, Haddock Film, 100 Bares, Telefe and others, 2009.

250 Joel and Ethan Coen, Quémese Después de Leerse, [DVD], United States, Bronx 

Community College, University Avenue at West 181 Street, Bronx, New York City 

and others, 2008. 

251 Gregor Jordan, El Dia del Juicio Final, [DVD], United States, Lleju Productions and Films and Sidney Kimmel Entertainment International, 2009. 
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252 United Nations, Derechos Humanos y Aplicación de la Ley: Manual de Capacitación en Derechos Humanos para Policía (Geneva, High Commissioner for Human 

Rights, Center for Human Rights, 1997), pp. 59-66.

253 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 13.3) and American Convention (article 22.3). 

254 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 20), International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights (article 20), American Declaration of the Rights and 

Duties of Man (article XXII), American Convention on Human Rights (article 

16), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 8), 

Covenant 87 on the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to 

Organize (articles 2 through 5), Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 15), 

International Convention of the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 

and Members of their Families (articles 26 and 40). 

255 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (articles 10 and 11), American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (articles XVIII and XXVI), International 

Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (articles 14 and 15), American Convention 

on Human Rights (articles 8 and 9), Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 

40) and Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of 

Detention or Imprisonment (principle 17).

256 William Friedkin, Contacto en Francia, [DVD], United States, D’Antoni Productions, Schine–Moore Productions, 1971. 

257 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (articles 6 and 12), International Covenant on Civil and Political (articles 16, 17), American Declaration of the Rights 

and Duties of Man (articles V, IX, X, and XVII), American Convention on Human 

Rights (articles 3, 11, and 14), Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 16).

258 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 

34/169 of 17 December 1979.

259 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (articles 10 and 11), American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (articles XVIII and XXVI), International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (articles 14 and 15), American Convention 

on Human Rights (articles 8 and 9). 

260 United Nations, op. cit., p. 63. 
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261 Martin Scorsese, Los Infiltrados, [DVD], United States, Warner Bros. Pictures, 

Plan B Entertainment, Initial Entertainment, 2006. 

262 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 12), International Covenant for 

Civil and Political Rights (article 17), American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (article IX), and American Convention on Human Rights (article 11). 

263 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 11), American Declaration of 

the Rights and Duties of Man (article XXVI), International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights (article 14.2), American Convention on Human Rights. 

264 Daniel O’Donnel, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos: Normativa, 

Jurisprudencia y Doctrina de los Sistemas Universal e Interamericano (Santiago, Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, High Commissioner of the 

United Nations for Human Rights, 2007), p. 526.

265 Maria Eugenia Ullman et al., Derechos Humanos, Seguridad Ciudadana y 

Funciones Policiales: Módulo instruccional (San José, Instituto Interamericano de 

Derechos Humanos, 2011), pp. 85-89.

266 Paul Greengrass, La Ciudad de las Tormentas, [DVD], United States, Universal 

Pictures, Studio Canal and Relativity Media, 2010. 

267 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 5); American Declaration of 

the Rights and Duties of Man (articles I, XXV, and XXVI); International Covenant 

of Civil and Political Rights (articles 7 and 10); American Convention on Human Rights (article 5); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 

Degrading Treatment; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; 

Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; Body of Principles for 

the Protection of All Persons Subjected to Detention or Imprisoned; and United 

Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty. 

268 International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (article 9.2) and American Convention on Human Rights (article 7.4).

269 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (article XXV paragraph 2), International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (article 10), and 

American Convention on Human Rights (article 5 paragraph 2).

270 Gillo Pontecorvo, La Batalla de Argel, [DVD], Italy and Algeria, Igor Fil y 

Casbah Film, 1966.
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271 Central Intelligence Agency, “Does the CIA Spy on Americans? Does It Keep 

a File on You?” https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/faqs/index.html#spyonamericans. Accessed 17 April 2011. 

272 The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 

Treatment (1984) establishes in its article 1: “For the purposes of this Convention, 

we understand by the word ‘torture’ any act used to intentionally inflict pain, great 

suffering, whether physical or mental, on a person with the objective of obtaining 

from that person or a third person, information or a confession, in punishment for 

an act that person has committed, or is suspected of committing, or to intimidate 

or coerce this person or others, or for any reason based on any type of discrimination, when this pain and suffering are inflicted by a public official or other person in 

the exercise of public duties, on their own volition or with their consent and acquiescence. Any pain and suffering that is the result of legitimate sanctions, or that are 

inherent or incidental to those, will not be considered torture.” The Inter-American 

Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985) notes in its article 2: “For the 

purposes of this Convention, torture will be understood to be any act carried out 

intentionally that inflicts physical or mental pain or suffering for the purposes of 

criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a 

preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Also considered torture 

is the application of any method that tends to change the personality of the victim, 

or to diminish his or her physical or mental abilities, even though it may not cause 

physical pain or psychiatric anguish.... What will not be considered torture are 

physical or mental pain and suffering that are only the consequence of legal measures, or of practices inherent in those measures, so long as they do not include the 

actions or methods that are specifically noted in this article.” 

273 Pablo Bonorino asserts that liberalism rejects torture because of its close connection with tyranny and because it constitutes an extreme negation of human 

dignity. In applying such measures, the torturer crushes, terrorizes, and humiliates 

the victim for the purpose of dominating him or her through pain. This has been 

the objective of military victories, as a way to dominate politically through terror, 

as punishment, and as a procedure to extract confessions under an absolutist justice 

system. Pablo Bonorino Ramirez, “Retorno de la tortura: la carga ideológica de la 

ficción televisiva,” Revista Académica, no. 51 (2011): pp. 111, 112.

274 Bonorino, ibid., pp. 109-215.

275 Humberto Antonio Palamara Iribarne sued the State of Chile because in 1993, 

while he was a civil employee of the navy, that institution prohibited him from publishing his book Ethics and the Intelligence Services. The unauthorized publication 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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of the book and his publicly declared disagreement with authorities, in defiance 

of the Naval Judge of Magallanes, brought on the confiscation of all copies of his 

book, the removal of the document from the hard disk of his computer, preventive 

imprisonment for 11 days, and the definitive judgment that his actions included 

“failure to perform military duties,” “disobedience,” and “disrespect.” The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights ruled against Chile and ordered the reform of its 

military justice system. (Case of Palamara Iribarne vs. Chile, 2005): Inter-American 

Court of Human Rights, 22 November 2005.

276 Humberto Antonio Palamara Iribarne, Ética y Servicios de Inteligencia (Valparaíso, Armada de Chile, 2006), p. 147.

277 Amalio Blanco Abarca, “La Condición de ‘Enemigo’: El Ocaso de la Inocencia,” in Manuel Cancio Melia and Laura Pozuelo Perez, coords., Política criminal en 

vanguardia: Inmigración clandestina, terrorismo, criminalidad organizada (Navarra, 

Spain: Editorial Aranzadi SA, 2008), pp. 257, 258.

278 Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology 

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 145.

279 Blanco Abarca, op. cit., pp. 292, 293.

280 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W. W. 

Norton & Company, 2007), pp. 1-8.

281 Younger-Yusuf reproaches his captors: “Do it! Do it! I love my country, you 

people crap on it! I love my religion, you people spit on it! Just remember something, I’m here because I wanna be here! I let myself be caught, because I’m not a 

coward! I chose to meet my oppressors face to face! You call me a barbarian? Then 

what are you? What, you expect me to weep over 50 civilians? You people kill that 

number every day! How does it feel Brody? This is not about me! This is about you! 

How does it feel? You have no authority here! None! There is but one authority, and 

it is not you! You are a blight, you are a cancer! How does it feel Brody?”

282 Sen, op. cit., p. 175

283 Alias “H”: “There is no H. and Younger ... there’s only victory and defeat. The 

winner gets to take the moral high ground, because they get to write the history 

books. The loser ... just loses. The only miscalculation in your plan ... was me.”

284 Albert Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,” 

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, no. 3 (1999): p. 200.
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448

285 See Bandura, ibid.

286 Jack Saunders, the Director of the FBI and Helen Brody’s supervisor, shouts in 

desperation, “If those bombs go off there will be no f*#@ing Constitution!”

287 In November 2012, the Argentine Minister of Security, Sergio Berni, said, 

upon the capture of a presumed and infamous trafficker, “that as soon as the Argentine police forces discovered that Lopez Londono had entered the country toward 

the end of last year, they began an investigation to find his hideout.” From http://

www.animalpolitico.com/2012/11/capturan-al-narco-mas-importante-del-mundo/.

Accessed 23 January 2014.

In Colombia, in November 2013, a former paramilitary official was captured, and 

the press chose to report that: “the police intelligence directorate said that his enjoyment of money, good food, and women were always his weaknesses.” From http://

www.rpp.com.pe/2013-12-08-narcotraficante-colombiano-pantera-cayo-por-tenertres-mujeres-noticia_653495.html. Accessed 23 January 2014. 

In 2011, the Mexican Minister of the Interior, Alejandro Poire, made it known to 

the press that “Operation Guest” had been put in place to detain Saadi Gaddafi, 

son of Muammar Gaddafi. The minister said, with respect to the operation, “the 

civilian intelligence services had detected an illegal plan for the infiltration of Saadi 

and his family into Mexico, and had proceeded in accordance with appropriate 

protocols and procedures.” From http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2012/620994.

html. Accessed 24 January 2014. 

288 For those classical formulations, see the different versions of the Libros Blancos 

de Defensa of Latin American countries, www.resdal.org. 

289 Governance has been operationalized as a concept to evaluate the behavior and 

evolution of democracies using indicators that reflect a country’s adaptability and 

achievement of international norms. It is an expression of the institutional viability 

of a country. See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 

290 See Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Las estructuras de inteligencia en América Latina,” 

Foreign Affairs en Español (primavera 2002), p. 60; Carlos Maldonado, Servicios 

de inteligencia en Sudamérica: Estado de situación en perspectiva comparada (Fort 

Benning, Georgia: Instituto de Cooperación para la Seguridad Hemisférica–

WHINSEC, June 2002).

291 See Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, Profesionalismo de Inteligencia 

en las Américas/Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas (Washington, DC: Joint 

Military Intelligence College, 2004). 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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292 The greatest requirements for international intelligence exchange lie in activities associated with organized crime, to include terrorism, narcotrafficking, and 

money laundering. This interaction involves officials who are directly responsible 

for the substance of the exchange, whether police, military, or others. 

293 See, among others, Michael Hermann, Intelligence Power in Peace and War 

(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996) and Richard K. Betts, Enemies of 

Intelligence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis also has produced several works of interest. For Latin 

America, see Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, eds., Reforming Intelligence: 

Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 

2007); Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, Democratización de la función de 

inteligencia: El nexo de la cultura nacional y la inteligencia estratégica (Washington, 

DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009); Jose Manuel Ugarte, op. cit.; 

Carlos Maldonado, op. cit. 

294 Ohad Leslau, “The Effect of Intelligence on the Decisionmaking Process,” 

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 23, no. 3 (2010), pp. 

426-448.

295 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 

(Boston: Little Brown, 1972).

296 See Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, “Bureaucratic-Organizational Politics and Information Processing in a Developing Country,” International Studies Quarterly 28, 

no. 1 (1984), pp. 69-95.

297 The presidential advising arrangements for the United States, France and the 

United Kingdom tend to be set forth as successful examples where the products 

of intelligence systems are regularly incorporated. In Latin America, at the presidential level, the incorporation of the products of intelligence systems in decision 

making has not yet been worked out, and little literature exists on the topic. Some 

attention to the topic does appear in Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of 

Political Decisión Making, revised edition (New York and London: Norton & Company, 2002); Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, ninth edition (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010); and Michelangelo Vercesi, “Cabinets and 

Decision-Making Processes: Re-assessing the Literature,” Journal of Comparative 

Politics 5, no. 2 (July 2012), http://www.cpupi.si/assets/jcp/JCP-Issue-8-July-2012.

pdf. For some particulars about Chile, see Maria de los Angeles Fernandez and 

Eugenio Rivera Urrutia, eds., La Trastienda del Gobierno (Santiago de Chile: Catalonia, 2012). The establishment of presidential decisionmaking support structures 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

450

is an unfinished theme in the literature on the role and functions of intelligence 

systems in Latin America. 

298 Strategic intelligence refers to the production of knowledge about themes and 

issues of vital national interest. It exists for the purpose of advising the highest 

political officials so as to anticipate, prevent, and resolve threats or risks to a democratic state. 

299 Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, Profesionalismo de inteligencia en 

las Américas/Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas, op. cit., and Democratización 

de la función de inteligencia/Democratization of Intelligence: Melding Strategic Intelligence and National Discourse, op. cit. 

300 See Nicolas Boscovich, “Pensamiento geopolítico brasileño,” in Geopolítica

(Buenos Aires), no. 34 (1986). Also see Lucas Figueiredo, Ministério do silêncio 

(Sao Paulo: Editora Record, 2005).

301 Especially the Argentine journal Estrategia, managed by General Juan E. 

Guglialmelli.

302 A good example is the Uruguayan intelligence law, still under consideration in 

the Uruguayan Congress. The defense law was approved toward the end of 2008. 

303 See Carlos Reppalli, Inteligencia criminal en el siglo XXI (Buenos Aires: Lajouane, 2009). By the same author, Inteligencia Criminal para la legislación de la 

Nación Argentina (Buenos Aires: Lajouane, 2007). On economic intelligence, see 

Walter Felix Cardoso, Andrea Lodeiro, trans., Guía de inteligencia empresarial: Enfrentando el ambiente de la alta competencia (Buenos Aires: Seguridad y Defensa, 

2006).

304 Thomas Bruneau, “Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14:3 (Fall 2001), pp. 323-341.

305 Armando Borrero Mansilla has explained the logic of intelligence organizations that, with the consent of the government or not, avoid or ignore control 

mechanisms. According to this Colombian intellectual, if information is power, 

power provides security, and security increases the chances of one’s survival, then 

transparency is not to be valued because it puts at risk the community that is to 

be defended. See Armando Borrero Mansilla, “De Wikileaks a la trivialidad y al 

olvido: Reir, llorar...o rezar,” Razón Pública, 13 December 2010.
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451

306 “Temen crisis institucional en Brasil por escuchas ilegales,” Infobae, 1 September 

2008.

307 “Hijo de puta, no vuelva a este país,” ABC (Madrid), 28 September 2010.

308 “Cubanos realizan espionaje digital en Venezuela,” Infolatam, 16 June 2011.

309 Véase “Los papeles secretos del DAS,” Semana.com, 17 September 2011, http://

www.semana.com/nacion/papeles-secretos-del-das/164304-3.aspx. Accessed 7 April 

2012.

310 See Mariano Bartolome and Javier Ortiz, “Apuntes sobre la inteligencia en la 

Posguerra Fría,” Seguridad Estratégica Regional (SER) no. 8 (1995), pp. 71-79. Also 

Mariano Bartolome, “El desafío de la inteligencia estratégica,” Informe de investigación no. 1 (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones sobre Seguridad y Crimen 

Organizado–ISCO, Universidad Católica de Salta, December 1999).

311 Marco Cepik, Espionagem e Democracia (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), 

pp. 27-28.

312 Additional nuances exist in each of these areas. For example, in terms of 

“control” over intelligence by the legislative branch: Is it carried out by a single 

committee or commission, or by multiple ones? Is it a bicameral commission, or 

does it operate only in one legislative body? Is the commission created expressly for 

oversight, or has this task been assigned to a preexisting committee or commission, 

such as a defense committee? Do intelligence organizations have the obligation to 

present periodic reports to the commission, or only as they are specifically called 

for? 

313 The Argentine case illustrates the dilemmas that can arise with respect to strategic intelligence: although the concept is employed as an accepted term of practice, Law 25520, which regulates intelligence activity, does not mention the term 

strategic intelligence, and the promulgation of this law implied the closure of the 

National Intelligence Center, which had carried out this specific responsibility.

314 The author knows of only one lengthy exchange on the topic of strategic intelligence among practitioners, congressional advisers, and academics involved in 

intelligence, its characteristics, and future challenges. This exchange occurred in a 

seminar titled “Strategic Intelligence in State Reform,” which took place over much 

of 1992 in the Argentine National Intelligence School. The final report on the 

deliberations was published by the professional journal of that institution. See “La 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

452

Inteligencia Estratégica en la reformulación del Estado,” Revista de la ENI 3, no. 1 

(Buenos Aires, 1994), pp. 143-152.

315 From a constructionist perspective, “securitization” is a political discourse process through which a political community decides to deal with a phenomenon such 

as a threat by making it a valued referent, setting the stage for the adoption of timesensitive steps to reduce the threat.

316 Angel Tello, “La incertidumbre estratégica,” in Mariano Bartolome, comp., Seguridad y defensa en tiempos de bicentenario: Visiones desde Argentina y Chile (Buenos 

Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 2010), pp. 21-34; Natalie Pabon Ayala, 

“Las relaciones cívico-militares en la política de seguridad democrática,” in Alejo 

Vargas Velasques. ed., Perspectivas actuales de la seguridad y la defensa en Colombia y 

América Latina, Colección Gerardo Molina no. 15 (Bogota: Universidad Nacional 

de Rosario, 2008), pp. 51-64.

317 “Senderistas se capitalizan en Bolivia,” La Razón, 7 March 2009; “Cómo funciona el mayor centro de venta de drogas,” Clarín, 18 April 2010.

318 The author considers the reports released by the government of Colombia 

concerning the information contained on the personal computers of Raul Reyes to 

be accurate, and accepts the verification of that information by INTERPOL, which 

has made the details a matter of public record. See OIPC-INTERPOL, Informe 

forense de Interpol sobre los ordenadores y equipos informáticos de las FARC decomisados 

por Colombia (Lyon: OIPC-INTERPOL, 2008).

319 Mariano Bartolome, “Secuestros extorsivos y reivindicaciones campesinas: la 

rara alquimia del Ejército Popular Paraguayo,” Analítica, 5 May 2010, http://www.

analitica.com/va/internacionales/opinion/3857731.asp. Accessed 11 April 2012.

320 Figures released in July 2009 by the Secretary General of this organization, 

Miguel Insulza, in his presentation to the Inter-American Conference on Public 

Security in Montevideo, Uruguay. See Mariano Bartolome, “Situación del Crimen 

Organizado en América Latina,” Ágora Internacional, no. 10, (November 2009), 

pp. 16-20.

321 The report also indicates Mexico hosts five of the ten most violent cities of the 

world; the Americas count 45 of the 50 most violent cities, with 40 of those in Latin America. For more information, see Consejo Ciudadano para la seguridad pública 

y la justicia penal: Metodología del ranking (2011) de las 50 ciudades y las 50 jurisdicciones subnacionales más violentas del mundo (México DF, 12 January 2012).
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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322 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), pp. 85-126.

323 Mariano Bartolome, “Colombia: Bandas Criminales (BACRIM),” Reconciliando Mundos, no. 7, (September-October 2011), pp. 16-22.

324 Rachel Stohl and Doug Tuttle, “The Small Arms Trade in Latin America,” 

NACLA Report on the Americas 41, no. 2 (March-April 2008), p. 14. Also see Fernando 

Gualdoni and Javier Lafuente, “Las armas ilegales desangran Latinoamérica,” El 

País, 25 May 2009.

325 “Tráfico de armas en los Andes,” El Universal, 27 April 2008.

326 Grupo de Estudiantes de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad de Palermo (GERIUP), “Tráfico de personas en América del Sur,” Informes del GERIUP, 

19 October 2011.

327 On this point, the preventive idea is of fundamental importance. A report of 

the International Bank for Development (BID) (see http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/

getdocument.aspx?docnum=876738) finds that adequate investment in prevention 

reduces between six and seven times the investment that would need to be made 

after the crimes are carried out. See Jorge Serrano Torres, Las potencialidades de una 

doctrina y un sistema de inteligencia criminal para desarticular al crimen organizado 

y afianzar la seguridad ciudadana en el Perú (Lima: Projusticia-Centro de Estudios 

para el Desarrollo de la Justicia, November 2011). The present author considers 

that the reduction of costs that come from prevention of terrorism yields an even 

greater savings. 

328 Carlos Gutierrez Palacios, “El papel de la inteligencia estratégica ante los desafíos regionales,” Revista Atenea, 6 October 2010.

329 “Narcotráfico debe verse como una amenaza para toda la región, dijo el jefe de 

inteligencia brasileña,” El Tiempo, 13 August 2009.

330 “Forman a militares para combatir al EP,” ABC Color, 1 March 2011; “Defensa 

tendrá más poder sobre las Fuerzas Armadas, reconoce el ministro,” ABC Color, 3 

March 2011.

331 “Claves de la reforma de las Fuerzas Armadas,” La República, 7 March 2011.

332 “Video: Colman (DNII) duda de la existencia de un ejército paralelo,” La Red

21, 17 March 2011.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

454

333 See Luis Casal Beck, “Una inteligencia segmentada,” La Red 21, 1 April 

2011.

334 “El DAS deja de existir para dar paso a la Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia, 

Semana.com, 31 October 2011. For a good summary of the period leading up to 

the dissolution of the DAS, the different bills presented in Congress to put in place 

an organization replacing the DAS, and other related questions, see “Agencia Central de Inteligencia de Colombia,” Observatorio Legislativo del Instituto de Ciencia 

Política, Boletín no. 144 (November 2009).

335 Serrano Torres, op. cit.

336 See details about this operation in “Así cayó Raúl Reyes,” Cambio, 12 March 

2008.

337 Maria Amparo Tortosa Garrigos, “Cómo se están redefiniendo las agencias de 

inteligencia: Las nuevas amenazas y conflictos requieren de un nuevo tipo de cooperación,” Safe Democracy, 12 January 2009.

338 Roger Zane George, “Beyond Analytic Tradecraft,” International Journal of 

Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 2 (June 2010).

339 Chilean specialist Carolina Sancho Hirane suggests a useful distinction between an intelligence system and an intelligence community. Whereas a system depends on regular interaction or dependency among its intelligence organizations, 

a community involves diverse, public organizations that each have a separate, substantive, and systematic role to fulfill with respect to the state’s strategic interests. 

See Carolina Sancho Hirane, “Servicios de Inteligencia en las Américas: Estado del 

debate y desafíos pendientes,” in Mariano Bartolome, comp., Seguridad y defensa en 

tiempos de bicentenario: Visiones desde Argentina y Chile (Buenos Aires: Instituto de 

Publicaciones Navales, 2010), pp. 149-168.

340 “Mujica no aceptó la renuncia de Grégori, el Coordinador Nacional de Inteligencia,” La Red 21, 1 April 2011.

341 “Comando conjunto de fuerzas armadas asumió control del Sistema de Inteligencia,” El Universo, 18 Ocrober 2010.

342 “Colombia: Santos crea la figura del Consejero de Seguridad Nacional,” Infolatam, 20 September 2010.

343 United Nations Organization, Un mundo más seguro: la responsabilidad que 

compartimos. Informe del Grupo de Alto Nivel sobre las amenazas, los desafíos y el 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

455

cambio, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, http://www.un.org/spanish/secureworld/report_sp.pdf. Accessed 7 April 2012. 

344 Felix Arteaga, “Una década de cambios en la seguridad tras el 11-S: de la globalización a la glocalización,” Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 125/2011, 6 September 

2011. 

345 “Sendero Luminoso es hoy un museo de cera del terrorismo que había en el 

Perú,” El Comercio, 7 September 2010.

346 “Zares antidrogas buscan combatir lavado de activos del narcotráfico,” El Nuevo Herald, 5 October 2010.

347 Mario Baizán, “Cooperación internacional en la zona de la Triple Frontera,” mimeo (Buenos Aires: Fundación de Estudios Políticos para el Tercer Milenio -FUPOMI, 

2004), http://www.fupomi.com.ar/img/TripleF.pdf. Accessed 7 April 2012.

348 Publicly available information on these units is scarce, especially of an academic nature. Among the few available sources is Ramon Quiroga, “Políticas de 

Seguridad y Defensa en América del Sur,” paper presented at the Fifth Conference 

of National Strategic Studies, Buenos Aires, October 2002.

349 Felix Arteaga, “Una década de cambios en la seguridad tras el 11-S: de la globalización a la glocalización,” Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 125/2011, 6 September 

2011. 

350 Pablo Martinez, Triple Frontera: un modelo de cooperación antiterrorista (Montevideo: Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos de Defensa (CHDS), Conferencia Subregional de Defensa “Seguridad Transnacional y Gobernabilidad,” November 2005).

351 The Latin American and Caribbean Police Intelligence Community was created in 2005, with the objective of promoting intelligence personnel career development and fomenting interaction among members. Today members are from 30 

countries, with external observers from the United Nations, the Organization of 

American States, EUROPOL, and Spain’s National Intelligence Center (CNI).

352 “México compartirá su plataforma de inteligencia con América Latina y el 

Caribe,” Agencia EFE, 3 July 2010.

353 One may understand by “scenario” the concept employed by the Saint Gall 

Center for Futures Research: “images of the future that represent a process, are 

based on a methodology, incorporate the knowledge of experts and that facilitate 

organizational learning.”
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

456

354 Richard Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a 

New Era (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006), pp. 37-38.

355 Some of the numerous references to this mode of strategic analysis: Bjørn 

Moller, “Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare: What Is the Problem? What 

Could Be Done?,” COPRI, Working Paper, October 1996; Eric de la Maissonave, 

Incitation à la Reflexion Stratégique (Paris: Economica, 1998); Alain Joxe, El Imperio 

del Caos (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003); and U.S. Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

356 The use of historical analogies can be valid for contemporary international 

political analyses, such as in strategic intelligence. However, the perspective that 

insists that every contemporary international phenomenon, without exception, is 

equally well understood through some historical referent, is not correct. This point 

is developed by Robert Kaplan, in El retorno de la antigüedad: La política de los guerreros [The Return of Ancient Times] (Barcelona: Editorial B, 2002). 

357 “Colombia ya cuenta con un nuevo material estadístico del Sector de la defensa 

y la seguridad,” Infodefensa.com, 7 September 2010.

358 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years. A Forecast for the 21st Century (New 

York: Anchor Books, 2010). 

359 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Transformed World 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2008). 

360 Jose Miguel Pizarro, “América Latina: la guerra que ya no podemos evitar,” 

Revista AAInteligencia 2010-3, http://www.aainteligencia.cl. 

361 Rogelio Nunez, “Sendero Luminoso: de guerra maoísta a cártel,” Revista Atenea, 14 February 2011.

362 The CDS is the regional security council for the 12 countries of the Union of 

South American Nations (UNASUR). It emerged in the wake of the crisis brought 

on by the Colombian attack on the FARC encampment in Ecuadorian territory 

in March of 2008. The council was created in Santiago, Chile, in March of 2009 

through the “Declaration of Santiago de Chile.” The 12 countries agreed to build a 

uniquely South American identity to handle security challenges and contribute to 

the strengthening of Latin American and Caribbean unity.
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

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363 The author wishes to thank Andres Gonzalez Vargas, professor at the Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Bogota, for the artwork in this essay, and gratefully 

acknowledges the support of the author’s wife, Amparo Vasquez Gallo.

364 Gregory Treverton, “Intelligence and the ‘Market State,’” Studies in Intelligence

10 (Winter/Spring 2001), p. 71.

365 Carlos Lleras Restrepo, “Los escándalos financieros,” Revista Nueva Frontera, 

Bogota (July 1988).

366 See Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking 

the Global Economy (New York: Doubleday, 2005).

367 Pilar Pozo Serrano, “Externalización de funciones de inteligencia: oportunidades 

y riesgos a la luz de la experiencia estadounidense,” Inteligencia y Seguridad: Revista 

de análisis y prospectiva, no. 6 (June-November 2009), p 19, http://api.ning.com/

files/0M9hu7HM12wNGdreMNlIP8gF6Rn2U-fJSMXBIjf9b*3ttSwCtlxK6sVGfiUq2ugpZva7LNBoUi1En8XjSY-QZ9clfviV1sL/inteligenciaprivada.pdf. Accessed 

28 September 2011.

368 Congreso de Colombia—Decreto Ley 599 de 2000 (Código Penal), Title XVII, 

Chapter II, Article 463 (on crimes against the security of the state): “Espionage: To 

improperly obtain, employ or reveal political, economic or military secrets related 

to the security of the state, will incur from four to twelve years imprisonment.” 

369 Percy García Cavero, Derecho Penal Económico, vol. I (Lima: Editorial Jurídica 

Grijley, 2007), pp. 103 and 105. 

370 Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, 20 July 2010, http://www.avn.info.ve/

node/5988. Accessed 27 August 2012. 

371 See Eldiario.ec, 18 February 2010, http://www.eldiario.com.ec/noticias-manabiecuador/144026-incluyen-a-ecuador-en-lista-negra-de-lavado-de-dinero/. Also, Patricio 

X. Sanchez, Ramiro Crespo Fabara, and Patricio Starnfeld Llamazares, “Prevención 

de lavado de activos frente a la concienciación: Conferencia sobre lavado de activos y 

financiamiento del terrorismo,” in Inteligencia Estratégica y Prospectiva, Fredy Rivera 

Vélez, coord. (FLACSO, Quito, Ecuador, and Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia 

del Ecuador, 2011), pp. 239-64. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

458

372 Andres Montero Gomez and Jose Martin Ramirez, “Inteligencia económica 

como vector internacional de seguridad,” Real Instituto Elcano, 21 April 2008, 

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/defensa+y+seguridad/dt18-2008.

Accessed 8 January 2011.

373 Ohad Leslau, “Intelligence and Economics: Two Disciplines with a Common 

Dilemma,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20, no. 1 

(2007), p. 106.

374 Marco Palacios, “Saber es poder: el caso de los economistas colombianos,” De 

populistas, mandarines y violencias, luchas por el poder (Bogotá, Editorial Planeta, 

2001), pp. 119 and 134. 

375 Jennifer Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” 

in Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark 

Phythian, eds. (London & New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 154.

376 Sims, ibid., p. 154.

377 “Refinería de Cartagena y ducto serían viables,” Petróleo y Gas, 8 November 

2005, http://www.bnamericas.com/news/petroleoygas/Refineria_de_Cartagena_y_ducto_serian_viables. Accessed 28 September 2011.

378 “As Rubens Ferreira de Mello notes in his Tratado de Derecho Diplomático [Discourse on Diplomatic Law]: Among the accusations made about diplomacy, one 

of the most common is that having to do with its history, not always admissible, of 

unscrupulous service to governments in terms of saving face and [maintaining] hegemony. This business is known as ‘secret diplomacy’ .... Certainly, face-saving and 

hegemonic intentions remain alive in executive branch offices where foreign policy 

is handled, and is not infrequently intentionally directed by those in power.” See 

Diego Uribe Vargas, Colombia y la diplomacia secreta (Bogotá, Universidad Jorge 

Tadeo Lozano y Academia Colombiana de Historia, 2005), pp. 28 and 29.

379 “Inversiones de Chávez en el país son peligrosas: ex ministro Santos,” El Colombiano.com, 8 November 2005, http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/O/

olac_santos_se_refiere_a_interes_de_chavez_colprensa_lcg_08112005/olac_santos_se_

refiere_a_interes_de_chavez_colprensa_lcg_08112005.asp. Accessed 12 December 

2010.
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380 Claudia Curiel Leidenz, “La economía durante la Revolución Bolivariana,” 

Hugo Chávez: Una década en el poder (Bogotá, Centro de estudios Políticos e Internacionales, Universidad del Rosario, 2010), p. 414. 

381 Moisés Naím, Illicit, op. cit., p. 55.

382 Ibid., p. 24.

383 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Las economías ilegales y el contrabando en Colombia: Los 

señores de las moscas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative, 22 February 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0222_

colombia_felbabbrown.aspx?sc_lang=es. Accessed 28 September 2011. [Material in 

brackets added by author].

384 Cited in William J. Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange, How Trade Shaped the 

World (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008), p. 376. 

385 Nonetheless, “There are several reasons why the armed forces of Venezuela are 

not as eager as Chávez to be confrontational. One reason is that the armed forces 

are major beneficiaries of licit and illicit commerce with Colombia and the United 

States.” Javier Corrales, “Cambios en el tipo de régimen y la nueva política exterior 

de Venezuela”, in Hugo Chávez: Una década en el poder (Bogota: Universidad del 

Rosario, 2010), p. 477.

386 This assertion is based on the author’s professional experience. 

387 Sims, op. cit., p. 62. 

388 Presidential address of 17 November 2008, http://web.presidencia.gov.co/boletin/

boletin_no2_17112008.html. Accessed 5 March 2009.

389 “Las Farc también ‘invirtieron’ en DMG,” Revista Semana, 19 February 2010, 

http://www.semana.com/nacion/farc-tambien-invirtieron-dmg/135207-3.aspx.

Accessed 22 September 2011.

390 “Gobernador de Putumayo: las Farc estarían aprovechando crisis por las 

pirámides para poner al pueblo contra el gobierno,” Radio Caracol, 2 December 

2008, http://www.caracol.com.co/nota.aspx?id=722564. Accessed 5 March 2009.

391 “A responder por pirámides,” El Espectador.com, 24 November 2008, http://

www.elespectador.com/impreso/articuloimpreso93236-responder-piramides. Accessed 5 

March 2009.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

460

392 “En el caso de las pirámides, ‘faltó gobierno,’” El Espectador.com, 15 November 2008, http://m.elespectador.com/impreso/cuadernilloa/entrevista-de-cecilia-orozco/

articuloimpreso90777-el-caso-de-piramides-falto-go. Accessed 5 March 2009.

393 “¿Quién espía en Colombia?” Informe especial, Semana.com, 21 July 2003, 

http://www.semana.com/nacion/quien-espia-colombia/71742-3.aspx. Accessed 18 November 2010.

394 “Las revelaciones de Tabares y Peñate,” El Espectador.com, 1 January 2011, 

http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/judicial/articulo-242994-revelaciones-de-tabares-y-penate. Accessed 18 January 2011.

395 Extrapolated from Sims, Defending Adaptive Realism, op. cit., p.156.

396 “In the case of Colombian exporters, when Chávez closed the border to commerce in mid-2009, the Venezuelans owed US$900 million. The border closure 

was accompanied by another, equally hostile act: refusal to allow payments for 

exports already in the hands of Venezuelans,” http://lanota.com/index.php/CONFIDENCIAS/Venezuela-no-le-paga-a-los-exportadores-colombianos.html. Accessed 9 

December 2011.

397 “A letter sent by the president of ANDI, Luis Carlos Villegas, to the thenpresident of Fedecamaras, and to Pedro Carmonas, for a few hours President of 

Venezuela, became a bone of contention between the government of Hugo Chávez 

and some elements of the Colombian business community.” See “Empresarios descontentos,” El Tiempo, 8 July 2003, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/

MAM-1014926. Accessed 5 June 2011.

398 “The government [of Ecuador] argues that a 40 percent devaluation of the Colombian peso existed at the time,” while, according to data held by the EcuadorianColombian Chamber of Commerce, “technically, the devaluation did not exist,” 

per the Chamber’s president, Milton Delgado. See “Ecuador pone en vigencia ‘salvaguardia cambiaria’ contra Colombia,” Peopledaily.com, http://spanish.peopledaily.

com.cn/31617/6699818.html. Accessed 12 January 2012.

399 Alphonso Chardy, “Chavez Expanding Influence of Cuban Advisers,” Miami 

Herald, 8 May 2004.

400 “La tenaza cubana,” Semana.com 13 February 2010, http://www.semana.com/

mundo/tenaza-cubana/134903-3.aspx. Accessed 12 January 2012.
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401 “Un pueblo sin memoria y malagradecido,” Eluniversal.com (Caracas), 18 June 

2011, http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/06/18/un-pueblo-sin-memoria-y-malagradecido.shtml. Accessed 13 September 2011.

402 “Juego de espías,” Semana.com, 25 August 2007, http://www.semana.com/nacion/juego-espias/105816-3.aspx. Accessed 3 September 2011.

403 “El chavismo estaría financiando políticos en el territorio nacional. Renuncias en Monómeros por supuesta actividad chavista en Colombia,” El Espectador.

com, 14 August 2008, http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/politica/articuloimpresorenuncias-monomeros-supuesta-actividad-chavista-colombia. Accessed 25 September 

2011.

404 Sergeant Evelio Buitrago Salazar, Zarpazo the Bandit: Memoirs of an Undercover 

Agent of the Colombian Army, M. Murray Lasley, trans., Russell W. Ramsey, ed. 

(Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1977).

405 National Constitution, article 2: “These are the purposes of the State: to serve 

the community, promote the general prosperity and guarantee the application of 

sacred principles, rights, and obligations of the Constitution; facilitate the participation of everyone in the decisions that affect them individually and in the economic, political, administrative and cultural life of the nation; defend the nation’s 

independence, maintain its territorial integrity and ensure the peaceful coexistence 

and maintenance of a just society. The authorities of the Republic are put in place 

to protect all people resident in Colombia, to include their life, honor, possessions, 

beliefs, and other rights and freedoms, and to ensure the accomplishment of social 

obligations to the State and to individuals.” 

406 “EE.UU. asume la protección del petroleo colombiano,” El Clarín, 11 February 2002, http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2002/02/11/i-02415.htm. Accessed 28 

September 2011.

407 See http://www.egmontgroup.org/.

408 Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero, República de Colombia, Descripción de cargos, funciones y perfiles, no date, http://www.uiaf.gov.co/index.

php?idcategoria=677. Accessed 13 August 2011.

409 Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria No. 195 de 2011. Artículo 3.—Agencies that carry 

out the function of intelligence and counterintelligence: The intelligence and counterintelligence function is carried out by elements of the armed forces and of the 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

462

national police, as organized for that purpose by the latter, the financial information and analysis unit (UIAF), and by other agencies as authorized by the law. These 

agencies make up the intelligence community and are the only entities authorized 

to develop intelligence and counterintelligence activities. All the agencies that carry 

out these activities will be entirely subject to the present law. 

410 “Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática: Fortalecimiento de 

las Capacidades del Sector Defensa y Seguridad.”

411 National Constitution, article 339. “There will be a National Development 

Plan that includes a general part and an investment plan for public entities at the 

national level. The general part will list long-term national purposes and objectives, 

the State’s medium-term goals and priorities and the strategies and general aims of 

economic, social and environmental policies as adopted by the Government....”

412 Clara Elvira Ospina, ¿Inteligencia o intimidad? Revista Poder360, 18 September 2010, http://www.poder360.com/article_detail.php?id_article=4755. Accessed 12 

February 2011.

413 Such as the steps taken by the U.S., as documented by Allain Juilet in “Principios 

y Aplicación de la Inteligencia Económica,” Inteligencia y seguridad: Revista de análisis 

y prospectiva, no.1 (December 2006), p. 15, http://www.intelligence-economique.gouv.

fr/IMG/pdf/Article_Alain_Juillet_pour_revue_espagnole.pdf. Accessed 30 May 2011. 

414 According to Naim, Illicit, op. cit., p. 55, international terrorism, as we are 

beginning to realize, is following the path of worldwide illicit commerce by using 

the instruments and services of the new global economy to cover, and thereby hide, 

its activities in cities and whole countries. 

415 Edward Luttwak, “From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics,” The National Interest 20, no. 3 (Summer 1990), p. 17. 

416 Nicolás Urrutia, “Colombia necesita espías,” Semana.com, 11 March 2009, 

http://www.semana.com/opinion/colombia-necesita-espias/121626-3.aspx. Accessed 11 

June 2009.

417 Marta Ardila, Actores no Gubernamentales y Política Exterior (Bogotá, Centro de 

Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de los Andes, 2009), p. 115.

418 Douglas Farah, Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism and Criminalized 

States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority (Carlisle, 

Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2012). 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

463

419 See White House, National Security Council, Strategy to Combat Transnational 

Organized Crime, part I, Definition, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/

nsc/transnational-crime/definition. Accessed 16 February 2013.

420 Ibid., part III, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, http://

www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/strategy. Accessed 16 

February 2013.

421 See the document at http://www.mindef.mil.gt/ftierra/emdn/sage/directivas/documentos/leyesyreglamentos/04.pdf. Accessed 16 February 2013. 

422 Ley Marco del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad, Decreto No. 18-2008, approved 

by the Guatemalan Congress, 11 March 2008, Article 3, http://www.mindef.mil.gt/

noticias/PDF/leyes%20y%20reglamentos/Ley%20Marco%20%20D018-2008.pdf. 

Accessed 16 February 2013.

423 The purpose of the national security system is to fortify state institutions, manage risks, control threats, and reduce vulnerabilities that inhibit the state’s ability 

to accomplish its objectives. The national intelligence system encompasses the Secretary of Strategic Intelligence, who coordinates the system, the Office of Civilian 

Intelligence of the Interior Ministry, and the Intelligence Office of the General 

Staff for National Defense of the Ministry of Defense. See articles 4 and 24 of the 

Ley Marco del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Decreto No. 18-2008, approved by the 

Congress of the Republic, 11 March 2008. 

424 Technical secretary of the National Security Council, Extracto Política Nacional 

de Seguridad de Guatemala, Introduction (Guatemala: Mayaprin, 2012), p. 1. 

425 The Advisory and Planning Commission was created to support the National 

Security Council. It operates in league with the technical secretary of the council. 

It is made up of security professionals who are appointed by the president of the 

republic upon the recommendation of Security Council members. See Ley Marco 

del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad, artículo 13, http://www.mindef.mil.gt/noticias/

PDF/leyes%20y%20reglamentos/Ley%20Marco%20%20D018-2008.pdf. 

426 Government of Guatemala, technical secretary of the National Security Council, Política Nacional de Seguridad (July 2012), pp. 28 and 36, http://www.asies.org.

gt/sites/default/files/articulos/publicaciones/5._anexo_i.3_politica_nacional_de_seguridad.pdf. Accessed 15 February 2013.

427 See http://www.mingob.gob.gt.previewdns.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=

item&id=1943:acuerdo-gubernativo-no-285-2012-protocolo-de-actuación-interinstitu-
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

464

cional-apoyo-del-ejército-a-las-fuerzas-de-seguridad-civil&Itemid=394. This protocol 

signals that the president of the republic will decide when it is appropriate for the 

military to support civilian security forces inside the country. Earlier, Congressional 

Decree 40-2000 established, in its article 1, that civilian security forces may be supported in carrying out their functions of preventing and combating organized crime 

and common criminality by Guatemalan Army units as necessary when the country’s 

circumstances require it and the “usual means employed by the civilian security forces 

are judged to be insufficient.” http://www.mindef.mil.gt/ftierra/emdn/sage/directivas/

documentos/leyesyreglamentos/09.pdf. Accessed 16 February 2013.

428 Decreto 11-97, Ley de la Policía Nacional Civil, artículo 9, 25 February 1997. 

See http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/sp/gtm/sp_gtm-mla-leg-police.pdf. Accessed 25 

February 2013. 

429 “Se pone en marcha reforma policial”, politicagt.com, 28 January 2010, http://

www.politicagt.com/se-pone-en-marcha-reforma-policial/. Also see International Crisis Group, Reforma policial en Guatemala: Obstáculos y oportunidades, 20 July 2012, 

pp. 9-11. Both accessed 26 February 2013. 

430 Dinorah Azpuru, Cultura política de la democracia en Guatemala: Hacia la 

igualdad de oportunidades (Wichita, Kansas: Wichita State University, December 

2012), p. 151, http://www.asies.org.gt/sites/default/files/articulos/publicaciones/guatemala_country_report_2012_vf_print_w.pdf. Accessed 26 February 2013. 

431 Comisión presidencial para la reforma policial, Proyecto de implementación de 

la fase inicial de la reforma policial, Producto 1 (Programa de las Naciones Unidas 

para el Desarrollo-Guatemala, Consultoría Análisis y Diseño de la Carrera Policial, 

March 2012). See http://www.cnrp.gob.gt/content/acciones-prioritarias. Accessed 11 

March 2013. 

432 Comisión presidencial para la reforma policial, http://www.cnrp.gob.gt/content/

ejes-verticales. Accessed 13 March 2013.

433 Army of Guatemala, General Staff of National Defense, Manual de asuntos 

civiles ME-20-02. Authorized by the Chief of the General Staff of National Defense, December 2011. 

434 Rodolfo Felipe Robles Montoya, Propuesta de un Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional para Guatemala, Chapter I, “Nociones básicas de inteligencia” (Guatemala: 

Fundación Myrna Mack and Fundación Soros, June 2003), p. 30. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

465

435 Ulises Noe Anzueto Giron, Ministro de Defensa de Guatemala, personal communication with the authors, 11 March 2013. 

436 Ibid. 

437 Official web page of the Ministry of National Defense of Guatemala: www.

mindef.mil.gt. 

438 Acuerdo Gubernativo Número 153-2012, article 52, chapter VIII.

439 Carlos Manoel Alvarez Morales, “Se desgasta credibilidad del Gobierno: Analistas señalan que la sociedad está polarizada en temas de conflictividad,” Siglo21.com.

gt, 10 December 2012. As Edmundo Urrutia, of the Faculty of Latin American 

Social Sciences (Flacso), notes here, “What happened at Totonicapán is a manifestation of the weak capability of the system for processing the needs and demands 

of the indigenous peoples. The government and members of society should see this 

as an opportunity for discussion at a high level.” http://www.s21.com.gt/nacionales/2012/10/12/se-desgasta-credibilidad-gobierno. Accessed 19 February 2013.

440 See Patrick Blankenship, “Out of the Andean Ridge,” Special Warfare (October 2012). Reproduced at http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2504/

SW2504OutOfTheAndeanRidge.html. Accessed 16 February 2013.

441 John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Policy and Strategy in the New Drug War,” 

Small Wars Journal (24 October 2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/policyand-strategy-in-the-new-drug-war. Accessed 15 February 2013.

442 Patrick Blankenship, op. cit. 

443 Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Jacobs, U.S. Army Reserve, “Los asuntos civiles 

en las operaciones de paz”, Military Review (January-February 1999), http://usacac.

army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/oldsite/Spanish/JanFeb99/jacobs.pdf. Accessed 

8 March 2013.

444 “Defensa: El narcotráfico representa hechos aislados que no confrontan directamente al Estado,” Diario La Hora, 7 May 2012, http://www.lahora.com.gt/

index.php/nacional/guatemala/reportajes-y-entrevistas/157905-defensa-las-manifestaciones-del-narcotrafico-son-hechos-aislados-que-no-confrontan-directamente-al-estado. 

Accessed 11 March 2013. 

445 The Municipal Development Councils are made up of the town or city mayor, 

who is also the individual charged with coordination within the council, trustees 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

466

and advisers as designated by the municipality, the representatives (up to 20) of the 

Community Development Councils, representatives of the public entities that are 

present in the locality, and the representatives of other local, civilian organizations 

as designated. The Community Development Councils encourage public participation in local planning and development and in local public administration. These 

Councils are part of the official System of Development Councils that operate at 

the national level. 

446 Jennifer Schirmer, “Asuntos civiles: Guerra psicológica, inteligencia social y el maya autorizado,” chapter 5 of the book Intimidades del proyecto político de los militares en Guatemala (Ciudad de Guatemala: Flacso, 2001), p. 179, 

http://www.enlaceacademico.org/fileadmin/usuarios/mas_documentos/Lib057.pdf. 

Accessed 15 February 2013.

447 The original document was sent by the authors to the Minister of National 

Defense, General de División, Ulises Noé Anzueto Girón, for his attention. 

448 “Ejes de transformación y lineamientos estratégicos,” chapter V of Gobierno de 

Guatemala, Política Nacional de Seguridad, 2012, p. 25.

449 Martin Nowak, Supercooperadores (Spain: Grupo Zeta, 2012), p. 55.

450 Sonia Alda and Héctor Saint-Pierre, coords., Gobernabilidad y democracia

(Chile: RIL/UNESP/IUGM, 2012), p. 219.

451 All sovereign countries on the South American continent hold membership in 

UNASUR. 

452 The present study is a part of a larger research project developed by the author 

for the Chilean Academia Nacional de Estudios Politicos y Estrategicos (ANEPE), 

under project Ext/12/2012, titled “Intelligence Cooperation and UNASUR: Possibilities and Limitations.” The author wishes to thank political scientist Jean Gutierrez for her assistance. 

453 Julia Pulido, “El papel de la inteligencia en la PESD [Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa]”, Cuadernos de Estrategia (Spanish Ministry of Defense) no. 130, 

2005; Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis, second edition (Washington, DC: CQ 

Press, 2007); Antonio Diaz Fernandez, coord., Miguel Revenga and Oscar Jaime, 

Cooperación Europea en Inteligencia (Spain: Thomson Reuters and IUGM, 2009).

454 Mathieu Deflem, “Global Rule of Law or Global Rule of Law Enforcement? 

International Police Cooperation and Counterterrorism,” Annals of the American 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

467

Academy of Political and Social Science 603, Law, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives (January 2006), pp. 240-251.

455 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Historia de los Servicios Secretos Norteamericanos (Spain: 

Editorial Paidos, 2004), p. 32. 

456 Inge Kaul et al., Bienes Públicos Mundiales (Mexico: Oxford, 2001).

457 Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, “De nuevo, la contraofensiva a las acciones 

occidentales,” Revista Foreign Affairs en Español 84, no. 6 (January-March 2006). 

Published by the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. 

458 Hans Blix, ¿Desarmando a Irak? (España: Planeta, 2004). 

459 Melanie Ramjoue, Improving United Nations Intelligence: Lessons from the Field, 

GCSP Policy Paper no. 19 (August 2011), Geneva Centre for Security Policy, http://

www.gcsp.ch/content/download/6457/59721/download. 

460 On this point see Eduardo Aldunate, Mision en Haiti (Chile: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2007). Also see Eduardo Aldunate, Las razones politicas y morales 

de la mission ONU en Haiti (Spain: FRIDE, 2008), http://www.fride.org/download/

COM_UN_Haiti_ESP_abr08.pdf . 

461 Julia Pulido, op. cit.; Antonio Diaz, Miguel Revenga, Oscar Jaime, and Rafael Martinez, “Hacia una política europea de inteligencia,” Revista Política Exterior

(Spain) XIX, no. 106 (August 2005). 

462 Estatuto de Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, artículo 5, letra B, Consejo de 

Defensa Suramericano: Crónica de su gestación (Chile: Ministerio Defensa Nacional, 

2009), p. 169. Document obtained from the Working Group of the South American Defense Council. 

463 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano: Naturaleza, balance provisorio, perspectivas y desafíos,” in Hans Mathieu and Catalina Nino, eds., 

Anuario 2010 de la Seguridad Regional en America Latina y el Caribe (Colombia: 

Friedich Ebert Stiftung, 2010), p. 34.

464 Julia Pulido, op. cit., p. 288.

465 Andres Gomez de la Torre, “Intereses académicos compartidos: hacia una comunidad iberoamericana de inteligencia,” Inteligencia y Seguridad: Revista de análisis y prospectiva no. 2, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, España (Cátedra Servicios de 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

468

Inteligencia y Sistemas democráticos) and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Instituto Juan Velásquez de Velasco de Investigación para la Seguridad y Defensa), 

2007.

466 Andrea Carvalho and Miguel Esteban, “Los servicios de inteligencia: entorno y 

tendencias,” in Jose Gonzalez, coord., Inteligencia (España: Tirant lo Blanch, 2012), 

p. 92. 

467 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Aportes y propuestas para la cooperación de Inteligencia,” Revista Política y Estrategia (ANEPE) no. 120 (July-December 2012), p. 163.

468 For these points, the author has taken into account the works of Antonio Diaz, 

coord., Miguel Revenga, Oscar Jaime, and Rafael Martinez, “Hacia una política 

europea de inteligencia,” op. cit., and of Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Aportes y propuestas 

para la cooperación de inteligencia.”

469 There are various ways of referring to the type of intelligence related to crime 

and to situations that may seriously affect public security. For example, one can 

refer to police intelligence, criminal intelligence, or police information. All these 

terms have the same referent, but with different breadths of meaning according to 

the organization involved. In the UNASUR region the police are responsible for 

police intelligence, but it is more usual in Spain to speak of police information 

services, and this is the term chosen for the present work because much of the 

referenced work is from Spain. Some authors in some countries distinguish police 

intelligence from criminal intelligence. 

470 Ibid., p. 62.

471 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Aportes y propuestas para la cooperación de Inteligencia,” p. 190.

472 MERCOSUR countries include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay (presently 

suspended), Uruguay, Venezuela and Bolivia (in process of joining). Associate 

members include Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana (now in process of 

ratification), and Surinam (also in process of ratification). “Expanded” MERCOSUR 

refers to the set of full and associate members. 

473 See Celina B. Realuyo, “Collaborating to Combat Illicit Networks through Interagency and International Effort,” chapter 14 of Michael Miklaucic and Jaqueline 

Brewer, Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2013), http://www.ndu.edu/

press/convergence.html. Accessed 13 April 2013. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

469

474 Antonio Díaz Fernández, “Modelos de servicios de inteligencia en Europa y 

Latinoamérica,” in Rafael Martinez and Joseph Tulchin, El rompecabezas: Conformando la seguridad desde las dos orillas (Spain: Centre d’Informació i Documentació 

Internacionals a Barcelona-CIDOB, 2006), p. 14.

475 Tim Schumacher, Europas Geheimdienst: Das Joint Situation Centre, 2011, 

http://www.imi-online.de/2011/06/02/europas-geheimdienst/. Accessed 15 February 

2013. 

476 Hans-Georg Wieck, Multilaterale Zusammenarbeit der Geheimen Nachrichtendienste im Nordatlantischen Bündnis (NATO)–Ein Modell für die Europäische Union?, p. 

1, http://www.hans-georgwieck.com/data/Eu%E4ische_Zusammenbarbeit_der_ND_

Vortrag%20_042008.pdf. Accessed 20 January 2013. 

477 Julia Pulido, “El papel de la inteligencia en la PESD,” op. cit., p. 282.

478 Julia Pulido, “Inteligencia: la ‘savia’ de la Unión Europea,” Inteligencia y Seguridad: Revista de Análisis y Prospectiva, no. 7 (December 2009-May 2010), pp. 

92-93.

479 The organizational chart where one may schematically see where this organization fits appears at http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf.

480 Chris Jones, “Secrecy Reigns at the EU’s Intelligence Analysis Centre,” Statewatch, no date, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-223-eu-intcen.pdf. Also see 

Iikka Sami, European Parliament, no date, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede041011cvsalmi_/sede041011cvsalmi_en.pdf. 

481 Julia Pulido, “Inteligencia: la ‘savia’ de la Unión Europea,” p. 87-107. 

482 Tim Schumacher, op. cit.

483 Francisco Veiga, “ECHELON, en control directo,” in El desequilibrio como orden: 

Una historia de la posguerra fría 1990-2008 (Spain: Alianza Editorial, 2009).

484 Antonio Diaz Fernandez, op. cit., p. 14.

485 Antonio Diaz, Miguel Revenga Oscar Jaime and Rafael Martinez, op. cit., 

p. 31.

486 Antonio Diaz Fernandez, op. cit., p. 32.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

470

487 Antonio Diaz Fernandez, “Evolución de la cooperación europea en inteligencia,” Varia Historia (Belo Horizonte, Brazil) 28, no. 47 (2012), pp.184-185.

488 Antonio Diaz, Miguel Revenga, Oscar Jaime and Rafael Martinez, op. cit.,

p. 26.

489 Examples of cooperation may be found in Antonio Diaz, coord., Miguel Revenga, and Oscar Jaime, Cooperación en Inteligencia (Spain: Thomson Reuters / 

IUGM, 2009) and in Anselmo del Moral Torres, Cooperación Policial en la Unión 

Europea (Spain: Dirección General de la Policía, Ministerio del Interior/Dykinson, 

2011).

490 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Aportes y propuestas para la cooperación de Inteligencia,” p. 194.

491 Foundational Treaty of UNASUR, http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option

=com_content&view=article&id=290&Itemid=339. Accessed 1 February 2013. 

492 Ibid. 

493 A more detailed examination of this idea may be found in Carolina Sancho, 

“Cooperación en inteligencia y UNASUR: Posibilidades y limitaciones,” Anepe, 

Chile, 2013.

494 “Valores, principios y seguridad en la comunidad iberoamericana de naciones,” 

Cuaderno de Estrategia no. 126, IEEE / Defense Ministry of Spain, http://www.ieee.

es/Galerias/fichero/cuadernos/CE-126.pdf. Accessed 10 January 2013.

495 The author recommends a review of the web pages of each of these organizations, which she accessed 15 November 2012. The CLACIP web page is at http://

www.clacip.org/ and that for INTERPOL at http://www.interpol.int/es/. 

496 National Research Council of the National Academies, Maritime Security Partnerships (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2008), p. 217. 

497 Extracted from the GAFISUD web page, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/financialactiontaskforceofsouthamericaagainstmoneylaunderinggafisud.html. Accessed 15 

November 2012. 

498 Extracted from the GAFISUD web page. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

471

499 Extracted from the Chilean Customs Office web page, http://www.aduana.cl/prontus_aduana/site/artic/20070227/pags/20070227233346.html. 

Accessed 1 March 2013. 

500 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Aportes y propuestas para la cooperación de inteligencia,” p. 175.

501 Ibid.

502 Ibid.

503 Ibid., p. 183.

504 Ibid. 

505 Ibid., p. 194.

506 See the web page http://www.unasursg.org/inicio/documentos/consejos-sectoriales/

consejo-suramericano-en-materia-de-seguridad-ciudadana-justicia-y-coordinacion-deacciones-contra-la-delincuencia-organizada-trasnacional. 

507 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Guerra en la red (Spain: Ariel, 

2011).

508 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Aportes y propuestas para la cooperación de inteligencia,” pp. 157-158.

509 Ibid, p. 160.

510 Monica Serrano, “Crimen transnacional organizado y seguridad internacional: 

cambio y continuidad,” in Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano (compiladores), Crimen transnacional organizado y seguridad internacional (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura 

Económica, 2005), p. 47.

511 On this point, the author recommends Javier Jordan, “Introducción al análisis 

de inteligencia,” Grupo de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional (GESI-Spain), 2011, 

http://seguridadinternacional.es/gesi/es/contenido/introducci%C3%B3n-al-an%C3%

A1lisis-de-inteligencia, and Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), https://www.cia.

gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/

psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/. Both accessed 10 October 2012. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

472

512 Monica Den Boer, “Cooperación para la aplicación de la ley y crimen transnacional organizado en Europa,” in Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano (compiladores), 

op. cit., p. 174.

513 It is also true that institutionalized intelligence cooperation as discussed in this 

essay likewise presents challenges. The U.S. experience is of interest in this respect. 

See Bridget Rose Nolan, “Information Sharing And Collaboration in the United 

States Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2013.

514 An example has occurred recently in Bolivia, whereby a senior anti-drug official was detained as he engaged in illicit trafficking activity. His arrest has affected 

intelligence cooperation, especially with Chile, because the intelligence service he 

headed is now disrespected, not least because his detention occurred on Chilean 

soil in a joint operation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. For further information, see “Ex Zar antidrogas boliviano se declara culpable en EE.UU. 

de tráfico de drogas a través de Chile,” La Tercera, 24 June 2011, http://diario.latercera.com/2011/06/24/01/contenido/pais/31-73881-9-ex-zar-antidrogas-boliviano-sedeclara-culpable-en-eeuu-de-trafico-a-traves-de.shtml. Accessed 5 February 2013. 

515 Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Aportes y propuestas para la cooperación de inteligencia,” p. 161.

516 Judge Barrington Parker, referring to Richard Helms, former Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, who was accused of lying to a congressional commission during his tenure to protect the secrets of the CIA. Cited by Paul Gordon 

Lauren, “Ethics and Intelligence,” in Intelligence, Policy and Process, Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1985), p. 72.

517 On the differences between national intelligence in a democratic state and a 

totalitarian state, see Jose Manuel Ugarte, “Sistemas de Inteligencia y Democracia,” 

in Bernardo Arevalo de Leon, comp., Función Militar y Control Democrático (Guatemala City: UNOPS, El Amanuense, 2001), pp. 182-185.

518 Jose Manuel Ugarte, ibid., pp. 177-236.

519 Adopted in San Jose, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969. See http://www.

oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm. 

Accessed 23 January 2013.
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

473

520 Jose Manuel Ugarte, El control público de la actividad de inteligencia en América 

Latina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Ciccus, 2012), p. 88. 

521 In Chile, the term “forces of order” is used to refer to police agencies, and in 

particular to the Carabineros de Chile and the Policía de Investigaciones.

522 The Colombian statute declares that “in every instance, interception of communications will be subject to procedures established by article 15 of the constitution and in accordance with the Criminal Procedures Code (Article 42, 3rd 

paragraph). 

523 In this case, notwithstanding the existence of judicial control over democratic 

security established in legislation, namely article 6, number 4 and article 13 of 

Law 750, of 2010, http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/b92aaea87dac7

62406257265005d21f7/8c11614758755b3a062578240073f60a?OpenDocument. 

Accessed 12 October 2012. 

524 See Legislative Decree 18-2008, article 34. 

525 Title V, On special procedures for obtaining information, articles 23 to 32.

526 Section 21, subsection 3 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

527 See for example the Netherlands’ Intelligence and Security Act of 2002, https://

www.aivd.nl/english/aivd/the-intelligence-and/#Documents. Accessed 10 October 

2012. 

528 Law 9883, article 1, sections 2 and 4. See Jose Manuel Ugarte, “El ámbito 

normativo de la inteligencia interior en América Latina,” Revista Vária História 28, 

no. 47 (Belo Horizonte), June 2012, http://www.scielo.br. Accessed 15 December 

2012. 

529 The council had one representative from the intelligence office of the Federal 

Police, one from the operations office of the Federal Highway Police, two from the 

Federal Treasury Office (specifically from the offices of finance and tax investigation), two from the Ministry of Defense, one representative from the president’s 

Institutional Security Cabinet, one from the civil defense area of the Ministry of 

National Integration, and one from ABIN. 

530 Although this slight was subsequently reduced by the creation of the National 

Council for the Chiefs of Police Intelligence (CONCOI), per Resolution 1/2009 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

474

of the SENASP-MJ, it remained evident that this step was only palliative in nature, 

given the weakness of the new organization.

531 The present author has described the rise of the phenomenon of criminal intelligence in Latin America in several articles, including: “La actividad de inteligencia 

en América Latina y el surgimiento de la inteligencia criminal,” paper presented at 

the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, 2007 (Montreal), www.

resdal.org (accessed 10 October 2012); “La evolución de la actividad de inteligencia 

y de la inteligencia criminal en América Latina: Actualidad, dificultades, perspectivas y propuestas,” paper presented at the meeting of the Latin American Studies 

Association, 2009 (Rio de Janeiro), and incorporated into Jose Manuel Ugarte, 

Actividad de Inteligencia y Democracia en América Latina (Saarbrücken, Germany: 

Editorial Académica Española, 2011).

532 I do not believe that the Chilean Strategic Center for the Analysis of Crime 

should be considered, strictly speaking, an organization dedicated to criminal intelligence. This is because of its limited role in carrying out the analysis of information 

sent to it by Chilean institutions that play a role in the penal system of the country. 

The actual analysis is conducted by individuals who represent those institutions. 

That is, the Strategic Center itself does not have the capability to carry out the functions of the intelligence cycle. 

533 On the National Intelligence Model, see Jose Manuel Ugarte, “La inteligencia 

Criminal en el Reino Unido y Canadá,” 2a Parte, Revista de Policía y Criminalística, 

no. 18 (March 2007), Editorial Policial, Buenos Aires.

534 A brief reference to the European intelligence model is found in Hugo Brady, 

Europol and the European Criminal Intelligence Model: A Non-state Response to Organised Crime (Spain: Real Instituto Elcano, 2007), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.

org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Print?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/

elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI126-2007. Accessed 4 January 2013. The exchange 

of police information is addressed in the European Union and the Council of Europe 

programs of The Hague (2005/C 53/01) and of Stockholm (2010/C 115/01).

535 Decreed Law 2859 (of 1979), article 1, with text from Law 20426, www.

leychile.cl. Accessed 25 December 2012. For historical reasons, this force is sometimes labeled the “Gendarmerie,” but both this term and “Gendarmeria” are used 

in Chile.

536 Information available on the web page of the Chilean Gendarmerie, www.

gendarmeria.gob.cl. Accessed 26 December 2012. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

475

537 It began operations on 19 April 2011. Details about the Chilean Strategic 

Crime Analysis Center may be obtained at http://www.seguridadpublica.gov.cl. Accessed 4 January 2013. 

538 The present author agrees with the idea (current principally in the UK and 

Australia) that crime analysis is part of criminal intelligence. 

539 In Latin America, intelligence doctrine usually distinguishes an “organismo 

[agency] de inteligencia,” or an “organismo técnico especializado en inteligencia,” 

both of which have the capability to carry out all the functions of the intelligence 

cycle, from an “órgano de inteligencia,” which is capable only of some of those 

functions. The organization of interest here, the Chilean Strategic Crime Analysis 

Center, is strictly an “órgano [organization] de inteligencia.” 

540 In the United States, Executive Order 12333 does not expressly mention the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons, which is part of the Department of Justice. Also in the 

United Kingdom, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 does not mention prison 

intelligence, nor do the Italian intelligence law of 2007 or the Belgian Intelligence 

and Security Services Law of 1998. To the author’s knowledge, no country’s intelligence laws specifically refer to any agency that engages in prison intelligence.

541 See Jose Manuel Ugarte, “La actividad de inteligencia en América Latina: De 

las reformas formales a las reformas legales,” paper presented at the meeting of the 

Latin American Studies Association, 2012 (San Francisco, California), www.aainteligencia.cl. Accessed 20 December 2012. 

542 Elizabeth Sepper, “Democracy, Human rights, and Intelligence Sharing,” Texas 

International Law Journal, 46 (Fall 2010), p. 150.

543 Article 1 of the Argentine Penal Code establishes that “this code will apply: 1) 

to crimes committed in, or whose effects are felt in, the territory of the Argentine 

nation, or in those places subject to its jurisdiction; 2) to crimes committed outside 

Argentina by agents or employees of Argentine authorities as part of their official 

duty.” Similar measures exist in other countries. 

544 For a discussion of the importance of a conceptual definition of intelligence, 

see Rodrigo Iennaco, Inteligência Criminal e Denúncia Anônima (Belo Horizonte: 

Arraes Editores, 2011). 

545 Domício Proença, personal communication with the author. 

546 Ibid.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

476

547 Eduardo Estevez, “Estructuras y su aplicación en policías en proceso de reforma,” 

in Inteligencia policial–Compilación de textos (Guatemala: Instituto de Enseñanza para 

el Desarrollo Sostenible, 2000), p. 38.

548 Corporateness or corporatism in this case should be understood in its negative sense, whereby colleagues in a given institution try hard to overlook their own 

mistakes as they compare themselves to those in similar institutions, acting in isolation in their own organization and giving priority to building up a pure and simple 

rivalry based on long-standing institutional differences—the opposite of engaging 

in cooperation.

549 Luiz Eduardo Soares, Segurança tem saída (Rio de Janeiro: Sextante, 2011; 1st 

edition - 2006 ), p. 33.

550 Ibid., p. 117.

551 Ibid., pp. 36, 63.

552 Ibid., p. 118.

553 Decreto 3695, 21 December 2000. For more on this point see Priscila Brandão, 

Serviços Secretos e Democracia no Cone Sul (Niterói: Impetus, 2010).

554 In Brazil, “military police” are part of the armed forces, but only as a reserve 

force (article 144 of the Constitution), and are subordinated to the 26 states and 

the federal district. They are responsible for maintaining public order, whereas civil 

police conduct criminal investigations. See http://www.pm.ro.gov.br/index.php/intra/

pm.html for coverage of each state’s military police establishment.

555 Relatório Ministério da Justiça–I Seminário Nacional sobre Atividade de Inteligência de Segurança Pública, Blue Tree Park, Brasília-DF, 5-7 December 2001.

556 Ibid.

557 Decreto 4685, 29 April 2003. 

558 Rômulo Gomes Fonini, Compartilhamento de Informações entre os órgãos de 

inteligência de segurança pública no país, monograph prepared for the Ministry of 

Higher Education Foundation/Newton Paiva (Belo Horizonte, 2010). 

559 Several witnesses confirm being astounded by the decreased level of attention 

given to the students and the course itself, especially at the graduation ceremony.
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

477

560 Anonymous interview conducted in Brasília, 26 July 2006.

561 Portaria 22, published in Diario Oficial, 22 July 2009.

562 Resolução No. 1, Conselho Especial do Sistema de Inteligência da Segurança 

Pública, 15 July 2009. 

563 National Public Security Doctrine, printed edition, declassified but with restricted distribution, shared with those who attended a meeting on the preparations 

for the 15th Pan-American Games, July 2007. 

564 Robert Blitzer, “Attorney General Guideline Changes Impacting FBI Intelligence Collection Operations,” George Washington University Homeland Security 

Policy Institute, 15 June 2011, http://securitydebrief.com/2011/06/15/attorney-general-guideline-changes-impacting-fbi-intelligence-collection-operations/. Accessed 27 

December 2011.

565 For an analysis of the military budget, see Patricia de Oliveira Mattos, “Orçamento e Defesa Nacional: an analysis of the defense portion of the federal budget 

from 2000 to 2009,” in III Seminário de Estudos: Poder Aeroespacial e Estudos de 

Defesa - Anais, 2010, v. II. pp. 439-459, http://www.unifa.aer.mil.br/seminario3_

pgrad/trabalhos/patricia-de-oliveira-matos.pdf. Accessed 3 January 2012.

566 Decreto 7364, 23 November 2010, http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/legislacao/

1025747/decreto-7364-10. Accessed 19 December 2011.

567 Leandro Fortes, “Nós, os inimigos,” Seção Seu País, Revista Carta Capital, 

edição 668, 14 October 2011, http://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/nos-os-inimigos-2/. Accessed 3 January 2012. Italics added by the author.

568 Domicio Proenca Junior and Eugenio Diniz, Política de defesa no Brasil: uma 

análise crítica (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Humanidades, 1998), p. 42. 

569 For discussion of these points the author is grateful to Roberto Numeriano, 

author of Serviços Secretos: a sobrevivência dos legados autoritários (Recife: Editora 

Universitária, 2010), and Vladimir Brito, author of Sistemas de inteligência no Brasil 

e nos Estados Unidos, monografia de especialização (Fundação Escola Superior do 

Ministério Público de Minas Gerais, 2009) and O papel informacional dos serviços 

secretos, Master’s thesis (Graduate Program in Information Sciences, Universidade 

Federal de Minas Gerais, 2011). 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

478

570 Monica Barroso Ferreira Lacerda, “Processo Cíclico e Análise de Inteligência Policial,” essay received by the author on 1 June 2009 for publication in the 

forthcoming book Inteligência de segurança pública: Teoria e prática no controle da 

criminalidade.

571 Michael Bayer, The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2010), 

p. 19.

572 Ibid., p. 100.

573 Ibid., pp. 17, 18.

574 Ibid., pp. 13, 15.

575 Ibid., pp. 20, 21

576 Ibid., p. 18.

577 Ibid., pp. 57, 59.

578 Article 23, paragraph VIII of Law 12527 (2011). 

579 Bayer, The Blue Planet, op. cit., p. 52.

580 Ibid.

581 Ibid., pp. 56, 59. 

582 The federal police have their own doctrine, which is being updated even though 

the older version is still unavailable to many intelligence operators. 

583 Relatório Ministério da Justiça–I Seminário Nacional sobre Atividade de Inteligência de Segurança Pública, Blue Tree Park, Brasília-DF, 5-7 December 2001.

584 See, for example, Edmund F. McGarrell, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak, “Intelligence-led Policing as a Framework for Responding to Terrorism,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23, no. 2 (May 2007): 142-58. Also Gregory 

F. Treverton et al., Moving Toward the Future of Policing (Washington, DC: RAND 

Corporation, 2011), pp. 32-39, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/.../2011/

RAND_MG1102.pdf. Accessed 9 January 2012. 

585 For greater detail, see Lucia Dammert, coord., Reporte del sector seguridad en 

América Latina y el Caribe (Santiago: FLACSO Chile, 2007).
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

479

586 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Security System Reform and Governance (Paris, OECD, 2005), p. 20, http://www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2012.

587 Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Informe sobre seguridad ciudadana y derechos humanos, 2009, p. 31, http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/pdfs/SEGURIDAD%20CIUDADANA%202009%20ESP.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2012.

588 Louis Garzarelli, “Correctional Administrators’ Attitudes: Making a Difference 

in Correctional Intelligence Gathering and Sharing,” Corrections Today (December 

2004), p. 119.

589 Edgardo Amaya, Populismo punitivo: el irracionalismo penal de hoy [Security and Penal Justice blog], 19 September 2006, http://seguridadyjusticia.blogspot.

com/2006/09/populismo-punitivo-el-irracionalismo.html. Accessed 1 July 2012.

590 Organization of American States, Declaración sobre seguridad de las Américas 

(2003), Section II (2) of the document, www.oas.org/csh/ces/documentos/ce00339s02.

doc. Accessed 1 July 2012.

591 Claudia Fuentes and Francisco Rojas, Promover la seguridad humana: marcos 

éticos, normativos y educacionales en América Latina y el Caribe (United Nations 

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2005), p. 52.

592 Garzarelli, op. cit., p.118.

593 Ben Crewe, “The Sociology of Imprisonment,” in Yvonne Jewkes, ed., Handbook on Prisons (Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing, 2007), pp. 123-51.

594 Brian Parry, “Intelligence: The key to Gang Suppression,” Corrections Today 

(April 2006), p. 42.

595 Crewe, op. cit., p. 125.

596 Dammert, op. cit., p. 123.

597 Ministerio de Seguridad, Presidencia de la Nacion, “Misión” (no. 8), http://

www.minseg.gob.ar/misión. Accessed 1 July 2012.

598 “El gobierno crea la Secretaría de Inteligencia mediante un decreto,” Diario en 

línea Hoy [Ecuador], 11 June 2009, http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/el-gobierno-crea-la-secretaria-de-inteligencia-mediante-un-decreto-352782.html. Accessed 1 

July 2012.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

480

599 Jose Maria Villalta, Proyecto de ley Derogatoria de la Dirección de Inteligencia 

y Seguridad del Estado y reforma de la Ley General de Policía, Law 7410, 26 May 

1994, with its modifications. 

600 “Un proyecto crea inteligencia estratégica para asistir a Evo,” Radio FM Bolivia, 15 January 2010, http://www.fmbolivia.com.bo/noticia21536-un-proyecto-creainteligencia-estrategica-para-asistir-a-evo.html. Accessed 1 July 2012.

601 “Mujica tiene en su escritorio texto del nuevo proyecto de inteligencia,” La 

Red 21 (Montevideo, Uruguay), 27 February 2011, http://www.lr21.com.uy/

politica/442693-mujica-tiene-en-su-escritorio-texto-del-nuevo-proyecto-de-inteligencia. Accessed 1 July 2012.

602 “Crean comisión para redactar ley de inteligencia,” El País (Montevideo, Uruguay), 23 November 2011, http://www.elpais.com.uy/111123/ultmo-608285/ultimomomento/crean-comision-para-redactar-ley-de-inteligencia/. Accessed 1 July 2012.

603 Dammert, op. cit., p. 115.

604 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American 

National Security (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989). 

605 For greater detail, see Lucia Dammert and Liza Zúñiga, La cárcel: problemas y 

desafíos para las Américas (Santiago, FLACSO Chile, 2008).

606 Parry, op. cit., pp. 42-45 and Garzarelli, op. cit., pp. 118-121.

607 Elizabeth Sepper, “Democracy, Human Rights and Intelligence Sharing,” Texas 

International Law Journal 46, no. 1 (Fall 2010), pp. 151-207. For a larger-scale 

examination of this theme, see International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, Hans Born, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills, eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). 

608 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 137, and Michael Herman, 

“11 September: Legitimizing Intelligence?” International Relations 16, 2 (2002), p. 

233.

609 Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the 

Global Economy (New York: Doubleday, 2005). Like Sepper, Naim points out that 

the underworld of criminality frequents ungoverned international or supranational 

spaces and opts for informal collaboration across countries and cultures. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

481

610 H. Bradford Westerfield, “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison,” 

Intelligence and National Security 11, 3 (July 1996), pp. 523-524.

611 James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 4.

612 U.S. Code, title 50, chapter 15, subchapter III, section 413b, http://www.

gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title50/html/USCODE-2009-title50-chap15-subchapIII-sec413b.htm. Accessed 3 January 2013.

613 With few exceptions such as the U.S. anti-corruption law—the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 governing the actions of U.S.-based corporations in 

bidding for overseas contracts and ensuring transparency in financial accounting 

practices—and the supranationally sanctioned but rare rendition of notorious 

criminals to the International Criminal Court.

614 Westerfield, op. cit., p. 541.

615 Martin Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition against 

Islamic Terrorism,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17 

(2004), p. 215.

616 Alasdair Roberts, “Entangling Alliances: NATO’s Security of Information Policy and the Entrenchment of State Secrecy,” Cornell International Law Journal 36 

(2003), pp. 353-354.

617 Sepper, op. cit., footnote 99. 

618 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 256, 258, 266, 268, 275-276. 

619 Examples of international conventions include the Geneva Protocols for protection of noncombatants and treatment of prisoners of war; various international human rights treaties; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 

Wild Flora and Fauna; and the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

620 Robert O. Keohane, “The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and 

the Use of Force,” Michigan Journal of International Law 24 (2003), 1124. The 

threshold for accountability requires two elements: 1) an effective mechanism for 

inquiring into the rationale for decisions, and 2) costly sanctions that can be imposed on transgressors. 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

482

621 International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, ISSN 2151-2868, a semiannual 

journal beginning Spring 2010. 

622 For example, in the view of an outside observer of the National Security Agency, 

the UKUSA community constitutes “a unique supranational body, complete with 

its own laws, oaths and language, all hidden from public view.” James Bamford, 

Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency—From the Cold 

War to the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, 2001), pp. 403-04. 

623 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization 

and International Human Rights Law,” University of Chicago and Harvard Law 

School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper no. 95, p. 41, 

find that acculturation by some states leading other states toward the adoption of 

positive human rights practices depends more on positive behavioral cues and thus 

“less on the properties of the rule than on the properties of the relationship of the 

actor to the community.” www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/62-Jinks.pdf. Accessed 25 

July 2012.

624 Sepper, op. cit., p. 164.

625 Peter Wright, Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking, 1987). From the inside dustcover flap: “...the British government has gone to great lengths to keep [this book] from being published....”

626 See Michael D. Bayer, The Blue Planet, op. cit., p. 34 and chapter 2 generally. 

See http://www.ndic.edu/press/18507.htm. 

627 On the rise of the public security concept, see Organization of American States 

at http://www.oas.org/en/topics/public_security.asp. For a review of several initiatives see 

International Peace Institute (formerly International Peace Academy), Police Reform 

through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation

(New York: 2004), http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UN/POLICE_

REFORM.pdf. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (Portland, Oregon: Willan 

Publishing, 2008) addresses the growh of intelligence-led policing. 

628 Sepper’s distillation of Michael Herman, “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001,” Intelligence and National Security 19, 2 (Summer 2004), see especially 

346-350. 

629 Sepper, op. cit., p. 202.
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

483

630 The most well-known evidence of this tendency is the secret rendition to partner states of selected “illegal extraordinary combatants.” See Dana Priest, “CIA 

Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,” Washington Post, 2 November 2005, http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.

html. Accessed 3 January 2013.

631 Sepper, op. cit., 203.

632 Sepper, op. cit., 203-204.

633 Bayer, The Blue Planet, op. cit., chapter 5.

634 Although comparative figures are difficult to certify because of the internal priorities of various agencies, the budget figures for national security intelligence compared to national law enforcement are illustrative of the imbalance. The Director of 

National Intelligence requested a budget of $55 billion for fiscal year 2012 for the 

National Intelligence Program, a figure that excludes the budget for military intelligence, according to reporting by Steven Aftergood in Secrecy News, 15 Feb 2011, 

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/02/intelbud_request.html. Meanwhile, only $8.3 

billion was requested for all Federal Bureau of Investigation activities for fiscal year 

2011. See http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbi-budget-for-fiscal-year-2011.

635 Mario Villarreal Diaz and Juan Jose Rico Urbiola, “La penalización de las actividades de inteligencia hostil en los órdenes subnacionales de gobierno en México: 

el caso ‘Nuevo León,’” in Jose Julio Fernandez Rodriguez et al., Cuestiones de Inteligencia en la Sociedad Contemporánea (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2011), pp. 175-185, http://www.portalcultura.mde.

es/Galerias/publicaciones/fichero/Cuestiones_inteligencia.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2012. 

636 Jeanna Cullinan, “Veracruz, Mexico, Fires 980 Police in Corruption Purge,” 20 

October 2011, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1729-veracruz-mexicofires-980-police-in-corruption-purge. Accessed 3 January 2013.

637 Spencer Ackerman, “How the Pentagon’s Top Killers Became (Unaccountable) 

Spies,” Wired Magazine, 13 February 2012, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/

jsoc-ambinder/. Accessed 2 September 2012.

638 A series of reports about military deployments to the state of Vera Cruz in 

Mexico in late 2011 was soon followed by a report of the vetting of police officials 

in the same state, as an example of the interaction of a national security institution 

with police agencies. Some relevant installments: “México: envían más tropas a 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

484

Veracruz para contener violencia,” Noticias 24, 5 October 2011, http://www.noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/330158/mexico-envian-mas-tropas-a-veracruz-paracontener-violencia/; Ronan Graham, “Mexico Installs Federal Forces in Operation 

to Secure Veracruz,” 6 October 2011, http://www.insightcrime.org/criminal-groups/

mexico/gulf-cartel/item/1667-mexico-installs-federal-forces-in-operation-to-secure-veracruz; “Veracruz suma 980 policias despedidos,” El Universal, 10 october 2011, 

http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/82622.html. Consulted 3 January 2013.

639 One of the authors interviewed members of the federal, local, and municipal 

police, as well as Mexican military personnel, whose tasks include (internal aspects 

of) national security. 

640 Note that in comparison with the military, a police officer in Mexico does not 

receive support in obtaining a mortgage for housing, whereas the military have 

excellent benefits such as assistance in obtaining home mortgages, car loans, insurance of excellent quality, educational support and recreational facilities, among 

other things.

641 For more information, see Encuesta Nacional de Inseguridad (ENSI - 7), p. 106, 

http://www.icesi.org.mx/estadisticas/estadisticas_encuestasNacionales_ensi7.asp. Accessed 

14 September 2012.

642 Human-source intelligence penetration of “el narco” occurs rarely enough 

to be newsworthy. See Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Agencies Infiltrating Drug 

Cartels across Mexico,” New York Times, 24 October 2011, http://www.nytimes.

com/2011/10/25/world/americas/united-states-infiltrating-criminal-groups-acrossmexico.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3. Accessed 3 January 2013.

643 Public Law 99-433, “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.”

644 Rogers does not use this phrase, but it perfectly captures the realm in which 

cyber crimes exist. The term was coined during the 1970s and is widely used in 

political science. 

645 Essays in Section One point to legislative, judicial and executive branch 

oversight and supervision mechanisms in place almost everywhere across the region 

that will help overcome some of the obstacles related to the potential abuse of 

government power, such as inappropriate invasion of privacy. Citizens in every 

country can point to their own historical examples in which such violations 

occurred, and many have adopted provisions to protect against future abuses. 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

485

Swenson notes in his introductory essay the “emphasis given to individual, personal 

or citizen security” in the region. However, that balance is constantly thrown into 

question as policymakers debate appropriate responses to acts of terrorism. Only 

constant, vigilant oversight by watchdog organizations, formal oversight bodies and 

elected officials can build public trust in intelligence organizations and maintain it 

over time.

646 Rosalba Gamez Alatorre, “Información o formación, en el ciberespacio,” Contexto Educativo, Revista Digital de Educación y Nuevas Tecnologías 4, no. 23 (2002).

647 Ana Rosa Velazco Lozada, “La educación continua como instrumento de desarrollo en el siglo XXI,” Tendencias, Revista de la Universidad Blas Pascal 5, no. 10 

(2011), p. 3.

648 Pablo Martinez, “Los nuevos desafíos de la inteligencia en la Republica Argentina,” Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia 1, no. 1, Segunda Época (2003), 

p. 21.

649 As an example, the Argentine National Intelligence School (ENI) has since 

1999 offered a master’s degree that is accredited within the official higher education 

system, with the support of the Universidad Nacional de La Plata. The program is 

open to anyone; only an undergraduate degree is required for all applicants. Over 

the course of its existence, the program has atttracted university professionals from 

different disciplines, lawyers, political scientists, engineers, and international relations specialists, among others. 

650 Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta, “Quien vigilará a nuestros vigilantes? (Reinventando a Juvenal ante el foro de Roma en Perú y Sudamérica),” Inteligencia 

y seguridad: Revista de análisis y prospectiva (Spain) no. 5 (December 2008-May 

2009), pp. 49-50.

651 Paul Chaves, “Los Espías no Bastan: Definiendo las Políticas Públicas en Materia de Servicios de Inteligencia en Costa Rica,” REDES 2001 (Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies), Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 

Washington, DC, 22-25 May 2001.

652 Miguel Angel Esteban Navarro et al., “Gestión del conocimiento y servicios de 

inteligencia: la dimensión estratégica de la información,” El profesional de la información 12, no. 5 (2003), p. 270.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

486

653 Comments from the National Secretary of Intelligence, “Acto de clausura del 

VII curso especial de perfeccionamiento en inteligencia estratégica nacional SIGLO XXI,” Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia 7, no. 1 (Primer Trimestre 

1998), p. 10.

654 Jesus Tramullas Sas, “Tecnologías para la gestión del conocimiento y la generación de inteligencia,” I Seminario sobre Gestión del Conocimiento y Servicios de 

Inteligencia en el siglo XXl, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Boletín Oficial del 

Estado, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (Madrid, Ministry of Defense, 

April 2003), p. 67.

655 Tramullas Sas, ibid., p. 70.

656 Diego Navarro Bonilla, “Introducción,” Cuadernos de Estrategia 127, Estudios 

sobre inteligencia: fundamentos para la seguridad internacional, Grupo de trabajo 5/03 (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Ministry of Defense, Spain, 

2003), p. 20.

657 Specialization: For this designation, the student must demonstrate mature handling and use of knowledge, to include writing, presenting, and gaining approval of 

a final product or thesis. Master’s: This degree involves a variety of organized activities in a specific area of knowledge, including deep and systematic knowledge of a 

discipline and the application of suitable research methodology, to be demonstrated 

through the development of a thesis. Doctorate: Doctoral studies are oriented toward developing researchers who will make significant contributions to knowledge 

in a particular area, and developing those capabilities through carrying out original 

research in the form of a doctoral thesis. 

658 Rocio Santamaria Ambriz, “Los desafíos del postgrado en América Latina,” 

Colección EDUAL 6, (1995), p. 21. 

659 Walter Barutia Feijoo, “Acreditación universitaria, retos y oportunidades,” 

Estudios en Ciencias Administrativas 1, no. 1 (2003), of the Universidad Nacional 

Mayor San Marcos, Facultad de Ciencias Administrativas, Unidad de Postgrado, Peru, 

pp. 209-210.

660 Examples of the professionalization of intelligence personnel through higher education include Argentina (master’s degree from the National Intelligence 

School/Universidad de la Plata); Chile (master’s from the Chilean Army War 

College-ACAGUE/Universidad de Chile); and the United States (master’s with the 

National Intelligence Unversity), although each of these countries has adopted different approaches. 
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661 Carlos Gustavo Arrieta P., et al., “Informe de la Comisión Especial para el 

DAS,” Bogota, 2006. This article notes that “the Commission insistently recommends the establishment of periodic, external evaluation of the education provided 

by the intelligence school—a rigorous ‘quality control system.’ It should be started 

immediately, and subsequently, the outside review should be accomplished every 

five years. The commission also recommends permanent programs to meet the 

needs of intelligence professionals after they have passed through this school, so 

that they can update themselves on the best and latest techniques for obtaining, 

handling, and analyzing intelligence and counterintelligence.” 

662 See http://www.esici.edu.co/. 

663 Relación de cursos impartidos por el CISEN (2000–2008). See http://

www.cisen.gob.mx/site/pdfs/doc_desclasificados/21_2008_CURSOS_CAPACITACION_2000-2008.pdf. Accessed 16 May 2012.

664 Guillermo Valdez Castellanos, “Inteligencia para la Seguridad Nacional en el 

Siglo XXI,” CISEN: 20 anos de historia—Testimonios (México: CISEN, Febrero 

2009), pp. 14-15, http://www.cisen.gob.mx/site/pdfs/actualidad/La_Inteligencia_seguridad_nacional_Valdes.pdf. Accessed 16 May 2012. 

665 See http://www.cisen.gob.mx/site/cisen.htm. 

666 NIU makes its catalog of courses and research publications available at http://

www.ni-u.edu/index.html. 

667 Interview with the Director of CALEN, General Jose Burone, on 10 January 

2012, published in La Republica Digital, http://www.diariolarepublica.net/2012/01/

calen-dictara-primer-curso-de-inteligencia-estrategica/. Accessed 10 May 2012. 

668 “By Decree 7662, the Bolivarian Military University of Venezuela (UMBV) is 

established,” Gaceta Oficial of Venezuela, no. 39,502, 3 September 2010. 

669 Russell G. Swenson, “¿Para qué sirve una escuela de inteligencia nacional?,” 

Conferencia Magistral, Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia, Peru, 2007.

670 Alberto Bolivar Ocampo, “Prefacio,” in Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. 

Lemozy, eds., Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas (Washington, DC: Joint 

Military Intelligence College, 2004), pp. 20-21, http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/

Intelligence_Professionalism_in_the_Americas.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2012.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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671 Jaime Castillo Arias, “Sistemas de Inteligencia: Perspectiva doctrinal para realizar un análisis integral,” Inteligencia estratégica y prospectiva (Quito: Facultad 

Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales-FLACSO and Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia del Ecuador, 2011), p. 98. 

672 Alvaro Jose Venegas Gonzalez, “Comportamiento profesional en un Área de 

Análisis de Inteligencia Civil estatal colombiana,” Nova et Vetera (Colombia) 19, 

no. 63 (2010), p. 131. 

673 William Lynn III, co-originator of the “4th-generation warfare” concept, 

speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Global Security Forum 2012, 11 April 2012, http://csis.org/files/attachments/120411_FightingACyberWar_GSF_Transcript.pdf. Accessed 11 August 2012.

674 U.S. President, Cyberspace Policy Review, 2009, p. 1, http://www.whitehouse.

gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2012.

675 Ibid. This more complete definition comes from the U.S. executive branch 

document, National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23. Most of this document is classified; therefore, only the cyberspace policy review is cited.

676 IT Business Edge, “Cyberspace” definition, http://www.webopedia.com/

TERM/C/cyberspace.html. Accessed 24 July 2012.

677 Cyberspace.cz, “Cyberspace” definition, http://www.cyberspace.cz/. Accessed 24 

July 2012.

678 Dan Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,” in 

Cyberpower and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 2009), www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/getDoc.cfm?fileID=181, p. 4. Accessed 24 

July 2012.

679 Although a full discussion of the legal implications of stopping just short of 

including information itself falls beyond the scope of this essay, one entanglement 

from doing so would appear in those countries that apply fraud laws to an intruder 

who gains unauthorized access in cyberspace (see the discussion on “intrusion” 

in the present essay), and then also apply theft laws for the information that was 

accessed.

680 “Cyberattack” definition in Technopedia, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/24748/cyberattack. Accessed 24 July 2012.
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681 This definition comes in part from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02 U.S. 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2012.

682 This definition comes from information posted on the U.S. Federal Bureau of 

Investigation website http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/computer-intrusions. Accessed 25 July 2012.

683 Paraphrased from U.S. Government Printing Office, Title 18, U.S. Code § 

1030, “Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers,” http://www.

gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title18/pdf/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap47-

sec1030.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2012.

684 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The 

NIST Handbook (Washington, DC: October 1995), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/

nistpubs/800-12/800-12-html/index.html. Accessed 30 August 2012.

685 “Private” in this use indicates limited access. Thus, a government computer 

or network that requires an individual password or other specific authorization is 

considered private, just like a private-sector computer or network. 

686 David A. Wheeler and Gregory N. Larsen, Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution, IDA Paper P-3792 (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, October 

2003), p. 1. 

687 Those curious about LOIC can simply search for “LOIC” on Google. 

688 For more detail about botnets and the effects that they can cause, see “Bots 

& Botnet: An Overview,” http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/malicious/

bots-botnet-overview_1299. Accessed 25 July 2012.

689 U.S.-CERT, “Cyber Threat Source Descriptions,” http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/csthreats.html#nat. Accessed 25 July 2012.

690 John Brodkin, “Government-sponsored cyber attacks on the rise, McAfee 

says,” Networkworld.com, 29 November 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/

news/2007/112907-government-cyberattacks.html. Accessed 25 July 2012.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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691 Anna Mulrine, “China is a lead cyberattacker of US military computers, Pentagon reports,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 May 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/

USA/Military/2012/0518/China-is-a-lead-cyberattacker-of-US-military-computersPentagon-reports. Accessed 26 July 2012.

692 Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), pp. 

27-28. All of Chapter 2 (pp. 25-43) presents a useful overview of cyber criminal 

activity. 

693 Price WaterhouseCoopers Brazil, Ltda, Cybercrime: Protecting against the Growing Threat—Global Economic Crime Survey, November 2011, http://www.pwc.com/

en_GX/gx/economic-crime-survey/assets/GECS_GLOBAL_REPORT.pdf. Accessed 26 

July 2012.

694 Norton.com, “Cybercrime Report for 2011,” http://now-static.norton.com/now/

en/pu/images/Promotions/2012/cybercrime/assets/downloads/en-us/NCR-DataSheet.

pdf. Accessed 4 September, 2012.

695 Phil Muncaster, “Patriotic hackers face off in South China Sea: Dispute over 

islands claimed by China and Philippines goes online,” 27 April 2012, http://www.

theregister.co.uk/2012/04/27/philippine_china_hack_stand_off/. Accessed 11 August 

2012.

696 Kim Zetter, “Report: Hacktivists Out-Stole Cybercriminals in 2011,” Wired 

Magazine, Threat Level blog, 22 March 2012, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/hacktivists-beat-cybercriminals/. Accessed 11 August 2012.

697 “Kaspersky Security Bulletin: Malware Evolution 2011,” Securelist, 1 March 

2012, http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792217/Kaspersky_Security_Bulletin_

Malware_Evolution_2011. Accessed 14 August 2012.

698 Parmy Olson, We Are Anonymous (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 

2012), pp. 93-94 and 107-12.

699 Press Association, “Anonymous claims responsibility for taking down government sites,” The Guardian, 8 April 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/

apr/08/anonymous-taking-down-government-websites. Accessed 11 August 2012.

700 Olson, op. cit., pp. 280-282.

701 Brian Emery, “LulzSec hits Brazilian websites,” BBC News, 22 June 2011, 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13878888. Accessed 11 August 2012.
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702 THN Security Analyst, “Lulzsec hack Infraguard Atlanta Members Alliance 

& challenge FBI!” Hacker News, 3 June 2011, http://thehackernews.com/2011/06/

lulzsec-hack-infragard-atlanta-members.html. Accessed 11 Aug 2012.

703 Ellen Nakashima, “CIA Web Site Hacked; Group LulzSec Takes Credit,” Washington Post, 15 June 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/cia-web-site-hacked/2011/06/15/AGGNphWH_story.html. Accessed 11 August 

2012.

704 John Markoff, “A Most-Wanted Cyberthief Is Caught in His Own Web,” New 

York Times, 16 February 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/16/us/a-most-wanted-cyberthief-is-caught-in-his-own-web.html. Accessed 12 August 2012.

705 Kevin Mitnik, Ghost in the Wires: My Adventures as the World’s Most Wanted 

Hacker (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2011), p. 385.

706 U.S. Government Printing Office, 42 USC § 5195c-“Critical Infrastructures 

Protection,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE2010-title42-chap68-subchapIV-B-sec5195c.pdf. Accessed 16 August 2012.

707 For a graphic representation of the comparative proportion of Internet users 

in Brazil and the United States over time, see Google.com at http://www.google.com/

publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=it_net_user_p2&idim=country:BRA

&dl=en&hl=en&q=brazil+internet+usage#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&

met_y=it_net_user_p2&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=region:NAC

&idim=country:BRA:USA&ifdim=region&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false. Accessed 

16 August 2012.

708 “For the Satellite Industry, Lines Blur Between Military and Commercial Markets,” National Defense Magazine blog, 18 March 2011, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=350. Accessed 16 August 2012.

709 The U.S. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 assigns responsibilities and authorities for providing cybersecurity to federal agencies and 

other executive branch organizations. For further information on this law, see: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 44 USC § 3541-“Federal Information Security 

Management Act of 2002,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title44/

pdf/USCODE-2011-title44-chap35-subchapIII-sec3541.pdf. Accessed 6 September 

2012.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

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710 All information about the seven centers comes from the illustration “National 

Cybersecurity Center Policy Capture,” posted on the White House website at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cyber/CybersecurityCentersGraphic.pdf. Accessed 

16 August 2012.

711 See the Brazilian home page at http://www.cert.br/en/ for further details about 

the CERT.br mission and subordination. Accessed 17 August 2012.

712 For a brief summary of SERPRO, see http://www.securities.com/Public/company-profile/BR/SERPRO_en_1154549.html. Accessed 17 August 2012. The serpro 

portal (serpro.gov.br) is in Portuguese. 

713 Luiz Fabricio Thaumaturgo Vergueiro, “Brazilian Security Structure,” Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Research Program, http://www.fas.org/irp/

world/brazil/fabrverg.pdf. Accessed 17 August 2012.

714 European Union, EU/COE Joint Project on Regional Cooperation against Cybercrime: Specialised cybercrime units—Good Practice Study, Version 9, November 

2011, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Reports-Presentations/Octopus2011/2467_HTCU_study_V30_9Nov11.pdf. Accessed 

17 August 2012.

715 Isabel Estrada, “Cyberspace Becomes Newest Battlefield for Brazil’s Armed 

Forces,” Diálogo-Américas, 8 March 2011, http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/08/03/aa-brazil-cyber-warfare. Accessed 17 

August 2012.

716 Marco Cepik and Priscila Antunes, “The New Brazilian Intelligence Law: An 

Institutional Assessment,” paper presented at Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies, Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies, 22-25 May 

2001, Washington, DC, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/brazil/index.html. Accessed 

5 September 2012.

717 Linha Defensiva, 12 May 2012, http://www.linhadefensiva.com/2012/05/brazilian-army-prepares-its-cdciber-the-cyber-defense-center/. Accessed 17 August 2012.

718 Nelson de Sa, “General detalha implantação do Centro de Defesa Cibernética, 

novo órgão brasileiro,” Folha de São Paolo, 5 July 2012, in Portuguese at http://

www1.folha.uol.com.br/tec/1085498-general-detalha-implantacao-do-centro-de-defesa-cibernetica-novo-orgao-brasileiro.shtml. Accessed 5 September 2012.
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719 Emerson Wendt, “Ciberguerra, inteligência cibernética e segurança virtual: alguns aspectos,” in GSI publication Revista Brasileira de Inteligência, no. 6 (April 2011), 

p. 22, http://www.abin.gov.br/modules/mastop_publish/files/files_4e3ae31e2c097.pdf. 

Accessed 5 September 2012.

720 For further information, see http://www.cert.br/en/. Accessed 12 September 

2012.

721 Whichever of the communities may be responsible for the national CERT 

should have a great deal of information about the intrusion. The responsible group 

may not be able to provide immediate attribution (who), but it will be able to discern some of the details about where the intrusion came from—or passed through. 

Country A may have several overlapping CERTs, each of which would have some 

knowledge of the intrusion. If that were the case, then the importance of sharing 

information is even greater: any one of the CERTs may have important information that the others do not. Overlap of CERT responsibilities is important to intelligence managers because it may increase the number of organizations with which 

intelligence information about the intrusion needs to be exchanged. 

722 The U.S. Intelligence Community’s obligation to protect information extends 

to protecting personal information that may be gathered coincidentally in efforts 

to gather foreign intelligence. U.S. law strictly limits with whom such information may be shared, and even how it may be stored, if it may be stored at all. For 

further reading, see U.S. Government Printing Office, 50 USC § 36, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

pkg/PLAW-110publ261/html/PLAW-110publ261.htm. Accessed 5 September 2012. 

In the United States, individual states can perhaps address cyber security in the 

more comprehensive and aggressive fashion envisioned by Michael J. Glennon in 

“State-Level Cybersecurity,” Policy Review (February-March 2012).

723 United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence 

Community Directive Number 208 “Write for Maximum Utility,” 17 December 

2008, http://dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/icd_208.pdf. Accessed 24 August 2012.

724 Ibid.

725 U.S. Government, Executive Order 12333, paragraph 1.7, “U.S. Government 

Intelligence Activities,” 4 December 1981, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-

08-04/pdf/E8-17940.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2012. 

726 Organization of American States, “A Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy: A Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

494

a Culture of Cybersecurity,” 2004, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_pry_strategy.pdf. Accessed 29 August 2012.

727 Gen. Michael V. Hayden, “The Future of Things Cyber,” Strategic Studies 

Quarterly (Spring 2011), p. 4, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/hayden.pdf. 

Accessed 5 September 2012. 

728 Ibid.

729 Senator Dianne Feinstein, “Feinstein Calls on Obama to Protect Computer Networks from Cyber Attacks,” 28 August 2012, http://www.feinstein.senate.

gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=8c64f8e4-6780-4a4f-88eb-cd26a8839aae. 

Accessed 6 September 2012.

730 “GCHQ to advise senior business leaders on how to fight cyber attacks,” The 

Telegraph at telegraph.co.uk, 6 September 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

uknews/defence/9521715/PLS-PIC-AND-PUB-GCHQ-to-advise-senior-businessleaders-on-how-to-fight-cyber-attacks.html. Accessed 6 September 2012.

731 Eric Ensign, Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 1920-1933 (Washington, DC: 

Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001), http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Intelligence_Rum_War.pdf. 

732 ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide, April 2013. https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/CAAT/Shared%20Documents/20130505_NIU_SFA_Guide.pdf. Accessed 5 August 2013. Also see Liz Panarelli, The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in 

Security Sector Reform (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace, April 2009), http://

www.usip.org/files/resources/USIP_0409.PDF. Accessed 7 May 2013. 

733 It is also underpinned by an internationally binding legal regime to which 

foreign forces are subject upon sovereign recognition. See Major Andrew R. Atkins’ 

discussion of the complexities of host-nation sovereignty recognition in military 

operations in his “Doctrinally Accounting for Host Nation Sovereignty during 

U.S. Counterinsurgency Security Operations,” Military Law Review 212 (Summer 

2012), pp. 70-132. 

734 Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnush, although they do not directly reference 

smart power, make a similar argument when they note that “[a]ccording to the 

U.S. Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations (2008) [also emphasized 

in its successor Field Manual (FM) 3-22, see fn. 777 below], SSR is an activity that 

can reinforce diplomatic and defense interventions while reducing long-term se-
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

495

curity threats by building capacities for stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.” 

See their Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity 

Building (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute Paper, 

Security Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2010, p. 7, http://

www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=960. Accessed 17 October 2012

735 See United States Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-22: Army Support to Security Cooperation (January 2013), paragraphs 4-57 and 4-58: “The advise 

task for the governmental level [SSR] is aimed at advising a foreign government’s 

high-ranking personnel at their national, federal, departmental, or ministerial level. 

U.S. agencies outside the DOD provide nonmilitary advice. The advise task at 

the governmental level must involve a whole-of-government effort integrating U.S. 

agencies such as the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice.... DOD initiated 

the Ministry of Defense Advisors (known as MoDA) program to forge long-term 

relationships that strengthen a partner nation’s defense ministry.”

736 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), p. 7, 

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf. Accessed 13 July 

2012. In this chapter the authors take an agnostic view toward smart power and 

limit discussion to its operational impacts on security sector reform and intelligence 

management. 

737 See Joseph A. Nye for a full explanation of his concept of soft power in national 

security and foreign affairs in Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New 

York: Public Affairs, 2004), and Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American 

Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

738 In John J. Hamre’s interview with key smart power thinkers Richard L. Armitage and Joseph Nye, they agreed that the smart power approach necessarily involves 

“ced[ing] some national sovereignty,” particularly “when working within international institutions” (Hamre) but that “every successful relationship requires compromise” (Armitage) and “the benefits outweigh the costs to us” (Nye). See “Smart 

Power: John J. Hamre talks with Joseph Nye & Richard Armitage” The American 

Interest 3, no. 2 (November/December 2007), pp. 34-41. 

739 Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnush, op cit., p. iii.

740 David Axe, “The Limits of Smart Power,” The American Prospect 21, no. 10 

(December 2010), pp. 23-27; Nicholas J. Armstrong, “Afghanistan 2014-2024: 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

496

Advising for Sustainability,” Small Wars Journal (4 May 2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/nicholas-j-armstrong. Accessed 4 October 2012.

741 United States Department of the Army Field Manual 3-22, paragraph 1-61. 

742 Liz Panarelli, op. cit, p. 2.

743 Ibid., p. 2. 

744 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011).

745 Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power: Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism,” Foreign 

Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), pp. 131-142. 

746 Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Investing in a New Multilateralism–A Smart 

Power Approach to the United Nations,” Center of Strategic and International 

Studies, Smart Power Initiative (January 2009), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/

pubs/090128_mendelsonforman_un_smartpower_web.pdf, 1-14. Accessed 5 August 

2013.

747 Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56 (March 2012), pp. 67-84. 

748 William B. Caldwell and Nathan K. Finney, “Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan: The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach,” Prism 2, no. 1 (December 

2010), pp. 121-129, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism2-1/Prism_121-130_

Caldwell-Finney.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2012.

749 Dennis Steele, “The Closers,” Army Magazine 60, no. 4 (April 2010), pp. 58-

66. The 3rd Infantry Division was tasked with providing support to the Department of State’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams while carrying out its advise and 

assist mission to Iraqi security forces development. Nicole Ball provides a comprehensive explanation of the functional intersections in security sector reform in 

“Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP,” 

Consultant Report (October 2002), Table 1, p. 14, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3202.pdf. Accessed 5 September 2012. 

750 LTG William B. Caldwell IV, with Derek S. Reveron, “Surging Security Force 

Assistance in Afghanistan,” Military Review (November-December 2011), p. 19.
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751 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959). See Mark R. Leary and Ashley Batts Watson, “Personality and Persona: 

Personality Processes in Self-Presentation,” Journal of Personality 79, no. 6 (December 2011), pp. 889-916 for an excellent extension of Goffman’s seminal concepts.

752 For more on the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program see http://www.defense.

gov/home/features/2011/0211_moda/. For the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program 

see http://www.jcs.mil/page.aspx?id=52. 

753 David A. Klein, “The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital: An Introduction” in David A. Klein, ed., The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital 

(Woburn, Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998), pp. 2-3. 

754 Mike Pedler, John Burgoyne, and Tom Boydell, The Learning Company: A Strategy for Sustainable Development, second edition (London: McGraw-Hill, 1997). 

755 David A. Klein, op. cit., p. 3.

756 Ibid., p. 4. 

757 Ibid., p. 4. 

758 Mary M. Crossman, Henry W. Lane and Roderick E. White, “An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution,” Academy of Management Review 24, no. 3 (1999), p. 522, citing James G. March, “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” Organization Science, 2 (1991), pp. 71-87. 

759 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, third edition, Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00, 30 August 

2011. 

760 Ibid., p. 1-7.

761 Ibid., p. 1-8.

762 Ibid.

763 Ibid.

764 Ibid.

765 Ibid.
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

498

766 Ibid.

767 In some instances the advising relationship is very close and the advisor is 

regarded as a confidant. When this happens the counterpart may provide insightful 

understanding by revealing a full explanation of the problem. Though it is 

extraordinarily valuable for an advisor and the advising mission’s leadership to have 

such direct insight, that insight nonetheless still needs to be corroborated because 

the counterpart may, without prejudice, be misinformed or misunderstand the 

problem. 

768 Director for operational plans and joint force development (J-7), Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (3 August 2011), III-11.

769 For a broader, historical perspective on variations in commitment levels among 

alliance members, see Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of 

Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), especially p. 35.

770 Thomas Scott Gibson (TRADOC), “CALL publishes Company Intelligence 

Support Team Handbook,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth 

(25 January 2009), http://www.army.mil/article/33509/call-publishes-company-intelligence-support-team-handbook/. Accessed 5 August 2013.

771 Joint Chiefs of Staff, AFPAK Hands (APH) Program Overview Brief (26 

August 2011), http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-09/090811135844_AFPAK_

Hands_Program_Brief.pdf Accessed 27 October 2012. 

772 http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0211_moda/. Accessed 6 July 2013.

773 David A. Klein, “The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital: An Introduction,” op. cit., p. 3.

774 Tony Bush, in Theories of Educational Leadership and Management (United 

Kingdom: Sage Publications, Ltd., 2010), draws from the organizational dynamics 

literature to summarize seven distinctions between organizational authority and 

influence.

775 See Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis, “Left of Bang: The 

Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s Environment,” Prism 3, no. 4, pp. 13-21, 

http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/prism3-4/prism12-21_flynn-sisco-ellis.pdf. Accessed 

2 June 2013. Note the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency’s emphasis on human geography equally with physical features and imagery intelligence (National 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

499

Geospatial Intelligence Agency, “NGA Strategy 2013-2017,” https://www1.nga.

mil/About/NGAStrategy/Documents/19639_NGA%20Strat%20Pub_Public_Web.

pdf, accessed 3 June 2013, as well as the Office of the Undersecretary for Defense 

Intelligence 2010 formalization of Activity-Based Intelligence (ABI) and Human 

Domain Analytics (HDA).

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501

Index

Abilities132, 261, 322, 338, 346, 359, 394

ABIN (Civilian Intelligence Agency, Brazil) 48, 70, 71, 149,155, 160, 254, 

255, 261,266, 267, 269, 277, 279, 288, 289, 328, 365

Academia 5, 125, 166, 292, 318

Academic ii, 21, 23, 24, 30, 83, 85, 102, 127, 133, 135, 165, 166, 168, 172, 

173, 190, 195, 225, 226, 228, 234, 265, 267, 278, 317, 318, 322, 

324, 325-327, 329, 331-333, 335-345, 347, 361, 376, 387, 405, 

406, 409

Access 11, 20, 23, 27, 36, 64, 65, 67-71, 73, 74, 163, 171, 180, 192, 253, 

268, 272, 274, 286, 292, 327, 336, 340, 355, 357, 358, 360, 361, 

366-371, 384, 392-394, 397, 403, 405, 406, 410, 412-414

Accords 70, 125, 212, 213, 228, 257, 289

Accountability (see Intelligence) 

Accountable 5, 71, 14, 24, 59, 62, 66, 92, 150, 197, 258, 262, 297, 298, 

302, 304, 380

Acculturation 257, 303

Accuracy (see Intelligence)

Adaptive 134, 150, 169, 171, 174, 179, 186

Administration (bureaucratic) 59, 62, 73, 128, 196, 248, 284, 286, 288, 

293-95, 323, 325, 332, 410

Adversarial 13, 270, 271, 307, 311

Advising 3, 22, 24, 146, 172, 234, 319, 377-380, 382-389, 391-397, 399-

407, 414

Advisor 11, 12, 20, 24, 33, 50, 63, 140, 149, 183, 202, 212, 224, 268, 319, 

323, 377-407, 414 

Afghanistan 83, 319, 377-407, 414

Agent (see Intelligence) 

Agreements 70, 92, 151, 152, 228, 230, 231, 245, 247, 258, 290, 293, 300, 

301, 371
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

502

Al Qaida 88, 227

Alliance 13, 151, 152, 175, 192, 194, 228, 229, 319, 367, 377, 379, 380, 

387, 395, 396

AMERIPOL (American Police Community) 152, 240

Analysis (see Intelligence)

Analyst (see Intelligence)

Andean 33

ANEPE (National Political and Strategic Studies Academy, Chile) 329, 343

Anglo-Saxon 59, 60, 86

ANI (National Intelligence Agency, Chile) 41, 253, 288, 328

Anticipation 23, 31, 121, 131, 135, 138, 150, 169, 170, 174, 177, 179, 183, 

184, 191, 192, 204, 205, 209, 222, 242, 287, 366, 388, 390, 393, 

397

Arabic 90, 116, 118

Argentina 5, 14, 19, 30, 41, 48, 79, 90, 95, 106, 122, 125, 148, 155, 164, 

168, 176, 236, 238, 239, 252, 255, 256, 287, 288, 292, 327, 342, 

343

Argue 17, 62, 91, 118, 137, 138, 145, 169, 199, 235, 245, 257, 261, 281, 

301, 317-319, 411

Argument ii, 8, 71, 101, 118, 133, 187, 243, 310, 311

Armed Forces 2, 21, 30, 32, 35, 40, 44, 49-56, 82, 97, 102, 113, 151, 158, 

160, 163, 175, 178, 211-213, 217, 218, 220, 221, 229, 238, 239, 

255, 261, 270, 271, 282, 283, 288, 290, 291, 326, 328-330, 333-

336

Army intelligence 31, 289, 327

Assassination 27, 86-88, 96, 184

Assessments 2, 10-13, 15, 23, 57, 88, 138, 165, 166, 173, 174, 179, 183, 

191, 195, 275, 277, 296, 302, 317, 336, 361, 374, 391, 407

Assets 170-172, 179, 192, 311, 385, 394
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

503

Attack 5, 15, 22, 71, 83, 85, 97, 120, 164, 170, 192, 234, 240, 242, 252, 

269, 301, 318, 353, 355-360, 366, 368, 414

Auditor 44, 59, 64, 312

Authoritarian 4, 5, 16, 34, 37, 57, 58, 60, 68, 76, 83, 95, 105, 136, 155, 

176, 220, 271

Autonomy ii, 4, 7, 8, 9, 29, 39, 45, 61, 89, 99, 133, 134, 142, 146, 257, 273, 

291, 297, 300, 302-304, 311, 398, 404, 405, 407, 410-412

Awareness 5, 232, 234, 302, 319, 363, 364, 377, 379, 382, 383, 385, 387-

391, 393, 398

Baseline 132, 301, 400, 405

Battle 111, 112, 122, 215, 217, 274

Behavior 7, 59, 62, 66, 83, 84, 90, 92, 94, 95, 100, 101, 112, 116, 119, 120, 

168, 173, 177, 188, 220, 257, 258, 273, 285, 293, 300, 301, 303-

305, 359, 377, 380, 383, 385, 389, 397, 406, 410

Bilateral 24, 151, 152, 185, 229, 298, 395

Blackmail 4, 87, 94

BND (Foreign Intelligence Agency, Germany) 89, 90

Bogota v, 188, 196, 332

Bolivarian 44, 56, 155, 172, 175, 188, 335, 336

Bolivia 29, 44, 90, 158, 159, 236, 238, 239, 291, 292, 327, 328, 332, 343

Bomb 105, 112-116, 121, 162

Border 162-164, 170, 176, 211, 217, 229, 270, 304

Brazil

and cyberspace security 318, 353, 356

and Haiti 5 

Intelligence organizations 2, 18, 48, 59, 70, 73, 78, 95, 149, 155, 

 160, 236, 254, 255, 261, 263-289, 328, 343, 364-

 366

Intelligence-related legislation 41, 69, 73-75, 77, 255, 269, 289, 

 291, 292
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

504

Public security 48, 95, 254-256, 263-278

Bribery 34, 87

Briefing (see Intelligence)

Brigade 158, 216, 217, 397, 398

British 94, 96, 232, 359, 374

Budget (see Intelligence)

Business 19, 58, 62, 90, 150, 155, 164, 166, 171-173, 176-178, 180, 183, 

188, 191-193, 195, 285, 288, 318, 362, 374

Cabinet 2, 48, 66, 68, 70, 266, 267, 289, 324, 364, 365

CAEN (Superior National Studies Center, Peru) 47, 333, 334, 343

CALEN (Superior National Studies Center, Uruguay) 335

Canada 27, 48, 49, 67, 74-76, 80, 86, 90, 91, 94, 160, 252, 253, 285, 299

Candidate 68, 76, 152, 162, 224, 322, 336, 339

Capabilities 11, 13, 14, 16, 20-22, 81, 126, 127, 132, 134, 135, 138, 141-

144, 149, 158, 161, 163, 173, 174, 177, 184, 187, 195, 202, 211, 

214, 216-218, 221, 227, 232, 235, 243, 244, 246, 255, 261, 269, 

271, 282, 283, 286, 291, 295, 296, 298, 308, 321, 324, 340, 345, 

350, 358, 371, 372, 375, 385, 402, 406, 409, 413, 414

Capillarity 273, 275

Capture 34, 119, 125, 126, 149, 159, 160, 163, 305, 319, 339, 378, 383, 

386, 392, 393, 396, 398, 401

Carabineros 238, 256

Career (see Intelligence)

Caribbean 152, 156, 164, 165, 237, 240, 246

Cartels 159, 164, 211, 217, 218

Castro, Fidel 31, 87

CCAI (Joint Committee on Oversight, Congress of Brazil) 78, 79

Centralization (see Intelligence)

CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) 357, 362-366, 368
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

505

Chavez, Hugo 44, 172, 175, 176, 181, 183, 185, 188, 

CHDS (Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, U.S.) 46, 102

Chile 41, 49, 80, 88, 95, 98, 99, 102, 106, 115, 122, 123, 128, 140, 148, 

151, 158, 164, 196, 237, 238, 248, 253, 255, 256, 261, 262, 288, 

292, 296, 328, 329, 332, 343

China 3, 349, 358, 359

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.) 4, 12, 54, 64, 81, 83, 87, 298, 299, 

334, 360, 373 

CICAD (Inter-American Commission for the Control of Drug Abuse) 231, 

232

Circulation 19, 159, 273, 274

CISEN (National Center for Research and Security, Mexico) 41, 55, 331, 

332

Citizensiii, 3-5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16-20, 22, 42, 44, 52, 57-61, 65, 66, 75, 77, 

81, 92, 95, 97, 102, 103, 108, 112, 115, 118, 125, 151, 152, 155, 

158, 160, 173, 177, 185, 194, 197, 210, 213, 214, 217-220, 222, 

236, 246, 257, 261, 263, 284-287, 299, 300, 310, 311, 313, 317, 

332, 353, 362, 367, 375, 379, 395, 410, 412

Civilian (see Intelligence)

Civic 61, 151, 214, 216, 304

CLACIP (Latin American and Caribbean Community of Police Intelligence) 

152, 237, 238, 240, 246

Clandestine 11, 38, 87, 95, 171, 172, 217, 369

Classification (see Intelligence) 

Classified ii, 5, 22, 36, 38, 39, 69, 70, 74, 125, 269, 274-276, 332, 355, 358, 

367, 369, 371, 373, 374, 413

Clientelism 94, 95

CNI (National Intelligence Center, Peru, Spain) 34, 36, 41, 47, 93 

Coalitions 3, 95, 304, 387

Cocaine 158, 173, 176
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

506

COCODES (Community Development Councils, Guatemala) 219

Cognitive iii, 166, 220, 325, 400

Collaboration (see Intelligence)

Collection (see Intelligence)

Colombia

Criminal groups 159, 176

Economic intelligence 138, 149, 150, 169-195

FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 97, 158-160, 

 162, 178, 183

Intelligence laws 29, 42, 43

Intelligence organizations 43, 49, 50

Combat 16, 31, 50, 85, 100, 118, 148, 156, 160, 162, 164, 172, 193, 227, 

232, 238, 270

Command 9, 33, 47, 48, 50, 81, 90, 92, 121, 162-164, 198, 199, 202, 216-

218, 220, 223, 238, 246, 290, 308, 328, 339, 360, 363, 365, 377, 

380, 384, 393, 395-399, 401, 402, 404, 406

Commerce 159, 169, 176, 183, 189-195, 217, 362

Commercial 21, 177, 180, 183, 184, 190, 289, 362

Commissions, legislative 43, 45, 69, 70, 94, 96, 97, 163, 212, 224, 292

Commissioners 18, 32, 96

Communications (see Intelligence)

Communism 30, 131, 215, 231

Community (see Intelligence)

Company 73, 171, 175, 178, 353, 358-360, 362, 365

Competence 61, 211, 261, 265, 281

Competition 6, 99, 174, 195, 208, 209, 226, 275, 392

Complexity 31, 116, 145, 157, 163, 264, 341, 414

Compliance 9, 20, 43, 54, 59, 60, 68, 74, 76, 85, 90, 98, 103, 221, 257, 

303, 345
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

507

Comprehension 345, 348, 388-393, 413

Comprehensive 5, 14, 180, 193, 204, 205, 209, 253, 254, 276, 287, 383, 

385, 388, 396, 398, 401

COMUDES (Municipal Development Councils, Guatemala) 219

Confidence 11, 61, 94, 143, 146, 162, 165, 177, 180, 184, 185, 214, 231, 

232, 237, 244, 247, 265, 273, 275, 276, 307, 371, 391

Confidentiality 20, 69, 108, 166, 172, 180, 378

Conflict 28, 31, 48, 51, 89, 103, 107, 110-112, 134, 138, 141, 157, 161, 

165, 167, 170, 201, 215, 216, 220, 222, 231, 232, 240, 242, 244, 

248, 251, 270, 282, 286, 322, 323, 360, 361, 380, 381, 398

CONPES (National Social and Economic Policy Council, Colombia) 193

Consequences 15, 92, 120, 163, 213, 257, 309, 384, 388, 390, 393, 394, 

404, 412, 414

Constitutional 1, 32, 36, 44, 52, 55, 59, 60, 71, 73, 75, 92, 106, 107, 254

Consultant 78, 123, 140, 153, 170, 177, 190, 202, 224, 279, 313

Consumers 61, 139, 141-144, 199, 320

Contingency 74, 167, 390, 392

Continuity 32, 135, 151, 306, 396, 399-401

Contraband 3, 159, 164, 176, 217, 375

Contract Services 29, 40, 76, 204, 205, 209, 298, 358, 367, 368, 385, 395

Conventions (human rights) 6, 20, 85, 301

Cooperation (see Intelligence)

Coordination (see Intelligence)

Corruption 16, 18, 94, 95, 109, 191, 211, 236, 244, 291, 310

Counterintelligence

Capabilities 46, 49, 96, 138, 161, 170, 171, 180, 181, 184, 254,

 267, 269, 323, 329, 331

Components of 187, 191, 192, 362
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

508

Measures 56, 58, 121, 179, 186, 245, 251

Operations 28, 38, 42, 107, 111, 112, 113, 188, 189, 277, 290, 

 307, 335, 355, 356

Organizations 50, 193, 270, 290, 368

Counterparts (see Intelligence)

Counterterrorism 54, 105, 239, 303, 305

Coup 31, 32, 34, 148, 183, 184

Court 6, 38, 39, 42, 64, 80, 98, 155, 181, 252, 253, 283, 301, 305, 307, 

311, 368

Covert 11, 27, 38, 40, 43, 71, 81, 164, 299, 369

Credibility 6, 174, 214, 227, 302

Crime 5, 13, 14, 17, 19, 45, 96-101, 109, 110, 115, 126, 128, 138, 139, 

157, 158, 160, 164-167, 171, 178, 179, 192, 193, 211, 213, 214, 

218, 219, 226, 229, 233, 236, 238-240, 242, 244, 247, 255-258, 

265, 269-272, 274-276, 282, 283, 286, 289, 293, 296, 309, 318, 

323, 332

Criminal intelligence

Agencies 48, 49, 254, 256, 267

Cooperation 152, 237, 239, 240, 242, 257, 258

Database 17, 18, 165, 229, 256, 268, 309

Investigation 79, 90, 108, 110, 115, 243, 253, 255, 269, 296

Prosecution 166, 176, 247, 264, 275

vs. Police Intelligence 6, 241, 255, 276, 288

Criminality 6, 16, 18, 165, 166

Crisis 95, 98, 121, 183, 234, 242, 247, 282

CSI (Senior Intelligence Council, Peru) 34

CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) 372

CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) 48, 74-76

Cuba 31, 87, 156, 184, 185
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

509

Customers 183, 198, 199-201, 360, 370, 374, 394

Customs (trade) 140, 152, 190, 191, 193, 239, 333

Cybercrime 3, 233, 318, 355, 358, 359, 363

Cyberspace intelligence 318, 320, 353-376, 414

DAS (Administrative Department of Security, Colombia) 31, 95, 96, 156, 

161, 181, 193

Databases (see Intelligence)

Debate ii, 11, 13, 27, 40, 41, 45, 54, 64, 73, 75, 79, 81, 93, 125, 137, 140, 

147, 149, 194, 234, 242, 257, 258, 264, 266, 268, 273, 281, 291, 

292, 334, 361, 374, 412-414

Deception 86, 187

Democratization 93, 147, 155, 282, 341, 409

Depose (witness) 109, 111

Detect 21, 98, 115, 160, 172, 192, 216, 242, 278, 291, 294, 295, 365

Detention 83, 96, 110, 111, 113, 114, 305

DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S.) 54

DIDEP (Plurinational Intelligence Directorate, Bolivia) 44, 291, 292

DIGICI (General Directorate for Civilian Intelligence, Guatemala) 41, 52, 

289

DIGIMIN (General Director of Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior, 

Peru) 53, 289

DINACIE (National Directorate for State Intelligence, Uruguay) 161

DINI (National Intelligence Directorate, Peru) 27, 38, 39, 45

DINIE (National Strategic Intelligence Directorate, Peru) 36

Diplomacy 101, 175, 379

Diplomado 325, 327, 328-331, 333, 338, 341

Discipline (of intelligence collection) 16, 298

Disinformation 187, 324
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

510

DISIP (National Directorate of Intelligence and Preventive Services, 

Venezuela) 31, 44, 181

Dissemination (see Intelligence)

Dissidents 104, 184

Distortions 163, 166

Distrust 18, 121, 195, 300, 310

DNI (National Intelligence Directorate, various countries) 43, 96, 161, 363

DNII (National Information and Intelligence Directorate, Uruguay) 161

DNISP (Brazilian Public Security Intelligence Doctrine) 268

Doctrinal 94, 115, 141, 215, 254, 255, 263, 266, 388, 392

Doctrine 115, 151, 168, 179, 214-216, 220, 221, 255, 263, 267, 268, 269, 

270, 271, 274-276, 278, 341, 381, 388

Domestic 2, 19, 57, 67, 79, 107, 127, 148, 197, 198, 251, 252, 254, 263, 

264, 269, 297, 300, 302, 303, 305, 318, 320, 367, 368, 387, 392

Drugs 3, 18, 37, 39, 41, 47, 54, 125, 158, 159, 164, 169, 170, 171-177, 

211, 214, 217, 231, 236, 267, 279, 294, 299, 304, 332

Economics 57, 152, 171, 173, 174, 179, 193

Economist 167-170, 173, 174, 176, 180, 193

Ecuador 2, 29, 43, 47, 51, 52, 80, 95, 97, 98, 107, 158, 159, 162, 163, 172, 

183, 184, 237-39, 289, 292, 330, 332, 340, 343

Education in intelligence 20, 21, 24, 155, 174, 245, 247, 293, 317, 318, 

319, 321-357, 413

Efficacy 6, 39, 43, 56, 73, 86, 139, 140, 157, 251, 258, 263, 277, 278, 326

Efficiency 5, 8, 43, 56, 73, 89, 94, 101, 117, 140 151, 186, 198-210, 213, 

226, 264, 274, 277, 310, 326, 337, 410

Egmont Group 13, 192

Empirical 27, 127, 175, 261, 269, 286, 322

Encryption 233

Endogroup 116-118
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

511

Enforcement 17, 54, 66, 75, 77, 85, 108, 110, 239, 264, 267, 301, 

305, 317, 318, 353-355, 357, 359-361, 363-365, 367, 368, 

371, 375

ENI (National Intelligence School, Argentina) 327, 343

Entrepreneurs 9, 188

Equipment 126, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211, 217, 267, 294, 309

ESG (Advanced War School, various countries) 342, 343

ESICI (School of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Colombia) 329, 330, 

343

ESINT (National Intelligence School, Brazil) 78, 328, 343

ESISEN (Intelligence School for National Security, Mexico) 331, 332, 343

ESMADE (General Staff of the Defense Ministry, Uruguay) 160, 161

Espionage 35, 87, 95, 99, 127, 150, 156, 161, 171, 173, 180, 185-187, 194, 

233, 271, 353, 355-358

Estimates 49, 159, 167, 190, 358

Ethics (see Intelligence)

Ethos 27, 93, 94, 98, 100, 102, 308, 311

EU (European Union) 94, 139, 152, 231-233, 246

Europe 5, 27, 33, 34, 37, 57, 67, 83, 90, 93, 94, 100, 103, 139, 152, 155, 

160, 171, 225-247, 256, 282, 413

EUROPOL (European Police Office)

Evaluation (see Intelligence)

Evidence 8, 9, 12, 19, 34, 42, 81, 99, 110, 120, 158, 179, 181, 188, 202, 

235, 266, 269-272, 303, 307, 311, 368

Evolution 27, 29, 31, 32, 41, 45, 99, 132, 138, 145, 158, 165, 175, 178, 

271, 302, 304, 311, 381, 387, 407

Exchange (of information) 4, 8, 15, 67, 70, 109, 135, 154, 164, 165, 181, 

183, 184, 191-193, 226, 228, 230, 232, 236-238, 240-242, 245, 

247, 255, 257, 272-274, 276, 278, 288, 290, 294, 298, 300, 305, 

317, 354, 366, 371, 372, 398, 399, 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

512

Executive (see Oversight)

Exogroup 116, 117

Expertise 10, 24, 63, 101, 204, 276, 298, 321, 322, 325, 330, 332, 341, 398, 

406, 409

Exploitation 14, 22, 144, 166, 218, 254, 256, 355

Extortion 99, 159, 185, 291, 358

Facebook 22, 374

Facilities (see Intelligence)

Factions 95, 381, 392, 401, 402

Failure (see Intelligence)

Family 96, 108, 119, 254, 384

FARC (see Colombia) 

FASP (Public Security Assistance Fund, Mexico) 309 

Favoritism 116, 371, 374

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.) 19, 105, 106, 112, 113, 115, 

118, 121, 355, 360, 363, 365

Finance 2, 18, 169, 171, 172, 180, 183, 188, 191, 210, 211, 364

Financial (see Intelligence)

Fiscal 206, 208, 209, 211

FLACSO (Latin American Social Sciences Institute) 47 

Foreign (see Intelligence)

Foundational 18, 135, 236, 260, 388, 397, 406

France 67, 86, 111, 160, 234, 235, 332

Frontier 164, 176, 304, 305

Fujimori, Alberto 4, 33-35, 40, 44

Funding 40, 197, 200, 202-210, 305, 392

GAFISUD (South American Financial Action Group) 238

Gendarmería 16, 288
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

513

Gendarmerie 256

Geography 19, 167, 312 

Geopolitical 148, 342

German 28, 33, 37, 66, 67, 74, 77, 89-91, 102, 104, 108, 122, 235, 332

Global 1-3, 10, 13, 53, 83, 85, 131, 132, 140, 145, 148, 151, 152, 157, 163, 

165, 169, 176, 186, 233, 244, 342, 354, 358, 359, 380, 409, 414

Google 22, 374

Governability 55, 131, 264, 279, 283, 286

Governance 65, 125, 146, 167, 277, 279, 283, 380, 401

Guatemala 20, 41, 52, 80, 139, 151, 212-221, 223, 224, 238, 253, 255, 289, 

292, 330, 343

Guerrilla 31, 96, 97, 162, 184

Hackers 359

Hacktivists 359

Hemisphere iii, 4, 19, 102, 125, 284, 333, 409, 410, 414

Holistic 221, 223, 282, 284, 317

Homeland 14, 54, 224, 362, 374

Homogeneity 232

Honduras 52, 80, 291, 342

Honor 96, 103, 111, 115, 120, 251, 252

Hostility 58, 88, 115, 187, 191, 201, 356, 359-361, 365, 372, 373, 375

HUMINT (Human-Source Intelligence) 46, 162, 165, 166, 298

IAEE (Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies, Paraguay) 160, 333, 343

ICCPR (International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights) 111, 112

Ideal 8, 20, 67, 73, 88, 140, 174, 203, 264, 274, 304, 311, 322, 341, 361, 

391, 400

Identification 117, 134, 185, 246, 256, 375, 393, 401
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

514

Identify iii, 1, 3, 13, 18, 22, 23, 30, 62, 65, 84, 94, 101, 109, 131, 135, 139, 

148, 150, 157, 177, 190, 199, 200, 208, 220, 225, 228, 231, 232, 

238, 241, 265-267, 271, 287, 296, 306, 321, 337, 349, 356, 375, 

384, 388, 389, 391-393, 400, 401

Ideological 104, 131, 133, 169, 175, 184, 215, 219, 271, 298, 303, 305, 

306, 372

IIFA (Armed Forces Intelligence Institute, Argentina) 343 

Illegal 5, 9, 62, 64, 87, 89, 90, 95, 110, 112, 113, 118, 121, 158-160, 164, 

170, 171, 176, 178, 179, 190-193, 217, 222, 233, 251, 271, 303, 

359, 375

Image 16, 34, 101, 102, 125, 155, 162, 179, 210, 219, 227, 245, 359, 413

Immigration 161, 185

Implementation 1, 7, 22, 24, 36, 37, 60, 70, 74, 77, 100, 110, 138, 172, 

180, 205, 208, 209, 218, 221, 239, 241, 243, 263, 264, 268, 336

Inappropriate 68, 96, 165, 201, 255, 271, 272, 392

Incarceration 281-284, 295

Indicators 1, 286, 336

Industrialists 177, 181, 188

Industry 13, 28, 104, 181, 190, 191, 221, 232, 354, 362, 367

Inertia 77, 127, 342

Infiltrators 109, 111

Influence 3, 4, 13, 18, 20-22, 31, 32, 37, 48, 74, 88, 101, 110, 119, 131, 

133, 136, 137, 142, 149, 152, 157, 171, 174, 179, 188, 215, 219, 

221, 258, 270, 271, 273, 324, 337, 340, 372, 373, 375, 379, 383, 

389, 390, 396, 401, 409

Informal 1,15,135, 222, 225, 228, 237, 239, 244-247, 267, 272, 273, 275, 

276, 278, 287, 293, 297, 298, 365, 377, 385, 401

Information handling (see Intelligence)

Infrastructure 169, 191, 192, 242, 276, 283, 293, 323, 354, 358, 361, 362, 

365, 366, 372
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

515

Initiatives 5, 18, 20, 35-37, 45, 64, 126, 148, 163, 164, 171, 193, 214, 231, 

232, 238, 247, 262, 268, 270, 294, 306, 307, 319, 341, 396, 401, 

402, 404, 405

Intelligence

Accountability

across intelligence agencies 245, 301, 312

and intelligence laws 5, 32, 37, 43, 413

Concept in English 59, 102

Concept in Portuguese 59, 66

Definition 59, 60, 67, 73, 74, 197, 306

within intelligence agencies 8, 9, 83, 92, 297, 301, 303, 

 304, 307

Accuracy 193, 305, 346

Agent 17, 58, 60, 83, 86, 87, 90, 91, 106, 107, 109-113, 117, 

 162, 176, 180, 181, 187, 194, 227, 229, 245, 253, 

 269, 302, 309, 323

Analysis

centers 192, 228, 233, 234, 256, 262

in senior decision making 135, 136, 147, 184, 286

of economic phenomena 190, 192, 193, 198, 

of selected films 19, 28, 103-121

of police information 5, 229, 230, 241, 309

of sociopolitical information 3, 319, 377-407

OSINT 166 

teaching of 322, 325, 326, 331, 336

techniques of 13, 241, 247

Analysts of 2, 8, 14, 82-88, 92, 136, 173, 174, 193, 195, 256, 267, 

 272, 286, 323, 324, 335, 376, 381, 384, 391-394, 403, 

 405, 406, 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

516

Briefing 13, 207

Budget 36, 42, 63, 73, 74, 102, 126, 138, 143, 150, 151, 197-210, 

 215, 270, 273, 294, 311, 312, 341, 411

Bureaucracy 66, 135, 136, 140, 171, 202, 261, 325, 340, 373,

 378

Capability 11, 19, 127, 142, 149, 152, 157, 160, 162, 170, 172, 

 201, 205, 212, 217, 220, 226, 232, 236, 243, 269, 282,

 295, 311, 341, 396, 401, 402, 405, 407

Career 23, 96, 100, 105, 125-127, 141, 155, 317, 322, 330, 339, 

 340, 381, 392, 399, 407

Centralization 29, 44, 163, 192, 291, 294

Civilian role 1, 4, 9, 11, 21, 29, 30, 41, 44, 52, 55, 56, 74, 96, 134, 

 135, 148, 155, 161, 171, 193, 204, 253-255, 262, 266, 

 272, 277, 289-291, 299, 303, 304, 307, 331, 333, 335, 

 343, 365, 378

Classification ii, 5, 20, 36, 38, 39, 69, 70, 74, 125, 269, 274-276, 

 332, 355, 358, 367, 369, 371, 373, 374, 413

Collaboration 8, 14, 20, 23, 139, 149, 163, 193, 219, 232, 237, 

 257, 292, 294, 295, 298, 317

Collection 16, 19, 20, 37, 43, 48, 49, 53, 55, 67, 68, 80, 91, 106, 

 107, 110, 149, 150, 156, 161, 170, 171, 174, 180, 181, 

 183, 187, 190, 195, 198, 205, 219, 223, 234, 252, 253,

 262, 269, 277, 287, 290, 293, 298, 300, 304, 307, 311, 

 324, 359, 361, 375, 394, 395, 403

Community 12-14, 16-21, 23, 54, 57, 61, 63-66, 73, 82, 83, 85, 

 87, 90, 93, 94, 104, 115, 22, 149, 157, 163, 165, 189, 192, 

 193, 197, 203, 210, 227, 236, 237, 246, 249, 251, 277-

 279, 285, 287, 290, 299, 301, 317, 327, 333-345, 361-

 365, 368-375, 395, 405, 406, 409, 412, 413

Cooperation

among intelligence agencies 163, 411-413

among police agencies 15, 237, 238, 240, 241, 273, 274
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

517

Factors limiting 139, 231, 232

for cyberspace security 353-376

Interagency 149, 275, 276, 290 

 International intelligence 15, 164-167, 257, 258, 397, 398

within UNASUR 139, 151, 152, 225-247

Coordination 34, 94, 133-135, 137, 149, 163, 164, 203, 214, 

 217, 221, 223, 226, 232, 241, 247, 257, 281, 288-292,

 295, 318, 353, 362-364, 378, 380, 413

Counterparts 4, 8, 15, 59, 61, 135, 164, 197, 209, 243, 245, 257, 

 293, 296, 308, 319, 347, 366, 377, 379, 381-384, 386-

 403

Culture iii, 8, 12, 60, 63, 65, 75, 133, 135, 136, 140, 141, 144, 

 153, 155, 174, 196, 202, 222, 266, 273-275, 278, 297, 

 317, 321, 323, 326, 329, 331, 332, 341, 349, 354, 356, 

 373, 385, 396, 398, 404, 409

Curriculum 160, 205, 248, 265, 323, 325, 329, 331, 335, 340, 

 376

Databases 17, 18, 165, 227, 241, 246, 247, 256, 268, 272, 274-

 276, 309, 310, 366-368, 383, 385

Dissemination 48, 67, 102, 144, 149, 150, 174, 195, 223, 274, 

 275, 336, 370

Ethics iii, 6, 7, 27, 28, 56, 60, 83-122, 232, 300, 302, 304, 397, 

 410, 411

Evaluation 49, 53, 149, 176, 178, 207, 213, 221, 266, 277, 287, 

 311, 322, 326, 329, 333, 336-339, 344-351, 382, 400, 

 405

Facilities 202, 204, 205, 209, 293, 295, 310

Failure 15, 21, 33, 85, 87, 92, 115, 134, 265, 272

Financial facets 2, 10, 13, 29, 39, 42, 44, 49, 50, 52, 64, 126, 139, 

 150, 155, 172, 178, 180, 181, 190-192, 202, 206, 217,

 219, 236-238, 268, 283, 290, 303, 309, 326, 358, 362, 

 377, 411
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

518

Foreign oriented 6, 10, 13, 15, 21, 43, 47, 49, 53, 67, 70, 74, 79, 

 81, 88, 89, 96, 98, 112, 170, 173, 226, 235, 252, 254, 266, 

 271, 298, 303, 304, 353, 363, 364, 375, 379 

Information handling 22, 24, 132, 263, 354, 361, 395

Independence 8, 15, 37, 39, 52, 61, 63, 71, 72, 74-77, 80, 82, 91,

 102, 105, 140, 151, 180, 183

Institutionalization 30, 115, 240, 243, 244, 266, 268, 332

Integration 14, 20, 23, 24, 133, 137, 233, 234, 236, 241, 263-

 279, 293-295, 304, 308, 315, 317, 318, 363, 409, 413, 

 414

Investigation 43, 79, 106, 107, 109, 110, 126, 174, 177, 214, 230, 

 234, 253, 267, 269, 271, 272, 286, 294, 296, 301, 309, 

 355

Leadership 5, 35, 40, 43, 46, 56, 101, 133, 137, 168, 175, 177, 

 201, 202, 247, 282, 285, 375, 382, 384, 385, 390, 396, 

 400, 401, 409

Legislation 31, 36, 37, 40, 41, 45, 69, 73-75, 77, 101, 102, 133,

 252, 255, 257, 269, 287, 291, 292, 317, 413

Legitimacy 27, 34, 95, 102, 107, 131, 135, 193, 214, 251, 263, 

 264, 269, 379, 410, 413, 414

Liaison 193, 230, 234, 238, 245, 303, 377

Limitations 60, 162, 225, 228, 231, 243, 245, 247, 252, 261, 340, 

 346, 349, 388, 394, 414

Management

Echelons of v, 4-24, 142, 150, 197, 290, 378, 383, 395, 

 409

of cyberspace 318, 353-376, 414

Responsibility for 3, 5, 8, 32, 33, 115, 121, 127, 137, 172, 

 413

Strategy 4, 6, 59, 132, 137, 145, 228, 242, 264, 272, 378, 

 386, 403-406
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

519

Methods 3, 14, 28, 32, 89, 97, 100, 106, 121, 135, 136, 166, 171, 

173, 180, 183, 187, 194, 220, 230, 255, 269, 272, 285,

300, 301, 303, 305, 308, 324, 327, 328, 338, 339, 369,

370, 397, 410

Modernization 30, 45, 160, 213, 294

Monitoring 20, 108, 173, 185, 189, 192, 195, 224, 232, 252, 265, 

 286, 287, 294, 312, 363, 364

Multilateral orientation 5, 24, 53, 99, 152, 164, 165, 226-233, 

 238, 239, 242, 245-247, 285, 298, 371, 374, 380, 395, 

 406, 412, 414

Non-Governmental 11, 271

Operations

and Integration 23

of law enforcement 19, 265, 267, 269, 272, 282, 291, 295, 

 296

in Peru 37-40, 42, 43, 45

Oversight of 55, 58, 61, 65, 67, 71, 87, 88, 102, 126, 198, 

 299

Oversight (see Oversight)

Personnel 

Professionalism of 60, 62, 86, 100-102, 135, 223

Preparation of 184, 192, 265, 287, 293, 295, 296, 323-351, 

 398

Selection of 100, 135, 398

Practices iii, 8, 9, 15, 40, 58, 63, 67, 70, 71, 75, 83, 89, 94, 121, 

 134, 135, 138, 150, 177, 178, 187, 193, 197, 230, 232,

 235, 251, 257, 258, 262, 294, 297, 300-302, 305, 311, 

312, 326, 338, 354, 371, 372, 375, 397, 410, 413

Professionalism iii, 4, 19, 83, 121, 126, 138, 195, 245, 296, 297, 

 340, 381, 391
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

520

Reform 5, 8, 17, 33, 36, 45, 54, 77, 81, 83, 87, 93-96, 102, 163, 

 263-278

Requirements 38, 84, 106, 155-168, 191, 197-210, 226, 253, 347,

 361, 373, 385, 387, 394-396, 411

Sources

Closed 10, 11, 162, 261, 303

Human 162, 167, 273

Open 166, 171, 173, 180, 272, 318, 322

Protection of 97, 183, 269, 300, 301, 305, 369, 370, 410

Success iii, 5, 29, 33-35, 45, 64, 69, 77, 92, 110, 126, 135, 137, 

 146, 150, 151, 175, 198, 200, 204, 210, 215, 221, 222, 

 231, 232, 244, 255, 263, 265, 272, 301, 307, 311, 318,

 319, 322, 328, 378, 379, 382, 387, 396, 399, 400, 402, 

 404, 407

Targets 8, 18, 61, 89, 108, 110, 127, 156, 167, 172, 180, 187,

 197, 229, 277, 300, 306

Theory 150, 169, 171, 174, 180, 225, 341

Understanding 3, 14, 21, 39, 40, 116, 131, 135, 141, 146, 148, 

 162, 177, 179 180, 193, 212, 215, 216, 219, 221, 222, 225, 228 

 232, 258, 275, 296, 297, 319, 324, 334, 356, 357, 361, 

 362, 377-407

Inmates 282, 285-287, 293, 294

Innovation 16, 24, 44, 75, 165, 194, 255, 262, 317, 320, 414

Insecurity 18, 157, 178, 296, 310

Insights v, 121, 156, 258, 285, 297, 304, 319, 339, 378, 379, 382-386, 388, 

390-393, 396, 398-401, 403, 406

Inspector General 43, 44, 59, 60, 71, 76, 91

Institutionalization (see Intelligence)

Instrument 3, 10, 33, 70, 73, 94, 155, 230, 272, 308, 324, 338, 397, 399, 

400
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

521

IntCen (Intelligence Center, European Union) 233, 234, 242

Integration (see Intelligence)

Integrity 8, 9, 19, 21, 22, 46, 55, 96, 97, 110, 112, 213, 270, 291, 302

Intellectual 13, 98, 170, 319, 320, 324, 329, 342, 346, 355, 361, 362, 376, 

377-379, 383-387, 389, 394, 396, 401-404, 406

Intentions 11, 87, 102, 170, 172, 175, 177, 187, 219, 372

Interagency 134, 137, 149, 163, 165-167, 226, 413

Intercept 6, 22, 90, 91, 93, 95, 106, 108, 155, 156, 233, 252, 253, 261, 277, 

300, 311

Interior intelligence concerns 33, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 56, 136, 152, 161, 163, 

229, 239, 255, 256, 289, 333, 335, 384

Intermestic 318, 414

International

Counterparts 4, 8, 377-407

Human rights 3, 92, 96, 107

Institutions 100, 152, 332

Intelligence collaboration and cooperation 5, 6, 8, 16, 17, 70, 227, 

 243, 244, 257, 297-312, 371, 372, 411 

Law and intelligence 19, 24, 27, 86, 110, 111, 237, 258, 297, 298, 

 368

Norms for intelligence 6, 7, 68, 70, 74, 98, 99, 107, 108, 110, 

 112-114, 236

Perception of intelligence legitimacy 8, 70, 135, 413 

Security 3, 70, 163, 165, 228

Terrorism 165, 226 

Internet 69, 145, 261, 354, 357, 358, 362, 364, 366, 367

INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization) 237, 238, 332

Interrogation 111, 115, 187, 308, 347

Intrusion 16, 38, 39, 44, 58, 71, 89, 107, 108, 111, 156, 252, 253, 272
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

522

Investigation (see Intelligence) 

Investment 18, 177, 178, 189, 190, 222, 268, 406

Iraq 2, 83, 85, 88, 227, 308, 397, 407

ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 381, 394, 395, 407

Israel 10, 67, 86, 90, 342

Italy 122, 160, 235

Japan 160, 285

Joint(ness) 49, 50, 53, 56, 78, 82, 163, 164, 210, 231, 232, 234, 243, 247, 

264, 290, 294, 308, 317, 327, 336, 363, 388, 398

Journalists 11, 33, 36, 85, 90, 96, 100, 102

Judge 72, 79, 80, 85, 86, 91, 93, 96, 100, 110, 113, 121, 136, 156, 200, 238, 

251, 252, 305, 323

Judgment 8, 11-13, 17, 84, 111, 156, 187, 220, 322, 347, 368, 371, 388-

390, 393, 394, 400

Judicial (see Oversight)

Jurisdiction 68, 75, 76, 98, 253, 301, 371

Justice 19, 36-38, 56, 98, 109, 117, 152, 163, 214, 242, 256, 262, 264-266, 

268, 283, 284, 287, 289, 295, 305-307, 323, 335, 362, 364, 365, 

379

Juvenile 153

Kidnapping 97, 105, 158, 166, 309, 333

Korea 160, 242, 392

Leadership (see Intelligence)

Leaks 39, 64, 74, 125, 126, 359, 384, 394

Learning 144, 172, 214, 297, 317, 322, 326, 336, 342, 378, 385-387, 396, 

400, 403, 410

Legislation (see Intelligence)

Legislative (see Oversight)

Legislators 37, 62-64, 77, 101, 137
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

523

Legitimacy 27, 34, 95, 102, 107, 131, 135, 193, 214, 251, 263, 264, 269, 

379, 410, 413, 414

Liaison (See Intelligence) 

Limitations (See Intelligence)

Logic 6, 157, 175, 270, 274, 332, 355, 374, 388, 393

Logistics 165, 302

Lookouts 18, 107, 111, 306, 307

Loyalty 13, 116, 185, 322

LULZSEC (hacktivist group) 359, 360 

Management (see Intelligence)

Manpower 176, 202-208, 210

Marketing 204, 207

Materiel 216, 217

MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) 152, 231, 239, 246

Methods (see Intelligence)

Mexico 1, 14, 18-20, 31, 41, 55, 70, 80, 95, 107, 125, 128, 144, 165, 217, 

229, 261, 307, 309, 310, 312, 313, 331, 343

Military intelligence

Accountability 80-82 

As political police 4, 220

Characteristics 22, 80, 133, 229, 230, 236, 303, 368, 394 

Cooperation 234, 238, 240, 241, 246, 372 

Education 330, 335

Institutions 5, 20, 30, 31, 218, 254, 255, 258, 270

Naval 39, 148, 210, 262, 334 

Military Police 217, 229, 230, 237, 267, 308, 328 

Ministerial 2, 30, 72, 73, 290, 377-380, 382, 388, 389, 393-395, 397, 399

Mobility 211, 217, 304
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

524

Model 17, 23, 31, 33, 34, 44, 45, 65, 71, 76, 93, 94, 104, 133, 157, 161, 

167, 213, 214, 221-223, 235, 240-242, 246, 255, 256, 258, 265, 

304, 305, 308, 311, 336, 337, 375, 377, 397 

Modernization (see Intelligence)

Monitoring (See Intelligence)

Monopoly 22, 67, 287

Morality 84, 87, 119, 120

Multidimensional 103, 157, 282, 284, 285

Multilateral (See Intelligence) 

Multinational 13, 20, 164, 181, 228, 239, 353, 377, 378, 380, 394, 395, 

404, 406

Narcotrafficking 45, 97, 138, 151, 158, 159, 164, 166, 167, 217, 219, 226, 

229, 239, 306, 332

Native 311, 322

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 94, 152, 234, 299, 377, 378, 

380, 395, 402, 407

Navy (see Military Intelligence) 

Nazi 90

Neutralize 55, 148, 160, 172, 191, 266, 330

Nicaragua 81, 159, 253, 290

NSA (National Security Agency, U.S.) 54, 106, 303, 373 

OAS (Organization of American States) 100, 284, 332, 371

Obstacles (to intelligence process) 14, 20, 62, 132, 199, 225, 317-319, 353, 

377, 394, 395

OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 95, 

283 

Ombudsman 36, 71, 76

Operations (see Intelligence)

Operatives 306, 308
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

525

Operators 185, 276, 278

Oversight of intelligence

Definition 59, 60, 147 

Executive branch 4, 7

External 4, 6, 7, 29-46

Internal 3, 197-210, 297, 411 

Judicial branch 4, 7, 304-312

Legislative branch 4, 7, 73, 74, 86, 287, 410

of military intelligence 80-82

Principles of 65-69 

Public 4, 9, 125, 299 

Status of, by country 79-82

Panama 29, 42, 46, 56, 80, 159, 175

Pakistan 71, 385, 398, 407

Paradigm 16, 139, 144, 194, 211, 212, 217, 220 

Paraguay 56, 81, 148, 158, 160, 164, 176, 237-239, 333, 343

Paramilitary 17, 43, 87, 96, 308

Personnel (see Intelligence)

Peru 4, 5, 14, 27, 29-46, 53, 80, 95, 107, 158, 159, 164, 171, 218, 237-239, 

289, 332-334, 340, 343

Philosophy 34, 84, 86, 103, 319, 372

Piracy 3, 113, 233, 270

Plurinational 44, 291

Poland 94,95

Policialization 308

Policing 16-19, 270, 276, 304, 307

Political intelligence 72, 134, 136

Politicization 12, 72, 88, 89
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

526

Polygraph 303, 307

Portugal 5, 6, 59, 66, 67, 356

Practices (see Intelligence)

Prevention 2, 6, 14, 44, 54, 81, 128, 139, 151, 214, 217-219, 247, 256, 257, 

274, 275, 283, 284, 286, 333, 361

Principles

Constitutional 59

Democratic 36, 37, 42, 46, 64, 275

Ethical, in intelligence 57, 83-102

of human rights 57, 112, 115, 215-223, 281, 297 

of intelligence oversight 6, 43, 65-67, 290, 412

Priorities 87, 133, 139, 149, 184, 199, 263, 264, 284, 312

Prioritize 219, 271, 373

Prison intelligence 256, 257, 281-296

Prisoners 85, 256, 282, 286, 287, 293

Privacy 4, 7, 14, 22, 28, 80, 91, 95, 101, 104, 108, 111, 249, 251-253, 277, 

373-376, 409, 410, 412

Professionalism (see Intelligence)

Professionalization 42, 96, 135, 147, 279, 321, 322, 326, 382, 387, 391, 

401, 409

Proof 13, 108, 217, 269, 286, 338, 402

Proprietary 318, 353, 355, 372, 376 

Prosecutor 61, 67, 78, 79, 85, 256, 284, 305, 365

Punitive 3, 91, 282, 284, 303

Quality (of intelligence) 90, 131, 139, 145, 165-167, 194, 204, 276, 282, 

321, 322, 325-327, 329, 330, 333, 336-338, 340, 341, 345, 346, 

410

Radical 106, 142, 233, 271

RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) 75, 76 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

527

Reciprocal 217, 219, 238

Reciprocity 120, 273

Recruitment 135, 305, 322

Reform (see Intelligence)

Regulatory 37, 266, 362, 375

Religious 115, 271, 381, 382, 402

Repressive 76, 94, 147, 168, 172

Reputation 8, 190, 252, 302, 303

Requirements (see Intelligence)

Revanchist 69

Revenue 179, 190, 191

Revolutionary 31, 32, 158, 178, 271

RILO (Regional Intelligence Liaison Office) 193, 238, 239, 246

Rivals 64, 173, 174, 181, 184, 199, 234, 265, 273, 323

Rural 188, 191, 214, 221, 223

Safeguards 16, 36, 39, 46, 62, 68, 70-72, 74, 75, 85, 111, 183, 189, 234, 

294, 297, 340, 370

Sanctions 86, 93, 119, 178, 301, 303, 306, 307, 312

Santiago, Chile 102, 248, 259

Santos, Juan Manuel 96, 161 

Scenario 28, 77, 104, 105, 114, 115, 121, 131, 132, 134-136, 140, 146, 

150, 165-167, 169, 176, 211, 216, 242, 244, 247, 308, 309, 311, 

366-369, 371, 388

SEBIN (Bolivarian Intelligence Service, Venezuela) 44, 56, 155, 156, 335 

Secrecy 6, 11, 27, 30, 36, 43, 57, 58, 61, 64, 69, 73, 92, 95, 109, 141, 146, 

245, 269, 300, 318, 322, 410, 411

SENAIN (National Secretariat for Intelligence, Ecuador) 43, 98, 163, 330

SENASP (National Secretariat of Public Security, Brazil) 254 
Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane

528

Sendero Luminoso 32, 33, 158, 159

SERPRO (Federal Data Processing Service, Brazil) 364, 365 

Sharing (in intelligence) 6, 15, 16, 20, 139, 146, 234, 235, 238, 258, 259, 

261, 265, 273, 275, 278, 294, 295, 296-302, 311, 312, 318, 353, 

356, 360, 362, 365, 366, 369, 371-375, 395

SINA (National Intelligence System, Peru) 32, 37, 38, 45, 53 

SIRC (Security Intelligence Review Committee, Canada) 75, 76 

SISBIN (Brazilian Intelligence System) 2, 41, 254, 263, 328 

SISP (Public Security Intelligence Subsystem, Brazil) 254, 255, 263 

SITCEN (Situation Center, Europe) 233, 234

Skills 21, 40, 317, 322, 325, 397, 404

SNBAT (Socio-political Network and Behavioral Analysis Team) 377-407

SNI (National Information System, Brazil) 261, 279 

SNI (National Intelligence Service, various countries) 212, 289, 290 

Social Intelligence 20, 139, 151, 211-223

Sources (see Intelligence)

Sovereignty 55, 96, 103, 161, 284, 377, 378, 379, 403 

Spain 5, 41, 46, 47, 93, 118, 160, 230, 235, 248, 279, 332

Spy 1, 8, 18, 58, 89, 100, 306

STASI (Ministry for State Security, German Democratic Republic) 33, 37, 

104, 108 

State Police 309, 312, 365

Strategic Intelligence

Capability for 30, 37, 135, 142, 155-168

Definition of 2, 145, 146, 148, 149, 230, 285

Education for 126, 321-351

Personnel for 194, 195

Production of 132, 135, 137, 169-195
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

529

Subversive 98, 151

Success (see Intelligence)

Supervision 3, 8, 32, 36, 42, 43, 59, 82, 89, 91, 106, 221, 345

Supranational Intelligence 234, 235, 301

SURNET (South American Communications Network) 238, 241, 246 

Surveillance 6, 72, 79, 81, 90, 93, 107, 108, 111, 112, 187, 252, 333

Switzerland 47, 90, 332 

Tactics 37, 207, 368, 370

Taiwan 215, 342

Targets (see Intelligence) 

Techniques 108, 111, 195, 241, 247, 269, 275, 336, 338, 385, 398

Technology 145, 169, 174, 211, 215, 276, 294, 298, 311, 317, 334, 342, 

354, 355, 361, 407, 412, 413

Telecommunications 354, 362

Tension (management of) 4, 6, 9, 29, 45, 57, 58, 72, 85, 86, 95, 107, 111, 

112, 151, 226, 229, 233, 242, 272, 287, 293, 305, 306, 410, 412

Territorial 96, 157, 291, 299, 318

Theory (see Intelligence)

Torture 28, 83, 85, 90, 91, 97, 111-115, 117, 121, 257, 305

Tracking 8, 72, 166, 209

Trade (commerce) 49, 138, 160, 176, 177, 180, 183, 190, 191, 204, 304, 

34 

Traffickers 18, 125, 169, 212, 217, 219, 306

Transparency 8, 20, 36, 37, 42, 56-58, 64, 70, 73, 90, 94, 102, 146, 156, 

251, 300, 306, 307, 312, 341, 410

Trust 8-12, 17, 18, 20, 23, 76, 115, 117, 121, 125, 134, 136, 185, 195, 223, 

235, 245, 258, 265, 275, 276, 300, 310, 317-319, 371-376, 378, 

384, 396, 398, 403, 411

Truth 69, 87, 92, 97, 145, 186, 305
Typology 105

UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) 139, 151, 152, 225-247, 

258, 412

Unauthorized 9, 43, 125, 355, 357, 360, 366

Uncertainty 156, 157, 166, 318, 360

Unconventional 32, 157, 163

Undercover 1, 106, 109, 111, 162, 188, 253, 311

Understanding (see Intelligence)

Uruguay 29, 43, 54, 56, 81, 146, 148, 152, 153, 160, 161, 163, 164, 224, 

237-239, 292, 335, 343

Venezuela 29, 31, 44, 56, 81, 107, 155, 156, 158, 159, 172, 175-177, 181, 

183-185, 187, 188, 237, 239, 332, 335, 343

Violence 18, 19, 113-117, 120, 151, 157-159, 215, 219, 222, 283, 293, 294, 

305, 308

Vulnerabilities 183, 218, 226, 228, 235, 360, 411

Warning from Intelligence 170, 191, 195, 234, 366, 367

Weapon 54, 88, 89, 120, 126, 159, 175, 176, 181, 219, 227, 236, 357

Westphalian 157, 167

Wikileaks 359, 384, 394

Wisdom 297, 318, 397, 399

Workforce 9, 23, 208

Worldwide 3, 15, 145, 159, 160, 193, 226, 229, 236, 238, 239, 272, 298, 

304, 305, 358, 360